Proposition 53K3414

Projet de loi établissant les mécanismes d'une politique macroprudentielle et précisant les missions spécifiques dévolues à la Banque nationale de Belgique dans le cadre de sa mission visant à contribuer à la stabilité du système financier.

General information ¶

Submitted by

PS | SP the Di Rupo government

Submission date

March 3, 2014

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

banking supervision central bank financial control financial intervention financial legislation financial market market supervision

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V Vooruit LE PS | SP Open Vld N-VA MR

Voted to reject

VB

Abstained from voting

Groen Ecolo LDD

Party dissidents ¶

• Bernard Clerfayt (MR) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

April 3, 2014 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Madame Vienne and Mr. Devlies, rapporteurs, refer to the written report.

I can speak first.

This is a text that is of course very important to us. At the limit, this should be the major text of this legislature, as it has been marked by the consequences of the banking and financial crisis. I used the conditional because we were disappointed with the result. Indeed, we were expecting and we are still expecting a fundamental reform of the banking sector so that, tomorrow, our fellow citizens no longer have to assume the consequences of the risk-taking and greed of the managers of the largest banks. We wanted and we always want a fundamental reform to prevent tomorrow that there are other Dexia, Fortis, KBC who take their feet in the carpet and then call on the state and all citizens to rescue, thus justifying the worst measures in budgetary and social matters, as was the case during this legislature. Very negative decisions on solidarity, especially on unemployment and pensions, were made simply because of the budgetary consequences of financial crashes.

In addition to the fact that these texts were delivered to us very late in the legislature while, in our view, reforms were and are still urgent, the fundamental reform has not come. The text under consideration is not intended to reform the banking sector. The government did not dare to put it in the wild. He decided to protect the universal banks. He chose to let a major risk continue to float over the heads of our fellow citizens and public finances.

You have tried as well as some colleagues – ⁇ they will still do so recently at this tribune – to make you believe that everything will change with this new law. But the principles are so blurred at the level of the basic articles on the separation of the banking professions – I will return to the question later – there are so many exceptions, such a power is left to the controllers, such a complexity continues to exist that it is, in our opinion, a reform of the blind eye that will not solve anything on the bottom.

Our diagnosis is that the federal majority has not learned the lessons of the banking and financial crisis. The core of this reform should have been a clear and clear separation of banking ⁇ . For credit institutions, both trading on their own account and trading on behalf of third parties should be prohibited, as well as the existence of two trading deposit entities within the same group.

With the principles you have entered into the law and which may be voted soon, unless a majority adopts our amendments, we will be well below the rules set in other countries (United States, England), while these countries also have a very important financial sector. Belgium instead chose the Franco-German model that preserves universal banks. It is a victory of this lobby, which has prevented, with your complicity, any reform that would challenge the continuation of their business, their small business.

The strategy of lobbying is very clear at the French level, at the German level, to make adoption by different countries in Europe, before a European reform, before a possible agreement on the projects of Commissioner Barnier, unambitious legislation, rather blurred, with the hope that they will then impose on the European plan in the absence of a definitive agreement on this Barnier project.

However, just after the crisis, various academic bodies, both on the Belgian and international level, issued clear, explicit recommendations on the separation of banking professions, on a fundamental reform, especially in terms of equity or risk-taking, on a questioning of the capitalist model of banks, on the return to a banking model oriented towards the real economy.

Everyone swore to this tribune, hand on heart, that everything would change. Time has done its work. The good intentions have faded and now seem very distant.

The separation of banking ⁇ should have been at the heart of the reform decided by the government. It is clearly a failure and a fault. This reform consists only of arrangements negotiated between the National Bank and the big banks, so that they can continue as before, without fundamental questioning of their practices, while retaining the implicit guarantee of the States that they offer precisely this status of systemic bank, with the risk that the natural will return to the galop and that a new crisis will hit us a little later.

Certainly, developments are taking place at the Belgian and European level. We place shutters, we strengthen controls, but we do not touch the heart of the system. Risky behaviors remain possible and the criteria applied are blurred, leaving too much power to the controller, the BNB, to judge what can be done or not.

Certainly, some banks act differently and move in the right direction, but the biggest want to keep their risk profile and profits, continue to mix genres and remain present in tax havens.

I also think of BNP Paribas, that bank of which we are the first shareholder but which continues to be pointed to the finger for its presence in tax havens – when those same banks are not involved in tax fraud cases.

Who can believe that the measures taken by the federal government will be enough to prevent tomorrow from repeating yesterday’s problems? As I said, the criteria are fuzzy and not all are set by the law. And the more fuzzy the criteria, the more complicated and costly they are to control, and the easier they are to circumvent except to set up a costly army of controllers.

How do you differentiate between trading on your own account and trading on behalf of third parties? In practice, this is impossible unless an electronic chip is placed in the brains of bank traders.

One of the criteria for the quality of financial regulation is its simplicity and legibility. We are far away! And you justify this complexity by its immutable character.

In the absence of a clear definition, entered into the law, a number of strategic choices are referred to the National Bank, including the restriction of trading on behalf of third parties or the dialogue between the National Bank and banking institutions.

We are ultimately not very far from the situation that prevailed before the crisis, with the CBFA in the role of the BNB and the prudential supervisory authorities of banks like Dexia or Fortis who have not been able to prevent, despite their diagnosis of the arrival of the crisis, these banks from going into the wall with the blessing or powerlessness of regulators.

They are the same people who are there.

How can we trust them for tomorrow?

How else can we trust those who, within the BNB, by their positions inhibit any reform and instead advocate for reforms in social matters that would cause more damage than the one you decided?

How can we trust the biggest banks that are again at risk of plunging into the system’s vulnerabilities?

Mr. Minister, in the committee, I have cited concrete examples, in particular the issue of the intra-group exposure for international banks. You have agreed that up to 100% of the capital of Belgian banks, subsidiaries of international groups, may be borrowed from the parent home. We think that is dangerous. We want to limit this to 25 percent, as the National Bank recommended in an interim report.

We find that you lack ambition when it comes to limiting the bonuses and salaries of executives of big banks. The latest news about the salaries of the KBC bosses is quite worrying. There is an obvious correlation between salary, extra wage benefits, golden parachutes and dangerous banking practices.

For example, management companies remain permitted, within the board of directors, until the end of their mandate, without an end date.

In this text, there are also novelty in speculation on food raw materials but the framework is blurred, again. We can be delighted to see such principles inscribed in the law but, ⁇ with my colleague Ms. Snoy, we are waging a long struggle to prevent the development of speculative financial products on food raw materials. This leads the populations of the Southern countries to see the price to be paid to simply feed themselves increase. The greed of some, often in the north, leads others, often in the south, to starve. It is immoral and unbearable. Mr. Minister, we have long been waiting for clear steps to correct this unbearable situation. They were discussed in the Finance Committee, but we could not get a vote, while we were almost there, because of the two social-Christian parties.

