Proposition 50K0897

Projet de loi modifiant diverses dispositions en ce qui concerne le parquet fédéral.

General information ¶

Authors

Ecolo Vincent Decroly
Groen Fauzaya Talhaoui
MR Jacqueline Herzet, Charles Michel
Open Vld Hugo Coveliers
PS | SP Thierry Giet
Vooruit Fred Erdman

Submission date

Oct. 12, 2000

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

public prosecutor's department judicial power criminal procedure use of languages

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen Ecolo PS | SP Open Vld MR

Abstained from voting

CD&V LE N-VA FN VB

Party dissidents ¶

• Alfons Borginon (Open Vld) abstained from voting.
• Richard Fournaux (MR) abstained from voting.
• Karel Pinxten (Open Vld) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

March 14, 2001 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, Colleagues, the Justice Committee has devoted 9 meetings to the discussion of the bill on the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. In order to enable the members of the committee to make informed decisions on the introduction of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, hearing was held, among other things, with Mr Schins, Attorney General at the Court of Appeal and Chairman of the College of Attorneys General, and with Mr Dejemeppe. Mr Brammertz and Mrs Coninckx, national magistrates, were also invited. The vote on the proposal and the report took place on Tuesday 6 March.

This proposal is a result of the various Parliamentary Investigative Committees, which have repeatedly identified a lack of coordination in the handling of complex dossiers or dossiers with a cross-border character. The findings of these investigative committees showed the need for a central level for the handling of certain criminal cases. Specifically, it was intended to combat terrorist acts, theft of nuclear material, human trafficking, international arms trade and crimes against humanity. Important and new is that in these files the federal prosecutor can himself proceed to the exercise of the criminal action. However, this competence is subsidiary to the competence of the ordinary public prosecutor. This means that the federal prosecutor can only pursue the criminal action if this is an added value for the file. Their

The federal prosecutor is also responsible for coordinating the execution of the criminal action, facilitating international cooperation and exercising the supervision of the federal police. It is important to note that this proposal is a further development of the so-called octopus law which included the establishment of a federal prosecutor’s office.

The Federal Prosecutor is assisted by 18 federal magistrates and 40 administrative powers. Furthermore, the federal prosecutor may, if he considers it necessary, appeal to local prosecutors for a specific investigation. Local prosecutors who possess specific knowledge of an investigation may be deployed to the federal prosecutor’s office. This delegation is always carried out in consultation with the Corps Commander. The local prosecutor shall be under the direction of the federal prosecutor for the duration of his mandate. In addition, a pool of local prosecutor judges will be established to which the federal prosecutor may appeal as a priority.

The Federal Prosecutor is directly under the authority of the Minister of Justice. General supervision is exercised by the College of Attorneys-General. This college will evaluate the federal prosecutor annually. Furthermore, the federal prosecutor is bound by the college’s policy decisions. The fact that the federal prosecutor is under the direct authority of the Minister of Justice does not mean in any way that the minister can exercise a negative injunction right.

Many members participated in the discussion of the bill. Without pretending to be complete, I would like to give a summary overview of the arguments. Mr JeanJacques Viseur expressed the position of the PSC. He pointed out the problem of competitive powers. He wondered if it was not opportune to assign the college of prosecutors-general a sort of arbitrator role. He also had questions about the control of the federal prosecutor’s office.

The Chairman replicated that there was no arrangement for any form of arbitration, because it was feared that the procedure would otherwise become too logical and would last too long. One of the reasons for the establishment of a federal prosecutor’s office is just the provision of a quick procedure.

The Flemish Bloc had a number of questions for the minister about the timing and the resources allocated to the federal prosecutor’s office. It also expressed a number of concerns about possible conflicts of competence. The PS noted that its party considers the fight against organized crime as a priority. The future Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office therefore seemed to Mr. Gillet a suitable instrument for this. However, he wanted to point out the danger of excessive powers for the federal prosecutor’s office. He called for a clear definition of those powers. Mr Van Parys considered the establishment of a federal prosecutor’s office an absolute necessity. However, he believed that other initiatives should also be taken. He was especially concerned about the too powerful position of the future federal prosecutor and any abuses that could result from it. The federal prosecutor must be able to conduct criminal proceedings on his own, but it must be able to conduct a sound control. It was missing, according to the same speaker.

Then Mr Van Parys had a number of questions about the position of the federal prosecutor at the Public Prosecutor’s Office. For example, he advocated giving the federal prosecutor the same powers as the first-instance prosecutors, but providing a list of a number of powers that would prioritize the federal prosecutor. On behalf of the VU&ID group, Mr Van Hoorebeke emphasized the need for a federal prosecutor’s office. Nevertheless, he also had questions about the direct criminal action that the federal prosecutor can initiate. He feared conflicts of power with other parks. Finally, he called for a consensual control, and he saw a role played by Parliament.

Mr. Erdman, co-contributor of the bill, said following the many questions and comments that all the norms and rules of the judiciary of course also apply to the federal prosecutor. In particular, he would like to point out that the new Article 144ter of the Judicial Code must be read together with Article 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It states that any government that becomes aware of a certain crime must immediately report it to the King’s Prosecutor. This also applies to the federal prosecutor. Both will decide who will bring the criminal action.

Mrs Herzet of the PRL pointed out the need for the establishment of a federal prosecutor’s office, a need clearly addressed in the conclusions of various parliamentary investigation committees and also contained in the Act of 22 December 1998 on the vertical integration of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and the King’s council of prosecutors. This law was passed during the previous legislature, and the current bill is nothing more than a further refinement of it, according to Ms. Herzet. However, the speaker believed that the bill was still subject to a number of improvements. For instance, she found that the bill did not contain a closing arrangement for possible abuses by a Minister of Justice. The proposal also laid down no arrangement for the relations between the federal prosecutor and the college of prosecutors-general.

I will not repeat the position of the VLD here. For this reason, I will refer to the remarks of colleague Coveliers later. The Minister replicated that with regard to the institutional profile of the future federal prosecutor, it was already encouraged during the discussions between the then Prime Minister and the College of Attorneys-General to place the federal prosecutor under the direct authority of the Minister of Justice. The current legislation simply adopted this idea. In addition, the Minister pointed out that there could not be a negative injunction right for the Minister of Justice at all. He also clarified that the Minister of Justice cannot simply assign a specific case to the federal prosecutor if he considers that it would be more competent to do so than a King’s prosecutor of a specific prosecutor’s office.

Regarding the competence, the Minister pointed out the main change, in particular the fact that the federal prosecutor can initiate the criminal action himself. The other powers are those exercised by the national magistrates to date, namely the coordination of prosecutions and international cooperation.

Many members had questions regarding the limitation of the powers of the federal prosecutor and expressed their fears of the emergence of conflicts of powers between the local prosecutors and the federal prosecutor. The Minister pointed out the existence of the mutual information obligation between these prosecutors. The King’s Prosecutor is therefore obliged to inform the Federal Prosecutor if he is notified of a crime within the competence of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. In turn, the federal prosecutor is obliged to inform the King’s prosecutor if this is necessary for the criminal proceedings.

As for the resources, reference was made to the discussion of the 2000 budget. The funds were calculated for a period of eight months, as the Federal Prosecutor’s Office is assumed to be operational from 1 April 2001.

Last week, the Justice Committee adopted the bill with nine votes for and six abstentions.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, the CVP group is, for various reasons, a party asking for the urgent establishment of a federal prosecutor’s office that can become operational as soon as possible. The first reason is that a federal prosecutor’s office is necessary if we want to enable an efficient approach to organized crime. In this regard, I refer, by the way, to the recommendations of the Parliamentary Investigative Committee Bende-bis. Following the enormous coordination problems identified in this file, the proposal was formulated to establish a federal prosecutor’s office. I think we can even claim copyright in this regard. Furthermore, I refer to the conclusions and recommendations of the Dutroux Commission of Inquiry and many files we have seen in relation to hormone crime and organized crime. The need for a cross-border approach to organized crime has been felt repeatedly.

A second reason why a federal prosecutor’s office is urgently needed lies in the fact that we must install a counterweight with the federal prosecutor’s office against the federal police that is slowly becoming operational. This is especially true because we find that Parliament is actually out of play with regard to the functioning of the federal police. We have no control over the use of the resources as the majority, following the budget discussion, has given a mandate to the government to dispose of the resources for the federal police. Parliament also has no view of this because the external control of Committee P threatens to disappear. The draft decisions concerning the inspection general of the federal police are intended to replace the Committee P. The reports I hear about this are ⁇ disturbing. So there is no or only a weakened control of the Committee-P on the federal police. I will return to that later. There is also no control over the capacity, the people who will be made available to the federal police and the federal prosecutor’s office. Therefore, there is not only a need for parliamentary control, but also for the supervision of the federal police by the magistrate. That was, by the way, the Leitmotiv of the recommendations of the Commission-Dutroux in which we stated that the federal police should come under the authority of the magistrates. That is the only solution. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office must be the opponent of the federal police.

For these reasons, our group has taken a very constructive stance from the outset, despite the fact that we were not involved in the preparation and submission of this proposal. We enabled quick treatment, despite the exclusion of which our group was the victim. We provided quorum at very specific times when we determined that some co-contributors were barely interested in this discussion. I look especially in the direction of the representatives of Agalev and Ecolo.

What we did is that in the discussion the majority and the minister faced a number of fundamental discussion points on the basis of which we feel that the federal prosecutor’s office, as it is now proposed by the majority, actually carries huge risks. I will go into it a little deeper.

The first problem is the problem of the omnipotence of the federal prosecutor and the federal prosecutor. The federal prosecutor actually monopolizes knowledge and power. After all, he has the monopoly on the information and has as the only right of initiation in the delicate and important files related to crime and organized crime in our country. That all power, colleagues, holds on very important powers. The federal prosecutor decides on the exercise of the criminal action and has an exclusive position in judicial information management. He becomes the chairman of the audit body for information management and will oversee that information management. In addition, he holds a key position in international cooperation and international exchange of information. Finally, he has a key position in overseeing the federal police. He also presides over the body which supervises the General Directorate of the Judicial Police.

Against those considerable powers and omnipotence—knowledge and power are centralized in one person—is a ⁇ great lack of control and supervision. The Federal Prosecutor is not subject to the supervision of the College of Prosecutors General, at least with regard to individual files, as the College will only exercise a posteriori supervision based on the annual report, the information of the Federal Prosecutor itself.

The only person who can exercise supervision over the federal prosecutor is the Minister of Justice. That federal prosecutor is under the direct authority and direction of the Minister of Justice. It is obvious that the supervision of the Minister of Justice does not extend to individual dossiers, since the Minister of Justice does not have to engage with individual dossiers in view of the separation of powers. In other words, with regard to individual files, no one will exercise control and supervision over the federal prosecutor’s office and the federal prosecutor’s office.

This is a very striking finding, which involves various risks. I will address this in my presentation. There is indeed a double risk in one of the key phases of an investigation, in particular when the federal prosecutor decides what to do with the information in his possession before the investigation or judicial investigation begins. At this stage, there is no control and supervision. At that moment, the federal prosecutor is lord and master. I dare to say very formally that one will never be able to find out whether the federal prosecutor has done nothing with certain information. No one will have any sight of it, and therefore will not have an eye on it.

