Proposition 54K2085

Projet de loi modifiant la loi du 22 juillet 1985 sur la responsabilité civile dans le domaine de l'énergie nucléaire.

General information ¶

Submitted by

MR Swedish coalition

Submission date

Oct. 12, 2016

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

civil law civil liability nuclear energy third-party insurance

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V Open Vld N-VA LDD MR PP VB

Voted to reject

Groen Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP DéFI ∉ PVDA | PTB

Party dissidents ¶

• Olivier Maingain (MR) voted to reject.

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Discussion ¶

Nov. 23, 2016 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

I am referring to the written report.

Mr. Speaker, dear colleagues, we have repeated it since Fukushima: a large-scale nuclear accident should never be excluded, even in countries that fully control the technology. We unfortunately saw it with the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan.

To say this, Mrs. Minister, is not to play with fear, but simply to show transparency and accountability. Too many today are public officials who practice some form of denial in the face of the risks inherent in the atom. We must stop repeating foolishly that zero risk does not exist, while comfortable thinking that a nuclear accident will never happen in Belgium. This is unlikely. The risk is small, but cannot be excluded.

For years, a victim-friendly compensation scheme has been organized: compensation for damages suffered by victims of a nuclear accident, which is organized in the framework of international conventions. You know they have been revisited through time.

At the initiative of the PS, the Act of 1985 was amended in 2011 to increase, as has been repeated, by 1.2 billion euros the maximum amount to which the operator’s liability can be engaged. In 2014, another positive change for potential victims, as they are better protected: the prescription for bodily injury increased from ten years to thirty years in 2014. And we introduce the possibility for the State to grant a guarantee, obviously for nuclear operators in the event of an accident but a guarantee, I insist because this law does not respond to this, by paying a compensation to the State since it is the State that offers its guarantee. This is of course.

Mrs. Marghem, I repeated it in the commission, in December 2015, you tried to submit an amendment to the law-programme to try to prevent the law of 2014 from entering into force in early January 2016. The manoeuvre did not work. There was still dramatization from the opposition groups and even the majority who did not follow you. Everyone felt that this important matter could not be dealt with in a hurry. As a result, the 2014 law came into force at the beginning of 2016 and we know the difficulties today.

The current legal uncertainty is due not to this parliament, but to the minister’s inaction between October 2014 and December 2015. We are there. So I regret the minister’s way of working, because, once again, you didn’t get it last year, but again, you waited long months for us to vote these laws in an emergency. It is the Parliament that must urgently recover your own delays. Here is the form.

Now let’s deal with the substance, Mrs. Minister, which is a catastrophe. If there were only the form, it could still pass. This bill is nothing but a fundamental step backwards from the 2014 law. Since the 2014 law, the repair of personal damage, occurring within a period of ten to thirty years from the date of the nuclear accident, is borne by the nuclear operator. This bill goes backwards and puts this financial burden on the State and, without any compensation being paid to the State in return for this service rendered to the operator. This will be the case at least until 2018 or later, if the government decides it, since there is not even a date in the law, it is a royal decree that will determine tomorrow whether it is in 2018, 2019, 2020, 2025, what I still know!

In its opinion, the State Council considers, this time, that this provision has all the characteristics of a state aid. We are back here, Mr. Friart. To all the laws that Ms. Marghem deposits, the State Council says “attention, this is a state aid.” Based on the opinion of the State Council, and in order to prevent Belgium from being condemned by the European Commission, on the initiative of sp.a, we have signed an amendment that Ms. Temmerman will explain to you in a moment.

For the PS, it is very clear that putting in charge of the community, for an indefinite period, and without compensation, the repair of bodily damage is an unacceptable advantage, an unacceptable gift, given to the nuclear sector. Mr. Minister, after the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2, the reduction of the nuclear rent, this is a new gift that you offer to nuclear operators, to Electrabel and Engie in particular.

We strongly condemn this new gift.

The debate we have today should be an opportunity to raise the question of unlimited civil liability – I believe my colleague will also return to it – not only, unlimited civil liability for nuclear operators but also the joint responsibility of motherhouses. We have discussed this issue many times in the Economic Committee. The current system has advantages that I mentioned but obviously it has disadvantages. I think that unlimited responsibility and especially the role of motherhouses should have been part of our debates.

We know how much Engie benefits today from Electrabel. We don’t see why, if there was a nuclear accident, it would be only Electrabel who would be responsible and not its parent home. This is not acceptable. You did not want to open the debate about unlimited liability either. We regret this obviously because it exists in other countries such as Germany, for example.

Today, my colleagues, what do we have? In 1985, in 2011, in 2014, the previous governments but also, every time, this parliament passed laws that improved the state’s situation, that improved the situation of victims and that obviously reinforced the duties of nuclear operators. Now with this law, it is a total backward return, that is, it has been decided to put the interest of nuclear operators ahead of that of the population and that of the state. Along with all Ms. Marghem’s projects, these are gifts to Electrabel and gifts to Engie. It is the state that shakes. It is the consumer who pays. This is totally unacceptable and a real step backwards from a nuclear risk policy that had been made since 1985, thus for more than thirty years.

It is not evil. These are just facts. You have to read the law, Mr. Flahaux! I’m just saying what’s in this bill. This bill, you will understand, my colleagues, we will not vote on it.

