Proposition 54K2855

Projet de loi modifiant la loi sur la fonction de police, en vue de régler l'utilisation de caméras par les services de police, et modifiant la loi du 21 mars 2007 réglant l'installation et l'utilisation de caméras de surveillance, la loi du 30 novembre 1998 organique des services de renseignement et de sécurité et la loi du 2 octobre 2017 réglementant la sécurité privée et particulière.

General information ¶

Submitted by

MR Swedish coalition

Submission date

Jan. 4, 2018

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

security services protection of privacy data protection public safety police

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V PS | SP Open Vld N-VA MR PP VB

Voted to reject

PVDA | PTB

Abstained from voting

Groen Vooruit Ecolo LE ∉

Party dissidents ¶

• Nawal Ben Hamou (PS | SP) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

March 8, 2018 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr Eric Thiébaut, rapporteur, refers to his written report.

Decades ago, cameras were used exclusively for television recording, for making film films on pellicule, for video footage on VHS bands, and photographs were taken on an analogue camera. Technology is advancing like a train. Today, approximately three-quarters of the population has one or more devices that can not only be telephoned, but also make photos and videos that can be edited and distributed to a wide audience. This technological advancement will not stop suddenly.

However, there is also a reverse side. The world consists not only of people who have only good intentions, but also of people with sometimes bad intentions and criminals. They also use this technology.

Our police and security services sometimes have to fight with unequal means, including inadequate or outdated legislation or too strict rules, for example in connection with privacy.

Since 2001, the government has only used flash cameras to record speed abuses or to make detections related to driving through the red light. The Camera Act is a relatively recent law from 2007, but due to the rapid technological evolution and the opportunity and desire to use new technology effectively, this law had to be modified several times, especially in 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2016. Especially with regard to mobile cameras, the use was too restrictive and required too much administrative work. In the long run, this was inoperable and no longer transparent, primarily for the police services, but equally for private security companies, internal surveillance services and the intelligence and security services.

In 2013, Professor De Hert argued a lot about this. I quote: “Because the use of smart cameras is not really regulated by the 2007 camera legislation, they are all operating in a grey zone today. It would have been more logical to change the legislation first and then use those cameras. Every lawyer knows that privacy-limiting technologies such as ANPR require a legal basis and that that legislation must freely detail when those technologies may be used, by who, for what purposes and what the citizens’ rights are.”

The position of our group is clear. The current unprecedented opportunities should not be left unused to protect the public space and to detect infringements. I take the ANPR cameras as an example. Flemish Minister Ben Weyts announced in March 2016 that the Flemish Road and Traffic Agency had already installed 147 cameras with number plate recognition on motorways and 326 on regional roads.

There were six different types of ANPR cameras from the Road and Traffic Agency: type 1 served merely for monitoring traffic flows, type 2 served for the so-called weigh in motion, where trucks are weighed already on the highway while driving, type 3 served to view the distance between trucks, type 4 served for track controls, type 5 served to control the mileage fee for trucks – Viapass has placed cameras in Flanders at 20 locations above each lane and above the pech strip – and type 6, finally, served primarily for police functions.

The figures on the cameras of the police zones are not fully up-to-date. I asked them to the Minister: As of December 31, 2016, the local police zones had 589 fixed ANPR cameras and 133 mobile ANPR cameras.

The proposed draft law unleashes that curvature and provides a flexible and broad framework so that the law does not always have to be adjusted after every new technological update. In addition, provisions of specific laws are incorporated so that it is also clear what applies to public services, police services, security and intelligence services, private surveillance companies and internal surveillance services.

The bill has four parts. A first part on the cameras of the police services is taken from the Camera Act of 2007 and is now regulated in the Law on the Police Office. The second part concerns the modernisation of the existing camera law; the third part concerns the adaptation of the law of November 1998, so that intelligence and security services also have access to images of police cameras; the fourth part, finally, concerns an adaptation of the yet very recent law of 2 October 2017 on private and special security in order to ensure that there is coherence between that law and the changes currently being made to the camera law and to the law on the police office.

The government has not gone ice overnight to come up with this vast and necessary legislative change. The committee has also thoroughly examined the matter, especially since the use of fixed and mobile cameras can constitute an infringement on the privacy. A good balance between proper use and respect for privacy is necessary. Therefore, clear rules are embedded in the law.

