Proposition 54K1738

Projet de loi visant à instaurer un système permanent de régularisation fiscale et sociale.

General information ¶

Submitted by

MR Swedish coalition

Submission date

March 29, 2016

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

tax return tax evasion tax law tax system fraud fine social-security contribution social security

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V ∉ Open Vld N-VA LDD MR PP

Voted to reject

Groen Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP DéFI PVDA | PTB VB

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Discussion ¶

July 19, 2016 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

I hear that the final text of the bill is currently being rounded up.

Reporters are Mrs Ann Vanheste, M. Stéphane Crusnière et M. by Benoît Piedboeuf. Mrs Vanheste informed me that she refers to the written report. Do other journalists do the same? If they do not, they must now ask for the word.

Mr. Speaker, we refer to the written report on the work of the committee, except for the morning report, since the report is to be submitted in session.

Who will make this report?

We share the work.

Our colleague Ahmed Laaouej accompanied by MM. Vanvelthoven, Crusnière and Daerden submitted an amendment no. 6 to amend Article 11.

This amendment aims to address the following problem: the bill did not exclude regularization in the event that the nature of the evaded tax of the period concerned by that tax would not be known. In order to resolve the issue of jurisdiction, Article 11 must be adapted in such a way that, in order to be regularized, revenues from VAT transactions and capital taxably prescribed for the portion thereof must meet three conditions: not have been subject to their ordinary tax regime, determine the nature of the tax to which the income belongs and precisely determine the tax category of the income. If these three conditions are met, we can then say that incomes that have not been subject to their ordinary tax regime and whose nature is indeterminate cannot be regularized.

This amendment, about which my colleague will give you the way it was received, helps to avoid waste of time and appeals to the Constitutional Court and thus to bring revenue faster to all who will want them.

Thank you Mr Piedboeuf. I give you the floor for the second part of the report.

This amendment was discussed at today’s meeting. There was an exchange of views and two sub-amendments were submitted. by Mr. Laaouej et consorts submitted Subamendment No. 9, aiming to also exclude VAT transactions from the settlement of amounts likely to be linked to certain infringements. Ms Smaers et consorts submitted sub-amendment No 10, aiming to provide for the obligation for the declarant to specify the period to which the tax in question relates.

We voted on these sub-amendments and amendments. Amendments 9 and 10 were unanimously adopted. The amendment, as amended, is adopted unanimously. The amendment was passed by 15 votes and one abstention. The amended bill was approved by 11 votes to 5.

This could have been the never-ending story. It has long been discussed in the commission, for a very simple reason. Indeed, this bill, on which the government put very strongly to increase its tax revenues, was introduced some time ago and has been the subject of very many exchanges, very many discussions in committees. But above all, he has experienced a number of legal peripeties, including several opinions of the State Council. He gave at least two opinions on the bill itself and a multitude of opinions on draft amendments.

But before we address this aspect, there is first the bill itself and its scope, namely a tax regularization. For us, legislators, the question arises as to whether a tax regularization is relevant today, given the evolution of the European and international tax environment. We can see, in fact, from various significant events, the last being the financial crisis of 2008, a trend to go towards more exchanges of intelligence.

Of course, among European countries, we think of the Savings Directive and the automatic exchange of information concerning financial income. But there is also the FATCA dynamic initiated ⁇ by the United States. The United States itself understood well that with regard to certain cooperative territories, nothing was worth the ratio of political forces. We will remember the gains recorded, in the case of the United States, with Switzerland.

Similarly, with the successive revelations (the Offshore Leaks, the LuxLeaks, but also recently the Panama Papers), the European Union wants to put the double blows on the identification of tax havens and, at the same time, on the strengthening of cooperation to combat the phenomenon of international tax evasion, without counting, of course, the strengthening of the law on laundering. These directives must be transposed into different national laws.

The trend is the exchange of information. The trend is cooperation.

In short, the strain is tightening. First, in terms of fiscal policy, it seems quite inconsistent to promote a new tax regularization. This is the reason why it happens against time, because it would not be necessary, especially if this fiscal regularization is conceived as permanent, to give the feeling that in the bottom, it is enough to proceed to tax evasion, to fraud and to say that one day or another, I will regularize at the time I choose. This is counterproductive in terms of addressed signal. That is why we will vote against this bill. We said it from the beginning.

There is an additional fact that is not new but that has amplified since the sixth state reform, it is the strengthening of fiscal federalism. In 2002, the regionalization of succession rights and registration rights was already complete. Regions were already competent on certain elements, including rates. But since 2002, this regionalization has been complete in these subjects. Added to this, in the agreements that sealed the Sixth State Reform, a partial regionalization of the tax on natural persons.

This obviously complicates the case. Why Why ? People will regularize capital that has not been subject to inheritance rights, this inheritance has not been declared. This is a bit the figure of the Uncle of America, but in this case, it may be the Uncle of the Caiman Islands, the Seychelles, or what do I know? They can also regularize professional income that a person has deliberately decided to evacuate abroad. In short, all this covers quite different realities but which, in one way or another, today, are at this point of intersection of federal and regional tax powers. This is why a regulation project such as this must necessarily take into account the rules for the division of competence between the federal and the Regions under the Special Financing Act. This is what the Council of State has not forgotten very early.

Yes, we will regret that the government has chosen not to take this into account quickly, immediately. We did not fail to recall it and say that if the government did not change its copy, it would expose itself to a legal risk of appeal before the Constitutional Court. I imagine that from a tired war, in order to ensure the legal security of its bill, the government has understood that it might be useful to take into account both the contribution of the parliamentary work of the opposition but also and above all the opinion of the State Council that, in relation to one of the amendments filed by the opposition - and I do not strictly take any pride from it, I repeat that this is a matter that could have been settled, several months ago - said that that amendment, in this case the amendment 6 which revises Article 11 of the bill as it was exposed by Mr. Piedboeuf, was a disposition that was necessary.

