Proposition 52K1470

Projet de loi portant des mesures visant à promouvoir la stabilité financière et instituant en particulier une garantie d'Etat relative aux crédits octroyés et autres opérations effectuées dans le cadre de la stabilité financière.

General information ¶

Submitted by

CD&V Leterme Ⅰ

Submission date

Oct. 14, 2008

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

bank central bank delegation of power financial policy financial control financial institution financial intervention financial solvency guarantee liquidity control monetary union State aid claim

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V Vooruit LE PS | SP Open Vld N-VA LDD MR VB

Abstained from voting

Groen Ecolo

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Discussion ¶

Oct. 14, 2008 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Mr. Colleagues, the Finance Committee has urgently examined the Government Bill on measures aimed at promoting financial stability and establishing, in particular, a State Guarantee relating to loans granted and other operations carried out within the framework of financial stability.

The Minister responded extensively to all the questions that were asked. by Mr. Nollet requested a written report. He has it on his bench. The bill did not result in a negative vote. I refer to the written report. Thank you Mr Nollet!

Mr. Jeholet, I thank you for your brilliant report, especially since it was brief.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, at this slightly advanced hour, I will keep it relatively short.

As the rapporteur already noted, a number of punctual and technical questions were asked during the discussion in the committee. I have already put them in the committee and will not repeat them here now. I will take the opportunity here in the current plenary session to give a brief political consideration on behalf of the Flemish Belang Group.

Those who have followed the stock exchange rates today have been able to determine what crazy booze leaps, for example, a Dexia share can still make. In the context of the current crisis in the financial markets and their persistent instability, the Flemish Belang is therefore aware that the government – though with the back against the wall – must take a number of measures to strengthen confidence in the financial sector. This is the subject of the present draft. However, the above is only one pillar of the whole story of the banking crisis.

There is also a second, important pillar, from which many small savers are currently awake. This is in particular the guarantee that the government guarantees in respect of their savings at the various financial institutions.

My group regrets that today the government does not take advantage of the opportunity to legally increase the savings guarantee, which currently amounts to EUR 20,000, to EUR 100,000, both for accounts at domestic banks and for accounts at branches of foreign banks. In this regard, the Kaupthing story is currently the most urgent. Who knows what will happen tomorrow.

The aforementioned possibility would be a reassurance for many savers at this time. However, this issue is apparently not resolved today, which we, Mr. Minister, deeply regret.

Furthermore, we must not underestimate the extent of the present bill. Colleagues, I would like to point out that with the present draft, public finances have never been used in such a large-scale manner before.

The guarantee for Dexia, for example, if they asked the government to obtain a state guarantee, would amount to 90 billion euros for the loans granted. That is a huge amount, not habbekrats. That is, of course, also one of the disadvantages: immediately the public finances are also exposed to a certain risk, where it will be the taxpayer who will reverse it if it fails. We must not forget this too.

Furthermore, we must not forget that this bill addresses some of the symptoms of the current banking crisis. For a parliament that wants to carry out its control over the government in a solid and serious way, this can not be enough: the causes of the banking crisis must, in our opinion, also be explored. Hence our persistent demand for the establishment of an investigation committee: which is absolutely necessary to expose the errors, the possible fraud, the responsibilities and responsibilities of the management of the banks concerned and their broad, whether or not political, entourage.

Lessons must be learned from the debacles that have occurred so that one as a government is better armed. This will also contribute to greater confidence in the banking system. In doing so, we must not escape a number of taboos such as politicization and other holy houses. Colleagues, every saver, every investor has the right to be clear about the circumstances of government financial interventions in Fortis and Dexia and has the right to know which decision-making processes have been there that may have led to risky banking products that continue to exist to this day. Hence the importance of a thorough investigation.

So far my brief speech. Vlaams Belang will support the present draft law.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary of State, dear colleagues, the financial crisis we are going through is – I am not the only one to say it – the most serious one we have had to go through in this century. That is why I will not limit myself to address point by point each of the articles that are found in the law text. I find the idea of imagining that, for such a debate, one limits itself merely to technical considerations is displaced.