I would like to point out that for the formulation of the present draft has already been taken into account a significant change in the GDPR privacy legislation that the European institutions will impose within the framework of the regulation that will enter into force from May. In addition to numerous written opinions, we also invited specialists on the subject on 6 February 2018 and asked for their findings, including the Council of Mayors, the Standing Committee of Local Police, the Association of Cities and Municipalities, the Privacy Commission, the COC, the BIM Committee and a professor. All the speakers were actually positive about the adjustments. They were satisfied that their opinions on the design were asked and that they were taken into account. They also emphasized that it is positive that the camera law is divided into a police hole and a general hole. Nevertheless, some have argued — that will always be the case, of course — that the law is not going far enough in terms of its application. These include municipal use, for example, camera use to detect certain violations of the GAS legislation and the use of mobile cameras by other emergency services such as firefighters. In this regard, I quote one of the Council of Mayors during the hearing: “The mayors are the requesting party to receive anonymised data from police services in order to improve their own services, of course within the framework of privacy.”

The bill allows police officers to use bodycams on patrol or during interventions. In the past, it was not easy to get that arranged. Now it is in the draft law.

In the past it was only possible to do so in specific cases during mass demonstrations and after complicated approvals. Both Antwerp Mayor Bart De Wever and late professor of criminology Brice De Ruyver have expressed the desire that bodycams could be quickly applied by the police following the incident in Borgerhout in September 2017, in which there was discussion about the violence that would have been used against or by the police.

Brice De Ruyver then said literally: “Government interventions are being questioned more and more often, especially when violence is used. If discussions arise, it’s good that there is evidence and that it’s not just word-to-word.”

The bill now stipulates that police officers can wear a bodycam visibly and that they must warn people when they turn on the device.

Another question was to provide firefighters with bodycams as well. This could help in the training of new firefighters or in providing assistance on the ground, for example to help locate victims.

The Minister then communicated that he was willing to explore the possibilities, but then appropriate in the specific legislation of the emergency services and not in this legislation. The current draft law mainly fits within the framework of public safety and in the fight against crime.

With this bill, the municipal council gets the power to positively advise the placement of cameras. It is also important that the administrative barrier that requires prior approval from the Privacy Protection Commission is no longer mandatory. However, data controllers should maintain a register to be made available to the Data Protection Authority and the police services. The municipal authorities will also be able to use ANPR cameras, although in very limited circumstances.

Our group is, of course, in favour of significantly expanding the ANPR networks as a means against crime and terrorism, as well as against many other offences. We are therefore pleased that this bill makes it possible to realize a national ANPR network.

The government has previously announced that there will be 1,000 new ANPR cameras in over 300 locations, but we are ⁇ pleased that it has also been considered to enable other technologies, such as facial recognition, in the future, and to combine those ANPR cameras with, for example, track control. Therefore, I also referred to the investments made by the Agency for Roads and Traffic in the Flemish Region.

There has been a long journey ahead of the bill. There have been several written and oral questions addressed to the government over the past few years regarding parts of this new legislation. The attacks of 22 March 2016 also provided an additional perspective, which included additional aspects. Finally, there was also the extensive query, which led to various text adjustments.

Our group is satisfied with the result, as well as with the way in which we organized the additional hearings in the committee, which gave us a deeper understanding of the matter, and with the debate, in which the Minister answered the many questions very extensively.

Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, it will not surprise you, the N-VA group will fully support this bill.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, Mr. Colleagues, Ten years ago, we provided ourselves with a specific law governing the installation and use of surveillance cameras. This 2007 law, which currently governs the matter, has already undergone several adjustments: in 2009, in 2012, in 2014 and again in 2016. A rigorous legislative framework is obviously indispensable to ensure the right balance between the work of control, protection, investigation, but also respect for privacy. Today, video-protection surveillance, whether visible or invisible, intelligent or not, has proven itself. Undoubtedly indeed. Some just realized it earlier than others. Of course, the legal framework must be adapted to technological developments, anticipating it if possible to accompany the public authority and all actors of prevention as well as security in their fight against crime and their fight against incivilities.

Our group recalled during the committee work the two fundamental aspects that are, on the one hand, the right balance between security imperatives and respect for privacy and, on the other hand, the need for an efficient operation of video protection systems. We took note in a committee of the opinion of the College of Prosecutors General and of the reminder of the four principles related to the perimeter of privacy: proportionality, subsidiarity, the degree of accuracy of the cases permitted and control by an independent, impartial body, before which a contradictory debate may take place. This is done in order to limit as much as possible the possible infringements on privacy.

