Proposition 53K2605

Proposition de résolution concernant la situation au Mali.

General information ¶

Authors

CD&V Peter Luykx
PS | SP Christophe Lacroix

Submission date

Jan. 16, 2013

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

Mali UN resolution foreign policy military intervention resolution of parliament multinational force forces abroad terrorism

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V Vooruit LE PS | SP Open Vld N-VA MR

Abstained from voting

Groen Ecolo VB

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

Jan. 17, 2013 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Monsieur le président, chers colleagues, in the course of its meeting of 16 January 2013, the Conférence des présidents chargé les commissions réunies des Relations extérieures et de la Défense de débattre de l'opération militaire au Mali, and pursuant to Article 76 of the Rules of the Chamber. During the meeting of the commissions meeting this same day, a proposal of resolution to be deposited by MM. The Croo, Lacroix, Waterschoot, Deseyn, Van der Maelen, Dallemagne et Ducarme.

In an introductory presentation, Mr. De Croo explains that the draft resolution refers to the various debates and exchanges of views on Mali that preceded, both in a committee and in a plenary session of the House of Representatives, the last meeting being an exchange of views within the meeting committees of Foreign Relations and Defence, to which the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Defence was associated.

The draft resolution is based on UN Security Council resolutions 2056, 2071 and 2085 adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which all address the security situation in Mali and emphasize the urgent need to respond to the terrorist threat in Mali.

The draft resolution calls on the federal government to actively cooperate in the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions and European efforts.

The House expresses its support for the Decision of 15 January 2013 of the Limited Committee of Ministers to participate in an action in accordance with the Security Council mandate and asks the Federal Government to ensure that Parliament is informed, in particular through a regular meeting of the Special Commission responsible for monitoring missions abroad during the duration of the operations.

The draft resolution also insists on the need to inform and involve Parliament without delay if new circumstances change the nature and duration of Belgium’s commitment.

The draft resolution also highlights the importance of the humanitarian aspect for the benefit of local and displaced populations, victims of the Mali conflict, and finally calls on the government to make additional efforts to give the UN-led political process in Mali and in the region the maximum chance of success.

During the discussion, most political groups support the proposed resolution. by MM. Van der Maelen and Dallemagne ⁇ welcomed the clear reference to the humanitarian aspect as it is essential to rescue the population.

The political aspect is also indispensable; in fact, military aid is not enough, it is also necessary to intervene on the political level in order to remedy the institutional void and security gaps.

by Mr. Ducarme also shares this view and emphasizes that the long-term goal is reconciliation, which will include new efforts in development cooperation. Mali is one of our eighteen partner countries.

Several members also expressed their satisfaction that Parliament has been, from the beginning, involved in the decision-making process. The draft resolution rightly insists on the need to continue to keep Parliament regularly informed of developments in the matter and to involve Parliament without delay in the decision-making process in the event of a change in the nature or duration of our country’s commitment. by Mr. Lacroix adds that this is not a declaration of war but that our country is putting itself at the service of an international operation.

I give the floor to my colleague Peter Luykx for the follow-up to the report.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, gentlemen ministers, we have indeed had a balanced and well-finished debate in the Joint Committee on National Defense and Foreign Relations over our country’s participation in an intervention in Mali in the last few days.

As my predecessor has already outlined, I would like to inform you for the fullness that during that meeting Mrs. Ponthier spoke and expressed her support on behalf of the Flemish Interest Group for the military action against the terrorists and against the excesses committed by them in Mali, but that she made reservations on a number of points.

Ms. Ponthier warned that we should learn from the international mission in Afghanistan and that we should be careful that the Belgian engagement does not serve only the economic interests of France.

According to Ms. Ponthier, European states should also intensify the fight against terrorism on their own territory. In that regard, she regretted that Belgium still does not have a genuine operational unit.

A thorough assessment of the terrain is necessary and the Belgian intervention must primarily be based on a concrete political plan.

Then Mr De Vriendt took the floor on behalf of the Green Fraction. He submitted an amendment aiming to further extend the requesting part of the resolution in paragraph 5. He emphasized the importance of a broad political approach and the establishment of a political dialogue between all parties.

He believes that the House should make the provision of Belgian resources and military personnel dependent on progress also on the political level.

In addition, the amendment calls on the government to submit an evaluation of the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions within one month.

Finally, according to the amendment, the prior consent of this Parliament is also required if the deployment of the Belgian troops would either be extended or if new circumstances are announced.

In short, in the proposal for a resolution, safety nets should also be incorporated. As proof, Mr. De Vriendt refers to the fact that France is now expanding the mandate of its troops.

On behalf of the N-VA group, Mr. Luyckx and Mr. Francken came to the debate. Mr Francken, Mr Luyckx and Mr Jambon submitted an amendment to add an additional point to the resolution. We urged the government to engage more actively with the European Union. First, a long-term political solution to the conflict in Mali should be sought. It is important that we do this for the entire population and for all parties on the ground, not for any government.

Then there was an exchange of views on these amendments. The majority parties found the amendments of Mr De Vriendt and the N-VA unnecessary because this resolution mentions the UN Security Council resolution. This includes both the military and political aspect.

In his response, the Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that we must demonstrate a policy of unity at the European level, both with the countries participating in the mission and with the other Member States. Belgium will also use its influence to effectively implement the political roadmap. Our country will also insist that the reconstruction of a rule of law is important. Our country has already undertaken several humanitarian actions in Mali in the past.

The Minister of National Defence informed us of some factual events. The military equipment was brought on site in less than 24 hours. The first C-130 from Chad landed in Abidjan. After an interim landing on Corsica to pick up French military equipment, a second C-130 would land in Abidjan that same evening.

Finally, we go to the vote. The Greens’ amendments and the N-VA amendment are rejected. The proposal for a resolution, which had to be re-written in extremis due to some formal requirements – some parts were not translated – is eventually adopted unchanged with 20 votes in favour and 4 abstentions.

Following the report, I would like to express the position of the N-VA group. Our group supported the participation in the intervention. In the light of the events in Algeria, we believe that a certain serenity is required in the discussion. It is still uncertain whether there were any casualties in the unfortunate hostage capture in Algeria.

We supported the intervention because the N-VA believes that the action is directed against jihadists, against Muslim extremists who cannot count on the support of their Muslim population even in their own country. They are not loved in their own country.

Furthermore, we believe that an urgent intervention was needed, as problems with security and stability in that region could have repercussions for Europe. West Africa is the backyard of Europe and without intervention, terrorist groups could become active there in the long run and set up their base in Europe.

We ⁇ did not approve the draft resolution in the eyes of Mr. Hollande, not at all. Our group, however, believes that we must be loyal to our international partners. We also note that there is a broad consensus in Europe on providing aid. The United Kingdom, the United States, as well as Canada and Germany have already pledged their support.

Minimum conditions were also met: the intervention is supported by a UN resolution; Western African troops are deployed; intervention in the conflict is also supported on the ground; the inhuman events on the ground call for urgency.

However, our group also wants to give a warning. We must take care that the solution to the conflict does not become a long-term intervention. Can the West African countries organize their troops in time? Do they have sufficient training? When will the rescue of the guard come? This issue must be followed day by day.

Finally, even more importantly, we can or may hope for a military success in the short term, for our group it is very important that we also offer the population a, hopefully successful, long-term solution on the political level. The roadmap that was discussed must also be effectively completed and we must not make the same mistakes as in Libya, namely a successful military action but a political mess afterwards.

We must not underestimate the power of the terrorists. After the fall of Gaddafi, many weapons were looted, which are in their possession. I may have already said it in a less strong tone, they are not terrorists on camels, but heavily armed jihadists, who can really resist and we must be careful about it.

Our group approved the draft resolution and also submitted an amendment, the text of which can be found on the banks.

Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen ministers, dear colleagues, the limited ministerial committee has taken, on Tuesday, an important decision, namely the participation of Belgium in the operation conducted in recent days by France in Mali, in support of the Mali military forces. However, Belgian participation was clearly defined by our Prime Minister, excluding any Belgian military presence in combat zones. Our country will provide two C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and two medical helicopters, one of which is a reserve, until March 1, 2013.

In the committee, several questions immediately came to our mind. Why intervene? Why now ? Why there? These questions, heavy but essential before a commitment, were answered during our committee meetings this week but also through the resolution that is being voted today.

Since the beginning of 2012, Mali has faced a series of security, political and humanitarian challenges. Clashes between government forces and Touareg rebels have erupted in the north of this country since at least January. This crisis is the result of much deeper crisis movements that affect the entire Sahel region, a region heavily weakened by a succession of destabilizations that the international community has undoubtedly underestimated for too long. Therefore, we are faced with a fact.

The internal conflict in Mali has taken a much more serious and wider turn since radical Islamists took control of the region, imposing an extreme version of the Sharia law and committing numerous abuses that even more specifically affect women. The situation in northern Mali has continued to deteriorate over the last three months. Today, according to the UN, several hundred thousand people have fled the region. In total, almost five million people have been affected by this conflict.

This situation cannot last. However, the initiative that would be taken today by our assembly in plenary session by adopting this resolution, of which I am a signatory, is absolutely not going to war. The intervention of our country in Mali within the framework of the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council is not a declaration of war against a country but rather a commissioning of an international counter-terrorism operation.

Indeed, my group has always adopted, in a committee, a clear position regarding a possible Belgian participation to stabilize the situation in Mali and ensure the defense of the rule of law.

For several months now, we have insisted on a triple condition for any participation of our country in such a mission, namely the need for a UN framework and regional support, a European context and a consultation with our assembly.

It is important to note that all these conditions are met. Indeed, the UN mandate, an indispensable prerequisite for us, has the merit of being clear, as does the regional support for such an operation. The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly expressed its concern about military activities and attacks by terrorist and extremist movements in northern Mali and, in particular, the seizure of the city of Kona, an event that has accelerated decision-making by the international community, France and the European Union. This worsening of the situation truly poses a threat to the stability and integrity of Mali, but also to international peace and security. Members of the Security Council adopted resolutions 2056, 2071 and 2085, in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Faced with the urgent need to respond to the terrorist threat, Security Council Resolution 2085, adopted in December, authorizes the deployment of the international support mission in Mali under African leadership for an initial period of one year. One of the key provisions of the Council resolutions was, therefore, the establishment of an international military force to support efforts to restore the territorial integrity of Mali.

