Proposition 50K1855

Proposition de résolution concernant le renforcement des règles prudentielles et du contrôle des comptes interbancaires.

General information ¶

Authors

PS | SP Claude Eerdekens, Thierry Giet, Charles Janssens
Vooruit Dirk Van der Maelen, Peter Vanvelthoven

Submission date

June 11, 2002

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

financial transaction fraud resolution of parliament criminal law money laundering

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen CD&V Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP Open Vld N-VA MR FN VB

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Discussion ¶

July 10, 2002 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

I refer to the written report.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Colleagues, I will briefly report on the two draft laws and the proposal for a resolution to which the Committee on Finance has dedicated five meetings. In its discussion, the committee focused the discussion primarily on the loop of surveillance. For most members of the committee, this is indeed one of the most important financial reforms of recent years.

Given the importance of both draft laws and the draft resolution, the committee has organized a number of hearings. She did not hear the least of the parties involved: Mr. Guy Quaden, Governor of the National Bank, Mr. Eddy Wymeersch, Chairman of the Commission for Banking and Finance, Mr. Lenaerts, Chairman of the Insurance Control Service and Mr. Ravout, Director-General of the Belgian Association of Banks.

The presentations of the aforementioned persons gave rise to a number of amendments which were eventually accepted by all members of the committee and adopted unanimously. The whole of both bills and the resolution were eventually adopted unanimously.

Until then, my brief report. I will take the opportunity to ask the Minister another question for clarification.

Mr. Minister, following the report, we have made another amendment to Article 48 which relates to the tasks of the Supervisory Board. After your proposal, we have added another sentence to the sixth paragraph: "...where the chairman does not participate in the advisory procedure". No amendment was submitted, but we accepted it. Looking back on this, I find that this article covers three elements where an opinion of the Supervisory Board is expected. These include the appointment of the Management Committee, the appointment of the Chairman and the appointment of the Secretary-General. It is obvious that in any case the President does not participate in the appointment of the President. As regards the appointment of the Management Committee and the Secretary-General, I would like to ask you questions to clarify why you then proposed that the President should also be excluded from that advisory procedure. We have always predicted the collegiality of the Supervisory Board. This involves two advisory assignments in which the chairman is not involved. Can you clarify this?

Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out simply, by collegial correction to Mr. Speaker. The final text is a common text. It is therefore necessary to consider the fact that there is no hierarchy for proposals as submitted.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, as the rapporteur just mentioned in his excellent report, this draft was unanimously approved in the committee. The fact that there was unanimity in the committee does not mean that the draft dissipated a very great enthusiasm. I don’t dare to say “on the contrary,” but nevertheless. It is true that it is clear to everyone in the committee and also to everyone in the field — the field of financial markets — and that there was much to change in financial supervision. We can no longer afford too fragmented supervision at a time when financial institutions want to ⁇ greater integration.

They offer a variety of financial products, both in the traditional banking and savings products sector and in the insurance sector. I do not think it is possible for strong financial groups to be controlled in a fragmented manner. Their

Both nationally and internationally, we have found that the supervision of listed companies has experienced difficulties in recent years. The problems were not only related to the correctness of the accounting data provided by the undertakings, but above all to the way in which the government exercises control over the correct reporting obligation. The current problems and the problems of recent months, not only in Belgium, but especially in the United States, make very clear that a lot of better surveillance tools and bodies are needed.

Everyone was therefore convinced that important steps had to be taken forward and that this design is an important step forward. The draft is not the ultimate goal for us and the majority of committee members. We had determined that there were a number of blockages on the political and institutional level and on the ground. They are now finally broken. We have taken a step towards an integrated supervision. That is a good thing.

In addition, the supervision of the stock exchange authorities was transferred to the CBF, the Commission for Banking and Finance. This overthrow is welcomed by everyone. Almost every member of the committee has expressed the intention to move forward. In the committee, we have succeeded in expressing this desire even more clearly through amendments. We have actually entered that will in the texts. That is a very good thing.

Unlike many recent debates in Parliament, this discussion of the draft was an example of what a parliamentary discussion should be. I do not claim that it was ideal, but yet there was a real opportunity to discuss the matter in depth and to submit a number of amendments that were then accepted through a very open and constructive discussion.

Our attitude towards the design is positive in terms of the goals. It is a positive intermediate step. However, it remains an intermediate step towards an even more integrated and efficient supervision of the financial markets. Furthermore, there is still a question about the role of the National Bank of Belgium. It is important that a clear vision has been established about the manner of action of that Belgian central bank. However, the discussion about the specific structure of the National Bank of Belgium continues. The bank also has private shareholders.

