Proposition 54K2083

Projet de loi portant organisation de la profession et de la supervision publique des réviseurs d'entreprises.

General information ¶

Submitted by

MR Swedish coalition

Submission date

Oct. 12, 2016

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

EC Directive professional ethics professional society accountant accounting financial control credit institution judicial proceedings access to a profession company law auditing

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen CD&V Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP DéFI ∉ Open Vld N-VA LDD MR PVDA | PTB PP

Abstained from voting

VB

Contact form ¶

Do you have a question or request regarding this proposition? Select the most appropriate option for your request and I will get back to you shortly.

Discussion ¶

Dec. 21, 2016 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr Flahaux, the rapporteur, refers to his written report.

I will have the list of speakers in a few moments. The floor is yielded to Mr. Crusnière.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Mr. Colleagues, in the preamble, I find it appropriate to point out that the creation of files that contain millions of personal data of all travellers, without their consent, constitutes a serious infringement on the protection of privacy.

Contrary to what this government seems to believe, privacy isn’t a vague and misleading idea. This is a very precise legal concept, guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. As such, it has been widely developed by a constant and very recent case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, decisions that one cannot simply ignore.

However, let us also be honest, privacy protection is not an absolute right, it does not prevail of office over the right to security that the government claims to defend here.

To violate privacy, European judges have clearly reminded in recent years that strict conditions must be observed. It must be clearly framed by a law, it must be necessary and it must pursue a legitimate purpose. Therefore, there is proportionality and effectiveness to be demonstrated.

The least we can say is that the PNR bill we are discussing today absolutely does not meet these requirements.

First, I would like to address the question of the legitimacy and the legality of the measures. While the PNR Directive lists clearly and restrictively the serious offences allowing the use of personal data, the project goes much further. The government goes so far as to allow the use of this data to combat vaguely defined behaviors that do not even correspond to minor offenses. This derivative is dangerous not only because it is illegitimate but also because it makes law enforcement unpredictable for the citizen.

Then we need to consider the need for measures. We also have the right to ask ourselves the question. Is it really necessary to extend PNR to land and sea transport to combat terrorism? Does it make sense to be the only European country to extend PNR in this way?

The answer is negative. Both train and bus carriers and the European Commission have said that land-based PNR is useless and completely disproportionate because it will produce no results. It is also you, Mr. Minister, who demonstrates the best that the PNR for buses and trains is not so necessary – you mentioned it in a committee. In fact, you hesitate yourself to take execution stops for these modes of transport. You predicted it, you said, but the execution orders would eventually define the next.

Those who do not want to appear in the PNR databases will only have to take a last-minute ticket, book without giving their name, cross the border by bicycle or even travel with uncontrollable fake papers from unknown countries. Or, he will do as others did before him: he will rent a car and wander several times across Europe in all directions without ever appearing in a mega-database filled with personal information of citizens suspicious of nothing but suspicious after all.

You will have understood, dear colleagues, nothing makes it possible to think that extending the PNR to buses and trains will be of any use. This fact was deliberately ignored by the government. Both at the government level and at the parliamentary level, the MR-N-VA majority has systematically refused to consult the sector. However, such a reform would have required a minimum of hearings. We have asked them, like other groups, several times in the committee. Even today, we receive emails from tourism and transport professionals who are concerned. In the north and south of the country, everyone is concerned about the economic impact of this legislation on the sector. Like us, they question the feasibility of such a reform that will affect, for the land sector, mainly small and medium-sized enterprises. Like the European Commission, we think it is absurd that Belgium alone imposes PNR on land transport. Furthermore, serious doubts can be raised as to the compatibility of these measures with the principle of free movement guaranteed within the Schengen area.

The late questionnaire, in the media, of some MPs of the majority – I regret that Mr. Yüksel is absent today – would make us laugh if it wasn’t sad. But in this case, why did he refuse the hearings and, even though I look forward to his late awareness, I regret that he did not support them.

Why have you stated in committee that the project was balanced and stated the opposite in the press, a few days later? Today, you will have an additional opportunity as we will re-depose our amendment that limits PNR to air transport and thus offer Mr. Yüksel the opportunity to catch up by voting.

Privacy is a right that allows everyone to live their lives as they desire. In other words, to live freely, freely. The power of the State can affect it only within a strict, necessary framework. However, here, the government’s project goes far beyond the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights. That is why we will vote without hesitation against this text, which has nothing to do with the directive, from which it draws only the name.

The content of my speech will be a little different. That may not be a surprise. I am also not surprised by the elements that colleague Crusnière recently raised, since it was actually the same argument as it was during the substantive discussion in the committee. I have not heard a lot of new elements here. You have already answered this very well, Mr. Minister.

Sometimes, by the way, some critical minds, who are not present here today, also notice that in the temporary committee “Terrorism Combating” too much is paralyzed and that no results are achieved. Over the past few months, in my opinion, the Terro Committee of colleague Metsu has already worked hard on a series of proposals and drafts, with the necessary favourable legislative results.

Today there is again a draft law that has been dealt with in a fruitful way — I dare to say that — in the committee, although there have been no hearings, but the views have been extremely well defended by the colleagues.

Mr. Minister, it is a positive bill, in which the federal government and now also the Parliament are the first to transpose the EU directive. It may also. The directive has been negotiated for years. The U.S. was, by the way, the first to start with it after 9/11, meanwhile fifteen years ago, but in Europe the spirits were only ripe after the deplorable attacks of Brussels and Paris. Therefore, the EU directive ⁇ does not come a minute too early. Our government had even announced in the counter-terrorism measures that it would start using PNR itself if an agreement could not be reached at EU level, but this is happily not to come.

The analysis of PNR data is an important additional tool in the fight against terrorism and serious crime. Personal data will be used for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorism and serious crime. Suspects of terrorist or serious crimes often use specific and variable modi operandi for their travel behavior. The PNR data, which must now be compulsory, contains those data. These data can be used to monitor the movements of such persons, as well as for the collection of evidence, for the detection of accomplices, for the establishment of any networks and for the discovery of certain modi operandi, new trends and phenomena.

This is not only important for the fight against terro, but it is also wider, in the fight against serious crimes.

Mr. Minister, an important role has been played in the implementation of this bill to the PIE, the Passenger Information Unit, which will manage the database.

Its concrete establishment will be regulated by royal decree and will operate interoperably. In addition, the PIE will be in contact with the PIEs of other EU Member States, as well as with Europol, Canada, the United States and Australia, which is essential in the fight against cross-border terrorism.

Colleagues, it has already been pointed out here by colleague Crusnière that it is important in the fight against terrorism to always make a good balance between the general interest – human lives, damage to third parties – and other interests.

By sharing that information, which is very well protected in terms of privacy, we get numerous advantages in the fight against terrorism. For us, there are sufficient safeguards built in terms of privacy.

Mr Buysrogge, you say and repeat that the PNR measure is necessary and effective. This was also the content of the words of the Minister of the Interior during the discussions in the committee.

I would like to ask you a simple question that all citizens should ask themselves. From the moment when a phenomenal measure is taken such as the collection of information about millions of passengers – this represents almost the Belgian population – in what specific case would PNR data have been useful in the terrorism cases we have unfortunately faced in recent years?

As far as I am concerned, I have looked at the question. I did not find. Since you say that this is very useful and absolutely necessary, could you give me an example where PNR data would have helped to either avoid or better understand a terrorist case that is dealing with us in Belgium or elsewhere in the world?

Mr Hellings, the importance and benefit of such PNR data should ⁇ not be underestimated. You are doing it quite coherently. With a positive hit in the database, for example, someone can be removed from the plane before the plane departs, and that does not seem to me to be irrelevant. Whether that one attack could have prevented, I will not speak here. It is important to have a well-functioning system for the future. We believe that the systems that are built in it will largely meet this desire.

Mr. Speaker, allow me to respond very specifically to Mr. Hellings’ question. He also asked this question at the committee meeting and I can refer to the report of the discussions at the committee meetings. On Times Square in New York, for example, a terrorist attack was prevented thanks to the PNR data. Mr. Hellings already knows this, since I have already answered this in the committee.

Indeed, this is the only time. I have asked you this question twice, in the first commission and in the second. In the first session, you did not answer. In the second commission, you answered that the federal police had met with the U.S. PNR team recently and that, during these exchanges, it ⁇ an investigation that could have been conducted thanks to the U.S. PNR in relation to an attack on Times Square. You did not specify when this person was arrested, why or how.

Je suis désolé mais on est en train de légiférer sur des millions de données de millions de passengers and Belgium on the basis of a phrase which contains six words and which is the saying: "oui, l'équipe PNR américaine a permis d'empêcher un attentat à Times Square". You find that it is particulièrement léger when it is in train, here, the légiférer sur la vie privée et sur la vie, tout court, de tous les passagers.

Finally, one important point that was also highlighted in the committee, in particular the consultation with the sectors. We have indeed received a letter from the tourism sector, from which we can deduce some nervousness in connection with this bill.

I believe that the sensitivities of the sectors, and of the tourism sector in particular, were extensively discussed in the committee. It is important to emphasize once again that this is a framework law. Therefore, it is precisely intended to then consult with the sectors in order to ensure that the royal decrees can be further concretized.

I think that we can — and I look you right in the eyes, Mr. Minister — that you have every interest in valuing those sectors. It is not our intention to destroy those sectors, be convinced of it.

Mr. Minister, I have a few very concrete questions on this subject. When will the consultation take place? When can we expect the royal decrees on the table? When will the draft law and the royal decrees be operational?

Mr. Minister, you can count on our support.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the bill that is presented to us today is the result of ten years of debate, ten years of intense discussions, especially at the European level, ten years that were needed to bring about this Passenger Name Record, the PNR.

We are in the presence of an important text. By adopting it, Belgium will transpose the EU directive adopted in April 2016 and will thus join other European countries that already have such a tool or are finalising it. I think of the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain. This project is part of the dynamics of this majority: to strengthen the tools available to our security or intelligence services, while ensuring the necessary and subtle balance between security and freedom.

The goal is triple. First, collect relevant information. Second, ensure that these are shared with the different competent departments. Third, limit these new devices with solid guarantees. This bill meets all of these expectations.

Intelligence and security services will therefore have access, in a range of ways, to information potentially relevant to their fight against terrorism, serious crime and illegal immigration. A first argument raised by the opponents of the PNR would be that it would serve nothing but “flipping” – I use the terms that have been used – Mr. and Mrs. everyone. It would be a massive collection of data as useless as intrusive for people who have nothing to blame. So the question is: is the PNR useless?

