Proposition 52K1278

Proposition de résolution relative à l'instauration d'un système de vote électronique amélioré.

General information ¶

Authors

CD&V Michel Doomst, Servais Verherstraeten
MR Corinne De Permentier, Jacqueline Galant
Open Vld Bruno Steegen, Bart Tommelein

Submission date

June 25, 2008

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

electronic voting resolution of parliament organisation of elections election

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V Vooruit Open Vld N-VA LDD MR VB

Voted to reject

Groen Ecolo PS | SP

Abstained from voting

LE FN

Party dissidents ¶

• Josy Arens (LE) voted to adopt.
• Hans Bonte (Vooruit) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

July 10, 2008 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

The presentation of the two draft resolutions took place in the presence of Mr. The Prime Minister. The first report was presented to us by Servais Verherstraeten. He recalls first the experience gained by the tests carried out in 1991 and then, by the law of 11 April 1994, which allowed to organize automated voting.

For a listing of all the advantages presented by automated voting, the speaker refers, of course, to the text of his resolution. However, he highlights the time savings of about seven hours and the fact that a return to paper voting would involve the mobilization of ⁇ 8,000 additional people. For the statistical data, Mr. Verherstraeten always refers to its resolution proposal.

However, in this context, the discovery of a clear difference between the Regions cannot go unnoticed. He then mentions Professor Delwit’s study to demonstrate that the current system enjoys broad popular support. However, the introduction of this new technology is costly. This observation, on the other hand, must be relativized if one considers a more than symbolic remuneration of the thousands of citizens called as counselors in the context of a paper vote.

In addition, the current system will need to be renewed soon. At first, the maintenance contracts will have to be renewed and then, the total renewal of the machines will be required. In this context, the consortium of universities proposed an improved paper voting system, the benefits of which are also reflected in the text of this resolution proposal.

In this context, pilot projects are to be organized within the framework of the elections scheduled in 2009. These pilot projects will highlight the extent to which the system is resistant to manipulation and fraud, on the one hand, and the costs and degrees of supplier dependence, on the other. The draft resolution therefore calls on the government to take the necessary measures to extend electronic voting in municipalities that already used the system, to organize a trial of the improved electronic system in 2009 and, depending on the outcome of these pilot projects, to provide for the introduction of one or another improved system after 2009.

Finally Mr. Versherstareten agrees with the decision of the Senate Committee on Internal Affairs and Administrative Affairs to amend the original text of the draft resolution.

by Mr. Eric Thiébaut then presented to us the PS resolution proposal. He refers to the criticism he has already expressed in the context of the exchange of views on electronic voting. His resolution proposal calls for the return to paper voting for the 2009 elections. It also calls for a revaluation of the presence tokens granted to the counselors.

As for choosing a voting system after 2009, his group wants a true, independent comparative study of the voting systems used: paper voting, electronic voting as well as paper voting combined with optical reading screening as it is done in the United States.

It also calls for an estimate of the costs incurred by the generalization of the improved electronic voting system using a paper medium as proposed by the university consortium before any decision is made. Finally, he hopes that, whatever the solution is chosen, there will be no additional financial burden for the municipalities.

During the discussion, the CDH deposits an amendment No. 1, which aims to replace point B of the resolution submitted by Mr. Servais Verherstraeten as follows: "also invites the Government to organize in the cantons of municipalities that wish to do so an improved electronic voting system experiment in which the voter receives a paper copy for the control of his vote or another automated voting experiment in order to strengthen the guarantees of democratic control while controlling the overall budgetary cost."

The CDH presents a second amendment that tends to replace point C with the following: “Requests the Government to carry out the evaluation of these experiments to enable, for the next elections (those of 2009) to decide on the safest voting system in democratic terms and the least costly, which must include the possibility of returning to the paper voting which, a priori, gives the most guarantee and is the least costly.”

Mrs. Zoé Genot deals with Mr. Fouad Lahssaini amendments 3 to 8. These amendments are of several types given that the proposal calling for the return to paper voting did not obtain a majority in the Senate, its group decided to amend this proposal to make it clearer. Thus, the proposal evokes the possibility of another automated voting experiment. At this level, there is a problem because this possibility would constitute a blank check that would be given by Parliament to the government.

Amendments 3 and 6 therefore seek to remove this possibility. Ms. Genot does not believe that this other experiment was in the intentions of the authors. The legislator must remain responsible for the organization of the elections.

Amendment No. 4 aims to clarify that RFID technology will not be used as it does not guarantee sufficient confidentiality. Ms Genot also considers it important to provide that the results of the experiment will be presented to Parliament before deciding whether or not to go further.

Finally, it submits amendments 7 and 8 focused on cost control. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior said that the cost of the new proposed measure cannot be estimated. In the Netherlands, this cost was estimated to be between 12 and 13 euros per vote.