In this regard, the interconnection of databases makes it possible to use data intelligently while leaving it in its natural environment, that is, without copying it. This is essential, as well as ensuring that correlations can only be implemented once the necessary framework has been determined.

Furthermore, the question of the efficiency of operating systems and technologies is equally crucial. It should be provided for the use of the systems by different security actors and at different institutional levels. Specifically, the project specifically extends the scope of cameras to incivilities through the problem of municipal administrative sanctions.

We have, in this regard, heard the Federal Police Council and the Federal Council of Mayors. Their opinions should also be taken into account. The qualification of certain public servants or public enterprises such as public transport companies is an important point of efficiency. The role of peacekeepers is also an important point of effectiveness, and here an element to be clarified.

Mr. Minister of the Interior, this project makes a positive evolution in the delicate case of video surveillance. Some elements are ⁇ still to be clarified, but we consider that in the state, the parliamentary work has been very constructive. We know you are willing to respond to the various points of attention that remain to be clarified in the context of the enforcement of the law.

Today, this project aims very simply to ⁇ the government’s goals of concentrating our police forces on their protection work and their presence on the ground, in public spaces. This project also meets the objectives, which you have also already recalled in your general policy note, modernization and adaptation to the technological developments that awaits our police.

For these reasons, we will vote in favour of this bill.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, it is indeed the camera law of 2007 — we are now eleven years later — which was to provide a framework for the use of surveillance cameras. In eleven years of time, of course, a lot is happening, especially in the field of technology and processing of image material, where there is a constant evolution. I am convinced that in the coming years the legislation will still be adjusted, not because the legislative work underway is not good, but because of the technological progress. This, after all, creates more and more possibilities with regard to the use of cameras, such as, among other things, the smart cameras. Furthermore, these instruments are becoming smaller and smaller, making it unclear for the legislator to create a legislative framework that is so resistant to the changes without having to adjust the law every time.

As colleagues have already pointed out, the use of camera images by police services, both administrative and judicial police services, has become more important. Currently, the debate is being held on administrative enforcement, and also there the camera story is being discussed. We must also acknowledge that police services have a specific task and that camera images are beginning to be part of their instrumentarium.

Mr. Minister, I live in a region where, under the impetus of our governor, many ANPR cameras have been installed in recent years. Many mayors, including myself, were encouraged to invest in ANPR cameras for our police zones. The last two years have shown that being able to be part of a larger network is an enormous tool for our police officers, for the investigation work, to be able to tackle crime. So the results are there. We are pleased that this system is being further rolled out in our country. In the end, our region is part of a larger whole.

We are satisfied with the present draft, which aims to adapt the legal framework in such a way that the surveillance cameras are regulated. The draft provides for adjustments, including to align the whole with the European Data Protection Regulation — and this has not been discussed by colleagues, if I have listened carefully. It will be on May 6th, if I am not mistaken. This will bring about a huge change for all of us. For example, it will also need to take into account the technological development as well as the concept of “smart cameras” that is now being introduced into the regulation.

As previously noted, the draft also entails an amendment to the law on the police office. From now on, the collection of data by means of cameras, as well as the storage and, above all, the processing of the data or the use of the bodycams by the police services will be subject to a specific arrangement in the context of the data processing by the police services. This also means that the necessary control bodies, which already apply to other data on data processing, can monitor those data, which is not insignificant.

The design also regulates a point that we think is important, in particular the use of images from police cameras in real time. In the context of a more integrated data sharing between security services and intelligence services, this is a huge step forward. In this context, I would like to emphasize that we must make every possible effort to reach a true cross-point for security, on which all relevant intelligence services as well as the security services can be connected, so that an optimal exchange of information is possible, of course within the framework of checks-and-balances. The history and stories we have experienced in our country in the past prove that the exchange of information is crucial.

This is an important draft for the legislature but also for all mayors and for everyone who carries local responsibilities in our country. In this sense, the hearing was quite interesting, as was the presentation of the Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities, in which the mayors and especially the working group within the VVSG requested more access to the images. I am convinced that there is still a path to be made in this regard and that the debate on this subject needs to be held. If we want to make this possible, then the question arises under what conditions obtaining the images can be obtained. The use of bodycams by firefighters also seems to us in any case a useful clue to investigate.