On the contrary, it is stated that the federal prosecutor is ⁇ lonely, that he stands alone. This was also evident from the hearing with the national magistrates: the federal prosecutor has no possibility of sharing this information or his responsibility with anyone concerning important information in a sensitive file. In delicate files, it is important to have a sound board from time to time, to know which direction to go in the matter.

There is another risk that arises due to the exclusive authority of the Minister of Justice: our powerlessness in the case of collusion, our powerlessness in the case of a negative injunction by the Minister of Justice. Everyone agrees that a negative injunction law by the Minister of Justice is not acceptable.

I dare to say without hesitation that the current structure of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office allows it, under certain circumstances, never to come up with an Agusta file. I will go deeper into this later, following a concrete dossier.

Mr. Minster, I believe that the exclusive and direct authority of the Minister of Justice also involves risks for the Minister himself because he will be directly politically responsible. He will no longer be able to refer to the College of General Prosecutors or the individual prosecutors as is now the case when he is questioned about specific or sensitive cases. I will give a concrete example that perfectly illustrates the impossible position the Minister of Justice could end up in. Last week we heard in the press that there are not sufficiently specialized people available for the fight against financial crime in the Lernout and Hauspie file. If the investigation judge determines that there are not sufficient specialists available to properly conduct the file, it will inevitably consult the federal prosecutor in order to determine how the capacity problem can be resolved. This should already be the case for the magistrate who oversees the police services. This will also be the case for the future federal prosecutor. In the event that the federal prosecutor fails to find a solution to the problem due to a shortage of personnel responsible for financial crimes, the responsibility of the Minister of Justice will be immediately addressed. The Minister of Justice will no longer be able to refer an interpellation to the College of Prosecutors-General or the Prosecutor.

If he is interrogated on this subject, the Minister of Justice shall no longer be able to say that the College or the Attorney General, whom he has interrogated on this subject, has informed him of the following. He will no longer be able to refer to the decision of the intermediary. Therefore, the Minister of Justice himself will face new problems.

This does not change the deontology or political responsibility of the Minister. He will be able to say that he interrogated the federal prosecutor about this, while he now says that he interrogated the College of Prosecutors General. It is not because they are with their five that they are worth more. So it remains exactly the same.

Mr. Coveliers, the major difference is this: in the current, classical system, the King’s Prosecutor in a judicial investigation or in an investigative investigation can turn to the College or to the Prosecutors-General for a problem such as capacity. In the new arrangement, the interim body of the College is no longer present, because the federal prosecutor, faced with a problem of capacity — he exercises the criminal action himself from — will no longer be able to fall back on the prosecutor general or on the College.

Let me clarify this by taking an actual example. There are currently too few financial specialists to staff and the research team-Lernout & Hauspie and conduct other major financial judicial investigations, such as the KBLux file. Well, as soon as a problem of lack of capacity arises, the minister comes into a ⁇ difficult parquet — the word parquet is in place here. After all, he will have to choose at a certain point where manpower should be prioritized. In fact, he is directly involved in an individual file. It will then be possible to blame him for giving priority either to the KBLux file or to the Learning & Hauspie file. This is the situation in which one threatens to be prosecuted, because there is no intermediate phase between the federal prosecutor and the Minister of Justice.

Mr. Van Parys, there have been a lot of questions asked to the Minister here in the Chamber, however, why the one or the other investigation did not progress. So there is no difference. Until now, the College of Prosecutors-General has taken the decisions and the Minister has also been addressed!

Mr. Coveliers, you know the situation perfectly. When we now question the Minister of Justice about an ongoing investigation, it is an investigation led by the King’s Prosecutor or the investigation judge in the case of a judicial investigation. At that point, the Minister of Justice has the opportunity to simply refer to the intermediary between the Prosecutor of the King and the Minister of Justice, in particular the Prosecutor General. He can tell us what the Attorney General has told him. He may also say that the Attorney General has taken a position in this regard and that he cannot say much more about it, because it belongs to the secret of the investigation or because the separation of powers must be respected. However, if the federal prosecutor deals with a delicate file, the Minister of Justice will no longer be able to appeal to that intermediary body, as it no longer exists. In the event of difficulties in the investigation, he will have to take a position on this and can at least be held directly liable.

The big problem is that there is no longer any intersection between the person responsible for the investigation, on the one hand, and the Minister of Justice, on the other. The absence of this intermediate shot in the form of the College of Attorneys-General or the Attorneys-General individually is, in my opinion, a major gap. We have been warned about this, and that is precisely why we have submitted an amendment. We were also initially of the opinion that there should be a direct authority of the Minister of Justice. All the opinions given on this subject — the College of Prosecutors General, the Board of Prosecutors, the national magistrates, the Council of State and the High Council of Justice — have made clear to us the risks existing in terms of possible political influence on the most important and sensitive files.

Colleagues, the objections we have have been reinforced by the temporary appointment of the magistrate responsible for overseeing the General Directorate of the Judicial Police of the Federal Police. He is the legal predecessor of the federal prosecutor. The way this has happened shows that our objections in reality already exist. The purely political appointment of this magistrate by the Council of Ministers and not by the Minister of Justice — the appointment was to be an expression of a political consensus — outside the High Council for Justice — despite the fact that all appointments in the meantime can only be made on the proposal of that High Council — and against the profile that the High Council for Justice had drawn up, has made us clear that there was more going on in this case. This man should and will become the federal prosecutor.

In the course of the debate, I have never been able to get rid of the impression that this is a false debate because everything was already decided. The tear was thrown and I can provide you with the proof of my thesis. In the second parliamentary investigation committee on the Bande van Nijvel, I was able to hear from Mr. Giet’s mouth that the Socialist Party was a fundamental opponent of the federal prosecutor’s office. The fundamental objections were related to the concentration of power, the threat of a lack of supervision and the powers of this federal prosecutor. All these objections, however, disappeared at the moment when it was known who would become the federal prosecutor. We were then able to determine what political signature this federal prosecutor was.

The proof of my position lies also in the total absence of the PS in this debate. It doesn’t interest them because they have the prey inside. They have the right man in the right place. In specific circumstances, one will be able to influence important and delicate files at any given moment.

I do not blame the Minister of Justice at this time. He has my full confidence in this regard. However, problems can arise in this structure when the Minister of Justice and the Federal Prosecutor play under one hat.Sensitive judicial files, in which no judicial investigation has taken place, can be politically influenced, all this without having any possibility to find out what is really going on. The system carries the germ of an incredible perversity with regard to the objective course of a judicial investigation.

My next objection arises from the conclusion that at the moment there is not enough qualified police personnel to allow this federal prosecutor’s office to function properly. Within the framework of the octopus laws, the new laws on the integrated police, we had decided from our past findings, when often qualified people were lacking for judicial assignments, that by law would be determined annually how many people are available for the judicial assignments. This was actually our guarantee that a reserved part of the federal police was available for important judicial files. This is regulated by article 106 of the law on the integrated police. This law stipulates that from 1 January 2000 this must be stipulated by law.

We note that until today, March 2001, there is no law which establishes the minimum part, the reserve of the federal police, in such a way that there is certainty of sufficient capacity. We cannot accept this. This law has been adopted here by a majority in the House and in practice nothing is right. It was not intended at all to guarantee sufficient capacity for judicial contracts, in the absence of fulfillment of the legislation that we have approved here. I refer to Article 106 of the Law on Integrated Police.

Of course, what Mr. Van Parys says is correct. It is necessary to determine what capacity will be granted to the research. Therefore, it is automatically known which capacity is available for the rest. The problem is that one cannot determine this at the moment as long as the various police councils and police colleges in the local area have not filled that research need. I assume that one will not only determine a research capacity from the perspective of the federal police. It is, of course, also true that one should clarify what one understands under this research capacity. There are a number of scientific functions and a number of logistic functions; at the federal police there is the training one cannot count on. You are right and I will not deny that a determination of this capacity is necessary. I just want to show that there are a whole set of factors that are currently not sufficiently filled in to determine that capacity.

Mr. Speaker, it is true that Article 106 stipulated that this capacity had to be fixed on 1 January 2000. This shows once again that in laws data must be relativized in the context in which they are drawn up. It was intended that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office would also be launched on 1 January 2000. What does it mean now, except for what I would call the intellectual approach to the problem? It may have psychological effects within the body. If one indicates today how many people will be at the disposal of a currently non-existent parquet, one immediately causes unrest within a corps that is now only in construction.

Where is the error? I give it to you Grif. The error is that we attached a date to Article 106 and that is 1 January 2000.

I come to my second comment. Mr Van Parys knows very well what I also emphasized in the committee. If we can complete this legislation, after approval by the Senate, after publication and including the implementing decisions attached to it, after the profiles to be drawn by the Supreme Council, after the procedure for nomination and nomination, then we are at least nine months ahead. Personally, I am prepared to eventually consider a formulation that states that once the law has been adopted but actually needs to be implemented, Article 106 would eventually be amended. On the day the federal prosecutor is appointed, a law should determine which police investigation should be made available. There is logic in it. Nowadays, we are actually between a ship and a cage. You are right by making a formal analysis of Article 106, but you are wrong in practice because of course there was a finality associated with it, namely the launch of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office with a capacity that was necessary to ⁇ the goal.

Let me start with this interesting debate. I do not agree with Mr. Coveliers and Mr. Erdman. This capacity is pretended to be necessary only in the context of the establishment of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. However, this capacity is also needed today, at a time when there is no federal parliament at all. Also today, there is a need for sufficient capacity for judicial contracts. This gives the impression of being in a transitional phase, without important judicial files, without delicate judicial assignments. It is believed that once the Federal Prosecutor’s Office is there, one must have that capacity. The reality is different, Mr. Erdman.

Mr. Coveliers, I will give you a concrete example, in particular the organized crime from Eastern Europe. Suppose that one is aware of the enormous risks arising from organized crime in this country being widespread and embedded in a number of key functions in our society in the economic life. What do we say about capacity? The cell in Brussels to deal with organized crime from Eastern Europe consists of two people: an ex-GPP who is now sick because he has so often insisted on additional resources without getting them, and an ex-BOB who we have met several times in the Commission-Dutroux, Mr Decroly, a certain René Michaux. This is the cell in Brussels, Mr. Coveliers, who deals with organized crime from Eastern Europe. Then you are going to say here that we can still quietly wait until the Federal Prosecutor’s Office is there, and then see how we organize the capacity. This statement is a light-sensitive statement. Their

After all, Article 106 existed not only for the benefit of the federal prosecutor’s office, but with the intention of reserving a minimum portion of the capacity of the federal police as soon as it would perform judicial tasks. And, believe me, there are many judicial assignments that require capacity.

Mr. Speaker, in order to safeguard the historical correctness and to ensure that no wrong consequences are drawn, I would like to say the following.

Mr Van Parys, the fact that the cell for the fight against the Russian organised crime in Brussels is indeed only very moderately manned is due to the existence of a ⁇ well-functioning and solid cell in the decentralized services of the federal police, which, by the way, is excellently managed by a prosecutor whom you know ⁇ well, in particular Mr Van Lysebeth who performs brilliantly in Antwerp.

It is in Antwerp!

That is where the problem lies, and I come to it.

What sense does it have to determine the capacity of the federal investigation at the moment, while one does not even know where the various cells are located? That is what it comes to.

That is where the problem really lies.

