Proposition 53K0477

Projet de loi modifiant la loi du 2 juillet 2010 modifiant la loi du 2 août 2002 relative à la surveillance du secteur financier et aux services financiers, ainsi que la loi du 22 février 1998 fixant le statut organique de la Banque Nationale de Belgique, et portant des dispositions diverses.

General information ¶

Authors

CD&V Hendrik Bogaert
LE Catherine Fonck
MR Damien Thiéry
Open Vld Herman De Croo
PS | SP Guy Coëme

Submission date

Oct. 27, 2010

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

banking supervision investment company consumer protection central bank consumer information delegation of power financial policy financial occupation financial legislation code of conduct financial market credit institution advertising malpractice monetary crisis insurance company

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V LE PS | SP ∉ Open Vld N-VA LDD MR

Voted to reject

VB

Abstained from voting

Groen Vooruit Ecolo

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

Dec. 2, 2010 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, my colleagues, in stating the title of this proposal, you have practically made the report. This will be short, you understand.

In short, I will present the service report.

First, we heard in the commission Mr. The law of 2 July 2010 amending the law of 2 August 2002 concerning the supervision of the financial sector and financial services, as well as the law of 22 February 1998 fixing the organic status of the National Bank of Belgium and containing various provisions, aims to implement a major reform of the supervisory architecture of the banking and financial sector.

The final phase provides for the integration, within the National Bank of Belgium, of the powers currently exercised by the Banking, Financial and Insurance Commission in matters of prudential control, according to the financial model called Twin Peaks. He indicated that the present bill was intended to extend the period during which the King was authorized to take the decisions of special powers necessary for the implementation of this reform. This extension consists in granting a period expiring on 31 March 2011 instead of 30 September 2010.

The bill also aims to maintain the Committee on Risk and Systemic Financial Institutions until the adoption and entry into force of the decisions to be taken pursuant to Article 26 of the Act of 2 July 2010.

During the discussion, Mr. Goyvaerts, Mrs. Gerkens, Mr. Bogart and his servant. It can be summarized briefly the interventions on the regret of the delay in implementing these provisions as well as the absence of new control structures. Articles 1 to 5 and the entire bill, including some legal corrections, were successively adopted by 12 votes against 1.

After my report is finished, I would like to speak in my capacity as a representative of the PS Group. The financial crisis that turned the world into this chaotic economic situation as we know it did not fall from the sky. It was not a coincidence. It was – it is now known – the result of the greedy, dangerous and opaque behaviors of banking apprentices who disconnected finance from the real economy and, for all to say, from its basic profession.

It is these titrations, this speculation, these kinds of poker hits that have made us kneel to the ground, but not only! If the culprits are well identified, we must never forget the passive accomplices, those who should have monitored, prevented, banned and who have been harassed. This is one of the lessons we have learned from the very important work that the House and the Senate have done to analyze the financial crisis. It was necessary to strengthen the control and, at home, to rethink it.

From the day after the crisis, we pledged to rethink our control model on the Twin Peaks model. It was therefore normal to congratulate the government’s decision to transfer prudential control to the National Bank. If, from the day after the financial crisis, we advocated for a transfer of powers to the National Bank, we also put on the table another struggle: the strengthening of the protection of consumers of financial services.

In fact, it is not the banks, the great losers of the crisis, but the customers and savers. There was also a need to rethink the model. We proposed the creation of a consumer protection agency that would take care exclusively of this. With the choice of the Twin Peaks model and the transfer of skills from the CBFA to the National Bank, the CBFA could become the new consumer protection agency. It was on the right track, but the fall of the government has degraded these prospects for better control.

The judicial news, with the Citibank trial this week, shows us that this agency is very necessary, that it is necessary to ban a series of products that are far too dangerous for the savers, that it is necessary to strengthen the controls, that it is necessary to force the banks to actually prevent the dangerousness of certain products.

With today’s government in ordinary affairs, Parliament could take back the hand. This is a debate that we will have to hold. Meanwhile, Mr. Speaker, dear colleagues, and not surprisingly, my group will support the bill, which is only a technical adaptation to address the effects of the political crisis, since it is necessary to extend the deadline within which the King must take the ministerial decree. But this is a beautiful area in which Parliament should be able to take its responsibilities.

I will be relatively brief, since many of the elements have been presented by Mr. by Coem.