We are, and for a while still, at the heart of the most important crisis. This is a systemic crisis that requires a systemic solution. And what the government now offers us urgently is by no means a systemic solution. It is a piece of the puzzle, a piece that you consider necessary, a piece that is returned to the emergency, a piece that was amended in commission this afternoon, but above all a piece that is insufficient in relation to the device that is to be implemented. I will come back soon.

Mr. Speaker, let me first of all thank the services for the quality of the work done in such a short time so that we can all have a report on such an important topic.

Mr. Brotcorne, you can smile but we are probably facing a text that could engage the country, at the budgetary level, beyond the sum of all other texts that we will have to vote during this legislature. That’s why we asked for a report; that’s also why our speeches at the tribune will go beyond the technical point of view to address the substance of the problem.

What is this problem?

For too long we thought we could operate with an economy completely disconnected from the economic reality: $3.250 billion in financial transactions daily, twenty times the GDP and fifty times the exports. This is what gives us a relationship between the real economy and the financial economy, a gap such that it is not the few measures you are proposing today to the House to adopt that will allow to respond in a structural and systemic way to the crisis.

Today, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, we are witnessing the bankruptcy of a system, the bankruptcy of a model, the model that you have always defended and that you want to save today. What we want and feel necessary at this time is to change the rules, to change the model.

Since I have not taken the time to develop these proposed measures in the committee, I would like to discuss them in plenary session. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, we consider it necessary to address other measures, which are totally absent in your text and your proposal.

It is necessary to draw all the lessons from the crisis and begin to clearly distinguish the banking professions with, on the one hand, the bank for deposits and for loans and, on the other, the banks purely of business, the same ones at the origin of a part of the current crisis, the same ones that also force us to go back into the foundations even deeper than this simple look at sub-primes or on derivatives related to securitisation. This distinction of banking professions is at the heart of the model to be reconstructed from bottom to bottom.

The second dimension is the creation of public and independent rating agencies. In this regard, several banks of the majority have already spoken in favour.

Mr Brotcorne, you are in favor of this. At least this is what you say here in Parliament. However, in the European Parliament, no later than on 24 September 2008, your party voted against this idea of creating European grants and regulatory agencies. This is in total disagreement with what you say here!

To tell you all, Mr. Brotcorne, the French-speaking liberals in the European Parliament voted for our amendment aimed at introducing these agencies, but the representative of your party, Mr. Brotcorne, voted for this amendment. Langendries, voted against! I therefore ask you for a little modesty and coherence in relation to the debate we are conducting here today. It is actually too easy to use the European alibi, to say that Europe should put certain things in place. When it comes to taking responsibilities at the European level, you are absent! Now, just recently, you will ⁇ say that you are in favor of the creation of public funding agencies and a stronger European regulation. Therefore, I ask you for more consistency in the facts and in the votes!

I come to another necessary proposal: the improvement of accounting standards. I am talking about this today because, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, you have an important European Council of Ministers tomorrow. These are the same accounting standards that have prompted companies to have to make today the figure in connection with their stock market results much more than with their actual results.

Until now, I have not read, in your proposals, any concrete measures that would allow to bring all the operations that are currently carried out out of balance sheet. Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, since the State is now largely a shareholder in a Belgian bank – Dexia not to name it – and a reference shareholder, as you say, in a French bank, I ask you a direct question. Can you guarantee us that the State, as a shareholder, will effectively repatriate into the balance sheet of Dexia, Fortis and what remains from its merger, a whole series of operations that are currently out of balance sheet?

In an even clearer way, will the state ban itself from investing and playing with tax havens?

These are the measures, the decisions that are expected of you if you really want to learn from the crisis we know today. For now, it is the silence around this responsibility that is now yours. You are the primary shareholder on one side; you are the reference shareholder on the other. There is as much urgency to learn lessons as to implement the device you are proposing today.

A number of other measures are needed, including the limitation of securitisation. I’m willing to come to the tribune today to talk to you about this because this is an ongoing debate at European level.