In other words, this amendment is necessary. We must see, in fact, that the government has given a signal to the opposition suggesting that this amendment could be accepted. This amendment was approved almost unanimously, except for my mistake.

This, of course, does not prejudice the succession of events, but at least, it may open the path of maturity for our fiscal federalism. I send a signal. We must learn, as Parliament, and you as Executive, to think today “in multiple dimensions”. At the beginning, it is not enough to ask ourselves what objective we are pursuing in fiscal policy. It must also be asked whether this objective is compatible with the contemporary reality of fiscal federalism. As I said, this goes through meetings and exchanges. Federalism is also this: the real, organized concertation. I do not necessarily say “institutionalized”. The consultation committee exists for this. But nothing prevents the creation of a permanent working group.

Should I draw the attention of all my colleagues on the arrival of other files? You will tell me that the gambling tax is only 39 million euros. It is still 39 million euros, even though it is not the 250 million of the regularization. But what is the advantage, for the federal government or for the Regions – which could also interfere with the competences of the federal – of making a text, a draft law, an order, a decree, which would not meet the imperatives of the Constitution and of the Special Funding Act?

Yes, I am pleased that you considered it time to curb this legal deficit. This restores a balanced framework of discussion with the Regions, which will have to determine their position for the follow-up of events.

I would like to ask a question for clarification. About the Panama Papers.

Mr. Minister, you have spoken in the press. You have taken a clearly resolved position, but we would like to hear you explicitly on this specific point regarding the files that are today identified by your administration as being revealed by the Panama Papers investigation. Are you confirming before Parliament the fact that the Panama Papers are excluded from tax regularization?

Mr. Speaker, I would like to briefly explain some of the reasons why we are embracing the bill.

First, the draft testifies to a very high legal clarity.

The stop-and-gob policy, which has been carried out in the past, has not wrongly and not surprisingly led to deviations. It has mainly resulted in various treatments.

Those who have witnessed the discussions with the BBI in the Panama Commission have identified how the differences in treatment by the offices actually had a basis. With the present draft law, we create very clear legal clarity.

Second, it should not be underestimated how incredibly hard it has been worked to find a diplomatic solution to the existing complexity between the federal government and the West. There are, at least at the moment, very thorough and good conversations in progress, in order to be able to align things with each other.

Mr. Laaouej, you see in the bill the basis for more fiscal federalism and coordination. That is not correct. I understand and fully agree that coordination is necessary. On the other hand, simplification should remain our starting point. On that level, the solutions can be sought in two directions, not only in the further merger, but in the simplification, in order to ensure that the burdens are placed where they are best placed.

Finally, contrary to what you say, Mr. Laaouej, the design really surfs on the common trends, in particular those towards more correct fiscal behavior, which you apparently want to deny. This is evidenced by several parameters that are available today.

One of those parameters we also measured in the Panama Commission, namely the increasing number of announcements for foreign constructions and foreign accounts. Taxpayers are more often out there. It will also be communicated more clearly and transparently.

The way in which the present draft law is conceived will only benefit the Treasury. This is especially beneficial to the honest taxpayer, who gets a little backback thanks to the capital with which one has not done what one ought to do for years.

In this way, we work towards a fairer taxation.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to come back in a few words to the considerations expressed by Mr. President of the Panama Commission. Laouej, for whom I have great appreciation, not for his position as president, which he does very well anyway, but because he knows, as a result of all the discussions that have taken place in recent weeks and in recent months, that this fiscal regulation is in a good momentum. Why Why ? All the commissioners of this commission are obviously aware that as long as there is only one country that remains a tax haven, there can always be a transfer to that country. It is obvious that if we are at the moment, in a consensual way for some, in an intention of transparency, it remains no less that many countries, or even certain states, will presumably maintain this paradise status for various reasons.

The momentum is justified especially since it comes at a time when the Minister of Finance and the government have decided to take a panel of measures. This includes, and has been widely discussed in the Panama Commission, the Caiman tax, which is also a way to fight tax evasion. There are a number of other means, such as increasing the scope of ISI agents, new measures to prosecute web crime, a set of measures that will be taken in the coming months.

Finally, as a result of a publicity of transparency at the international level, the insecurity that the person who wishes to make an honorable fine will feel will encourage them to do so now as part of this regulation.

So I think this is a good time, it’s an opportunity for some before the shock of transparency and therefore it’s a fully justified measure that my political group and myself will support with great determination.

Mr. Speaker, I promise not to take back on my account the time spent speaking to my colleague Georges Gilkinet. I will be more concise according to my habits, especially since many debates have already taken place around this bill.

The approach to this tax regulation could be ideological or philosophical and we might ask ourselves whether, in terms of moral or ethical, it is a good or a bad thing. I leave this ideological debate to those who want to carry it. What is certain is that precedents have taken place: three regularizations have been carried out successfully. The last was voted by the CDH group on the grounds that it was just the last one. Three groups of the majority of four also voted for it for the same reason. It was the third and the last. If the CDH group, today, does not vote for this new regularization, it is precisely to not deny the lawmaker’s word by instituting a new regularization operation after the one that should have been the last. Moreover, this new operation becomes permanent and, once it becomes permanent, the offence itself persists in the mind of the legislator, which is a very bad signal.