The draft law submitted to our Assembly is intended to extend the period during which the King is empowered to take decisions of special powers necessary for the implementation of the reform of the control architecture of the banking and financial sector. This extension consists in the granting of a period expiring on 31 March 2011. In fact, this deadline was initially set to 30 September 2010.

This proposal also aims to maintain the Committee on Risk and Systemic Financial Institutions, the CREFS, until the adoption and entry into force of the decisions to be taken pursuant to Article 26 of the Act of 2 July 2010.

The current philosophy of the law, which says that the CREFS ceases to excite at the expiration date of the special powers when the King does not use them, remains, nonetheless, ⁇ ined.

As a reminder, the law of 2 July 2010 aims to reform the control architecture of the financial sector. The CREFS was established for a transitional phase. And this phase will be followed by an integration into the branch of the National Bank of Belgium of the competences of the Banking, Financial and Insurance Commission in matters of prudential control according to, as recalled by Mr. This is called the Twin Peaks.

Without this extension, the CREFS, which is therefore this transitional body, will be abolished on 31 December 2010 and the reform will not be effective.

I would like, of course, to thank the co-signators of this bill law who understood the importance and urgency of this approach.

Mr. Speaker, dear colleagues, it was not so crazy a long time ago that I stood here discussing three bills for the reform of the supervision of the banking sector.

I remember the debate in the House. Everyone agreed that supervision needs to be reformed, especially after our discussions about the CBFA. There was some discussion about the twinpeaks model, but everyone agreed that something had to change. Everyone in the Chamber mostly agreed with the fact that fundamentally something had to change in the system. Not only supervision, which is actually a symptom treatment, but also the pyromans, who set our house on fire and caused the banking crisis, had to be addressed. They have caused the great crisis in which we all have come across. They have ensured that a lot of jobs have been lost and that we have not been able to engage in building, but only with laying work.

At that time, competent Minister Reynders replied that we must see that as an evolution, that it all would come. What do we see? Today we stand here to vote on the extension of a vehicle that everyone at the time considered unnecessary, while also we can perfectly transition to the twinpeaks model, where the supervision is redistributed between the National Bank and the CBFA. Although that vehicle was seen as useless by the majority and opposition, we will vote today on its extension.

We must maintain the CSRSFI, because the government has failed to show any evolution. Worse, she has just remained silent, even with what she had proposed as a temporary solution.

The reform of the twinpeak model leaves itself waiting. The special powers requested for the King will need to be extended, but in the meantime you cannot use them because the government is in progress. In short, we are in a kafkaian situation, in which there is no control, but also no fundamental adjustment of the system.

Although every citizen had to make so much effort to get the house broken, the pyromans – which is being proved today again – can safely go on their way again. After all, there is no one who can tap their fingers, there is no one who can blow out the lighthouse in their hands. The speculators we are talking about can even turn against us today.

The notion of evolution, then put forward by the minister and the majority, sounds ⁇ cynical in the light of what is coming to us and the bill proposed. It sounds very cynical, and in fact it is intriest. It is intriguing that a government that is now in ongoing affairs longer than it has ever ruled and that said it would address the problem in the bottom, but that started with symptom control, now can not even do symptom control. She must now ask for help from Parliament to make something more of that vehicle.

Where are the measures to fundamentally reform the sector? Where are the measures to tackle speculation? What are the measures to prevent future fires?

Do you want to adjust the model? Mr. Cohen, I have heard you very well. That’s all good and well, but you are the one who sits in the majority, while our bills on the subject are being gathered. It is ⁇ cynical that one comes here to tell stories about the lessons one has learned, if it is not in any way followed by the government.

Therefore, we stand here, as opposition, to vote on two measures: the extension of the special authorisation decisions given to the King, and the maintenance of the Committee on Systemic Risks and Systemic Institutions or CSRFSI.

We can only approve that, as the common sense says, if we do not want to fall back on nothing at all.

At the same time, the same common sense of the majority said at that time that the vehicle of which we must approve the extension today was absolutely unnecessary and so we are here today as an opposition again in a situation where we find that the majority has made a piece of it and we must think how we can prevent it from getting even worse.

I know that the government is in ongoing affairs and that we should not ask current questions, but you may remember that there has been a call from citizens concerned about the new course of affairs at the banks, a course of affairs that suspiciously much resembles the old course of affairs.