Currently, this cost is 4.5 euros per electronic vote. Between the two systems, there is no precise assessment. It therefore requires that the Government communicate to Parliament, at least 4 months before the elections, all the costs associated with the different voting systems. It also asks that the government communicate what level of power bears what types of costs. It is important that clarity exists with regard to the costs incurred by each level of power.

by Mr. Bruno Steegen announces that his group fully supports this resolution proposal, the first one, and the explanation given by its principal author. There is no need to repeat the discussion that took place in the context of the exchanges of views on electronic voting. Enough experts have been heard. For his group, electronic voting is positive and must be continued in the direction of improvement. With regard to the amendments submitted, it communicates that its group will only support Amendment No. 1.

Mrs. Linda Vissers is surprised that, contrary to what was said during the discussion, the resolution no longer provides for the obligation to decide on the system of cantonal voting. Secondly, it regrets that the resolution leaves open the possibility of organizing electronic voting according to a system other than that of improved electronic voting which provides all the necessary safeguards. Furthermore, it regrets the absence of the obligation that the new system provides for the possibility of a recalculation. Finally, it announces its group’s support for amendments 1 and 2 given its commitment to maximum control of the voting process in general and a control by the voter himself of his vote in particular.

Then we voted.

Point A was adopted by 9 votes against 3 and 1 abstinence.

Amendment No. 1 to the CDH replacing point B was adopted by 10 votes against 3. Amendments No. 3 and 4 of Mrs. Genot and Mr. As a result, Lahssaini becomes objectless.

Amendment No. 2 to the CDH is rejected by 8 votes against 5.

Amendments No. 5 and 6 by Ms. Genot and Mr. Lahssaini was subsequently rejected by 10 votes against 3.

Point C is adopted by 9 votes against 3 and 1 abstention.

The new D point, proposed by Amendment No. 7 by Ms. Genot and Mr. Lahssaini was rejected by 10 votes against 3. Amendment No. 8 of Mrs. G. and Mrs. Lahssaini becomes objectless.

The entire draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 9 votes against 3 and 1 abstinence. As a result, the attached motion for a resolution on the return to paper voting for the next June 2009 election becomes obsolete.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Secretary of State, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, our country has a very large experience in the application of electronic voting since this voting system was tested for the first time in the legislative and provincial elections of 24 November 1991.

We are therefore well placed to measure the advantages of this voting system, among which we find:

- the use of modern, user-friendly technologies as part of an electoral process;

- greater speed and reliability of disposal: except for technical problems, electronic voting allows a time saving of more or less seven hours compared to paper voting;

- the absence of manipulation of too large ballots, ⁇ in Brussels;

Impossibility of issuing an invalid vote;

- a reduction in the number of councillors to mobilize on the day of elections.

As an illustration, a return to paper voting would involve the mobilization of some 8,000 additional people per election. In the case of four simultaneous elections, it would therefore be to mobilize 32,000 people in total.

Electronic voting has a high level of confidence. More than 89% of respondents in an academic survey expressed their confidence in this voting procedure. Less than 9% of them expressed a negative opinion. In fact, the electronic voting has met all expectations, except for the cost, will undoubtedly clam the critics of the system. It is difficult to argue that electronic voting is more expensive than paper voting.

However, I insist on the fact that the use of modern technologies has a cost that can hardly be compared with the work of thousands of people who loathe voting bulletins for several hours in a row and who receive in return compensation for the least symbolic.

For example, an increase in the compensation for voting offices chairs and counselors, which currently amounts to EUR 15 per voting day, would greatly reduce the cost difference between manual voting and electronic voting, especially in the event of four simultaneous elections involving significant mobilisation. We therefore consider that the advantages and utility of the electronic voting system that we have been using for fifteen years are real. This does not prevent that the system must now be renewed because one or the other is found to be inadequate in relation to the requirements set by the Council of Europe.

The consortium of universities that had been commissioned by the Minister of the Interior to reflect on the future of voting procedures in Belgium recommended an improved system, blending the advantages of electronic voting and those of paper voting. This would have obvious advantages, in particular that of the control of voting by the voter. In the face of this proposal, the government has already stressed that a decision must be made in view of the adoption of this new system and so that a pilot project can be organized at the next elections. If the results of the pilot project are conclusive, this system could be proposed to all cantons or all municipalities for the following elections.

However, despite the positive state of the places, it is observed that the controversy continues to climb. We cannot be deaf to the many criticisms made during the joint committee hearings of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Some have expressed suspicion about automated voting, citing, for example:

the risk of fraud or manipulation of the votes cast;

- the impossibility for the voter to control the accuracy of his vote on the magnetic strip of the cards used so far;

- the possibility of violating the secrecy of the vote by means of technological means;

the high cost of automated voting;

- dependency on private firms and the risks of abuse by such firms.

In the face of these criticisms, the lack of confidence expressed by certain political groups in electronic voting and the desire of elected members of these same groups to prefer paper voting in the upcoming elections, it would seem reasonable to provide for cantons, whose municipalities decide not to use automated voting, the possibility still to make this decision in the future and to opt for paper voting.

