Proposition 52K2128

Projet de loi relatif aux méthodes de recueil de données par les services de renseignement et de sécurité.

General information ¶

Submitted by

The Senate

Submission date

Dec. 10, 2008

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

banking secrecy professional secret protection of privacy secret service judicial inquiry search source of information telecommunications protection of communications terrorism access to information money laundering

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V LE PS | SP Open Vld MR

Voted to reject

Groen Ecolo N-VA LDD FN VB

Abstained from voting

Vooruit

Party dissidents ¶

• Peter Luykx (CD&V) voted to reject.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

Jan. 7, 2010 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, I will briefly report on our work on the bill on the methods of data collection of the intelligence and security services.

This project comes from the Senate. We are therefore the second chamber to examine this text which has a long history. Indeed, already during the previous legislature, the government had attempted to file a bill on the same subject and the Senate had failed to conclude an essentially difficult text as regards finding a balance between, on the one hand, the methods of data collection by the intelligence and security services and, on the other hand, respect for privacy and the rights of citizens.

During this legislature, a bill was submitted, signed by a set of senators of the majority. The first signatory is Mr. by Vandenberg. This text was voted in the Senate and transmitted to the House.

Our committee has, from the beginning, sought the opinion of the State Council on this project, given that the project of Mr. Vandenberghe had not been submitted to him, even though the project of the previous government, he, had been. Therefore, we had an opinion on the subject.

Our committee worked in two periods. We first devoted our work to a series of hearings on the assessment of anti-terrorism laws. A series of hearings preceded the examination of this bill, since, at the request of some parliamentarians, we had decided, within the House Justice Committee, to evaluate all anti-terrorism legislation. We did this while the Senate was examining the bill aimed at introducing methods for collecting intelligence data in our legislative arsenal.

Thus, a first group of auditions brought together a series of actors. As you will see in the report, it is essentially the responsible at European level for anti-terrorism laws, Mr. Gilles de Kerchove, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, magistrates, lawyers and some associations who came to present us with a state of the issue on the application of anti-terrorism laws.

Then the Senate’s draft came into our committee. From the beginning, the question arose of how to articulate this way of working: a first series of hearings on anti-terrorism laws and this bill that not only deals with the application of anti-terrorism laws, but which has as merit to install a legal framework relating to the collection of these sensitive methods.

The text was voted in the Senate. In the House, each member of Parliament was able to relay in their expressions what we had heard otherwise during the hearings on the evaluation of anti-terrorism laws, even if the subject did not specifically concern the aforementioned laws.

We also requested hearings on the bill as such. Again, magistrates, lawyers, intelligence services appeared before our commission to say what they thought of this bill. We then received the opinion of the State Council, an extremely interesting opinion.

This followed an in-depth review of the text in the House, even though it was the second House, and more than 80 amendments were submitted. Many of them have been recognised, mainly technical amendments or bringing in-depths, but coming from observations of the State Council.

In any case, as a rapporteur, I welcome that the commission has requested the opinion of the State Council.

In short, for those who do not participate in the work of the Justice Committee, what does this project include? It aims to establish a legal framework for the collection of sensitive data by intelligence and security services.

I would remind you that we are one of the only European countries that do not yet have such a legal framework that allows its services to use both ordinary but above all specific and exceptional methods for collecting such data.

One thing is to give that power to intelligence and security agencies and another thing, and that is the purpose of the project, is to install a legal framework to exercise control over how this data is collected, in order to ensure that this is done in compliance with the law and with the desired permissions.

I will not go into the details. Ordinary methods do not require special control. On the other hand, for the specific and exceptional methods, which affect the privacy of people, this bill establishes control bodies. This includes an administrative commission, composed of magistrates, to monitor how this data is collected.

Grosso modo, there is no preventive control for collecting data by special methods. Actors will be able to do so, and it is only after using these special methods that they will have to warn a commission that will have to ensure the legality of the procedures.

For exceptional methods, prior authorization will be required. I will not list them but specify that they can be intrusive (public and private places).

The text seeks to provide very special guarantees for professions that deserve special attention: lawyers and journalists. These are professions that are excessively sensitive to respect for freedoms. The text sets out how or not intelligence services can, and with what safeguards, collect data when it comes to approaching these two professions.

The discussions in the committee mainly focused on the balance between respect for freedoms and these methods, on how the established bodies (the Administrative Commission and the R Committee) would work, and on how authorisations would be given and controlled. Another delicate point of the discussion concerned how certain information passes from the intelligence field to the judicial field.

Where information has been collected for intelligence purposes and it may or may not be used in the field of justice, what safeguards are needed for such data collected for intelligence purposes to be processed for a judicial purpose, which is obviously not the same thing at all? In the field of intelligence, the purposes are different from the judicial purpose. The methods and guarantees are also different.

These are the main points on which the discussions focused. Several parliamentarians have repeatedly raised the way some essentially broad concepts were defined. I mean the words "radicalism" and "anarchy" and all political activities in the broadest sense of the term that could be confused or taken for "terrorist" acts, while it is simply a contest against established regimes. I think the Greens will take the floor on this.

The topics discussed are often those usually discussed when it comes to legislation not only anti-terrorism but also those relating to MPRs, i.e. specific research methods. Parliamentarians have therefore very often raised questions as to whether the legislative solutions found in this draft were analogous to those of the legal framework of the MPRs on which so much has been worked in the previous years and which, in addition, have often been the subject of appeal before the Constitutional Court.

As I said, between 80 and 100 amendments were submitted. This text was not taken lightly at all because, in a second chamber and after multiple meetings, it was voted: 9 voted for the text, 4 voted against and there was an abstinence.

Here is, Mr. Speaker, in short, what I wanted to say about this bill. I repeat that it has been expected for a long time. Some may contradict me, but few countries do not have similar legislation. Belgium was "later"; our intelligence services must be operational and able to work with abroad. However, it is curious that Belgian intelligence services are unable to use certain methods that other neighboring countries, such as France, use. In the current European judicial and police space, it is clear that having little means to collect intelligence is a problem. The whole was to give political methods and to find counterweights, both at the level of intelligence and at the level of the judiciary, which allow to control the activity of those who collect this data.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Mr. Colleagues, as the rapporteur just said, the bill that is submitted to us today is the result of a long and thorough parliamentary work carried out first in the Senate and then in the House.

In the Senate, all stakeholders involved in the project were consulted, from intelligence services to Committee R to civil society actors such as the Human Rights League. The State Council was also consulted.

In the House, a rigorous work was also carried out. We conducted additional hearings. The opinion of the Defence Committee was also requested and a second opinion of the State Council was carefully studied. In addition, many amendments result from the comments in this second opinion.

All of these initiatives have resulted in a text that, for my group, is overall satisfactory.

I would like to recall the primary tasks of the intelligence services. They serve to combat extremism from all sides, to protect citizens, fundamental freedoms, state sovereignty and democracy. It is therefore necessary, as it has been said, to equip these services with effective means; and this was not the case before – or at least equivalent to those of neighboring countries, neither more nor less, but also – and this is extremely important – to guarantee the balance, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms as well as the strict respect for the privacy of all citizens.

Therefore, guarantees and guarantees have been provided in this project. I will cite three. First, a commission made up of magistrates providing upstream control for exceptional methods and downstream control for specific data collection methods. Then, the Committee R is there as the Chamber of Appeal. It has a jurisdictional role. In this regard, let us not forget that Committee R emanates from Parliament which can therefore, through this body, fully play its role of control and monitoring. Finally, the Privacy Protection Commission is also an integral part of these control mechanisms.

And let’s not forget this substantial advance: the possibility of resorting to the R Committee and the control of the Privacy Protection Commission set up for exceptional methods are also applicable to ordinary research methods. This must be emphasized.