We also made agreements. We have allowed the decree to pass without amendment by the majority because we are convinced that the fulfillment and question of the local level should be thoroughly discussed, taking into account all existing legislation. Our group will approve this bill with great pleasure.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker. In fact, it aims to enable both police forces and public authorities – municipal in particular – to evolve in a legislative framework more in line with the technological developments in the field of camera surveillance.

In this sense, it is useful and even necessary. We are well aware of the importance of these devices in the fight against crime, but we are also aware of their limits, as demonstrated by the back walking that it operates (...) and the importance of beacons to protect the privacy of citizens.

In my opinion, two elements remain insufficiently framed or uncertain.

The first element is the use of bodycams by the police forces – a debate already old since it animated the Interior Committee at the end of the previous legislature – and in this area two points must be emphasized.

1 of 1. The effectiveness of these devices is highly questionable, as evidenced by studies conducted by an American university. They do not allow, in fact, to present a more objective view of conflict situations, contrary to what its defenders claim. Furthermore, the visible or non-visible character remains subject to caution and their implementation could pose problems, both in the head of the citizens and the police themselves.

2 of 2. The cost of these devices and the area’s investment capacity pose the risk of reinforcing the idea of two-speed security, ⁇ in a context where local areas are getting less and less federal support.

I come to the second element: the supervisory body responsible for monitoring future technical databases. We heard the officials of the Privacy Protection Commission and those of the Police Information Control Body (COC) responsible for the monitoring of technical data bands. I confess that their observations, however positive, did not give me the impression that the project, despite its qualities, offered all the guarantees of a truly effective control in this area.

You will probably be asked with the Privacy Protection Commission about the relevance of the retention periods. Are they not too long in view of European jurisprudence on this subject? This remains a point of attention and it will be up to Parliament to carry out an assessment of the controls and the actual strike force of the COC, a young and still looking for its means of action for the tasks entrusted to it. In this context, the loss of its administrative support to the Privacy Protection Commission must ⁇ draw our full attention to the solutions that need to be delivered. It would be disturbing if, in a field like this, we entrust control tasks to an organ that would not have the means to carry them out.

These reasons will justify my abstention.

A modification of the camera law is of course urgent, I think we all agree on that. However, the present proposal raises concerns. I will limit myself to two important comments, in order not to repeat what has already been said in the committee.

First and foremost, this law defines the bodycam and allows its use. Along with its use, intelligent software is also allowed. As always, its use will need to be linked to good management, both technical and operational. This, of course, requires an investment, both in people and resources.

The question now arises whether the bodycam will be used actively or passively. It seems to us necessary to develop a uniform policy for the full integrated police. Given the fragmented financial situation and the capacity of the police zones, on the one hand, and of the federal police, on the other hand, we fear again a fragmented management and a fragmented policy. This does not take away that the bodycam can have an added value. However, using or not using a bodycam can also cause a counter-reaction. So far, much value is still attached to the report of police officers. Their report is accepted for good as proof of the contrary.

Colleague Vermeulen, the question is now who can question the credibility of the police inspector when the bodycam is used. If it is assumed that the bodycam can be an element of evidence that provides an objective representation of the facts, the question arises how that objectivity can be guaranteed without the bodycam. Officers who do not wear a bodycam could sometimes be questioned. This can absolutely not be the intention. Let me give a concrete example from a police zone. At a recent trade union consultation, the question was asked whether police cars that are not equipped with a track-and-trace system because they do not have operational tasks to perform may have something to hide. This is a question that was asked internally among police officers.

In our opinion, there should be a better developed and uniform framework for the use of bodycams in all local zones and with the federal police.

Secondly, this bill builds too few guarantees with regard to privacy protection. It is understandable that data is kept for a year for the judicial police and, of course, the administrative police. The images are stored for both purposes. However, the Privacy Committee points in its opinion in particular to the fact that, given the principle of proportionality, no shorter retention periods are possible which equally allow the achievement of the objectives pursued. In addition, several databases will be linked to each other to detect, for example, movement patterns.

These issues have a major impact on the privacy of citizens. It makes the systems unnecessarily complex. This makes it impossible to maintain control over the data and to monitor privacy. In my opinion, the proverb that one wants to shoot a mosquito with a cannon here seems to be in place.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, colleagues, in fact, my colleague Katja Gabriel has followed the draft in the committee. However, since she became the mother of Arthur yesterday, I take a moment from her. (The applause)

Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, colleagues, the change of camera legislation has gone a long way. Under the previous government there was also a bill on the table, but that did not reach the final meeting. Now it has succeeded.