This possibility is therefore the subject of a resolution that has been voted in the Senate and in the Interior Committee in the House.

However, I will clarify that at MR, we believe that paper voting has some undeniable disadvantages.

It involves recruiting additional personnel on the day of the elections; but we know the difficulties experienced in recruiting counselors who are mobilized for hours for a rather symbolic compensation.

The ecological cost is quite large and the process is poorly qualitative for the voter.

Paper voting is also less user-friendly than automated voting. This is especially true in big cities: just rethink the kilometre ballot tickets that we have known in Brussels and we will no longer make voters, especially the elderly or people with reduced mobility, believe that they would find themselves better there than on the screen.

Furthermore, the automated system prevents errors; for example, panchage leading to the cancellation of the vote.

Moreover, paper voting has the disadvantage of proven fraud. Is it necessary to recall the number of fraud that this process results in? This paper vote is all the more a source of fraud as the vote is nominative, that the voter is not simply asked to drag a coupon with the name of his chosen candidate into a envelope, but that a number of boxes should be red. This paper vote therefore leads to opportunities for fraud on a wider scale than in France, for example.

In some cities, paper votes have not been voted for 15 years. In addition to the fact that these localities have probably lost their paper voting know-how, it is surprising to find that the localities in which electronic voting was chosen do not complain about it; on the contrary. They obviously do not want to return to paper voting.

The experiments conducted for 17 years are conclusive, but are only a first step. We share the concerns and suggestions made in the reports and assessments submitted to us. We see therein material to develop our reflection and creativity in order to strengthen democratic control over voting technique.

We also remain convinced that, well thought out, electronic voting can bring a real democratic added value compared to the paper procedure. We believe that voting regulations should not only aim to set the technical framework for the organization of the vote, but also to convince the voter that the voting system actually reflects the votes cast, excluding any possible eventuality or simply supposed.

As far as we know, experts have never detected in practice the existence of fraud in the use of electronic voting. Can we say the same about paper voting and its multiple possibilities of fraud on which we will not extend but which have proved? In the field of electronic voting, experts recognize the theoretical possibility of fraud; therefore it is necessary to counteract for the future the risk that a magnetic card contains, without the knowledge of the voter, voting information separate from the votes he has issued. The voting process must be transparent.

It is important to strengthen the voter’s confidence in the reliability of the system. From now on, he has the opportunity to reintroduce his card in the voting machine after his vote and to check the result carried on his card. Despite this possibility, there may remain a doubt in the minds of some. For this reason, measures aimed at increasing the transparency of operations must be taken. In this perspective, it seems to us that this addition to the electronic procedure of printing a ticket confirming the vote issued, in all letters and by means of a barcode, corresponds to an effective system offering the desired democratic guarantees. This system, which combines ease and rapidity of manipulation, frankness and transparency at the level of procedures, is marked by the seal of democratic progress.

Citizen confidence should be restored. The citizen has the guarantee that the registered vote corresponds well to his choice and the political world must no longer trust only experts to have the guarantee of the proper functioning of the system.

For these reasons, the MR is in favor of the principle of electronic voting and naturally intends to offer voters all the democratic guarantees and the practical effectiveness they are entitled to expect from a reliable and transparent electoral procedure.

I think this country knows what votes are and what elections are. I think we have a ⁇ rich experience, because we have almost 20 years of experience with electronic voices in the meantime, since 1991, and we continue to practice regularly.

In the committee, we as experienced experts have prioritised a number of priorities. First, people who are going to vote are concerned that their vote can be done correctly and discreetly.

Second, public administrations are having increasing difficulties recruiting people who have the civil obligation to be present at polling stations or polling stations.

Third, people also want to know the results of a count quickly and without delay. People find it important that this can happen without delay and without delay. We believe that electronic voting is going in the right direction.

We have also had to establish in this dossier, which is apparently inevitable, that there is a community breaking line between the regions, where Brussels and Flanders are on the same line and Wallonia apparently sees it differently. Our conclusion is, “Let that diversity in unity be the fate in which we must settle here.”

Therefore, we have come to a number of important points with this resolution. It is also good that we play the principle of subsidiarity here. It is the municipalities that organize the elections. Let us give the municipalities the freedom to organize elections on their own scale. Those who want to vote with pencil and paper can continue to vote. Those who want to vote electronically and maintain that can also do so.

Moreover, we ask the government to link the benefits of electronic voting as soon as possible to the legitimate concern of the people to be able to control their voting operation and as soon as possible to test a pilot project of automated voting, but with a barcode ticket that the voter can check himself, so that he remains in sight of what he has decided.