I posted a video of the internet on my Facebook page. I don’t know if you’ve seen that video where an Italian citizen makes a call to run on the bank. Don’t misunderstand me, I don’t think this is the right solution, but it shows that while we are apathetically, in a way of speaking, wandering in our own world, there are citizens who are tired of having in Africa children crumbling through the system of speculative markets. The images in that video show very clearly what we don’t want to see. They show the raw images of the effects of those speculative markets worldwide, of the creeping of children worldwide because of a system that we still allow. In the spring we did not have the courage to address it at the root. We were able to do so in the spring, after all these parties had expressed themselves in the committee on the address to the banking crisis in favour of binding those speculations and for separating the various activities of a bank. We have limited ourselves to combating symptoms, and even that we are not bringing to a good end.

With a deep regret, I must note here today, when I return to Parliament after my maternity leave, that, just like in the banking world, there is, unfortunately, much left in Parliament. I had hoped otherwise and wanted to see it. I would have liked to see that instead of extinguishing the fires, the Pyromans had taken out the lights.

It is, unfortunately, again a disappointment, as I have had so many, but I notice that the citizens are tired of it. We condemn the calls they make very easily by saying that the banks are still healing, that therefore we should not do stupid things. However, there is something in them that we may have long forgotten.

Once again we must approve something here today, because the majority, unfortunately, has failed to do its work properly and, unfortunately, has failed to take something to heart, which, however, has very clearly very painful consequences directly and globally. We close our eyes for it. With lead in the shoes, the bill will be approved here by some. Others will push the button very easily.

I want to make a call. The sense of urgency, of which we all speak so easily, please find it back quickly! Let us not forget what the concrete consequences of speculation are, not only for our country, but also for so many, worldwide, who are vulnerable and who abandon it every day.

I understand very well the explanation of the three colleagues, including you, but you also agree with me that this is a short-term extension from which we unfortunately cannot escape. Ms. Almaci, I have worked with other colleagues, Mr. Mayeur and others, for a very long time on a number of draft laws that were submitted. I understand very well what you say. I can largely share your opinion, but you exaggerate the importance of this. In this situation, we can only extend it. You hang things on the Christmas tree, which I think is hanging out a little too early.

Christmas will come much faster than we think. You agree with me, Mr. De Croo. We failed to do what we had to do. From the opposition, we had a lot of hassle on it that it had to happen, but unfortunately it did not happen. We stand today for something that we must approve, because it cannot be otherwise. You need to realize what a low point is actually for a parliament. We can hardly control the government.

Do not interrupt me; I answer. I also want to raise some awareness. If we have to approve something here today because it can’t be otherwise, then that is actually a low point for democracy. As Parliament, we do not act proactively or controllingly, we simply suffer. It is especially painful to have to conclude, before Christmas, when our country is gradually getting into the vizier of speculators, that we have not even done anything to those speculators, even though they were one of the major causes of the crisis. I express my frustration here and I realize very well that we are in a situation where we have to approve something, because the alternative is even worse.

Madame, it is not personal, but it must nevertheless remind me that, in fact, the whole country has been waiting for the formation of a government since the June elections. You are the leader of a party that is currently negotiating the formation of that government. Then you come here to hold a speech to say that there is actually a sense of urgency, an urgent need to form a government. We also think so.

In hell, what prevents you from negotiating carefully and forming a government as soon as possible so that you can address your question, which you actually wrongly address to Parliament, to the other parties sitting around the table with you, the new majority in the process? I think that question is a bit misplaced.

I think you are mistaken. We are not negotiating the formation of a government. We are negotiating a solution to the community pattern, in which we have been so many years.

Mr. Dewael, the majority had perfectly put those proposals au fond for the regulation of the entire sector on the agenda for a long time, but they did not. I just spoke about Mr. Didier Reynders, who is not here now. At that time, there were legislative proposals, also from us, on the table, but one chose a surveillance, for an intermediate vehicle that was absolutely unnecessary. At that time, however, there were fundamentally solutions. That is now my accusation. That is why I am now frustrated.

Mr. Dewael, you bring things that you do well politically because you are on the sideline, but that has nothing to do with the debate. You know that very well.

Ms. Almaci, you say that you are negotiating the institutional problems. Today I read in the newspaper that a second workshop is being opened on asylum and migration. What prevents you from opening a third factory on this kind of important issues, which you rightly cite? Just do it!