Currently, the available persons have been made available for the investigation that is underway on the basis of some concrete data in Antwerp. This, however, means that for all other initiatives to be taken to combat organised crime from Eastern Europe, one has at least two persons, one of whom is sick. We were able to assess the service capabilities of the others following the Dutroux Commission of Inquiry. Today, Ms. Herzet, the organized crime cell in Brussels is headed by René Michaux. That is the conclusion of the story that we wrote together, but for which we do not want to take responsibility in this.

I now come to my conclusion. The CVP group will abstain from voting on the proposal establishing a federal prosecutor’s office. On the one hand, we are convinced that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office needs to be established urgently in order to effectively tackle organized crime, but on the other hand, we have some fundamental concerns about its establishment. In this regard, I repeat that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office carries immense risks, due to the concentration of knowledge and power in one hand, due to the lack of control and supervision and due to the direct authority of the Minister of Justice. The result is that structural political influence in the exercise of criminal prosecution in sensitive files becomes uncontrollable and thus possible. Therefore, we will not approve this bill.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, I would like to express today the disappointment of the PSC over the adoption of the draft law on the Federal Prosecutor’s Office.

Disappointment because, as you know, we have actively participated in the Octopus group and, as my CVP colleague said, and like you, we always wanted and wish for the establishment of a federal prosecutor’s office. In our opinion, this was the only way to decouple the various prosecutors in order to face an increasingly organized crime outside our borders, a global crime in the face of which the different prosecutors became increasingly inoperative due to their compartimentation. by

We are disappointed with the method. Indeed, we have never decreed to leave the Octopus in matters of justice. We would have appreciated being at least involved in the negotiations and discussions on the choices made to reach this bill. In advance, we might have been able to use our various objections more effectively, quite close to those that have just been expressed by my CVP colleague. by

This disappointment over the method and outcome is based on five major reasons: - the problem of the federal prosecutor's omnipotence; - the problem of the federal prosecutor's dependence, on certain points, on the executive, in particular the Minister of Justice; - the risk of pillaging the prosecutors of instance, in terms of means or persons sought to accompany this federal prosecutor; - the low overall progress in either the absence of an investigative jurisdiction at the federal level or the lack of means to ⁇ better cohesion at the level of a federal inquiry; - finally, the different implications for the federal police.

These are the five main objections to the project.

First, as regards the omnipotence of the federal prosecutor, without paraphrasing what has already been said, we share the same concerns when we find its competence in the field of information management, its competence — subject to caution, in our view — of right of initiative in the field of public action, its important role in the very large cases of international coordination. by

Especially with regard to individual cases, we can only regret the absence of any control of this federal prosecutor who will become an omnipotent personality in our country, which does not correspond to our idea of a rule of law or our idea of a democracy, where powers need to be independent from each other but controlled by each other. by

In addition to the development of the Committee P, I regret, among other things, the rejection of our draft special police commission. We have repeatedly asked, as provided by the Octopus Agreement and Mr. Van Outryve recalled it well recently in a master exhibition given in a university—the creation of a special police commission at the House level; the idea has never been accepted. Nevertheless, this commission could become one of the most precise means of monitoring the reform of the police, without constantly partitioning the judicial implications and the implications of the Interior, exclusively dealt with at the level of the Interior Committee.

In particular, we regret that all the amendments we had submitted to ensure that this federal prosecutor is, in any way, under the control of the College of General Prosecutors – in the absence of specialized judicial control – have been rejected. These amendments were moderate and subscribed to a better rule of law. We therefore consider them appropriate, which is why we will submit them again.

Along with this lack of control and the risk of omnipotence of a personality that, if its appointment is politized, risks to profoundly disrupt our democratic mechanisms, we also deplore the risk of dependence of the federal prosecutor in other types of sectors. I think that mr. Van Parys spoke about the risk of confusion of interests. We know from experience that this can happen quite often. We regret that there is a risk of this federal prosecutor being dependent on the executive and, more specifically, on the Minister of Justice, whether he acts as a representative of the executive or on a personal basis. This is not healthy at all and, there too, we should have obtained better control to allow a screen between the executive and the judiciary. It is also not healthy for the Minister of Justice not even to have better thought about this control and an interface between the role of the executive, the Minister of Justice and the federal prosecutor.

Furthermore, with regard to this problem of control and omnipotence, we persist in thinking that it was neither happy nor appropriate to give so quickly such an important power to this federal prosecutor’s office, in particular with regard to how to exercise public action autonomously. We had submitted equally moderate amendments to demand that there be at least an evaluation of the implementation of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, its functioning and, after completion, to consider increasing its competence in a substantial and major way. We would like to have an evaluation period of 5 years, or even 3 years. Again, the various amendments we had submitted were rejected. In a slightly too easy and precipitated way, the power of a prosecutor who has not yet taken up his duties and of whom it is still unknown how he will exercise them. We will not yet be able to assess the risks of omnipotence compared to other highly substantial missions.

The third point that we reproach to this bill is the risk of “plundering” or the way some court prosecutors could be empty, either from their men or from their affairs in general. As regards the affairs, it is to be feared, given the lack of precision of the hypotheses in which the federal prosecutor exercises public instruction, that the Federal Prosecutor's Office chooses to grant itself the most beautiful, the most important dossiers and that it leaves the pieces to the prosecutors of instance. It seems to me that such a behavior of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office risks to lead to a dismotivation that is never very favourable to the effectiveness of the various court prosecutors. This creates confidence among the different types of parquets. If one wanted to settle the war between police offices, I would not want that, by this, one would organize a new war between different police offices. This is not a negligible risk and it would not be healthy to arrive at this case.

There is another point that we regret in this bill: at the level of principles, we regret that the federal prosecutor’s office remains able to define itself and without objective control, its own competences.

There is no arbitration in case of conflict. There is no authority that will be able, apart from itself, to determine its own competence. However, during my studies in law, I have always learned that it is not healthy for an authority to define its own competences alone and without control.

Colleague Milquet, I think there is a wrong nuance in your judgment. Their

You say that he can determine his own powers. I think that is wrong. If you said that the federal prosecutor can set his own priorities, I would give you partly the right, because he can do so in accordance with his task and on the basis of the criminal policy, which is also determined by the prosecutors-general. He must also follow that policy, because he will be inspected annually by those conscious prosecutors-general. Do you not think that your judgment on your own authority is actually not correct?

In the end, it is still he who has the last word on how he decides to launch his public action initiative.

This does not determine its competence. He determines at most a priority, which he can temporarily set. You should bear in mind that at the same time the local prosecutor will be able to continue working on a number of matters that the federal prosecutor does not deal with. As a result, that contradiction will not be as strong as you now anticipate, at least with most prosecutors. There are always exceptions. We will see them again, probably not so far from here.

I realize that the border remains confusing and that, even when deciding priorities, it is inevitably an indirect way to define your action plan. I think the risk remains quite real in this matter. by

Regarding the problem of human resources, it is regrettable that there is no limit to the power of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office to come and draw from the staff of the prosecutors of instance. We proposed a maximum quota of 25%. This was not accepted. Nevertheless, it is a path to which we may have to go later, when we realize that we were right and that it will ⁇ be appropriate to set limits. It is a shame that this has not been envisaged in the text because we risk, in a somewhat larval way, to empty the parquets of instance of their effectiveness. In the end, the Federal Prosecutor will have the last word in this matter. This is a risk that we regret. We had suggested paths that were not excessive but they were not followed.

We now have a federal police and soon we will have a federal prosecutor’s office. It would have been logical – ⁇ within a certain period of time because it would not have been appropriate to do so directly since it is expensive; observations have already been made on this subject – that the text provides for a certain “federalization” of instruction. It would have been necessary to find the means to allow the Federal Prosecutor’s Office to find interlocutors among the magistrates of instruction of the various instances. Despite our amendments, we have not found in the text a start of track in this regard. If our amendment had been accepted, we could have allowed the various presidents to draw up a list of investigative magistrates to whom the federal prosecutor could have addressed. This was done for the members of the prosecutors but not for the judges of instruction.

The last objection, Mr. Van Parys expressed it very well, it is obvious that the omnipotence of the federal prosecutor’s office and the lack of control over it will inevitably have a link with the control of the federal police. We had demanded at the time that sufficient control be exercised over the judiciary. But, according to the text, it is the federal prosecutor who will have both the powers in terms of information management and control over all judicial functions of the federal police. The criticism that we have already issued may affect how the federal police will evolve. We regret that, on this point, there has not been provided sufficient guard.

Madame Milquet, if you allow it, Mr. Erdogan would like to intervene.

Madame, if my memory serves me, we voted, you and I, the law of December 22, 1998, which already provided that the federal prosecutor would control this police. And at that time, it was clearly planned that it was under the authority of the Minister of Justice. No one reacted then, asking for shelters, possibly an intermediate structure, to preserve the Minister of Justice from untimely reactions. At the time, we unanimously accepted this structure that you now question.

No, we do not question it. Certainly, we all agreed and the request was precisely aimed at strengthening judicial control over the police. The Octopus agreements have not been discussed and examined in depth, but this text has nevertheless been decided later. Our principle was to put a person in power but who is nevertheless controlled.

The law of 22 December 1998 clearly stipulated who was under the authority of the Minister of Justice and who exercised control of the police services. So the structure as presented today, which is actually a refinement and a much more precise determination of skills, possibly of the operational order, does not change anything to the principles set at that date.

But the clarity was not made with regard to, for example, the relations with the College of Prosecutors General. So when it is specified that "the College of Prosecutors General takes guidelines that are applicable to it," for us, it was obvious that the College of Prosecutors General had its word to say, but we didn't really discuss it in depth at the time. by

So this is not an expectation of a philosophy change, because a phrase did not necessarily mean that the federal prosecutor would find himself with such power and so far without any direct or indirect control link with the college of general prosecutors. So, in our minds, we heard it. Furthermore, none of the sentences of the text prevented that it was at any time under direct or indirect control of the College of Attorneys-General. by

It is for these five main reasons that we participate in the goal. As much as we are convinced that this federal prosecutor’s office should be put on the ground as soon as possible, as much as we think that the way we have proceeded is disappointing. Therefore, we will not be able to support the text as it is drafted. On the other hand, we will support the goal as we originally formulated it.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, when I listened to the ⁇ interesting arguments of Mrs. Milquet and Mr. Van Parys, I had to reconsider history. There is a French proverb that says “one reform calls always one counter-reform”.

When one speaks of renewal in the field of justice, one immediately gets a unification of forces. Everyone prays, begs and demands changes and renewal, but not in their own field! In the light of the renewal of the House of Justice, it would be good that this adagium and this attitude be adjusted.

I thought about it, Madame Milquet, when at some point you used the term “plundering” that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office could exercise in relation to the prosecutors. You didn’t say it explicitly in these terms, but I’m convinced that you were thinking of beautiful affairs that would go to the federal prosecutor’s office, while the poor little parks would only have fun with bits. by

Sorry, but I know only things that need to be clarified as soon as possible. And I only have to do good business and good business. What matters to me is efficiency.

This is also the definition I give of judicial cases. For me, there is no priority depending on the importance of media or other. However, this is not necessarily the reasoning of everyone. by

If you became a federal prosecutor, I would have all my consolations, Mr. Erdman. But I fear that unfortunately, it is not someone of the same size as you who will be chosen in the end and that, therefore, the risk is real.

Given the profile drawn by the Higher Council, I no longer meet the criteria.

Colleague Van Parys, I have witnessed your constructive attitude during the discussion of the bill. You know that I have made a more timid attempt not to restrict the proposal to the majority. The majority put a position in a proposal. Your position does not fully match our proposal. I will return to this later.