Obviously, hearing the words of Mr. Scourneau, I measure how much the majority and the MR, in particular, remain attached to this project. This will ⁇ remain one of the markers of this majority, as well as the index jump. The index jump and tax regularization are the two strong markers of this majority. They will be in charge until the end of the legislature.

It is not the infringement that is permanent since the person who commits an infringement is entitled to regularize it only once. Only one!

This may be the case at the individual level, but in the general philosophy of the system, there is, in some way, an acceptance of the fact that this tax fraud against which one claims to fight, persists, becomes permanent and obliges to provide mechanisms of endless regularization. This is a breakthrough approach compared to previous operations and in particular, to the one we had supported on the CDH banks.

What complaints can be made about this project? First of all, we must emphasize how hard the road was. When you look at the retrospect of parliamentary work, you see that it took a very, very long gestation. The first opinion of the State Council – there are four in total – dates back to October 2015. How many discussions in committees, how many new readings, referrals to the State Council were not needed? This shows how improved the text was. And, as far as I am concerned, I am not convinced that its final version is satisfactory. In any case, the baby does not seem to be very successful.

Furthermore, the way in which we have approved, this morning, an amendment and sub-amendments, i.e. in the urgency, somewhat at a rush, may suggest that this corresponds to the hope of a maturity as our colleague Mr. Mr. wants to believe. by Laaouej. But we can also see in it the confirmation of a method mostly marked by improvisation and by a series of reversals, the one whose question is only the last in date.

So we witnessed a late reversal, somewhat in extremis while alarm signals had been issued from the beginning. In fact, it is not since before yesterday that it is known that the provisions relating in particular to taxes of indefinite nature pose a problem.

In its first opinion issued in October 2015, the State Council emphasized that this was one of the major problems of this project in so far as it allowed the regularization of amounts whose origin of the tax was eluded and whose taxable period was not known.

The State Council again made this comment in its second opinion in December. There were so many comments that I forgot the exact date. On this occasion, the State Council recalled that the regularization of capital for which the evaded tax and the taxable period are not determined creates a violation of the rules of allocation of powers. October 2015, December 2015. It would have taken some time for the minds to evolve and for the majority to come to the idea that there might be a real problem of skill distribution, like Mr. Pietro Bottas acknowledged this in his oral report.

Overall, I find that this way of working – amendments and sub-amendments have been drafted in a handwritten manner; they are ⁇ here orally – is not to be credited with this legislation which, on the contrary, seems to me to be marked by the seal of uncertainty.

This is the second complaint I would like to raise. There is no doubt that this amendment will resolve all of the problems. Far from there! Far from there! Per ⁇ there is some satisfaction. Let’s say that maybe it’s less bad. Nevertheless, important points have been discussed throughout our work and, to my knowledge, they have not obtained a satisfactory answer. Particular questions arise with regard to EU legislation. The fact that the collection made by the State of residence is not deducted is considered to be contrary to the European Savings Directive. What is the response of the government and the minister to this possible breach of EU law? I would have liked to hear it here in a public hearing, had I not heard it in the committee debates. Similarly, the inability to appeal may appear as incompatible with a judgment of the Constitutional Court that, decisively, is on your way throughout the legislative process of this text. In fact, on 19 December 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that the inability to appeal was unacceptable in the light of the Constitution.

There are, therefore, two legal uncertainties: one related to European legislation, the other related to this ruling of the Constitutional Court.

And above all, there is always the subsistence of uncertainty, of legal uncertainty in relation to the Regions. It is true that the amendment limits the breakdown, in a way, but I think it would be better to go a step further, as you said this morning in the committee. I would like to hear you again in the plenary session on this matter. Since the powers are so intertwined, the State Council has not ceased to say that a cooperation agreement between the federal state and the Regions was needed. You rejected this analysis. Then, finally, here, in extremis, lightning of clarity, you admitted that indeed, this cooperation agreement was desirable and was on the right track.

If amendments are submitted, this is the only issue. This is precisely so that the cooperation agreement is entered into the law so that you can meet your commitments. A political statement, in a given context, is already better than nothing, but it is not entirely reassuring.

We are submitting amendments to ensure that the necessary cooperation agreement, as judged by the Council of State, is incorporated into the law. This would allow us to consolidate and legally consolidate your project. Otherwise, there will be a sword of Damocles.

by Mr. Van Biesen said that Mr. Vanhengel had eventually become reasonable and that he would not lead a fight to the bust, to the Constitutional Court. But that does not completely reassure me. The risk exists and is still real.

If you want to protect yourself from a decision of the Constitutional Court, it would be best to accept, very officially and in the law, this need for a cooperation agreement and that you really enter into this negotiation with the Regions in the framework of this mature federalism that our colleague Mr. Laouej called out of his wishes and to which we all aspire.

I now come to a third complaint. This is the questioning in relation to the tax revenues you expect from this regularization operation. From the beginning, the figure of 250 million euros has been cited. Can you confirm this number?

Objectively, the latest elements related to the publication of the monitoring committee report do not fully advocate in your favor in terms of the reliability and credibility of the budget forecasts.

Is the €250 million target really what you want to ⁇ ? Unless, as part of the government’s budget work this summer, you are forced to increase the possible revenue from this regularization to maybe 500 or 750 million. This would be a way to fill the hole identified by the monitoring committee. Mr. Speaker, can you put a number here? This would be interesting because we will come back to you at the end of the year to find out that your estimate was serious or, on the contrary, very random.