Mr. Speaker, I would have two small remarks about what my colleague was saying since I did not have the opportunity to intervene while she was speaking. This is a project that was not submitted to the rescue at the end of 2015. This is a project that has followed its path. It was also passed by the State Council, which had given an opinion. It should already pass in November 2015, but it is the Conference of Presidents, by an agreement between the majority and the opposition, which, given a very loaded 2015 agenda, had decided to postpone it in 2016.

But the project was ready in 2015.

In addition, at the last committee meeting, Mr. Dussart-Desart was very clear about state aid. I quote: “The state of relations with the competent departments of the European Commission does not give rise to any particular concerns. The case seems solid, especially since several European bodies, Euratom, for example, encourage States to take measures to assure the proper functioning of the objective liability regime. All this seems to indicate that Europe does not consider there being a state aid."

I will return to my speech, Mr. Speaker.

Mr Freeman, I am far from the idea of extending the debate. However, let me ask you to demonstrate common sense. If the bill was in state, in November 2015 – we just wanted to make an amendment and a bill-budget program while this bill has no budget impact – how is it that it was deposited on the table of parliament in November 2016 with an emergency request? Why did the Minister not submit it in January 2016, when no problems arose? Let’s be a little serious!

As I said, the form is the one used normally, the emergency was requested. There are delays and it is the Parliament that has to catch up with the delays of the Minister.

Moreover, of course, Europe says that this objective coverage should be organized in favor of the victims. But when there is state coverage, when the state offers a guarantee and it risks to have billions and billions of costs in the event of a nuclear incident, it must make that guarantee pay. That’s all that is said. Otherwise, the state gives a gift to the exploiters.

In fact, during the year 2016, operators had to make sure. However, it appears that at this stage, no insurance company agrees to cover this risk. Therefore, a guarantee must be taken from the government. All this will be implemented. These are the reasons why this project is presented to you today. Now I come to the project.

On 22 April 2014, our assembly adopted the bill amending the law of 22 July 1985 on civil liability in the field of nuclear energy.

This law extended the civil liability of nuclear operators. It added to the damages already considered, the repair of environmental damage and increased the prescription period for bodily damages to 30 years.

The bill submitted to us today does not question these important achievements within the framework of the nuclear civil liability regime. On the other hand, it aims to take into account, on the one hand, the practical constraints generated by the entry into force of this law on 1 January 2016, but also, on the other hand, to take into account the imperatives established by the European Union that the State Council itself had also emphasized, during the examination of the draft which became the law of 29 June 2014.

What is it about? The practical problems to which I refer are primarily related to the fact that it appears today that the nuclear insurance market still does not have the necessary capabilities to cover the risks related to the new guarantees offered by the Act of 29 June 2014.

Furthermore, the 2004 Protocols to the 1960 Paris Convention on Civil Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, which the Act of 29 June 2014 wanted to transpose into our domestic law, have not yet entered into force. Two European countries, the United Kingdom and Italy, have not yet ratified these instruments although the first country is about to proceed with the so-called ratification.

However, it has always been clear in the minds of the legislator, and therefore of the parties that are part of the former majority, that these provisions could only enter into force once all the Member States of the European Union, parties to the Convention, have ratified them. This is a condition of simultaneity required by the European Council Decision of 8 March 2004. In other words, it can therefore only be implemented once all European countries have ratified the Convention. The State Council emphasized this.

This bill preserves the main achievements of the 2014 law. It temporarily suspends certain provisions of this law until the conditions necessary for its applicability and its entry into force can be met.

Finally, the bill creates an interpretative provision lifting any ambiguity as to the amount of civil liability of a nuclear operator, fixed since January 1, 2012 to 1.2 billion euros. As a reminder, the historically in force regime in Belgium consists of the limited liability of the operator of the nuclear installation in exchange for the fact that the victims will not have to prove fault in the head of the latter.

On the occasion of the review of the bill, some members indicated that they wanted to introduce unlimited liability in the event of a nuclear accident. The bill, defended by Ms. Temmerman, stipulated that each operator would be obliged to guarantee the availability of 2.5 billion euros, as would be the case in Germany. Indeed – this was recalled in the committee – such a proposal is based on a misinterpretation of German legislation. The capacity of nuclear civil liability insurance is roughly the same in all Western European states. Contrary to what was supported in the commission, German operators are not insured at the rate of 2.5 billion euros, but 256 million euros. The balance must be provided through a contractual mechanism of solidarity between all operators and other companies in the nuclear sector. The amount available is related to the size of the nuclear industry in Germany. Not so long ago, it was five times larger than the Belgian nuclear industry.

It must be kept in mind that such a proposal, a priori seductive, would also endanger the nuclear transport sector in Belgium. Indeed, fixing an amount of civil liability insured or to be guaranteed without relation to the actual risk would not be economically justifiable and would jeopardise the continuation of certain commercial or research activities. Some sites could close or relocate, with all the consequences it could have on employment, and we care about it.

The proposal thus risked to render the operation impossible (the installation presenting only a low risk), as is the case of the IRE in Fleurus and of the SKC-CEN in Mol, by repealing the King’s faculty to fix the amounts of reduced civil liability for low-risk installations and transport installations.

They would therefore have been forced to have an insurance of EUR 2.5 billion, regardless of the risk presented by the installation or transport. In this case, such a measure would be arbitrary. In doing so, we could only reject this proposal in a committee and we will continue to vote on this proposal at the plenary session.