Today, there are some principles in this area in the law, with position limits for some investors on food products, but there is no prohibition of this form of trading as aggressive as immoral.

The satisfaction of those who shout victory over these principles does not resist the analysis of the provisions provided. As in other parts of the text, there are speeches and there are facts, and there is an obvious contradiction between the one and the other.

I will conclude quickly because I am expected at Mons at 18:00.

Mr. Minister of Finance, as regards the aspect of extending the tax exemption to the first 1,880 euros of interest from accounts held abroad, I am surprised that it is possible to legislate without having evaluated a priori the budgetary impact of the measures taken. I have too bad memories of other measures, such as notional interests, which we denounce very regularly. I also have concerns about the ability to control these bank accounts, since the device you are going to vote for provides only for a voluntary declaration of the relevant savers without having an automatic exchange of information internationally, which is very necessary and urgent in the fight against tax fraud.

I do not have to tell you that the governor of the National Bank is in full resistance to the establishment of this central register of accounts, which is somewhat the turnkey of the device.

For all these reasons, we will not be able to support this new banking law. The majority did not take into account the risk and the conclusions to be drawn from the banking crisis. This is a reform in the eye.

We give you a chance to improve it by reintroducing the amendments that we had submitted to the Finance Committee and which provide for a clear and clear separation of banking ⁇ , between the savings bank and the business banks so as not to mix these two very different ⁇ . The savings bank must be protected within the framework of a public arrangement. The business bank belongs to the private dimension and must operate at its own risk and danger.

We want to be able to increase the own funds, reduce the bonuses and salaries of banking institutions executives. We are submitting all our amendments. We hope that they can be supported, not only in the speeches of the television platforms but by a vote in the only place that counts, this Parliament. Otherwise, we will find ourselves in the obligation to vote negatively on this new banking law, since it does not provide – it is fundamental – the pure and simple separation of banking ⁇ .

Thank you for your attention and please apologize for being brief.

Despite the importance of this proposal, I will try to speak briefly.

Of course, the importance cannot be underestimated. Through the transposition of a number of European directives and a number of draft directives, we can make a major step towards a safer banking sector.

Nevertheless, we see a number of major problems, which will be a reason for us not to approve the proposed draft.

What do we determine? In the present draft, we apparently want to be absolutely stricter than the rest of the European Union and the eurozone.

Why do we want to be stricter? There is no one who doubts the importance of strict regulation, ⁇ not in terms of capital buffers. Banks must be able to cope. However, such strict regulations need to be established at European level.

After all, what we need here is a level playing field or an equal playing field, which with the present design is not created and which is disturbed by the design. With the above draft, we are rolling out the red bar for foreign banks and industries, who can pick up our Belgian savings here and invest in their home country and in their economies rather than in our economy.

That is of course a big problem. We are a small country with an open economy. Due to our small scale, we are the country with the largest number of industries in relation to our gross domestic product, which is an additional invitation for the industries concerned to become active here.

In addition, we also want to be extra strict in terms of reporting and additional regulations. The directives leave a margin for banks with a balance sheet of between 3 and 30 billion euros. This is a fork within which the National Bank of Belgium can determine the rules. Who is subject to stricter reporting and regulation and who is not? Who is under control and who is not?

What are we fixing? Currently, the National Bank of Belgium is set a threshold of 3 billion euros. In other words, the smallest banks here in this country will be subject to the same strict rules and to the same overhead costs as the big banks.

That is just the problematic. We always talked about the value of small banks. Now we will disadvantage them proportionally to the big banks, which is exactly the opposite of our goal.

The banks that were too big to fail, of course, had to be subject to a much stricter regulation, just because they pose a danger when they are too big to fail.

In the current draft, however, the small banks get just less chances of growing, they get more overhead costs and that is a problem. It will only increase the exit of our Belgian savings and our investments abroad. The absorption power of those branches, of foreign banks, only increases. Those banks will be more competitive because they have fewer overhead costs and are less bound by the tough rules imposed in our country. In this way, foreign banks can offer better interest rates and suck even more savings abroad.

This ⁇ perverse effect is further reinforced by the high deposit tax applicable in our country. This tax is equally problematic. Several smaller banks have, in my opinion, rightly initiated a procedure in this regard before the State Council. The deposit tax is ⁇ perverse. One of the most stabilizing factors in a bank is the deposits. The less a bank depends on external financing and the less a bank depends on the financial markets, the more a bank has own deposits, the more stable that bank is. But what do we do? We discourage deposits by a much too heavy tax.

Today we have already noticed that foreign parent banks operating with subsidiaries in our country are shifting their activities here and there. For example, we see that large loans offered through the offices of BNP Paribas Fortis are booked on the Paris balance sheet. The next step is that ⁇ also the deposits will be shifted due to the high deposit tax in Belgium, for example from Fortis in Belgium to GDP in Paris. I don’t think anyone is in favour of this step. Again, no one can ignore the importance of solid capital buffers, but it can be done in a correct way and on a European level playing field, not by wanting to be in our country stricter than in the rest of Europe and to seed our banks with additional costs.

Additionally, we see in the present draft a missed opportunity to finally address savings taxation, address the discrimination of income from dividends, the discrimination by which someone who invests directly in our economy is punished compared to someone who puts his money on a short-term savings book at a bank. Even those who put their money in a bank for a longer term are still discriminated against. Such discrimination is unacceptable and does not benefit our economy, but is detrimental to it. But what are we fixing?

An extension of the exemption in the savings taxation could have been a tax reduction. I note that this is being stopped by the liberal group in this Parliament, which has left the hemisphere in the meantime. This is ⁇ regrettable. This design disrupts the level playing field in our country. This is a missed opportunity in the field of taxation. We will not support it either.

As you probably know, the PS had made banking reform a prerequisite for government participation. My group felt it necessary to encourage checks and ethics in this area.

Too many abuses, too many deviations were seen during the 2008 crisis, but also too much arrogance, too many outrages on the part of this sector and that, even in the post-banking crisis period; I have been able to see this repeatedly, whether in the speeches or in the acts of the bankers. I participated in all the committees monitoring the banking crisis: I can say it was edifying. The banking sector is too complex, too complex. He has problems with ethics and is not sufficiently controlled.

The great reform that is presented to us today is part of the same logic as that of Twin Peaks. Both of these reforms were very involved.

When we think about such a reform, a few major topics appear to be prioritized: the protection of financial consumers and savers, the separation of banking ⁇ , the strengthening of supervisory and internal controls in financial institutions and, finally, ethics, good governance, remuneration.

Each priority has been met. Some may still argue that this reform is not going far enough, that it remains insufficient, but let’s be clear: it has taken days to negotiate to get the result we present today, which I’m not afraid to call excellent. Indeed, we go beyond Europe in a multitude of aspects, whether in terms of governance, remuneration, ethics or asset allocation.