Mrs. Almaci, you say that we are on the side line. First, let it be clear that we did not win the elections, on the contrary. From this we draw democratic conclusions. Whether this applies to your entire group, I don’t know. Your French-speaking sister party has seen its votes halve, which does not prevent her from sitting at the negotiating table today.

Second, we have always offered, when we are called upon on state reform, to help unblock the affairs community-wide. We are prepared for this. We are not a candidate for government responsibility, but we want to make community progress. We are not on the side line.

You think, with seven parties, that at this moment we cannot deliver any added value, no added value.

A final comment. I find the following news in the window of this debate. I note that Ecolo-Green! It does not actually negotiate the formation of a government, but the discussion is limited exclusively to a state reform. Mr Deleuze confirms this here. In other words, the formation of government is only a matter of five parties.

This means that you are not candidates to enter a government, Mr. Deleuze! You are a candidate only to try to unlock a state reform. This could relieve a few parties on the Flemish side.

I would like to say two things to Mr. President. and Dewael.

In the mathematics of mr. Dewael, it is possible to lose 50% of the votes and to maintain the number of its deputies; this is what I find extraordinary and he will have to explain to me.

Second, in effect, the ecologists participate for the moment at the institutional discussion for seeking to assemble a majority of the two tier and in view of a reform of the institutions and Belgium. Point on the line!

I will conclude with a very simple statement.

Mr. Dewael, you confuse me with the Prime Minister and the Government, to whom you cannot ask current questions. You may also confuse me with a formator or an informant, which I am not, or with a mediator.

We work constructively on every solution, as we have done throughout the discussion on the banking crisis. We do the same for all the discussions about the future of our country that are now ongoing. We will be constructive, as we have always been.

However, the above does not exclude that we can very clearly express our frustration over the progress of the discussion of the present bill. Your party has also agreed in this regard to the establishment of a vehicle, of which everyone then argued that it was useless. We then requested that an amendment be submitted to withdraw it. That has not happened.

Allow me to put something in a global context, which may frustrate you or which you would rather not face, but which for the citizen today is indeed a reality. You want to drown the problem in another discussion, for which you won’t get a forum so quickly.

Sorry, I am not the trainer. I am not the informant either. You will not receive from me any statements or expressions concerning the formation of government. I am here today to talk about the present bill.

It is intriest and ⁇ disappointing to conclude that we must approve the extension of a case for which there is no alternative. There is no alternative, because the previous majority, at the time they could, instead of treating the system au fond to symptom treatment has done. This was my presentation.

I understand that you have difficulty with it from time to time. Take a look at the citizens’ initiative. Also look at the frustration that is at the basis of the aforementioned initiative. I hope you will then communicate with the Parliament and with me the message that it has been enough. It is already proclaimed too much, so that it sometimes becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, which I ⁇ do not want and to which I ⁇ do not want to contribute: however, the speculators are opposed to anybody, as long as it only works for them. We could have tackled such abuse for a long time.

Remember the above as my message for today. Do not go too far, members of the Open Vld.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Secretary of State, dear colleagues, the financial crisis we have experienced has been one of the worst in the last 50 years. We were on the edge of the abyss and if we had fallen into it, the situation would have been much more catastrophic.

One of the main lessons from this financial crisis was that it was necessary and urgent to revise the control and regulation system both at the Belgian and European level.

Based on the conclusions of the commission created by the House and the Senate, the government has put in place a Twin Peaks model, with the strengthening of control of our systemic institutions and the transfer of this to the National Bank.

A transitional measure was planned: the creation of the CREFS. That is why today a bill was also signed by the CDH group to extend this transitional period. There is no other possibility! We need to open our eyes and realize it. We do not move from one system to another from day to day. The government has chosen, together with Parliament, to move from one system to another with a transitional measure. The CREFS saw their days counted until December 31. This system had to be extended temporarily, until next March.

I have heard a lot of things on this tribune but it is worth this occasion to remind that finance must remain at the service of the economy and that it must not serve the economy! It is also worth remembering what was at the root of this financial crisis. I will cite three reasons: greed, mal-government and mentalities.

I believe that many in this tribune do not hesitate to charge speculators. Yes, rightly, but behind the speculators, there is also the greed of individuals and human beings and some of our fellow citizens who speculate and participate in this system. In this regard, there will still be a lot of work to be done since at the G20 summit a consensus was reached to subject investment funds, such as leverage funds, to a stricter control but so far nothing has been realised.