Africa is the gateway to Europe. The European Union has understood this. And one cannot carry the project of Europe of integrated defence, as many colleagues do here, without responding to the request of France and its call for solidarity of the European Member States. This departure on a mission, however, once again illustrated the crying lack of real diplomacy and a European military command.

I recall the commitment of my group to bring these tools into practice, indispensable for European credibility on the international stage.

Beyond the aspects of the UN mandate and the European framework, but also the extent of our commitment outside the combat zones, I would like to emphasize the symbolic but how crucial aspects of this text.

While this text provides the government with parliamentary support in conducting these operations with a view to carrying out military action against terrorists and their abuses in Mali, it also represents a crucial paradigm shift for my group.

The initiative of the full and full involvement of our assembly had already been taken under the regime of ordinary affairs in March 2011 when our country had committed to Libya to help a population massacred by its own regime. By voting this resolution, we reiterate this initiative, but above all we insert it in the duration. We concrete an important point of the Government Agreement which specified that "the Government undertakes to inform the Parliament without delay and to associate it in the monitoring of operations under the UN mandate."

The transparency displayed in these operations by the Prime Minister and the Government can therefore only be welcomed. I am convinced, it marks a strong symbol for monitoring ongoing and future operations.

However, the vote on this resolution should in no way be interpreted as an absolute green light. Indeed, this is strictly conditioned by the inclusion of the Belgian action in the UN framework of origin and within a European context.

Therefore, I want to be very clear: my group demands that an urgent and concrete assessment of our participation in these operations be carried out by the deadline of 1 March and that, as part of this, Parliament be fully informed, in particular if new circumstances change the nature and duration of our commitment.

We know that a military solution alone cannot be sufficient to ensure respect for human rights, the rule of law, and to fight terrorism and all forms of extremism. Diplomatic, political and humanitarian options within a UN framework must continue to be preferred with Mali, in particular to repair the damage and help victims of these abuses. It will therefore be that the international community will continue to handle the matter once the military conflict has ended to sustainably pacify and rebuild a legitimate rule of law. This is the meaning of requests 4 and 5 of the resolution.

Moreover, the Minister of Development Cooperation did not wait for this military intervention to take humanitarian arrangements in 2012 and thus help civilian populations hard hit by the abuses of these terrorists.

Through these means, it is to avoid any spread and any instrumentalization of this conflict as well as the distress of the population. We can no longer tolerate such a situation in a partner country of our development cooperation. Therefore, it is time for an intervention, under the conditions that I have already indicated, in order not to allow this region of Africa to be weakened by the terrorist attacks it is suffering.

I thank you for your attention and, I hope, for your support for this text.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs, before starting the debate on Mali, I would like to tell you that we especially appreciate that you are also present today for this debate. We can imagine that this is not so obvious.

Colleagues, as already stated in the committee, our group supports the mission in Mali with great conviction. With regard to international responsibility, we have no choice. I explained in the committee the status of Mali as one of the poorest countries in the world and thus a potential feedstock for international terrorism. We should not be blind to this link. Given the link between development opportunities, terrorism and the current threat to the regime, we need to approach the Mali case more broadly than simply through military intervention. We also need to do something about development opportunities.

Mali is an unknown country but nearby. Both for the people there and for ourselves—we must dare to say that—we must be alert to what is happening in that region. It can be a feedstock for international terrorism, given the presence of many extremist rebel groups and terrorism. It is becoming a center of Salafism. Therefore, we had no choice in terms of our support for the mission. France has responded very quickly. We actually provide logistical support to the French mission. It is very clear that we do not have the leadership. It is an example of cooperation between European Member States. We must therefore also look at this dossier in the light of the pleas for a European defence. This is also a useful operation in which we must take our responsibility.

What are the main focus points in this mission for us? We believe that these are more than sufficiently represented in the resolution. We regret deeply that not all groups in this assembly support the text of the resolution, although it is very similar to that of previous interventions.

One of the first important concerns around Mali is transparency. It is very important that we are adequately informed in Parliament about the actions of France on the ground. With regard to our own military deployment, we must obtain sufficient guarantees in the Succession Commission. We must also have continuous attention to those who are in charge of this file and what is happening in the Security Council. It is extremely important that this operation is fully under the mandate of the Security Council, thus fulfilling the legal conditions. That is logical and an absolute condition for our participation.

Second, we must absolutely support the training mission of the EU and ECOWAS. Here too, I call for transparency and regular information.

Finally, I come to what is ⁇ the most important point in this matter.

I see that my fan, Mr De Vriendt, would like to intervene.

Mr Waterschoot, I have heard you say twice that you consider it important that Parliament is informed, in the interest of transparency and information. As a member of the Parliament — not yet a member of the government, but of this assembly — do you not consider it much more important that the Parliament should be able to effectively, at regular times, approve of this operation and its continuation, after the government’s evaluation?

I would like to remind you of the situation in other countries where this is happening. I will develop my argument later, but our amendment to your resolution has in any case also included a regular approval by Parliament. This is a little stronger than what you imagine.

Mijnheer De Vriendt, I can quite clear be. I guessed dat of Mr Van der Maelen op dat punt zal interveniëren. He has in committee quite clearly said "de Grondwet is de Grondwet". If you want to change the Constitution, then you can discuss it. Voorlopig is de Grondwet echter nog altijd de Grondwet in dat means dat deze beslissing aan de regering toekomt. We ask questions from the Parliament in all transparency as soon as possible is informed. and point.

Mr. De Vriendt, I allow myself to point out that we have already debated this topic very often. This debate has been held in the committee. In the present situation, the Constitution is the Constitution. It was the same when I was Minister of Defense, and it continues to be like that. We can continue to talk in vain until tomorrow.

Mr. President, if you allow me, this is not a constitutional amendment. This is about repeating the procedure as we know it, namely that the majority parties submit a resolution to obtain the effective approval of Parliament again after one month. This does not require any constitutional amendment.

I will not exhaust the debate. We can go twenty times again and again. I will just continue my speech.

To conclude, I would like to mention something that is very important to our group and that we want to emphasize, namely the full content of the UN Security Council resolutions. The three resolutions that have been adopted explicitly also address the restoration of democracy throughout Mali and the re-transfer of power to a democratically elected government. In the past, there were already some problems. In addition, a political negotiation process must be initiated with the rebel groups in the north that have pledged terrorism. Furthermore, the return of refugees should be enabled, and the necessary humanitarian assistance should be provided.

In short, the CD&V group gives its full support to this mission, but from the philosophy that this mission is a first phase and that the reconstruction of that country and the stabilization of that region must absolutely follow.

We have been discussing this issue since Tuesday afternoon. The Parliament took note of the government’s decision to associate our country with the French intervention in Mali. We support him in this approach.

By submitting this proposal for a resolution, we wanted to ensure that it was expressed more strongly and that it included a humanitarian aspect. In terms of development cooperation, Mali is among our eighteen main partners. Our proposal, in particular, calls on the government to consider a broader humanitarian aspect. It is in fact essential for all co-authors to associate a cooperative approach with this military approach.

As parliamentarians, we will send two C-130, one Agusta helicopter, seventy men. At such a time, we must think of our military engaged in this operation to support the French soldiers. We are obviously aware of the risks they take and the dangerous nature of this mission. But we also know their professionalism, which is such that – both on the Mali territory and on other operations theatres – Belgium is considered by its allies as a completely reliable partner.

I would also like to recall and highlight very sincerely what I consider to be the courage of our government to thus engage our country in a difficult test. Armed intervention is a crucial moment in terms of political responsibility. The government and we are responsible for it.

As I said, on Tuesday and Wednesday, we have broadly debated in committees gathered on the engagement of our troops in Mali and this resolution proposal. The Reform Movement gives its full support to the policy carried out in this context by the government.

This intervention in Mali is both legitimate and necessary. The Security Council, in its resolution 2085 of December 20, 2012, stressed that “the situation in northern Mali and the fact that terrorist groups and criminal networks are solidly deployed there continue to pose a serious threat, for which time presses, on the entire population of Mali, and on the stability of the Sahel, of Africa in general and of the international community as a whole.” It is necessary, because it is necessary to stop the threat posed by 7,000 men, agonized by years of guerrilla, on the ground in West Africa.

What are we talking about? From Mali, from a country larger than France, from a country at the gate of the Maghreb, himself at the gate of Europe. Therefore, intervening alongside France means showing solidarity with the Mali government, but it is also – we must keep it in mind – playing the future of security in Europe.

Therefore, it is essential to realize that Mali is situated "side by side", that there is the risk of seeing a terrorist state set up at the gate of Europe and that it is truly necessary to cut the grass under the foot of those who would install there, would build there a terrorist state.

The strategy is very clear – this is ⁇ the only element on which we could have extended more in committees of the House and the Senate: the strategy is to completely disrupt the aggression suffered by the Malian government, to neutralize its perpetrators, to preserve the existence of the Malian State and to allow it to regain its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Naturally, we must prepare for the deployment of an African Intervention Force and, as the UN Secretary-General recalls, implement the political and military aspects of Security Council resolution 2085.

We were able to read some French statements, ⁇ intended to reassure the public. I think of what Mr. Mr. said. Fabius, which means that all this would be finished in a few weeks. It would be wrong to reassure the public in this way. We will not finish it in a few weeks. We are in Mali at least until March 1 and then, based on the government’s decision, we will undoubtedly have further discussions to extend this intervention. I doubt that all the goals, as assigned today, will be fully achieved by 1 March.

Questions remain pending, following the discussions we have had and in the general context of this intervention, regarding the role of the European Union. It is clear that you want, we want, a more active European Security and Defence Union. We want a Mrs. Ashton who is less discreet. We believe that after this conflict, we will have to learn from what we want in terms of security and defense for the European Union. 2013 is, as we know, an important year in this regard. by Mr. The Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized this in the discussions we had.

With regard to the problem related to West Africa, the terrorist threat in West Africa and the terrorist threat in the Maghreb area, we will have to push the European Union to engage more and ⁇ do it faster. At the same time, we will have to make sure as much as possible, in the years to come, to further structure the Europe of defence.