The provisional postponement of the extension of the obligation to repair in the regime of nuclear civil liability for environmental damage will not affect the guarantees currently in force. Indeed, most, if not all, environmental damage remains covered by other rules providing for reparation of the damage. Thus, an injury to patrimonial property in the event of soil pollution will open a right to repair in the head of the owner of the property. We hope that the two European States, parties to the Convention, which have yet to ratify the 2004 Protocol, will do so quickly so that the positive contributions of the 2014 law can finally be realised.

In the meantime, it was necessary to provisionally postpone the entry into force of the new regime provided for by the law of 29 June 2014. That is why we will vote for this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I will not talk about the shabby path that the present draft has taken. Ms. Lalieux has already talked extensively about this. However, I would like to repeat again, Mr. Friart, that your reasoning that everything was finished at the end of 2015 does not stand, since the discussion of the draft began only in November 2016, that is, eleven months later. Again, Parliament must correct the crackdown of the Cabinet-Marghem. We need to take them back and quickly deal with the design.

Colleagues, with the present bill, the government will once again give Electrabel a gift. We are that for the time being, but now, of course, it is a gift that our country could be very expensive. Let us hope that this will never happen.

What is actually being decided? It is decided that the government, we all, and the population will be guaranteed in the event of a nuclear disaster. The reasoning is that the likelihood of a nuclear disaster is small, but is it really so unlikely?

If you allow me, Mrs. Temmerman...

I have actually not said anything yet.

Sometimes this happens here. Mr Freud, you have the word.

Mr. Speaker, I wanted to point out that when this Paris Convention is finally ratified, there is ⁇ a whole insurance market that will be established in Europe.

I have not yet said anything about insurance, Mr. Fiart.

I already tell you.

You speak of the state guarantee but I tell you that this state guarantee, from the moment the Paris Protocol is put in place, will ⁇ no longer play. An insurance and reinsurance pool will be established and will support not only Belgian operators but also all European operators. At that time, there will no longer be any state guarantee.

So I asked if it is so unlikely that a nuclear disaster could occur. In the 1980s, in Chernobyl, and then in Fukushima, it was considered very unlikely that a nuclear disaster would occur. Unfortunately, colleagues, this has happened.

However, there is much more. We recently – unfortunately not at the time of the discussion in the committee – heard the FANC’s roaring criticism of the shamelessly nonchalant security policy of ENGIE Electrabel. I think we should really be concerned about this.

I also refer to the countless incidents in our power plants: the technical defects in the pumps and in the heart of the reactors, the fire in the transformers, water leaks or sabotage in the oil reservoirs, and so on. All imaginable and unthinkable incidents take place in this country, Mr. Friart.

In fact, German, Dutch and Luxembourg municipalities have expressed their fears of a possible nuclear incident in one of our nuclear power plants. Therefore, the border municipalities demand that the power plants be closed. Let us hope that there will never be such an incident, but you let the citizen be charged today for potential damage that the exploiter should bear. Your selective advantage of a particular energy producer, Mrs. Minister, really knows no boundaries. Gas power plants and wind turbines can be some dreams of such a regime. Of course, you do not look at that.

Mr. Friart, not only Germany imposes an unlimited liability on the operators of nuclear power plants, Finland and Sweden also introduced them. This is not possible in this country alone. Indeed, we believe that that same operator should not only be unlimited liable and liable, we also believe that he should insure himself in the amount of EUR 2.5 billion, on the private market.

That this is not utopia, Germany proves.

Mr Friart, if you say that this is not economically feasible, you actually prove yourself that the exploitation of nuclear energy is not economically feasible, because it is indeed not insured. If a disaster occurs, the costs are not insured. You say it yourself. You have just said in connection with my bill that this is not economically feasible.

I want to repeat it again: if one transposes the nuclear disaster that occurred in Fukushima to Belgium, it is estimated at 742 billion. This is far above the economic strength of our country.

So let’s stop investing further in this economically unprofitable energy producer and let’s finally switch to alternative energy. Mr. Friart, there are a lot of jobs there too. The real future is there. We do not have the problem of these nuclear disasters, nor the problem of nuclear waste, which we have not yet solved.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Temmerman’s bill does not distinguish between nuclear power producers and other operators, which are much less important on the market. We talked about the IRE and the SKC-CEN. There is also everything that is nuclear medicine, the transportation of all these radio-isotopes. With the bill as filed by Ms. Temmerman, all these activities would also be endangered. They would be placed between parentheses. This would be serious because it would affect the health of the population.

You can always submit an amendment. I am definitely willing to see that. I have also said this in the committee, but I still have not received an amendment from you, Mr. Friart.

In the bill as it exists, there is a distinction between major operators, electricity producers and other operators.

That’s true, but you’re letting the state charge for the guarantee. That is of course the big difference.

A resolution will be on the agenda. I suggest that we no longer vote on resolutions. In 2011, we unanimously adopted a resolution aimed at revising the system of legal liability in nuclear energy in order to provide for a system of unlimited legal liability to be borne by the operator of nuclear installations. This was unanimously approved by all parties sitting here in 2011.

Now you come up with a proposal that catapultes us back in time. Not only do you renounce the resolution you approved at the time, but you also add a number of things to it, such as the environmental damage.