A European passport should also be required for fund managers to access our markets. It will have to be realized. It will also need to take initiatives to deal with short sellings, disclosed sales. Measures should also be taken with regard to financial transactions. It is not all done at the level of Belgium.

Some measures must be intervened at the global level, others at the European level, and others at the Belgian level.

With regard to the measures at the Belgian level, the transfer of competence to the National Bank appeared indispensable. A transitional period was actually to be established through the establishment of the CREFS.

Beyond greed, there is also mal-government. It should be recalled. If our institutions have experienced problems, it is that, for most of them, governance problems have arisen. This aspect of the matter should also be addressed. Certainly, we have legislated on golden parachutes, their prohibition and their limitation, but we will also need to review the governance systems within our banking institutions.

It is also important to take into account the evolution of mentalities. Some have suggested, for decades, that one could get rid of states, that markets could automatically self-regulate, that everything was fine, the state without the state, and that public power was only a disability. The crisis has affected the private sector. If public authorities had not been there, if parliaments had not been there, if governments had not been there, we would be in a catastrophic situation today. This is the lesson of the crisis.

The path to go is still long. But the vote on this proposal, co-signed by the CDH, is indispensable. It will be necessary to continue to fight against these forms of greed, mal-government and against the mentality that the state was reduced to a role of observer. Both in the financial and other sectors, there is no sector capable of self-regulating. In the financial sector, as in the other sectors, rules must be established and arbitrators must be empowered to control the implementation and compliance of these rules.

Mr. Speaker, dear colleagues, our group will support the present bill.

I would like to remind you why it is necessary that we transfer competencies from the CBFA to the National Bank.

When we were in the depths of the Fortiscrisis and the financial crisis, it has been shown that pieces of information in Belgium were on the one hand with the CBFA and on the other with the National Bank. Because the information was in two different places and was not combined, we did not know crucial things.

When the Dutch came to talk about Fortisbank, it became clear that we could not give all the information we needed to be able to give.

Therefore, I think it was a good idea to centralize the information, to “take away” some of the powers of the CBFA, and to place it at the National Bank.

We could not do this at once. There is an intermediate established with that difficult name, namely the CSRSFI, which actually means that an intermediate body is created between the CBFA and the National Bank to accommodate the additional competences that are transferred from the CBFA to the National Bank.

I understand Ms. Almaci when she says that this all takes a long time. I share the frustration about it. I think we should have been ready now and could have transferred the powers immediately to the National Bank itself.

It is clear. I hope that doesn’t happen, but suggest that our financial architecture is not yet at the point where it should have stood. I think that at some point we were really at the forefront in Europe with the new financial architecture, but that we are at risk of falling behind.

I therefore deeply regret that we are not there yet, that we must introduce a kind of extra time here today, that we are wasting some time to put it in order anyway.

This could have been avoided if certain conflicts between the MR and the PS regarding the relevant appointments could have been avoided. I am very sorry that this is happening, but nevertheless we will support this as a party of good will. In these circumstances, of course, we do not want a wheel to end. We will support this proposal, but again express our regret that this has not happened faster and that we are hanging from our lead position in the back of the peloton.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, it is difficult to speak after colleague Bogaert, who uses phrases such as “it is sad”, “we must win a little time” and “it is a pity that the PS and the MR do not agree on who to be appointed”. All this comes from a speaker of the majority. But I think the conclusion is correct: the supervision of our banks is ⁇ among the worst in Europe today. When one says that we have fallen from the top position to the tail of the European peloton, then I fear that one is right.

For us, however, it is not essential who controls the banks and their practices. Whether it is the CBFA or the National Bank is not essential. What is controlled, how it is controlled and how it is acted is of course crucial. I effectively share the critical reactions I have just heard here, namely that it does indeed take a very long time, because two years after the outbreak of the financial crisis we are not a step further. This is, of course, the responsibility of the government, which has taken a number of initiatives very recently. I learn that that apparently has to do with the fact that the prime minister fails to get MR and PS on line about a appointment. It depends on that in our country.

I want to emphasize two truths. First, the financial crisis has so far cost the Belgian 20 billion. We have pumped 20 billion public funds into it. That is roughly the same as what the future government will have to save. The second element is the following. Yesterday, a judge in Brussels sentenced a bank.