I suppose you know that the Commission has proposed that every financial entity, which decides to securize a series of products and sell them out, must keep in its own accounting a minimum of 15% of the value of the assets that are subject to securitisation. This proposal dates from June. It was submitted for consultation with all governments and all actors.

What was the Belgian government’s response to this proposal? A total lack of response. Belgium is one of the only governments that has not officially responded to a proposal from the European Commission.

On the other hand, the silence of the Belgian government has left all the necessary space for banks (Dexia, Fortis, ING, KBC, who today use the device you intend to set up) to submit an opinion to the European Commission in which they request not to maintain at 15% the value of securities on the own account of the relevant banks but to lower it to 5%.

What has the European Union done on the basis of all the consultations and responses received, in particular that of Belgian banks? In his final proposal, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, she held the figure of 5%! This is the total opposite of all that has been said by all those who today accept to recognize that this system has failed and that it needs to be reformed from the bottom to the bottom.

Tomorrow, you will participate in the European Council of Ministers. We will, for our part, wait for your return to this assembly to conduct the debate. I think it is extremely important that you can come and tell us when a step back has been made. This is an up-to-date debate. This will allow us to take further action at the level of the European Parliament. Limit securitisation, go back in terms of final proposals, return to fair proportions where the one who takes a risk assumes it rather than sell with the consequences that it can have.

Proposals to strengthen bank solvency requirements, limit leverage and prohibit out-of-the-box sales should also be taken. All these proposals were unanimous the day after the discovery of the extent of the crisis. However, at the moment, from the day after the Paulson plan was voted, uncovered sales are again allowed in the United States. Under these circumstances, how to go to the heart of the necessary changes?

The European Union has decided to maintain, for only three months, the ban on open-selling. We ask you to maintain structurally, in the legislative arrangements, the prohibition of such sales.

In addition, we have heard a lot about the golden parachutes. The Prime Minister said in a committee of that Chamber that golden parachutes are no longer admissible and that provisions should be made in this regard. Today, the text presented to us does not say a word about this while environmentalists have filed, now already ten days ago, a bill aimed at ending the system of golden parachutes.

Mr. Jill, I know my words are bothering you. You may need it!

However, we must end the stock-options-based remuneration system, limit the remuneration of business executives who are so disconnected from the economic reality that they are no longer aware of what is happening today. There are texts. Proposals are made. If you do not have time to submit a bill on this subject, be aware that these proposals are at your disposal! However, the current text does not refer to these issues at all.

Mr. Jeholet, one cannot invoke the urgency to protect the banks without putting in place the necessary devices, which you have supported before the cameras, in order to end the golden parachutes.

Today, there is nothing in the text, nor about this, nor about other necessary measures.

I would like to further address the need to tax speculative stock market operations. To say that a text has been adopted here and that it can only come into force with an agreement of the 27 countries of the European Union is an argument too easy. It is important to go beyond this concept and dare to address this discussion again in the Eurogroup, in enhanced cooperation or with other countries equally attentive to this dimension.

I hope that you will put this question on the table of the European Council of Ministers.

The other proposal on the orientation of the investment made in pension funds dates back to 2006. This is a proposal that we drafted a few months ago. It is inspired by the Quebec model, where pension funds, the second and third pillars, are used to support local business, and thus local employment, which meets a series of sustainability criteria. Why is this proposal, which has been trapped in our committees since then, not even more supported? Only with this kind of mechanism will we succeed in transforming the system; this is the necessary goal.

I do not hide from you, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, that if you really want to work quickly, you will succeed, but then you will miss the goal that you announced to us: not to re-live such crises.

Today we strongly denounce the logic in which you want to hurry the whole Parliament and that a bill is deposited, voted and the crisis is resolved! We know very well that we will not have resolved the crisis, nor have we brought the structural changes, the necessary systemic changes. You will obviously have your communication tool, but it is not that that will solve the crisis, it is the whole of the proposals developed here.

The European countries gathered in Paris a few days ago considered it necessary to take measures to guarantee, to make guaranteed by the state, by the public power, bank and interbank loans. The European decision aimed to limit this guarantee, to limit the very significant financial intervention of the state to 31 December 2009. In your text, there is no time limit. This device can be used as an emergency device in five years, in ten years or in twenty years. This is not what we expect to solve the crisis structurally.