Mr. Van Parys, you are so honest to say that the Christian Democrats, although after the various investigative committees they have cooperated in the creation of the Octopus Act of 22 December 1998, at this time want to introduce a correction to the principles that were enshrined in the law of 22 December 1998 and want to introduce an intermediate shot of control. This control was not included in the law of 22 December. We agree on that.

In no case – this point was clearly negotiated in the octopus discussions – we wanted to appoint a sixth Attorney General. We also did not want to appoint a 28th Attorney of the King. Therefore, a sui generis structure had to be developed that is a little disturbing for those who encapsulate themselves in the existing structure of the prosecutor’s office. Ham question is what the place of the federal prosecutor’s office is in the structure of the prosecutor’s office. That’s all.

The rest is a technical issue, whether or not to accept additional powers.

Colleague Van Parys, your reaction on the omnipotence of the prosecutor’s office surprises me frankly. It may be a lapsus in your mind. Do we agree that all the other aspects we talked about, and for which even amendments were submitted, are technical aspects? More essential than all this is what is the place of the parquet general in the entire structure.

Colleague Van Parys, the omnipotence, a concept that you repeatedly put forward as a deterrent, shows that the federal prosecutor can take initiatives or decisions without any control. This, however, is a negation of the structure of the procedural approach. I can still follow you in part if you say that the federal prosecutor has a lot of decision-making power when initiating an investigation. However, I do not dare to put my hand in the fire for the selection made by the current parquet between whether or not to start a particular investigation. Day after day, we are faced with verbal processes that don’t have any further effect, ⁇ because one doesn’t prioritize it, or maybe because of lack of capabilities, or maybe for some other reason. I can still follow you somewhat if you say that no one monitors the right of initiation of the prosecutor in individual files. Conformity with the general policy is, on the other hand, sufficiently guaranteed by Article 143bis, by the guidelines of the College of Attorneys-General and by the assessment of their application carried out by that College.

Colleague Van Parys, you cannot contradict that stakeholders, the victims, for example, can already take initiatives today that can pull the federal prosecutor out of any inertia. Anyone, even in matters falling within the competence of the Attorney General, can take the initiative by becoming a civil party in a case and initiating an investigation. Any injured party can now inquire about the state of affairs, even at the stage of the preliminary investigation. Everyone has the right to information. The law-Franchimont contains the guarantees for this. Information can be obtained, regardless of the further procedural approach, from the moment that any measure requires the intervention of an investigative judge. From that point on, there is a possibility of control by the investigative judge concerned, and ipso facto there is a possibility of control by the Chamber of Accusation on all investigative acts resulting from it, without prejudice to the control of all subsequent acts of the public prosecution exercised by the headquarters. I would almost say that all these acts are abundantly tested for possible nullities.

So do not exaggerate, colleague Van Parys. Per ⁇ your conclusion about the omnipotence and possible orientation of an investigation is inspired by the innovative approach to the action of the prosecutor’s office?

Mr. Speaker, the problem arises in the phase that precedes the investigation or judicial investigation. After all, this is the moment when the federal prosecutor must determine a direction for the information he has at his disposal. Unlike ordinary parquets, these are the most delicate files that can have far-reaching judicial and political consequences.

Mr. Speaker of the Commission, we may have different opinions on the intersection of the College of Attorneys-General. However, what I do not understand, even from the viewpoint of the majority, is that one does not accept that the supervision of the college is not based solely on the annual report of the federal prosecutor, which is only a posteriori. Therefore, we have submitted an amendment so that that intersection of the College will not be taxed. In terms of philosophy and vision, we are still on your line, but there is still a possibility for the College to organize effective and effective supervision. If this is done solely on the basis of the annual report of the federal prosecutor, surveillance is carried out on the basis of the information of the person to be checked. I do not understand this. This way you take irresponsible risks in delicate files.

In the phase of the investigation and judicial investigation, we have the classic instruments of control, such as, among other things, the council. However, the previous stage is much more delicate. I admit that the system in the past was also not risk-free, but it is necessary that we incorporate all possible guarantees into these delicate files. However, we did not do this.

This is indeed the point where we differ. As a supervision, the direct authority of the Minister of Justice is now incorporated. This is undeniably the responsibility of the Minister of Justice in the face of the political approach to the whole problem.

I’ll give you one example, but I don’t want to open the discussion about the available political forces. Suppose the federal prosecutor comes into conflict with the minister because he does not get sufficient research capabilities. Should the Minister not approach it politically and budgetarily, and should it not be discussed in this Chamber? What is the difference with the current position of the Minister of Justice?

You remember my question to Attorney General Schins about the origin of the chosen formula. We have not simply written this. We have copied this from what exists today with regard to the relationship between the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General. Then Mr. Schins’s response was that we act here in front of the Attorney General who in second instance judges in appeals.

You are talking about delicate files and you have referred to a very specific and delicate file. However, this was a priority of jurisdiction, and as an example it is therefore not valid as an argument, while it is the most crucial one that the Attorney General also judges in the first instance.

Mr. Erdman, you refer here to the position of the Attorney General. If you want to work in a similar situation, then why didn’t you incorporate the possibility that the federal prosecutor would somehow be part of the college? Now they cut him out of it. They make a break. The Attorneys-General now rightly complain that a very important part of the fight against crime — which will continue to gain importance in the future — escapes their attention. They no longer have any grip on it. It would have been much more logical to give that federal prosecutor a different title, such as, for example, federal prosecutor-general. It would be part of the college.

It is a great disadvantage when one only listens to what one wants to hear. I told you from the beginning that they did not want a sixth Attorney General. Not left for me. I pleaded for it at the time. They did not want a sixth Attorney General because the five Attorneys General did not want a sixth. They want to play with five the mother-in-law about that new structure. That is the contradiction of the whole. That is the lack of innovation in the face of the – and I note, by the way, the statements, both of Mr Van Parys and of Mrs Milquet and of all who have spoken in the committee – need to build a structure that can cope with transnational, internationally organized large crime. These structures cannot be controlled by parquets in the current state of affairs, despite all supervisions and training carried out by the parquets.

My conclusion, Mr. President, is a logical conclusion. Mr Van Parys has not forgotten to emphasize this in the discussions. Both my party, my group and myself have consistently defended this structure as described here. I feel very well about this text I submitted. I am convinced that he must be able to work.

I repeat what I always say in the face of every new structure that we bring to life. One can describe it beautifully, but if dark forces appear to ignore or undermine this a priori, when certain people will try, for whatever importance, to ignore those new structures and do not want to see the finality of this structure, then the legislator also fits in his approach. The finality of the legislator is to respond to what we all undergo as a necessity and at the same time endorse. However, the approach to the operationality of this new institution seems to me very clear. Therefore, my group will support this proposal.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the political will to create and organize a Federal Prosecutor’s Office was very clearly manifested during the work of the various parliamentary commission of inquiry. I think of the Committee of the Sectes, the Commission of the Killers of Brabant, and also the Commission of Investigation on Missing Children. We had already stated very clearly that an institution such as the Federal Prosecutor’s Office was a necessity, and we already defined its main characteristics. by

I remind Ms. Milquet, with all my sympathy, that the law of 22 December 1998 on the vertical integration of the public prosecution, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and the Council of the King’s Prosecutors, was part of the implementation of the force lines of the reform of our judicial organization, set forth in the Octopus Agreements in 1998. Octopus means that eight parties participated, including PSC and CVP.

On the occasion of the work of the parliamentary investigation committees, we all — we, the political world and the public — have had to clearly see the inefficiency of the judicial organization in the fight against organized crime. Efficiency requires the establishment of a sui generis instance ensuring coordinated, centralised and comprehensive judicial handling of complex cases involving multiple territorial entities and requiring a comprehensive view. In other words, matters need to be treated at another level in order to have an overview. by

In support of what Mr. Van Parys, and as an example, I will remind you that the Dutroux Investigation Committee, in its report, recommended the following: “Investigations which, because they go beyond the frame of a district or present other specific characteristics, require means or capabilities greater than those available to local investigative magistrates, should be able to be instructed at the federal level. This requires a structured federal prosecutor’s office, headed by a federal attorney general, placed not under the authority of the college of attorneys general, but on an equal footing with them within the college of attorneys general.”

The bill we are about to vote on tomorrow only confirms and refines the principles defined in the octopartite agreement. As the Minister of Justice pointed out at the time – i.e. in 1998 – this law is a framework law laying down the fundamental principles of the reform it initiates. The realisation of the principles requires the adoption of several enforcement laws, including one aimed at more precisely defining the composition and tasks of this federal prosecutor’s office. It is therefore a body intended, in an emergency context, to optimise the effectiveness of judicial actions in the context of complex cases and the ramifications transcending the borders of a district or a judicial jurisdiction. This federal prosecutor’s office, we all wanted it in order to meet a concern and a requirement of effectiveness to which we have given a pluralist importance during all our work and which, of course, required choices. Whenever we talk about choices, a series of questions arise that have resulted, it is true, in decisions included in the bill. This proposal has triggered a long and lively debate in the committee. Van Parys will remember, and following various opinions given by other instances, concerns have arisen and questions were legitimately asked by one and another to the Minister of Justice.

Mr. Minister, two remarks that I had relayed to the committee because I shared them, have not yet found a satisfactory answer, at least at my level. The first is that I always regret that there is no clear definition of the criteria for exceptional circumstances that would prevent the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office from taking away the best elements from local prosecutors by means of delegation and dispatch. I am always very skeptical about this. The second hypothesis, and I also share what Ms. Milquet said ⁇ more moderately than I did, is that the federal prosecutor’s office, through a process of aspiration from above, and we all fear it, seizes only the beautiful affairs mediated to get rid of them later.

Not everyone has professional ethics. Erdman, I am sorry for it. Misconfidence exists on both sides and therefore, I think it is necessary to take into account what men are, simply. I am sure, Mr. Minister, that you will convince me that I am wrong on these two points.

In addition to this, I believe that the bill will provide the necessary clarifications: 1. the position of the Federal Prosecutor in the structure of the Public Prosecutor’s Office; 2. the tasks of the federal prosecutor's office, its composition, the delimitation of the competences between the federal prosecutor's office and local prosecutors or the statutory implications of the creation of the federal prosecutor's office.

The position of the Federal Prosecutor in the structure of public prosecutors has been given special attention during the discussion of the text we are examining today. The draft law, which is based on the principle laid down in the law of 22 December, specifies the relations between the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, the College of Prosecutors General and the Minister of Justice.

The Federal Prosecutor is exclusively and directly under the authority of the Minister of Justice and is bound by decisions concerning criminal policy taken by the College of General Prosecutors. The College of Prosecutors General's control over the Federal Prosecutor is general and is limited to the way the Federal Prosecutor implements the criminal policy guidelines.

In order to ensure optimal synergies between the College of Attorneys-General and the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, the authors of the proposal provided for, under the responsibility of the College, a obligation to systematically inform the Federal Public Prosecutor and a obligation to transmit notes and meetings reports directly. I recall and insist on the fact that these principles taken back in the bill are, in fact, only the faithful translation of the negotiations of the Octopus Agreement which opted for the creation of a federal prosecutor’s office that could not be either a general prosecutor or a King’s prosecutor.