Our group is convinced that this path, which must be followed, is the best way to link democracy to technology; here one finds a piece of freedom, a piece of solidarity and a piece of subsidiarity. Therefore, I think that almost no political group can have a problem in approving this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Secretary of State, Mr. Minister, colleagues, tonight, or rather in the early morning of our Flemish holiday, there is a proposal for a resolution concerning the introduction of an improved electronic voting system. In the past, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that electronic voting and the electronic processing of votes cast are vulnerable procedures. Meanwhile, the systems are very obsolete.

Furthermore, the vulnerability can be demonstrated in a more general sense by referring to some potential problems such as the appearance of viruses in the voice or telephone computer, the possible misunderstanding of the magnetic reader, both in the voice and telephone operations, the possible transmission of incorrect data through the disquets, and so on.

Furthermore, it is unthinkable that in a democratic country elections are held that are not recognized by the population as safe and fair. Therefore, it should be possible to verify the correctness of the registration of the voter’s commands. The possibility that exists now to visualize the voiced voice by entering the magnetic card into the voice computer is insufficient as a control tool.

The Flemish Belang has therefore since the launch of the current electronic voting system questioned its reliability and now notes with satisfaction that there is a growing consensus on the fact that the current system is faulty and not waterproof. The resolution presented today is a step in the right direction. But this is not extensive enough for us.

The Flemish Belang is in favour of a mandatory electronic system with a print of the votes cast. The result is then a paper ballot note and this ballot note contains the voter’s vote in the form of a encrypted barcode on the one hand, and a human-readable print on the other. This ballot can then be checked by the voter before depositing it in the urn. After the vote, the urns are empty and all votes are scanned electronically.

This way, the votes can also be manually recounted in case of errors or suspicion of fraud. We would like to include in this resolution a procedure to enable recounting after the elections. Nevertheless, we will support this resolution because, as I have already stated, it is a step in the right direction.

Our group will ensure that the experiment with an improved electronic voting system, in which the voter receives a paper print to verify his vote, with the aim of enhancing the guarantees for democratic supervision, will be thoroughly evaluated after the 2009 elections and, where necessary, updated.

We will soon support this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Secretary of State, Mr. Minister, colleagues, as Open Vld, we are pleased that we in the committee, after having heard a lot of experts and after having debated a lot of days, have yet to find a majority to continue the electronic voting. We find that very important.

More than 17 years ago we introduced it in Belgium. I also do not think that the reference to the Netherlands, where one returns to paper and pencil, goes up here. The Control Commission, which inspected the federal elections in June 2007, was able to convince us in the committee that there were no errors found in our system. Our system is better than in other countries. Therefore, I think it also needs to be continued and modernized in the next period.

We are also pleased that every canton and even every municipality will be given the freedom of choice to continue voting in 2009 by electronic voting or by paper and pencil, for the municipalities or cantons that did not do so at the moment.

The government has pledged to launch an experiment with electronic voting in two cantons where voters receive the paper prints to control their vote.

As we continue with the modernization of our voting system, it is also important that in the coming months we reflect once more on our bill to bring the abolition of the compulsory appearance to debate and to vote in this hemisphere.

I think we should also have the courage to modernize in this area. There are four other countries, Australia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and our country, where there is still voting obligation with a sanction. Like colleague Vautmans, I have submitted a proposal to abolish that compulsory appearance and to remove the sanction. I call on all parties to think about this in the coming months. If we want to modernize our voting system, the abolition of the voting duty is also a must.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Secretary of State, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, we have been experimenting with automated voting in our country for more than seventeen years now. At that time, five arguments had been put forward in favor of an automation of our voting system. The first concerned the use of modern technologies in the electoral process. The second aimed at a faster and more reliable disposal. The third was a reduction in the number of counselors and the fourth a reduction in costs. Finally, the latter concerned the disadvantages associated with much too large ballots and impossible to manipulate by the voter. That of the Brussels Region was almost 1m2.

What balance can we draw from these 17 years of experience? What has shown us this experiment that has been going on for too long in my opinion? Did we meet the goals we set for ourselves? My group’s response is simple and unanimous. So far, nothing satisfactory has been demonstrated, both in terms of the objectives announced in 1991 and in terms of respect for fundamental rights related to elections in a representative democracy.

On the first argument, we have actually introduced modern technologies into the electoral process but, today, our system is completely outdated and requires a complete software update. As for the second argument regarding faster and more reliable removal, the years of experimentation have shown several malfunctions. That said, what does it use to have very quick results in a country where it sometimes takes a few months to form a government. In 2003, in Schaerbeek, for example, a mistake ...

(Out of the micro)

You are right, Mr. Ducarme! Be careful because you will do it again one day and I will not miss you either!

In Schaerbeek, in 2003, an error of 4,096 preferential votes was detected in a candidate. In Liege, in 2006, the results were known at a late hour well after those obtained in the cantons where the traditional vote was applied. Add to this the many small technical problems that have sometimes caused long queues in the polling stations, such as faulty optical pencil, power outages or even magnetic card blockages in machines.