I would like to formulate another complaint that is due to the symbolic scope of this bill which constitutes a strong political step for you. Even if on the principle of regularization, we can consider that by pragmatism, we must go through this, we find ourselves in a context where the public opinion expects a reinforcement of control measures, based on the recommendations of all international organizations, rather than a perpetuation of a mechanism of regularization for the benefit of fraudsters.

by Mr. Scourneau described the Caiman tax as a beautiful example of government voluntarism. We will talk about it again because the Panama Commission observers all emphasize how fragile and ineffective this tax is.

If you want to convince us of your determination to fight tax fraud, you could, as you have pledged for a long time, provide the Panama Commission with the status of the implementation of the 108 recommendations of the Special Committee on Fighting Tax Fraud. We understood that you were willing to press your services for this update to be communicated as soon as possible, but I think you were too late. I ask you to officially communicate the state of the place of what has been done to the Panama Commission and to make us new suggestions and interesting recommendations. Otherwise, your advocacy in favour of the fight against tax fraud will lack persuasion.

Furthermore, this bill has the effect of erasing the distinction between ordinary tax fraud and serious tax fraud. We may understand a certain form of criminal immunity in order to encourage the persons concerned to regulate their situation, but you cannot ignore the distinction between these two categories of fraud. I think this policy is harmful.

In addition, I would like to emphasize how the context created by the disclosure of the Panama Papers should encourage us to be more firm instead of trying to facilitate regularization operations.

Finally, I have doubts about the actual effectiveness of this operation. It is difficult to have a definitive opinion at this stage, but a number of technicians, through articles in specialized journals or in the press, have argued that the device under review today contains elements that may be detrimental to the goal you are pursuing. The amount of fines is significant, ⁇ even dissuasive. However, some elements do not guarantee that this operation will reach its goal, which would be the worst of things. We could then say to ourselves, "All this for that!"It is probably too early to resolve this question. We will see more clearly in the coming months when we will know who benefits from this operation, under what conditions and for what amounts.

I have some objections and criticisms. While some might have thought that the political climate could soften in favour of a unanimous vote in the committee, the strong differences that remain with regard to this text have as a consequence that the CDH group will not be able to vote on it in the state.

Mr. President, Mr. Dispa, “All this for that!” But of course! It must not be forgotten what the previous regulations have brought to the State, but also to the Regions: 5.5 billion euros, of which 1.6 billion went into the state treasures and 680 million in those of the Regions. “All this for that,” I think when colleague Laaouej says that 30 million is already something, 5 billion, it is all the more!

I have confirmed!

Thank you for the confirmation, President. I would return to the Panama Papers.

But before that, I would like to say this. I was a bit upset by the remarks of colleague Dispa, who seems to say that it is a political marker, that the liberals chose to regularize what could be an infringement. This is a rather peculiar intellectual evasion in the sense that at the same time it refers to Article 6 of the law, which has long been discussed under the cover of colleague Laaouej’s amendment. This article specifically covers more than twenty offences that do not allow regularization. Of course, these are serious offences that you will never be able to deal with.

Our colleague Dispa seems to be silent and to reject this point that we find ⁇ important. We talked about the Caiman tax; in the Panama Commission, we talked a lot about it. What have we heard at the bottom?

The people who are most accustomed to this type of legal device and experts have, all, recognized that it was an innovative and interesting system.

Of course, these are the first months of the implementation of this law. The bill was passed following the Government Declaration of Policy. This was one of the first measures taken by the government. It has only been operational for a few months. It will be evaluated because everything can be improved. In other words, I think that’s where we will go in the framework of our recommendations, following the work of the Panama Commission.

However, the law has the merit of existing, for a very short time indeed, but it is there!

And finally, I would like to conclude on one point that I also find important, that is that colleague Dispa tells us how shocking it is not to distinguish serious tax fraud from normal incidence. I would like to emphasize that in the context of previous regularizations, the figures are evocative. For DLU ter, only 30 serious cases were recognised out of 6,200 cases. For the DLU bis, no cases of serious tax fraud have been ⁇ .

He talked about pragmatism. I think that tax regularization is a pragmatic system that, in a pragmatic way, takes into account the past in proposing you this new bill.

I would like to comment on a few points of Mr. President’s speech. by Scourneau.

Regarding the budget estimate, I am delighted to hear the estimate of Mr. The Minister . The government announces 250 million revenue and Mr. Scourneau generates $5 billion in revenue from previous operations. Where will the cursor stop between these two amounts? I would like to obtain from the Minister of Finance a somewhat supported estimate, which is not simply out of the past without knowing whether it can be verified.

Mr. Scourneau, you referred to Article 6, but in fact it is Article 11 that provides for a series of sources of income that cannot be subject to regularization. I would like to tell you that there would be no more than that! The fact that terrorism-related income cannot be regularized, you cannot brand this as an ethical and moral satisfaction of which the majority could prevail. That illicit drug trafficking cannot be legalized, should we congratulate you? That human trafficking cannot give rise to a regularization is the least of the things! There is nothing to gargage.

Finally, you mentioned the number of serious cases. You quote about thirty for one of the previous operations. There would even be only one, it should be considered as a serious case and not as an ordinary fraud. That is the difference between you and us. You consider that nothing is really very serious and that this tax fraud can be considered quite ordinary. I consider that there are serious cases that should be considered as such. I regret that, by pragmatism, you have decided to pass this distinction by losses and profits.

Mr President, my colleague has caricatures. In the fourth paragraph of the aforementioned article, it is obvious that such facts are not regularisable. In addition, all fraud committed to the detriment of the financial interests of the Communities, environmental crime, counterfeiting of property, stock crimes, etc. are mentioned. Therefore, let us try to keep the right measure and avoid developing a manichean vision between the "good" who would be against regularization and the "bad", those infamous who would want to regularize anything.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, this dossier has been discussed in the House since the beginning of this legislature. I think the previous government clearly and clearly stated that after the permanent regularization, a temporary regularization would be implemented, which would end and also ended on 31 December 2013.