Instead of slogans, let’s actually look at what this reform contains. Bankers will no longer be able to speculate with money that does not belong to the bank. We prohibit speculation on behalf of banks, i.e. banks will no longer be able to use the money of their savers to speculate to improve their own yields. These activities are often speculative and risky. We go further than the English by separating the business from the first euro of speculation on our own.

Next, we strongly frame trading for customers. Beyond the limit, every euro invested will have to be directly and fully offset in the balance sheet.

This is a considerable step forward in Europe. This measure is very binding on banks and protects customers.

We are still protecting depositors as from now on they will be among the first creditors to recover their money in the event of bankruptcy. Therefore, the bank will have to organize itself to always have sufficient assets. On the one hand, it protects customers; on the other hand, it deprives the Belgian state of a significant burden, namely the guarantee of 100,000 euros.

We go further than Europe, which does not stipulate that the bank must have enough assets. But we are totally in favor of a system that goes to the covered deposit: each deposit is offset by an asset.

We also go to the banking will system, as banks are subject to recovery plans in case of failure. The supervisory authorities, the European Central Bank or the National Bank of Belgium will decide how to implement such plans. In addition, banks will have a resolution plan that will contain actions and recommendations to implement in the event of a risk of bankruptcy. Finally, we are setting up a resolution authority within the BNB to develop and update this plan that takes into account different scenarios.

Finally, the controls of regulators in banks – from physical controls: they will go to banks – will be strengthened.

Finally, I would like to go a little further on the remuneration policy. This project goes far beyond what Europe predicts, and that’s important. It is undeniable that remuneration policy had a significant share of responsibility in the 2008 crisis. Short-term risk-taking has brought significant returns to banks. The more risks traders took, the more bonuses they received. Long-term profitability was not considered.

The goal was to make a lot of money right away. Variable remuneration was always allocated on the basis of short-term results and sometimes resulted in serious conflicts of interest. A customer was not advised by considering his or her risk profile, but in relation to the product he or she wanted to sell at a given time.

The government has decided to act and go further than Europe. From now on, the variable remuneration may not exceed 50% of the fixed remuneration, when the EU directive provided for 100% or even 200%.

A clawback clause is established for any person who has participated in practices that have resulted in substantial losses for the institution or was responsible for them, has failed to comply with the applicable standards on expertise and professional honour, or has participated in a particular mechanism that has the purpose or effect of fostering tax evasion by third parties.

In any case, the exit compensation will have to be reimbursed.

My group has submitted a draft that aims to sanction tax intermediaries who imagine assemblies aimed at evading taxes. This project already opens the door to this debate.

With regard to state-aided banks, no variable remuneration will be tolerated and exit allowances will be limited to nine months of remuneration. Finally, institutions will publish their remuneration policies.

It was time for such a reform to take place. We voted in parliament, a few years ago already, a resolution calling on the minister to frame the exorbitant salaries of bankers. We submitted, almost three years ago, three bills that also concern the management of bonuses and not only in the banking sector. One part deals with public enterprises and Minister Labille has already come to parliament with his reform. The other part concerns companies listed on the stock exchange. Unfortunately, the debate is still topical. In short, we are pleased to have achieved two of the three reforms on the remuneration framework.

Given all the positive points outlined in my speech, it is clear that my group supports this comprehensive banking reform and congratulates the government for its rigorous and serious work. Of course, other reforms will still need to be implemented, but this does not affect the success of these projects.

Bravo and thank you!

You have an international obligation. Do you agree that the Minister of Justice should serve as the Minister of Finance? At your own risk and risk, Mr. President.

I would like to thank the members for their understanding.

The financial crisis made it clear that extensive deregulation, self-regulation and soft law are not sustainable options. After the crisis, all relevant governments and regulators had a responsibility to build a more sustainable financial system. Many actors have taken their responsibilities: the federal government, the European Union, the northern governments and the banking sector. The Parliament has also worked with several special committees.

The challenge was to re-balance the interests of savers, consumers, entrepreneurs, shareholders and the government in order to restore confidence in the financial sector.

In April 2009, CD&V formulated thirty concrete recommendations in response to the financial crisis in the areas of audit legislation, consumer protection and company law. Many of the recommendations have led to legislative work by the government, including the current bill.

Concrete proposals were also submitted in Parliament. For example, Senator Wouter Beke on the obligations for financial institutions submitted a bill to draw up a resolution plan for banks. The bill is integrated into the present draft law.

Our group is pleased with the European approach to the reform of credit institutions. CD&V is aware that there are limitations to the Belgian capabilities. Belgian reforms must be integrated into European and international initiatives. A minimum of international harmonization is an indispensable factor to be successful.

The present draft law complies with the principle of subsidiarity. The measures shall be taken at the level of administration that is most appropriate for this purpose. European directives are implemented, but where necessary measures are taken that are specific to the Belgian context.

With regard to the separation between commercial banks and deposit banks, our group is satisfied with the concrete outcome. The bill does not provide for a pure division of commercial banks and deposit banks. However, sufficient guarantees are built in order to limit the risk behavior of banks and protect savers. Banks are no longer allowed to speculate on their own account with the money of the savers. Even if the banks make risky investments for third parties, a limit is lower than 2.5 % of bank capital. The National Bank should fix those percentages per bank based on the risk profile. Banks must have sufficient funds in stock to compensate the saver in case of bankruptcy. In addition, the saver receives a general privilege on the bank’s assets. When a bank has come into trouble, the savers will be reimbursed immediately after the staff.

The bill does not provide for a pure separation between commercial banks and deposit banks, but provides intelligent protective mechanisms. This approach is also supported by various international reports, such as the Liikanen Report of 2012.

One of the causes of the banking crisis was the remuneration policies of financial institutions, which focused on short-term profits and rising bonuses. With the present bill, bonuses for banks that have in any way used state aid are completely restricted. For other banks, the bonus is limited to 50 % of the fixed salary. For banks that have received government support, it is logical that they cannot grant bonuses. It should also be noted that it should not be the intention of the government to maintain structural participations in the financial sector for a long period.

Once the banking sector has been reformed and sufficient guarantees have been developed for a sustainable financial system, it is no longer the task of the government to have banks in its possession. For banks that have not received government support, the bonus is limited to 50 % of the fixed salary.

In addition to the extensive work carried out by the government, there were also additions made by members of Parliament through amendments. The main supplement seems to me to be setting a legal framework around crowdfunding.

Each investor will be able to invest up to 1,000 euros. Initiators can raise up to EUR 300 000 without any difficult administrative requirements. My colleague Jef Van den Bergh submitted a draft resolution a few weeks ago calling for a specific legislative framework for crowdfunding. That resolution has now been translated into a law. Crowdfunding is a form of financing in which demand and supply of capital are combined via the Internet.

Crowdfunding strengthens the direct bond between the entrepreneur and the investor and proceeds through as few financial interconnections as possible. That doesn’t necessarily mean that crowdfunding could replace traditional forms of financing in the long run, but it can be a very useful supplemental source of financing. Crowdfunding is already being charged by traditional financial institutions as an element in the market validation of a project. After all, a crowdfunding operation gives an initial indication of the consumer’s potential interest in a new product, as well as a start of equity.