Some raised strong concerns about the minister’s direct authority over the federal prosecutor and its place in the public prosecutor’s structure. The de facto independence of the federal prosecutor would therefore not be assured by the bill we have submitted. In fact, the direct relationship between the Federal Prosecutor and the Minister of Justice and the singular talks that could arise between them regarding the appropriateness of individual prosecutions would therefore contain in germ the risks of a considerable infringement of the principle of independence.

Some have gone so far as to raise the question of the constitutionality of powers and the position of the federal prosecutor with regard to Article 151 of the Constitution. Others have argued that the bill is likely to weaken the position of the Minister of Justice by the lack of sufficient regulation of the supervision and control of the federal prosecutor’s office.

At this stage of reflection, I would like to make a few observations. Prior to the establishment of the College of Prosecutors-General, which is quite recent, there was no buffer between the Prosecutor-General and the Minister of Justice. In the current system, the Attorneys-General also have the possibility of directing certain cases and the position of the Minister of Justice in relation to each Attorney-General, taken individually, is equally vulnerable. by

Prior to the creation of the College of Prosecutors General, the possibility of the singular colloquium between the Prosecutor General and the Minister existed and continues to exist for individual cases and since 1830, this has been told to you in commission, and without the CVP having cared about it until now.

Furthermore, it is very clear that Article 143 of the Judicial Code must be understood in the light of Article 150 of the Constitution. It is excluded that the Minister of Justice may formulate negative orders — it is true that we had raised the debate in committee — either in general or in individual cases. If the Federal Prosecutor’s Office operates in an emergency context, it is important that the Federal Prosecutor is independent of any other guardianship authority other than that of the Minister of Justice.

The principle of consultation provided for in the bill is intended to avoid wasting time in terms of procedure. The authors renounced any form of arbitration in order to be able to act urgently. By providing for the system of consultation and final decision of the federal prosecutor, the proposal respects and complies with the principle of unity of the public prosecutor.

Both the General Prosecutors and the King’s Prosecutor are under the authority of the Minister of Justice. The formula used in the bill merely translates the classical principle of the direct authority relationship of the Minister of Justice to the heads of public prosecution bodies and does not result in a fundamental modification of the current system.

Furthermore, with regard to the question of the status of the public prosecutor and, more specifically, a possible interference of the Minister of Justice in cases — the question deserved to be asked — the new article 151 of the Constitution is very clear and determines the margin of manoeuvre of the Minister of Justice. Negative injunction is therefore clearly excluded.

Article 274 of the Code of Criminal Investigation stipulates that “The Attorney General, either by office or by orders of the Minister of Justice, instructs the Attorney of the King to prosecute the crimes of which he has knowledge.”

Finally, Article 151 of the Constitution defines the question of the status of the public prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor is the executive power. He is under the authority of the executive power and a certain independence is nevertheless recognized to him in the exercise of the prosecution, in so far as no negative injunction can be made by the Minister of Justice. Criminal policy arises from the responsibility of the executive power with, alongside it, the College of Prosecutors General.

Others also questioned the powers entrusted to the federal prosecutor, in particular the exercise of public action by the federal prosecutor. Let me once again be surprised here to see some of my colleagues criticizing an option they voted for in 1998.

I remind you that in the context of the implementation of the reform of the judicial organisation arising from the octopartite agreements, the law of 22 December 1998 — I will try to respond in part to Ms. Milquet — very clearly specified the competences of the federal prosecutor: 1. facilitating international cooperation; 2. exercising supervision over the general functioning and, in particular, over the federal police; 3. Ensure the coordination of public action and carry out public action.

Article 144ter of the new Judicial Code defines the competence, ratione materiae, of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in relation to the exercise of public action. The bill specifies a number of clearly defined matters for which the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office is competent to carry out this public action. In so far as the law of 22 December 1998 sets the principle of the full management of criminal records by the prosecutor’s office, the competence of the federal prosecutor’s office to carry out public action itself must be regarded as subsidiary. The intervention of the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office will only be admitted if it is established that the handling of the case by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office brings an added value for a good administration of justice.

If a conflict of jurisdiction arises between the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and an instance prosecutor’s Office, the bill provides for a number of safeguards as well as a negotiation mechanism, aimed at avoiding delays in an arbitration procedure and being able to act in an emergency context. If the conflict persists after the negotiation, the federal prosecutor will decide.

The concern of effectiveness and operationality of this new instance requires that any blockage should be avoided if no agreement is reached at the outcome of the consultation or that things should be delayed by entrusting the dispute to an arbitral body. We must avoid any delays and therefore make clear political choices. The objective was met with the bill we submitted.

I will conclude with two or three comments. The exercise of public action is a competence assigned to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office with an extremely well-defined legal orientation. This is an optional competence, insofar as the action of the federal prosecutor is conditioned by the added value it could bring. And as the national magistrates pointed out in a really interesting hearing, this skill is of course the most important. It should be replaced in its perspective, concern for efficiency, modality and added value, for a better administration of justice.

And finally, as a conclusion, my dear colleagues, let me say that despite the few imperfections, and I do not deny that there are still those that can be pointed out this and there in the text, the bill on the Federal Prosecutor’s Office deserves to be voted, and to be voted urgently. As I have had the opportunity to emphasize in the Justice Committee during our debates, these inaccuracies that are still emphasized are, in all cases, only inevitable consequences of the attributions and competences that all stakeholders, including the CVP and the PSC, in the Octopus agreements, wanted to give to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office.

I conclude with a philosophy that I always apply, and you know, Mr. President, that my faith in man inspires me to think that the proper functioning and effectiveness of these new instances will depend first and foremost on the will of the judicial actors to work with good intelligence and in a real concern of public service. And as in any institution, it is the quality, the ethics of each, that will make the difference. This is a bet on the people and a bet on the future. Of course, my dear colleagues, the PRL group, co-signatory of the bill, will support it and will be ⁇ attentive to the observance of the missions and the proper functioning of this new instance which must ensure a better administration of justice that is the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. And I am convinced of it.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the bill on the Federal Prosecutor’s Office is intended to enable a more efficient fight against organized crime. This is of course important, but the way it is done shows numerous shortcomings. In addition, the scheme is accompanied by another initiative by the Minister of Justice to further complicate the execution of the penalties imposed and thus restrict the functioning of the prosecutor’s office and the courts to a very large extent. We could read it in the newspapers this morning. As an introduction, I would of course like to take this into account. Belgium has the most loose liberation policy in Europe. The effective prison sentence is already one of the most minimal fractions one can imagine, and you want to further reduce that by the provision that at least one third of the sentence sentenced must be effectively extended, abolished and the sentences of less than one year ceased to be executed. Where are we going? Who takes this seriously? More than ever, you ridicule both the prosecutor and the criminal judge. Whatever they claim, and whatever punishment the criminal judges impose, it is all butter to the gall. It’s all but dolls. The real punishment is worshipped behind closed doors. Whoever receives a year "box" from the judge may set up a wide grind, because in reality he must go on to shell up to three hundred hours of onions in Sun and Sea or in the animal shelter of Zevekote.

Mr. Minister, I also find it very questionable that you have all kinds of concrete plans on the shelf, including on the conversion of effective penalties into alternative penalties. However, you are silent about this in all languages during the committee discussions on alternative punishments. Yesterday we discussed extensively the cost of this punishment method. You have not spoken a word about what you planned, while that has great implications on the ground. By the way, your intention is largely contrary to the proposal discussed yesterday. It is precisely aimed at increasing the capabilities of the criminal judge, while you want to bind that judge more than ever. Mr. Coveliers, I know that my comments irritate you, but I would like to introduce them.

First, what you say has nothing to do with the subject. Second, the side still touches the shore. Thirdly, you read your text in a ⁇ eye-catching tone.

Colleague Coveliers, I thank you for your interpretation. My comments have to do with the subject, because they address the undermining of the parquet and its functioning. I think today we should say a few words about the parquet in general, especially because here a drastic change in the structure of the parquet is proposed.

That being said, I focus on the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and its establishment, the subject that we are dealing with today. That will ⁇ please you, colleague Coveliers. We will not talk about your sometimes seen tone.

The establishment of a federal prosecutor’s office is in itself a joyful decision, which the Flemish Bloc has long been asking for, and of which one must first acknowledge that it is much too late. While the criminal is becoming more sophisticated and working more internationally, in our country for complex files that cover the whole country or large parts of the country, there are still 27 districts with 27 times different views and approaches. The reports of the Dutroux Commission, the Bende Commission and the Senate Committee on organized crime were needed before the file could finally get into a streamline.

It is not yet said that this is a good proposal.

One of the main features is that the federal prosecutor is placed directly under the authority of the Minister of Justice and not under that of the prosecutors-general. This is a political choice with far-reaching and nefarious consequences.

First, there are negative consequences for the minister himself. I don’t know if the current Minister of Justice knows what lies over his head. By placing the federal prosecutor directly under his authority, he and especially his successor will be constantly under fire and identified with the federal prosecutor. Any failure in the investigation and prosecution policy of this Prosecutor’s Office will be personally blamed on the Minister.

Second, there are negative consequences for the federal prosecutor himself, who no longer has a buffer. It becomes the direct instrument of the Minister of Justice. There is no serious control body above him and he only stands for his impressive task. I don’t know if one will ever find a really suitable candidate for this position, even though one already has candidates in mind. After all, one asks for a superman at the head of this park.

Mr. Coveliers, I know you’re supposed to be Superman, but that doesn’t match the reality.

If one sees what functions, what responsibilities this man or woman will have to bear, it is ⁇ dangerous to place this person directly under the Minister of Justice. Concentrating too much uncontrollable power in one person is dangerous for democracy and for those involved. I agree with Mr. Van Parys. Mr. Erdman will again say that this is a lapsus in our thinking, but I leave him in his great wisdom.

This is a blow to my credibility.

I would like to believe that, Mr. Van Parys, but I have a lot of fun in that.

Third, for the Attorney General, of course, the consequences are also large. They see a significant part of criminal justice policy slipping out of their hands, precisely that part that will become so important in the coming years. They see what is happening rightly as a degradation, as the mocking of their power and their influence.

The majority has consistently emphasized that the federal prosecutor should be able to act quickly and timely and that placement under the authority of the College would work the logic of the bureaucracy in the hand. I have not yet heard any convincing arguments for this. During the hearing, Attorney General Schins said that the national magistrates are still under the authority of the College today. This does not mean that their work is paralyzed or that the College interferes daily in the files of the national magistrates. So the placement of the federal prosecutor under the authority of the College would have been much more logical. There was also the least studiable alternative of the professors Fijnaut, of Daele and Parmentier, who in their interesting book "A Public Prosecution for the 21st Century" advocate for placing the federal prosecutor under the authority of a sixth Attorney General who is part of the College and also controls the federal prosecutor. It is strange that Mr. Erdman now says that the Attorney General would not want a sixth Attorney General. We are the legislators. Decisions must be made here, not in any governing body not elected by the population.

Mr. Laeremans, you come here to sing the praise of the College.

I am not singing the praise of the College. I only say that it is a very inconsistent measure that decreases much of the powers and influence of the College. I see no reason for this at the moment.

Indeed, it is contradictory that, on the one hand, one does not wish to oppose and obey their desire not to have a sixth General Prosecutor and, on the other hand, one deprives them of part of their power. Logical is different.

