Proposition 50K0622

Projet de loi modifiant le Code judiciaire, la loi du 22 décembre 1998 modifiant certaines dispositions de la deuxième partie du Code judiciaire concernant le Conseil supérieur de la Justice, la nomination et la désignation de magistrats et instaurant un système d'évaluation pour les magistrats et la loi du 15 juin 1935 concernant l'emploi des langues en matière judiciaire.

General information ¶

Authors

Groen Jef Tavernier
MR Daniel Bacquelaine, Claude Desmedt
Open Vld Hugo Coveliers
PS | SP Claude Eerdekens
Vooruit Fred Erdman

Submission date

May 3, 2000

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

judicial power use of languages

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen Ecolo PS | SP Open Vld N-VA MR

Abstained from voting

CD&V LE FN VB

Party dissidents ¶

• Richard Fournaux (MR) abstained from voting.
• Karel Pinxten (Open Vld) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

June 15, 2000 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Justice Committee examined this bill at its meetings on 16, 23, 24 and 30 May 2000. During the previous parliamentary period, several legislative initiatives aimed at reforming the judicial system were implemented, in particular, as a result of eight-party negotiations. However, it has appeared that some of the provisions provided have not been harmonised, which the text submitted to you thus tends to fill or rectify. What are the strengths of this text? 1) The achievement of the consistency of certain articles of the Judicial Code in order to enable peace judges and police courts, with regard to the advice requested from corps heads for certain appointments and playing a role in the assessment of certain persons, to be able to deliver it as well as the presidents of a court. 2) Correction of some erroneous referrals. 3) The provision of a regulation for the mandates that will, in the future, be qualified as Deputy and Specific and a transitional provision enabling the launch of the evaluation system. 4) Changes relating to the effects of certain adjustments concerning, more specifically, the treatment supplement awarded to several categories of magistrates as well as appointments in the jurisdiction, in the absence of vacant seats. 5) The removal of a lack of clarity in the text of Article 100 of the Judicial Code concerning the cumulation of adjunct and specific mandates in the different courts. 6) Better regulation of the status of the seat magistrates in charge of a mission in the head of the position of the deputy representatives. The purpose of the proposal is therefore to technically amend the text to enable the proper application of the law of 22 December 1998 after having had, during the committee discussions, an exchange of views with members of the Office of the Supreme Council of Justice, which allowed to give a light on the delay taken by this Council in the beginning of its activities, in terms of its functioning as well as with regard to personnel problems. In addition, their comments on the text submitted to you have been positive. Subsequently, discussions focused on the most appropriate method for remuneration of members of the Supreme Council of Justice, in particular for exam corrections. Was it necessary to specify in the law the manner of remuneration, an hourly remuneration, and how should be remunerated the benefits made by the members outside the headquarters of the Superior Council of the Judge? It was decided that it was the hourly compensation that should be ⁇ ined, as the representatives of the Supreme Council of Justice desired. This hourly allowance will be limited to the benefits related to the correction of examinations and the examination of complaints that will be made outside the headquarters of the CSJ. Clarifications and explanations were also provided for the rules applicable to the appointment of magistrates as chiefs of bodies in a jurisdiction of which they were not previously members. Thus, such a appointment is made of full right within the said jurisdiction and, if the framework is complete, this appointment will be made in surplus. The surplus will be removed either at the end of the term of office of the chief of body – the magistrate will then return to his original jurisdiction – or at the first vacancy of a position within the jurisdiction. The committee also took into account the observations of the Legal Service of the House of Representatives. Finally, the committee voted on the proposal as amended, with eleven votes against four.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, I will brief my presentation in the general discussion. If the President allows me to do so, I will at the same time explain the 12th amendment we have submitted. Colleagues, our group will not approve this proposal, but since it is a technical proposal, it is obvious that we can understand some aspects of the proposal. These are repairs or corrections resulting from the concrete operationalization of legislation to which we have worked in the past. Although this is a rather technical matter, we would like to bring some important elements to your attention at this public meeting. We find that this majority is sick in the same bed even in the reform of the judiciary – with the discussion and approval of this bill as an illustration – although the citizen may not experience the effects of it in the short term. In the previous legislature, we launched major reform movements – reform of police and justice – with major agreements. In doing so, we have introduced major principles in the Constitution: temporary mandate, responsibility of the corps chief, evaluation techniques and external control. It was already clear that in this period of government one should invest very much time in the implementation and implementation of what had been put on track in the previous legislature. Whoever speaks of the implementation of such large movements in institutions and institutions that have been so long immobile in terms of adaptations to the changed society, knows also that one must take his time for it, that there must be quality work delivered, that additional resources are needed and that there must be - especially in the direction of the operation - clarity, good communication and action. For us it is no shame that after several months, after contacts with the officers of the Supreme Council, one comes to the conclusion that certain texts need to be corrected. On the contrary, however, we are concerned that the first parliamentary moment in which one can check whether what is in the shelves can be carried out – when the first signals from the terrain enter – has not been used to reflect on the way the reforms have been carried out as a legislative power. I give two fundamental examples. It is a mystery to us why these bills have not addressed the problem of the stand-still in the appointments to the Judiciary, which we will experience since the entry into force of the Supreme Council on 2 August. We have put the people of Justice with their two feet in a huge reform process. We asked them to join, we would support them and ask for understanding before questioning the acquired positions. We are going to inform these people that the legislature has doctrined a system that made it impossible to fill retirement pensions with new magistrates and new appointments of peacekeepers and added judges for 225 days. We evaluated the law, but that small problem was not taken into account in the evaluation. We know that there is a problem, a few points and commas to the law have been amended but a fundamental discussion has not been conducted. This is incomprehensible for the CVP. What are we fixing? The parliament evaluates a law and discovers a major trouble. The removal of this barrier — the waiting time of 225 days — is not only essential to ensure the continuity of the service, but also of capital importance to motivate people not to let the judicial lag out again. We are fixing this point. Consideration of a possible solution by involving additional judges in consultation with the Supreme Council was not spent on the majority. This possible solution does not continue. The CVP finds this quite dramatic. The same determination applies to the remuneration of magistrates and members of the High Council who perform additional services. If all these points – for example, the hourly fee for the improvement of exams – should be fixed in the law in the future, I wonder how the Parliament can ask the members of the High Council who are currently preparing their assignments at a high pace and with a lot of idealism to be dynamic and flexible. The CVP Group has submitted an amendment aimed at giving the High Council a certain degree of autonomy within the budgetary boundaries and in an objective and transparent manner. We should not regulate by law which performance per hour can be reimbursed. If such things need to be regulated by law, soon the fence of the dam will be. If tomorrow a member of the Supreme Council finds out that a visit must take place in one or another seat of a court and wishes to receive compensation for this, the Supreme Council will have to ask the parliament to amend the law because this performance is not included in the law. This is an absurd situation. The CVP will submit the amendment again. I repeat that Parliament would have done better to allow the High Council, by way of its Rules of Procedure, to issue additional specific fees for those benefits that are not covered by seating pensions. The majority did not want this. This means that the highest legal level continues to regulate the lowest daily management of the Supreme Council. If that is the style in which big changes need to be supported, if that is the way Parliament will try to motivate the High Council to tackle the often unexpected challenges with a great sense of creativity, the CVP can only regret this. This evaluation should have provided a solution to the 225-day waiting period in the appointments that is unacceptable. We should have examined, on the one hand, how large this problem is effective and, on the other hand, what solutions are possible in consultation with the Supreme Council. We should have used this evaluation to find out how we could give the Supreme Council the necessary space, dynamism and policy tools to carry out its tasks. It should not have been. As with the police reform, it is clear to the CVP that this reform process does not have the determination and quality that we could have acquired at the beginning of the legislature. For the CVP this is not a school example of good governance.