Mr. Bonte, I understand your argument, but it is of course important that we continue to say things as they are. It is clear that the government has invested 20 billion in collective funds to save the banks. I think that is a ⁇ good investment. It is not right at this moment that 20 billion has been given and that nothing will ever come back. I hope, together with you, that those 20 billion will be fully returned and that there may be something extra.

Significant burdens have also been imposed on the banking sector, which also serve to strengthen the budget. Therefore, you must not continue to claim in Parliament and in the public opinion that 20 billion have been put into the banking sector and that that money is gone. No, it was an investment for the rescue of the banks. I think it has been a good investment and your party has always supported it, I mean.

On the contrary, sp.a would have preferred other government interventions in the banking sector, but you are right. I didn’t even say that 20 billion was thrown away. I have said that the government has released more than 20 billion to save the banking sector. I have added at the same time that the upcoming government is facing a giant sanitation task, which will be about the same order of size, if I can believe the news.

Mr. Bogert, I had come to a second truth. A court in Brussels has sentenced Citibank for misleading 4,100 clients. The judge says that the banking supervision has failed massively. We have tools in this country to protect consumers from misleading advertising. We have inspection services. The Economic Inspection has done brilliant work, also in the context of this trial, but the guard dog of the banks, the CBFA, has done nothing.

Over the past few months, I have addressed the minister to boredom and said that something is going wrong with Citibank. This is the third time he comes to court. I have repeatedly pointed out the legal possibilities that the CBFA has to act against it. It is strange that, on the one hand, Mr. Van Quickenborne’s services make findings on infringements of all kinds of legislation, such as the Commercial Act, but that, on the other hand, the same federal government, through the CBFA, fails to bind conclusions thereon. That is very strange.

So I can only state, together with you, colleagues, that it has now become clear in the courts that our banking supervision has failed. That is one more reason why it is ⁇ annoying that we must here again give a postponement to the government in order to get that more or less in order.

Mr. President, I assume that Mr. Bonte has no problem with being interrupted, because he does it himself regularly.

I want to clarify something. You say that this government, the government in ongoing affairs, is facing a giant operation of 20 billion, and you say, quite shortly by the turn, that this would only be the result of the rescue of the banks. This is of course not correct.

The [...]

You have just said that. The contribution made in the banks, Mr. Bonte, was vital at that time. I think this could count on a broad social and political support. If you see what has happened in other countries, and what effects it has on the public finances in those countries, then I would like to compare with you the comparison between what we have done and what has happened in those other countries.

This is a first determination.

A second determination is the following. We speak here in Parliament and there is a difference of opinion between socialists, liberals and Christian Democrats. That still stands for something, right? Have you ever seen what happened in a number of countries that have been ruled or ruled by your socialist spirits for years and days? I think of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Look what happens there. So please don’t come here to explain quite blatantly what should and could have happened.

In terms of bank rescue operations, we will see what the future brings. However, I think that the outgoing government, the government in ongoing affairs, has done what should be done.

As for the rescue operation for the budget of the coming years, the sanitation operation: redirect that not to what has been invested in the banks, because it is, of course, much more complex than that. So I think you are going through the curve for a few things really briefly.

Colleague Dewael, I can repeat it; it is exactly what colleague Bogaert sonet has also noted. I have indeed admitted that there is no connection to the 20 billion that the government has pumped into the banks. We even agreed to that. However, I expect you to listen when I, together with colleague Bogaert, develop these ideas. You now repeat exactly the accusation that colleague Bogaert has made and which has now been corrected.

I come to the political responsibilities, Mr. Dewael. When you talk about the defence of the policy in question, I would like to zoom into everything that has happened in the context of the misguided affairs at Citibank and the conviction that was pronounced yesterday.

I just said that we have repeatedly pointed out the dysfunctions and the misleading of clients by Citibank. The Economic Inspection and the services of Minister Van Quickenborne have also pointed to this. This has happened repeatedly. The CBFA remains until next order lam. To those who are responsible in ongoing affairs, I would like to ask what prevents the CBFA from taking its responsibility now that Citibank has been convicted. Now you can no longer look at it! The justice system in this country must be respected. What prevents the CBFA today from going into its wide arsenal of sanctions to look at how one can act in relation to Citibank?

This brings me to a second case. Very strange was the composition of the government, which refused to establish itself as a civil party. I have repeatedly suggested this to several members of the government. This was apparently not necessary, while Citibank appeared before the court for the third time in a row. Two times a friendly settlement was accepted and once the bank was truly condemned. I find this very strange.