I also insist that this bill specifically specifies that data collection methods cannot be used in order to reduce or hinder individual rights and freedoms and that the implementation of specific and exceptional methods must respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This is not just a principle affirmation. In fact, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will have to be respected by the intelligence services from the implementation of the method, and they will also be able to be invoked during checks and appeals.

The text is therefore there to protect fundamental freedoms without violating them. We have been ⁇ attentive to this necessary balance. This is why during the various debates my group emphasized the protection of professional secrecy for lawyers, doctors and journalists. The question of the professional secrecy of lawyers has ⁇ attracted our attention, among other things, to see whether the security and intelligence officials were excluded from Article 29 of the Code of Criminal Instruction. I would like you to confirm what was said in the committee. Article 29 of the Code of Criminal Investigation states that any official who, in the course of his activities, has knowledge of an offence must compulsorily transmit it to the judicial authorities and prosecutors.

In this context, let us take the example of a lawyer suspected of belonging to a terrorist group or in any case of being at the initiative of a threat to the State Security. This lawyer is interrogated, he receives a call from his client and during this telephone conversation, his client confesses to him that he has committed an offence. The official will collect this data that has nothing to do with the terrorist threat: it can be a car theft, theft, what I know... For us, according to the law, the information of the existence of this offence cannot be transmitted to the prosecutor's office and can not be on the basis of a judicial instruction against the client of the lawyer who obviously has nothing to do with the threat for which the particular method of search was activated.

There is the Commission’s filter. For us, it is very important that this official is released from his obligation to transmit directly. From now on, he will forward the information to the committee and the committee will decide whether the information should be transmitted at the level of the prosecutor’s office.

I see that you accept, Mr. Minister; that reassures us.

We insist on the buffer role that the commission composed of independent magistrates should play. This committee will work on a case-by-case basis for each case and each method established.

In addition, my group would like to emphasize the problem of locations and computer intrusion.

The answer you give is very important. You said that the text of data collection methods follows an intelligence logic while the text of particular research methods follows a judicial logic. The two logics are different and must remain the same. In this context of double logic, the problem we have raised seems to be met.

Dear colleagues, before, the framework was blurred, but thanks to this bill, greater transparency and a just balance between means and protection of freedoms are ensured. My group is satisfied with the established control mechanisms that – we hope – will prevent any form of abuse. For us, this law constitutes a step in the evolution of the Belgian intelligence services since we must not forget that we started from nothing. It is part of a continuity. We are not at stake, but we are not at stake either.

In this context, my group will vote on this text while keeping in mind that the essential component of parliamentary and legislative work is the evaluation of the provisions taken. The PS will therefore be attentive to the application of the law and its possible adaptations.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, the previous speakers have already said that the text of the BIM Act has already gone a long way. The reports of the Committee I have repeatedly reiterated the need for special methods for collecting data.

Mr. Minister, it may also have to do with the difficult relationship between the intelligence services and the outside world. The intelligence services operate in the shadow and in that shadow often arise unjust, that I emphasize, ghost images. Fortunately, this is now a past time.

Colleagues, slowly but surely the awareness has grown that our security and intelligence services need to have additional tools and powers. The awareness has grown due to developments abroad, where intelligence services have special methods. Awareness has also grown due to the development of, unfortunately, new, potentially very large-scale threats such as 9/11, and the events in Madrid and London. Awareness has also grown due to the ever-changing ways in which state-threatening groups come into contact with each other.

During the previous legislature, a text was prepared and submitted. Due to lack of time, this was not discussed. Open Vld has therefore fully supported the proposal that was submitted in the Senate during this legislature and cooperated with the amendment on a number of points.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to summarize briefly what is important to us in this text. It is five points.

First, it is important that the granting of additional powers, additional resources and additional methods, which we are doing now, is also accompanied by efficient control. For us, the Committee I and the Commission go together. They should not be seen separately.

Second, it is important to emphasize that the intelligence services cannot simply use these methods. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality must always be taken into account. Such special methods shall only be used or shall only be used if other methods of data collection prove to be inadequate.

Third, the BIM Act goes beyond the BOM Act in some points, but both laws have a different purpose and a different finality. Special investigation methods in the service of the police are intended to collect evidence in order to reach a conviction and punishment. Special intelligence methods, on the other hand, are intended solely to identify potential security threats.

Fourth, important to us is the relationship between, on the one hand, the intelligence research and, on the other hand, the investigation or judicial investigation. Collega Déom has also already alluded to this and outlined the case of information that comes to light in the context of intelligence research.

Intelligence and security services should not conduct investigations that may impair the smooth progress of an investigation or judicial investigation. If, in the context of the intelligence investigation, information arises about a crime to be committed or a crime already committed but not yet revealed, they must immediately inform the federal prosecutor.

The law also stipulates that data obtained through an intelligence investigation must never be the sole basis for convicting a suspect. I think this is also the answer to the question asked by Mrs. Deom. It should never be the only reason to convict a suspect.

I will come to the last point that is important to us. The colleagues have already mentioned it. There has been a long debate on the extent to which intelligence services can gain access to protected data, for example data protected by the journalistic source secret. The proposed solution provides for access to journalistic sources only in very exceptional cases, after the President of the Association of Professional Journalists has been informed. We think this is a fair solution.

I will decide, Mr. Speaker. Our group supports this text. The amended proposal responds to the concern for greater safety, but it also provides buffers against the abusive use of the special methods. Mr. Minister, we believe that it is in the interest of the services to strictly comply with the legal conditions we enroll, because any excess of authority or any excess of authority will reopen the discussion whether, and to what extent, specific or special methods of intelligence collection are permitted. Getting more powers also means taking more responsibilities. (Applause of Applause)

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, the applause from the politically correct banks does not surprise me.

There has already been pointed out the technical aspects of the law, the possibilities it offers and any restrictions that have been introduced. After me, there will be speakers who will point out this. I am convinced of this. However, I will go past it. I will focus my arrows on the politically correct thinking contained in this law and also on the organization, which should ensure its implementation and which should be its pillar.

Let it be clear that Vlaams Belang strongly and convincingly rejects this legislative change and the law to which this legislative change applies on principle grounds. Why Why ? In the first place, this law upholds the existence of the Belgian State Security as an institution. Secondly, it seeks an ideological trend that is democratically represented in each of Belgium’s parliaments as extreme and state-threatening.

I explain myself more closely. First, the Institute of Belgian State Security continues to exist and, under this law, it receives more armshake. The state of service of this organization over the past decades is a sequence of blunders in which a comedy series like comedy capers would fade. I will take a few examples: the dossier of the Bande de Nijvel, the case-Juan Mendez, the murder committed on the FN topman. There were clear links with state security. Furthermore, it involved the rental of garage boxes to hide and mask burned weapons. This was signed by the State Security. We also remember the flight of Fehriye Erdal, a great flight. The case-Belliraj is still fresh in the memory. This is only a small grip from a large number of painful exfoliators. Also, the number of chefs that have passed the review at the top of this organization and the way that happened is shameful in comparison with democratic countries. The political signature often primates on the competence of those who are appointed. That is a first point.

A second point is the manifest demonization of a life view. I refer here to Article 8, which explains the threat to the security of the State in paragraph 1, point c. It defines the term extremism. Extremism is defined as “racist, xenophobic, anarchist, nationalist, authoritarian or totalitarian conceptions or intentions, whether of a political, ideological, confessional or philosophical nature, which are theoretically or in practice contrary to the principles of democracy or human rights, to the proper functioning of democratic institutions or other foundations of the rule of law”.

A conclusion is urgent. As a lawyer, nationalism is here by definition cataloged as a potential form of extremism while in fact it is an ideology that exists alongside ecologism, socialism or liberalism that also all know their extreme views and their extreme side in the political spectrum.