In the second reading of the bill, the Minister of the Interior gave an eloquent example that has just been mentioned. This is the example of Times Square. Similarly, the French Socialist Prime Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, at the time French Minister of the Interior – a socialist, dear colleagues, but ⁇ there are good and bad socialists – declared, on 20 November last, that the PNR would have been very useful to counter the projects of Mehdi Nemmouche, following his multiple displacements. Is the PNR sufficient for itself? No, of course !

This is an important tool, similar in this to the twenty other measures adopted so far by this majority. Combined with other tools, including more efficient and well-powered databases, PNR will provide our security and intelligence services with information that could help them confuse a suspected terrorist or an individual posing a threat to our security.

To whom will this new tool apply? It will apply to carriers and travel operators in the aviation sector, international high-speed trains, international rail transport, maritime transport, for example between Belgium and the United Kingdom, as well as to passengers whose data will be transmitted to the PNR Voyages database, within the Schengen area or from and to the Schengen area.

We know that terrorists do not travel only on flights outside Schengen. Like other types of criminals, they gladly use the gaps of this great space of freedom that we must preserve while continuing the necessary improvements.

Data protection shall be guaranteed and shall comply with the necessary proportionality criteria. The Passenger Information Unit, which will be empowered to handle the new PNR database, will include a senior official independent of the services. Similarly, a Data Protection Officer, independent of the senior official, will report to the Minister of the Interior and carry out a control mission.

Services will never have access to the database, except through precise and predetermined criteria or through a correlation with their own database.

When the result of the treatment is negative, for example following an individual re-examination, the result can be archived to avoid false positive matches.

The bill also guarantees a right of direct access and rectification to passengers. The Privacy Protection Commission welcomed the guarantees provided in the project. This seems to us extremely important. In its previous opinion, in addition, at the adoption of the April 2016 Directive, the Commission welcomed, in particular, the safeguards relating to the processing of passenger data in punctual searches, both for the judicial component involving the prior intervention of the King’s Prosecutor and, where appropriate, the investigative judge, and for the intelligence services – the Committee R being responsible for monitoring their activities.

As the Minister in commission recalled, other remarks from this instance have, meanwhile, been settled by the European Directive of April 2016. On some points, Belgium goes even further in terms of guarantees to passengers. In particular, it is planned that agreement protocols are concluded with each foreign UIP (Passenger Information Unit) that may use the data. In addition, they will have to provide in advance the guarantees of the correct use of the data transmitted.

Finally, I will conclude this non-exhaustive list of guarantees by reminding that the European Commission will organize – and we consider this extremely important – an evaluation within two years of the transposition of the PNR Directive. This approach will allow it to examine possible paths for improving national legislation.

Mr. Flahaux, since I see that you do not address the issue of rail transport, I wanted to ask you the following question. Regarding the extension of PNR to rail transport, do you rather share the opinion of the Minister of the Interior, who considers this measure necessary, or of Minister Bellot, who considers it a bad idea? Your heart balances between the two positions.

I doubted your question since we took the train together to go to parliament today. You see that the MR can travel with the PTB without any problem!

The cordon is political. He is not human! As you would always say, “Of course, no.” I would like to answer Mr. Van Hees because I do not believe that you are the wife of Mr. Van Hees. Not yet yet.

I would like to tell him that the Minister has agreed that there would be a consultation with the railway carriers of the neighboring countries of Belgium and that depending on this consultation, it would be notified as to whether or not this system will be implemented for the railway. As Belgium is a small country, although some would still want to reduce it, it is clear that there could only be real effectiveness of a rail PNR through coordination with neighboring countries. I see that the ministers accept.

Mr. Flahaux, it is fun to see your gestures around the expansion of the train. Why Why ? Because in the letter addressed to the Interior Minister, the three European Commissioners, one in charge of Mobility and Transport, the second in charge of Migration and Home Affairs and the third in charge of Security, say that the expansion to train, boat and bus could represent a significant cost – as a liberal, you may be sensitive to the issue of cost – and a service break. This is very serious, because the European Union means being able to move from one country to another, thanks to a high-speed train, for example. Those three commissioners, and not the least, therefore have doubts.

Finally, there is a difficulty in implementing the system. Why Why ? Because at the EU level, interior and transport ministers are currently considering the best ways to ensure safety in trains.

A series of initiatives other than PNR are taken to, for example, allow – this is in discussion – to systematically control in case of suspicious fact or in case of danger, certain people in certain stations, which is very different from controlling all people in all stations. This is exactly what PNR will do.

This system cannot be implemented. I do not know how many times in the history of this parliament, commissioners have interfered with a law in Belgium, by sending letters.

I think we are at the heart of the problem. I will return to this later in my speech. But expanding on the train is a false good idea. It is above all a dangerous and anti-economic idea, a criterion that I thought was important for you, liberals.

I would like to thank my colleague Mr. Hellings. We have already had the opportunity to discuss this in a radio debate at RTBF. But I think you probably did not understand my answer to Mr Van Hees, namely that there would be a consultation with the railway operators, in particular on the questions you raised. be calm .

I believe that in addition, the minister has undertaken to report on the outcome of these consultations before the royal decree enters into force. You will therefore still have the opportunity to return to these questions, which are legitimate questions, which we must be able to address, but which must not create an impossibility of finding solutions. What annoys us in your a priori, if I dare to say, is that on the basis of true questions, you seem to consider that, anyway, there is no way to implement it. We prefer to go deeper to see what is possible and what is not. This is another approach.

I would like to conclude this speech with a call to the opposition. I respect but regret the attitude of Ecolo-Groen and the PS, who voted against the draft in committee, although the PS approved the PNR at the level of the European Parliament. In doing so, they appear to us to enter into an ideological and dogmatic dynamic. More than ever, we need pragmatism and to find ourselves behind projects whose sole goal is to strengthen our services and tools at their disposal while respecting the necessary balance between security and freedom.

Simply in relation to your reflection on the support of the Socialists for the directive, I confirm. Indeed, we have supported this directive and, I repeat, if this bill currently being discussed fully respected this directive and was limited to what the directive provides, we would have supported it. For this reason, I am submitting an amendment, to make this draft in line with the wishes of the directive, namely to limit PNR to air transport. If you ever vote on our amendments, it is obvious that we will support this text as we have supported the European directive.

Mr. Crusnière, you seem to say that the Directive does not allow the extension to other means of transport. No, she doesn’t say that! I think it is good to clarify this!

Mr. Crusnière, I would like to clarify two things. First, if you read the directive – and I do not doubt that you did – you will find that it stipulates, literally, that “we can open this same system to other means of transport” and this was voted by the Socialists.

Secondly, as regards your amendment, I do not know if you have read the State Council opinion. It states that “limiting this system only to air transport is against equality.” If we didn’t have enough arguments yet, it is now the State Council that supports our project.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Mr. Flahaux, the discussion between the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council lasted five years before reaching this directive. Why Why ? Because, during those five years, there was no majority in the European Parliament on a PNR project that concerned only aircraft passengers.

It is true that the directive allows the opening to other modes of transport. I will return to this issue in my speech, Mr. Minister. Things changed after the Paris attacks. The Socialist Party in the European Parliament has changed its mind. In contrast, the Greens opposed this PNR system end-to-end and, in particular, the German Green MEP Jan Albrecht, who led this project. I would like to pay tribute to him here, because he is the foundation for blocking this measure that will prove – I am sure – counterproductive in terms of effectiveness against terrorism and extremely damaging in terms of human rights.

While it is true that the directive allows the opening to other modes of transport, it is not least that three European Commissioners – very important authorities – believe that it is not easy to implement.

Furthermore, Mr. Minister, even if we are against, we must not forget that PNR is a European objective relating to the sharing of information. However, you do the opposite for train, boat and bus transportation as you create databases that you cannot estimate. In fact, during the discussions, at no time could you say how many passengers would be affected. You may tell us sooner. How many passengers will be affected? This is a fact that is essential to know before legislation.

In terms of health, De Block, for example, does not imagine taking action without previously estimating the number of patients that could be affected. Before taking a tax action, Mr Van Overveldt also tries to estimate how many taxpayers could be affected. And you, you legislate on passengers while unable to answer a simple question: how many passengers will this measure apply? However, this is not complicated!

From the outset, the European and Belgian Greens have considered that a PNR measure would be unlawful. And, today, you complicate the situation even more by introducing PNRs for the boat, train and bus, without consulting your European partners.

I find this profoundly ineffective.

I was saying that I regretted the attitude of the PS, at the Belgian level, as well as that of Ecolo-Groen, both at the European and Belgian level. They voted against the proposal in the committee. I urged them to adopt it or abstain in the plenary session. More than ever, we need pragmatism and to find ourselves behind projects whose sole goal is to strengthen our services and tools at their disposal while respecting the necessary balance between security and freedom.

Mr. Hellings knows that the Privacy Protection Commission acknowledges that the privacy protection measures are indeed comprehensive in the project in question. I hope therefore that they will join us when voting for this important text, as they have done for other measures in the past. The CDH could also do this.

As regards the MR Group, he welcomes and will support a balanced text that adds to the twenty measures taken so far to strengthen our services in their daily fight against terrorism. Because – and I will be a little controversial for my last sentence – what sometimes makes me a little busty is that we have the chorus of weeping after the occurrence of an attack, but when we want to give ourselves the means to fight for such events not to occur again, then a whole series of people are no longer at the meeting.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, today we will adopt a bill aiming at the indiscriminate collection of data of all international passengers, in Belgium, of aircraft, trains, buses and boats. This is what it is about. We are not discussing, as we have been used to in this hall, databases of criminals, of radicalized people and that concerns a little more than a thousand people. It is not the police database, the BNG, which concerns people who have had contact with the police, some of which are criminal and others are not, and which counts a hundred thousand people.

This is not a database of intelligence services that also concerns hundreds of thousands of people. It is a general database of all Belgians since, today, we live in a highly connected country, in the heart of the European Union, all Belgians and all residents in Belgium using an international means of transport.

This is a paradigm shift for our intelligence services and for our police services because, until now, our police services and political power considered that we were all allegedly innocent citizens. Today, the government’s goal, by voting this law implementing a directive, is to consider that everyone is a priori guilty or potentially guilty. This paradigm shift must be taken into account.

The goal of the law and the directive it transposes is praiseworthy, it is the fight against terrorism and serious cross-border crime. This is the confessed goal. We will see, in the course of the discussion, whether this goal is achievable or is achieved.