Fourth, the consequences of this structure are, of course, also great for the unity within the prosecutor’s office. Today, the Public Prosecutor’s Office is one and indivisible and we have a clear hierarchical structure with at the top the College of Prosecutors-General. This is being drastically changed. We have an omnipotent super-procurator, which is largely separate from the College and which can even be used by the Minister against this College. The dispute and the power struggle within the Prosecutor’s Office is embedded with this proposal from the beginning. All rightly, Attorney General Schins warns against the wickedness driven by this proposal in the corps. The Attorney-General is blindly watching how the federal prosecutor actually takes his place in important matters, thus breaking the hierarchy entirely. They fear — and their fear is realistic — that their function will more and more be reduced to that of a refined audit firm. Divide and rule, that seems to be the motto of the current majority parties, apparently with the intention of greatly increasing the grip of party politics on the prosecutor’s office.

This is the fifth result of this proposal. More than ever, the independence of the Public Prosecutor’s Office is under threat. Due to the much stronger grip of the minister — and therefore of the party policy — on the prosecutor’s office, the investigation and prosecution policy in this country will be identified and perceived by the population as a party policy more than ever. In this way, it institutionalizes the people’s distrust of the court. In the past, until thirty or twenty years ago, the prosecutor’s office was known as the guardian of the law, as the rock in the branding on which society – every citizen and especially the victims – could count to make the rule of law respect. Today, the public has received a ⁇ diffuse image of the prosecutor’s office. In the past it was an ally of the citizen in the fight against crime; today the man and woman in the streets see that these parks must more and more conform to political priorities. They see mostly inertia and inability. Those who file a complaint are told by police officers that the parquet magistrates cannot handle their work and are therefore forced to suspend their giantly many criminal files.

So we end up with the second chapter, the problem of the prosecutor’s office as a whole. I had hoped that the introduction of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office for the Minister of Justice would be an opportunity to come up with a rescue plan for the parks. Launching the federal prosecutor’s office should be the locomotive to pull the prosecutor’s office out of the mud. However, our hopes proved futile. It is like the railways: a high-speed train is put on the rails, but domestic rail traffic remains behind. This is also the case with the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Mr. Minister, for decades the parquets were scrupulously neglected and they remained hanging in the age of the goose feather. There are still complaints from the parket magistrates. 70% to 80% of their time they are engaged in purely administrative work. The parks crumble under the work. They are today absolutely insufficiently armed and trained to play short on the ball and to keep track of the crime and the rapidly changing tactics and techniques of the criminals. They are not even able to maintain contemporary communication with the police services. In the major cities, especially in Antwerp and Brussels, the profession of prosecutor has become so unattractive that a quarter of the relationships are open and no longer filled. This Minister of Justice, like his predecessor, is not prepared to make a real turn. This can only be done through a drastic injection of people and resources. A modest increase in premiums, as discussed yesterday in the committee, is nothing more than a drop on a hot plate.

If you place a well-equipped and supported federal prosecutor’s office opposite that can attract all the interesting things, the discouragement and the demotivation can only increase. The prosecutor’s office is the nerve center of the fight against crime in a country. A security policy stands or falls with a well-developed prosecutor’s office.

During the debate on the so-called security plan, I therefore accused that there was nothing in it to be found in connection with the support of the prosecutor’s office. This plan was hardly more than a turf pulp on prevention and a gentle approach to crime. I said then that the prosecutor’s office was the big blind spot for this government. However, I am increasingly convinced that it is a very conscious policy to leave the parks as much as possible in the mud because the more persecution, the more penalties and the more costs. More repression does not fit in the image of this red-green government.

As a third and final point in my speech, I would like to consider the community aspect of this bill. As with the High Council for Justice, it must be determined that this new unitary body will once again be provided for a paritary composition. In fact, the federal prosecutor is exempted from this so that this prosecutor’s office will be mostly French-speaking when the prosecutor is also French-speaking.

... ... It is perfectly paritary and paritary.

Mr. Coveliers, in that reasoning you can also work with a 80/20 ratio in favor of the French speakers. You should take into account the population numbers in this country. The policy of the federal prosecutor’s office is related to the perception in the different parts of this country. If you reduce the Flemish population to 50% then you leave 10% of the Flemish people out. Proportionally, it is therefore much more difficult for a Dutch-speaking parket magistrate to penetrate into this federal prosecutor’s office. This is also a discrimination. All this while the Flammers make up 60% of the population.

In his opening speech for the Mechelse balie, Professor M. Storme about this an interesting consideration.

What type of storm you are talking about?

Mr. Coveliers, I am talking about M. The Storm, the Son. Some — I think of Bert Anciaux, among others — call this man a danger to democracy. I would like to quote him.

Colleague Coveliers, I assume that you are very restless today. Is this due to the fact that I said some painful things for your party?

I continue with my quote: “In the last two years, a centralist recovery was carried out, especially in the field of Justice, which culminated in a series of paritary composed and therefore the Flemish discriminating central bodies concerning the judiciary and the magistrates. The establishment of parity instead of the normal rules of play of representative democracy necessarily implies the assumption that there are two groups which differ in the field of the respective institutions in such a way that there is a breaking line between them and that the members of one group can never represent the other. Parity proves that a normal democratic decision-making is not possible because there is no sufficient degree of social homogeneity within which people can first differ in a democratic way."

Professor Storme concludes at the end of his speech that the Belgian Judiciary no longer has a future and must necessarily be divided. It is obvious that we agree with this.

I would like to ask a last question in the context of the community. Are the persistent rumors, and these were somewhat aroused by colleague Van Parys today, that the first federal prosecutor, according to an agreement in the majority, will be a French speaker? Will Flemish magistrates, for example Van Lysenbeth, already today be allowed to compete for the office of federal prosecutor?

You should have addressed this question to Mrs. Milquet, because it is through an amendment by Mrs. Milquet in the Senate in 1998, that indeed the federal prosecutor would be a French speaker. This amendment of the previous government has connected almost everything in Brussels.

Compared to the previous draft in connection with the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, it has been changed somewhat, isn’t it? At the time, we were talking about a federal attorney general. Now this is changing. Now this is a federal prosecutor.

If you had taken advantage of the opportunities we have to meet Mrs. Milquet, you could have asked for it.

I would have liked to have an exclusion on this matter. This would mean that, for example, Attorney Van Lysenbeth is no longer able to apply for the position of federal prosecutor. That would be quite extensive.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies, Ladies and Ladies, Ladies and Ladies, Ladies and Ladies, Ladies and Ladies, Ladies and Ladies and

He recalled the new facilities created by the free movement of capital, the problem of new technologies, information highways and others, the shortcomings also of our legislation regarding international collaboration, the few holes left by these legislations and the lack of means to implement them.

All this, he stressed, makes the bed of this organized crime and must be remedied by tracing the pistes for the creation of a true European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

I think, ladies and gentlemen, that the bill amending various provisions concerning the Federal Prosecutor’s Office evolves in this direction. In fact, in addition to other functions assigned to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, the catalysting of this international cooperation is in good place. The other tasks of this Federal Prosecutor’s Office will fall under the control of the Federal Police, not only the coordination of public action but even the operational exercise of this public action, on the basis of criteria of competence either material, related to a series of offences limitedly listed in the proposal, or geographical, depending on the scope, beyond certain arrondissements, or even beyond certain countries, of certain facts prosecuted. All this falls within a framework defined by the criminal policy guidelines developed at the level of the College of Prosecutors-General.

We are therefore in the right line of this long-term perspective traced by the Geneva Appeal but also in that of already old recommendations from several inquiry commissions that have been conducted in this house or in the Senate.

Criticism of this bill usually revolves around problems of organization or concentration of power. For example, we are told that we should fear a form of interventionism of the government or the Minister of Justice who is deemed to be in a much too powerful force ratio with the federal prosecutor, with the magistrates of the federal prosecutor’s office.

I think that the fact that the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office is placed under the authority of the Minister of Justice is not synonymous with open doors to interventionism that some especially fear.

Of course, this federal prosecutor’s office is placed under the authority of the minister, but it should be remembered that the minister is not appointed by the minister but by the Supreme Council of Justice under an elaborate profile that will be adjusted by this council. The negative injunction, which has been widely debated in the committee, is constitutionally excluded from the possible risks. The possibility, for the Minister, to exercise his right of positive injunction is ⁇ ined and confirmed but according to a arrangement and a transposition term-for-term of what regulates the current relations of the Minister of Justice with the entire public prosecution, namely prosecutors general and prosecutors of the King.

Whatever the situation is today, with regard to the problem of the power of the Minister of Justice and the independence of the public prosecutor, and in this case of the independence of the federal prosecutor, it is necessary to recall the adoption of Article 151 of the Constitution. This has resolved, we have finally emphasized in the committee, this important debate by accentuating the positioning of the public prosecutor in the camp, if I can say, of the executive.

Alongside these remarks and these fears about a possible interventionism of the minister, we also highlight somewhat paradoxically – among the Cassandre sui have expressed themselves in commission – the risk that would run a Minister of Justice, this time far too fragile and in a state of great vulnerability, given his position just above the federal prosecutor.

It seems to me – and this has been expressed by others in the committee – that it is not unhealthy but even, probably, interesting and bearing on a democratic level, that this political responsibility be reaffirmed and confirmed within the framework of a project like this. This is a functional and never personal responsibility, at least as long as the criminal facts are not brought to the minister. It is positive that this political responsibility is confirmed and in particular on a matter that everyone agrees that it has a real impact on important dimensions of the evolution of our society, on the democratic level, on the level of the credibility of its institutions and the trust that citizens give it.

Third order of remarks or criticism, with regard to the organization of powers: the omnipresence or omnipotence of the federal prosecutor’s office. In this and other fields, we are called to make a choice, which may be painful for some, between a form of platonic aesthetics and a pragmatic imperfection. It seems to me that when the issue is the order of organized crime, which is profiling internationally, and that a series of actors have to progress towards more voluntary forms of action against this organized crime, the choice made by the bill we are discussing, is the right choice.

Is this federal prosecutor’s office too powerful against organized crime that we would not consider as ⁇ powerful?

Is there not a balance and consideration of different aspects to be taken into account by our assembly?

I believe that this is the case and that, in terms of competence and the distribution of cases between the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and the Prosecutor’s Office – another issue that has been the subject of many discussions – the answer given by the bill or the clarifications made at the end of the debate, allow to answer that the choice made is a correct choice. There is, indeed, a principle of concertation between the Federal Prosecutor and the Prosecutor’s Office in the event that a file is the subject of a request for treatment by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. It is true that it is the federal prosecutor himself who has the last word.

The particular conditions under which the public prosecutor is required to carry out its task with regard to this type of cases, the fact that in many cases speed is one of the primary criteria for assessing the quality of its action, make me incline in favour of this principle of concertation and final arbitration by the federal prosecutor himself, inasmuch as other types of models, such as a multi-stage regulated procedure allowing the assignment of the case to one or the other, probably do not, in most cases, allow to meet the requirement of speed in a number of emergency situations.

Anyway — and there you can also complain because, aesthetically, the option decided is probably not the most elegant — there is a guarantee that in any case there will be no nullity of pursuit, following this type of skill problem. If disruptions in the distribution of cases were nevertheless observed, there is still a possibility of intervention by disciplinary means, in addition to the general responsibility of the Minister of Justice that I described above.