As for the third argument, which highlighted a decrease in the number of counselors, we can ask ourselves whether the goal is praiseworthy in democracy. Is it not healthy that citizens participate in the course of the elections, that they themselves control the electoral process? Furthermore, if electronic voting requires fewer counselors, it also mobilizes them for longer, since the polling stations remain open until 15:00 and even 16:00 in Brussels.

In terms of cost reduction, the figures make it clear that, in the current state of affairs, the automated system costs three times more than paper voting. In fact, we are talking about 4.50 euros per vote for electronic voting versus 1.50 euros for paper voting. In addition, with the new system proposed by the university consortium and commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior, this cost is almost ten times higher than paper voting.

As for the disadvantages of too large bulletins, there are quite simple and practical solutions, such as, for example, a sheet system to remedy this problem.

If I refer to the various experts who have been heard in the committee, we are faced with a system that challenges two of the foundations of our system of representative democracy: the control of electoral operations by voters and the guarantee of the secrecy of the vote. It is a system that is not always as fast and efficient as one thinks; a system whose maintenance and logistics are entirely ensured by private firms, chosen by the state – which, however, strongly resembles a form of privatization of the electoral process –; a system so technical that it has become completely opaque.

While with paper voting, everyone can control the correct running of the elections, the electronic voting system can only be controlled by a handful of specialists.

It is a system that does not solve the problems of fraud and, worse, creates new ones; a system whose current cost is three times higher than that of paper voting, a cost that ⁇ weighs on regional and municipal budgets. Finally, it is a system that poses accessibility problems for the elderly, the visually impaired, the less educated citizens, for example.

In the light of these elements, I see only one reason for ⁇ ining electronic voting, that of being able to introduce modern technologies in the electoral process at any cost. Can this will justify, in itself, to continue against and against everything in the way of electronic voting while all other European countries have given up on it? I do not think so.

More specifically, we also have the problem of organizing the 2009 elections.

In principle, there will be regional and European elections, but we all know that legislative elections are also likely to be organized. In this case, software adjustments could not be made in time and would probably involve a forced return to paper voting.

There is also the problem of the ageing of the devices used. It should be known that if we continue on the path of electronic voting, we will use in some municipalities computers that were purchased in 1991. This seems unthinkable. Using a computer that is 17 years old is completely absurd for any consumer.

The resolution presented to us here in the plenary session does not take into account any arguments relating to the fundamental rights of a representative democracy or the practical aspects we face. Apparently, the experts hearing in the committee were not all heard since six of the eight speakers voted against electronic voting and some of my colleagues apparently did not take this into account.

What is included in this resolution?

There is an extension of the current system for 2009 despite the objections that have been expressed by experts. However, I note a positive element in the possibility of returning to paper voting for municipalities who wish to do so.

Then, it is proposed to try in 2009 and then generalize the automated voting system as recommended by the study of the university consortium, commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior.

This study should be objective. Although it presented some exhaustivity, it did not take into account the paper possibilities.

As for the new system proposed, according to a Dutch computer scientist very active in this case, it resembles very much the one that has just been abandoned by our northern neighbors. It combines the electronic system and the paper method, with the printing of a ballot that the voter can deposit in an urn that will be used in case of a problem.

This is what the university consortium proposed, whose study was commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior.

(Intervention of various members outside of micro)

In a few minutes, I will also talk about our French friends, which will ⁇ please Mr. by Ducarme!

The ecological cost of this new device will not be negligible, as it will require the purchase of an incredible number of small printers. It will cost ten times more than paper voting and will not guarantee security or election control. In short, we are asked to test and implement after 2009 an electronic voting system that has already demonstrated all its flaws in our neighbors.

In addition, I will also quote an article published yesterday in the French newspaper "Le Monde" whose seriousness cannot be questioned. He referred to a study that questioned the reliability of the voting machines. Here’s a brief excerpt: “Voting stations equipped with electronic voting machines would be less reliable than others. This is the paradoxical result of a study made public on Tuesday, July 8, and conducted by Chantal Enguehard, a researcher at the computer science laboratory of the University of Nantes.

According to these studies, the number of votes and theoretically identical margin varies in 29.8% of voting offices equipped with electronic machines in which approximately 1.5 million French votes.

In conclusion, the only positive point of this resolution is that municipalities and de facto our fellow citizens will be able to choose not to use electronic voting for 2009. In our view, this system does not guarantee the security of the election and does not allow the full control of the elections by the citizens.

Before finishing, I would like to clarify that we will not vote in favour of the amendments submitted by Ecolo-Groen! The debate was held in the committee. I think I can say that our group has been very active in dealing with this case. We have submitted a clear and clear resolution proposal that strongly calls for the return to paper voting.

Today, we bow before the majority without having to roast the battle we have fought in commission.

There are some important moments in a democracy. Elections are a time for this, because the politician puts his power in the hands of the citizen. During this symbolic day, citizens vote, citizens organize this vote, citizens count, citizens announce the results to politicians.

The [...]