I would like to comment on the struggle we are talking about. The law does not mention the databases that will be correlated with the PNR database. Flahaux clarified during the debate that this is a paradigm shift, not only because this project concerns all Belgians but also by the method of the police services. This is a bit technical, but it is important to remember.

Before, when a police or intelligence service had doubts about a person, suspected or potentially guilty, searches were carried out in a series of databases to verify where that person moves, who he meets, what he does, or which country he went to. This is normal.

The paradigm shift in the method of the PNR system is to say that there is a database concerning tens of millions of international passengers that will be correlated with other databases such as the database of the Office of Foreigners, the BNG database of the police or the terrorist database, which is also normal.

However, at no time does the law restrict the number and specificity of the databases that will be correlated. This is where there is a problem. Why Why ?

As this has been specified by some colleagues of the majority, it is hits, incidents, which will alert the police services, and no longer suspicions. It is the algorithm that will set the priorities, in the work of our police services, plus the field work, knowledge, infiltration of our security and intelligence agents in the sectors that pose a potential danger to our fellow citizens. No, it is no longer the human intelligence that will be the basis of the work of our police and intelligence services, but the algorithm.

And it is known that it can be mistaken, as has been the case many times, as part of the establishment of the US PNR. I have mentioned it in the committee and I will not mention it here. Remember: an American senator, today deceased, Kennedy, was arrested six times because he was on the red list or the black list of air carriers. But Mr. Kennedy was not a terrorist and has never been.

Why is it so important to recall this phenomenon and this paradigm shift here in plenary? Obviously, Mr. Minister, you specified in the committee that this algorithm would respect the privacy law and, of course, the essential criteria of the rule of law. But who, in this parliament or elsewhere, is able to read an algorithm? Not to me. I think none of my colleagues here is able to say whether the algorithm that will be chosen to correlate a PNR database with a whole series of other databases complies with the fundamental criteria of the rule of law, such as non-discrimination or the principle of combating racial inequality, among others.

In this case, the PNR database will be correlated with other databases that are not specified in the law. While the eminently praiseworthy goal is to fight terrorism and serious crime, this PNR service will, however, in fact, be able to be used in the fight against immigration that you call illegal – which does not constitute a serious crime. While it is justified to put the privacy of several millions of people in parallel in the name of combating terrorism and serious cross-border crime, it is absolutely not so for small crime or for facts that are not crimes. I take here the example of border surveillance, but I could mention many others. I think of the smuggling of cigarettes, which you mentioned as a British example of the effectiveness of PNR and which does not constitute a serious crime. Of course, this is a phenomenon that must be fought, but by other means than the cannon to kill a fly. PNR should be used to combat terrorism and serious cross-border crime, and nothing else.

For a measure that is equally intrusive to the privacy of all Belgians and all residents in Belgium, it is a matter of being able to demonstrate its proportionality. This is the five-year debate between the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council, from February 2011 to May 2016. The discussion focused only on this aspect. What is Proportionality? It consists of demonstrating efficiency, on the one hand, and necessity, on the other. My point of view is that you have not demonstrated either.

Furthermore, the Commission and the Council have never demonstrated them either, which promises interesting debates when the directive or the law will be submitted to the European Court of Justice or the Constitutional Court.

Mr. Hellings, I feel like I hear the same arguments when it comes to adopting in many municipalities the installation of surveillance cameras. These are exactly the same arguments: proportionality, intrusion, etc., while there are a whole range of measures that ensure that privacy is respected. I think your arguments are somewhat special.

Mr. Flahaux, your intervention allows me to explain more in advance why this bill is neither effective nor necessary. I insist on these two words: effective and necessary. These are the two adjectives that must be present to consider that a bill and the directive it implements are proportionate.

In terms of effectiveness, I asked the following question in the committee: in which specific cases, the UK and US PNR, implemented for several years, have prevented a terrorist attack? There has been the case of Times Square, on which one can go back, but it is not enough to say that we will legislate to put the privacy of 11 million Belgians in the name of the fact that there would have been a defeated attack on Times Square. It is important that an attack could have been deterred at Times Square but ...

Explain this to the victims of terrorist attacks!

This is very interesting because it is at the heart of the subject. Yes, the attacks are a tragedy, Mr. Minister.

Since this legislation responds, in your opinion, to the objections, information and experience of our police services who had to deal with these dramas, who investigated these dramas, who tried to avoid these dramas, we would have liked to hear them so that they explain to us how your PNR measures could have helped them to defeat them. This was not possible. Worse, when I asked you the question – and I replied it to you just recently – of how these PNR measures would have helped to defeat, prevent or investigate the dramas that occurred, at no time, you could not answer.

Mr. Hellings, you said that there was only one example, that of Times Square. I answer you that if this can avoid even an attack, it is worth it. It is worth making this decision here today, with responsible people.

Terrorists are not answered by slogans. We respond to terrorists with concrete and effective measures. Effective and necessary.

The [...]

Mr. Laaouej, you can ask for the floor later if you wish, but for now it is Mr. Hellings.

In order to be able to take a measure that, according to the minister and the majority parties is presumed effective, we would have had to hear the police to check this effectiveness. This has not been done, but it is not serious. The minister could have explained why, in one or another case, benefiting from the PNR tool could have defeated, prevented a terrorist attack. Since this work has not been done, you have forced me to do it. And I did it.

So I took back the 39 terrorists who, since March 2012, in France and Belgium – we know that the chains are more or less connected – have been involved in terrorist attacks. Let’s make the point, because this is the last time we will have the opportunity to do so before the vote!

There was, first, the Merah case, the massacre of Toulouse and Montauban in March 2012. Mohammed Merah was French, he moved in a scooter. Mohammed Merah did not use a PNR means of transport (aircraft, bus, train or boat) to commit his attack. He was known to police officers. He had to be searched, he had to be watched. This was not the case.

The first attack we saw in Belgium in May 2014 was that of the Jewish Museum. Mehdi Nemmouche did not travel by train or by plane. He may have used the bus, but he was already stuck. He committed the attack in a car. The PNR would have been ineffective.

He was known to the French secret services. He was known by the French police. The sharing of crucial information between France and Belgium would have allowed Mehdi Nemmouche to be arrested at some point in his murderous caval.

Charlie Hebdo, the January 7 and 9 attacks. The three terrorists, Chérif Kouachi, Saïd Kouachi, Amedy Coulibaly, were French, circulated on French territory, did not use aircraft, boats or buses to commit their attacks. That would not have served.

The defeated Verviers attack is very interesting, because it is a success story of our State Security and our police services. Marouan El Bali, Sofiane Amghar and Khalid Ben Larbi, these three terrorists who were neutralized in Verviers during the defeated attack, used rented vehicles. They did not use the bus, train or plane.

In the case of the defeated bombing of Villejuif in France, Sid Ahmed Ghlam, a French resident, did not travel either by plane or by bus; not by boat or by train. In the case of the Nice attack on three military personnel in February 2015, Moussa Coulibaly, a French resident, did not travel by plane, bus, boat, or train. In the case of the June 26, 2015 attack that saw the decapitation of Saint-Quentin, Yassine Sahli, a French resident, did not travel by train, bus, airplane or boat to commit his attack.

Regarding the attack on the Thalys on August 21, 2015, U.S. military had allowed the person to be arrested before he committed the irreparable. It is this failed Thalys attack that justifies, in your bill, the extension to trains of this bill. I quote the justification of Article 6: “The incident in the Thalys has once again demonstrated how important it is to be able to track the movements of certain individuals.” The person in question was Ayoub El Khazzani. He entered the Thalys. He travelled to Belgium by other means than by international train, plane or boat. But he took the Thalys and, as a result, Belgium had to be equipped with a PNR. If she had obtained a PNR before August 2015, it would have allowed her to be arrested before she commits the irreparable. Fortunately, this did not happen.

Here, Mr. Minister, there is a problem.

Mr. Hellings, I listened to your statement saying that those people who committed attacks somewhere across Europe did not take the Thalys or public transportation. What I do not understand in your reasoning is that in fact, these people did not use public transport to commit their attacks but they could very well have taken them at some point in their lives, before becoming criminals. Per ⁇ we could have traced them back then.

One thing I don’t understand in your reasoning: Is it necessary to wait for someone to commit an attack before putting the PNR in place? This is the question. When we still have a problem here – which no one wants – when there will be an explosion in a Thalys at Brussels station and we will not have put in every possible means to avoid it, you will blame us for it. This is not in your reasoning.

Where is the origin of the expansion of PNR from aircraft to train? In the failed attack on the Thalys in August 2015. And we come to the heart of the subject, Mr. Thiery, and I will answer you. What’s interesting about the previous mode of operation, which helped to defeat the Verviers attack, is that when a person, or a group of people, is suspicious, it’s normal for our intelligence and police services to make every effort, including extremely intrusive means in privacy, to check what these people are doing, who they meet and where they move. These methods already exist; these are data collection methods and specific research methods that police and intelligence services can use. The Verviers attack could be defeated thanks to this, thanks to a database of several thousand people whose movements, physical contacts, telephone contacts, via the internet and others, whose apartments could have been intercepted or whose vehicles – including rented vehicles – could have been equipped with GPS tags. That’s what we need to do and that’s what worked.

What I would have liked, before we vote on this bill, is that the minister or, ideally, the police can explain to us how this PNR would have helped to deter an attack. And what I’m demonstrating here is that in fact, PNR methods would not have helped to deflect recent attacks.

Again, I understand your reasoning but there is a concern at the source. If I understand you correctly, the PNR principle should only be applied to persons who are recognized, who are arrested and who have already committed one or the other crime. But before having a file, the person did not have it. What is the moment from which one will be able to say that someone will or will not commit an attack while their file is virgin? This is therefore the proof that in your reasoning, of course, one can take into account all those who have already had a concern or who have committed crimes, but there are all those who have a virgin record, who have not yet intervened and who will do so.

So, Mr. Thiery, you are a supporter of the fact that everyone has to be fooled.

This is not at all what I said!

That is it, Mr. Thiery! There are tens of millions of people taking the Thalys. The PNR is that, Mr. Thiery. I know that you are discovering the case right now.

I, Mr. Hellings, also work in good sense! To say that I do not know the dossier is not true because I actually participated in some discussions on this subject. You are the specialist in the subject, but with the lessons you give us, I wonder ultimately who is the specialist.

We can see that you have studied at the ULB because the argument of authority, it knows you!