What is even more striking – with this I come to the politically correct core of the legislation – is the fact that integrism, Islamic Fundamentalism or Islamic Socialism are not mentioned anywhere in the definition I just quoted, while the overwhelming majority of cases involving extremism in these times have to do with the threat from radical and fundamentalist Islamic organizations. Therefore, if one calls nationalism, one should also include a number of other aspects in the law. As far as I am concerned, nationalism and even anarchism can be relieved.

Mr. Minister, you said in the committee that there are sufficient guarantees in the law and in this legislative amendment to avoid abuses. Basically, there is no amendment to the Act of 1998. I can disprove with two examples that sufficient guarantees are provided, which you said in the committee. If one does not consider Islamic fundamentalism as a threat, it is not abnormal that one can, on the one hand, allow a radical Islam fundamentalist and murderer like Belliraj to become an informant, while on the other hand, one abruptly stops the career of a promising singer like Soetkin Collier because her family members are Flemish nationalists. That amendment does not change that, Mr. Minister, the original law, nor this law. Politically correct thinking is contained in the law, and the organization that has to apply the law is rotten and destroyed to the bone.

Where are the guarantees? Read Article 8 here. If you are a conscientious and intellectually honest politician, then you draw your conclusions from the definition I read to you later.

I can only decide that this is Belgian. This is the Belgian regime, in its most ridiculous, absurd, painful and most extremist aspect, with a total lack of respect for freedom of expression, where terrorists can make expenses on the cap of the taxpayer and nationalists are broodrooted. Furthermore, the control from the Senate, from the Committee I, is a laugh. The opposition is not even represented.

I come to my decision, Mr. Minister. The State Security must be abolished and the state security must be guaranteed by the police services, as set out in the Flemish Interest Bill, which was included in the discussion but was not approved. None of the diseases of which this law suffers, and ⁇ the body that must apply the law, is helped out of the world. On the contrary, I think we can still experience serious farce. Therefore, we naturally reject the legislative amendment.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, for the preparation of this legislation on the collection of data and the method for this by our intelligence and security services, the Parliament has ⁇ not gone ice overnight.

Senator Vandenberghe already on 10 December 2008 submitted a proposal inspired by a bill from the previous legislature. Several hearings were held in the Senate. There were 13 committee meetings. 148 amendments were submitted and discussed. Hearing sessions were also held in the Chamber. The Council of State was asked for advice. We listened to the Committee I, the lawyers’ and journalists’ organizations, the College of Attorneys-General and the Administrator-General of State Security. 82 amendments were submitted and discussed. I give all this to indicate that the present work has become an important democratic work.

The challenge was therefore great: how we can equip our intelligence and security services and provide their legal instruments to detect the threats to our society in a timely manner, respecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.

The fact that security risks have increased globally can no longer be denied. Think of the recent intention of a 23-year-old Al Qaeda terrorist to blow up a trans-Atlantic flight between Amsterdam and Detroit on Christmas Day. Fortunately, the attack was prevented by alert passengers; the facts are known. Indeed, if we want to avoid that in the future the intelligence services, which face ever-increasing challenges, do not remain completely helpless on the sideline, the adaptation of our legislation is urgent. In addition, important European and international institutions such as the European Union and NATO are present in our country and our country also hosts the largest concentration of persons with diplomatic status: more than 60 000 persons. The Belgian intelligence services are also the last in Europe that still do not have solid legal instruments; we should no longer remain a vulnerable area.

We fully support the amended bill. It clearly specifies under what circumstances the methods can be used, how the decisions are formed and how a legal certainty control can be guaranteed.

There shall be a distinction between three types of methods and also a grading between the ordinary methods, the specific methods and the exceptional methods, which shall be applied in compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

The controls are applied stricter and stricter. There are also very strict conditions if the specific or exceptional method concerns a lawyer, a doctor or a journalist.

The monitoring of the use of the methods is also well developed. There will be an administrative committee, which will be fully independent in the exercise of its audit tasks. Both the actual and substituting members are magistrates. The committee is also chaired by an investigative judge.

There is also a strong a posteriori control. The above-mentioned task belongs to the Standing Committee I, which can deliver opinions on the legality of decisions on the application of the method as well as on compliance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.

We support the present draft. We would like to thank the rapporteur, Ms. Nyssens, and also all the staff of the Cabinet and the FOD Justice, who have successfully completed the drafting of the draft in question.

Mr. Speaker, my dear colleagues, for the MR, it was necessary, as soon as possible, to define a legal and effective framework for the use of methods of data collection by the State Security as well as by the General Service of Intelligence and Security of the Armed Forces, since these methods involve a high degree of infringement of fundamental freedoms, protected by the Constitution as well as by a whole series of international texts, including the European Convention on Human Rights.

That said, since it is about ensuring the security of our country, our fellow citizens, our interests, a fortiori, in our current society, our intelligence services imperatively need these means. It was therefore necessary to make them available and frame their possibilities of use as best as possible.

It is in this spirit that the Justice Committee has worked on this text, as the Senate had done before it. Thus, after new hearings and new reports, a number of technical improvements could still be made to the bill as submitted by the Senate.

In the order of our satisfaction, we will mainly mention four points.

First, the expansion of the different measures of data collection and their hierarchy according to their degree of infringement of fundamental rights; the determination of the authorities that can activate the implementation of the MRDs and the mission of a posteriori control of the methods of data collection assigned to the Committee R.

Second, the fact that the committee responsible for the supervision of MRDs is permanent and that its members perform their functions full-time, as well as the fact that all effective and substitute members must be magistrates, constitutes a guarantee of quality and therefore of security.

Third, the place given to the professional association of journalists, when a specific or exceptional method is implemented in relation to a journalist, also seems to us to be an interesting advance.

Fourth, the strengthening of the respect of the rights of defence is guaranteed in several ways, in particular by the fact that the intelligence services communicate their information about the existence of infringements to the commission which, if appropriate, prepares an unclassified, i.e. unclassified, minutes, which will be transmitted to the King’s prosecutor or to the federal prosecutor. On the one hand, the data to be included in this unclassified record are listed by law and, on the other hand, this record is included in the criminal record and is therefore subject to the contradiction of the parties.

Consequently, the improvements made to the original text in the Senate and then in the House fully justify, in our opinion, the support that this bill must be supported.

Our group will therefore vote on this text because we consider that it offers an acceptable balance between fundamental rights and freedoms and the use by the State Security and the General Service of Intelligence and Security of the Armed Forces of particular methods of research, into ultimately the right to freedom and the right to security.

Mrs. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, to immediately fall into the house with the door, our group considers that the draft law on the special intelligence methods still has a few shortcomings. It crashes here and there.

The draft was relatively quickly pursued by Parliament, although it cannot be called a specifically insignificant legislation. In the committee was also stated literally, after criticism of the opposition in the course of affairs, that when there are errors or unclearties in the draft, which can still be filtered out by the Senate. This is, unfortunately, the characteristic attitude of the policy carried out at the federal level.

The weak points of the design are as follows.

First, I would like to refer to my bill, which is linked to the draft. My proposal was also credited by the Association of Professional Journalists during the hearings. I think there should also be further efforts on the source secrecy. It should actually be even more integrated into the BIM Act, even though part of it was welcomed.

Second, we believe that there is no real protection provided if the intelligence services would illegally use the extensive methods that they will be able to exercise through this bill. This can lead to abuses that may violate certain human rights. Human rights, which, however, form the cornerstone of our society and provide the people with the necessary protection, must be protected at all costs.

A third point of criticism that I would like to mention is that it is often pointed out that an extension of the intelligence methods is necessary in order, inter alia, to legally frame the cooperation with the foreign intelligence services. Mr. Minister, on that point you are right, but what happens when information is obtained from a foreign intelligence service, where it is not clear whether that foreign intelligence service has collected that information in compliance with human rights? Take, for example, the prohibition of torture. I think a better guarantee should be included in the bill.