Mr Friart, in your proposal or the proposal of the Minister, environmental damage is no longer considered nuclear damage. Electrabel will therefore no longer be responsible for compensation for any damage to our environment. Do you think that’s normal, Mr. Friart? I do not think. Moreover, it is not at all in accordance with the resolution that we all, including Ms. Marghem, adopted in 2011.

This 2011 resolution was not incorporated in the law of 29 June 2014, while you were in the majority, as well as the PS and the CDH, when this law of 29 June 2014 was passed.

Mr. Friart, you have not answered the question whether or not the environmental damage is no longer...

There was another person who asked for the word, Mrs. Temmerman.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, our group will never be the biggest fan of nuclear energy, Ms. Temmerman. You know that we also have ambitious plans to dismantle the nuclear power plants as soon as possible.

But let’s get away from the drama. I understand that you are in the opposition and the duty of the opposition is to oppose. However, you know just as well that today there is no alternative to having supply security and affordable energy. It will not be the magic cable of Johan Vande Lanotte that will save us in terms of supply security in the winter.

The situation is what it is today. The most proactive and ambitious report ever written to make the transition from nuclear to other energy is that of Elia. This report is known to you. That report assumes as much as 50 % of electricity imports, which is not possible today because we do not have the infrastructure for it. Other countries are also unable to provide us with that energy today.

Today, the situation is just what it is. We are with those power plants and we must deal with them in the best possible way.

As a member of the Nuclear Safety Subcommittee – you know we met yesterday – I am sometimes worried when I read the newspaper this weekend. I think we should take this very seriously. Together with the FANC, we must check with the subcommittee whether the safety culture in Tihange is acceptable. If this is not the case, we must attach the necessary consequences to it.

Today we are discussing a bill that you are the applicant of. In fact, we are conducting a somewhat semantic discussion. If we really need to greet the damage of a nuclear incident – let us all hope together that this will never really happen – then we are talking about hundreds of billions. You mentioned an amount of 742 billion euros. Whether we apply the German system, where one has an insurance obligation up to 2.5 billion euros, or now 1.2 billion euros, that will not cover the damage of that nuclear incident anyway. In whatever circumstances – the German or Belgian system – one will not have insurance to cover that damage. This will then come to the government.

Whichever legal framework you prefer – yours or the government’s – it will make no difference. In the end, it is a damage that is not insured because the damage is much greater than the amounts mentioned here.

What are we trying to do in a quiet way? We have gone a long way in this area together in the previous legislatures. I refer to the initiatives of my colleague Willem-Frederik Schiltz, along with Karine Lalieux and members of the sp.a. group, in the previous legislature. Since then, we have expanded the definition of nuclear damage. There is, of course, the problem of insuredness, which is still discussed today and requires a little more time. In addition, together, we have increased the minimum discs of recovery payment, a measure that we remain behind. Finally, we have extended the limitation period for physical injury.

So we really want to go in the same direction, I think, but you must admit that the damage is gigantically much greater than the insurance ceiling imposed by any country in Europe, including Germany or any other country. In fact, the German system does not differ so much from our system; there is talk of unlimited liability, but for me it is the insuredness of tel. This is actually about it. In Germany, no insurance can cover the actual damage caused by a nuclear incident.

Mr Lachaert, I am very pleased with your argument, because you simply confirm my assertion that the damage is not insured. Mr. Friart just said that if the other two countries also pass such laws, many insurance companies will insure such damage. Then the problem is solved and the state guarantee is no longer needed. You are right, because you say it is not insured. We all know that. Such damage is not insured. As a liberal, you must also dare to say that it is actually economically irresponsible today to continue doing something.

The alternative was the nuclear withdrawal, which we had decided together some time ago. It was planned. Unfortunately, you and your party have stopped doing so, making investments in the alternatives almost impossible. After all, it is very uncertain what is happening in Belgium: one time stop, the other time not. There will be no more investments. As a liberal you know very well that one must only create uncertainty in order to block something. In this case, investors are no longer willing to invest.

You also talk about supply security and interconnection. Are you in favour of a big Europe? We must go there. We all know that. We must go to that interconnection, we must make agreements with the countries around us in the future.

We cannot go down there. Among other things, because of the proposed measure and all other measures that the government has approved in connection with the nuclear withdrawal, we are constantly returning. We are not moving forward in the matter. And then I’m not talking about the energy transition, which we still have to vote on.

We are now far beyond the scope of the bill. It is a very interesting discussion and we should definitely conduct it, with Mrs. Marghem. But what you decide here today is, of course, a consequence of all the decisions that have been made for it. Why should we give Electrabel a gift here again? Why Why ?

You say that we have jointly introduced a scheme related to nuclear damage. This is now back with the present design. Electrabel is no longer liable for compensation.

Mr. Speaker, I want to say one thing, and then you give the floor to the colleagues.

We have not even talked about the physical damage. You say that the people who no longer need to prove. This is also stated in the draft law. However, you forget to say that the physical damage that occurs ten years after a nuclear incident is no longer compensated. You know very well that certain cancers do not manifest themselves immediately, but only much later.

Colleagues, Electrabel is also exempted in that respect and is once again not liable, even if one can prove that the cancer was caused by a nuclear incident.

Mrs. Temmerman, first of all, you said that we are reversing the nuclear exit. The departure date has not changed. In your version, the last nuclear power plant will close in 2025. In the version of the previous government, the last nuclear power plant will close in 2025 and also in the version of the current government, it will close in 2025. In that regard, there is nothing changing.