I understand the reasoning of the majority, but I wonder how far they want to go. If one penetrates that logic, it actually means that one must take DNA and fingerprints from all Belgians and collect them in databases. Then the surveillance of the 11 million Belgians should be increased to the maximum. In addition, in case of a crime, one must apply algorithms to the immense database of 11 million Belgians. The result is a series of suspects where the police must immediately go, who must be charged and arrested, and so on.

Our point of view is that what is stated here is ineffective and disproportionate. It would be better to use the available resources to strengthen our police, security and intelligence services.

I asked a question. Your logic, which is quite sloganic, thus means maximum surveillance and databases of DNA and fingerprints. That’s actually what the majority says and that’s disproportionate and ineffective. There are more effective ways to tackle terrorism than that.

I will not blame anyone for a lack of knowledge of the dossier. In the anti-terrorism committee, I think everyone speaks with knowledge of matters, especially Mr. Hellings.

However, I lost him here for a moment when he applies his new element. The disproportion has already been mentioned. In any case, we cannot deny that the PNR data stopped an attack on Times Square. He also acknowledges that, but now he says that the end does not justify the means. I wonder what a human life is worth. Is there a kind of point of reference? How many terrorist attacks must be avoided before we, a small country like ours – it has a limited impact on our inhabitants – also take our responsibility?

I will answer each of the interventions with the example. The fact that we legislate today on rail transport is justified by the bill and by that person, Ayoub El Khazzani, who took the Thalys. She had been arrested for five years, Mr. Thiery. This person was the subject of investigation and surveillance by various European intelligence services - Spanish and French. This person, if it had been the subject of more special attention – which was not the case – could have been under surveillance and could have been the subject of a police control, be found and arrested before his wrongdoing.

The PNR would have changed nothing. I explain why. Today, PNR is open to trains because it is believed that terrorists also take the train, boat and international bus, not just the plane. That is the logic. The Minister has been knocked on the fingers by the European Commission twice. Why Why ? Because the PNR for trains cannot be implemented – I explained it recently during an interruption – because it could be too expensive and that it is contrary to the principle of free movement, especially if the possibility of taking a train at the last minute is removed.

What is PNR? This is the indiscriminate collection of data of all passengers 24 hours before the departure of the means of transport. This is the PNR. PNR is like a plane. You cannot take the plane if you do not provide your ID card details. The PNR extended to trains is that! It is that you cannot take the train without giving 24 hours in advance your identity and the eighteen other data provided by the directive and transposed into the law. This is the PNR.

The Minister responds to the European Commission and answers us that we will discuss in the royal orders, in collaboration with the railway sector which is ⁇ concerned, and we will see how to do to still respect the principle of free movement and keep last minute tickets. This means making an exception to the rule that requires all PNR data to be transferred 24 hours before the departure of the means of transport.

Ayoub El Khazzani bought a first-class ticket in the last minute at Midi Station for 149 euros. This means that with the PNR extended to the train, with the exception of being able to buy a ticket at the last minute, this system would not have been able to prevent him from boarding the Thalys. Here is ! It is as simple as this. It is still terrible that we had to research ourselves and discover this today. It was the opposite that should have happened. The police and the minister should have, in front of our banks, demonstrated the usefulness of the PNR to stop this guy in the Thalys before he commits his attack. Fortunately, two American soldiers took charge of it. It was the opposite that should have happened. The Minister will have to accept a PNR with exceptions because the European Commission will not allow, from the point of view of freedom of movement, that the PNR prevents the purchase of a ticket at the last minute. But it was just in the last minute that this terrorist bought his ticket.

Mr. Hellings, you focus your argument more or less on the efficiency of the bill, and not on the disproportion, which I asked for. We now have a flag that tries to cover a full load. Of course, KBs must be connected to this. I think the minister will come back on this. We cannot currently require certain operators to play through the data, but the government wants to give a very clear signal with the design and we fully support that. The government wants to ensure that anything can no longer be anonymous. This is about efficiency. I think that this will be returned.

My question was more about the disproportion. I don’t understand that and I hope you forgive me. You say that avoiding an attack is insufficient for the implementation of this bill and to take the step towards passenger name records.

My questions to you are the following. How much is a human life worth? How many attacks should be avoided in the future before your group wants to think about PNR?

Mr. Metsu, this is a ⁇ ineffective argument. Terrorist attacks in Belgium in Verviers. I have just made a list of these attacks. The Verviers attack was defeated without PNR, thanks to the effectiveness of existing methods, specific research methods and data collection methods. This attack was defeated by the strength of our law, which respects privacy, and that of our police and intelligence services, which worked well.

We visited Security, Mr. Metsu, who explained in detail how this attack could have been defeated, and how people could have been neutralized before they committed the irreparable. There, I have evidence that our systems and our values work, in the fight against terrorism, while you, you did not come up with any evidence that this PNR could deflect an attack.

I just demonstrated to you by a + b that the extension of the PNR to the train was ineffective, since this person, who justifies this extension, would have passed between the mesh of the net, in so far as the minister will be obliged, in his royal decrees, to guarantee the purchase of train tickets at the last minute. The terrorist took a train in the last minute.

Mr. Speaker, I did not intend to intervene and interrupt Mr. Hellings, but I have a problem with Mr. Metsu’s comment and I would like to respond.

I have not followed the work of the Terro Committee, or rather, I have followed them with regard to the aspects of privacy and mobility and what is supplemented in this regard. I totally disagree with your statement, Mr. Metsu, as if those who oppose the maximistic transposition of this PNR Directive would balance what a human life is worth.

You ask colleague Hellings what a human life is worth in his opinion, so that he would agree to this conversion. I find the analysis incorrect: as if people who find this transposition of the PNR Directive too maximistic and who doubt the additional burden, would not have committed every human life. I think everyone in this assembly agrees that every human life lost as a result of a terrorist act is one too much.

That should not be the discussion. The discussion during the transposition of this European legislation is about whether the sling has not been passed too far. I understand that in the head of the competent minister there is a certain fear of future attacks. Each of us here asks what our responsibility as politicians is. In this conversion, however, the core of the matter is whether a maximistic conversion with additional administrative burdens and data collection will guarantee that this can no longer happen. Unfortunately, I have to answer no to this. I would then ask whether, in transposing this Directive, it is really efficient to apply the maximistic interpretation. To be honest, I doubt that.

Mr. Hellings, I try to understand your reasoning. You say that in Verviers, it was shown how one could defeat an attack. Fortunately, after this event, we have not stopped taking action! You believe that the PNR should not be put in place, because the Verviers case proved that we have all the means available. But fortunately we didn’t stop there and so we installed MPR cameras, that we decided to change the law to fight these terrorists and that we took all the other steps!

You can think of what you want from your study, or...

I ordered one! But not you!

Why was the PNR requested? It was after September 11. I do not know if you remember what the means and weapons of the terrorists were.

I just said it.

They were aircraft. Can you guarantee me that we will never know about September 11 here or in neighboring countries? and no!

We have never said that PNR is the only way to stop terrorists. This is one of the many steps we will take – and we will take them, Mr. Hellings. I hope that we will never have to use it or hear ourselves say, “If we had a PNR, we could have avoided an attack.” This is a serious responsibility for you.

Mr. Speaker, once again, I regret that in this debate, when one tries to argue and enumerate the reasons why one is opposed to this measure, we are accused of not wanting to make arrangements and showing laxism. This is not the case.

The real question to be asked is the following. The extension of PNR to maritime, rail and road transport will also overmultiply all the data that will be collected. Their treatment will require enormous work. Does this measure gain efficiency or does it not risk drowning our services, with the consequence of skipping important data?

One aspect has not yet been addressed. Hearing would have helped to identify the right measure to be taken and whether it would be appropriate to extend it. We would have liked to know the position of the police services in this regard.

I also recall – because, if I am not mistaken, this has not yet been mentioned – that three European Commissioners wrote to you drawing attention to the danger of this text and the lack of coordination at European level.

They say that the directive is enforced. If the desire had been to extend this directly, it would have been done in the directive. However, this is not the case. You tell me that she gives the opportunity to do so, indeed. But the danger lies in the fact that three European Commissioners draw attention to the necessary European coordination and you don’t care!

Mr. President, Mr. Crusnière, Mr. Hellings, I would like to reserve my response for the end of the debate. However, concerning the letter of the three Commissioners – this question has already been asked several times – I would like to say the following. I responded to this letter, and then, on 5 December, we had a meeting with the representatives of the three Commissioners. There they told us that their criticism was based on an older version of the bill and that after hearing our explanations on the content of the real bill presented to parliament, all the arguments developed in that letter had become obsolete. Both on Article 45 and on Article 47, we were able to explain the change included in the new project. Therefore, it has been confirmed to us that the criticism expressed has become pointless. Therefore, it is necessary to stop referring to this letter of the three Commissioners!

Mr. Minister, you are presenting a draft law. It is up to you to demonstrate its usefulness and effectiveness, which you have not done.

I am the one who offers you here all the terrorist cases that happened in France and Belgium – the chains being linked – and who demonstrates to you by a + b that the PNR would not have been effective.

Today, I ask you how the PNR would have prevented this terrorist, Ayoub El Khazzani, from buying in the last minute a first-class train ticket for €149 to climb the Thalys at Midi Station and to try to commit this attack?

Answer this question. How would the Belgian PNR have prevented this? This is what justifies the extension of PNR on the train. And to this question, you cannot answer. For me, this is proof that this measure is ineffective.

My criticism is about effectiveness, not principles. I show you here that the extent to which you extend the indiscriminate collection of data to passengers of cross-border trains is not effective. And it would not have allowed the preliminary arrest of Ayoub El Khazzani.

I continue with my macabre list. The attacks in Paris on November 13. This is a big file. There are Abdelhamid Abaaoud, Brahim Abdeslam, Chakib Akrouh, Samy Amimour, Ismail Mostefaï, Mohamed-Aggad, Bilal Hadfi, Ahmad Al Mohammad (probably a false identity) and Mohammad Al Mahmod, Salah Abdeslam (which is well known) and Hasna Aït Boulahcen, Mohammed Amri, Hamza Attou, Ali Oulkadi, Fabien Clain, Khalid Zerkani (called Santa Claus), Mohamed Belkaid, Zouhir Mehdaoui, Gelel Attar. All of them were residents of Belgium and France, with the exception of two people who had a fake Syrian passport. With the exception of these two people, all these people traveled through Europe with rented cars. These people have repeatedly crossed Europe via means of transport that are not covered by the law. The Paris attacks – the attack on the terraces, the attack on the Stade de France or the attack on the Bataclan – could not have been defeated thanks to the implementation of a Belgian or French PNR; these persons were French or Belgian, residing in France or Belgium.