I would also like to point out that with regard to this problem of the distribution of cases, the Higher Council of Justice, which, however, is not tender on other points of this proposal, considered that it could evaluate our proposal positively. It may be necessary to pay attention to the sound and well-understood application of the principle of subsidiarity by verifying that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, in fact, limits its intervention to situations where its action can actually bring a more concrete in the operationalization of the prosecution.

I repeat that, in my opinion, there is no alternative that is not procedural, therefore slow and heavy, to the one proposed here, even though, in many respects, one could, for the sake of elegance, have desired better.

As for the problem of the possible looting, to take the formula of Mrs. Milquet, of files by the federal prosecutor, I am not convinced that one can see this risk only by this end of the watch. If this federal prosecutor and his prosecutor — his 18 magistrates — obtain victories, if files succeed, if persons are convicted as a result of an action by this federal prosecutor and his magistrates, it will also be a remote factor for a number of magistrates who sometimes tend today to drop their arms in the face of the concrete material difficulties and the problems of means they encounter. From this point of view, a resumption of the machine, based on remotivation and positive emulation factors, is not to be excluded. by

In this context, if there is an effective seizure by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office of a number of files handled so far by the Prosecutor’s Office, the impact is not the object of frustration or dismotivation as some can predict here.

Finally, a number of criticisms have also been issued regarding the conduct of information by this federal prosecutor’s office because some believe that this body has too wide powers.

We wish, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, that this federal prosecutor’s office be equipped with a real strike force. As I said earlier, the challenge deserves an investment in terms of the devices, the legal mechanisms established as well as the means. But this does not prevent that this federal prosecutor and his federal prosecutor’s magistrates will not escape the moderate rules applicable to all members of the public prosecutor’s office. I mean here the control by an instructional judge of the necessary respect for the rights of defence. For all these reasons and therefore for all the answers, which we consider reasonable and justified, to the various objections that we have been able to listen attentively in the committee, the Ecolo-Agalev group will vote on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker. We also had the opportunity to attend very interesting hearings. Whoever reads the report thereof will notice how very nuanced and very detailed sometimes the heard magistrates have given us a picture of what the federal prosecutor and the federal prosecutor should be and of the possible dangers of the so-called superparket. I will not resume the various discussions on this subject.

In any case, the VU faction is positive to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, as it is the framework in the Octopus Agreement that was concluded under the previous government. In addition, a number of investigative committees showed that we need a federal prosecutor’s office or a larger prosecutor’s office that has an important role to play in the judiciary. I think of the fight against organized and cross-border crime. The time that could be addressed by local parks is over. I am convinced that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office will meet the needs of a changing society, including in the area of crime.

From my concern about the police aspect, I mean that the federal prosecutor should also play an important role as a police inspector. We have already conducted an extensive discussion on this subject following the provisional law, which was adopted by Parliament. The Octopus parties have clearly chosen, not for a unity police, but for a two-level police. At the local level, sufficient democratic control was introduced through the police committee. That committee prepares the safety plan, monitors its implementation and acts as a control body for the mayor who ensures the effective implementation at the police level. It is clear that when we have opted for democratic control at the local level, there must also be control at the federal level. The Parliament has a task to fulfill through the Committee on Internal Affairs. You remember the discussions on this subject: we would rather have had a real commission for the police. In view of the drastic police reform, in my opinion, a full-fledged police commission is indeed needed to exercise democratic control. This is still not discussable today.

It is clear that ⁇ the federal prosecutor should be able to exercise adequate control over the police. The provisional law was therefore correctly adopted in order, pending the establishment of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and its entry into force, to entrust the control to the magistrates.

I will not repeat what we have said before, including in the discussion of the provisional law. In any case, as I emphasized in the committee, we opt to place the federal prosecutor under the direction and supervision of the College of Prosecutors-General.

I will not repeat what has already been said in the discussion of the provisional law. You know, however, Mr. Minister, that we choose to place the Federal Prosecutor under the direction and supervision of the College of Attorneys-General. The majority opts for a different approach.

Until now, there are no elements demonstrating that it would be inappropriate for the federal prosecutor to fall directly under the competence of the Minister of Justice, but there are also no elements demonstrating that it would be inappropriate for him to fall under the direction and supervision of the College of Attorneys-General.

If I weigh both options against each other, I wonder why, Mr. Erdman, should be deviated from a system that works quite well, in particular the supervision exercised by the college of prosecutors-general.

Mr. Van Hoorebeke, we should deviate from this because a new structure is being built. Within the framework of an existing structure, it is not possible to contribute a stone to a construction that does not meet the requirements that we put in this regard to the federal prosecutor. So simple is it.

I can accept your explanation on this matter, Mr. Erdman. Therefore, the majority has clearly taken an option.

A new structure is being developed and, rather than integrating it into the existing structure, you prefer to place them next to it. Their

We opted for the other system and we will maintain our position. However, this is not a manifestation of distrust towards the Minister of Justice, since I believe that sufficient parliamentary control is possible and that aberrations in this area can and will be avoided.

In the current state of affairs, however, we maintain our position.

I hope, Mr. Minister, that as soon as the effective fulfillment of the mandates on the level of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office is passed, this will be done in the most objective way. In the Justice Committee, you said in that regard that there will be no problem, as the High Council of Justice will develop the profile and deal with the appointments. Well, I am willing to accept this, but allow me to formulate a certain reservation in this regard, in the sense that in the designation of magistrates under a provisional law, certain elements indicate that the most objective criteria were not immediately used. We strongly oppose party-political nominations. The Supreme Court of Justice will have to handle this at its best.

Finally this. The establishment of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office cannot actually be the final step in the reform of the prosecutor’s office. In this context, I would like to talk about the territorial distribution of the prosecutors and the judicial districts.

I have heard the following warning from several banks. If I have understood Mr Decroly correctly, he has warned of too much power from the federal prosecutor’s office. In any case, we must not have a super parquet, which will drum the smaller parquets within the judicial districts in the corner and leave only the small, local crime to the others. This would, of course, create frustrations with regard to that superparket.

I always take the example from the United States. I don’t know the situation very well, but I know that nothing is more frustrating than that in an event that gets a certain dimension, the local police are pushed away by the FBI, who come on the spot like almost supermen and direct everything.

This should not happen, Mr. Minister. In the future, it will need to be studied to what extent a recalculation of the various parquet can be carried out. The system of judicial districts will need to be revised. Their

I would like to point out here that in that context the division of the judicial district Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde will also have to be discussed. This discussion has been raging for a long time. Many of us are convinced that this would lead to a more efficient functioning of the judicial apparatus of the Brussels agglomeration. We also know that the hic et nunc cannot be discussed on purely community grounds. Remember the discussion we held on the implementation of the decentralized services for the police in Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. I still disagree today with the solution that has been drawn up, although the deputy director is given a full authority and does not have to work through his director. He can go directly to the Attorney General and the Attorney General. In any case, this debate will need to be held in the future.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Colleagues, we are positive about this bill, which has been submitted by the majority parties because it responds to an important need in the context of the judicial and police landscape. We wish this Federal Prosecutor’s Office to have all opportunities to conduct and control a full and efficient judicial and police policy, but since we would rather have seen this happen under the supervision and direction of the College of Attorneys-General, we refrain.

Colleagues, you know that the Conference of Presidents, on the proposal of Mr Tant, has decided not to establish a separate committee concerning the police. The Internal Affairs Committee will hold a monthly meeting for the integrated police at two levels. There is a tendency to not establish too many subcommittees.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to comment on Mr. Van Hoorebeke’s speech. It is, in my opinion, surprising to note that in the debate on police reform nobody apparently worried about the psychological pressure that can arise on the local police because the federal police take on certain tasks. In this debate, everyone is in the weather for the local parks that threaten to be displaced by the federal parks. It is strange!

I do not want to open a polemic. In the debate about police reform, this issue may have hit somewhere in the background. Mr. Erdman, I point out that in my demonstrations I have always warned of this danger. This fear lives with the local police. All reforms must be reviewed on the ground. I would like to give the establishment of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office every opportunity, but I would also like an evaluation.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, Mr. Colleagues, in my speech I would like to emphasize why the VLD group will approve the bill. The debate was interesting. I am aware that other political groups have different views on a number of options taken. It is good to be warned of a number of things. Later, one can refer to this and say that errors have been made that need to be corrected.

This proposal, in my opinion and in all modesty, has crossed all these warnings and has remained. This is a good proposal. The change in the title already shows this. Initially, the title was "Law on the Federal Prosecutor's Office". This was forcing copyright. In the law of December 1998, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office was already mentioned. The title was changed to "Law Proposal amending several provisions relating to the Federal Prosecutor's Office". We are building on the law of December 1998. Moreover, we build on even older elements. The coordination of the prosecutor’s office was already mentioned in the first report of the investigation committee to the Bende van Nijvel in 1990. This point was not included in the pinkster plan because a party of the then majority thought that this coordination would mean that a parquet would be established for the whole country.

The other parties of the then majority opposed this. As it happens more often, it was then said, "We will not talk about it." The idea was clearly present. That discussion has been there. This was also discussed in the 1997 policy statement. The then Minister of Justice said that something had to be done at last because it could not go further in that way. We all know of course the parliamentary investigation committee who worked at that time and who gave an impetus to this. They have made everyone realize that in the face of a phenomenon in crime that formerly — I speak of the period before the 1970s — was in fact strongly localized with far fewer bonds, organizations and counter-strategies but later on the European level was strongly organized outside the boundaries of the arrondissements and the national boundaries, one had to put something else. This is exactly what the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office meant.

I have never heard an operational magistrate talk about the clean and the ugly things. I can assume that some magistrates prefer to deal with some matters than others. This often also has something to do with the institution of the magistrates and with the media engagement that certain cases get. This also applies to policemen and a fortiori to politicians. However, the structure is understood in such a way that the federal prosecutor, by definition, deals with the matters which he initially receives from abroad. He will not search for them himself. It has already been established that national magistrates usually receive matters from abroad, which are coordinated there.

Therefore, I do not think that the problem of competition in terms of jurisdiction will be heavily raised. Moreover, I think much less that the power that could derive from it will be as great as it is presented quite often. I agree that one should never make power uncontrolled, that one should never make it too big, and sure that one should not concentrate it on one person or one group. However, I have my doubts about whether that power will be so great. It should be noted that at the same hierarchical level, local parks also work. At the same time as the local prosecutors and the federal prosecutors work, the College of Prosecutors General is also working. This includes the conceptual confusion or misunderstanding with regard to the College of Attorneys-General. That College does not work — as has been said here — as a refined audit agency. Mr. Erdman has already said that there are always people who have trouble with it when you change something. The friction is a natural phenomenon. I understand that some people prefer to leave everything with the old and not realize why some things should be changed. However, the perception of five respectable magistrates should not serve as an argument for building up or changing a structure.

The College of Attorneys-General will be given a more policy-supporting function. That is also the reason why it will have a number of aid judges, who will probably also know a community distribution. You will be complaining about this again, Mr. Laeremans.

The Federal Prosecutor’s Office is also the control of the federal police. After the next step, the verticalization of the prosecutor’s office, there will be the integration of the prosecutor general and the local prosecutor’s office and, at the horizontal level, also with the labor auditors. Then one will be able to ensure that one part of that prosecutor general goes to the assistant magistrates; a second part will have to do the specific work — there will be a lot of criminal prosecution work at the prosecutor general — and a third part can then provide for quality management, for quality control and for a system of reference magistrates with the prosecutor’s office of first instance.