CD&V has worked hard at all policy levels in our country to improve the access and cost of credit for SMEs. Kris Peeters has implemented his banking plan. Koen Geens has established thematic national loans and covered bonds. The reimbursement fees were also legally restricted. The legal framework on crowdfunding also contributes to better financing of our companies. Companies will have easier access to alternative financing.

I come to my conclusion. I think it is right to say that this bill will be the most important reform of the banking sector in 20 years. Belgium supports the European initiatives and puts its own emphasis. This creates a framework for a sustainable financial system.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, our group will gladly approve the draft legislation relating to the banking sector.

I have listened carefully to our colleagues from the N-VA and from Green. According to the colleagues of Groen, we did not go far enough and according to the colleague of the N-VA, we went too far in Belgium.

We are in Belgium on the golden middle, but still a little more on the side of a sharp, stronger banking legislation. All specialists agree that this Belgian banking legislation goes beyond the regulations recently issued in France and Germany and then the regulations in other countries.

For that reason, as well as for the seven reasons I will list, our group will approve this new banking regulation.

First, the sp.a has been advocating for years for the introduction of a bank testament. This is introduced by this law and consists of a recovery and resolution plan. The bank testament examines which events may have a significant impact on the financial situation of the banks. It also examines what measures the bank can take if these events occur. The legal structure is very clearly outlined in the bank testament and the supervisory authority may request a simplification of the structure if it would be too complex and would complicate a possible settlement.

The second reason why our group will approve these bills is because trading for own account is prohibited. Trading for own account is even broadly defined, namely, all trading in financial instruments in the trading portfolio, using own capital. In the future, a bank will only be able to trade in financial instruments if it is for customers, to cover risks, for market making, for sound and cautious liquidity management and, finally, with the aim of ⁇ ining them in a sustainable way.

The bank will also always have to demonstrate that the transactions are necessary in order for the bank to fulfill its role as an intermediary to its customers.

Furthermore, within these five newly listed permitted categories, risk limits are still imposed from which there may only be very limited deviations, provided that the transactions are carried out within one of the five exemption categories. This scheme is quite identical to the Volcker Rule in the United States.

A third reason why the SP-A group will approve the bill is because permitted trading activities are also limited, both in terms of volume and risk. If any of these limits are exceeded, additional substantial capital buffers should be retained which are highly penalizing. For example, the volume of trading activities shall not exceed 15 % of the balance sheet. For every euro held above that threshold in trading assets, equal amounts of equal capital should be held. This system does not exist in the United States. That is why we go further than the strict regulations that exist in some other countries.

The fourth reason is that in the event of bankruptcy, depositors are privileged over the bank’s assets. It stipulates that the bank will set a limit on the deposit of assets so that sufficient unpaid assets are left to enable the privilege to be effectively exercised. When the bank is in trouble, there must always be sufficient funds to repay the savers. This was a requirement of the SP, so that every saver is safe. Up to 100 000 euros there is the statutory deposit guarantee, above 100 000 euros, savers enjoy a privilege on the bank’s assets. We ensure that sufficient assets are permanently present.

The fifth reason is because traders’ bonuses are limited to 50 % of the fixed salary, or a maximum of 50 000 euros. They must also be linked to long-term results of three to five years. This deprives them of the incentive to be more risky in the short term. Furthermore, the bonus can be reclaimed if it turns out that too many risks have been taken in the past. Europe sets a limit of 100%. We set a limit of 50% of the fixed salary. We are going beyond what Europe is imposing.

The sixth reason is that no bonus can be given in banks that receive exceptional government aid.

The seventh and final reason why the sp.a. group will approve this new regulation is that the FSMA can determine the limits of positions that individuals can take in financial instruments whose underlying value consists of a food commodity.

In short, colleagues, for these seven reasons, the sp.a. group will approve this new regulation.

Mr. Van der Maelen, I have listened attentively to your speech. You speak like a proud man. You are very proud that Belgium will have a much stricter regulation than France, Germany and even the United States, but especially stricter than France and Germany. You are proud that there is a disturbed level playing field and that Belgium is different from France and Germany.

I wonder, Mr. Van der Maelen, what you will do when we review the rules of the National Bank of Belgium in two years and we will have to find that there are banks that have moved part of their activities and ⁇ of their deposits to their homeland France or to a bank in the Czech Republic. I wonder what you will do then.

Will you then be the first to stand on the barricades, crying crocodile trains over the lost jobs due to that shift of activities? What will be your message to those people who will lose their jobs because there are stricter regulations here than in France and Germany? What message will you have to the people who work in the financial sector today and who are at risk by your legislation? What message would you send to those people?

I will try to answer briefly.

First, I am really very happy that we have stricter regulations in Belgium than in France and Germany, for the simple reason that Belgium is a small country, with a GDP that is many times lower than that of France or Germany, and that we are therefore much more vulnerable when our large banking sector comes into trouble.

We have already experienced that. The consequences of the 2008 banking crisis have reached Belgium much harder and harder than the larger countries, which can handle it more easily.

Secondly, I did not say this at the speaker’s table because the minister is not there, but your question gives me the opportunity to say it briefly. Man is not there yet. It’s not just the SPD group that says that. I would like to show you the study of the OECD, not a leftist think tank, in which it has fairly severe criticism of Europe, because we are far too soft with the new regulation. There are still at least thirty to forty major European structural banks — listen carefully — in the danger zone. So we are doing well, all countries are doing well, to have a well-developed regulation.

Thirdly, and finally, Mr Dedecker, I also invite you to take a look at the new directive issued by Commissioner Barnier. The Directive contains provisions that go even further than our Belgian legislation. I think it will be a task for the next government and the next finance minister to ensure that there is not too much enforcement on the draft European regulation.

To protect our economy and our jobs, not only in the banking sector but also in the other sectors, we need tight regulation with tight supervision of the banking sector. We know how dangerous the banking sector can be, we learned in 2008. If a banking sector is given too much freedom, it can be dangerous for the economy, jobs and people’s income.

Mr. Van der Maelen, I think this is a very strange reasoning. We are going to be stricter in our country. Again, no one disputes the need for stricter rules at European level, and we also think that there should definitely be a step further. But what you will get is precisely that deposits and activities from our Belgian banks will shift to those banks that may even be in the danger zone, the banks you just talked about. At that moment you are really not a step further, quite the opposite.

Can I hear the echo of Febelfin?

Even not, Mr. Van der Maelen, because Febelfin and the Belgian banks have sufficiently studied this legislation. The Parliament has worked for a long time to transpose various directives, and has looked at ways to prevent an economic crisis and reduce its impact on our banking sector. When I just heard the discussion, I was a little surprised that they were again trying to pretend it was a new measure that would endanger our economy and our financial sector. Nothing is less true. I invite you to listen to what I want to share with you.