Finally, I would like to refer more specifically to the Minister of Justice. Mr. Minister, we have been able to exchange ideas several times over the past few months about the importance of group claims and a legal framework for them. This means that together we have sought a way – taking into account the complexity of the legislation and the weakness of the consumer towards these large banks – to better defend the consumer through group claims, the so-called class actions.

I remember the day yesterday that you, like your colleague responsible for Consumer Affairs and Business, said the following: “We will try to get around this before that trial is round.” The commitment of the federal government – listen well, Mr. Minister, because maybe you are somewhat forgetful in that regard – was that any saver could count on the support of the federal government. The government would guarantee that no savings would be lost.

Well, yesterday, Citibank was actually convicted. 63 civil parties were right, but those 4 037 others were forced to comply with an acting agreement in which they placed 65 % of their deposited savings.

This to indicate, Mr. Minister, that by not fulfilling your commitment to enable group claims...

Mr. Speaker, I apologize for falling over words, but I meant that an act was always concluded with two?

Mrs. Rutten, I would like to make sure you contact some of the witnesses in this, people who put their savings in Lehman Brothers products and who after literally waking overnight finally got an offer. They had to decide within 24 hours whether or not to accept a 65-percent punishment agreement.

I can assure you, Madame, that the vast majority of those concerned have chosen eggs for their money, among other things because the federal government has not stood hundred percent behind the requirement of the inspection services. That was happening! I blame the federal government and the ministers of then.

Mr. Speaker, can I interrupt for a moment in connection with the act? I do not follow my colleague at all. I myself have also assisted a number of parties that had made themselves a civil party and who had very consciously chosen it. Now claiming that those people voted for 65 percent because the government has failed is flat populist. That is not true.

Do you know what flat populism is? That is a prime minister, who comes in full financial crisis in Parliament to say that he too has been deceived by Citibank and he will therefore with his government ensure that every saver gets back all the cents he has put into those products. That is what was literally said in Parliament.

That translated, among other things, into the commitment of Minister Reynders, who is not here, to order the CBFA with a thorough investigation, which I believe has not been conducted. In any case, I have not seen any performance of the CBFA.

This translated, among other things, into a commitment by the Minister of Justice, together with the Minister for Entrepreneurship, that a group claim would be possible, allowing all 4 100 savers to go to court not individually, but collectively. That commitment was also not hardened, because there was no agreement in the government on the exact formula. That is the truth and that is the political responsibility of the government.

I finished with another element. If the bank we’re talking about, Citibank, still has some respect for our rule of law and for its damaged customers, then it would have to pay the additional compensation to the people who have concluded a crime agreement, so that they too are compensated in the same way as the people who got the right through the court yesterday.

Mr. President, Mr. Bonte, I am really disappointed. Congratulations would have been in place.

Belgium is the only country where Citibank has been brought before the court and where a judgment came after a year.

You can see the glass either half full or half empty. In this case, however, you choose the path of populism, on the cap of people who have already suffered enough. That is unacceptable.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Rutten, if it was not clear, I would like to repeat what I have stated later.

My greatest respect in the whole dossier goes to the Economic Inspection. I have seen how the concerned employees of the aforementioned service prepare a steel-hard file for the third time in order to bring Citibank before the court. Therefore, I can only be praiseful and say “chapeau”.

However, I do not understand – you have to explain it to me – why the bank guard dog, the CBFA, does not appear once, when the Economic Inspectorate makes it right for the third time. That is very strange.

The above is exactly what I mean. Yesterday it was proven that banking supervision looks like nothing.

Finally, Mrs. Rutten, I would like to come to your last point. If you are effectively concerned with the fact that Belgium, as the first European country, brought Citibank before the court and won the case, I would like to insist on the following. Belgium is the European Presidency. I would like to insist that you interpell the Prime Minister and that you also interpell your neighbor, the Minister for Entrepreneurship, and urge them to address the issue absolutely quickly at European level. After all, the Lehman Brothers products have been brought to man in exactly the same way, especially in Spain but also in Germany and Great Britain.

I would therefore very much like to see here a very dynamic government, which takes the condemnation of Citibank to the European level, to address the problematic way of banking of Citibank. At that moment, we will be together on the same side of the file.

( ... ) Do it though.