I come to my conclusion. We invite you to bring this resolution with us. It is important to strengthen – even if it doesn’t need it – the government in this decision to engage the country in the context of this conflict.

It may be more needed in relation to the extremely important aspect of development cooperation for the Mali people. Nearly two million Malians live in this country, they are of flesh and blood. We can give them a lot based on our expertise in Africa in cooperation.

We are currently in the process of negotiating the budget. It is clear that this type of operation that we conduct in a number of locations demonstrates our expertise, our reliability, our talents, even on the military level. We are invited to participate in these interventions.

Mr. Minister of Defence, Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs, we must make sure to be as consistent as possible in the future with regard to the training of our military, the equipment that is supplied to them, the budget devoted to our armed forces. Indeed, if we want to keep this capacity to weigh on a number of political decisions, to invest our country in these important moments for Africa and for Europe, we still have to make sure in the future to keep our military capacity as intact as possible.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Minister, colleagues, it is obvious that we will support this resolution because we have signed it.

During the two days during which the discussion was held, we also had the opportunity to improve the resolution technically. A resolution is never perfect. The last two points were also a way to keep in mind, on the one hand, the humanitarian aspect and, on the other hand, the political aspect, Mr. Luykx.

I also understood that this resolution can count on almost Chamberwide support.

What happens to me in these circumstances is something very different. I will not repeat what others have already said to me. I am somewhat disturbed when I look at the geopolitical world. If one looks at Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Mali and other places in the world, one discovers a double movement.

On the one hand, there is a certain Islamism, that fanatically and hard, sharia-like, takes power and tries to impress, and that accepts that Church and State are mixed. On the other hand, we, especially the enlightened spirits, are called for the separation of Church and State.

Some of us are tempted, when that separation from Church and State does not take the classical form known to us, but concerns another religion, to yield to it. For example, think of the ritual slaughter and other things that we respect in other religions and begin to accept as a normal norm.

We have the advantage that many followers of this religion are largely tolerant and have great human values. They have a cultural heritage to counter you. We are pleased that in many countries they also have democratic power in their hands and are exercising it.

In other countries, we see extreme waves arising, with which we do not know exactly how to act. Mali is a country that has half a dollar per head of family as income. Afghanistan is probably the largest drug supplier in the world. In Iran, it is known which caste is in power. Syria is experiencing an enormous split that is dramatic and for which we are sometimes hopelessly looking for solutions.

More and more, however, we will, in my conviction, encounter elements such as those of Mali, of Somalia and of similar places.

At the committee meeting, yesterday or yesterday, I have quoted about this from a book that has been a long time old, from a very well-known writer that needs to be read more, namely Amin Maalouf. The title of the book I aim at, I name in French: Les croisades à l’envers.

In that book, Amin Maalouf shows that a part of our Western civilization, our religion, our languages, our culture and our manners, was almost involuntarily imposed on a number of peoples, while now a kind of rejet de la greffe develops, a kind of rejection phenomenon. That phenomenon is, of course, stimulated by terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling, and whatever one wants. We see this as dangerous.

What do we do against it? Well, we react as we would always react: we protect ourselves. We are trying to fulfill common tasks. We have been in Afghanistan for twelve years, or maybe even longer. We do not know how to deal with Iran. We are currently supporting French initiatives to deter a kind of uprising that threatens a part of Mali and the capital of that country.

Is this the right solution in the long run? Are we competent in Europe, and should we be competent, to raise a kind of defensive curtain around our values? Do we thus believe to strive for freedom, for culture, for equal rights of men and women, among others? Are we able to defend our values in a shrinking world? We believe that and therefore we take such measures. Specifically, in Mali, we support that. I am asking questions in the longer term. Is this final in the corridor of the world the possible solution we should aim for?

We have a civilization worth living, a civilization for which we have had to sacrifice much in the past and which has only slowly but surely come in its freedoms and its cultural values. We are proud of our civilization.

We try to carry them out here and there, in a sense, with some paternalism. But are we sure that we will pay the price for these civilized values?

I always say, ⁇ somewhat simply, that whoever has a house also insures his house against fire and storm and pays the premiums for it. This homeowner could claim after a few decades that he or she did not have an accident, fire or house destruction and thus paid his or her premiums uselessly. However, we count on the solidarity of others if something went wrong.

Couldn’t we think that the values we defend and the civilization we see and have in our hands also deserve premiums that must be paid?

Colleagues, please believe me, I am not a tiers-mondist, but you can’t imagine that 1 200 000 000 heads of families have to pay out half a euro a day every day. Such a stream of misery cannot be infiltrated with jet fighters, armies, or military means.

We must ask ourselves whether we do enough for the children and grandchildren of our civilization and for those who have earned our civilization, who have worked for this civilization and have worked for it rightly. Do we do enough to stabilize the poor of this world, to praise them more than just democracy, and to encourage something more than complete freedom of the press? Do we do anything more to prevent the material and what drives them to such an end? Do we do anything more to prevent them from being chased by extremists and manipulated by religions? Do we do enough to get that part of the world to some extent the dignity of the part we inhabit? Do we make enough efforts to give the people there a minimum standard of living as well as a minimum mode of self-development and of peculiarity to be what they want to be? Do we do enough for them, so that they will not be somewhere the paria of this world, having complexes by the civilization they had, before we have brought our civilization to gins? Have we thought about it enough?

Are we willing to pay the insurance premiums of our civilization, the premiums resulting from our mental well-being, our freedom, our psychological self-assurance? Do we think about it from time to time?

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I use this opportunity to invite you to think about this with you all thoroughly, calmly, but effectively.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, colleagues, we have already discussed this resolution a lot. There is also a lot to say about the procedure. In this regard, I would like to congratulate the majority parties. They have succeeded in drafting a resolution asking Parliament for approval for a military operation after the C-130s have already departed towards Mali.

In a number of other countries, such as Germany, the Czech Republic and a number of Scandinavian countries, however, there is somewhat more respect for Parliament and parliamentary approval is requested before the operation begins.

A military operation is always a difficult decision. It is about participation in war and the human toll is always very high. We decide and reason in this Parliament sometimes very businessfully about participation in a war. However, some emotion is in place. And it always helps when one reads stories about the human toll of wars. The figures are known, Ms. Ashton gave them for Mali. It is about half a million refugees, families and families with children. It is about bombing. It also concerns civilian victims. These are all things that need to be played in, so that we can make decisions in a well-informed way.

This also requires a large and strong parliamentary support. The government has not sought this parliamentary support. The government’s explanation on Tuesday 15 January was even closed without formally asking for a vote, so that it then, in the presence of all the ministers involved, even of the prime minister, remained with a non-binding exchange of ideas.

We want to reflect more on other countries. We have therefore submitted a proposal for a constitutional amendment, so that Parliament must take a decision in advance.

In Mali, under the leadership of France, a coalition of the willing is engaged in the fight against extremist Islamic rebel movements that threaten the integrity of the country and the civilian population from the north. Their offensive threatens the population. The rebel movements are effectively guilty of serious human rights violations.

There are several UN resolutions. At the end of December, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2085 with a political roadmap to stabilize the country. The situation is ⁇ complex and ⁇ not black and white. It is more than a battle between the good and the bad.

There are several conflict lines in Mali. In March-April 2012, the government army committed a coup d’état against the government. The government army also condemns human rights violations in the country. There are conflicts between populations.

The Toeareg in the north have been a party demanding for decades for greater autonomy on the cultural and political level. Their questions are constantly ignored by the government of Mali. However, it is a legitimate question. Ignoring these questions is one of the major structural causes of the current conflict. In December, political consultations were launched between the government, the Toeareg and the Islamists of Ansar Dine. They should be resumed as soon as possible. The Malaysian government should take initiatives in this regard.

Finally, there are Salafist rebel movements active in the heart of the uprising. However, they are largely infiltrated by Algerians and Mauritanians. The conflict has a regional dimension. It is not between Muslims and non-Muslims. Nine out of ten Malines are Muslim. It is also a kind of imperialism through movements from Mauritania and Algeria. It is a ⁇ complex dossier.

The UN resolution I talked about takes into account this complexity and presents a very concrete set of political measures. It calls for the initiation of a political dialogue between the stakeholders, as well as for the stabilisation of the Malines army, the establishment of a European training mission for that army to enhance respect for human rights and the establishment of an African Peacekeeping Force. The resolution thus puts a range of political measures on the table.

However, given the situation on the ground, the French ruled not to wait for the implementation of the UN resolution, but to intervene immediately. On January 11, they began their offensive. Subsequently, that offensive was quickly legitimized, by statements of the UN Security Council. But is the operation initiated by the French, with the coalition of the willing, sufficiently covered by international law, as it should?

Let us not be naive, of course, it is not a coincidence that France takes the lead in this. France has many interests in Mali: it is a former colonial power, there are several thousand French in Mali and there are many economic interests. A third of the uranium France needs for its nuclear power plants comes from Niger, a neighboring country of Mali. It is no coincidence that the French took the lead.

What is the response of the Belgian government? She decides to support the French intervention with two C-130s, two helicopters and eighty military personnel. I want to be very clear: if there is an urgent need to protect the civilian population and if the UN Security Council gives the green light for it, it will be supported by my group. However, military support is not sufficient. The Belgian response to the crisis in Mali must be primarily political. The tracker in the file should therefore very clearly be the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and not the Minister of Land Defense.

We must come into a scenario where the military support of our country, which we have now provided – we have made a decision about it – is the lever for political progress. Military support is what we as a country must weigh in order to enforce everything, in particular the implementation of as many aspects as possible of the UN resolution.

What we fear, when we look at the debates of the last days, is that our country is following the French from the idea-fix that we are obliged to immediately, if necessary blind, support an ally who undertakes a military action, without developing our own vision and without representing at this time a real added value in the debate, which is still taking place today at the European level.

I would also like to point out the importance of emergency aid and development cooperation when it comes to Mali. In the spring of last year, our development cooperation was lowered following the coup that took place there. Mali is a partner country. In December, the European Union launched a call to strengthen aid to Mali. What efforts will our country make, ministers De Crem and Reynders, except for the deployment of military aircraft?