The financial crisis has shown that prudential supervision, such as it was before the crisis, needed a thorough review. The draft law that is being submitted to us for approval today aims to bring about this necessary revision in Belgium. It does so, on the one hand, by transposing as many European legislative initiatives as possible into Belgian law and, on the other hand, by introducing a number of additional rules, in particular in the fields of governance and structural reforms. The draft clearly reflects the will of the Parliament and the Government to avoid bank failures and a new financial crisis as best as possible and to protect the Belgian financial system and savers against it in the best possible way.

Prudential supervision of credit institutions aims to ensure the soundness of the financial system as a whole – that is, macroprudential supervision – and of the financial institutions themselves, microprudential supervision. Both dimensions of this prudential supervision fall within the competence of the National Bank of Belgium. Prudential supervision should ensure that each credit institution is solvent, has sufficient liquidity, is profitable and is organized and managed in such a way that it can adequately control its risks and thus be able to meet its obligations to creditors, including depositors. Prudential supervision is compatible with a macroeconomic perspective, as it contributes to ⁇ ining the financial stability of the financial system as a whole.

The financial crisis has demonstrated the lack of sound macroprudential supervision. It is only since the crisis that the prevention of systemic risks is internationally regarded as an integral part of that prudential supervision. Systemic risk prevention aims to protect savers and investors and to ensure the stability and confidence in the banking and financial sector as a whole. From a macroeconomic point of view, this objective is essential. When a banking crisis occurs, the liquidity deficit not only has a potential direct budgetary impact due to government intervention, but it also leads to a shortage of the loan offer, resulting in higher financing costs for our companies. This inevitably has an impact on economic growth.

In order to ensure effective macroprudential supervision throughout the European Union, the European Systemic Risk Committee issued Recommendation No. 2011/3 on the macroprudential mandate of national authorities.

Our country follows this recommendation with the draft law establishing the mechanisms for a macroprudential policy and establishing the specific tasks of the National Bank of Belgium in the framework of its mandate to contribute to the stability of the financial system. This draft gives the bank the macroprudential mandate. The Bank will be empowered to make recommendations to other authorities in order to maintain the stability of the financial system.

The draft also responds to the recommendation of the special follow-up committee responsible for the investigation of the financial crisis, on the one hand, to grant a macroprudential mandate and, on the other hand, to develop additional macroprudential instruments.

The draft law should be read in the context of the development of a banking union for euro area countries and the Member States of the European Union, which would engage in close cooperation with the ECB. The initiative for the establishment of a banking union was initiated by the Communication of the European Commission "A Roadmap to a Banking Union" of 12 September 2012.

One of the essential objectives of a banking union is to break the link between public debt and bank debt, which the euro crisis exposed.

A banking union should ideally consist of three components: a single supervisory mechanism, a single resolution mechanism and a single deposit guarantee mechanism.

The European Council gave a strong political impetus to the development of a banking union in its conclusions of 14 December 2012.

With the adoption of the GTM Regulation, the first pillar of the banking union was established.

For the second pillar, on 10 July 2013, the European Commission presented its proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms under the Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund. The European Council and the European Parliament are currently negotiating that proposal.

This second pillar will also be governed by a rule book containing substantive rules on the recovery and resolution of banking institutions.

A proposal for a third pillar of the banking union, namely a common deposit guarantee system, is not yet on the table.

However, on 17 December 2013 an agreement was reached between the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission on the revision of Directive 94/19 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit guarantee schemes. The draft revision dates from 12 July 2010 and provides for further harmonisation of national deposit guarantee schemes.

The three pillars of the banking union are key components. The bill that we are discussing today aligns the Belgian supervisory framework with the first pillar of the banking union and some elements of the second pillar. However, it remains essential that the Council continue to strive for the swift completion of the negotiations on the resolution pillar. We must absolutely avoid losing momentum for the establishment of the banking union and its coherence.

In order to give the new banking law the necessary sustainability, the government has taken into account the establishment of a common supervisory mechanism. The Single Supervisory Mechanism shall consist of the European Central Bank and the national competent authorities of the participating Member States. The participating Member States shall include, on the one hand, the Member States whose currency is the euro and, on the other hand, any other Member State which has entered into close cooperation with the ECB pursuant to the GTM Regulation.

The GTM aims to ensure that, on the one hand, the Union’s policy on prudential supervision of credit institutions is implemented in a coherent and efficient manner and, on the other hand, that European legislation is applied in the same way to credit institutions of all the Member States concerned, without taking into account non-prudential considerations. Thus, the GTM should contribute to the security and robustness of credit institutions and to the stability of the financial system of the European Union and the participating Member States. The supervisory tasks assigned to the ECB are listed in Article 4 of the GTM Regulation. The ECB shall be responsible for carrying out those tasks with respect to all credit institutions established in the participating Member States. For the purposes of those tasks, the ECB shall apply Union law and, where that law consists of directives, national law transposing those directives and using the options provided by those directives. Thus, it is the legislation that is the subject of the bill at present.

The need for a complete revision of the Act of 22 March 1993 is partly explained by the transposition of the European Directive 2013. The financial crisis has highlighted structural undercapitalization and acute liquidity problems in some banks.

Directive 2013/36/EU aims to respond to this with the following measures: strengthening of bank own funds, both quantitatively and qualitatively; stricter liquidity requirements to manage short- and long-term liquidity risk; and standards to prevent the distribution of dividends and premiums or the increase in lending from affecting prudent management and solidity. For instance, to be able to pay dividends and premiums, banks will have to maintain a significant security buffer, above the regulatory own funds.

In case of overheating of the credit cycle, i.e. an excessively rapid increase in lending, banks will have to set up a security buffer. These buffers should play a so-called countercyclical role and allow the bank to continue financing the real economy in the event of a crisis.

In addition, there is a leverage ratio between capital and assets, as well as better accounting for counterparty risks associated with exposure to derivatives and the strengthening of the rules on corporate governance of banks and their supervision.

In addition to the transposition of Directive 2013/36/EU, the draft new Banking Act aims to advance the reforms at the international level, on the one hand in terms of the separation of certain trading assets and, on the other hand, in terms of governance requirements by further strengthening the supervision of credit institutions at three levels: the statutory governing body, the operational level and the supervision by the supervisory authority.

Therefore, the present bill includes the following measures: the presence of an independent director in each of the committees, the mandatory establishment of a management committee and the anchoring in the law of the three independent audit functions and the extension to all credit institutions of the prior approval by the supervisory authority of their strategic decisions.

Another important component of the draft legislation concerns the rules on the recovery and resolution of credit institutions, which draws on a large part of the provisions of the draft BRR Directive.

At the time of drafting this draft, there was no political discussion between the Council and the European Parliament on most issues of the BRR Directive. The provisions on which an agreement existed at the time are already implemented with this draft.

