Proposition 54K2034

Projet de loi portant création de l'Agence fédérale de la Dette et suppression du Fonds des Rentes.

General information ¶

Submitted by

MR Swedish coalition

Submission date

Sept. 14, 2016

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

administrative formalities public administration public debt

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V Vooruit Open Vld N-VA LDD MR

Abstained from voting

Groen Ecolo LE PS | SP DéFI ∉ PVDA | PTB PP VB

Party dissidents ¶

• Olivier Maingain (MR) abstained from voting.

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Discussion ¶

Oct. 20, 2016 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

The rapporteur is Mr Van Biesen. It refers to the written report.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the Belgian public debt amounts to 109.2% of GDP, 406 billion euros. It is nothing! This is also the supervision of bank guarantees that we have given in particular as part of the Dexia file. Every year, billions of euros are given in interest, which requires both prudent and intelligent management to avoid any false step that could cost, as has already been the case, hundreds of millions of euros to the Belgian state.

The object of the text is a reorganization of debt management, the creation of a federal debt agency. But the intention above all, as we understood in the context of the discussions, is to allow for a relaxation of the conditions of recruitment within this type A body. And the stated goal is to be able to resort to specialists, as you call them, from the stock market sector, accustomed to market halls and complex operations, traders in some way, and to be able to exceed the bars that are usually applied within the Federal Public Service.

We will not deny that some specialization in debt management may prove useful. These are complex mechanisms. However, we ask ourselves, Mr. Minister of Finance, specifically on the baremic question. I have said this in the committee and I repeat it here. To what baremic level can we go? Is it healthy to exceed all the ceilings to recruit this type of staff from the private sector? Shouldn’t this expertise be developed within the framework of public service? Do we really have no officials in the Public Service capable of handling these issues? Furthermore, we are concerned about future methods that will be used for debt management. Should we really import all the methods from the private market halls into the management of public debt? Who will hold the pilot tomorrow? Can we be assured that those traders who will be engaged will not take power over debt management officials and over the control agencies? How will the internal control be organized? Will it be effective? These are questions that we have asked in the framework of committee work and to which the representative of the Debt Agency has answered.

You will allow us to consider that these moral and methodological commitments are insufficient in view of the financial, ethical and methodological risks that arise. I would like to take note of this, but I think these calms are very mild.

Therefore, we will abstain in a precautionary concern. I can assure you that we will be very attentive following this case. We ask you to be the same with all the senior officials of our state who are responsible for overseeing debt.

The proposed bill is not a small matter. It is about the creation of a federal debt agency, which will profoundly transform the face of the institutions we now know.

We abstained in the Finance Committee. We will do the same at the time of the vote, because there are still some questions and several sources of concern.

First of all, Mr. Minister, it is necessary to avoid bringing the wolf into the herd. We have a colossal debt: 109.2% of GDP. However, its weight is increasing; it must be measured. At the same time, the interest burden decreases, as OLO rates reached 0.32% at the beginning of the week. They are at the floor level. This means that you could alleviate debt, but the policy you are pursuing does not contribute to it – on the contrary.

In view of the considerable weight of debt, it is essential to continue to manage it properly. My fear is, I repeat, that you will not bring the wolf into the herd. Your willingness to resort to external expertise through recruitment that you would facilitate in particular by contracting could result in a situation such as people from the financial and banking sector to be the managers of public debt tomorrow. So, how will you avoid conflicts of interests and connivence? How are you going to prevent some from importing in the management of public debt the techniques of the private sector, of which we have seen in the past to what danger they could lead?

You have to reassure us, Mr. President.

We expect you to take the commitment, in front of this assembly, to make sure to create a clear, precise framework, avoiding conflicts of interests and which, through the development of profiles, will allow to bring people who will be completely devoted to the general interest, without wanting to in any way facilitate – I allow myself to say it directly and without distortion – the business of certain actors in the financial sector.

The second point that we also need to be reassured about is about management techniques. It will be remembered that in the 1990s, one of your predecessors had experienced difficulties on swap operations that had been poorly closed. In fact, the Debt Agency explained to us during its hearing that it continued to use techniques, coverage operations. In the absolute, it can be understood, however, of course, that the risk taken is well-framed and that one avoids finding itself in a situation where ultimately, the operation aimed at obtaining a profit does not result in an additional deficit. What safeguards will be put in place to prevent this from happening?

It is a volume of 109.2% of GDP. Of course, there is the stock, there is the renewal of debt, there is the repurchase of debt, and there are the new debts. In other words, management does not necessarily involve 109.2% of GDP, but it does not necessarily involve considerable amounts. This means that the slightest mistake can result in a colossal cost for the state. Here, we need clarification on how you mean, as Minister of Finance, to protect yourself from a kind of excessive zeal, carelessness, risk-taking that is not suitable for the management of public debt.

Mr. Gilkinet, Mr. Laaouej, we have already discussed this in the Finance Committee. I understand very well your concerns about the proper management of the debt, a huge mass of more than 400 billion euros. Good management of this debt is imperative for the economic health of our country. The professionalization of this Agency that we are currently running seems to me necessary, because the world in which this debt must be continuously financed deserves the greatest vigilance.

The general management of the debt agency is entrusted to a strategic committee. The daily management will be entrusted to an Executive Committee. The Federal Debt Agency will be responsible for the operational management of public debt. This management must comply with the general directives that are issued by the Minister of Finance.

We have thus created a structure that leaves a certain freedom, necessary to manage these debts in an optimal way, but which, nevertheless, gives the guarantees that few defensive risks are taken, or even none.

Mr. Gilkinet mentioned recruitment; professionalization is imperative, but the current framework, with the profiles present, is sufficient for the project we have just started. We will ⁇ comply with what is included in the budget today.

You don’t give a very precise answer regarding the recruitment, Mr. Minister. How do we avoid recruiting experts who would continue to have links with the private financial sector from which they come? We must take care of the independence of those who will work for the Federal Debt Agency tomorrow. In other words, it is necessary to avoid conflicts of interest, collusion and connivence.

Will you here undertake to establish procedures that will avoid finding yourself in this damaging situation?

Private organizations have lived at their own expense by giving too much power to traders. I think of known cases, such as the General Society, the Kerviel case and others, which are still in court. Risk-taking, which would be the consequence of traders’ engagement within the new Federal Debt Agency, requires clear tags. I also share my colleague Laaouej’s concerns about potential conflicts of interest and a form of incompatibility. I added the questions of the potential baremic derivative.

In a comprehensive and prospective manner, the Belgian Federal State must be able to build within it the expertise necessary for the management of this type of files.

As part of the Dexia case, it was seen that we were completely lacking in the urgency to provide the right answers, depending on both the expertise coming from France and the expertise of private banks or expensive law firms. The outsourcing of this type of expertise is problematic. As much as I can join you on professionalization, so much the method understood here is in question and we ask for guarantees in this regard.

Mr. Speaker, I note that both speakers agree with the need for professionalization. We will set up structures that will make impossible the drainage that we have experienced in the past.

I emphasize that the Debt Agency will remain closely linked to the General Treasury Administration. I repeat that, thanks to the three levels (strategic committee, executive committee and the directives of the Minister of Finance), we have three guarantees, according to which the checks will be done at each level without taking away the freedom necessary for professional management. If this balance remains to be found, all the ingredients are there to ensure that balance in the future.