Second, I note that in the previous legislature you have adjusted the departure date for Tihange 1. This is done for the sake of supply security. This had to be done so that the light would remain on.

You referred to this legislature in a committee to the fact that two winters ago we were crushed by the eye of the needle in terms of supply security and that this step is therefore indeed necessary.

Third, you say that investments will decrease and that the transition will not take place. We have held hearings as part of the discussion of the life extension of Goal 1 and 2 with, among other things, the Federal Planning Bureau. That calculated that there is just as much renewable energy available in the system in the scenario of extending the lifetime of Goal 1 and Goal 2 as in the scenario of not extending the lifetime, for the simple reason that it comes first into the market and its marginal costs are lower than that of nuclear power plants.

However, we must take into account the fact that the Netherlands produces more energy in its coal-fired power plants, because Belgium needs more energy, according to the report of the Netherlands Central Bureau for Statistics of June. In Germany we hear the same story. There is an increase in electricity production in coal-fired power plants because it is cheaper than natural gas plants. I cannot deny that.

Finally, there is a lot of uncertainty about the insurance obligation in Germany. We are fortunate – Mrs. Lalieux can testify – that we organized a lot of hearings about liability and about insurance obligation in Germany in the previous legislature.

I hear you say several times – and this is also stated with so many words in your amendment – that in Germany there is an insurance obligation up to 2.5 billion euros.

However, this is not true. In the previous legislature, it was very clear how the system works in Germany. There is indeed an insurance obligation of 250 million euros on classical insurance. Mr. Marc Folens explained this in our committee in the previous legislature. What are the remaining 2.250 billion euros going to be? Well, Germany permits the value of nuclear power plants to be considered as a guarantee. In this case, an insurance can be concluded. In Germany, therefore, it is about an insurance of 250 million euros and in our country we were already much higher than what is on paper. We need to put everything in perspective.

Therefore, we cannot approve your amendments, because the system you propose is not used even in Germany, because it is not realistic and impossible. We must stop at that for a moment. If you wish, I can send you the report of the hearings, so that you can read quietly how one and another goes in his work. In any case, the reality is different from what you imagine.

Mr. Speaker, I can assist Mr. Wollants. The system in Germany is indeed a layered system, which does not correspond to Mrs. Temmerman’s representation of matters. The first layer is a private insurance by the operators, depending on the output of the power plant, and the first layer is subject to a limitation in size. The second layer is an insurance pool, as Mr. Friart has already explained. All operators of power plants in Germany pool their insurance. There is also a limitation in the size of this second insurance layer. The third level is the responsibility of the community. Mrs. Temmerman blames us if this would be the case here too.

In fact, I find it hallucinating and purely populist to blame the current minister and government for delaying the nuclear withdrawal. On the contrary, Ms. Temmerman believes that an investment-safe climate should be created sufficiently long in advance, because otherwise the nuclear exit cannot be realized. Well, when should that investment-safe climate be created? Years ago, right? Therefore, it is nonsense to blame the current government for a lack of decisions on this subject in the last two years. Seven to eight years ago, a plan should already have been drawn up so that the market could have adapted. Therefore, the energy plan is currently being worked out with the regions.

Mrs. Temmerman, you should not blame the government for delaying the nuclear departure. In the previous governments you have always ruled, but in that period you have failed to make the necessary investments so that alternatives are now available.

Today you bring something very populist. You are shooting at nuclear power plants and you have no alternative. These cables are not there. That interconnectivity does not exist. These alternatives do not exist. You want to shut down today’s nuclear power plants tomorrow. Then I tell you, then we can turn off the light here tonight.

It is a pity that Mr. Wollants has left. It is indeed quite special to see people, who were for the liberalization of the sector, change the rules of the game. You support an actor who is quite dominant in Belgium with totally unacceptable gifts. You can always try to prove this to us, the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2 was not necessary. The reduction in the rents that you will vote in a week is still a gift to a monopolistic actor.

Mr. Lachaert, I did not hear you. You don’t listen to the French speakers, but that doesn’t matter.

He does not listen anyway.

Mr. Lachaert, I did not hear you about this fact. It is good to talk about the bill with the problem of unlimited insurance. But what about the gift that this liberal and right-wing government makes, at some point, to a ⁇ monopolistic company? It’s going backwards, saying, “You don’t have to be completely insured,” 1.2 billion euros – fortunately we haven’t reached 1.2 billion – “and, we’re going to give you a guarantee without even having to pay a euro.” We go backwards in relation to environmental and bodily damage. This is the heart of the debate that you did not want to do here.

You are talking about the energy transition that we do not have and will obviously not have with this government, not to mention this return backwards from a fully liberalized market that is within your framework of ideological thinking. You don’t talk about that. It’s too easy to drown the debate as you do. I think the debate has taken place in the committee and that we should not continue to debate.

I didn’t listen to you because, of course, it annoys you. And Mr. Wollants left because it also bothered him. A state guarantee that is not financed by a multi-millionaire, billionaire actor and that makes money on the back of consumers is still special!

Mr. Speaker, I have been patient in the debate on this matter, which has long been analyzed in the committee and of which the resurgences are seen here.

I would like to tell Mr. Friart that he has a somewhat special way of rewriting history compared to an amendment that was submitted during the vote of the 2015 Programme Act. This was not a bill, Mr. Friart. This was an amendment that was to be intervened within the framework of a law-program.