Even you, Mr. Ducarme, you are a citizen and you can vote like everyone else that day.

The different systems we have experienced make these citizens no longer the great craftsmen of the day. For many months, the minister and his administration must prepare computers with companies that make the software, who experiment with them. There are experts trying to control, private companies trying to certify that the hardware has not been used inappropriately between two votes. We are therefore gradually moving away from this great ideal, from this great moment when the citizens organize the elections.

We started in 1991, we did different experiments, we no longer use the same software as at the beginning. In particular, we have experimented with scanning and computers with printers. It’s also fun to remember that when we tested computers with printers, we were told that it was a bad experience, that it was expensive, and that these printers were getting stuck. Now, it is in this direction that we are moving.

However, it should be remembered that 56% of our citizens still vote on paper and, as far as I know, you never see big articles in newspapers reporting that this is going wrong. So tonight we are talking about a practice that affects only 44% of citizens.

How is things going in other countries? Ireland spent 53 million to manufacture voting machines that it did not use because following the various studies and reflections that were conducted, it was judged that it was not a good thing, despite the investments made.

The Netherlands had introduced a computer voting system, very close to the one we want to adopt, but after mature reflection on the cost of the experiment and after they were shown that the operations performed on the computer can be monitored remotely – experience that we unfortunately could not carry out at home – the Netherlands decided to end this experiment. France has experienced various experiences, which several municipalities have abandoned. The Municipality of Hamburg has stopped its experience. Belgium is the only country in Europe where 10% of voters vote electronically.

The good news is that everyone here agrees that electronic voting does not work very well, as we are deciding to change the system to move to a much more sophisticated system. Therefore, we all recognize that electronic voting is not at the point and does not put the voter in confidence. We are told that we can put the white card back into another computer to check what is written on it. I, who am zero in computer science, can still tell you that this card can contain more than one information: what I voted for and other things. The citizen is not convinced that returning a card to the computer was sufficient to certify the content of the card.

In each report, experts designated by our parliaments highlight a whole range of difficulties. They do not claim that there is fraud or that nothing works but they can not guarantee that there is no problem, that there is no computer bug. In fact, different moments in the procedure are likely to create problems. It would be necessary to control all the computers in the country: it is not possible; control all the disquets: it is not possible; it would be necessary to control the software: we now have access to the source codes, but since amateur computer scientists are not in possession of all the elements, even with the source code, it is difficult to verify that everything works properly.

The last difficulty is compliance with procedures. If you’ve had the opportunity to talk with some office chairs, you’ve found that it’s not easy for everyone and that some call on officials to launch the machine, even if it’s quite contrary to the Electoral Code, because it’s too complicated for them.

I have two questions to the attention of the Minister of the Interior, two technical questions to which we have not been able to answer in the commission, which you may be able to do now. There are regional and European elections. When voters vote on paper, they put their regional ballot in one urn, their European ballot in another. However, some voters – European – will only vote for the European elections.

A ticket will be issued from the printer which will contain only the people for whom they voted in the European elections. Imagine that there is only one European voter, in the urn, you could see immediately what his European tickets are and for whom he voted. How will this difficulty be solved?

Do you think there will be no municipality voting in 2009?

and no. Now it’s a little late: Parliament took three months to get out of this debate. The current system is ⁇ ined.

I am sorry. You had asked for an experiment; obviously, the minister does not respond to your request, which was however in your resolution.

Do not play at this time. I replied that it was quite late and my administration let me know that starting now with experiments was not possible. Parliament took three months to discuss this. I will not start these experiments in September.

What I must therefore understand is that you have no solution for the case that European voters participate in this vote and not in the other to guarantee the confidentiality of the vote. Today we are voting not on the current system, but on having a new system.

But not . This will happen after the 2009 election.

Well, after the 2009 elections, this problem will arise. Are European voters voting after 2009?

What do you want: do you want the return...?

No, I want you to explain how confidentiality is guaranteed for European voters.

Madame Genot, it is well tried, but I tell you that, for the 2009 elections, it is the choice of the municipalities. I am convinced that municipalities will continue to use the current system: on the one hand, those who vote with paper and pencil will continue and, on the other hand, the IT will be revised and rearranged ahead of the 2009 elections. This is the continuation of the current system. If an experiment is possible, I do not exclude it but, for now, the administration tells me that it is already very late.

After 2009, we will see the demand of the municipalities who want a different system, either give a chance to computing, or continue with paper and pencil; they will be able to do so. In fact, it is a subsidiarity system and it is the choice of the municipalities. Today we are voting on a resolution, i.e. a recommendation. and continue .

Mr. Minister, it is you who must continue to answer my question.

Whether in 2009, as part of a potential experiment, whether five years later in the European elections with the system proposed with the consortium of universities and supported by the resolution to be voted today, a ticket goes out. However, this ticket will not be the same for European voters as for voters who participate in both types of voting. And I find that you cannot give me any answers regarding the confidentiality guarantee for European voters. This fact seems to me somewhat worrying, especially, as you said, after three months of in-depth discussions.