As for the Brussels attacks, this is even clearer. Mohamed Abrini, Najim Laachraoui, Ibrahim El Bakraoui, Khalid El Bakraoui, Osama Krayem, Mohamed Bakkali, Sofiane Ayari: all of these persons resided in Belgium and did not use any means of transport. I add here that most of them have not traveled to Syria.

The terrorist attack on March 24 in France: Reda Kriket. As a French resident, he did not use any means of transport covered by the bill. The Golden Drop attack on January 7, 2016: Tarek Belgacem. As a French resident, he did not use any means of transport. The aborted attack in Carcassonne on June 13, 2016: an unknown. He did not use any means of transport. The Nice attack (which the Berlin attack echoes): Mohamed Lahouaiej Boulel. French resident, he used a truck, he did not use any means of transportation. He did not go to Syria, he did not use the plane, boat or train to commit his attack, not even before. The police attack at Schaerbeek in 2016: Hicham Diop. Rachid Kassim as well. All of these people did not use any means of transport.

The discussion can be interesting. This has already occurred in the committee.

No, not on these elements, Mr. Thiery.

Mr. Helllings, you didn’t hold what I told you before. You say that these people have not taken the means of transport for which PNR would be applied. They did not take the means of transport to commit their attack but, in the meantime or before, they took it, of course. That is why your reasoning does not hold.

It is really interesting! They did not use any means of transport. How old are these people and what did they do in their lives before either being arrested or having committed an attack? Can you tell us today in the plenary session that they have taken neither the boat nor the train nor the plane? I would like to know!

Mr. Thiéry, the PNR is the correlation between databases (database terrorism, BNG, other databases, Bank-Carrefour, Office des étrangers, etc.). It happens that not all of the people I cited went to the country where they committed the attack, France or Belgium, using one of these means of transport. So, the Belgian, or possibly French, PNR would not have allowed to arrest these people before they commit the attack. They may have taken this means of transport, but the PNR could not have prevented the attack.

Mr. Speaker, I wish the reporters a lot of success with the recording of all names.

Mr. Hellings, there needs to be something from my heart. You act as if we – the majority and the minister – say that this bill is blissful and that suddenly all terrorist crimes will be definitively out of track and nothing will ever happen again.

I never said that. My colleagues of the majority have never said that. I have never heard the minister say that.

It is one of the measures we propose in the fight against terrorism, which we believe will ⁇ prove their usefulness.

Please stop that populist tone. I think this is politically incorrect.

That is completely true. Security policy is also implemented in an integrated way. I think this is an incredibly crazy logic. You have listed a whole list of terrorists. Quod erat demonstrandum that there is a lot of work in the store.

The fact that nothing has happened through these modes of transport would mean, in your opinion, that we should do nothing about it. Therefore, we must not proactively intervene, but must wait until something has happened again, before we can pass a bill here.

I think I can speak for the whole majority, when I say that logic is completely out of our minds.

Mr. Speaker, I invite each of the speakers to listen to what the other said, as I do, because, Mr. Metsu, when I spoke of the failed attack on the Thalys, I mentioned the justification of Article 6. It is not my logic to open PNR to trains or to say that PNR could prevent attacks, it is the logic of the minister and the government.

It is written in the bill that the purpose of this indiscriminate collection of this data is to fight terrorism. It’s not me who says it, it’s the minister and, wrongly, the European Union! Remember that everything that comes from the European Union is not necessarily good!

The [...]

At least one point. But I’m not sure we agree on what’s not good.

The Minister and his cabinet justify Article 6: “The incident in the Thalys has, once again, demonstrated how important it is to be able to track the movements of certain individuals.” This means that the failed attack on the Thalys justifies the collection of data from the people who borrow it.

You said that I am not talking about proportionality but about efficiency and usefulness. The measure must be useful and effective to justify the setting between parentheses of a fundamental right, privacy. I show you here that proportionality does not exist because this bill is neither useful nor effective in the purpose it has assigned itself, the fight against terrorism and serious cross-border crime.

You denounce the logic of the minister and not mine, which is the logic of an opposition parliamentary who has never received a clear and clear answer to the question of how the Belgian PNR would have helped to defeat a terrorist case, while in the case of Verviers, the existing methods have allowed to defeat the terrorist attack.

I would like to mention the murder of a policeman and his companion in the Yvelines. Larossi Abballa, a French citizen already convicted in 2013, did not use any means of transport to commit his attack nor before.

During the attack on the church of Saint-Étienne in Rouvray, Normandy last summer, Abdel Malik Petitjean and Abdel Kermiche, both living in France and one of whom wore an electronic bracelet, did not use the means of transport covered by the law.

In September 2016, Ines Madani, Ornella Guilligman, Sarah Hervouët and Amel Sakaou, who were French residents, did not take means of transport. They attempted to set fire to gas bottles in a car parked next to Notre-Dame de Paris borrowed from the father of one of them.

Finally, there is the attack on Osny prison – I didn’t remember that event – in which Bilal Taghi was involved. He was arrested and did not use the relevant means of transport.

In the Berlin attack, the Franco-Belgian chain does not appear to be involved, at this stage of the investigation. But no one can confirm it yet.

I’m just here to give you a list of 39 terrorists who have been tormented for four and a half years. Of these, 18 have done what is called the hijra. In other words, they went to an area controlled by terrorist groups. Nine of them returned by plane. Four of them returned by other means of transport. Five returned by unknown means of transport.

Mr. Minister, what justifies the indiscriminate and massive collection of data are these 39 terrorists and their path. Now, I have just demonstrated that a legislation such as that which is not only intrusive but also expensive – this represents an investment of 11 million euros. For this amount, I could give you many examples of much more efficient public investments – it is in no way justified. Indeed, the arguments that justify your bill collapse and melt like snow in the sun.

Finally, Mr. Flahaux said that we were dogmatic. I think this is dogmatic. It is based on a myth that in order to fight terrorism, you need to capture as much data as possible about as many citizens as possible.

This is the viewpoint developed by the majority and the general philosophy of this project. Our point of view, and what has shown its effectiveness in previous terrorist cases, is the pragmatism of which a certain colleague spoke before; it is to have the relevant information about a limited number of people. I agree with what Mr. Crusnière said: today, what is clear in terrorism cases is that our police and intelligence services have the information but it is not processed. Here, we do not offer a tool that aims to separate the important from the accessory; we aim to create an algorithm that will add sometimes irrelevant information about a series of people in the name of the fight against terrorism. But in fact, the reality, the pragmatism, the work of our security services demonstrate that it is not more information that they need, but better information. We will vote against this bill.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, dear colleagues, I did not participate in the work of the committee, but my colleagues being held back, including this morning in the committee on the attacks, you will allow me, on behalf of my group, to speak here on the political level.

I recognize that we are facing a very serious collective threat. We must strengthen our legal arrangements, European and national, in the face of terrorism. PNR is an indispensable tool. As early as 2013, on the initiative of Belgium and France, nine Ministers of the Interior or Justice, Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and Sweden, wanted to accelerate the implementation of this PNR in order to ensure the monitoring of persons traveling to Syria or other conflict zones and returning.

Gilles de Kerchove, the European coordinator for the fight against terrorism, has advocated and continues to advocate for the establishment of this PNR. This has long been patterned at European level and it is true that terrorist attacks in Europe have moved the lines. As you also reminded, dear colleagues, this Directive was then adopted on 27 April 2016.

I didn’t want to interrupt each other but, if it’s important, it’s also because everything leads to the belief that terrorists returning from Syria or other conflict zones manage to blur the tracks by traveling from one country to another. In this regard, I would like to give two examples. The first is that of the French citizen, Mehdi Nemmouche, who, returning from Syria, made turns through Asia and thus managed to blur the tracks by passing from one country to another.

A second example is also that of this French unemployed without legal history who committed an aggression in Belgium in 2012, if I remember correctly. He decided one morning to take the train because he had seen that in Belgium, there were fines against the full veil. He arrived in Molenbeek. He injured two police officers who avoided the death of justness. It is, in fact, a single man who, at one point, was caught by a radicalization movement and who, one morning, took the train to come to Belgium.

These are two examples, one international and the other intra-Belgium. I ⁇ didn’t want to go into a whole series of files whose data is not necessarily known here in parliament. I just wanted to give these two examples that interpelate and show how PNR is obviously not a magical tool that will respond to all situations of terrorist risk. However, it can actually help in a number of cases. These two examples are interesting in this regard.

Indeed, Ms. Fonck, here are two interesting examples. I have read Mehdi Nemmouche. I have not cited the whole of his file as it was taken back recently, but indeed he has stayed in Syria, Turkey, Malaysia. It even passed through Algeria and Lebanon. He made stops in Bangkok and Singapore before landing in Frankfurt, where he disappeared.

This is interesting, because Mehdi Nemmouche was included in the SIS (Schengen Information System) database. This means that just like Abdeslam, when he is controlled by a police officer and his identity document is confronted with the existing database in which he is mentioned, Mehdi Nemmouche could have been arrested, on this basis, in Frankfurt, when he set foot in Europe for the first time, after his long journey in Asia and the Middle East. Based on the existing database and control mechanisms, Medhi Nemmouche could have been arrested, as Salah Abdeslam could have been arrested, four times, in France, if the police had carried out a check, and if they had been able to compare the person’s name and identity document with the SIS database in which he was mentioned. This is Mehdi Nemmouche.

I think you did not say the name of this French unemployed who came to Belgium to try to kill as many people as possible on the basis of misinformation. You say yourself that this person was not known to the police services. It is interesting. I hear Mr. say, “Just right!”

We should not forget what PNR is: it is the correlation, therefore the comparison, between a passenger database, on the one hand, and another database, on the other. This means, Ms. Fonck and dear colleagues of the MR, that if this person was not known to the Belgian police services, or if she was not included in a Belgian police, security or intelligence database, she would not have been arrested by the PNR. His name would have been taken back into the PNR database, but because his name was not known in another database, there would have been no hit, concordance, and therefore, no effectiveness of the PNR database.

I believe that our existing means, such as the SIS database and the measures that could be taken on the basis of human information on the imminence of an attack or the preparation of an attack in a busy place such as a station, would allow us to temporarily monitor all passengers at the entrance of trains, if a formal indication would allow us to determine that such person represents a danger in such a place.

This is a way to work effectively! It has proven its effectiveness in the past. It is faster and does not require legislative amendment of the kind that unfortunately the majority will vote today.