Between December 2015 and November 2016, however, it has been eleven months without being able to move things forward. The result of this is that the government came to ask for the urgency before this Parliament in relation to this project, which it was imperative to vote before 31 December. This is the typical character of good governance that is currently in front of us today!

Mr. Friart, you must get this way because no diplomatic action has been undertaken between November 2015 and now to try to put this famous Paris Convention in motion.

To return to the content of the dossier, when we see the technique of unlimited liability, this demonstrates though that the bill consists of the fact that the nuclear sector is, in the end, not or not insured. I find it unacceptable that an industrial sector, whatever it is, is unable to insure itself against the risks it puts on the community. Admit that it is still special.

In this case, there is also the issue of state aid. This has been mentioned several times and I think the Council of State is very clear about this. Why hasn’t there been a formal procedure at the European Union level? The Ministry of Finance has only launched an informal procedure. It can be estimated that the opinion of the State Council leaves little doubt on this issue and the risk of being in state aid will return to us as a boomerang in this situation.

Following the meeting of the Nuclear Subcommittee yesterday, I am not reassured with regard to what is actually happening within the framework of the nuclear gendarme and its weakness towards the operator.

I hope that this issue of nuclear coercion and surveillance will become more and more pressing in our debates, in order to prevent dramas from occurring and that significant amounts of insurance must be put into action at the state level.

Finally, the amount is 1.2 billion without appealing to Electrabel's parent house, since it is Electrabel that insures and not Engie. However, when it comes to asking Engie to validate the extension of Doel 1, Doel 2 and to establish amounts to be paid to nuclear operators and operators, gloves are not put on. The operator and operator signs and co-signs the draft laws and annexed agreements. Admit that there are two weights, two measurements with this somewhat particular operation.

We also discussed the problem of environmental damage and bodily damage. Of course they were removed. We will not go back on this for now, but know that it is a problem that concerns us all and to which we will come back one day or another.

Mr. De Lamotte spoke only of the amendment. But before the amendment, which was rejected, to the law-program, there was the bill. I had explained it. It is one thing.

On the other hand, at the level of the guarantee, but I see that Mrs. Lalieux has left, it is obvious that the state will demand a remuneration for the guarantee that it will bring to the nuclear operators. This has been said. It is normal. This is of course.

We know that: when something is asked to Electrabel, we know how it happens. Mr. Lachaert, you blame me for populism. I do not agree with this at all. If there are matters that I or my party support, then I will defend them, even if the majority comes. It is not that I say those things because I am now in the opposition; it is things that I am firmly convinced of.

The following is very strange. There is a ruling from the State Council, in which it makes clear that this draft could possibly include state aid. You are convinced that this is not the case, but why not ask it directly to the European Commission? Why should this be done indirectly, should we not receive the letter, should we not receive the application, and even the cases are not forwarded to the European Commission? If you are so convinced that this is not a state aid, then you should also support the amendment? The amendment stipulates that it can only enter into membership when the European Commission gives the green light. This cannot be a problem, right?

How can you, as a liberal, Mr. Lachaert, declare that one producer has an advantage over the others, not once, but again and again, as Mrs. Lalieux says? The offshore also has a major insurance problem. Not as large as the nuclear sector, but also very large. So big even, that some investments do not happen there because the insurance problem is so big. How can you, as a liberal, continue to defend that one sector is always favored again, so that the State Council warns that this is a form of state aid. Nevertheless, you say that you will not ask the European Commission, you just go on with it and you will also back this project again.

If I can finish my reasoning, Mr. Speaker, then my intervention has been done and the colleagues can take the floor.

At a time when more and more votes are gathering to align the system of legal nuclear liability with common law, this government is going back a few years. Countries such as Germany, Sweden and Finland are at the forefront. They started with it. You allow families to move on in the event of a nuclear disaster, but you remain consistent: you always call on the same people. They will have to pay if it fails.

Of course, we can continue the debate. We also deviate from the current bill, but I am still surprised when I hear your speech, Mrs. Temmerman. One might think that the sp.a has never been in the government and never extended a reactor in Tihange, along with the gentlemen Wathelet and Di Rupo. If we look at the convention afterwards, we have a number of difficulties in calculating the nuclear contribution. So all this has not happened? You are again virgin and every nuclear power plant should be closed now? I think this is a witness to lightness. That is not correct at all.

You have to be a little consistent somewhere. This government is doing the same as the previous one. Because supply security is not guaranteed and the FANC says that further exploitation is possible, the extension has been approved here. Should we continue to do this forever? No, we need to make a plan to finally deal with it. Our party will be your ally in this. We must find solutions together. You will not be able to blame us. Bart Tommelein will, at the Flemish level, work very ambitiously to take all necessary steps from the Flemish region to ensure that we do it in 2025. We should have done this together ten years ago. Stop playing the black pit together and let’s just work together on the alternatives that should be there in a few years. It makes no sense to tell people about nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plants cannot be shut down and supply security can still be guaranteed.

As for the possible state aid, I have understood that there will be a notification anyway. This majority is looking at this fearlessly.

Mr. Lachaert, I would like to point out that we have decided together to conclude Goal 1 and Goal 2. At the time that closure was ordered, Elijah came up with a report stating that there was no, but there was no problem with the security of supply. You should read that report again.