That was a clear message for anyone who had hidden money somewhere.

It is a bit bizarre that Mr. Van de Velde just came to blame the past for the stop and go. It is just like the previous government that has long announced that there would be a definitive stop and it is this government that again says go, the government that also likes to pack out with legal certainty in tax matters. This is now a proof of the opposite.

There was a clear and clear message from the previous government. The same partners Open Vld, MR, CD&V who were then in the government now say with the N-VA that the stop that was then introduced is abolished and that we are going back forward with the regularization.

We regret that. I have said it repeatedly. We regret that, since we in the previous government decided to introduce a definitive stop, to make a definitive end to the regularization, because this was then linked to a number of matters that were new at the time and essential to actually tackle tax fraud.

I will remind you of a few measures against tax fraud that were taken at the time. The BBI was strengthened by 20%. There was a framework for specialized tax magistrates. The legislation was strengthened. There was a prison sentence up to 5 years. The acceptance policies of the banks have been improved and strengthened. Nevertheless, this government comes with a regularization that means that tax fraudsters can no longer be prosecuted. We have appointed additional tax magistrates and raised prison sentences, but today this government considers all that no longer important: it now gives these people the opportunity to regularize and, in other words, buy off their punishment.

A second element that was important at the time, and we have talked about several times, is the international becoming more stringent. We know that from the beginning of next year there will be an exchange of financial data from foreign banks to the Belgian Fiscal Authority. So we will get a lot of information about money abroad that may be there, but in part may also be unfair. Just at the moment we get that data, that we will be able to identify the money thrown away, just at that moment this government still gives a chance to regularize. I think this is disrespectful and ethically irresponsible. I think that is anything but. If we want to take tax fraud fighting seriously, that is the reverse signal that the government wants to give today with the new regularization law. I deeply regret that.

I see that CD&V is absent in large numbers. I thought though. You are with two, which is in large numbers absent.

What annoys me most at CD&V is that the party, after the previous government had decided that fiscal regularization would end, has also written it down in so many words in its electoral program. I will not read it again in this speech. CD&V has gone to the voters with the promise that there will be no further tax regulation.

My question to CD&V is to explain this. Explain it to me because I don’t understand it. However, explain it to your voters as well because if there is something that people are full of, it’s politicians who say A before the elections and let the day after the elections include the opposite in the government deal.

You had the chance to remain true to your word and uphold the decision made by the previous government. Let me explain why you promise to the voters the end of tax regularizations first and you will approve this bill today. What happened that suddenly changed your mind? Measures have been taken, both internationally and domestically, which are exactly the opposite, in particular no more regularisations.

I expect a further presentation from the CD&V banks so that we can get clarity on this.

Mr. Vanvelthoven, I will briefly interrupt you. We have already clarified our position on the draft law on tax regularization. We see that as part of a comprehensive package on tax fraud, especially with the aim of increasing the collection, so getting additional income, receipts that we must get. We see this as a closing point in the entire arrangement, to which also the Kaimantaks belongs. We have always been in favour of the KAIMANTAX as a working instrument, in order to effectively bring so much money that is in offshore countries to Belgium and to reap the fruits there.

Regarding the workwork that is now underway, we have already said in the committee that we are obviously not a big proponent of systems of fiscal regularization. However, we see this bill as a closing piece and so it is constructed. Money that was in the past, for example, in offshore reconstructions, can not be returned to Belgium through the Kaimantax, but through fiscal regularization it can. Since it is a closing part of a set of instruments and is structured in such a way, we will approve it at the vote. We have also clarified this in the committee.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I thank CD&V for this “unclearness”.

When you wrote the electoral program for CD&V, the argument of tax revenues already existed. I read in your electoral program that, in the context of combating tax fraud, we must get capital hidden abroad here. That is right, and this is also stated in our electoral program.

There is no need for fiscal regularization. Fiscal regularization is to say to the owner of hidden money that we know it and will soon be able to catch him, but that he can get rid of it cheaper, not only in terms of rates, but also in terms of judicial immunity that can be purchased here. I think this is a rejection for serious tax fraud.

Also the argument that we need that tax regularization to get that money abroad here because otherwise it will not come here is not true.

The general tax legislation that exists today says what happens when someone with his hidden capital, with his black money, wants to come to our country.

Without tax regulation, the legislation says the following. I will limit myself to the amounts from after 2005, to the amounts that have been hidden over the last ten years. Article 444 of the Income Tax Code and Article 225 and subsequent of the Royal Decree for its implementation state that there is no tax increase, no fine when it comes to incomplete, incorrect declarations, independent of the will of the taxable person. If it is about things that were unintentionally hidden, then there is a tax increase from 10%. If it is intentional, in other words fraud, then a tax increase from 50% can be introduced.

When it comes to the use of fake documents, we go to 200%. However, it is an argument that we need the regularization, because otherwise the tax fraudsters will not come here with their money. Our general tax legislation today provides for that possibility. Why is it not enough, after years of being told that the story is over, to raise taxes by 50 percent? Why is that too much? Why should it be 36%? Why do we need judicial immunity? I would love to hear from you. I don’t understand why anything should be cheaper, and especially why such facts should be able to be purchased in court. These are the substantial arguments why the SPD will, of course, vote against the regulation.

However, there are two things I would like to talk about, which we have had a lot of discussions about lately.