From the hearing in the committee came up a number of good suggestions. However, the agreement is that these suggestions will be reserved for a later legislative initiative.

Why is this bill so important to us and do we fully support it? It translates the new European data protection regulation into our law. The entry into force is therefore consistent with EU legislation and the necessary transitional measures were provided. In addition, it has become a technically neutral text that is therefore not dependent on permanent technological developments, which is very important in such a sector.

Privacy protection is also an important element here. The balance between reality and practical needs of the field was preserved.

That there are no heavy administrative obligations is an important point for us, liberals.

Regarding the sharing of information between police, intelligence and security services, the bill allows the police to use the new technology within a clearly defined framework, with adequate safeguards. It regulates the use of all types of cameras by the police services. It provides for rules, both on the level of consent to the placement and use of the cameras and on the level of their use itself, or for the processing of the collected data.

The national digital register that lists the geolocation of the fixed cameras is a significant added value. This will provide a visual mapping image of all the fixed cameras used by our police services.

This design also gives greater clarity, clarity and readability to the camera.

Finally, the design is intended not only to allow cameras to prevent, detect or detect crimes against persons or property, but also to prevent, detect or detect harm, monitor compliance with municipal regulations or maintain public order.

So far, Mr. Speaker, colleagues, the most important points for my group are to fully support this draft. We will do so in the vote that follows.

Mr. Speaker, in my turn, I will expose the elements discussed in the committee regarding the text.

For Ecolo-Groen, it was also important to have a clear legislative framework. Some colleagues have said that it is important to change the "camera" law, including updating it because we know that technologies are evolving rapidly. It was therefore important for us to have such provisions.

As always in this type of themes, the analysis of ecologists is guided by the need to balance public security and the protection of individual freedoms. This is fundamental for us. That is why, as a committee, I often referred to the opinion of the Commission for the Protection of Privacy by highlighting, for example, the question of the preservation of images, databases. We now go up to a year, with the coupling of databases between them. This will determine the behavior and movements of natural persons. We asked if it was possible to consider a shorter deadline.

I relayed the question, also raised by the Commission for the Protection of Privacy, concerning sound recording. The same applies to the monitoring of workplaces. In this regard, you referred me to your colleague, the Minister of Economy.

Another important element: the use of bodycams. They are increasingly used. Some police areas have already tested the system. For us, in terms of the use of images, the storage of data, the access to this data, whether we are on the side of the police officers or the side of the protesters, this subject is sensitive and needs to be ⁇ well framed. The device itself is not problematic; it is the use of images and the framework of the preservation of these images that, for us, is important.

It is true that, in general, at the level of discussion of all these points, you have answered some of them. You have actually taken good note of the opinion of the Privacy Commission. On some points, you join it, on others not and you have justified it. Other points in the text will be decided or, in any case, detailed by royal decrees. It is true that we do not benefit from a perfect clarity on all these issues since, on some points, you do not go as far as the Privacy Commission and, on others, it is planned to settle them by royal decrees.

Another element is related to a missed opportunity that I also mentioned to you in the committee and which concerns the ANPR cameras that will be used to frame the low-emission zones. As you know, many cities, such as Brussels, Antwerp and soon Ghent, will have low-emission zones to improve, I hope, the air quality of our fellow citizens and therefore their quality of life. This is a measure that we support as environmentalists. To control these low-emission zones, ANPR cameras are needed. It is true that this text does not speak of this and does not provide a framework in relation to this. This is a regret that we also express.

You referred me to regional decrees in your reply in commission. Since then, I have re-contacted colleagues who are specialists in the matter and who tell us that effectively, we could move forward through decrees but that the ideal would be to do so at the federal level; otherwise, we must consult all the Regions. Per ⁇ it would be easier, at least according to the opinion of several experts, to do so here within the framework of this law. This is a missed opportunity for not being able to frame the use of ANPR cameras in the framework of the low-emission zones that will be set up in the different Regions.

As I said in the committee, my group will abstain. Indeed, if we agree to put a framework in place, we do not have all the guarantees in relation to all the points I wanted to highlight. That is why we abstained.

Mr. Minister, I thank you for the ambitious draft amendment of four laws, the most important of which are the so-called "camera" law and the law on public service.