In other words, there are actually minority shareholders. Mr. Minister, I think the matter would become much clearer and there would be less discussion if we came to a clean situation. A pure situation is, in my view, a situation in which the National Bank becomes a public institution tout court. This, of course, requires an important political decision. The government must then say that for a central bank with the limited but real powers it still has now, it is an anachronism if there are still private shares. I know that it requires a political and budgetary decision, but it would make things much clearer if this option was taken. Mr. Minister, if this ever becomes politically and budgetarily possible, we will fully support this. The role of the National Bank.

Finally, I would like to point out that we would like to pay particular attention to the protection of minority shareholders, those who are not directly in the decision-making organs of a company but are considered to put their capital at the disposal of those who undertake. In our economic system, this is an important data that, however, relies on reciprocity. As a society, we expect entrepreneurs not only to deliver real added value, create employment and provide a proper social and ecological environment, but also to provide correct information to those who make their capital available, even if it is temporary. As a government, we must ensure by law that there is an audit body for auditing financial institutions and listed companies to ensure that they provide clear, transparent and correct information to those who wish to make their capital available. We have approached this design from this perspective. This is a step forward that we support, although for us it is clearly only an intermediate step.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, after many debates and several hearings, the Committee on Finance and Budget has just voted on the bill on the supervision of the financial sector and financial services.

Thus, the Belgian Financial Place will be equipped — I hope — with a legal framework adapted to the latest developments in the financial markets. This evolution of the financial markets and the development of the techniques used have led the Socialist Group to look at the various techniques of money laundering. by

Recently, in order to combat money laundering, we submitted three bills and three resolution proposals addressed to the government. Our goal is to put in place political acts capable of dismantling the occult financial circuits that are used by financial criminals. by

Money laundering enables criminals to legitimize profits from fraudulent activities, such as illegal arms sales, smuggling, drug trafficking or prostitution networks. by

Among our proposals, the proposal for a resolution on strengthening the prudential rules and the control of interbank accounts was attached to the draft law on the supervision of the financial sector. Both were unanimously voted in the Committee on Finance and Budget.

We demand that the government strengthen the role of the Banking and Financial Commission, which is, as we all know, the supervisory and supervisory authority with regard to interbank accounts. by

Interbank accounts are accounts between banks and their subsidiaries — between, for example, a Belgian bank and its subsidiary in Liechtenstein. In the banking jargon, they are also called accounts "nostro vostro". Only bank-to-bank transactions, strictly related to their commercial operations, such as movements related to foreign currency investments for commercial purposes, may transit on these interbank accounts. Movements of funds for individuals cannot transit there. It would seem, however, that individuals use these accounts, but of course indirectly. These uses are mainly made to be able to place on an account the profits of tax fraud. by

There could therefore be gaps in CBF’s control over these interbank accounts. Our resolution calls on the government to strengthen control of the CBF. by

In the same resolution, we also call on the government to provide for a systematization of the reporting obligation when a customer, coming from countries or territories considered to be non-cooperative, deposits an amount in cash or other assets on an interbank account.

The development of new communication technologies today acts as a spectacular lever of the financial economy. It allows the global financial system to perform a very large number of transactions from one corner of the world to another, in record time and at minimal cost. Without making any accusations at this stage, it is fundamental to carry out an objective audit of interbank accounts but also of the activities of clearing companies.

The object of their interventions and the way they operate can, in fact, constitute an exponential mode of dirty money laundering. Our proposals will probably not be enough to eradicate the plagues of financial corruption and money laundering, but they are the starting points of a struggle that the Socialist Group intends to continue to carry out to track down all forms of financial crime and money laundering.

Mr. Speaker, as the Minister of Justice is in charge of these two projects, I will welcome the efforts made in the committee that have helped to bring together the views on a common text.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, the bill that is being discussed today is intended to reform the supervision of the financial sector and financial services through a new control structure. The strange thing — although this is not strange in itself for this purple-green government — is that it took almost two years before this draft was drafted, including the extensive consultation with the parties involved — the National Bank, the CBF and the CDV. Of course, the urgency also had to be asked, as with so many bills in recent weeks, to hunt for it shortly before the recess through Parliament. The preparatory work was apparently so well done that another thirty amendments were to be amended to update the draft on the runway for a number of key points.