This applies, for example, to recovery and resolution plans that must be drawn up by the credit institutions themselves and by the resolution authorities.

The Government has deliberately made this choice for anticipative conversion, especially since the IMF in its 2013 financial sector evaluation program had recommended to draw up short-term recovery and resolution plans for banks of Belgian systemic importance.

This draft also provides provisions relating to the resolution instruments in the light of the BRR work.

A third important component in which Belgium takes the lead with other European countries, such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany, relates to the re-framing of trading activities. On the basis of the provisions of the present draft, it is forbidden for credit institutions to trade for their own account.

A range of other trading activities on behalf of third parties is not prohibited, but better framed. The activities involved, such as market making or liquidity management, will be possible within certain risk limits and subject to accompanying measures. The provisions are a crucial part of the government and Parliament’s response to the laundering that led to the financial crisis. Indeed, an over-developed trading book poses a potential threat to the deposits held by the credit institutions concerned and to the stability of the credit service.

The present draft law also responds to various recommendations of the parliamentary committees established in Belgium following the financial crisis, and takes into account the changed circumstances that have arisen or new insights that have emerged since the recommendations were published.

I would like to extend my special thanks to the Chairman of the Commission, Herman De Croo. He has led the work of the committee in an excellent way and is thus part of the foundation of the important draft law.

The draft law also implements several provisions of the government agreement.

In addition, the report follows the comments of the International Monetary Fund in the light of its evaluation programme for the financial sector, which was recently implemented in Belgium. This has resulted in changes to the legal framework to align banking legislation, where necessary, with the core principles for effective banking supervision formulated by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. Those principles and the associated methodology constitute the main standard in the field of banking regulation and banking supervision. They provide a framework of minimum standards for sound supervisory practices.

It is clear, colleagues, that the Parliament and the Government, with the present bill, once again wish to contribute to the restoration of the confidence of the savers and investors, and especially to the stability of the financial system.

Therefore, the Open Vld group will confidently and unshortedly approve the bill.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker. For my part, I would like to intervene on a particular point, namely the food speculation.

Since the 2000s, speculation on the evolution of the prices of agricultural raw materials has intensified, reversing the economic paradigm according to which prices are determined by the law of supply and demand. This serious problem was raised, as early as 2008, within my group by my deceased and regretted colleague, Patrick Moriau, who deposited, at the time, a bill aimed at prohibiting speculation on foodstuffs.

Several factors determine the evolution of this financing of agricultural markets. It’s not me who says this, but some great experts in the matter. of the shooter.

In short, I will note above all that this phenomenon has been amplified with the financial crisis. Stock markets have begun to be less rewarding for investors. In doing so, agricultural markets have become refuge values for scrupulous investors, for whom the end justifies the means.

Now the scale of speculation is such that it has caused a reversal of roles and that it is the financial markets that determine the prices of foodstuffs, disconnecting them from any connection with the real agricultural market. This speculation has dramatic consequences for food security and for producers in Southern countries. It is not exaggerated to say that the pursuit of exceptional yields through speculation on basic food products is not alien to the conditions that have led to serious food crises and the death of so many people.

The impact of politics in this situation is important. We have to act, my colleagues. Nevertheless, it took years for my group to make these partners hear—and I’m not hiding that we’re satisfied with this advance—all the interest in fighting this speculation. For fighting against food price speculation is fighting hunger in the world, but not only. Even Belgian producers denounce the detrimental nature of this speculation. The hearings that were held in the Finance Committee showed this to the wishes.

Food speculation is the most infamous. I would like, therefore, to place the debate on the level of financial ethics. Is it acceptable that banking institutions offer products linked to rising food prices, while the dramatic consequences of this form of speculation for the population of Southern countries are known? and no! Clearly not!

Certainly, this speculation is not the only one to be responsible for food crises, but it is too easy to hide behind the alleged complexity of the reasons that led to crises - food, economic, banking - or to pretend that it would be futile to address such behaviors and products.

It is a matter of principle: speculating on hunger is intolerable and revolting! We have asked the Finance Committee to organize hearings. We received the world of banking, the world of agriculture, the world of food distribution. from Schutter, as well as the associations that operate in this sector.

Following these hearings, we decided to submit a proposal for a resolution, which, in our opinion, responded better to the discussions held in committees. I will not return to the fiasco that followed in the Finance Committee.

As a result of this failure, we submitted a third bill, which entrusts the FSMA with the task of introducing position limits that would allow for maximum activity in the food market. The least we can say is that we have demonstrated perseverance in this case that deserves it.

My group is therefore fully satisfied to see that the government has worked on this subject and on this basis. Some are not moved by this dossier, while others would like to make believing that they are at the basis of the debate. That is fucking! We are not giving the prizes. What we wanted was to act instead of throwing slogans. This is done! We have a text that allows us to advance the debate. It is not perfect, of course, but it is a first step and a very important step.

Let’s be very clear, the prohibition of course manipulation is for me toileting and brings nothing more than what already existed! On the other hand, the introduction of position limits joins our latest text. The FSMA is assigned a task, namely to fix the limits of positions by settlement for financial instruments, the underlying value of which consists of foodstuffs.

We also enjoy significant parliamentary control, as the FSMA can, at the request of Parliament, come to explain its annual report. In this context, questions regarding position limits or exceptions can be followed.

I had a few questions, but Mr. The Minister responded in full to the Commission. I will not return therefore. Furthermore, I am very proud that the government has taken charge of defending this important point of financial ethics.

Finally, I would like to conclude by paying, once again, a tribute to our regretted colleague Patrick Moriau. This was one of the last struggles he wanted to do. I am, like my group, very proud of him. Patrick has provoked the debate in this parliament and we will vote today on a law that allows to frame these abject practices. We give him a wonderful tribute.

I will start where the previous speaker ended. On food speculation, I will be brief, because for the rest, my explanation focuses primarily on the Banking Act.

Colleagues, many of you will remember the campaign of 11.11.11. They complain that the Belgian banks invested billions in food speculation: 3.8 to 4.7 billion euros was the amount stated in their press release, a crazy amount. The proposal that we are going to discuss today should make this impossible. I say “would” because whoever analyzes the vague framework presented today will find that it is far too little ambitious to effectively address the unrest that 11.11.11 has rightly accused.

Colleagues, we had a proposal earlier in this Parliament legislature that was much more ambitious. This proposal was rejected by the majority and was subsequently rejected due to disagreement. Today we have a vague framework, little ambitious and ⁇ contrasting with the discourse that many have held on this subject in the committee and at these banks.

We will limit investment positions, but not the trade on the food products themselves. The speculation can continue. I see that the interest in this banking law is ⁇ understated, but this element becomes very concrete for all colleagues who go on missions abroad, who are engaged in development cooperation, and who are engaged in world hunger and the Millennium Goals. Last week, they spoke with me about some beautiful principles.

Colleagues, this is a very concrete consequence of what you decide today. I regret that the proposal that was previously on the table in this legislature has not achieved it and that we now have to vote on something less extensive.