Fourth, it seems to me too extensive that, in the absence of the committee’s opinion within a certain period, the competent minister may decide whether to proceed to the practice of those special practices which, let us be honest, seriously violate privacy. In my opinion, the minister is not the right person to judge at that time about the opportunity of the breach of privacy that these methods involve.

Finally, I would like to point out once again that the parliamentary control of the intelligence service in our country is very undemocratic. As one of the few countries in Europe, parliamentary control is carried out only by the majority. It is known that the control of the Committee I is absolutely ineffective. This will not be different even after the adoption of this design.

The majority is not part of this committee. I am part of the majority and I am not part of it.

That is a very absurd reasoning! You’re not sitting in the Board of Directors in the Senate, and so it’s all so bad not? That makes it even worse!

This is not a blame to you, Mrs. Smeyers, but to the members of the majority. That committee is just too small. There need to be a lot more members in seats, as in any other parliamentary committee, so that both large and small political groups can accommodate them.

What is happening now is that some large majority factions draw everything to themselves and therefore there is no democratic control, and then precisely in an institution that is so dangerous or involves so many risks of manipulation and of penetrating political opponents and the like. With regard to this problem, the control should be very strong, but that is not the case at all.

The minister has given signals in the committee that he wants to do something about it, but he has remained very vague.

Mr. Minister, I hope that you can say during the debate what initiatives you will take to make control more democratic.

My party sits in Committee P, but not in Committee I. Committee I deals with intelligence services. We would like to sit there, precisely for the reasons that colleague Schoofs has just outlined, that is, because of the undemocratic dangers that such an intelligence service can bring with it.

I hope, together with Mr. Laeremans, to find an answer on this subject. I can only conclude that because of the five points cited above, but also because of other, smaller points that we can’t keep behind, the N-VA will not support the design in the future.

We have discussed and discussed this draft in the committee. It was occasionally a good and engaging discussion, but at some point one finds that certain points of view are too far apart. We have submitted many amendments and tried to make amendments, but we have failed. That is democracy and the law of the majority. We will be consistent and will not approve the bill today.

Is there anything positive to say about the project? Of course, there is something positive to say. I think it is good that there is now finally a legal framework that regulates what the security services can and should do and under what conditions. There are also control mechanisms.

I want to be clear: the fight against terrorism is of course important. We should not simply go over that. However, the fight against terrorism cannot and should not be a pretext for adopting laws that are dangerous to personal freedom. We need to constantly review such legislation. On paper everything looks good. The question is also how it will be organized in practice. Are there sufficient guarantees inscribed in the law to avoid being overwhelmed by the writing?

Mr. Minister, colleagues, the draft is, for the time being, the last initiative in a long series of laws and measures taken after the attacks of 11 September to give governments more resources in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. This evolution is noticeable throughout Europe. Belgium is not a unicum. Some say that we are somewhat behind, but the question is also whether we should always be with the others. The evolution is noticeable and we also see that it is often under pressure from the United States.

Just as many legislative amendments have been adopted since 11 September 2001 aimed at combating terrorism, we and our group at the beginning of the year asked to review the various legislative initiatives taken in recent years. The Commission has made a start. We have had very interesting discussions and discussions on this subject, but at the moment we started discussing the BIM Act, the evaluation was not completed, Mr. Minister. That is a pity, because we left well, with a good goal, but we were not able to complete the entire route.

Therefore, we also propose to re-evaluate within a certain period of time. We have held the discussion on this. If the law is in effect for several years, we need to re-evaluate. You say that reports must be submitted every so many months and that control is possible. Again, the Committee I is a limited group of persons who must carry out the direct control. What we will receive from our banks will be an annual report from Committee I. This, of course, is not so much to follow the control from close.

If we pass such a law, is it necessary or not to extend the powers of the security services? It is always said that we must go along and that the foreign security services can do much more than we do. We are going behind. The question, however, is whether the State Security needs all those methods to do its work properly. The advocates confirm this and add another argument, namely that the police services also have the special methods within the framework of the BOM legislation. This, of course, is not an argument and actually only shows that there is also competition in the field. While in the past there was competition between the different police services, we now see competition arising between police services and security services in the fight against terrorism, intelligence collection, and so on. Competition is shifting to another area. The argument “if they are allowed to use those methods, we must be able to do so or we are lagging behind” is, in my opinion, not a good argument. Moreover, it is not because police services are allowed to use certain methods that intelligence services should also necessarily be able to use the same methods.

We have made a lot of comments on the bill. I would like to address three key critical remarks, with which we expose the weaknesses of the law. First, the definitions are too vague. We also discussed this in the committee. The second point of criticism is about what happens to the information collected by security services in relation to justice. Third, it is about control.

First, Mr. Minister, we have said that the fight against terrorism is important and that we fully support it. However, if the security services are allowed to use these methods, against whom will they use them all? That is what we worry about. We have held the discussion on this. The definitions in the law are actually too broad. Take, for example, a term like the radicalization process. When will a group now radicalize, what is radicalization, and when will that radicalization then become a problem?

Mr. Minister, in times of economic crisis, trade unions and groups can radicalize their actions and act much harder. This is also a radicalization process. In times when the climate issue becomes very serious, an organization such as Greenpeace can take much more radical actions, for example at the nuclear power plants, at the gates of Electrabel. If the legislation on terrorism is taken into account and the broad definitions are used, they can also be considered as potential terrorists, because if the electricity supply is compromised, there can be terrorism.

I would like to say that we should always pay attention to the definition. Of course, it is not easy to make definitions, but here, we think, one has been too wide.

The example I gave from Greenpeace is not so fictional. A few weeks ago, another article appeared in De Morgen about the infiltration of a member of the military security service ADIV into the environmental movement for 20 to 25 years. Does anyone note when one will jump over the fence again to Little Brogel? Is this so state-threatening? Apparently they have been doing this for 25 years already. It was not denied. Is it true?

Among other things, he was also involved in the organization of the Big Ask. Also in it one had to infiltrate and one needed to know what would happen there if tens of thousands of people were dancing on the beach of Oostende. The military security service had to know all that and infiltrated. I think there may be security services, but then it is about monitoring the security of the State. Is such a Big Ask so detrimental to the security of the State? What they protest against is harmful to the world and to the survival of humanity, Mr. Minister, but ⁇ not to the survival of our country.

Then we discussed which groups are all fishing. There are also nationalists and anarchists. There are naturally nationalists who are state-threatening. We know them very well. According to some, however, of all Flemish elected, a third Flemish is Flemish, Flemish nationalist. We are talking about the V-party. A third of the voters in the Flemish Parliament and here in the federal Parliament would be nationalists. That is, a third of Flemish voters could potentially be followed by state security. That is a big problem.

There may also be some French-speaking nationalists. I do not know that nationalist currents on the French-speaking side so well, Mr. Minister, but there can be nationalists there too. There will be fewer. Are they all state hazards?

I see that there is some debate among French speakers about whether or not they are a state hazard. However, we will not go into the topic more closely.

Our group is experienced expert. Apparently, ten to fifteen years ago, Ecolo and Green were also elected! followed by the security of the state. There were files. This is also stated in the annual reports of the Committee I.

Are we so nationally dangerous? Are we anarchists? Are we so dangerous, Mr. Minister?

The above are striking examples of the finding that – although everyone knows that it is not intended – it happens in practice that security services are engaged in filing and recording of persons and groups that are in themselves not state hazards.

Vague definitions can thus become almost a letter of freedom for intelligence and security services. We, of course, hope that this will not happen and that the control will work well. We also hope that someone, when he goes too far, will be stopped. However, the law offers too few guarantees in this regard.