This was undoubtedly the result of the increasing, sharp criticism from the Chairmen of the CBF and the CDV. This criticism showed that the consultation, or rather the involvement in the past, was not what the government imagined. This reform is entirely a hybrid operation in the sense that the National Bank has lost its monetary function since the establishment of the European Central Bank and ⁇ since the introduction of the euro and therefore as an institution can survive only by either partially or not dismantling itself — we can hardly look beyond the Board of Directors with a board of directors consisting of approximately 17 members, one of whom has already been paid a little more than the other, or one already has a little more political advantage than the other — or to look for new powers and therefore its eye has fallen on the banking and insurance sector. Their

With this new structure, however, there are a number of comments to be made. The first element is, of course, the status of the National Bank, which is half in the hands of the Belgian State and for the other half through the stock exchange in the hands of small shareholders. Just because of this, it is strange to mention that a listed company comes into a new structure with the CBF, which is precisely the task of controlling listed companies. I do not know if this really is a conflict of interests, but purely on the grace it seems to me that is ⁇ not. And this is ⁇ not the case if the CBF will be asked to judge on matters related to the listed nature of the National Bank. It is precisely that Belgian solution is a unicum in the sense that no place in the world is the central bank or the national bank, nor is it in the supervision of both the banking and insurance sectors and the financial markets. In many countries, the central bank is only involved in banking supervision, as the executive agent of the supervisory authority that determines the policy. In this present construction, the situation is reversed in the sense that the National Bank dictates by way of speech what must be done and the auditor does the execution. This is the reverse world.

That the possible conflict of interest is not an imaginary issue, the actions carried out by the legal office Deminor against the National Bank demonstrate. In this regard, I refer to the recent case in which the minority shareholders of the National Bank were harmed through all kinds of real estate transactions. Also the file on the transfer of 100 million euros of pension reserves to the Belgian State is a reflection; instead of including them in the result account and thus benefiting from the dividend of its shareholders, also the small.

This demonstrates once again that in this whole new structure the National Bank does not really play a credible role, ⁇ not when it itself as a supervisory authority harms its own minority shareholders. Apparently, however, the government is in favor of the action initiated by Déminor, because since 25 June 2002 it is intended to include the National Bank on the list of companies that publicly rely on savings. For the National Bank, this means that from now on, it has a broader information obligation. That is already positive in itself.

Then there was the completion or composition of the management committee of the CBF. There were the necessary objections to the dominant settlement with members of the National Bank, which created a certain conflict of interest and consequently made the credibility regarding the independence of the CBF for its specific policy areas very questionable.

Also about the invention of the new post of Secretary-General and more specifically about the job description and decision-making powers, I have the impression that not everything has been clarified. This bill defines and defines almost everything, except the duties and the precise description of the function of the Secretary-General. For me this is confusing. What else can a reform in this country offer without its completion accompanied by a train of political appointments? For us, that is old political culture, because that is the double bottom of this design. This whole reform stands or falls with the newly established office of Secretary-General. For this position, your own Deputy Cabinet Chief, Mr. Jean-Paul Servais to name him by name, Mr. Minister, is the greatest potential to fall into the prizes. This function has, by the way, been assigned a lot of powers, both in the use of resources and in the management of personnel. Not for nothing, your own Deputy Cabinet Chief is the driving force behind this construction. Last week we could read in the economic magazine Trends an article about it with the strange title "The Teeth of a Pitbull Terrier". I previously had the impression that the article in Trends was an extensive curriculum vitae, including the political red thread. We should not be surprised, therefore, that the government will roll out the red carpet — in this case better: the blue carpet — for this man. Of course, this does not stop with it. There will also be some shifts in the Board of Directors of the National Bank. In any case, and with this I will close my previously concise, but not insignificant intervention, given the elements I have just outlined and the political analysis that is as a double bottom behind this reform or is intertwined with it, one will understand that we give this reform ahead the disadvantage of the doubt. We will therefore abstain from voting, in contrast to the unanimous vote in the committee, which I was unable to take part in due to circumstances.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, at the current stage of the development of the markets of financial services, there is an absolute need for harmonised basic rules to ensure a good course of affairs in an integrated market. This goal was envisaged by the Belgian Presidency in the second half of last year and is the basis of the proposed reform. This reform — I risk to say here what the rapporteur has already said — aims at achieving four main objectives, which I will briefly outline: first, the redistribution of the powers of the authorities responsible for various aspects of market control and of the powers of the various financial service providers; second, a change in decision-making and an adapted treatment of conflicts of interest in CBF and CDV;

third, the remedies against decisions of market companies, the CBF and the CDV; fourth, institutional approximation to the central bank and better management of human potential.