This text aims to expand the possibilities for municipalities and police services to install and use surveillance cameras. It also aims to provide for the possibility for intelligence and security services to access the data of the police services.

In the face of the ever-increasing interference in the privacy of our fellow citizens, it should be assessed whether the text achieves a balance between the response to the needs of the ground and the obligation to protect the privacy of our fellow citizens. We tend to respond favorably when it is found that the text – which is the result of inter-cabinet meetings, which took place over a year and a half, and of consultations with field actors – has undergone substantial changes following the comments of the Privacy Commission, the State Council and the College of Prosecutors General. In addition, it also highlights the provisions of the European Regulation on the processing of personal data, which will apply from 25 May.

We regret, however, that the bill does not fully ⁇ the intended objective, and this for two major reasons. First, the police information control authority has a cruel lack of sufficient means to properly carry out its tasks. In the face of the significant extension of the powers of the police services, it should be able to handle complaints, to issue opinions, not only on legislative initiatives – which has not been done in the present case – but also to the public, and to impose corrective measures (warning, rectification, deletion or limitation of processing, temporary or permanent restriction of processing or prohibition of processing). However, already at the time of the discussions of the law establishing the data protection authority, the Privacy Protection Commission noted that the Police Information Control Body was not able to assume all its tasks. I refer to Opinion 45/2016 of 3 August 2016.

In short, you extend the capabilities of intrusion into privacy without giving the supervisory authority sufficient resources. I would like to illustrate my statement with the example of the central database on terrorism, which would still have serious gaps in control. What is undue is not deleted, and more than 1,500 security services have access to it.

If the government does not wish to give itself the means of its policy, I invite Mr. Minister to entrust the control of police information to Committee P, which has sufficient personnel to do so.

Our second reservation, which is also fundamental, concerns the ability for police services to use invisible surveillance cameras as part of their administrative police missions in connection with radicalism and terrorism. Obviously, our group fully supports the fight against radicalism and terrorism. We therefore fear that once again the choice of the minister will weaken the work of the security services on the ground, and that for three reasons.

The first is that the intelligence and security services constitute the competent department, having the necessary experience to carry out information collection in advance when it proves useful. An additional link, namely the administrative police services, should not be added to the information chain, at risk of confusion and inefficiency.

The second reason is that the excess of information in the head of police services risks feeding "infobesity", which will result in police services being overloaded and will no longer be able to properly process data or distinguish the essential from the accessory.

The third reason is that putting administrative observations in connection with terrorism constitutes a form of potential circumvention of the Special Methods of Investigation Act, as the College of Prosecutors General emphasized in its opinion of 26 October 2016. However, the conditions for opening and exercising the special methods of intelligence are stricter than those contained in the law on the police function. Therefore, it is essential to put badges to avoid abuses and preserve our democratic state.

As I said at the beginning of my speech, this is an ambitious project. We recognize it and are happy about it. However, my group and I regret that you have not taken all the necessary steps to carry out this project. In fact, we consider it to be unbalanced as it intrusively extends the possibilities of using surveillance cameras, without accompanying these possibilities with sufficient safeguards. However, it should not be that in the absence of sufficient guarantees, one can derive to a police state. We also regret the rejection of the amendment we had proposed in the committee. It consisted in evaluating the text after a two-year period of application. It was the addition of a 90th article, if I have a good memory.

For all these reasons, my group will abstain.

The proposed bill aims to create a flexible legislative framework for the use of cameras. It is mainly focused on the use by the administrative and judicial police but also includes some changes regarding the use by individuals and by the intelligence services.

One of the findings of the Attacks Investigation Committee – which we fully agree with – concerned the recognition of an “infobesity” problem, i.e. a problem related to too much data and the inability to properly analyze it, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism and organized crime. This is a problem resulting from the current mass surveillance doctrine to which the government adheres.

In our view, it is incomprehensible that this bill applies a generalization of mass surveillance by the police; that a government gives the green light to a whole series of databases, new techniques at various levels, with various officials; that because of complex texts, there is now a lack of clarity about instances that can operate and those that cannot.

We are not at all sure that this will actually lead to greater effectiveness against terrorism. The most important thing will happen is that all Belgian motorcycle journeys will be kept for one year.

For the data processing of ANPR cameras, 10 million euros were released to attract 200 additional full-time equivalents. You may wonder if this money could not be used more effectively elsewhere.