I want to go one step further. In this context, there is a heavenly paradox, colleagues. At a time when we must realize that a military operation is actually the recognition of a failure to prevent a conflict, at a time when we must realize that the causes of conflicts in Africa are rather structural economic, a lack of development opportunities or a game of national interests, at such a time the government decides to shrink the budget for conflict prevention.

I have a direct question to Minister Reynders. The post Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Human Rights will decrease in two years from 23 million euros in 2011 to 20 million euros in 2012 and 16 million euros in 2013. Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 2011 an important project for Mali was paid with money allocated for that post. This is a half-million-euro project for the rights of children in Mali. On the same post, you also save in the 2013 budget. On the one hand, we now decide to join our ally in a military operation, but on the other hand we decide to reduce the funds for conflict prevention and peace-building. However, just this could have helped prevent a conflict as we are experiencing it today.

Colleagues of sp.a, Open Vld and CD&V, in fact, I was also assuming that we had learned lessons from the failure in Afghanistan. Apparently I was wrong. There is no military solution to a conflict. We have been waging war in Afghanistan for twelve years, but that has done little to nothing. The withdrawal to which we will soon move is actually a withdrawal after a lost war. We must dare to name the facts as they are.

We have completely misguided the conflict in Afghanistan. The Belgian government has been very passive in recent years and has taken little or no initiative to change NATO strategy. What Afghanistan needs is a regional solution. The key to the conflict lies in Pakistan. What Afghanistan needs is a UN-led internal political dialogue between all the fighting parties. What Afghanistan needs is a comprehensive economic and development offer so that the population has a prospect of improvement. What Afghanistan needs is more than a one-sided military strategy.

We have spent billions on an operation with no results. Green and Ecolo have warned in this Parliament for years, asking that our country put its military support on the scale for a broader strategy.

Even now, the ambitions in Mali are not small. The French are not just talking about protecting the civilian population, but want to regain half of the territory to the rebels, namely the north of Mali. Minister Reynders has made it very clear in the committee that this will take a long time.

When we read the resolution of the majority parties, we find that they are not taking lessons from the Afghan failure but, on the contrary, they are preparing the way for a new street without end, for a new illusion that there is a military solution to this conflict. I quote the resolution: “insisting on additional efforts for the political process” and “considering a humanitarian gap.” Colleagues, Mr. Van der Maelen, Mr. De Croo, colleagues from CD&V, this resolution text contains alarmingly weak formulations. Moreover, the proposers of the resolution only ask, and I quote again, “to inform and engage the Parliament.”

We have, by the way, the additional experience of the operation in Libya.

The difference with Mali is that the political options in Libya were almost exhausted while in Mali a UN resolution awaits implementation. In addition, in Libya, we have gone far beyond what was originally stated in the resolution. We really did mission creep. It was only about protecting the civilian population, but in the end we went behind Gaddafi and there were a lot of offensive actions. To avoid such a mission creep, it is important that a government regularly returns to Parliament; we propose after a month. This should not be done to engage and inform the Parliament, but to submit an evaluation and re-seek approval for the continuation of this mission, given our experiences in Afghanistan and Libya.

Our group has submitted an amendment. We had the impression that there was a constructive atmosphere to deal with the conflict and that there was a Chamber-wide consensus that action should be taken. We were really surprised that our amendment was not supported. In particular, the governing parties refused to address our request to emphasize more the importance of the political process and to make military deployment dependent on political progress, in particular the withdrawal of the unilateral French operation as it is currently underway. This is very important, also because of the self-interest involved. We must quickly move to an international or multinational peacekeeping force as stipulated in the resolution. Furthermore, the commitment should depend on progress in dialogue and political consultation between the relevant parties in Mali and on the establishment of that African Peace Force. In other words, we have actually learned nothing from our experience in Afghanistan where we have been pumping military resources into a conflict for twelve years without a political approach, which has no meaning.

Our demand to come back to Parliament within a month with an evaluation and then let Parliament decide was also pushed aside. In fact, the majority parties here have decided to give a blank cheque while we have held a plea to be more cautious in dealing with this conflict. Our questions are very logical given the previous experiences. We would have desired more lessons from our previous military operations. Now we are given that opportunity once again. We have submitted our amendment again. We therefore once again ask the majority parties to consider this well and approve our amendment.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Minister, we know the difficult circumstances under which you are here, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, we greatly appreciate that you have come here.

It has already been said by colleagues for me. It is never an easy solution to decide that our military will participate in a foreign operation. I don’t want to reveal it from the start. This is not a decision for us with our full discretion. This is a 60/40 ratio. But a government party must take its responsibility and cannot hide behind an abstinence, one must say yes or no: we have said yes. And we did this for various reasons.

Collega De Vriendt will agree with me, I think, that there are reasons that advocate this intervention. No meeting is missed in the Foreign Affairs Committee or there is a colleague who says that we need a common European foreign and security policy. Everyone in the committee agrees on this.

But colleagues, when it comes to the Sahel, we have that. In June 2011, the European Union, the 27 Member States, adopted a document outlining its policy with respect to the Sahel for peace and stability in the region.

This operation is in the extension of this document. Sp.a does not wish to be a party that confesses something with words and defeats European beliefs and who, if then responsibility must be taken, remains absent.

We are also in favor of European defence. We are in favor of a pooling of the resources of the Member States. We are in favor of specialization by Member States. There is a wide-ranging consensus that transport, more specifically logistics transport, is one of the specialties that Belgium will develop in European defence. What we do in this operation, colleagues, is structural and tactical transport, to say in professional terms. Therefore, it is difficult to say that one is in favor of European work agreements, and yet to refuse when one is asked for something.

The third and least important element, I now address to colleague De Vriendt. When the Toeareg took over northern Mali at the beginning of last year and then radical Islamists were promised to do so, the United Nations also began to focus on the problem. The Security Council has reached a set of agreements to bring peace and stability to the crucial Sahel region. A special envoy of the Secretary-General, Romano Prodi, was appointed to seek a political solution for Mali. These conversations began slowly. It concluded, among other things, that the Malinese army needed to be strengthened and that it was optional to ask a number of ECOWAS countries to Mali military intervention. It was all in the stallions.

What happens then? Early last week came what I would call the Benghazi moment. The rebels or the radical Islamists, or everyone together, decide to break the stock and move south. There was a stock. Then one was faced with the choice: to watch with patience and let Mali be taken over by radical Islamists or take action. Go away with all the beautiful plans of the United Nations and the European Union for peace and stability in the entire region, not only in Mali.

Have you ever thought about what regional effects it has? I mention Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso, each also unstable countries. The arrival of a radical Islamic state there, with all the powers and instruments that it brings, means a destabilization for the entire region.

Uranium also plays a role. You referred to that. Not only in Niger there is uranium, but also in Mali there are uranium mines. Is there anyone here in the Chamber who feels comfortable in knowing that there would be a radical Islamic state in Mali that is in possession of uranium mines? No no, is it?

Therefore, I would say that the Benghazi moment, which President Hollande of France stood before last week, was the choice between either doing nothing, with the consequences I have just described, or trying to reverse the tide again. France has chosen the latter. In short, this is the description of the 60%.

Colleague De Vriendt, allow me to say something about taking lessons from the past. I invite you to introduce the resolution, which is now present, alongside, for example, the resolution on Libya. We have also mentioned Afghanistan, but as far as I know, we have not written too many resolutions on this subject.

You have read the above resolution yourself and I regret that you are a little downright about it, for the following reasons.

First, unlike the resolution on Libya, you can read in the current resolution that it calls for attention to the humanitarian aspects. It is the merit of colleague Dallemagne that this is stated in the text. We haven’t said much about the humanitarian aspects yet, but there are hundreds of thousands of people fleeing there. I happened to be in northern Mali a decade ago. I can confirm that by being on the flight, families and children find themselves in a ⁇ difficult and difficult situation. It is innovative and right that for the first time in a resolution on a foreign intervention, the humanitarian aspect is called for attention.

Second, colleague, this resolution is not like the resolution on Libya, where there was nothing in the resolution. Look at how the ginds went. First came the military, and once the military was over, we would think of the political aspect. In this resolution, on the other hand, we ask our Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the military operation is currently developing, to parallel with his colleagues in the European Council of Ministers and, if we have reached that point, to his colleagues in the Security Council, to call for the political process to take place.

I agree with you that there is no military solution to the problem in Mali. We need the military action to create a balloon, to gain time in order to again strive for a political solution.

We do not demand that during the military efforts the political efforts cease. No, the political and military efforts must be developed together and at the same time. This is stated in the resolution.

I therefore ask you to examine in the resolution what is under point 3, in particular a limited operation in size and time.

When you compare this resolution with the resolution on Libya, you will find that we now explicitly refer to the decision taken by the nuclear cabinet on 15 January 2013. We all know the contours of that decision of the nuclear cabinet. We know that there are two C-130s and two helicopters with medical equipment. We know that by the end of February 2013 an evaluation has been agreed. There is a time gap.

The size and duration are limited. Also in the text of paragraph 3 we refer to the fact that the Chamber must be consulted again and that the Chamber must be informed and involved in the dossier. You understand what that means, right? We must be involved in the file if there is a change in the size and duration of the operation.

If we compare this resolution with the previous resolution on Libya, which we adopted in similar circumstances, we must note that clear progress has been made.

I now get to my 40 percent. Colleagues, someone who is correct and intellectually honest and who will vote for the operation as I will later, do they doubt? I have hesitation. I do not ignore that I feel insecure about the good outcome of that operation.

What are those hesitations? The first doubt is whether the military will succeed. It may be populist, but at the moment there is one country that makes its combat capabilities available – air force and troops. Is it possible that one country succeeds in eliminating that mixture of radical Islamists, those well-equipped, well-trained, radical Islamic militias?

To what extent does the Toeareg belong to the camp of radical Islamists or are they going over? They have already offered to turn back to the side of the Malinese government and the West, but we do not know yet.

Is it possible for the military to succeed? I do not know. I read that certain military experts say it can and others who say it will never be possible, that one will never be able to rule out that hit-and-run operations come from those lazy.

The second hesitation – and I’ve touched it for a moment – is that there’s a lot of support for the operation being confessed by mouth, but will big countries like Britain or Germany come when it comes to actually jumping in? I do not know.