First, the State Council has repeatedly issued a negative opinion on your draft. This may be resolved in the Commission today. I have understood that there have been informal talks with the regions over the last few days and weeks and that the matter has been resolved. I hope it is so. If you come to Parliament with legislation against which proceedings are announced, that is bad legislation from the perspective of fiscal legal certainty. If fiscal legal certainty comes today thanks to amendments from the opposition, it is good that we did so, but in fact you should have done that job, Mr. Minister.

Secondly, in the previous discussions we have repeatedly pointed out the danger that by the adoption of the regularization law, those mentioned in the Panama Dossiers could still apply for a regularization.

We have asked the majority to postpone the draft law on regularization until the BBI has effectively started the investigations. I heard yesterday through the press that the BBI has started an investigation in 239 of the cases. Maybe you can later explain a little more about how this happened.

It is a good thing that the BBI does this work. But it is the opposition that, against your will, has always delayed this bill with all possible procedural measures. Had it been up to you, Mr. Minister, then there would have been no delay from the discussion and the draft had already been approved. You have always refused delay.

Fortunately, the opposition has delayed the procedure again and again. If the Belgians mentioned in the Panama Dossiers today can no longer make use of the regularization, which you are apparently proud of, it is due solely to the opposition. You have zero merit. and zero!

You should not shake no. Whenever we asked in the committee to postpone the discussion, you refused. The majority has tried to oppose any delay we have requested.

Mr. Minister, it is surprising that you are now standing on the table to say that you have made sure that the Belgians mentioned in the Panama Dossiers will not be able to make use of the regularization.

If you think it is so important for the Belgians mentioned there, why do you not think it is important for all the others who commit tax fraud? Why Why ? In the case of the perpetrators in the Panama Phase, you are glad that they cannot regularize but all those other perpetrators who have nothing to do with Panama can regularize.

That is another discussion.

No, that’s not another discussion, that’s just the same discussion. If tomorrow we get the Liechtenstein Papers, which also mentions a number of Belgians, they will be able to regularize. In fact, it’s all a bit ridiculous, in the sense that the Panama beef can be caught, but that all the others can go freely, if we approve the present draft regulation law.

That is why the SP-A-Fraktion will reject this draft law of regularization with very great force.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister of Finance, without great surprise, my group will not support this bill aimed at establishing a permanent system of tax and social regularization.

The Panama Papers special committee has been held in our parliament for several months. This commission, set up after another tax fraud scandal, will allow our assembly to grasp the mechanisms of evasion and fraud to which some Belgian banks and citizens have been involved.

We would obviously wish, as part of a constructive debate, that the government awaits the conclusions of this Panama Papers special committee before proceeding to this vote.

With regard to the fate of fraudsters and the fight against tax evasion, with this mechanism, this time permanent, the government allows fraudsters to regularize their assets, their wealth. In other words, by means of an increase in taxes whose rates can be criticized, and I will return to it, fraudsters will be able to get a white-seing and repatriate their hidden assets abroad, and this, in all quietness.

It is true, I admit to you, that this mechanism already existed under the former government. However, the difference is that there is nothing permanent. After the third DLU, the previous government said: "Stop!". Only the possibility of regularizing with the Special Tax Inspectorate remained, which enabled the recruitment of ⁇ 125 million in 2015 income taxes.

At a time when the barrage continues to tighten on tax havens and fraudsters, the government’s choice continues to question.

As for the rates applied, let me also return to that. The risk of tax fraud is increasing. Why Why ? The rates of increase envisaged in the bill are too low. In the case of unprescribed income: an increase of 20 points. In the context of tax-prescribed capital: increase of 36 points. In other words, for the entry into force of this new legislation, we take back the same rates as under the DLU ter, and we start again.

However, I welcome the fact that by 2020, the increases will reach 25% for non-prescribed income and 40% for prescribed capital.

This government claimed to be the one who would represent the new tax transparency. Since 1 January 2015, the Caiman Tax has entered into force. From this date, in principle, the founders, holders and third-party beneficiaries can be taxed on the income of the constructions they hold abroad. In other words, income which would have been received after 1 January 2015 and which would not have been declared by the person referred to in the provision cannot be subject to regularization.

Such a hypothesis can also be deduced: in the case of prescribed capital, the Caiman tax would logically prevent regularization. So why not specify it explicitly in the legislation? I suppose that too much legal uncertainty would only harm the work of the tax administration. It has been discussed several times in this session, the risk of an appeal by the Brussels Region against this bill will inevitably lead to obvious legal uncertainty. If this appeal hypothesis is confirmed, I recall that this is the second time that the government of the Brussels Region initiates an appeal against the federal, the first being against the overflight of aircraft above Brussels.

If I welcome the two Brussels regional initiatives, I find again that the government, in case of disagreement with these two Regions (Brussels and Walloon) decides to come into force by negotiating a cooperation agreement with Flanders alone. I hope this is not due to coincidence.

You will easily understand that, for the reasons mentioned by my colleagues in the opposition, my group will not support this project by in no way holding accountable fraudulent behaviors, or worse, encouraging tax evasion. We also ask ourselves questions about the relevance of the return of the 250 million (this was discussed here earlier) while there is a lack of 2.4 billion in the budget! What performance can we expect?

Mr. Speaker, like some colleagues who have preceded me, I will not go back in length and wide on the institutional aspect of the project under discussion which we have yet to discuss in the Finance Committee.

I just want to draw attention to the fact that once again this project demonstrates, after the first five reforms, that the Sixth State Reform does not work or works with very great difficulties.