Secondly, another fundamental problem is the question of what happens to the information obtained when collecting intelligence.

There may be fears that the information from security services will be used in court files. The Order of Flemish Balies has also made comments on this subject and is concerned about it. There are too few guarantees built into the law to avoid such acts. The fear or fear is that a number of police services, if they cannot do it themselves, may use the State Security to trace and collect certain intelligence in order to use it in a criminal procedure.

We must be very clear on the previous point. You agreed in the committee. Everyone in the Parliament also agree. We must make a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the collection of intelligence for the purpose of the State Security and, on the other hand, the investigations that take place to detect and punish crimes. The latter belongs to the jurisdiction of the court, the prosecutors, the investigative judges and the police services. Both things should absolutely not be mixed.

The previous observation is ⁇ important. We must be very vigilant in this regard. I hope that the Committee I, which will monitor, and other bodies will pay a lot of attention to this problem.

My third point is about control, because everything stands or falls with good control.

For us, control is not sufficient. I will give four small examples of why we think so.

We believe that there is no distinction between specific and exceptional methods. Now a distinction is made. For us, prior consent may be requested for both the specific and the exceptional methods. That is the best guarantee for exercising control over the activities of the security services. One will say that it will result in a lot of work, but that is the price we have to pay for democracy and for the protection of privacy.

My second observation concerns the composition of the committee, in which a King’s Attorney is also present. We have discussed this and amendments have also been submitted. For us, a parket magistrate does not belong in that home. It would be much better if only members of the seat were to sit there, because the prosecutor’s office of course also has other interests. It was also a note from the Order of Flemish Balies. At the hearing, lawyer Hans Rieder stated that position. We can follow him in full.

Third, Mr. Minister, I refer to the famous amendment that was submitted by the Government at the end, in the second reading. The amendment actually ensures that the Committee I will not always receive the information it requires from the services. It is sufficient for a service that receives a request to transmit information to declare that the information is not relevant. This concludes the case and does not have to provide the information to the Committee I.

The majority says that the Committee I will exercise control. First, only the majority is in Committee I, and as a result of the amendment, services can even refuse to transmit information to Committee I. They should not even motivate it. They just have to say that it is not relevant. This is truly unacceptable. In such legislation, a control system is ⁇ important. If we choose the system of Committee I, it must also have the fullness of competence. If they request documents, they must also be able to obtain those documents, unless there are really specific reasons why it cannot, but then one must at least be able to justify that. This is also not provided in this draft.

Fourth, it is also about the control of the foreign security services, Mr. Minister. This has been clearly demonstrated in the hearings and in the discussions. We are not only dealing with the Security of the State or the military security services of our country. There are also foreign security services present on our territory. We also know them. All the great powers will be present. The Mossad will also be present. They are in Zaventem every day. We have had other discussions on this.

With the Belgian Presidency, from 1 July, many more foreign security services will come here. How can we control the activities of foreign security services in our country?

I have an additional question. If our legislation may be somewhat too strict here and there, are certain tasks not outsourced to foreign security services that are active on our territory and that are not covered by Belgian legislation?

The problem of controlling the activities of foreign security services has been addressed several times in the Annual Report of Committee I. Initiatives and clear agreements are needed.

Mr. Minister, you have engaged in the committee to work on this. Unfortunately, this does not appear in this bill. I hope that this year we can put that control in a framework.

In our view, the control is the Achillespees of this design. Practice will show whether this control will work properly. We are afraid of holes. In the coming months and years we will follow this very closely, to the extent possible.

I will conclude with a comment from the Legal Service after the first reading, in particular on the provision that the Senate shall determine the budget of Committee I. The legal service then said that this cannot be done, that it is the House that is competent for the budget.

You would argue about it and explain it today. However, the text still states that the Senate adopts the budget. I await your answer. It is at the end of the report, under your words. I have read it. You have to do that, Mr. Minister. A report can sometimes be interesting.

We submitted a number of amendments. We have done a lot in the committee. Four of them are served again. They will be explained later during the presentation of my colleague Lahssaini.

After the excellent intervention of my colleague Van Hecke, I will be brief. First, I would like to make a clarification and a correction.

In reading the report, my colleague Nyssens said that commission work was almost combined, as it carried out simultaneously both the assessment of anti-terrorism laws and the work on data collection methods (MRD). I will recall the fact that the work on MRDs has been imposed on us and has gone above the work we were doing on the assessment of anti-terrorism laws. This project came to us dictated by the government, which linked it to the discussion and work on the seats.

I would like to recall the context in which we worked.

Mr. Lahssaini, I understand what you say, but I need to correct a little for the purposes of the report.

Two elements met. It is true that the House had decided to evaluate anti-terrorism laws; we agree. We started this work and organized a series of hearings. Meanwhile, regardless of our work, the Senate – and we have nothing to do with the Senate calendar – looked at this bill on data collection methods. The Senate took the time that belonged to it and, at some point, forwarded the draft to the House. The House thus met with a Senate bill on data collection methods, while the commission already had a large part of the hearings on anti-terrorism laws.

This is what happened. At that time, we had a discussion: how to deal with the calendars of these two rooms running independently from each other, which is quite normal? We then decided not to delay the Senate’s review of the MRD bill, given that the bill had been expected and examined for years. We chose to resume this bill and already use what we had heard during the antiterrorism law assessment hearings for the needs of this bill.

It is true that we have not yet conducted an assessment of anti-terrorism laws as such. This is what I wanted to correct, but I think we agree on this timetable.

You will remember that in the previous legislature we had decided to ask the Senate to stop working on the MRD project because we had seen the link that existed between the assessment of anti-terrorism laws and the work on this bill. We had seen the possible consequences and we thought it was important to be able to first clarify this chapter on anti-terrorism laws, which date from before 9/11, before introducing new laws.

The assessment of anti-terrorism laws did not come by itself. It came as a result of the finding of a number of judicial errors, excesses and threats to individual freedoms. These individual freedoms are at the heart of the project we are discussing today.

The question of the assessment of anti-terrorism laws was not a method to slow down the work that was being done in the Senate. This is a fundamental debate because it challenges the individual freedoms and democratic freedoms to which we are all attached.

It was said that the debate that was held so far on anti-terrorism laws would be used as part of the discussion on MRDs. This is where I feel the threat that weighs on this work. For me, this work has been stopped incorrectly and will need to resume it urgently, without linking it to the project we are discussing today. These are two things that have unfortunately become distinct. The debate on anti-terrorism laws is not complementary to the project we are discussing today.

This is a clarification that I wanted to bring. I will return to the committee to remind that the work on anti-terrorism laws must take place with the same rigour that we have demonstrated for the examination of this bill.

The bill, which is being voted today, aims to regulate the methods of data collection used by the intelligence and security services. It significantly expands the scope of the Act of 1998 and therefore the scope of competence of the services concerned.

Initial methods of data collection, already regulated by the Act of 1998, are now classified as ordinary methods. By creating specific and exceptional methods, the project significantly expands the legal means available to the intelligence and security services. We all agree on this point.

The main reasons invoked in the statement of reasons are based on the need for these services to see their competences expanded, on the one hand, as a result of the emergence of new threats and, on the other hand, because Belgium would be the last European country not to have them. While we all agree that there is a need and urgency to protect ourselves and to fight terrorism, we also agree that this should not be done at the expense of our freedoms and that we must find the right balance between the two concerns.

Regarding the position of Belgium in relation to other European countries, it should be noted that in the Netherlands, Germany and France, legislation provides for a system of authorization for the use of these methods, including those which we now call ordinary methods. To say that our country is lagging behind other European countries must be relativized. It can be conceived in some aspects, but I think for others, it is necessary to put things back in place.