This reform therefore aims to introduce, neither more nor less, a complete and autonomous supervisory structure of the financial sector in the broad sense of the word, in Belgian law. Therefore, various changes are implemented in the field of financial services, as defined in the texts of European law. The reform also responds to the government’s approach to simplification — everything is of course relative — and the unification of the economic control procedures in Belgium.

Finally, the proposal highlights the need to ensure that savers and investors are better protected against the offer or the unlawful provision of financial products or services, even if this information function is already guaranteed daily by the CBF and the CDV. In this way, the reform should also guarantee a better protection of consumers. In this context, two draft laws were drawn up, which resulted from a very extensive consultation of the associations, sectors and institutions concerned. The European Central Bank, the ECB, also gave a positive opinion by supporting the mutual philosophy of reform.

The proposed reform was criticized because of the Chairman of the Committee on Banking and Finance, who had a major problem with the fact that the National Bank of Belgium had a large presence in the bodies of the CBF and the CDV, which would exaggerate the influence of the National Bank in a new supervisory structure and would create confusion as to who is ultimately responsible for supervision. However, the VLD notes that a comparative study has shown that while there is no single model in Europe for the institutional organization of prudential control, the aspects of systematic control are entrusted to the central banks. The ECB, the European Central Bank, also believes that the maintenance of the financial stability of the financial system requires a greater involvement of the national central banks. From this perspective, the proposed reform is based on a comprehensive system that shows strong similarities with the reforms underway or already developed in the other Member States of the European Union. It provides for additional institutional cooperation at three levels, capable of creating real synergies and simplifying decision-making by enabling the various prudential audit authorities.

The three levels are: first, an intersectoral forum for discussion between the supervisory bodies; second, an operational obligation to consult among the members of the governing bodies of the different institutions; third, the development of synergies through the functions shared by the three institutions.

The overarching system also makes it possible to clearly and in terms of corporate governance distinguish between supervisory and management functions, while ⁇ ining operational services. The VLD therefore fully supports the philosophy underlying the present texts as well as their concrete elaboration and is of the opinion that the institutions concerned, in the interest of the successful operation, will need to be prepared to accept the principle of the introduction of a comprehensive system.

In the Chamber Committee on Finance, a number of fundamental amendments were adopted. First and foremost, we support the Minister’s position that a certain flexibility should be ⁇ ined in the composition of the CBF and the CDV, both for the appointed members among the members of the Board of Directors of the National Bank and for those from another institution. The established parity between the members of the Board of Directors of the National Bank of Belgium and those who come from outside prevents members elected from among the members of the Board of Directors of the National Bank of Belgium from forming a majority in the Board of Directors of the CBF and the CDV. Their

Furthermore, that parity will make it easier for the chairs of the institutions if they do not wish to use their decisive vote in the event of a vote strike.

The amendments also strengthened the role of the Secretary-General and thus clarified that the Secretary-General is charged with the administrative management of the services. The operational management of the services, on the other hand, is in the hands of the Management Committee, which takes its decisions collegially. These directors shall determine the tasks to be carried out by the staff members working under them. The Statute of the National Bank was also updated to make it clear that it is not a listed company like any other.

The acceptance of the aforementioned amendments has entirely resulted in the achievement of a balanced relationship between the National Bank, the CBF and the CDV. The proposed renewal, on the one hand, opts for renewal but, on the other hand, oversees the exercise of external supervision over the market undertakings to which adequate resources have been provided, which can adequately evolve with the developments identified at international level. Their

The VLD is convinced that the present texts provide the correct response to the challenges arising with regard to the developments in the financial markets and therefore supports both drafts.

Mr. Speaker, first and foremost, I would like to thank all groups — at least the groups that were present — for their good cooperation in the committee, as Mr. Tavernier has already said. I would like to thank all members of the committee, including the opposition, for their support. I have, for example, conducted many discussions with Mr Van Rompuy, which made it possible to draw up joint amendments. In this matter, it is a very good thing to ⁇ such a consensus.

I would like to thank Mr Vanvelthoven for his report. It is not easy to report on such an important reform.