Furthermore, it can be seen that in tax matters, it is always very difficult to pass a project so the "crazy" distribution of skills is a problem.

I would also like to return to the substance of the matter. Without going back on thirteen years of tax history, I would like to bring the text back to consideration in the process of tax amnesty as it occurs in Belgium and remind that, finally, we find ourselves facing the history of a single amnesty that has become repetitive before becoming permanent. I would like to summarize in one sentence the text I am talking about.

As a reminder, in 2003 the DLU was voted, i.e. the single liberatory declaration – I say very unique – to which the PTB, which was not yet represented in parliament, was already opposed. If I refer to the Scourneau classification, at the time, the PTB was already part of the bonds to the extent that it already opposed tax amnesty while the MR was already part of the bad ones who defended it. At the time, it was Mr. Didier Reynders, then Minister of Finance, who carried the project.

Why were we already opposed to this project in 2003? Because it is neither more nor less than an incentive to fraud that, in the short term, makes money return to the cash, but that, in the long term, generates a much larger budget loss.

At the time, in 2003, a member of CD&V had called the DLU operation “a large-scale whitening operation.” He is now a member of this government. As you don’t see it a lot, sometimes you wonder if it’s really a member, but I can confirm that. This is Pieter De Crem. It was he who declared this in 2003: “large-scale laundering operation.” You hear well! It was the DLU No. 1. It was not permanent. At the time, it was unique. It does not prevent...

Didier Reynders, the author of the project at the time, explained in 2005, two years after the DLU: "It is not anyway to do it again. There is no question, in fact, of giving a bad signal of the kind "fraud without restraint for a few years and you will then have the opportunity to regularize your situation." Well, we were already against this single amnesty, but it happens that, a few months after declaring that it was not anyway to be done again, Minister Reynders in 2006 makes a DLU bis. This is a paradox: one makes a new operation, a bis, of a measure that is unique. In DLU, U is set for “unique”.

In 2013, we will continue. In DLU, the U is put for "universal" probably. We do not stop here! Then comes the DLU ter. Again, a member of CD&V makes a shocking statement: “This is the last time that this possibility of amnesty will be proposed.” It is another CD&V that makes a statement in this regard, the then Minister of Finance, Koen Geens.

This is a small parenthesis. I don’t want to overwhelm the CD&V, but you still see the evolution: in 2003, large-scale whitening operation, in 2013, it is the “der des der”, and then, today, permanent regularization operation! The evolution is quite rough, if one could laugh at it, which unfortunately is not the case! In 2016, we reached the fourth but permanent DLU. At the same time, this is a good news. It can be said that it is actually the last, since it is permanent and there will be no more afterwards. Consolation is weak. In fact, we are moving to a higher stage. The incentive to fraud is amplified, since the fraudster knows that he will have eternity ahead of him to regularize his situation! They can cheat for years. He will know that he will be able to regulate his situation when he will, when it will fix it! This is obviously a quite important problem.

“A large-scale whitening operation,” said Peter De Crem at the time. In fact, this also poses a real problem in terms of laundering. This is the former head of the CTIF, Mr. Delepière, who mentioned it. I quote him: "Nothing better than a tax regularization to wash money from organized crime." Indeed, one of the problems found is that the CTIF probably does its work with the means it has available but that at the level of justice, there is no follow-up. There are almost no money laundering cases coming to court. There is a very high level of impunity.

The question of penalties obviously poses a problem since, here, it is true that it can be said that compared to other operations, the penalties are ⁇ a little higher, but we remain in very gentle penalties of the order of 20 to 25%. This remains in any case below the 50% that are due in case of fraudulent intent in the Tax Code. This remains well below the penalty that strikes the small ordinary fraudster, the one who takes the bus without paying and who must pay, in relation to the price of the ticket, a penalty of 5,000%. Of course, we are very far from that. Especially if they escape the penalty. It is also in this sense that the PTB introduced an amendment to remove this possibility of escaping criminal prosecution from the moment that this regularization is applied. Al Capone was sent to prison for tax fraud. In Belgium, Al Capone could have escaped prison.

I will conclude with this conclusion: this project of permanent tax regularization is part of a tax policy that allows the richest and large companies to escape tax. This regularization is integrated into a six-story rocket that serves to avoid taxes when you are rich or a large multinational company.

The first floor of the rocket is the tailor-made laws, like those discussed this morning: real estate funds, Diamond tax, patent deductions, all those laws that are tailor-made for a particular economic sector.

Second floor of the rocket: the entire system of rulings. On the one hand, there is the "ready-to-tax" for the ordinary taxpayer, but on the other hand, for particular sectors that have entries to the Early Decision Service, arrangements can take place.

The third floor of this rocket is the absence of a voluntary struggle against tax fraud.

The fourth is the permanent tax regularization that we are currently discussing.

The fifth floor is also the work of Minister Geens when he was Minister of Finance: it is the criminal transaction, which allows diamonds or Chodiev to escape justice.

The sixth floor is the trials, like that of KB Lux and others, where large fraudsters escape sanctions after a ⁇ tired procedural trial, where everything is done to put sticks in the wheels and prevent the condemnation of these large fraudsters.

This is a tax system that allows some to escape tax. This permanent tax regulation fits perfectly into this process.

Mr. Speaker, colleague Van Hees always has great names as references: Lenin, Stalin, Al Capone. Fortunately, in our country, no one is sent to prison for selling beer, otherwise our cherished colleagues would have some concerns!

That being said, it is always false to present the system of tax regularization as a system inciting to tax fraud. This is a system with very heavy penalties; they can rise up to 40%.