So far, Belgium has used uncontrolled – and it is not known to what extent – ordinary methods. This is the merit of the project we are discussing today. Indeed, if we regulate these methods, we will probably see more about how far they can go and what powers to be conferred on the security and security services.

This project therefore grants significant investigative powers to Security, which are very intrusive to the privacy of individuals. These include observations in private spaces, telephone listening, access to e-mails and I pass.

It is therefore crucial to pay particular attention to the new powers conferred on the intelligence services in order to clearly determine whether new interference is actually contained in a clear, precise and predictable law and whether such interference can meet the principles of legality and proportionality enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights.

I will not return to the debate we had in the committee, but if we pass on these different requirements, we would see how far we are on a steady rope. The vague and disproportionate nature of the definitions should encourage us to be cautious and vigilant.

I invite all my colleagues to carefully read our amendment aimed at correcting the vague and disproportionate nature of the tasks that the intelligence services will be able to perform under the cover of surveillance in very different situations.

My colleague Van Hecke has already mentioned the case of NGOs, trade unions, journalists, but also citizens who could be affected by this expansion of the powers of the intelligence and security services.

I would also like to remind you that organizations such as Oxfam or Friends of Peace were, a few years ago, on the list of organizations considered terrorist. Now we know what these organizations really are.

I would like to further clarify that a few weeks ago, the Liège Court of Appeal defrauded the Belgian State in its attempt to condemn three trade unionists who could be considered, in view of the text presented to us today, as persons representing a threat, potentially capable of fomenting terrorist acts.

In this debate, we are talking about extremism, fundamentalism or radicalism. It must be known that, in fact, each of us risks being involved in his daily life, as part of contacts, relationships that he can maintain with lobbies. They may at some times be classified as a threat, as being terrorists. And, as my colleague said, the current economic crisis will cause certain groups of people, associations to organize themselves to claim rights, protect their achievements and try to fight against a model that sometimes puts them in a situation of fragility. Tomorrow, these organizations, these citizens can also be cataloged as threats, or even terrorists.

I come to another comment. Since ordinary, specific and exceptional methods are now very clearly defined, it seems to us at least necessary to align ourselves with the other European countries. For each of these methods, an application for prior authorisation must be submitted to the committee that will be established for this purpose.

While it is now necessary and urgent to see more clearly in the working methods of the security and police services, it is equally important to establish in a very clear manner the control and the framework in which it will operate. It should be avoided to postpone each time or to put a guard after the intervention of these services. As my colleague said, we have submitted amendments that concern these different dimensions.

My PS colleague, Ms. Deom, rightly drew our attention to the usefulness of carrying out assessments, even though we know, Mr. Minister, that you are not ⁇ supportive of assessments. Today it is up to us to make a decision. We need to set up a system to evaluate this set of methods that we have been developing for a few months. We propose to put this assessment on the banks of the parliament in three years, so that we can judge – and I return to the concern expressed by each of the stakeholders – our ability to find this balance between privacy protection, security and state security.

With regard to this bill, I think there is a small problem with Article 1. I’m not going to push on that, but there’s a wrong article. It may have to be based on Article 78 and not on Article 77. It is not essential, but it is a huge beauty defect that threatens to make something unconstitutional. This for completeness.

I would like to talk about the need for an effective legal framework for the special intelligence methods. I would like to emphasize this need through the fantastic report, especially for the annexes, by Mr Nyssens. The statement of Administrator-General Wynants in connection with the need for a legal arrangement is speaking. What does the leader of our intelligence services say in a distinctly different style than that of the eighties or nineties? During that period, the head of the intelligence services ran away faster than Liekendael when there was press nearby, a little like Leterme in difficult times; running away was the only image we knew of the Belgian intelligence service.

Today it is different. Today, the general administrator is very open to the media and also, that must be said, to the Parliament. Contrary to my habit, I would like to give a quote and thus emphasize the usefulness of hearings, Mr. Minister. You must listen. I think there is something else to be done in this regard. Mr Wynants said: “Because they are not allowed to use technical methods, our intelligence services are facing increasing difficulties with other European intelligence services. As our services do not have the required legal resources, the other European services are hesitant to cooperate with them.” To the extent that the solid determination that there is a need for a legal arrangement to obtain the necessary information also on our territory. In addition, Mr Wynants, however, says: “To a certain extent that lack of resources makes our intelligence services also dependent on the foreign intelligence services, which are technologically much more efficient.”

“This finding raises questions and shows that there are other intelligence services active in our territory that ⁇ use those technologies.” In fact, it is well described here that it is effectively necessary that we have a legal arrangement, because it happens. Today, people are already being listened to, but not by our services, but by foreign services. In particular, if we want to be respected a little more, says Mr. Wynants, then we must cooperate with those services. In other words, there is a form of subcontracting. We let the dirty work be done by other intelligence services.

Mr. Minister, I hope, now that there is a legal arrangement, that there will also be action against such methods of foreign services. You know that there is a very well-known case that has not yet been resolved, of which we do not yet know everything, in connection with the European Commission and the interception in the outskirts of the European Council. There are special intelligence methods used by foreign services without a legal basis. Tomorrow is obviously an illegal situation, in so far as it was not yesterday. In any case, I hope, given the official statement of Mr. Wynants, that this will have some effect.

Again, the core message of the legislation can be followed. We cannot approve the text yet because it is not yet perfect. I think there will have to be something else in the future.

It is good that here — which has not happened in the Senate — we place the administrative committee which is to carry out the inspection fully under the control of the Committee I. This is an improvement compared to the Senate text.

At the next level, however, I still sit a little on my hunger. It brings me back to Mr. Wynants. We will not only have special investigation methods and thus be able to provide more opportunities for prosecutors and investigative judges in the context of judicial investigation. Now that we have a legal regulation, I do not understand that we are legally permitting longer, apparently, that the general administrator of the intelligence services may make more statements than a prosecutor, conducting a criminal investigation.

It is another possibility and it allows more.

What bothered me a little, not because of personal sympathy for the victim, was the fact that a few months ago he gave a list of all sorts of organizations of which that person was a member, a person who was convicted for nothing and who had no criminal investigation against himself. The fact that someone does this in his capacity as head of the intelligence service gives the information a certain character. We cannot deny this.

There is the possibility of special intelligence methods. There is a service that can know very much about the private life of certain individuals. Then allowing that man to make statements about a person in a way that is wider than the capabilities of a prosecutor or investigative judge cannot be in a democratic rule of law.

As it is now formulated in the legislation and as it has been approved in practice, also by you, Mr. Minister, on behalf of the Belgian State, the head of the intelligence services may without necessity provide a television summary of the activities of a person who is neither prosecuted nor convicted. Nevertheless, he may with his authority say how things are going. I think this really cannot be done.

He makes it easy by saying it was still in the newspaper, which gives his own intelligence service a strange weight. Why should he, as the head of the intelligence service, say what was in the newspaper? The fact that he says it gives it an official character.

I don’t think it should be the intention to give the intelligence service the opportunity to listen to conversations and then tell how it is.

Why can he say that? According to the law, it might be necessary. In Antwerp, it was suddenly necessary to say about a certain person with whom he was all engaged. It seems to me something that we should not allow.

I hope you again officially say that this is a bad interpretation of the existing article.

This is the only amendment I have submitted again, my other amendments have been approved. It aims to give the general administrator of the intelligence service the same opportunity, neither more nor less, as to a prosecutor to make statements while conducting a criminal investigation.

In doing so, he receives the same protection from the presumption of innocence of everyone, without being allowed to name names, because in the context of a criminal investigation one cannot name names. In accordance with practice and current legislation, the general administrator may name names or disseminate information about persons. I think we should prevent this. Therefore, I hope, now that the intelligence services have more possibilities, that you can agree that we should limit the possibilities to make statements, because later he will no longer make statements about what he has read in the newspaper, but about what he has listened to. I think that is a step too far. I think we need to adjust the text.