I have already mentioned that the UN plan provides for support from the ECOWAS countries. Do these countries have sufficient military and capacity? Will they be strong enough to stabilize the situation after France has withdrawn? Will there be political support from neighboring countries or the Arab world?

Another reason for my hesitation is the risk of terrorist acts. Yesterday, terrorists occupied a BP facility on Algerian territory. The information in international newspapers about this is quite contradictory, but it is clear that the Algerian army has entered the installation. There were fights. The death toll ranges from 4 to 49. I just read that there were nine nationalities involved, but no Belgians. In nine countries, families and politicians are concerned about the possible death of a compatriot in that operation.

In the coming days and weeks we will have to follow the developments very closely. I ask both ministers to monitor the situation together with their colleagues day after day. It is better to come to the committee once too much than once too little to consult with us.

We need to agree on a few things, but in that I may differ in opinion with colleague Ducarme. Our objective must be that the French intervention should not be too far-reaching and should be limited to reducing the rebels to their position before they push south. After that, a political space should be created for the UN and the European Union to accelerate the political dialogue in Mali and the countries of the region.

Should we prevent the fall of the Malinese state? There is complete chaos in Bamako. There is political and institutional instability. There is also maximum insecurity. We must therefore act and launch that European training mission as soon as possible so that other troops can take over the matter and keep it under control after the West has intervened.

I hear the president’s impatience behind me. I will keep it here. As promised, I will not run away for colleague De Vriendt.

Mr. Van der Maelen, I thank you for staying there, it should still be missing. In any case, it is a little shy that you do not allow yourself to interrupt, in order to avoid the debate. However, that is your choice. I find that regrettable.

You say that the draft resolution calls for a political process. Mr. Van der Maelen, in Afghanistan we have been calling for a political process for 12 years. For 12 years, we have been waging a war there, without NATO and its allies taking the necessary steps to start and succeed that political process. How long are you willing to continue in Mali without any substantial political progress? You are talking about March 1, but that date is not in the resolution text. This is a decision of the nuclear cabinet. We have called for Parliament to include that end date in the text of the resolution. You did not want to do that. We have proposed to make the use of military resources dependent on political progress on the ground. You did not want to do that. We have proposed to make a much clearer statement on humanitarian aid and development cooperation in Mali. You didn’t want to do that, unless that’s the progress you’re talking about.

To the colleagues, I would like to quote again what your great humanitarian progress is: “The Parliament invites the government to consider a humanitarian component as well.” You are talking about “thinking”!

Last year, the government decided to put the development cooperation in Mali on a low pit. This year, the government, in a budget approved by you, decides to reduce the posts of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. One of them was a project in Mali. You approve of all this well. You approve the draft resolution, while we had a constructive amendment to give more weight to the political process and to give Parliament more control. That is necessary. This has been demonstrated by operations in the past.

I will come to my last point, Mr. Speaker. We have called for lessons, Mr. Van der Maelen. You can refer to Libya and Afghanistan, but as politicians we must learn from the past and from the way we as Parliament deal with a nuclear cabinet, a council of ministers or a government that wants to conduct a military operation. That is what we wanted to do. We did this in a very constructive atmosphere, but you missed the opportunity – you are planning to do it again today – to support us in it and thus to reach a greater consensus in our house.

Mr. Van der Maelen, I did not want to interrupt you at all. I listened to your presentation very well. I assume that you, as a government partner, have taken the decision in full consciousness and are also well aware of all the risks associated with it. You have listed a lot.

You call it uncertainty, but the biggest uncertainty with which I remain now is whether you are sure. Is the government guaranteed a collegial vote? The spread of the conflict to other countries is not unlikely. You estimate that very well, but does that mean that sp.a ceases its support for the intervention when another country is involved? The fact that there are victims cannot be ruled out.

If there were a first victim today, would sp.a. no longer support the intervention?

During the discussions in the committee, you insisted on a validity date, namely 1 March. In the end, he is not in. What does that mean after March 1? We hope that the Government has taken the decision in full consciousness and with full reason and will uphold it.

Mr. Speaker, I will be brief. First of all, I would like to address colleague Luykx.

Please take point 3 of the draft resolution. We express our support for the decision of the Nuclear Cabinet on 15 January 2013. I don’t know if you know, because there is no notification of it, but you can see in the Belgian Declarations of Minister De Crem and Minister Reynders that that decision of the nuclear cabinet of 15 January 2013 contains a number of elements: two aircraft, two helicopters and evaluation for 1 March. The evaluation before 1 March is therefore implicitly contained in the decision of 15 January 2013.

The government must immediately inform the Parliament and involve it, if new circumstances arise – we are talking about the two aircraft and the two helicopters to put it simply – and change the duration – that is March 1st.

I feel completely comfortable with this draft resolution. We have never had such a good text.

I would like to add that in 2010, the day Parliament was dissolved, I submitted to the House a proposal to amend Article 167 of the Constitution. I still remember it: there were 54 votes for and a majority against. Not all 150 members were present, but there was a lot of people. There were 54 votes in favour, but these were unfortunately not enough to declare Article 167 of the Constitution subject to revision. In the formation of government, since Article 167 of the Constitution was declared not subject to revision, I tried to extract the maximum. I invite you to review the government agreement. Parliament should be informed as soon as possible and should be involved as closely as possible in such decisions. Well, that is exactly what is repeated in the presented text.

The draft resolution therefore recalls what is stated in the government agreement. Furthermore, unfortunately today we cannot go without considering the Constitution and especially given the fact that unfortunately there is no majority that wants to go on. Don’t blame me for not going further, because my party wants to go further. The SPA group, by the way, again submitted a declaration on the revision of the Constitution at the beginning of this legislature. We want to move forward, but there is no majority in the House at this time.

Dear colleague, I agree that we have different opinions. I think we learn lessons: we advocate for simultaneous political processes.

You complain about the wording, namely that one “thinks”. You have heard the responses of the two ministers in the committee. They are willing to consider providing the necessary humanitarian efforts. I count on you and you can count on me in the coming weeks, if we discuss this issue, to ask the government to bring butter to the fish in that area and to consider the humanitarian aspect. So we really take lessons.

You provide an example of recent decisions on conflict prevention. They were taken before we knew there would be a conflict in Mali. I agree with you that we should pay a lot of attention to conflict prevention. However, if you are part of a government in full economic crisis, you need to save some here and there. Sometimes you have to do this in positions where you would rather not do it. However, we have worked pretty well with the government through the economic crisis and made a number of difficult decisions on the social and economic level and in the field of conflict prevention.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that five speakers and two ministers still have to speak.

Mr. President, Mr. Van der Maelen, you did not know that there would be a conflict in Mali and so you agreed to reduce the budget for conflict prevention. That is quite a reasoning!

If we follow your reasoning, then it would be very unlikely that conflicts would emerge in the world and therefore we can also reduce the budgets on conflict prevention. Come to say! This is short-sightedness. If one should not do anything in a context such as Syria, the Arab world, Afghanistan and the like, then it is all about demolishing the positions for peace-building and conflict prevention!

In connection with all your other points, I have already given our opinion. We support military operations to protect civilians, who receive green light from the UN, but we do not support this resolution, which is far too non-binding and could have been much stronger.

I give the floor to Mr. Van der Maelen and then we will conclude this exchange.

Ik ben bereid om schuld te bekennen op het vlak van de besparingen met betrekking tot conflictprevention as u mij, met Groen, aanduidt waar u die 17 billion euros aan besparingen gaat halen. That I want to see. I want to see 17 billion euros. (The Rumor)

Dear colleagues, a little bit of calm. This is no longer the problem of Mali.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, Colleagues, now stands the resolution confirming the decision of the nuclear cabinet to initiate a military intervention, at least to provide logistical support to it, which in reality has already been initiated in Mali.

The reasons cited for moving to help and action include the rise of Islamist fundamentalist groups from northern Mali to the south of the country. These groups pose a threat to the stability and integrity of Mali and, therefore, represent an indirect threat to international security. There is a kind of coalition of the willing created on the spot under the leadership of France. France, of course, has at least as many other interests to defend on the ground, not least economic interests.

In short, the Belgian government confirms the French decision that Belgium will provide assistance in the intervention in Mali. I have said it repeatedly during the committee meetings earlier this week, but I will repeat it today before this plenary session. The Flemish Interest does not stand up to this military intervention without reservations. In principle, we support the Defense’s global vision of its foreign operations policy. That means for us that well-defined and timely operations that set clear goals and serve the general interest can take away our approval.

With regard to the current operation in Mali, however, some restraint is obvious. As our group briefly explained during the joint meeting with the Foreign Relations and Defence Committees, it seems that we know where we will start this operation, but not where we will end. It is also very blurred. Initially, our assistance will be deployed until the end of February, followed by an evaluation to see whether or not our commitment will be expanded in time and resources. Also as far as the exact task description on the spot is concerned, everything remains somewhat vague and continues to look at the coffee pool. It reminds of Libya, where the content of the UN resolution, originally intended to protect civilians on the ground, was consciously kept vague and expanded according to the situation. We are reluctant in this regard and have taken lessons from the past. A lot has already been said about this.

We also fear that a scenario could take place that is largely similar to our long-standing commitment in Afghanistan. The initial goal there was also to fight the radical Islamists of the Taliban. We now know the results of this effort. The result of years of Western military deployment in Afghanistan was in reality the replacement of one Islamic regime with another, which is at least equally corrupt. However, the case remained unresolved.

Also in Libya, and with the expansion in the development of the rest of the so-called Arab Spring, we have seen that the situation on the ground is not always black and white and that the regime often does not have to submit to the rebels. Again, here we are threatening to fall into a wespennest of which it is now impossible to predict what role our troops will eventually play and will still have to play.

The struggle against the threatening radical Islamism is a defensive goal for our group, but it would be ⁇ naive to think that this is the only reason for the Belgian support.

All this operation seems to us too much to the traditional pursuit of France and the jumping on the breeze for their economic and political interests in their own country.

With regard to that last point – Mr. Luykx has already mentioned it – we have indeed pointed out that European governments in general, and the Belgian in particular, would be better to work first on an efficient and financially supported fight against Muslim extremism in their respective countries.

For us, it does not matter that this government has 3,4 million euros gross or 660,000 euros net ready for such a mission, if at the same time we find that there is too little money in our own country for the use of equipment for terrorism detectors, for translators and interpreters in the fight against Muslim extremism.