In addition, if you take into account all the problems of the power plants and their age, and the fact that the FANC report now states that there are major safety problems, I find this design really irresponsible.

It is true, together we have decided to close one power plant later, but under two conditions: that the other two power plants would definitely be closed, and that the phrase “if there is still a problem of supply security” was omitted. But I forgot to say that.

We are very consistent in our attitude. We are very consistent.

Again, it amazes me of the liberal colleagues, both the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking... In my opinion you never talk to producers of alternative energy? I am . Those who say: today we no longer invest, because the political climate regarding keeping the nuclear power plants open is too uncertain.

Mr. Lachaert, that is the case. All studies show that too.

In terms of consequence, your party has decided that Goal 1 and Goal 2 will be closed definitively. Definitely, we all said that at the time. With this government, however, you have decided to keep them open. As a consequence, it can count.

Mr. De Lamotte, is this enough for you?

Is everyone served, as they used to say on the tram?

No one more? I will give the word to the government.

Everyone was served except the government. I will try to be as synthetic as possible to avoid lengthening the debates, knowing that we have already widely discussed these issues in committees.

This government’s point of view, repeatedly expressed, is to provide for security of supply and it cannot be done without the country’s nuclear power plants.

Studies – GEMIX 1 and GEMIX 2 – have long predicted this. They also envisage the extension of Tihange 1, Doel 1 and Doel 2, while the previous government has preferred the extension to Tihange 1.

This extension interferes with what could be called the half-time of the road to nuclear departure as it was envisaged by the 2003 law while it was expected to have sufficiently organized things so that Doel 1 and Doel 2 are closed at the age of 40. But, and as Mr. Lachaert has well specified, from the moment when we did not work on the energy transition from the moment when we voted in 2003 to leave the nuclear power in 2025, all that time has been lost to work on this energy transition.

Even today, even with Doel 1 and Doel 2, we have a very tight supply security. You’ve seen it recently during the last weekends when the cold has been stagnant for a few days over Western Europe. Knowing that in addition, we have a special situation with the closure of five French nuclear power plants in addition to what is usually planned.

Because of this, we cannot benefit from a full-regime interconnection. It is nice to have a physical interconnection and to enjoy physical capacities at boundaries up to 4000/4 500 megawatts but if no electricity passes through these interconnections, we must think about a minimum of energy independence.

From the moment when these units are operational, they must be insured as all units, whatever they are, and Ms. Temmerman recalled it well: even the operators of offshore wind turbines – the offshore wind turbine is within the competence of the federal power – have insurance for the machines they place and that produce, when the wind is at the appointment, the megawatts we need. It is precisely this wind that was not at the meeting during the last weekends that made our supply security not guaranteed as wind energy is intermittent.

This is one of its characteristics. In the spirit of the 2014 legislator, which we were all, the text should not enter into force until the day when all parties to the Paris Convention – composed of European states and non-European states –, in any case those that are part of the European Union, have ratified international instruments such as the Paris Convention and the 2004 Protocol.

In order for an insurance market to be able to take into account the insurance increases envisaged by international instruments and envisaged by countries – some countries, including Belgium, are above what is envisaged in these international instruments – Europe has indicated that a market needed sufficiently deep and wide, in Europe, so that these insurance can be covered by insurance companies that reinsure each other. This simultaneity is required.

But it is also requested in order to avoid distortions of competition between countries, depending on the entry into force, differentiated in time, chronologically different in each country, if each progressed at its own pace. There are still two countries to ratify. Britain should apparently do so at the beginning of 2017. Italy is nowhere and does not show any particular sign of progress on this issue. This is where the fundamental problem lies, which had not necessarily been evaluated with the sufficient knowledge of the future that we could have at the time. Indeed, in 2013, when we assessed this legislation that, on a bill, you voted here in parliament on 29 June 2014, we thought that these two countries would be able to ratify so that the law of 29 June 2014 entered into force on the 1st day of the 18th month following its publication in the Moniteur belge.

Unfortunately, it was again too short. This is why, by an article to the law containing various provisions, this government wanted, at the end of 2015, to postpone in two lines the entry into force of the text of the law of 29 June 2014 to be in the conditions of simultaneity required by Europe. Since, at the Conference of Presidents, this law was somewhat disossed from one or another of its parts, because an agreement had been reached between majority and opposition to pass only the texts on which the two parliamentary groups – majority and opposition – would agree at the end of 2015, I had the courage to take back this simple text of postponing the entry into force, to make an amendment to the law-program.

I found the justifications quite easily, since the State Guarantee (second subject) implemented in the law of 29 June 2014 – a concrete and objective element that we voted and you know very well – is not conceived without remuneration of operators to the State that provides this guarantee. It is made necessary by the fact that the insurance market cannot offer sufficiently broad and deep coverage, in particular due to the lack of ratification by some European countries that do not create the valid scale in terms of insurance.

The State must therefore provide this guarantee so that the nuclear operators of that country have the possibility, on the one hand, by the normal insurance way and, on the other hand, by remuneration to the State, that is, without any cost for the consumer, by means of this guarantee, to respond in the event of a disaster at the level of what is required in the international instruments duly implemented in our legislation.

The mechanism that we have before our eyes is very simple. There is therefore no cost for the consumer since the Minister of Finance, when he has developed this guarantee, will provide for the payment of a premium to be charged to the operators in order to benefit from it to the extent that it is necessary for the entire insurance scheme. Then it was the obvious financial justification that I had developed by saying that this law carried out financial impacts on the state budget.