So I hope, dear colleagues, that you will calmly compare my amendment to the current situation of a prosecutor. It is literally the text about the prosecutor, running the criminal investigation, which I also apply to the administrator-general, because today, according to the letter and the interpretation in practice of the law, he can make much more statements.

Mr. Minister, I also refer to my quote from Mr. Wynants’ statement. As an official, he knows that foreign intelligence services are intercepting our conversations. It is stated in his statement. Later he will be able to do it himself. I hope that he will now, with Article 29 of the Criminal Procedure Code in his hand, make the necessary notices of those who are illegally working here on our territory. I hope you will give him a good, clear guidance on this.

Furthermore, I hope to receive support for a legal restriction on his ability to speak. He must not run away, as before, but he must also not exaggerate by throwing everything out on the street now.

Mr Landuyt was the last speaker in the general discussion. The Minister of Justice has the word.

First of all, I would like to thank the rapporteur for the excellent work and the perfect report.

The current, important design has gone through a whole circuit. It is presented in the Chamber today.

Hopefully it will be approved later.

It is, of course, a follow-up to the legislation of 1998 – that is a while ago – by which we approved the mother legislation or basic legislation for the intelligence and security services, after we had prepared the text for a long time. Both Belgian intelligence services, namely the Security of the State and the General Service Intelligence and Security of the Armed Forces, were then given a legal framework.

We have left that law as intact as possible, which is important, for example, in terms of definitions and in terms of methods of secrecy or possibilities to conduct conversations or come out.

We have chosen the strategy to leave the whole legislation as it is. The law is a good basis. However, the major problem at the beginning was that only the usual methods were established in the legislation. Therefore, a number of additional initiatives had to be taken to allow other methods. These are methods that can be used by foreign services, but not yet by the Belgian services. Therefore, it was absolutely necessary to integrate this into Belgian legislation as well.

Of course, the world has changed a lot in the meantime. Technologies and threats have changed. Of course, there is an absolute need for accurate legislation. Of course, an intelligence service in the aforementioned sense is also useful.

So I do not follow the attitude of the members of the Flemish Interest, who believe that some things are done better by the police. It would only be a problem if the police not only detected the criminal offences, but also collected further intelligence and everything was mixed up. This would only lead to a democratically dangerous situation. Therefore, it is much better for such acts to be carried out by its own intelligence and security service.

I will not reflect all the elements of the present law. I will try to answer some specific comments.

To Mrs Smeyers, who is no longer present, I can only answer that she had made her comments better known in the committee. She would have preferred to submit amendments at that time, since she declares that a number of matters are not satisfied. The right place for such a decision is the committee. By submitting amendments to the committee, we could have taken account of her concerns.

Overall, the Chamber Committee for Justice after the Senate has devoted a very thorough debate to the current, delicate and technical legislation. I would like to thank all members for this.

The present draft law aims to grant additional methods. The proposal dates from the previous legislature.

Colleague Onkelinx has proposed it in the previous government. It was acquired by Hugo Vandenberghe. This has long been discussed in the Senate. There were hearings and opinions of the State Council. The design that is presented today has been worked very hard by many people.

I am not repeating how the specific and exceptional methods have been balanced. It is important that we constantly re-examine proportionality and subsidiarity. We need to make the right balance between specific and exceptional methods. A committee should constantly monitor the correct application of those methods in a proper and efficient manner.

The most extensive methods, the exceptional, may only be used if there are serious threats to the internal security of the State and the survival of the democratic and constitutional order, to the external security of the State, to the international relations or to the scientific or economic potential, and when the threat relates to an activity and is related to espionage, terrorism, including the process of radicalization, proliferation, harmful sectarian organizations and criminal organizations as defined in Article 8, paragraph 1 of the Act of 1998.

They do not apply to all situations. The law includes a specific restrictive definition. Consequently, an exceptional method cannot simply be applied when the threat relates, for example, to an activity related to extremism or interference.

It is important to remember that basic legislation and those basic definitions. I have to repeat them every time for the colleagues of Ecolo-Groen! The Flemish Importance. They must re-read the texts of Articles 7 and 8 of the legislation and determine that the application and practices of national security are limited. These articles are fundamental. The use of the methods must always be re-tested by the new committee to be installed and of course also by the supervisory committee, about which I will say something later. Articles 7 and 8 are fundamental. They have been applied unchanged since 1998. They prevent excessive or inappropriate use of legislation.

The [...]

You must read the texts. I repeat every time that the word nationalism is in it. It is not only in Article 7. Article 8 states that there must be nationalist views or intentions that are in practice contrary to the principles of democracy or human rights, or to the proper functioning of democratic institutions or other foundations of the rule of law.

I have also repeatedly ⁇ before that arrangements have been made to exclude such acts against political parties. Therefore, I myself have already absolutely assured before that the methods will not be abused, not even in relation to political parties.

In short, with the text, methods are added to the arsenal methods of the intelligence services. However, there is a specific problem. I will respond to the comments on this subject in a concrete manner.

Our colleague Ms. Deom asked a question about Article 29 and how information should be processed on one side and the judicial aspects on the other. I think the transfer of both is helpful. Let me allow you to read the following text:

“These questions were raised in connection with the application of Article 29 of the Code of Criminal Investigation in the context of the interception of electronic communications with regard to the protection of the professional secret of lawyers and doctors and the secret of the sources of journalists.

Two different situations may occur: either the knowledge of elements of an offence results from data covered by the professional secret of a lawyer or a doctor or by the secret of sources of a journalist, or the knowledge of elements of an offence is not opened by the professional secret. In both cases, this is an exceptional method that can only be implemented in the event of a serious threat to the fundamental interests of the State.

As for the protection of professional secrecy and the secrecy of sources, it could only be implemented if the lawyer, the doctor, the journalist has personally and actively participated in the birth or development of the potential threat.

The Chairman of the Surveillance Commission is also obliged to alert the Chairman of the order or association concerned and provide him with the necessary information, in the case of an exceptional method, to be present during the execution of the method and to examine whether the data collected, when protected by the professional secret or the secret of the sources, have a direct link to the threat.

The Supervisory Committee shall examine all elements of the file from the perspective of legality, subsidiarity and proportionality and give its authorisation prior to the implementation of the exceptional method.

Given the special protection procedure in the context of professional secrecy and source secrecy, the commission is, in this case, directly or immediately aware of the elements of an infringement revealed through the exceptional method.

In accordance with the proposed Article 19, the committee shall examine whether there are serious indications that may lead to the commission of a crime or a crime or if there is a reasonable suspicion that punishable acts will be or have been committed, but are not yet known.

In such cases, the chairman of the committee shall draw up a non-classified minutes after hearing the head of the intelligence service concerned. This minutes, which specifies the context of the intelligence mission and the purpose pursued, shall be forwarded without delay to the Prosecutor of the King or to the Federal Prosecutor. It cannot alone constitute the exclusive motive or the prevailing measure leading to the conviction of a person. The elements it contains must be supported by other evidence collected in the context of a judicial purpose.”

This monitoring is important. There are preliminary interventions: from the moment information is brought to the attention of this committee, there is a procedure to be followed. I think this is a good method, with some logic in the different steps to follow.

There was also a question about the administrative committee and its financing. This administrative committee is the key element of the entire legislation. Three magistrates will judge all these special techniques. They will be constantly informed and must be informed preventively or post factum, depending on the circumstances. The composition is important and the chairmanship of this committee is exercised by a magistrate who has the capacity of investigative judge. I think it is important that one of the other two magistrates is a member of the Prosecutor’s Office because that practice is also important.