Mr. Van Hees, it is as if, because you can pay a penalty for over-rolling, you were asked to exceed the speed limit tolerated. Of course, it is false! This is not how the system works. The penalty is 40% to be paid on amounts that would have been hijacked and for the causes that we know.

If there is a punishment, there is no incitement and there is no pleasure in being punished! Do not present this system as an incentive! This is a false and intellectually dishonest presentation.

I have two elements of answer.

In terms of penalties, there is a scale. Forty percent is not the bottom of the scale. If we compare this with the legal sanction found in the Income Tax Code for fraudulent intent, we are at 50%. It is higher.

Furthermore, this is explicitly written in the text: whoever uses permanent tax regularization escapes any criminal sanction. We submitted an amendment to delete this article.

Tax fraud is reduced to an investment, to a financial risk since the risk of criminal punishment is eliminated for the fraudster. That is what is serious. In a country such as Finland, bankers, fraudsters have found themselves in prison. In our country, large tax fraud never leads to truly dissuasive criminal sanctions such as prison sentences. I think that if this kind of sanctions existed for the major tax fraudsters, Belgium would not be in the lead of the countries where the most fraud is done.

It is in this spirit that Mr. Van Hees said that one can cheat, we will regularize afterwards!

However, you can’t regulate when you want to. Thus, when a person is known to the administration before he has completed the steps, he can no longer regularize his situation. This is an important prerequisite. You should not incite people to cheat, but you must determine a time to make an honorable fine. Otherwise, regulation is not possible.

Mr. Speaker, first and foremost, there were comments as to whether this is the time for a permanent regulation that, for the sake of clarity, can be used once and for all. Yes, because this regularization is not an isolated thing. Ms. Smaers has already alluded to it, it is part of a triangle consisting of the Kaiimantax, which ensures that the money in tax havens is detected and taxed, the regularization that gives taxpayers a last chance to actually declare incomes that have not yet been declared and it is also a one-time opportunity, because the regularization itself is permanent, but can only be exploited once and this, I would like to emphasize, at higher fines than in the past.

Non-fiscally-expired capital is +20 % from the rates in each of the tax categories. Previously, that was also 20 % for serious fraud, but 10 to 15 % for other fraud.

This brings me to another point. It asks why this distinction between serious tax fraud and other fraud has been removed. However, previous regulation operations showed that there was no record of serious tax fraud in the second operation. I assume that. In the third round of tax regularisation, there were 30 serious fraud cases out of 6,200 regularisation statements. That distinction did not seem evident. Even considering this in terms of pricing, now all fraud is serious fraud. In the case of tax-expired capital, it was 35%. Now it is 36%, rising year by year to 40%. So the fable that this regularization is cheaper is what it is, especially a fable.

In the spirit of what the State Council has written several times, there seems to indeed be good hope that we can indeed reach cooperation agreements with the regions. That has taken a lot of time, energy, work and consultation, but the reality behind it is that our state structure is complex which means that reaching such agreements is absolutely not sinecure.

by Mr. Laaouej is quite right in calling for an effort to make fiscal federalism work better. We are working with the Ministers of Finance and Budget of the Regions.

Wat betreft of the Panama Papers: 239 cases have been identified by the ISI as worthy of thorough investigation. All of these 239 files received a request for information. This has as a consequence that they can no longer use regularization, because a research act implemented prevents the use of regularization.

Indeed, the revenue is still estimated at 250 million euros, which we believe, given the circumstances and even with a shortened year, remains a realistic estimate.

It was also asked whether the bill was in line with the European Savings Directive. Indeed, we have very explicitly provided that double taxation will be avoided, namely the declaration in the year itself and the settlement of the residence tax. By setting up the structure in this way, there is compliance with the savings directive.

Finally, I find it very strange that one sees in the proposed regularization operation, which is heavier penalising than previous regularization operations, the proof that we let scammers go and that we feel stuck in the corner when something like the Panama Papers pops up.

Today, 28 measures have been taken to combat tax fraud, and most of them have been agreed by the opponents. The BBI employs 100 employees. Reporting obligations for banks have been strengthened. The analytical techniques for transfer prices will be tightened. Access to the CAP has been greatly expanded. For me, it is absolutely a mystery how a set of such measures, of which I have mentioned only a few and which need to be supplemented by measures that are under preparation, can even be narrowed up somewhat in a logically defensive way with the assumption that tax fraud would not be a major priority. The opposite is true.

The regulation we now propose, with all its characteristics, is part of a triangle of chaimantax, regulation and anti-fraud measures, which is logical and coherent. This is also logical in the international context, where, on the one hand, on various sides, the pressure increases and, on the other hand, the gaps of the network close. That’s why we are convinced that the three measures will mutually reinforce each other and lead to good results in terms of anti-fraud, legal certainty and the channeling of capital to the real economy and job creation.

I will not resume the debate. I think we’ve exchanged our arguments and we’ve been doing so for several months. I therefore take note of the affirmed will of Mr. The Ministry of Fiscal Affairs has been pushing further dynamics into fiscal federalism. I can only encourage them on this path. I think this will avoid many problems in advance. It is better to prevent than to cure.

Mr. Minister, you conclude that the present regularization is quite logical. If it is logical, then why is it not logical that the Panama Birds cannot use it? If all that is so good, so fine, and so strict, so that everyone now has to take it into account, then why do you think that the Panama Bulls cannot use it? What is the difference between the Panama fraudsters who should be punished and should not use regularization, and all the others for whom it makes sense to take advantage of regularization?

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, I do not understand this. It may be the logic of the current majority to pretend something is being undertaken, but using arguments that unfortunately do not cut wood.