Mr. Hellings, is PNR an absolute and unstoppable barrier? No, probably not! But I can’t agree with you and if you know a more performing system, because if it’s true that the one you’re talking about is largely insufficient, then why not? But to deny that these radicalized people and these terrorists blur the tracks and take advantage of the breaches to melt into the crowd is a profound mistake and, in my opinion, it is to deny the evidence.

It is a tool that enables us to strengthen the fight against terrorism. I never said — and the Justice and Interior Ministers at the European level never said — that it would be an unstoppable tool that would enable us to trace and spot without anyone escaping, or that it would enable us to spot all terrorists. This was not said either! When you hear Gilles de Kerchove, to quote an example outside of politics, advocating for years as the European coordinator of the fight against terrorism in favor of PNR, do you say that he tells anything? In this regard, I cannot follow you, Mr. Hellings.

However, it is not possible to use PNR or imagine tools blindly. It is very important to protect privacy and to find a balance (because that is what it is) between respect for privacy and strengthening the fight against terrorism. We support PNR but a PNR that makes sense. What does this mean?

Almost everyone wants a PNR for ships. Some will argue, "No trains, boats and buses!" But in this matter, does it make sense to imagine a PNR where in the end potential terrorists would be dispatched and could then take advantage of gaps and other transportation possibilities to go unnoticed and merge into the crowd?

Madame Fonck, this is incredible! I just demonstrated that the members of the chain of the Brussels, Verviers and Paris attacks had, all, rented vehicles. They are not covered by the PNR system.

Mr. Hellings, I know this very well. Of course, not all of them take the train and some come by car!

I live on the French border. Regularly, it is blocked on the highway. Mr. Minister of the Interior, I know that this is not the topic of the day, but I allow myself to tell you. This makes me laugh!

It has nothing to do with this, Ms. Fonck.

Why does this make me laugh? You think the alleged terrorists do not borrow the highway. It blocks honest users. Where do terrorists go? I simply say that breaches and gaps exist everywhere.

Let us return to our sheep, Mrs. Fonck.

The terrorists take the small bushing paths to pass through the grids of the net.

Did I not have the word?

Mr. Minister, I allowed myself this inscription because Mr. Hellings brought me the argument of vehicles.

You are drowning the fish, Mrs. Fonck.

No, it is not drowning the fish. Do you allow?

I explain to you. You just said, Ms. Fonck, that if we didn’t extend the PNR from airplanes to international trains, buses and boats, a terrorist candidate for an attack would not take the plane, but would turn to these other means of transport. This is your reasoning. I reiterate that the PNR does not apply, and for obvious reasons of efficiency, to individual vehicles. But it is to them that the terrorists will turn, as the attacks in Paris and Brussels have demonstrated. These terrorists took individual vehicles and did not use the train, boat, bus or plane.

But, Mr. Hellings, they will not return from Syria or from certain conflict zones in individual vehicles, especially when they want to blur the tracks and transit through a whole series of countries.

Furthermore, if you propose or if we find a performance, balanced system, which effectively, tomorrow, would also allow us to have a proportionate control over the rental of individual vehicles or individual vehicles, it will need to be studied.

Nowadays, you can’t make a PNR on everything. Is it enough, then, to keep the arms flat, to do nothing until we have a perfect system? Is there a perfect system today in terms of fighting terrorism? and no! This is the case in Berlin, Zurich. I will not repeat what happened a week ago, in Egypt, in Istanbul and elsewhere. This threat is constantly on the shoulders of citizens today. In this regard, we do not have absolute weapons, but we must move forward.

If there were only somewhat crazy politicians, as you seem to think, who wanted this, I wonder why Gilles de Kerchove pledged it with so much force. I think that’s an argument because I’m ⁇ not an expert on terrorism but he, he is. At least it must be recognized.

If you allow me, I will continue. I said that we wanted a PNR that makes sense, that is, not limited only to aircraft. This seems quite logical to me. This law is a framework law. I will allow myself a few additional comments.

First of all, I can obviously hear some reluctance. In addition, following the letter of the three European Commissioners, we last week also supported and submitted amendments for the referral to the State Council.

Two things in relation to this. First of all, I read the opinions of the State Council. They are quite reassuring. Then I heard what you said just recently. He met with the European Commissioners. I think it would be interesting if we could have additional elements regarding their position. By the way, since they wrote us a letter that was actually interpellant, they may be re-adjusting their point of view and their new point of view could also be written. I think that would be an important element in this debate.

There are also a whole series of issues, Mr. Minister, which must definitely be resolved. First, what will be the applicability and operationality for the different types of transport? Of course, there can be questions about the fact that some could take transportation on the road, Mr. Minister. Or, what happens when a supposed terrorist decides to take a last minute?

These are two examples, there may be others. The question of operationality, so that we can be as effective as possible, remains full and complete. It will obviously have to be put on the table and discussed not only with the different transport sectors, but also with Europe. This is for the first part: applicability, operationality. Everything remains to be settled.

Second, the coordination at the European level. We are not an island. We cannot continue to isolate ourselves at the European level. You have had contacts with the European Commissioners. But beyond that, I would like to challenge the Belgian government, and in this case you as the Minister of the Interior, to convince at European level of this extension of the PNR to other modes of transport.

Again, if Belgium works alone, we will not be effective. We can only be effective – we have enough borders – if this enlargement is carried out by all European countries or at least by a certain number of them. I recalled in 2013 the progress and the fact that some countries had decided to go further with this device.

Finally, for us, it is important that there is an evaluation. This assessment is planned within three years of the entry into force of the arrangement. For us, it is important that this assessment verifies whether these measures have real effectiveness in the fight against terrorism, whether the extension of the scope from the Directive is useful, effective or possibly counterproductive; to verify whether the significant infringements of privacy that are identified by the Privacy Protection Commission in its first opinion are proportionate to the objectives pursued. As I said before, it is important to find a balance between the two. Finally, it will be necessary to check whether the controls carried out for API data are carried out at the borders of the Schengen area and not at the Belgian borders.

We will therefore be vigilant on these different aspects, while supporting this bill.

Mr. Speaker, this bill is ineffective in the fight against terrorism and contrary to the fundamental rights of citizens. I would say that this is blind data collection, unnecessary mass control rather than targeted data collection and proper information tracking.

Currently, there are at least seven databases in Europe for passenger controls, such as the Schengen Information System, the Visa Information System, the General National Database (BNG) in Belgium. These databases are, in theory, if used effectively, sufficient to identify potential terrorists. The problem is to be able to analyze these data. Several terrorists who committed the Paris attacks were checked, their movements were ⁇ , but it was estimated that they did not pose a threat. If the PNR system had existed, the results of both preventive and subsequent investigations would have been the same.

I quote Dennis Broeders, a professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam: “When you look at recent attacks, the finding is always the same. It was not about a lack of information or listening, intelligence services complain about receiving too much data rather than too little."This analysis is shared by many other attentive observers or experts. I can quote you Beatrice de Graaf, professor at the University of Utrecht, or Alexis Deswaef, president of the League of Human Rights.

The costs of PNR are huge. Transport companies will have to provide additional storage spaces for the encoding and transmission of all passenger data. The cost for the state is estimated at 13 million euros for three years. But there is also a cost for passengers. According to the European Commission, a comparable measure in Denmark and Sweden for rail traffic resulted in travel time increasing from 10 to 60 minutes while the number of passengers decreased by 16%. As for the economic cost of the controls, it amounted to 300 million euros.

It is because this measure is ineffective, costly and difficult to implement practically that European Commissioners have been critical of this bill. They sent a letter to the Minister of the Interior who ignored it and who came here to explain to us that this letter was about an old version of the bill. We must believe the minister on word since we have not been informed of the various mail exchanges.

As I had the opportunity to tell Mr. Flahaux, we even noted the concern of the Minister of Mobility, François Bellot. I have asked him about this in the committee. He replied that he had taken note of many concerns, including those of certain railway operators and the European Railway Community. “I have already expressed,” he said, “these concerns and my own during the exchanges around the bill.”

Giovanni Buttarelli, European Data Protection Supervisor, said: “PNR has become an icon in the fight against terrorism, but, in addition to its symbolic value, this system is not very useful. The costs are enormous and the very long implementation times do not meet the needs of law enforcement in an emergency phase as we know it today.”

In short, to conclude, I repeat, this measure is ineffective, expensive, difficult to implement practically, but it is also dangerous for the rights of our population. Public freedoms risk being seriously undermined if every citizen taking a plane, TGV, international bus or boat finds himself stuck not because he represents a particular risk, but simply because he wants to travel.

Furthermore, we may fear that this massive data will be used to monitor the travels or movements of political opponents or trade unionists who, near or far, have nothing to do with terrorism. In any case, in France, the extension of emergency measures against environmental activists clearly shows that the fight against terrorism also serves as a pretext for suppressing social protests.

That is why we will vote against this proposal.

Thank you for the debate in this plenary session and also in the committee. We have had a good debate on an important bill, which is one of the elements in the fight against terrorism, but not the only one. This element is also considered at the European and international level as an essential part of the fight against terrorism.

Ms Fonck correctly referred to the competence of Gilles de Kerchove in that area, who has repeatedly pointed out the need to implement such a system. I confidently acknowledge his knowledge and competence and we will therefore follow his advice.

I would like to address one of the key elements of this debate, which has evolved since our exchanges in committees: the famous letters of the three European Commissioners. You know them, because you have received them all. In his July 2016 letter, the Director-General of DG Mobility & Transport (DG Move) expressed his concern about the impact of the transposition of the EU Directive into Belgian law and more specifically for international transport by bus and high-speed train. I answered and on 28 October we also received a letter from three Commissioners, Ms. Bulc, Mr. Avramopulos and Mr. King. In my response, I made clear that I would like to participate in a consultation on the impact of the measures of the future PNR law. In anticipation of this consultation, I have formulated some responses to the remarks and concerns of the three Commissioners mentioned in their aforementioned letter.

You all know that the pre-project does not require identity checks, but only a verification of conformity between the passenger’s identity and the name indicated on the travel document. The study on safety measures to be taken in the railway sector is one of the measures to improve safety. The more measures we take in this regard, the more security will be guaranteed. The study mentioned above does not exclude the PNR system; both are necessary and go hand in hand.

I also mentioned in my reply that the Belgian PNR Act is a framework law that will be executed by royal decrees. For this purpose, there will be collaboration and discussion with all relevant partners. Ms. Fonck, this means the sectors, the European level and the countries concerned.