Even this afternoon we have been able to find in a painful way that we are still far from home in this regard.

It would therefore adorn this government if it also in Belgium would invest at least the same amount of resources and courage in the struggle against radical Muslim extremists who threaten democracies.

For these reasons, our group refuses to participate in this logical, but in fact unfulfilled story, rather unilaterally serving the interests of a particular country.

Furthermore, it remains unclear to us whether and based on what eventualities and criteria Belgium could eventually withdraw if the situation goes out of hand and if the time we currently anticipate has passed.

What is this exit strategy? What are the criteria that will be taken into account during the evaluation that you plan within 6 weeks? A regular evaluation that is tested for concrete objectives is currently lacking and is therefore urgent for our group.

Colleagues, as long as such a window and concrete policies in this regard are left behind, our group will not issue a blanco cheque for this adventure. When voting on this resolution, our group will abstain.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker.

I would like, first of all, to let you know that we express our full support for the government’s decision taken in a limited committee to provide its assistance, not only to France, which requested it, but also to the Malian government and its people who desired it, as well as to all the forces of the CEDEAO.

I would also like to emphasize the fact that this resolution has a legal framework. It is within the framework of international law. The intervention of Belgium is part of the various resolutions cited by my colleagues. For me, it is important to highlight this legal basis, but also the support of the entire international community to this intervention. I note, among other things, the support of China and Russia, which, under other circumstances, however, have already shown their reluctance to intervene by the international community.

I also find it important to emphasize that there are a number of Muslim countries (Pakistan, Morocco, Azerbaijan) in the Security Council that offer their full support. Indeed, I have sometimes heard that, even if no one made such remarks in this hall, that it would be, for some radicals, a form of crusade. and no. This is the opposite of a Crusade. We intervene at the request of a Muslim country. We are within the framework of international law. And if holy places are liberated, it is Muslim holy places that are located in Tombouctou, area that I know especially well for working there for a very long time as a doctor without borders.

That said, I am pleased to see that a custom is established with a systematic association of Parliament through a resolution of Parliament. The will of the government – this is also reflected in the government agreement – and our wish was that, as soon as possible, the parliament be associated with the government’s initiatives in the field of military operations.

I must say here that I do not agree with Ecolo’s proposal because of its constitutional considerations, which have already been long discussed. Moreover, the fact that you are submitting a request for an amendment to the Constitution shows that we are not, today, in the case requiring a prior agreement from the parliament. I would not want that through the request you make today, we go against the constitutional prescription.

There is, in your request to amend the Constitution, a contradiction that I do not understand very well. As far as I am concerned, I am not in favour of this amendment. We may eventually work on a clarification but I think it is important that, like in most countries in the world, the government can, without waiting for a parliamentary decision, take measures to ensure both international security and that of our troops. It cannot be ruled out that decisions need to be made in time on the ground for security issues. I would not want a problem to arise in the future because of the need for a prior Parliamentary agreement, even though I would like it to be associated with decisions. I would like a meeting of the meetings of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees to be held before the end of February.

With regard to the situation on the ground, we are concerned and we also share some concerns of colleague Van der Maelen. Let’s see what is happening in Algeria today! Should we not intervene? I really do not think so! This shows how dangerous the situation has become for the local population, for our nationals, for the entire international community, and not only in Mali. We are engaged in a long-term struggle against these radical elements. This struggle is not only military but also political. It is a political struggle that we have to fight with the countries in which these groups struggle, with the Arab countries, to end this constant threat that weighs on these populations and on our own.

We need to measure the risks we take and see how we can limit them. I would be happy to hear the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the situation of our citizens on the ground. Evacuation decisions have been made. Are our citizens still in Mali? Are they safe? I also think of our nationals in other countries where they might be in trouble, especially in Algeria.

Some wanted to submit amendments to strengthen the political aspect of the government’s approach. I have already had the opportunity to say that these amendments were redundant in relation to what is already very clearly noted in several places in the text of the resolution and what was also the government’s commitment to pay special attention to the political process, not only in Mali, but to the whole movement that would restore order and the right to democracy in Mali and to the countries capable of playing a positive role but currently playing a negative role in this conflict.

Indeed, I have already said everything I thought about arms trade, trafficking in this case, between the countries of the Persian Gulf and Mali. We all know Qatar’s support for MUJAO, the support of some Algerian groups for AQMI and the role Saudi Arabia can play. It is time to have serious discussions with these countries about their role in these countries, but also in a country like Pakistan.

Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs, I find it useful to study to what extent Belgium can take, together with other European colleagues, an initiative on the issue of terrorism and radical groups by convening, why not, an international meeting and by checking whether it is not time to initiate an in-depth international dialogue with the countries victims of radical groups, but also where some of these radical groups are born.

This would seem to me a useful and important initiative to be carried out if not at the Belgian level at least at the European level. These problems have appeared for years and they will still be ahead of us for years; there must be a political response to them.

I would also emphasize that I have been aware that this resolution has a humanitarian aspect. Today, we are also going to help the Malian population. In addition, we saw the welcome they reserved for the French troops. We know the situation of distress in which they are: they deserve our full humanitarian attention.

I hope that we will soon have a concrete plan of humanitarian aid for the people of Mali, especially those who are displaced and refugees in neighboring countries.

This is the essence of what I wanted to say about this resolution. Again, gentlemen ministers, we wish to continue to be fully involved in government decisions and initiatives.

On behalf of my group, I thank the Minister of Foreign Affairs for being present today.

Today, Belgium is entering the war in Mali. We make available to France military human and logistical resources for an urgent and necessary operation. This is an important moment in the life of our country, its people and the parliament that represents it. This also applies to Mali. In fact, in the face of recent rebel advances beyond the lines of separation between Azawad and Southern Mali, and due to fears of seeing Bamako fall, the state of emergency has been declared. The Civil Government of Mali has launched a call for assistance to France and the CEDEAO Member States.

The UN Security Council Resolution 2085 was adopted last December. But it was France that accelerated things at the request of Mali. The local situation is very critical. We believe that a military intervention, combined with political and humanitarian initiatives, is meaningful, useful and necessary. We must quickly stop the advance of armed Islamists in order to protect local populations. There are already more than 450,000 displaced persons and many refugee camps at the border.

But military intervention is not enough and, unfortunately, it also carries a lot of risks. One of these is the interruption of the political process. The Touaregs of the MNLA also draw attention to these risks that military action puts on this process, while also making known their readiness to assist the French army on the ground. It should be avoided that military intervention does not undermine all the steps already undertaken. I think in particular of the process started in Ouagadougou last December, which was unfortunately interrupted but which should be restarted soon.

The MNLA claims the self-determination and independence of Azawad; the UN resolution insists on the importance and urgency of responding to the long-standing concerns of the northern populations of the country. It also calls on the Mali authorities to complete the establishment of a roadmap for transition and to fully restore the constitutional order and national unity.

We need to clearly distinguish between the legitimate claims of the Touaregs (this is also mentioned in the resolution) and those of Islamist groups such as the AQMI groups and the MUJAO. These are not aimed at independence or autonomy, but rather the creation of an Islamic State and the imposition of Sharia in all of Mali, or even in the whole of this region, which we obviously cannot accept.

The horrible acts they commit, the non-respect of women’s rights, the cut hands, the stoning and all the atrocities committed in the name of the Sharia, we must fight them. We must extend our hand to the members of the MNLA who want a political and negotiated solution and we must fight those who want to make this region an Islamic sanctuary, where the law of Sharia would rule.

We cannot ignore the consequences of a war on the civilian population. There are always too many dead. There are always too many people, often women and children, who pay the price of military intervention. A military intervention is always a failure of diplomacy, it is a failure of politics, it is a wound for the country that will have to rebuild itself and for its people, who have suffered it.

The humanitarian needs are already huge and will continue to grow. That is why we regretted that the government, as part of the budgetary choices we denounced, has seriously reduced funds for emergency humanitarian aid, as the consequences are such that aid programmes in Mali, especially in the Kidal region, have seen their Belgian financing stopped, while these NGOs were the only humanitarian medical actors in the region, which is in great need.

We therefore request that as soon as possible, as soon as the situation on the ground again allows it, the government reactivate the humanitarian aid program in northern Mali.

As a committee, I also insisted on the importance of taking lessons from the lack of anticipation of Belgian politicians, Europeans and UN members. What is happening in Mali was predictable after the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya. Some countries had anticipated and somewhat better managed the return of their population who had fled Libya. Unfortunately, Mali did not do so.

Moreover, the international community has also failed to keep its promise contained in the 1973 resolution on Libya, which also insisted on the political transition to be implemented in this country. The resolution states that “the dialogue should be facilitated which leads to political reforms necessary for a peaceful and sustainable settlement.”

The consequences of inaction and the failure of the international community to create the conditions favorable to the restoration of peace in Libya are disastrous for this country. It also did not improve the already difficult situation in Mali, with a weak civil power and incapable of reform and a corrupt Mali army responsible for a coup that set the powder on fire. This absence of state, of democratic structure, always leaves the field free to radical movements, who then take advantage of these state gaps to attract to them a population left to abandon.

Today, we are in favor of the principle of rapid, urgent, humanitarian and as limited in time as possible, coupled with humanitarian action and a process of political consultation. But we will have to constantly re-evaluate it in the course of military development, but also and above all political on the ground.

This Belgian military support must be, beyond securing the population, a lever for achieving the full implementation of UN resolution 2085. Indeed, this resolution authorizes the deployment of an international force, but also and above all calls for a process of political reconciliation and negotiations with the Northern rebel groups that would dissociate themselves from terrorism.

Resolution 2085: “A credible reference framework must be quickly established for negotiations with all parties in the north of the country who have broken any bond with a terrorist organization and who accept unconditionally the unity and territorial integrity of the Mali State, in order to address the long-standing concerns of the northern populations of the country.”

This process is fundamental. This must be made a priority. Without this, military action will make sense in the short term but will shrink in the medium term and endanger the long-term reconciliation between the northern and southern peoples of Mali.

In addition, as my colleague Wouter De Vriendt said, we re-submit our amendment to the majority resolution in this sense. Beyond our claim that parliament should be associated with the decision on any military intervention, we must obviously follow the situation closely.