Mr. Speaker, you are, of course, much better informed than all of us, or even better than members of the opposition. You say that it ⁇ won’t happen at the same time. Do you have any idea of how long there will be between the establishment of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and the vertical integration? Is it a year later, is it six months later? Why can’t it happen together? I see no problem there.

I didn’t say it won’t happen together. I have said that it can function perfectly independently of each other. It is a personal suspicion that, due to the fact that the Federal Prosecutor’s Office must go through the procedure of appointment, which will take about nine months, that verticalization will come into effect approximately simultaneously. That is possible. At the moment, it is difficult to say, but it can be best.

If we look at the countries around us, we see a similar system. The Netherlands has a National Parquet; Germany has Schwerpunktstatsanwaltschaften, in which, as it were, gravity-point parquets are formed; France has a very different system, but the United Kingdom has a National Crime Squad, which is competent for England and Wales; Scotland has a different system. So I think we are in the right direction.

I am surprised that no one has said that the investigative judge fits here like a tang on a pig. One should ask whether the system of an investigative judge is still the most appropriate system for the investigation of major crimes. One may also wonder whether the guarantees for the judge and the freedoms that the investigative judge must undoubtedly offer in the current system cannot be given in another way.

The positions of the prosecutors-general and the federal prosecutor, whether or not under the College, depend to a very large extent, otherwise entirely, on the option taken.

The majority — and we invite all of us to follow in it — has therefore clearly taken the option of not further building a hierarchy, because that hierarchy is often counterproductive. We will incorporate a functionality as it is incorporated in the police. During the Octopus talks, there was a large discussion about how the federal police should relate to the local police. Then we talked about the functional link and the functional hierarchy. Later that will flow out in Dirco and Dirjut. This is the translation of the functional band. One should not speak of hierarchy because the other side of the barrier is also not set hierarchically. Any form of hierarchy here is actually counterproductive.

Mr. Coveliers, I agree with you that a different structure is being developed. It is hard to compare it to the police. Here something is created that is completely outside of any hierarchy. The Attorneys-General have nothing to say on the annual inspection report.

It is not just a control report. There has been a long debate about how to exercise control over the federal prosecutor. It doesn’t have to be because he would do things that shouldn’t be done, because then the criminal judge must act. He is especially concerned with the fact that he would not extend his authority too much to himself. He should not take too many things on himself, nor should he throw too much away. Then it was said that one could not do it case by case, because the things were then blocked. It is mainly about international observations or police techniques that need to happen internationally. You cannot simply block a case. Therefore, it was decided to do this post factum annually. There are two sanctions options. He was appointed for five years. After a period of time, he can get a penalty. A disciplinary sanction is also possible. If it turns out that the magistrates or the federal prosecutor's office are making mistakes, then there is the possibility to sanction.

I tried to listen to the arguments. They do not convince me, because the main reason is that everyone who makes a judicial decision — even if it is only in first instance — must be inspected and an intermediate shot must be installed. That is unnecessary. The Minister has a responsibility, but it does not increase or decrease it if one incorporates an intermediate shot.

I would also like to cordially welcome the fact that in the discussion on whether the Federal Prosecutor’s Office should conduct criminal proceedings or should be merely coordinating — as the national magistrates now do — there has been a clear opposition to operationality. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office should also be able to carry out the execution of the penalty. She may also leave them to the local parquet, but must be able to perform them. I think that is important. Whenever one in a dispute has a transition of the case, one loses part of the information. That federal prosecutor should also know what cases are on the ground. He must know which arguments are raised and which arguments are raised against the evidence. In this way, he can also create a judicial system in which he can manage these affairs.

I would like to assist the Chairman of the Committee. This text has been discussed constructively; there are disagreements; warnings have been formulated. I think that is good. I listened to them with the necessary seriousness. I am glad that we have been touched by the text and that we are coming to an operating system. This will hopefully – along with the other reforms that have yet to be carried out – contribute to providing a little more security and security. That must be the purpose of justice. Providing security, justice and freedom. We will therefore approve the proposal with full conviction.

Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen, in today’s debate, which followed the discussions in the Committee on Justice, a number of important principles were recalled.

The most important finding I made today is that no one considers the federal prosecutor's office superfluous or that it should not come there. There was a certain reservation formulated, which I can partially understand and to which I will come back a moment.

On the one hand, the present proposal follows the recommendation of several parliamentary investigation committees — the Bende-bis investigation committee was the first — to establish a federal prosecutor’s office. Furthermore, the recommendations of both the Bende-bis investigative committee and the investigative committees on the sect or on the murdered and missing children were unanimously adopted by the Parliament. On the other hand, it implements in practice the Octopus resolution, which was the basis of the Framework Law on a number of reforms in the public prosecutor’s office.

Mr. Speaker, I was initially not in favour of the hearings, but they have taught us a lot. On the one hand, they brought us back to the principles of the Octopus Agreement. On the other hand, we could hear from the magistrates the desiderata on the ground. A federal public prosecutor’s office should initially be an operational public prosecutor’s office that can act quickly and smoothly. It must be able to engage in the fight against organised crime, which not only transcends the borders of a judicial district, but even takes on an international dimension. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office also has tasks that are not found in the current magistrates, not least the execution of the criminal action. This was clearly stated during the hearings. It is of course that the federal prosecutor should also be controlled, but I will return to that later.

Mr. Speaker, I will briefly address the six themes that mainly determined today’s discussion. There is the institutional embodiment of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office that, in my opinion, corresponds 100% to the philosophy of the Octopus Agreement. I will then discuss the direct relationship of authority between the Minister of Justice and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office or the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. I also refer to the Statute of the Prosecutor’s Office. Indeed, today’s debate involved, among other things, the place of the prosecutor’s office in the criminal justice policy and its implementation. Then I will talk about the powers, the police capacity available to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and last but not least, the budget.

First, what is the institutional embodiment of the federal prosecutor? It is fully in line with the Octopus Agreement and the Act of 22 December 1998. The Federal Prosecutor shall, in the cases and in the manner prescribed by law, under the authority of the Minister of Justice, carry out all duties of the Prosecutor’s Office in criminal matters in the courts of appeal, the courts of assises, the courts of first instance and the police courts. In this way, I have outlined the principle on which the incubation is based.

Second, the direct relationship of authority between the Minister of Justice and the Federal Prosecutor also fully corresponds to the existing relationship between the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice. That ratio, on the other hand, remains with regard to the areas of competence assigned to the Attorney General under the Act of 22 December 1998. It shall also and to the same extent be fixed for the Prosecutor of the King. I would like to remind you of the two important principles governing this matter: under Article 143, paragraph 2, the Attorney General, under the authority of the Minister of Justice — and I would like to emphasize that — carries out all the duties of the Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal, the Labour Court, the Courts of Assises and the courts of its jurisdiction; under Article 11 of the same Act of 22 December 1998 the Procurator des Kings, by amending Article 150 of the Judicial Code, is placed directly under the authority of the Minister of Justice. In other words, all segments of the prosecutor’s office are under the authority of the Minister of Justice. There is thus also a direct authority link held in various articles.

I would also like to return to a point that has been raised several times, namely the direct authority between the Minister of Justice and the Federal Prosecutor, and above all the effect that the Minister of Justice could have in individual repressive cases: as is the case from now on, only the possibility of positive injunction remains, but negative injunction is prohibited.

The question of which entity within the public prosecution actually makes the decision on public action, in the light of the relationship between the federal prosecutor, the general prosecutor and the prosecutor, does not appear to me relevant in this regard and this, because we have put the status of the public prosecutor in the Constitution. This means that if we want to change this clause in the future, it will lead us to declare that this Article 151 must be revised and that a special majority is required. by

Article 151 of the Constitution states: “The judges are independent in the exercise of their judicial competence, the public prosecution is independent in the exercise of individual investigations and prosecutions, without prejudice to the right of the competent minister to order prosecutions and to issue mandatory directives of criminal policy, including in matters of policy of investigation and prosecution.” by

But this is immediately tempered by the fact that "the Minister of Justice can only intervene on positive injunction." I would like to emphasize this constitutional principle that was upheld.

Mr. Speaker, I will then come to the exercise of the criminal action granted to the Federal Prosecutor. In my opinion, this is the greatest innovation, which in addition corresponds to the suspicion of the two national magistrates. In the hearings of the Parliamentary Investigative Committees, national magistrates have repeatedly pointed out the absence of that possibility. This is not the only authority given to them. We have also determined that they should ensure the facilitation of international cooperation. This is a task that national magistrates already see. In addition, there are also surveillance tasks related to the police. In this regard, it is understandable that the Prosecutor acts in its capacity as an official of the Prosecutor’s Office.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to talk about the four aspects of that power. Several speakers, including Ms. Herzet, have repeatedly referred to that competence and the scope of that competence. Let us first emphasize that this is a delegated competence. We have determined under what circumstances and under what legal criteria a federal prosecutor may act. Furthermore, it is a facultative and residual authority which means that the act of the federal prosecutor must have an added value.

I can hardly live with the criticism I have heard today. Some argue that the federal prosecutor will be able to suck an empty parquet or attract the important matters to him. I am convinced that the way this prosecutor’s office will work, the cooperation that will be necessary between the first-instance prosecutor’s office and the Federal Prosecutor’s office, will provide added value for both. I have no idea what demotivation will result from this.

The Federal Prosecutor will be evaluated by the College of Prosecutors-General for the implementation of the criminal policy. The main control that will be exercised on that federal prosecutor is that all matters in which that prosecutor will act are matters in which a judicial investigation is ordered. In other words, there is at that time a triple control by the investigation courts — the council and the accusation chamber — the ground judge and a posteriori the College of Prosecutors-General. This is a translation of principles already approved by the Act of 22 December 1998.

Finally, I have two other concerns. As regards the resources to be made available to these federal prosecutors, I find that, in addition to their salary, a budget margin of 39 million Belgian francs was provided. This means that approximately 75 million francs will have to be made available for the proper functioning of the federal prosecutor’s office.

I will then come to a very important comment from Mr. Van Parys. I, by the way, follow him in his comment where he said that this federal prosecutor can only carry out his work when he also has the necessary capacity of the federal police services at his disposal. Article 106 of the law on the integrated police has, according to Mr Van Parys, actually not yet really taken shape. I gave him right in that, but I must say for the fullness that we still have a small problem. If I examine the law on this subject, and in particular Articles 235, 248 and 250, I find that it stipulates the following: "The members of the police brigades who pass to the local police shall, from the moment the local police zones are established, be eligible to be taken into account in the search capacity." I will not call it a problem of execution, this is a normal matter. For me, 2001 is a transitional year with an evolutionary workforce that is not immediately tangible. We already know how many persons, coming from the judicial police, coming from the BOBs, will be part of the federal police. About the research capacity that will come in the local police, we only have a percentage and this will also need to be filled in. I agree with you that this is an operation that we will have to keep a close eye on, because it will contribute to the operationality of this federal prosecutor’s office. In these circumstances, the draft law has followed this path because this was the usual path within the octopus negotiations and this fully complies with the principles agreed on 22 December 1998.

I can only hope that we will see the recommendations of those three parliamentary investigation committees put into practice and that we can indeed speak of the actual approach to a form of crime that in the past, but too much, slipped us through the fingers in the absence of the appropriate legal instruments. We will ⁇ have to approach this with a critical look at the moment when everything becomes operational.

General discussion is closed. The general discussion is closed.