I would like to clarify Article 48, §1, 6° of the law. In the first version of our text, a clarification was already included. The text "except for the President" is only a clarification. We continue with a new sentence to make the right reasoning. The chairman of the Supervisory Board, who may also be the chairman of the Management Committee, shall not advise on the appointment of the chairman, the Secretary-General and the other members of the Management Committee. That is normal. The President shall cooperate with the other members of the Management Committee and with the Secretary-General. Therefore, it is difficult for him to give advice during the appointment procedure. This clarification was already included in our original version of Article 48, §1, 6°. M is Give a echo to the resolution relating to money laundering. De toute évidence, nous allons nous acheminer dans cette voie tout et formulant deux remarques. First of all, I wish that the CETIF be associated with the examination of this proposal of resolution. Thus, the text that comes from the commission does not pose any problem to the CETIF which has been consulted on the amendments introduced and during the debate. Their

Furthermore, I can confirm that the bill transposing the latest directive on laundering will be continuously submitted to the government. I introduced the text for the Council of Ministers. At the entrance, we will organize this debate on the problem of money laundering and the transposition of European directives. I thank also Ms Moerman for her support in connection with several amendments, first in particular for a few new articles in connection with Nationale Bank van België. Het was possible met alle fractions — en dus ook met mevrouw Moerman — om met enkele amendementen verder te gaan. I think trouwens that it is possible is om, like in one amendment was asked in like also of Mr Tavernier it has said, verder te gaan in de direction van een echte fusie van CBF in CDV. Dat is nog niet rond en ik hoop dat er verder kan worden gegaan met een koninklijk besluit vóór 30 June 2003. This is a new step. I am theretoe bereid, but de regering moet in dat verband nog enkele beslissingen nemen vooraleer een ontwerp kan worden ingediend. In addition, the projects that are the subject of our work this afternoon were also discussed, this morning, in the Senate committee. This should lead us to a vote before the holidays! This seems to me important given the consensual nature of the reform, so that the new structures can be set up as soon as possible. We must now align ourselves with a number of developments which, of course, are not homogeneous in Europe. This was also said by mevrouw Moerman. It is not always an enig model. I think, however, that we meet our design of good direction outgaan. I hope there will be a vote in the House next week. Thus, we will be able, as soon as we return, to see these new institutions functioning in a collegial way. I would like to thank you, in any case, from now on, for the support provided by all the political groups present in the committee when considering this project.

Mr. Minister, before going to the discussion of the articles, I would like to ask you a few questions. by

In this document 1842/5, you have, after article 119, a chapter VI, which I find surprising on the legal level. I see it stipulated: “Article 120 (...). Article 121 (...)” and so on until Article 124. I know very well that this refers to document 1843 which, at a given time, takes over articles 120, 121, 122, 123 and 124. Then we have Chapter VII of Document 1842/5 which refers, in the same way, to Articles 125 to 128 of your other text of Document 1843/1.

I assume that once these two laws have been voted here and, if necessary, in the Senate, you will publish a coordinated text. For now, we are voting for a text that, graphically, has strange characteristics. by

Could you give us a brief explanation about these two texts?

Mr. Speaker, you know that in the evolution of the work of the House, we have now imagined to give a certain number of information, not only through project summaries, but also through coordinated texts. In this case, we have taken another step. During discussions with the State Council, it emerged that it was necessary to work on the basis of a bicameral text on one side and monocameral text on the other. But, the two texts moving together, it was planned to present already to parliament the structure such that it will be coordinated of what was actually the banking law, on the one hand, and the law on the Banking and Financial Commission, on the other. by

The text submitted to you will obviously be the subject of a coordinated document covering all the articles of the second project, at the locations of Chapters VI and VII, as they are provided here.

Could I suggest the following? When these texts are voted here, sent back to the Senate, then voted in the Senate and subject to royal sanction, we will have two separate laws. Normally, these laws enter into force only after publication in the Moniteur belge. I read on each of these texts the mention: "The King shall fix the date of entry into force of each of the provisions of this law." So, at first glance, you should publish in the Belgian Moniteur the two laws as voted. And then, through a royal decree of coordination, the two laws will need to be merged. Is that your intention?

Certainly Mr President. And if I am not mistaken, Article 147 allows this coordination. We will therefore have the possibility, by decision, to review all the numbering. The aim is, of course, to bring about a single legislation on the supervision of financial markets. The two-chamber chapters should therefore be incorporated into the coordinated legislation.

But this law already provides for the coordination technique, in its article 147, including for the numbering of provisions.

We are fully agreed. I read well, in article 146: "The King may change the terminology..." and "The King may coordinate the provisions of chapters VI and VII." This is another law.

Absolutely at all.