To do this, as long as we are engaged militarily, weekly consultations with parliament are necessary. I think it would be good to make a quick review of the hostage taking that took place in Algeria. I thought I understood that Belgians would still be in the hands of the hostage-takers, but ⁇ the Foreign Minister will tell us.

We engage military men and women on the ground, but also large budgets. Parliament must be fully involved in making these decisions. I regret unfortunately the weakness of the text of the resolution submitted to us today, both on the importance of the political and humanitarian aspect, on the one hand, and on the necessary consultation with the Parliament, on the other.

We advocate for a full implementation of resolution 2085 and a full involvement of Belgium in the establishment of the political process, which is complementary to the military component and priority in the absolute.

This challenge could not be fully addressed in the context of the intervention in Libya, it was long discussed. That is why we also do not give a white card to the federal majority. We will therefore keep an eye on the development of the military situation on the ground in Mali, hoping that the operation will be the most limited in time, that it will succeed in rapidly repelling the Islamist armed movements and re-establishing a framework favorable to the resumption of negotiations with terrorist groups and that it will bring back peace as soon as possible.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, the FDF parliamentarians will support the majority resolution. We will do this essentially from a European perspective and concern because we are convinced that this military engagement in Mali requires a large European political cohesion and is even a test of this political cohesion.

First, I would like to make a sort to the argument of those who want to convince us that our constitutional usages and customs should be adapted with regard to the commitment of military operations. We are not in the case of a declaration of war. Certainly, it will be acts of war that will be committed but we are not in the case of a constitutional figure of the declaration of war that requires the prior consent of Parliament.

Everyone can understand that emergency situations must allow the government to have a faster response time than the legislative power can have. But, let’s be honest, I have never experienced any military engagement by the government that is not covered by a decision of the Parliament and that does not give rise to regular monitoring by the Parliament. No government would have stability if it did not secure the support of Parliament in the involvement of the armed forces, a fortiori abroad. So I ⁇ ’t want some to hide behind a bad constitutional debate, ⁇ to try to mask their hesitation to accept a more frank commitment.

I said that we are committed to supporting the government’s decision from an essentially European perspective. I would welcome the courage of Daniel Cohn-Bendit in the European Parliament. It is true that it has become so European that it has also become less and less green. We will learn in the weeks, months and years to come. He was right to say that it is a great contradiction for Europe to say solidarity with France but not to have the courage to assume a greater military integration. For those who say they need more Europe must, as I say in the commission, accept the consequences. Who says more of Europe, says, if there is a greater military integration, a greater military commitment than what Belgium assumes today following the government decision.

This will be the real question in the coming weeks and in the coming months: how far will a military engagement alongside France be assumed? Indeed – there must be no doubt – we are, without doubt, in a case of military figure that will engage the armed forces for long months, if not more. It can be discussed indefinitely on the question of what military operations will be privileged by France and whether the decisions it will take will be in concert with its allies, but no one can believe, for a single moment, that on March 1, we will learn that President Hollande has decided to bring back the French troops to their starting base.

Therefore, logistical support – we are currently registering for logistical support – will probably need to be extended. I would like to know, Mr. Minister of National Defense, where he will be located on the ground. How far will we put our logistical resources? In the Mali? Outside of Mali? If it is in Mali, will it be in the confrontation zones or outside those areas? This is the real debate.

If we really want to be solidary, if we really want Europe to show its ability to counter one of the biggest threats on the African continent – everyone agrees on this point – namely the rise of Islamist currents in several countries in the Sahel... Experts all consider that the Islamist threat in the Sahel has been underestimated, including by the French. It is also paradoxical to see that it is a left-wing government that, today, assumes what it would have denounced yesterday if it had not been in power. But from the moment when one considers that one has embarked on a long military operation in the Sahel after observing the failure of the international community, ... Indeed, despite the resolutions taken, the United Nations has not been able to mobilize an African force, train it, prepare it and allow it to be operational at the right time. It must also be noted the failure of the countries that financed the training of Mali troops. I read in the international press that the United States had devoted tens of millions of dollars to the training of Mali troops with a result at least unproven. Some say it was the elite troops who were in Kona when the rebels crushed the Mali lines.

In a certain way, it is the failure of French policy in this part of Africa that, of course, saw the rise of dangers but could not prevent them. It is the failure of the European Union that, despite all the budgets for development cooperation, has probably not taken the real preventive measures in the face of the rise of Islamist currents.

We must have the intellectual honesty to say that, for now, the military option is necessary and is probably the only sustainable option in the short term. When I say short-term, it is in the perspective of several months. Therefore, we will need to be told, at some point, in the very interest of Africa – because those who say that it would not have had to react know very well that Bamako was taken, it is a set of countries in the region that would be threatened – and of the European Union, what should be done other than privileging for the moment the military operation. I expect the government to tell us, beyond March 1, how it sees the future development of the presence of our armed forces alongside other countries of the European Union.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, dear colleagues, Belgium is indeed the country of surrealism. This morning, we read in the press that the Belgian army is unable to fight against the few militaries with radical Islamist convictions that exist in its own heart and that it is impossible to dismiss them without sufficient legal means; however, at the same time, we decide to help France in its fight against terrorism by providing logistical assistance for its operations in Mali.

What would we not do to fight terrorism outside our borders!

I only hope that we will have taken care not to send, for these anti-terrorist operations in Mali, these famous Belgian Islamist soldiers. I say it in humorous form, but what is happening in the world now does not make me laugh at all.

Indeed, without a doubt, the leaders of our Western countries are taking the peoples for fools, with the help and support of the press, which is no longer today but an organ of propaganda of the powers in place.

A little around the world, military interventions and regime destabilizations are becoming increasingly frequent. Preventive warfare became the rule. Today, in the name of democracy or the fight against terrorism, our states grant themselves the right to violate the sovereignty of independent countries and to overthrow legitimate leaders.

There have been Iraq and Afghanistan, these wars of American lies; there have been Tunisia, Egypt, Libya where, thanks to your decisions, our country has participated in the front line of crimes against humanity to overthrow, every time, progressive and moderate regimes and replace them with Islamist regimes whose – it is bizarre – first will was to impose the Sharia. The same is the case now in Syria where Belgium shamefully funds the arming of Islamist rebels who are trying to overthrow Bashar al-Assad.

Thus, in the midst of the economic crisis, while more and more Belgians have difficulties in accommodating, feeding, heating or taking care – yes, I already hear the dirty populist I am – the Minister of Foreign Affairs decided to offer the Syrian rebels 9 million euros. Of course, they will try to make us believe that this money will be used for humanitarian purposes. Yet another lie.

As you can see, for months, our country has only participated in the establishment of Islamist regimes in North Africa and the Middle East.

When one pretends to go to war to fight terrorism in Mali, I want to laugh: it is not true!

Under the appearance of good deeds, we only intervene to defend financial interests, in a total neocolonialist logic. It is not consistent to go to help France in Mali in the name of the fight against Islamist terrorism when, at the same time, we support in Syria the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad by Islamist rebels who wish to impose the Sharia law, as is already the case in Tunisia or Libya. We really need to stop lying to ourselves and taking people for idiots!

On the contrary, the time has come to tell the truth. By arming Islamist rebels as the West had previously armed Osama bin Laden, this friend of the Americans before they turn against him, Western countries take advantage of it to deploy military bases in the newly conquered countries, while promoting their national enterprises. Everything is strategic.

In Iraq, our American allies have put their hands on the country’s oil wealth. In Afghanistan, it was about opium and drugs, always very useful to make a lot of money quite quickly. In Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and even Syria, the goal was, and is still now, to overthrow moderate powers to replace them with Islamist powers, which very soon will become annoying and which we will attack without shame under the pretext of fighting, at that time still, against terrorism or protecting Israel. The next targets are already known. In a few months, I bet that our eyes will turn to Algeria and eventually to Iran.

To wage war to liberate peoples from an external aggressor is noble. But whether it is to defend the interests of the United States or large corporations like Areva and to put hands on gold mines, it has nothing noble. And this turns our countries into aggressors and thieves.

No one dares to talk. But if it does not matter, I will not be silent. It doesn’t matter if my struggle should make me look like an enemy of this system that violates human rights in the name of financial, geostrategic and neocolonial interests. To denounce this regime is a duty and a pride for me. And, sincerely, I apologize for the popular vocabulary used: “I bust” all the so-called well-thoughts, whether they are from the left, right or center and who are today in the basks of our corrupt powers and who will like to turn me into ridicule. “I’m upsetting” our leaders who play with their bombs like children in a recreational courtyard. “I’m upset” by those who claim to be Democrats while they’re just low-level criminals.

I also don’t have much respect for young journalists, who have the trick of making opponents look like mental weaknesses, while they know very well that they are perfectly right.

Finally, I despise at the highest point those who take themselves for kings of the world and who dictate their laws to us. For I am on the side of truth, justice and these innocent victims of money at all costs. It is for this reason that I have decided to clearly oppose this resolution that sends our country to support France in its neocolonialist operation.

Since the beginning of the French operation, the lie has been organized. We are told that France is only responding to the call for help from a Mali president. It would almost be forgotten that this president has no legitimacy and that he was set up to ensure the transition following the March 2012 coup. Who supported this coup, who is at the origin, for whom does this transitional president work? This is the first lie. President François Hollande dares to pretend to lead this war to fight against the jihadists, who threaten – be aware! French and European territory. What a wicked lie! By repeating this official argument to frighten the population, by raising the level of terrorist threat, by implementing the Vigipirate Plan, our leaders and the media are showing an unimaginable asshole.

How can one dare to make such an argument, while France and Belgium have not hesitated to arm and support the jihadists in Libya and that these same countries continue to support the jihadists in Syria? This pretext only serves to hide strategic and economic purposes. Our countries are no longer even afraid of inconsistency, because everything is done to hide it. But the inconsistency is still present: it is not tomorrow that you will see a Malian coming to commit an attack in Europe! No to No! Unless it is created suddenly to better justify this military operation. We have well created September 11 to justify the invasion, arbitrary arrest, torture and the massacre of innocent populations! So, creating a Mali terrorism, it shouldn’t be too complicated for our bloody leaders!