It is part of a comprehensive system to which will be added another law providing for a state guarantee against remuneration to complement the insurance regime and, since this has a budgetary impact, it is possible to attach this amendment to the program law. So here is the whole story. It is one thing.

Obviously, it is not as easy as this to establish a regime that takes into account the entry into force, in January 2016, of a text that should not have come into force with the problematic technical consequences that I have just exposed, and nevertheless to ensure that there is a legal continuity allowing the whole regime to find in fine its harmony when this remunerated guarantee is developed.

This is not a retreat. This is simply a situation that takes into account the premature entry into force of the law of June 29, 2014 and the fact that one could do nothing and vote on the postponement of the entry into force. And there, we were in a situation of non-progress, or even backward as you hear it, because we would not have allowed a law that has been passed, which gives additional guarantees to the victims, to enter into force. It would have been recognized, by this postponement of the entry into force, that international conditions were not yet fulfilled. We have not done it and, in the end, we must be able to take advantage of what is done and draw the right conclusions.

This is what we do through this law that can be called "reparation law" or "intermediate law" that allows the regime to exist, not to be in contradiction with the absence of ratification of all European states and therefore to create distortions that could actually be qualified as state aid, that is, aid not in accordance with the rules of European competition. But that is nothing! There is no such thing as we provide a paid guarantee, a guarantee against remuneration. Such individual operators are, like all other operators of gas power plants, offshore wind turbines, of any unit of energy production, subject to insurance for the risks they cause by the units they operate.

It can be discussed at loss of sight the unlimited nature or not of this insurance. The Belgian regime has always been to provide for a limited liability. It has nothing original; it is simply the translation of a pre-existing regime in the Paris Convention and the 2004 Protocol. Other countries have made other choices, but in reality, this too is a semantic discussion. Because unlimited liability is the liability of the operator until the end of its assets, that is, the bankruptcy on its assets to provide the liability, beyond what is required in terms of insurance, even in Germany, of the operators in question.

It all depends on what you want to do. You can agree with everything, but you need to have a concrete and practical mind. From the moment you choose unlimited liability, for damages that infinitely exceed the amounts of liability in Belgium and Germany, compared to a damage that would occur due to nuclear energy, this simply means that your regime is based on the idea that companies must, if necessary, disappear. I reassure you from the beginning: probably because of the incident itself, she would disappear from office. This reasoning therefore does not make much sense, except to give a purely semantic signal without any concrete impact.

Think of Fukushima. I do not know the particular insurance scheme imagined in Japan. But it is clear that the scale of the catastrophe, which rightly moved the whole world and prompted us to take more severe measures on stress tests, including insurance matters, has demonstrated that all States are responsible to their citizens for environmental damage caused by units producing such damage on their territory.

This is the continuity of the state. A State is nothing more than a sum of individuals, of legal personalities producing income, with a continuity in time, which far exceeds the continuity of enterprises, and with financial forces, which also exceed the financial forces of enterprises. In the end, it is the state that is responsible for this.

I believe that the Belgian State feels responsible for this situation, since it analyses the problem that is submitted to us with the greatest seriousness and provides the instruments. On 31 December of this year, we asked the Minister of Finance to provide and establish this guarantee against remuneration. We have requested that it provide the necessary instruments to supplement the increased insurance scheme, not only in amounts but also in the quality and nature of the damages thus insured.

The Belgian state, like all other states, including the German state, is responsible for more than 2,500 billion. The German state is responsible beyond this sum. And if a nuclear damage occurs in Germany and the financial impacts of it exceed that amount and if the German State, assuming responsibility by the victims, decides to provide for the repair of these damages, it can do it, and I suppose it will do it, beyond what is ensured by the law. This is obvious.

So all this is ultimately, as our colleague Egbert Lachaert said, a semantic debate that does not want to acknowledge that we are progressing more and more, over time, towards an increasingly widespread recognition of damage repair. We are moving towards increasingly strict requirements for operators to secure the risks associated with the operation of their industry.

I would therefore ask you, dear colleagues, to vote for this text. We will come back, the Minister of Finance and myself, with the file that will relate to the paid guarantee that will complement this system. Why did we ask to vote on this text before 31 December 2016? Because this is the time that all the ministers involved in this matter have received to complete the whole regime.

This deadline applies not only to the Minister of Economic Affairs and myself, who present this file to you, but also to the Minister of Finance, who must establish this guarantee. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is also concerned, because he does the necessary to raise awareness in Italy to finally make the decision, first of all, to sort between its so-called nuclear infrastructures, knowing that in Italy the situation is simple because they do not have a nuclear power production unit.

It would therefore be very easy for them to quickly ratify these international instruments, to ensure that the entire market opens to nuclear operators and allows the market to bear premiums that would ⁇ be less important than the guarantee that the Belgian State will require from the operators in that country. Insurers, in the market, will then be able to fully assume the risk, as required by Belgian law and, with other requirements, the laws of other European countries parties to this convention and that we can continue to progress.

I imagine that in the coming years we will be increasingly demanding with the damage that these units can cause and that we will further refine their insurance scheme. However, it is necessary to remain reasonable and ensure that such insurance can be financed by operators so that they can continue to properly operate their infrastructure for the benefit of the population in terms of security of supply.