Furthermore, I emphasized the fact that the Royal Decrees will take into account the specificity of each sector and that the intention is to find a balance between security and the commercial interests of each sector. I subsequently indicated that Belgium is participating in consultations with the European Commission and the Informal PNR Working Group and that it is also participating in a dialogue with neighbouring countries on the application of the Directive to other sectors.

On 5 December, so quite recently, following my response to this letter, a meeting was held with the representatives of the DG Accueil and Move. DG Home expressed satisfaction with Belgium’s constructive cooperation within the PNR Working Group as well as its hard work in transposing the PNR Directive. Representatives were explicitly asked what were the problems related to our pre-project. The DG Home indicated a problem with Article 7 which would impose an identity check. This problem was resolved by emphasizing that the pre-project requires a compliance check and not an identity check. There was also a problem with the sanctions provided for in Article 45. This is now framed by the mention of the fact that these are maximum amounts and by the fact that the withdrawal of authorisation of carriers has been removed from sanctions.

DG Home and DG Move indicated that the meeting was very informative. There was a misunderstanding about these two articles, but things are resolved.

Belgium also participated in the 12 December meeting on the implementation of the PNR Directive. A meeting was scheduled for December 13 with neighboring countries on high-speed trains and maritime transport. It does not work in isolation. During this meeting, it was decided that a common approach to these modes of transport should be adopted. It was agreed to formalize to the carriers by approaching them as a group. All participants agree to this approach.

I would finally like to refer to the meeting that was scheduled last Monday with Mr. Julian King, but we had the commission of inquiry, so I had to postpone this meeting to January 2017. I think that with this, I was able to bring clarifications regarding the criticism of Europe.

Mr. Crusnière, it is not true that Belgium is the only country that considers expanding the number of modes of transport. We will participate alongside other countries. To think that Belgium would do it alone makes no sense. To be effective in this type of work, you need to collaborate with other countries, and if the other countries do not want it, it makes no sense. This is a framework law, which must be fulfilled.

Mr Buysrogge, you asked me when the consultation will take place. As I said in the committee, we will first address the Royal Decree for the aviation sector. This consultation is ongoing and the KB is almost complete. Once KB is implemented, we will talk to the following sectors. Again, at European level, a number of countries are grouped for consultation with the sector. It is intended to find a balance between the commercial feasibility of the project, including for the transport sector, and safety. If we do not get out of that, it will not be carried out if necessary. But I repeat that this is a framework law.

Mr. Hellings, we exchanged our ideas and I don’t think I will convince you. We are separated by an ideological barrier and despite all the arguments you have presented, you cannot convince me. I would like to thank you for the rich debate that took place and which allowed to make known the different points of view.

Mrs. Fonck, I think I answered your questions by communicating you all the elements relating to the European plan. I thank you for the courage that the opposition will demonstrate by voting on this important bill.

I think that I have answered all the questions.

Our views are incompatible, but I have asked you two questions. First, I wanted to know more about the Times Square attack. I would have at least wanted to know when it could have occurred, even if only for a period of time. When was it planned? How many people were involved? This is an important part of your argument that deserves a clear answer. Of course, we do not have to have the name of the person. This is of course.

On the other hand, you did not answer an essential question. In the implementation of this law, among other things through the article 7 which opens, which extends the PNR from air transport to train and other means of transport, do you provide the possibility of purchasing train, bus or boat tickets at the last minute to comply with the principle of free movement, as repeated during your meeting with the European Commissioners? I insist on. Why Why ? Because, in the case of the failed Thalys attack, Ayoub El Khazzani bought a last minute train ticket for 149 euros at Midi Station.

Therefore, having a PNR without removing the possibility of purchasing a train ticket at the last minute loses the PNR’s objective of arresting a terrorist before he commits an attack because he will be detected by the correlation of the PNR database with another database. It is important that you can at least specify your intentions in this matter because it justifies or does not justify the alleged effectiveness of the system you are submitting to vote here.

Mr. Hellings, here are two elements of answer. On the one hand, as I have said many times, we are starting to negotiate on the mode of transport "train" with other countries and with the sector. Therefore, I do not know where this will lead us. I hear very well what you say about last-minute tickets but you may face problems or obstacles when implementing them. This is part of the ongoing consultation with the sector and other European countries. I will keep you informed.

On the other hand, in your reasoning, you analyze past cases and say that they could not have been avoided with the PNR. I do not look at past events. I look at the possibilities for the future. My concern is the future attacks. I am not going back.

Here is another beautiful slogan. You used in the discussion between you and me, the argument of the attacks on 11 September 2001 in New York. It was not me who made this argument, it was you! So don’t tell me that you only care about the future! You are interested in the past, and that is what justifies the implementation of a PNR directive for aircraft. The past attacks justify Article 6, namely the extension of aircraft PNRs to trains. What you claim is false. A series of rules are available to us today to prevent attacks in the future by inspiring us from the past. As such, Verviers is an undisputed success story for our intelligence and police services which demonstrate that the current rules and laws are sufficient to handle this matter in order to effectively counter these criminals.

Nov. 24, 2016 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mrs Dierick, the rapporteur, refers to her written report.

Nov. 23, 2016 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr Jean-Jacques Flahaux, rapporteur, refers to the written report.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to take the word in relation to the arrangement of the work. I have not agreed this with the previous speaker, colleague Dirk Van der Maelen, but I address myself explicitly to you to ask you to send back to the committee the important draft law, which is now ahead. This would allow us to resume the debate. I will explain to you why.

We received the draft law sent on 10 October with the request to deal with it urgently, whatever happened. All the drafts and proposals in the special committee “Terrorism Combat”. There was no response to the request of several members of both our and other groups to organize hearings, which, in my opinion, is somewhat contrary to the spirit of that committee, since in that committee would be sought to seek consensus across the boundaries of majority and opposition in a joint struggle, also a legal struggle, against terrorism. On 21 October, ten days after the round-sharing, the discussion of the bill was initiated. On November 10th, another lecture took place and that’s it.

This could be the case if a colleague from that committee, Mr. Yüksel, who is also present here, on 16 November, six days after the conclusion of the discussions, suddenly felt disturbed and communicated to the public, referring to a letter of the European Commission about the draft law. The European Commission is apparently warning the Belgian federal government of possible problems with the design. I tried by all possible means to get that letter from the European Commission, but I failed.

If the European Commission writes a letter to the federal government on this draft law, it would make sense for a democratic debate to report and explain that during the discussion of the draft law. I have thoroughly read the report of our committee work. The Minister refers to the transposition of a European directive and reports of all kinds of opinions, but no mention is made of the writing of the European Commission concerning this draft, while that letter, according to the public statement of Mr. Yüksel, apparently had already arrived at the federal government.

I would therefore request that we, within the framework of the transparency, which our institution requires, allow us at least to take note of that letter and to dedicate the necessary discussions to it. Therefore, I urge that the draft be further discussed in the committee as soon as possible. That means that it should be sent back to the commission here.

Mr. Speaker, I agree with my colleague on this request which seems to me all legitimate because, effectively, there is an important data that has come since the closing of the work in commission. It is this famous letter that was sent by three different commissioners, which was in any case signed, according to what can be read, by three different commissioners. This is not anodin.

Also, if we do not return to the committee, I would like to have at least that mail so that we can see what is the Commission’s preliminary opinion on this Belgian PNR project. I think this is important in the context of the debate we have today. It would be much more serene if we could postpone the point and discuss it again in committee. I will ask you at least to have the letter that was sent by the Commission. I thank you.

I think we had a good discussion in the committee twice. It is true that some were in favour of organizing hearings, including the two speakers who have just taken the floor.

I think it is also interesting to know what exactly was requested by the European Commission. I hope the Minister can clearly explain what exactly was said here. I think this does not have to be a suspensive effect for the discussion and voting of this text.

Indeed, in this somewhat special legislative process, we met twice at noon, one on Thursday at noon, which is quite exceptional, and one on Friday at noon, which is even more exceptional. Here, with new information coming to us, if we had followed a normal legislative process that would have spread over three weeks, we could have had a week of hearings. We could have heard the European Commission such as the police, the Privacy Protection Commission or other actors.

We could have heard the European Commission, possibly Violeta Bulc, Commissioner for Mobility and Transport, Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, or Julian King, Commissioner for Security. We could also have heard the DG Transportation who sent you, through our ambassador to the Coreper of the European Union here in Brussels, a letter last summer.

I have the letter from the European Commission. I am quite prepared, if Mr. Minister is not willing to give it, to transmit it to Mr. President so that we can share it with colleagues. I would be happy to share this information. It is a shame, it is true, to have to get there.

A normal, non-urgent democratic process would not have lasted longer and could have allowed the adoption, under normal democratic conditions, of a measure which is an extremely intrusive measure in the area of privacy. Here, unfortunately, the process does not allow us to have this complete openness to the information we have. If there is a need for transparency here in the plenary session, I am quite willing to give this letter that has been sent to me.

We will immediately begin the final discussion of a framework law. The comments of the European Commission do not affect this. The further development of those matters in the KBs — which was also especially my point of criticism — implies that the appropriate approach is considered by transport sector to ensure that the side effects are largely addressed by a number of supporting measures and framework conditions. I will discuss this in detail later during the discussion.

It is of course up to the Minister to judge the request of Mr. Bonte and other colleagues to make the letter public.

The [...]

Mr. Van der Maelen, I do not know if the letter has arrived. I know he has left and for the rest I have no information about it. Tomorrow we will vote on a new law. The comments do not prejudice that.

I understand the opposition very well. I might have done the same in their place, except for these important issues related to safety. However, I understand that the opposition is making every effort to curb the legislative process. This is part of the parliamentary work of an opposition.

Mr. Bonte, you never asked me, otherwise you would have received the letter. That would not have been a problem, since the topics cited in the letter, as Mr. Yüksel rightly says, all have passed the review in the committee. We talked about the fact that it is a framework law, about consulting with the various sectors before we come up with KBs. I have committed myself that we will not take unilateral measures on such matters, for example for international rail traffic, without exchanging opinions with the countries concerned.

All those topics have been dealt with and I have no problem with dealing with that in the debate that hopefully will be unleashed tonight, Mr. Yüksel. However, the position will later, during the debate, be no different than during the discussion in the committee. The letter of the three Commissioners, which I addressed to Commissioner King last Friday and which has already been answered, does not differ in any way from the discussion in the committee. I do not see any reason why we should pause the discussion at this time.

First, I take note of the willingness to spread the letter, to those who do not yet have it, for apparently some have it already.