Colleagues, what comes ahead today is a matter of everyone.

Madame Almaci, when I hear you, I feel like I’m listening to the grinching Schtroumpf, the little blue man who is never content with anything.

Of course, I agree with some of your words. We fought together, with Mr. Gilkinet, in this case. But when you have the choice between everything or nothing or an essential position and defended by the associations you just cited (CNCD-11.11.11, SOS Hunger), what to do?

I am talking about food speculation. What do they say? The imposition of position limits is the key to regulation. These limits should aim to prevent speculative activities. This is the key to regulation.

I also recall a speech from Ms. Virginie Pissor of SOS Hunger, who explains that position limits on agricultural financial markets are the first important measures to be launched.

Certainly, the text has gaps that we regret because it does not encompass everything, as we would have liked, but we have taken an important first step. This first step puts us ahead of other European countries. We will not release the strain. From the next negotiations, if we are called to be there, we will want to go even further than what was set today.

Mr. Lacroix, I agree with you. You have effectively supported us and we have fought together for the preservation of that more ambitious law, but it has failed. I propose an alternative: our amendment that is on the table. I assume that the PS will support this today, because this is going on effectively: not words, but actions! That is what I expect from you, Mr. Lacroix. Otherwise, everything you say here is empty. But effectively, we have fought for this together and we continue to fight because we think it’s important.

The banking law itself. Colleagues, for those who were there: on 29 April 2009 we held a debate in this half-course on the report of the special banking committee: hundreds of pages after dozens of hearings with open doors or closed doors and with four experts who have accompanied us, elected by the majority. Dexia was then first rescued, Fortis was split and sold, KBC was still held up with state aid. Mr Dewael was still chairman and Mr Reynders was Minister of Finance. A lot has changed since then. I wish I could say the same about the attitude of all those parties who at that time knocked on their chest here that they would split the banks. I wish I could say the same about the banking sector.

Literally five years later, twenty days later, the great demand of the time, about which all experts are talking then and today, the division of the banks, has completely disappeared from the attention. We quickly got a Twin Peaks model to strengthen the fire department, the supervisory authority, but those who had failed at the supervisory authority in their task of adequately addressing the crisis, including firewood reports from the French Court of Auditors, are still on board. I go to the banks themselves. The former CEOs who failed horribly at the head of one bank are now in the board of directors or at the head of other big banks. There was just a carousel.

In those last five years, and that is important to the population, none of all these people have offered their apologies. No one said at any moment: our apologies, we should have seen this come, we should have held it in our hands, we did not do it. None of all those who were responsible for privatizing the profits and then for rolling off the debts on the public, has hit mea culpa since that date.

The taxpayer is aware. Our national debt has risen. All the austerity exercises and budget discussions we have held here in the past years have therefore been mortgaged. The decision to cut the benefits and the decision to save everywhere, up to Development Cooperation – the link with food speculation is therefore restored – have much to do with what happened then, in 2008. For a systemic crisis that has left people worldwide without home and income, all these things are remarkable.

It could be different, colleagues. In Iceland, political leaders and banking officials have been brought to court. Unlike us, there was no overdose. They have dismissed the matter and set up real investigative committees, because they believed that they owe accountability to the public, who had to bear the debts. It also sounds like that. What do we get? After five years of waiting, we will get a proposal for a banking law before the fall of this fierce legislature.

The neoliberal model of the invisible hand collapsed in 2008. In response to that crash, we received neoliberal recipes, which the ordinary citizen paid for. The savings and responsibility were placed on the citizens. Never wanted to examine responsibility in reverse. The speed with which the system banks and big banks stopped their hand with the taxpayer and the government was unseen. The blind belief that ever-larger institutions brought ever-greater benefits turned out to be false. The dimensions of those banks were extraterrestrial: their balance sheets exceeded more than dozens of times the GDP of their home countries.

What has changed since 2009? Take a look at the balance sheets of the big banks. What has changed? What does this law do to the problem of too big to fail? I do not need seven arguments to be in favour of this law. I have one to be against: too big to fail, too big to exist. and nothing. The foundation of the 2008 problem remains. Explain this to the population, who has been able to cough billions and will be able to guarantee the zombie bank Dexia for another forty years.

The size of those banks was extraterrestrial in 2009 and is still. The problems remained. There is still a lack of trust and transparency. There is still a remarkable mixture of business banking activities and deposit banking activities. Also, too low own funds are not addressed by this law.

Thro ⁇ the years, Greens have pledged for thorough reforms. We demonstrated the need to do so by calculating the gigantic gap on our banking market itself and by indicating the size of the implicit state aid that the rescued state banks enjoy today. Because they are saved by our country, they can borrow much cheaper money on the interbank market and they can compete flatly with the banks that did not need to be saved. We calculated that the banks that operate in our country in this way generate 58 billion euros of benefits within the European Union, a giant shift in the market to the detriment of the banks that had done their homework.

How does it work? Too big to fail, implicit state guarantees, cheaper borrowing, others flat competing. A government that allows too big to fail to exist gives the implicit guarantee that the taxpayer will always act when they stop handing. We do not participate in that game!

We said it then and we continue to say: there is one clear remedy for that. Some have used the tooth of time to renew that message. Therefore I repeat them today clearly: whoever guarantees the voter tomorrow that this law will not have to be interfered again, has not done his homework properly.

There is no strict separation between business banking activities and other activities. Within business banking activities, this law only makes a distinction between trading on own account and on behalf of third parties. As colleague Gilkinet said, this is not a split, this does not prevent us from having to rescue banks again. We knew what had to happen, but we did not.

We offer simple or even simplistic answers to complex problems.

Since, like me, you have an excellent memory, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that, during the 2008 crisis, among the banks that provoked the crisis, some were just trading-related banks, separate banks. Therefore, it is not the separation of trades, as you think in a simplistic way, that will prevent banks from trading for their own and other purposes. Unlike the project that is coming.

On the other hand, when you talk about job separation, you forget that in the United States, for example, it took President Obama four years to get a measure similar to job separation. A 800-page text has been written to explain what trading for own account is.

What is all about this government is that in Belgium, between simplism and a gas plant, we have chosen a formula, the one proposed by the government, that really separates the professions. It is true that to explain it to our voters, it will need more than just a slogan. We can be prepared for it, but our voters are not fools!

Mrs. Vienne, I take note that you consider people like Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz and in your own country Ivan Van de Cloot and Paul De Grauwe to be absolute idiots. I take note that you categorize a system that has existed seventy years, that was the most stable and led to the most growth in the banking sector, as a slogan. However, it has existed for decades, longer than the system that exists today. It was more stable and led to greater growth. I note that you note that in the United States the problem with the depository banks was that they took the path of risky speculation with their deposits and engaged in business banks.