As regards operating costs, it was provided that they are borne by the budget of the Senate, not the House. Article 74, paragraph 3 of the Constitution stipulates that for the budgets and accounts of the State the federal legislative power shall be exercised jointly by the King and the Chamber of Representatives, without prejudice to Article 174, paragraph 1, second sentence of the Constitution which stipulates that the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate shall annually establish the allocation for their function for each of them. Therefore, there is no contradiction between Article 43.1 of the bill and Article 174 of the Constitution. The Senate’s own funding may provide the resources to finance these institutions. This is a correct legal construction. Thus, the Senate will now, on the proposal of the committee, determine the annual budget and provide in its budget so that the committee will have the necessary human and material resources to ensure its proper functioning.

I will conclude, of course, by referring to the existing Standing Committee I. This is being commented by several parties from the opposition and now even from the majority that one is not involved. First, it is in the Senate. Committee P is in the House, Committee I is in the Senate. It is the Chamber and the Senate that determine the composition in their Rules of Procedure. Article 66 of the Act of 1991 provides that the Chamber, respectively the Senate, shall determine in its Rules of Procedure the composition of that committee. The debate should therefore be held in the Senate. The Senate itself decides how this composition should be made.

This is an important bill. There is a balance between, on the one hand, efficiency, the fight against terrorism and the fight against a number of phenomena in which we must prioritize the security of the state and, on the other hand, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. We need to control this in a proper way. On the one hand, we apply modern techniques, while on the other hand it is constantly monitored by magistrates and committees, the Committee I and the Parliament to prevent abuse.

This is indeed important.

The two points mentioned above fit into that framework. The colleagues Landuyt and Van Hecke referred to the foreign services. Indeed, it is fundamental that such legislation can force foreign intelligence services not to apply some practice here. If a problem arises, they can contact the Belgian services, which apply the Belgian law in its entirety, from which no derogation is allowed. The rules should be applied as they are applied to own initiatives, involving the committee and there is a possible control by the Committee I. This is an important step forward. Indeed, the annoying thing was that sometimes cooperation questions were asked or initiatives were taken that the Belgian services could not answer accurately. That is now over. The legal framework is there. It is good that this can enforce legality not only for Belgian services, but also for foreign services.

Colleague Van Hecke spoke about the evaluation. I fully agree that the House and Senate must follow the new legislation. This will be discussed. This is provided in a specific way: a report must be sent every six months. There is the Committee I who will be able to specifically follow up on the problems. There will be a debate here. The essence of control will be in each individual act. The ongoing review and control by the Committee and the Committee I provide sufficient guarantees. Parliamentarians, especially senators, will obviously be able to play a special role in this. The fact that the debate can be opened at any time, including in the Chamber, is equally obvious.

I come to my decision, Mr. Speaker, colleagues. This is a very important legislation. It is a delicate, technical matter for ordinary intelligence services and the military services. In the context of the international role we have to fulfill, we absolutely needed that instrument. It is a supplement to the Act of 1998. It provides us with greater security and guarantees that we will be able to protect the interests of the State in all possible ways, always democratically tested and controlled. I am grateful to all who contributed to this.

I listened carefully to the Minister’s speech. I have two comments on what he said, more specifically on our vision. According to him, it would only be a wrong choice to make the police services competent for the security of the State. I would like to point out that in Denmark the security of the State is guaranteed by the police. Denmark is one of the countries that have been seriously targeted by terrorists and potential terrorists in recent years. There, however, the police services, which are responsible for the security of the State, have proved to be able to work efficiently.

I refer to the case of last week. It has still not been achieved, although in the Muslim world many fatwas apply to Kurt Westergaard, to kill that cartoonist, while there is still a very serious threat, with the security of the State in Denmark. So I would not put the idea of leaving the state security in the hands of the police simply at home rubbish. In Denmark, you can prove that you can.

Regarding the definition of extremism and the fact that nationalism is referred to in it, I say again that this definition can be applied to all ideologies. All of them must be registered. The minister, however, refers to political parties. We know like no one else that political parties are being fought in a different way in this Belgian kingdom. In fact, we do not have to worry so much about national security. There are other methods, such as taking out party funding or conducting common law-based processes and the like. These are people who are nationalists. I have cited the example of a simple citizen who is not even a member or was a member of a political party, Ms. Soetkin Collier. In her family there were members of a political party, but she herself was not. She is brooded because of the nationalist view of her family members, as a citizen of this country. That is it. It is not the political parties but individual citizens who are nationalists and in this law one finds a means to act directly against them, sometimes completely wrongly.

Again, the guarantees have not been given, so you do not convince me at all, Mr. Minister. If you say that the case of Soetkin Collier was not excessive, then I don’t know how we as lawyers can understand each other. What happened in the case of Collier was ⁇ excessive and the law, in my opinion, offers no or inadequate guarantees.

Mr. Minister, I thank you for the answers you have given.

First, I think that with regard to Article 17, the problem has been solved. The Senate can determine its budget itself. We have just before the holiday here in the Chamber approved a whole series of budgets and annual accounts, including those of Committee I. That is, that competence will no longer be the competence of the House, but will be transferred entirely to the Senate. I do not know how this will go practically in his work and whether it will be so for other services, but it will apparently have some consequences for our work.

Second, you have commented on the comments about foreign security services. You say that with this law you can force that foreign security services no longer simply carry out activities in our country. If they wish to take certain actions, they must ask the Belgian intelligence and security services and the Belgian services will carry out that task. That is what you said.

So you say that with the law you have a sufficient legal basis to defend foreign security services? That is how I understood it. You knock yes. In short, the observation that the Committee I has made for years in its annual report, that there must be legal action and that there must be an arrangement for the control of the foreign security services, does not need to be implemented anymore? Or are these two separate things?

Do you say that with this law we can prohibit them from coming here? Committee I has always noted that we need to have a control mechanism to be able to control what foreign services are doing here. Will you take another initiative to do so, or do you consider that it is no longer necessary after the adoption of this law?

Third, I have one small comment. You went on to article 18, on page 63 of the report, today giving even more explanations. It was about the observation of the legal service on Article 43/8, I quote: “Against the decisions of the Standing Committee I no appeal is possible.” The report states: “Mr. Stefaan De Clerck, Minister of Justice, informs that he will also give an explanation on this point at the time the bill is discussed in the plenary session.” I don't know if you can give that explanation today. You had announced that it would be specified today, because there is still some uncertainty on the subject.

I would like to receive another brief answer to my questions concerning the foreign security services and Article 18, which introduces Article 43/8 into the law.

With regard to foreign services, it is important to be very clear. Following the statements made and the vacuum that was there, the following. There has been a problem in the past. There has been a problem within the services and also within the Committee I. They wondered how they should deal with it.

The conclusion is now very clear to me. On the basis of the current legislation, there is no reason why any foreign service — in addition to being present here, collecting general information and ⁇ ining general contacts — can not apply any practices, as prescribed in our law; otherwise they enter into illegality. The only possibility that the foreign services have is to contact our services so that our services are informed and ensure the execution, provided that the provisions of this legislation are fully respected.

This will now have to be monitored. The Committee I will be able to monitor this. Questions can be asked about whether the applications are now running correctly, based on this legislation.

As I can see, with the current legislation, it is essential, in the future, to the question of how services collaborate and make arrangements. This means that our services perform the job in accordance with the law, the reports and the opportunities offered. The Committee I has the opportunity to monitor it, to ask questions about it, and to document everything that has happened.

In connection with the point on page 63, I can say the following. It is about the lack of profession. There is no appeal against the decision of the Standing Committee I. I think this is clear and remains. Per ⁇ this needs to be reviewed legally. I will let it be checked, because it has not been further investigated. I have no technical answer to that. The intention, however, is very clear, in particular that no appeal is brought against the decision of the Committee I in this area, as the present legislation now stipulates.