The doctrine of mass surveillance is, in addition, highly antidemocratic and it violates the presumption of innocence. The ANPR cameras whose use will be widespread through this bill have again won – if I can say –, last year, the public award as part of the award of the Big Brother Awards organized by the League of Human Rights.

“The mass storage of everyone’s data for future research and prosecution is unlawful,” the European Court of Justice ruled earlier this year in an innovative ruling on data retention. This, in fact, constitutes an inverse of a basic principle of the democratic rule of law. Authorities may violate someone’s privacy only if there are reasonable suspicions about a concrete fact punishable. Today, this principle is understood and anyone who moves becomes a potential suspect.”

At European level, two new decisions on the use of cameras will come into force in May 2018: a regulation on the use by individuals and ⁇ and a directive for police services. These decisions specifically put more emphasis on data protection and the limitation of privacy infringements.

However, this bill takes the exact opposite direction. The policy that leads to more Big Brother also goes against the decisions made in this regard in recent years by the Belgian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, among other things regarding the cancellation of the Data Retention Act. Currently, several proceedings are still underway at the Belgian Constitutional Court in which recent laws are challenged on the grounds, precisely, of their infringements on privacy. If it felt some respect for democracy, the government might be better off waiting for the decisions of the Constitutional Court.

In practice, this bill will not only ensure the multiplication of the number of data stored but it also provides for a longer retention of these data. The retention period is increased from one month to twelve. Despite the clarification that after a month, the consent of the prosecutor will be necessary, the Data Protection Authority has already made known that this rule will probably not survive the confrontation with the Constitutional Court and with the European Convention on Human Rights.

It is also worrying that control over the use of cameras by police services will be granted to the recently established Police Information Control Body (COC). This body itself admitted that it could not make the slightest assessment of the impact that this data control would have on the workload, in particular as the administrative support of the Data Protection Authority will fall. It is already very unlikely that the Body has the necessary resources. The ministers merely said that an evaluation will be necessary.

In the committee, it was also said that the COC does not meet the conditions set by the European General Data Protection Regulation. It should be noted that at present, the Authority cannot give any guarantee regarding the handling of complaints, the provision of opinion to the public opinion or the intervention against possible improper uses.

I finally hear expressing our doubts about two technical means that we want to consider as soon as possible: bodycams to the police and the continued development of smart cameras. For bodycams, it is clear that this does not offer any guarantee of objective rendering of police interventions, especially since it will always be the police who will decide when to use or not to use these bodycams or these images.

As for smart cameras, the Interior Minister already dreams – which may be more easily granted in the future – of being able to use them for facial recognition, sound recognition or acts. We ask ourselves serious questions as to whether this is in accordance with the principle of proportionality in respect of privacy.

For all these reasons, the PTB will vote against this bill.

Mr. Speaker, dear colleagues, first and foremost I would like to thank – I also speak on behalf of the two other colleagues who submitted the draft law – both the majority and opposition parties who were present in the committee for the mature debate that we have had on this draft. When controlling the use of cameras, there is always a need for a balance between respect for privacy and privacy, on the one hand, and security, on the other. It is a continuous exercise of balance. I think it is normal that the debate is about this.

Finding the point of balance between these two poles is at the heart of the debate.

As for the specific questions, I think most of the points have already been discussed in the committee. However, I still want to emphasize two elements that are worth adding. First, the bodycam as proof. We discussed this in the committee, saying that it was not “the” proof.

It is not the only evidence, it is an element in the file. I understand your concern, Mr Top, but in that sense it does not replace the police report or other elements in the file. It comes with. It is a piece in the file and, of course, not the only evidence.

I understand the criticism of Ms. Ben Hamou: there is also a context for every action of the police. Sometimes the images from the cameras do not reflect the context. That’s why this can’t be “the” proof, but must be an element in the file.

The second point I would like to emphasize again concerns the discussion of low-emission zones and the cameras that control access to them. You should know that this design is all about surveillance cameras. The cameras that control access to the low-emission zones are not surveillance cameras. The control of access to the low-emission zones is a competence of the Regions and is thus regulated by decree. It is evident that those decrees are also subject to the European GDPR, but that access control is therefore not within the competence of the Chamber, but of the Regions.

I think that I have answered two new elements, Mr. Speaker. For the rest, I refer to the debate in the committee and thank again everyone who has made this important bill possible.