Well, Mrs. Vienne, then be consistent and split those banks instead of saying that they should continue to speculate! That is not so difficult. It is not a slogan. Please read the literature of all the economists who took the turn after 2008. Look at how many neoliberal economists have then said that they have learned from it, that it must not happen again, that they do not want it again, to Nobel Prize winner Krugman!

I think, by the way, to remember that the PS was one of those parties who here in 2009 – you can check it out in the reports – paradeed with that slogan for dozens of minutes as being something that the PS was going to ⁇ . I think you get a bit of election stress.

What determines that law? That law is less ambitious, which is at least a understatement. It is difficult in this law to distinguish between the two forms of trade, for own account or for the account of third parties. In any case, it is a finding that in 2008 banks that held less than the 15 % allowed herein fell. There were banks wandering with lower standards than those laid down in this legislation. So even if you are not carrying out that split, you could have been a little stricter in terms of trading, I think.

The five exceptions you give are, by the way, not really clear. When is trading for your own account and when is it for third parties? If a company goes to the stock exchange and a bank accompanies that company to that exchange, is that bank participating in speculating or is it simply facilitating that company’s trading? I have to explain this, because this is not clearly stated in the legislation.

Furthermore, the part of the government agreement that regulates trade on behalf of customers is not even anchored in a law so that Parliament can control it. No, this is regulated by the National Bank of Belgium and the government. Thus, that other requirement from 2009, in particular greater transparency, is also by no means fulfilled in this bill. You stay away from the public opinion. Even worse, that 15% standard for trading may even be adjusted afterwards. In what direction? We do not know.

You could say that 15 % is an absolute maximum, given the facts of 2008. You do not do it. You say that it can be adjusted after an agreement on the proposal of the National Bank of Belgium with the Government. It must be done! I assume that you really did not understand the message of 2008.

More transparency, more trust, the division of the banks: it is not in it. The National Bank of Belgium is given a lot of responsibility and playing space here.

In deciding which bank is a systemic bank or not, a lot of playing space is left. As my colleague just said, in the case of less than 3 billion euros on the balance sheet, one does not speak of a systemic bank. For Europe it is a balance sheet total of less than 30 billion and it applies the rule of proportionality. With us, the National Bank will interpret whether banks with a balance sheet total between 3 and 30 billion euros are systemic or not. Between 3 and 30 billion: I think that is a very large margin, and I have also told the minister.

Now we are getting news that all the banks that operate in our country would be system banks, including the small banks that have survived the banking crisis and already pay disproportionate amounts by a banking law that imposes them extra tax because they are safe savings banks. Where is the rule of proportionality?

This, combined with the explicit state aid, is destroying the diversity in our banking landscape. And the minister says the diversity in the banking landscape and the banking law will be adjusted after the elections. The National Bank of Belgium apparently intends to label all banks as systemic.

My question to the Minister, in this case Minister Milquet, is whether this is true. What is the Minister’s assessment of proportionality? How many banks are systemic? Do you think that the National Bank of Belgium should handle the limit of 3 billion, or do you think that the norm of everything below 30 billion should be used?

To that I wish to answer today, because that is crucial for the banks that never needed to be saved, who had a much simpler business model, who, as a good housekeeper, have suited to the cents of their customers, but who today are told that even the five exceptions on the hundreds of pages that are in this banking law for non-systemic banks will not apply to them.

So it is clear that this government and this majority were led by the lobby of the big banks and that the National Bank of Belgium does not intend to clearly correct that. I ask for a clear commitment of the majority.

I hear here many advocates for diversity within a bank, that we need universal banks for this, but the diversity outside it appears to interest this majority much less.

No division, less diversity.

I understand that the word “splitsing” in a particular context can induce specific feelings in some. Put the word, however, in the context of the Banking Act.

Why is it so important for us that our country would have been a precursor rather than a successor to Germany and France? I will explain for a moment why the German-French model may not be very interesting. Deutsche Bank and BNP Paribas are internationally the banks’ samples. The model that France and Germany are pushing forward is therefore more tied to the interests of their banks than to the interests of the ordinary taxpayer.

Our country seems to find their model very interesting rather than our second best, namely the ringfencing in Great Britain, where rigorously choosing a split is chosen. The British choose the second best within one bank, so an absolute infection becomes impossible. However, we did not go that way.

Why am I hammering on it? Because in Europe the CRD IV Directive, the Capital Requirements Directive, is a transposition of Basel III. What are the Basel Standards, of which the ordinary citizen always hears talk? These are agreements between banks that, after the financial crisis of 2008, have admitted that their own assets were indeed apparently somewhat low and that they thus apparently cannot properly cope with crises. They promised to learn from this and increase their own assets to 7% in 2019. Colleagues, the Bank of England has calculated that the big banks should actually raise their assets to 20 percent. Thus, the requirement of equity, which is derived from the Basel III standards, and which is now incorporated through CRD IV into our legislation, is absolutely not sufficient to keep a bank standing in the event of a crisis.

We should therefore expect a good housekeeper to decide differently, having the above in mind and knowing that Greens in Europe also advocate for the increase of equity, because equity is a very important buffer. If the pillar of equity is insufficiently defended on the international level — many here defend the international aspect, but they do not always manage to listen at the international level to the experts, who nevertheless come from the sector itself, such as the Bank of England, which I have just mentioned, — we must be sure that the other pillar is strong enough. Quod not.

According to all experts, the two pillars had to be strengthened. However, I find that in the present draft we have failed, neither through Europe nor through our own legislation, to adequately arm one of the two support bears of our financial sector.

I come to my decision, Mr. Speaker.

You have three minutes of speech, Madame Almaci.

Do you know what I deeply regret?

I only know one thing, and that you have three minutes left. The rest, I totally ignore.

I know there is no timing agreed.

Now you have two minutes left, Mrs. You have a 30-minute speech time, as prescribed by the Rules.

Mr. Speaker, I am about to finish.

So then finish.

I want to say what I regret. For such a fundamental debate, similar to a nuclear catastrophe, we must continuously fight against such drugs and disinformation of public opinion. In addition, we do not even have time to honestly discuss each other.

The standard for equity is too low to cope with a future crisis. The banking lobby has taken control of Europe. Our colleagues Philippe Lamberts and Bart Staes have really fought against this and we have gotten into a number of matters in the area of the bonus policy. However, it is ⁇ painful to need a bank testament after all these things in order to be able to protect the citizen somewhat.

Mr. Speaker, I conclude to satisfy you. Since 1970 we have experienced 124 bank crises. We have lost time to learn lessons. System banks are for us like nuclear power plants. We do not want to allow a second nuclear disaster, but this majority apparently does.

There are no more registered participants.

The Minister of Justice is not there yet.

A government is collegial and the Deputy Prime Minister is present. So there is no problem. This being recorded and well understood, Madame Milquet, would you like to react?

The President, Mr Geens explained the project extensively and answered all questions in the committee.

Mrs. Dudley asks, but does not listen to you. Mr Minister, you have given your answer. It is perfect! Thank you very much.