I also ask myself another question regarding the system you propose to us in the resolution. So we talked a long time about the ticket, the bar code. You are remembering! A system has been ordered to universities. It is also supported in the resolution presented to us today. During the discussions in the commission, one of the problems raised was that the accounting is made by passing the ticket before the scanner. What happens if the same ticket is presented several times? How do I make sure that this ticket is not counted multiple times? Has this possibility been taken into account?

I don’t know if you’re doing your shopping. But sometimes the cashier scans the same item twice, for one reason or another. This is counted twice. It seems to me that the same kind of problem could arise with the electronic system. But I find that some people do not often do their shopping and are surprised that this is possible. I invite you to talk to your fellow citizens who check their race tickets.

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But yes ! And there are some who do not visit them often.

That said, if you don’t shop, maybe you’re using a computer. You know that it is fragile material. When it works, it’s great, but when it’s not, things get complicated. In recent years, many machines have failed and have had to be replaced. This is one of the disadvantages. But you will probably tell me that every system has its disadvantages.

Some problems are more important. We talked about what happened in Schaerbeek where 4.096 votes were unfairly attributed to a candidate. Fortunately, after accounting, the error was detected.

After that, I questioned the minister to ask him if a mistake of the same type could have occurred elsewhere without being detected. He confessed to me that he could not guarantee that no mistake of the same kind could have occurred. Giving such a guarantee is impossible.

It should be noted that if you use an automated voting system, you cannot guarantee that no bugs will occur. It is so. The Minister was very honest in his answer to the parliamentary question.

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I agree with you. No system is perfect but I would like everyone here to suspect the difficulties of this system and see to what extent they are willing to engage in it.

I know that in Brussels-City – several Brussels-City shelters are present – we tested the old machines to see if we could continue to use them. The results were worrying. I hope that we will be cautious because I would not want to find ourselves in situations where many computers fail and thus revive the painful situations of the gigantic rows to access the isolator.

The last problem is accessibility.

It can be said that many people now work with computers and have become accustomed to using them. However, there is still a whole portion of the population for whom the computer is not a part of everyday life. It is therefore more difficult.

For example, older people are asking for help. They indicate the party they want to vote for, but they rarely dare to disturb the person further by specifying the people they want to give their vote to. It is always embarrassing to be uncomfortable with computer science. Others tap randomly hoping that it stops quickly and that they get their cards back.

The system has the advantage – I acknowledge it – of avoiding panchage or other types of errors since it is impossible to commit them. Unfortunately, this does not overcome all the difficulties encountered.

I also recently attended a press conference of people with disabilities who addressed all the difficulties of going to the polls, whether in the case of paper or automated voting.

One gentleman explained that with his very heavy electric car, he had never been able to enter the school because the stairs were too high. Fortunately, they voted on paper in their municipality and they were able to get out the ballot. He was able to vote hidden by coats. If it had been electronic voting, he would not have been able to vote.

I hope that the Minister will take hands-on these problems of accessibility for disabled people and that everyone will be able to reach the isolators, in all municipalities, whether they apply the paper or automated system.

The last important element is the cost. A computer used once a year has a "difficulty", even if it is used for ten years. A computer used only once a year does not fatally age very well. These are not machines that are overly well preserved. There will be a number of discharge teams. Automated voting is three times more expensive than paper voting.

You will reiterate to me that we must call on counselors, knowing that in Brussels, their benefits must be extended for automated voting, because everyone must have the possibility to vote.

Of a total of 7 million voters with a paper vote of 1.50 euros, the bill amounts to 10 million euros. In the case of a vote of 4.50 euros for 7 million voters, the invoice amounts to 31 million euros. In the new system proposed to us, the Netherlands estimated its cost to 12 euros per vote (scanner, printer, etc.). Thus, the invoice will amount to 84 million euros against 10 million for paper voting. An additional $70 million is worth considering. It could be allocated to taking a series of important steps for our fellow citizens.

This is not the first time we have this debate. A few years ago, the CDH, more specifically Ms. Nyssens and Mr. Brotcorne had already submitted a proposal for a resolution, which highlighted technical problems, the impossibility of democratic control, a more complex and less transparent procedure, the cost of equipment and which proposed optical reading. I was rather surprised to see the CDH vote for the continuation of the automated voting experience.

We strongly supported the resolution that advocated the return to paper voting. Clearly, a majority wants to work on the text of return to improved electronic voting.

Mr. Dewael, maybe you believe that what we vote today is only the continuation of your experience? The proposal is “relating to the introduction of the electronic voting system”. We are talking about this system with ticket.

Therefore, I propose four amendments aimed at continuing Parliament’s exercise of its prerogatives in this matter, four amendments being part of the majority’s willingness to work with this improved electronic voting.