Another argument used in recent months to justify military operations is the protection of human rights. This argument is still used today to justify the war in Mali. But yes ! We must act otherwise the radical radical Islamists will impose Sharia in Mali, stone women and cut off the hands of thieves. Certainly, the intention is noble and saving, but then, why did our countries participate in the accession to power in Tunisia and Libya of Islamists, who decided to apply this Sharia in those countries that were, not so long ago yet, modern and progressive? I invite you to ask the young Tunisians, who are at the base of the revolution in Tunisia, if they are happy with the current situation. All this is hypocrisy!

The purpose of this war in Mali is very clear. And since we don’t talk about it, I’ll talk about it. The aim is to fight China and allow our American ally to maintain its presence in Africa and the Middle East. This is what guides these neocolonial operations! And you will see, when the military operation is finished, France will of course maintain bases in Mali. These bases will also serve the Americans and, at the same time – as this is always the case – Western societies will put their hands on juicy contracts, which will once again deprive the colonized countries of their wealth and raw materials.

Let’s be clear, the first beneficiaries of this military operation will be the bosses and shareholders of the French giant Areva. The group has been trying for years to obtain the exploitation of a uranium mine in Faléa, a 17,000-member municipality located 350 km from Bamako. My little finger tells me that it won’t take long for Areva to finally exploit this mine. That is an impression I have! It is therefore out of question that I participate in this mining colonization, this colonization of modern times.

I invite those who doubt my arguments to inquire about the wealth of Mali. This country, a major gold producer, has only recently been designated as providing a world-class environment for uranium mining. How strange it is! One more step towards a war with Iran is obvious.

For all these reasons and in order not to fall into the trap of the lies that are being told to us, I have decided not to support this intervention in Mali. I will vote against. In doing so, I show consistency since I have never supported our criminal interventions in Libya or Syria in the past, profiling myself as the only parliamentary in this country who defends non-interference and the fight against obscure interests.

I really think it is time to put an end to our participation in the UN or NATO and to leave the European Union if this Europe, instead of being a guarantee of peace, becomes a weapon of attack and destabilization of sovereign countries in the hands of financial and no longer humanistic interests.

Finally, I can only encourage our government to remind President Hollande of the obligations arising from the Geneva Convention regarding respect for prisoners of war. I was indeed outraged to hear on television from the French president’s mouth that his intention was to ‘destroy’ the Islamist terrorists. I would not want the qualification used to name opponents of the Mali regime – it is still practical today to speak of “Islamic terrorists” – to be used to circumvent any democratic state’s obligations to respect the rights of prisoners of war.

We expect such respect from the homeland of human rights.

Finally, let me highlight the lightness with which we decide to go to war. First of all, the government acts, without any parliamentary permission. He says he has the right. He sends equipment and men to Mali. The parliament then reacts and, when it reacts, as today, this institution is composed of only one-third of its members, and much less if we speak of the French-speaking elected. It is therefore a guilty lightness, which does not really surprise me, coming from a parliament of 'toutous' subject to the dictates of political parties.

Mr. Speaker, dear colleagues, I would like first to thank all groups who, for three days, have supported the government’s decision to provide logistical support to the operation launched in Mali at the request of the Mali government by the French authorities.

This operation is linked to the protection of the populations in Mali, who suffer from serious violations of human rights and in particular women’s rights, as has been known in other parts of the world. It is important that we can remember this commitment that is ours, more broadly elsewhere also in the Sahel.

The Constitution states that the government must first make a decision and then inform the Parliament about it. I have already said in the committee that I did this with my colleague of Defense and with the Prime Minister even before the communication to the Council of Ministers. Is it hard to do more? To act even faster than to come to Parliament after a core decision and conduct the debate there?

I heard the question whether it is possible to start a debate as soon as possible. We have held the same debate twice in the committee in the last three days and now in the plenary session. It is a correct application, not only of the Constitution, but also of our government agreement, that we give all information as soon as possible.

Is it possible to make an evaluation? This is ⁇ possible. This was also decided by the nuclear cabinet. The first phase runs until 1 March. We will see if it is possible to stop before March 1, but that will be an evaluation within the government, with a communication and a discussion in the Chamber. I think it is so clear and clear.

As for the content of the decisions and the follow-up of the operations, I will not recall everything that has been said in the committee. However, I would like to remind you of some elements.

First, concerning the military operation, the desire is obviously to return as soon as possible to an international operation as prepared since the mini-top that took place in New York in September last year. This means an operation requested by the Mali government, supported by the countries of the region, in particular those of the CEDEAO, organized within the framework of the African Union and for which the European Union, like others, intervenes in second line, in logistics, in training.

We had to react faster. This is why we participate today. Nevertheless, the commitment is very clear: what we demand, what the European Union and the United Nations want, is to return to an international operation as soon as possible.

On this point, I would like to recall at least one element that we gave in commission: will the operation be long? and yes. Don’t be mistaken about this subject: the operation will be long-lasting. This does not mean that the operation will be sustainably a French operation with the support we provide today. What we want is, I repeat, that the relay be taken by an operation of an international character.

Can we do more? Certainly . At the European level, the language is clear and clear and Belgium has used the same language. First and foremost, a political process is needed to ⁇ a real state and a real government in Bamako, but there must also be a rule of law throughout the country. That is to say, there may also be civil support for justice, police and other tasks, and, more than that, a negotiation process in Mali begins and therefore also a possible negotiation process between the various political actors, for reconciliation and ⁇ more autonomy for the north of the country. We will work on it. Everything is clear and ready for Belgium.

I would tell Mr. From Germany, who insisted on this point, that I do not rule out that we take initiatives in this area. This must be done as far as possible within the framework of the European Union and the United Nations by supporting a political process concerning both Mali and the entire Sahel. If it is not the political process that takes the lead, military operations will shrink and will not lead to a lasting solution.

The same is true on the humanitarian level. This was reiterated by the Minister of Cooperation, we will of course continue to work with a country of concentration, but nothing prevents us from reorganizing our interventions or even strengthening them.

Mr. De Vriendt, in the budget are a lot of savings included, but yet there are enough resources in the post Conflict Prevention of Development Cooperation to do something, and more than now, even in Mali. You can say that there is a savings, but with almost 1.4 billion euros for Development Cooperation and a correct amount for the Conflict Prevention post, it is perfectly possible to do more in Mali in 2013 than what has happened in previous years. Only a choice must be made. Per ⁇ this will lead to fewer actions in other areas, but it is always a matter of making choices. There were also savings on the defence budget, but yet we have made a decision for a cooperation of Belgium with France in this operation. It is perfectly possible to use a lot of resources.

Mr. Speaker, as Ms. Boulet pointed out, I will say a word of the still very chaotic situation today in Southeast Algeria following this attack on a gas site, operated not only by BP but also by other actors, including local.

The attack resulted in a large number of hostages. Initially, it was mentioned about 40 hostages, but with uncertainty as to the number of people present on the site. The Algerian authorities have decided to intervene. At the moment, I cannot give you the details of the consequences of this intervention, but I fear that they will be very heavy in loss of human lives, especially among the hostages present on the site.

That being said, I will clarify that we have taken all initiatives to know the exact situation of our citizens. I had said it in the commission: 183 Belgian nationals or entitled beneficiaries who can benefit from our consular assistance are in the Mali territory. I reassure you: we are in constant contact with these people, many of whom are collaborators. I would like to remind this tribune that the request is clear, for all whose presence is not entirely indispensable, to leave the territory of Mali and return to Belgium, unless they put themselves under the protection of the security forces present on the theater of the operations. I insist on this point: the message is to take all safety precautions.

With regard to Algeria, we were able to contact four people present on a non-very-distant oil site, who have never been the subject of violence or hostage: three are returning to Brussels and the fourth person has returned to Alger because his wife is Algerian.

As for the gas site in question, at this moment, we could not obtain any confirmation of the presence of any Belgian – I say rightly: at this moment – both from the Algerian authorities and from our embassy or BP officials in Algeria and London. No Belgians are on the staff lists. And, this is also an indication, we did not receive any calls from relatives or family members of someone who might be on the spot. Of course, my department has organized a crisis cell and will continue to monitor the development of the situation.

If we follow the situation very closely, it is not only because of the drama that is being witnessed today in Algeria, but also because a news agency, it seems, quite close in terms of information of the hostage-takers has broadcast a message about three Belgians. But at this moment – I say rightly: at this moment – all the messages that reach us invalidate this information. Therefore, we are not aware of a Belgian presence on this site.

I would like to conclude, Mr. President, by thanking all those and all those who support the government’s approach. Of course, it is not easy to undertake and is not without risks. by Mr. Maingain asked where the military would intervene, but anyway there are risks in this operation both in terms of logistical support and from the perspective of the region as a whole. Reactions and contagious phenomena in neighboring countries are possible. We see this today with this terrorist action in Algeria. I would therefore like to thank for their support all the groups that have expressed themselves in this sense, but also to remind our fellow citizens in Mali and in the whole region of the caution that must be applied at this time. It is not necessary that they remain in place if their presence is not indispensable. If it does, they must be as cautious as possible and put themselves under the protection of the forces present on the ground.

This is, Mr. President, what I wanted to say. Of course, evaluations will be conducted within the government. And Parliament will be regularly informed of this and of the follow-up of the decisions that may be taken.

The President, Mr. Maingain asked me for some clarification.

I would like to thank all members of Parliament and committees for the speed with which we have worked. There were three committee meetings. The meeting was held this morning, behind closed doors. In the afternoon, the discussion took place in the plenary session.

Mr. Maingain, as regards the deployment of our forces, these are currently under the command of the French forces. The helicopters will be stationed in Ségou, located outside the conflict zone, where possible wounded military personnel or people who need to receive care will be transported by the French to be then evacuated to Bamako, which is also in a secure zone.

We were asked that the helicopters could be deployed from January 21 or 22. We have now been told that they should be ready from January 27 or 28, which will not pose any problems. As you probably know, the C-130s are currently in Abidjan. One came from Melsbroek and made a stop in Corsica. The other was part of an EATC mission and was moved from N'Djamena to Abidjan.

Tomorrow morning, a first flight under French command will take place, from Abidjan, in the area. I assume, according to my information, that it will be a strategic flight, that is, a displacement of French troops from Abidjan to Bamako.