Secondly, and for the benefit of Mr Bonte who started the discussion, I must of course say that I confirm that there is a committee report, that there has been a vote, and that this issue has thus been handed over by the committee to this plenary session. We are therefore called to initiate this discussion, unless, of course, we decide otherwise. That is the proof of self. In that case, you must tell me exactly where you want to go.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, I would like to respond calmly to what you say, in particular that the opposition should slow down. You have not seen any delaying manoeuvres from me in the last two years, in no draft law.

Mr. Minister, I only notice that certain topics need to be addressed suddenly, while other issues related to security policy, which are ⁇ important for many, both of the majority and of the opposition – I think for example of the discussion on the merger of the Brussels police zones – are not even scheduled yet. What is crucial in the fight against terrorism in this country, in particular an effective unity structure in our capital on the level of the police, is not even scheduled because some majority party makes it a taboo. That is the reality.

I have not made any delaying manoeuvres so far and also in these I would like to denounce that it is a delaying manoeuvre.

I would also like to point out that even if one announces on Wednesday that there will be a committee meeting on Thursday afternoon, we will be present. I will question it and let you know how many times the committee could continue despite the majority was not in number.

Even if the majority was not in number, we discussed further from the opposition in order not to have a delay. I will look at it and let you know. I do not criticize the fact that in the past we have been working slowly in the safety files, and I do not take it today that the manoeuvre I am describing here is regarded as a delay.

In a democracy, the majority can force the minority. This also happened in the committee, after which the committee concluded, had it not been five days later that a member of the committee referred to a European letter that appeared to be already on the table and of which no notification was made.

Mr Yüksel, I feel like you are taking a curve. I have the press release here for me, which shows that you are very concerned about the writing of the Commission and that you take the warnings of the Commission in this regard on the draft law to heart. I read that in your press release.

Mr. Speaker, the only thing I want is that we can also form an opinion in this important draft with all the arguments and elements of the dossier. This is how I started my presentation.

So my question is to postpone it for a day and deal with it tomorrow or Friday in the committee. I understand that today we received an email that we have a committee meeting on Friday. Put it on the agenda and next week we will be here again.

Mr. Speaker, our country has engaged in the story of European directives. That European directive should be transposed by April 2018. On October 21, 2016, the design was rounded up. The first time it was thoroughly discussed, and the second time in second reading. Then the criticism of the European Commission was published by a member of the majority and I have no control over it.

I just ask that you be the guardian of decent parliamentary work, of decent legislative work. I have understood that today an investigation committee has been set up to check whether we did not work too fast in the past. Let us do decent parliamentary work here, which is likely to enable us to create a much broader draft law. It would only benefit security policy if we have a broader democratic support for important laws like this.

Colleague Bonte, I would like to reassure you, first of all, in connection with the unified police. I know you will be impatient, but we will also conduct that debate in the committee. Do not worry.

Second, as regards the Commission’s concerns expressed in the letter, I share those concerns. When we begin the discussion later, I will also return to it. There is no talk of a curve or anything. My point is, and the Minister has just confirmed that: we will talk about a framework law. The practical development...

The Commission’s concern is about this. I will return to that later. In the practical development we take into account a number of things. Not more, not less.

I hope that we can start the debate. There is enough space and time to discuss all these issues further in the coming weeks.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to emphasize, in relation to the honourable member of the sp.a, that the discussions were conducted correctly. I would like to thank the Minister for being present every time, for answering all the questions that have been made.

This is the implementation of a European decision. In the European Parliament, there were hearings, there were many debates at the level of the Committee on Freedoms. In this context, we may not share, as is the case with the Ecolo group, the foundations of what has been discussed and voted by the European Parliament. There was a large majority, ranging from Christian Democrats to Liberals, through to the Socialists, against this project.

Certainly, the minister’s project is a framework law that, a priori, can allow to go further, since it allows to go beyond railways, towards railways, seaways, bus routes. But the Minister has repeatedly recalled, twice in the committee, that there will be negotiations. A consultation is also underway with the railways of other countries directly surrounding Belgium. The Minister was more or less committed to not acting alone in this area.

Moreover, it seems to me extremely important, and it has been said in the committee, that it is explicitly envisaged that intermediate balances and a synthesis analysis will be organized after the two years of application, which will allow, if necessary, and we are always smarter when we adapt to the reality, to modify, if necessary, the legislation.

I suggest that we limit ourselves to the discussion on the order of work. This is the point that Mr. Bonte introduced. The debate is either for today or for later.

Mr Flahaux, Mr Bonte insists on a letter from the European Commission that is concerned that the Belgian law transposing the PNR Directive involves other means of transport than aircraft, namely train, bus and boat.

They ask for a consultation and we have already answered that we were ready to accept the latter.

What you say is not correct. Let me translate the last paragraph of the letter. The implementation of a PNR could result in reducing the attractiveness of public transport. If this is not a concern, Mr. Minister, it is a very clear warning. This is not a request for explanation.

Mr Flahaux, while the in-depth debate has already been held in the European Parliament regarding the choice of the European directive, the debate at the European level has only taken place on the aircraft. And the letter to which Mr Bonte refers refers to the fact that only Belgium incorporates other means of transport than aircraft in its law transposing the directive.

Mr. Bonte, I would like to reassure you that you are not the one who causes delays in the files. You may say that the majority is not always in number, but even though you were present at the time the procedures were discussed, you left the meeting when it was about the content. You will have your reasons for that. You did not make a delay, because you were not present at that time.

You blame the government and the majority that we are working too fast in the file and you argue that there is still time. On the other hand, you also often blame us for following the facts with our legislation. We now take the lead in a file. We take the lead at the European level. I therefore suggest that we continue this pioneering role and begin the discussion.

I am apparently misunderstood.

I blame no one for anything here. All I want is that I have all the elements of the file available to make a correct judgment. That is my pride as a member of Parliament.

I had to find out that after the hearing in the committee, a letter appears from the European Commission, which, according to the press, was signed by three Commissioners and addressed to the Belgian government and of which I have no knowledge. There is no mention of it in the report, let alone that there has been a discussion about it.

Today it is confirmed that in that letter there is criticism of the legislation. I feel a little stuck as a member of Parliament, because I am unable to judge and weigh the arguments. That’s it! For the rest, I blame no one here and I will always try to be as constructive as possible on the relevant policy area. Please allow me to consider all the elements before I have to press a button here.

Mr. Bonte, first, there is a committee meeting and a report. The draft will then be submitted to the plenary session.

Second, it is constantly about the letter. I have a question, Mr Bonte. Would you be able to live up to the debate as the letter in question, of which I have understood that it circulates in the hemisphere, as quickly as possible, that is, immediately, copied and distributed?

Third and last, we can only change the agenda by voting on it. But if you ask for the vote, then we are not with enough to be able to validly decide, not to say more. In that case, I must, to the regret of those who envy it, suspend the meeting and, in application of Article 42, 3, refer to tomorrow.

Mr. Bonte, you have the word.

Mr. Speaker, I have long been the chairman of the committee, of the committee for public health, of the committee for social affairs and of an investigative committee. I have a lot of experience with this. Therefore, I also know that I can ask for a vote to change the agenda. Per ⁇ I should really consider that.

I just want to try, also in this debate, to keep the courtesy going and continue to work constructively. There is no reason, Mr. Speaker of the Chamber, to refrain from addressing a question from a member of the Parliament, if he knows of additional important arguments, to refer the bill, without having to ask for voting, back to the committee, whose meeting will take place overmorrow, in order to then, instead of 23 November on 30 November, be able to record a premiere.

It is a directive that must be transposed by April 2018. Can I point out to you, colleagues, that this is also a transposition of a 2004 directive? We are about 12 years late. Would it come in a week? Therefore, I would like to ask that you, Mr. Speaker of the Chamber, in the interest of the proper functioning of the Parliament, make your own judgment to refer the draft back to the committee.

Mr Bonte, I have to disappoint you. I am not going to do that for the simple reason that I have heard the two opinions here. Some people ask that the debate be held now, by the way, with the argument that the discussion in the committee was just about the elements that are applied in the letter. I was not there. I have not read all the reports either. I only read the newspaper. I don’t know, but I take note of it.

Therefore, I will not make that decision myself, but I repeat: if you ask for the vote on the amendment...

Then I can indeed do nothing but ask for the vote, Mr. Speaker, even if it were only for the colleagues of the committee for domestic affairs or of the anti-terrorism committee, including the chairman.

I do not know whether the chairman of our committee, who may not be present here, is aware of the letter. Even if it was for the sake of the intense parliamentary debate and so that everyone who has followed this discussion knows all the elements.

I ask for the vote.

I assume that you are asking for the vote. I also note that the Chamber is not in number to be able to validly vote. Upon application of the Rules, we will add this draft to the agenda of tomorrow.

To understand technically. I understand that we are not in number. There is no need to make the calculation. But if you postpone the general discussion to tomorrow, does that mean that a committee will examine new items in advance?

and no. The House cannot vote because we are not in number.

I understood that.

In addition, I quote you Article 42 of our Rules, point 3. I apologize for reading it in Dutch.

“If it is determined that the required number of members is not present, the chairman can challenge the meeting.” I don’t think this makes sense, we will not be here in 60 minutes with 75 members. Do you keep listening? “If he does not exercise this right or if the required number of members is not yet present, he shall fix the next meeting on one of the next four working days” – which may be tomorrow – “unless the Chamber has already convened a meeting at an approximate time.” So it will be added to the agenda tomorrow in the plenary session. Okay to?

Mr. Speaker, I understand Mr. Bonte’s question regarding the letter. You just made the offer to spread the letter. If you have read the letter in your hands, colleague Bonte, you will find that the letter does not question the Framework Law, but above all concerns the modalities of application. Therefore, I suggest that you read the letter, we can suspend it for five minutes. Then comes the question of the essence. Then you can ask to suspend or not suspend.

Mr. Yüksel, I have made the proposal myself. I appreciate your help and your effort, but I fear that Mr. Bonte has the right to ask for it and that we are not in a position to decide about it. I don’t know if it still makes sense.

By politeness, I give you the word, Mr. Crusnière.

Thank you Mr. President. Of course, I support the call for voting made by my colleague. All clarifications need to be made. I would therefore like to have the mail quickly, before tomorrow’s plenary session, so that we can have time to analyze it. I hope we have it again tonight.

The question is asked. In my opinion, we can still distribute, tonight, the letter from the European Commission but the final conclusion is that the session is suspended.