The resolution clearly supports this improved electronic voting. On the other hand, the text strangely speaks of “improved electronic voting or another experience.” I think it’s like giving a white check. One could, for example, return a vote without a ticket, which is quite the opposite of what was desired during all the discussions.

by Mr. Ducarme makes a sign that no, but since he was not present, he could not know it!

Mr. Ducarme, you are asking me if you can stay. If you listen, you can of course stay!

I propose you to make this resolution clearer, stating that we want an improved electronic voting with ticket and to remove "or another automated voting experience."

We talked about an experience to accomplish. I think it is important that Parliament can look at the results of this experiment. In the second amendment, I propose to present the results of the experience to Parliament. You will find that these are far from “ultra-amendments”!

Finally, any good manager can only support the amendment that proposes to require the government to communicate to Parliament, at least four months before the elections, the costs related to the organization of these elections. At the moment, the minister himself tells us to ignore the costs with the new system. I would find it normal for Parliament to be informed four months in advance. If you have no problem with the fact that Parliament does not have the possibility to know the cost of the things it votes for, I have one!

In the last amendment, we propose you to be able to recalculate, in some municipalities. We offer you in 1% of municipalities to recalculate tickets, which will reassure all those who lack confidence in electronic voting.

The last speaker on electronic voting is Ms. Almaci.

This is a very ungrateful task. However, I hope to get your attention, because I am the last speaker.

The issue of electronic voting is an important issue. In any real democracy, every vote counts. Every voice is equally important. Elections are, as we all know, the mother of the ultimate government.

Therefore, the agenda of the point to be discussed has been preceded by many discussions. We consulted, rightly, several experts.

In the first resolution, from the CD&V, the Open Vld and the MR, experiments with an improved voting system are proposed. In the second resolution, of the PS, the electronic voting is abolished.

Both resolutions do not only come from the majority. They also come from the same conclusion, namely the conclusion that the electronic voting system, as it is used today in our country, is still insufficiently transparent and also insufficiently controllable. From a democratic and technical point of view, therefore, the reuse of an old code, to become just as technical, of the electronic voting system for the 2009 elections is not without problems.

Let me be clear: Green! strongly advocates further automation and a smooth, comfortable and fast voting process. However, the current debate is not about whether one is for or against an automation of voting and/or counting, but all about the extent to which it is organized, controlled and above all legitimized in an open, professional and good way.

On that point, we can only say that there are still a lot of questions. Not only does the voice computer still insufficiently respond to the principle of equality, where, among other things, the problem of accessibility for visually impaired and blind persons still exists. The system also does not take into account the still existing digital divide in our society. Approximately 20% of the population has never used a computer.

In the field of control – very important – there is a question about the fraud sensitivity and the correctness of the system. In the United States, where electronic voting systems are also being used, pilot settings were carried out. The voting system was hacked by experts with a program that subsequently simply destroyed itself, so that it did not leave any trace. Choice computers therefore also give ginds a paper print.

In the Netherlands, a country that developed its own electronic voting systems and resold to other countries, there were so many problems in tests, carried out by its own intelligence and security service, that one has decided to return to voting on paper.

In Ireland, which bought voice computers from the Netherlands, it was ultimately decided to never use those voice computers. Our country is the last country in Europe that still uses an electronic voting system, a system that is also very expensive: up to three times as much as voting on paper.

Given that cost and given the many questions that remain unresolved in the field of security, in the field of control, in the field of accessibility, we are requesting party for clear and critical control mechanisms and also for the use of a paper evidence that in case of dispute is the only thing with a legal value.

Together with Ecolo, we have therefore submitted several amendments to the proposal that has been submitted in advance. We would like the results of the proposed experiment with the improved ticket system to be submitted to Parliament so that we can speak about it.

In the present resolution, it is also stated that in the future, the government can actually decide entirely autonomously on the application of the proposed ticket system or another automated system. For us, dear colleagues, it is unacceptable that the government, ⁇ given the sensitivity of the discussion, can unilaterally approve and introduce a new system independently of Parliament. We therefore request the withdrawal of that reference to another automated system in the resolution.

In addition, research in the Netherlands has shown that the paper vote costs approximately 1.5 euros. An electronic vote costs 4.5 euros, and that without including the printer, additional security measures against hacking, and so on.

We have determined that the Minister of Internal Affairs cannot yet answer us what the new system will cost. We have therefore proposed that at least four months before the elections, Parliament be notified of the cost of the system. But unfortunately, and to our dismay, we have noticed that our three reasonable amendments were rejected by the committee. For us, this is absolutely incomprehensible because the control function of this Parliament, so continuously emphasized by CD&V – I said it last week and I repeat it today – is left behind again with the looming remarks of Minister De Crem and of the group chairman Verherstraeten on the looming of the Parliament and on the looming of the control function of the Parliament.

Dear colleagues, because this is incomprehensible to us, because we have made three reasonable proposals and because there was no action on them, the proposal for a resolution as it is presented now is therefore too short by the curve for us. You missed a chance here.