Mr Vandeurzen, if you wish to do so, you can later defend your amendment from your bank.

In recent years, a number of initiatives have been taken to reform the Belgian judicial system. The necessity of these reforms cannot be disputed and they were supported by a broad political majority. However, there has never been a sound coordination of these texts. The present proposal is in fact a coordination of two texts of December 1998. There is, on the one hand, the problem of the Supreme Council and, on the other hand, that of the reform of the Prosecutor’s Office and the evaluation system. A number of changes have not been made. The opportunity was taken to introduce and modify a number of other cross changes that had changed in the meantime. Another amendment is that of the law on the use of the language in court proceedings. There was a reference to an article of this law that has since been changed. This law has also been used to solve the problem of the adjunct mandates. This occurred, on the one hand, for the evaluation and, on the other hand, for those who take up a mandate after they have not yet fully fulfilled the temporary mandate, thereby expiring the period during which they have exercised the mandate. These changes were brought forward as a result of the implementation of the law on the High Council. I am a little surprised that the spokesman of the CVP is quite opposed to this law. The main argument he puts forward, in particular the problem of the 225 days, is actually contained in the original law of 1998. It was clearly stated in this law that all appointments that would take place after the establishment of the Supreme Council would take place according to the system of the Supreme Council. This was done to prevent appointments from happening soon after the establishment of the Supreme Council, but before it would come into effect. These appointments could be politically co-opted. The effective entry into force is August 2. It would be inappropriate to turn this deadline back now. Then one would get the accusation that there are still a number of appointments being realized while the High Council is already there and functions. It would be ⁇ difficult to demonstrate that the most competent candidate is then appointed. Even a slight appearance of any political commitment of this candidate would be interpreted as a political appointment. That is why this note must be cracked. This note was created by declaring the law enforceable from the installation. The second aspect concerns the amendment on the fees. It is quite obvious that the original law, which was passed in 1998, provides for a system for the remuneration of permanent members. It also provided for a system for the remuneration of the non-permanent members through the system of travel costs, travel costs and seating fees. It now turns out that it is counterproductive from an organisational point of view to have some of the 44 members of this Council come specifically to the social headquarters to carry out a number of activities. At the request of the Council itself, it was clearly determined that a specific system of compensation could be applied. It is at the express request of the Council itself to mention it in this way in the law. Therefore, it is not the legislator who intended to impose a system. It is therefore an honor for the legislator to take into account this question of the High Council for Justice. Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to make two comments. It seems to be a demonstration of independence for a number of individuals that the budgets of, among others, the Committee-P and I and the Court of Auditors are not credited to a particular minister, but to the Chamber. The result, of course, remains the same: the taxpayer must provide those resources. This is also the case with the High Court of Justice. We have no objections to this at all. On the contrary, we are very pleased that the discussions show that eventually in a very short period of time – ⁇ this month – the budget of the High Council for Justice can be finally approved and that at the same time the staff formation and the language framework can be established after a royal decree consulted in the Council of Ministers, allowing the High Council to soon begin its work with the necessary staff members. Mr. Speaker, I abstain from the complex and somewhat boring listing of the elements of this law and refer to the ⁇ interesting report by Mr. Giet. However, I would point out that these provisions were necessary in order for the High Council to be able to function properly from 2 August. It would, in my opinion, have not been judgable if we had also adjusted the system of appointments following the present amendments, which are purely caused by coordination problems. Therefore, we will approve this text and not the amendment submitted by colleagues Vandeurzen and Van Parys.