Second, there is no more limit in terms of volumes committed. I consulted the decisions of other countries, since you echoed in committee the decisions made in other countries: all of them limited the amount that could be committed, sometimes large amounts, in connection with the size of the country. Here, Parliament is preparing to vote on a text that does not specify any time limit and no limit of financial volume. I think it is going too far.

Likewise, as we said in the committee, you ask for a form of special powers by this text, also unlimited in time. This is not normal. That you propose exceptional measures to manage the crisis in the emergency, okay. We also supported some of the measures you have proposed. But whether you take advantage of the urgency today to ask for full support for a plan that has no tags, including what banks will do with the money that will be borrowed or given to them, that, no, we cannot support it.

Mr Jeholet, if you had been present in the committee, if you had read the report, you would properly know that we did not support this text, that we abstained in the committee and that we will also abstain in the plenary, for all the reasons I have just advanced: because there are no limits, that you do not want to end this system because your goal is to preserve it. That is why we will not support this text: because you do not learn from the crisis and you want to continue in the same way! You will continue without us.

Exceptional circumstances sometimes require exceptional measures. The financial crisis that has hit the world in recent weeks, and therefore our country, requires that the government can act strongly. The effectiveness with which the government has managed to cope with the financial crisis in recent weeks must also be guaranteed in the future. At the moment we see that the measures taken have an effect, but ⁇ more will be needed in the future.

Today, with the highest urgency, we vote on a draft, as a powerful signal that the government will safeguard the financial system, also in the future. Indeed, the present draft, which has rightly been given the highest urgency, grants the King special powers to quickly take certain decisions to safeguard the financial system in the event of a sudden financial crisis or a serious threat to the financial system. In this way, you can act quickly.

I think everyone has seen that the Dexiadossier shows that in the short term the liquidity of a bank can get seriously in trouble. Therefore, quick action is necessary.

Second, the draft also provides for a state guarantee to the National Bank to guarantee the loans it provides in the context of financial stability. This also ensures the functioning of the central bank in extreme circumstances.

Third, a state guarantee is also provided for loans between system banks. This should restore the necessary confidence between financial institutions in order to pump sufficient liquidity into the system. After all, liquidity is the lubricant oil of the entire system.

The measures therefore deserve our full support, but are separate from the principled questions that we need to address in the future. It is our strongest conviction that measures will be needed to solve the problems for the future. Increased transparency, better regulation and strengthened supervision are the measures that we need to address fundamentally, not today but in the coming weeks and months. This should be clear to everyone.

Finally, we would like to insist on this again to bring the legal framework for raising the guarantee guarantee for savers from 20,000 to 100,000 euros into order as soon as possible. The Minister of Finance has assured us that the KB will be taken for this very soon, but I would nevertheless take the opportunity to request that there be the necessary urgency, as an important signal to the many thousands of savers in our country, who may be waiting for the expansion of that security system.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, I will begin my presentation in the same way as the CD&V colleague. Exceptional circumstances require exceptional measures.

I hope CD&V agrees with me that these exceptional measures apply not only when we talk about the banks, but also when we talk about the savers. I have just announced and discussed in the committee that we have submitted a number of amendments that have been rounded up. It is intended to approve today not only the guarantee for the banks, but also two other matters, namely the guarantee for the savers in Belgium and the guarantee for the customers of foreign banks that have offices in Belgium. That is what sp.a today, in addition to the guarantee for the banks, wants to see regular and approved.

What do we see? What is the reaction of the government? On Monday, the Ecofin Council met. Minister Reynders was present. Last week Monday, the Ecofin Board decided that the guarantee for the savers will be increased from €20,000 to €50,000 - mandatory - and to €100,000 - optional.

Now, more than a week later, unless some government promises that this would come out, nothing has been done to arrange that for the small savers.

The difference with the scheme for the banks is incredible. Yesterday, exactly a week after last Monday, heads of state and ministers of the euro area met and it was rightly decided that there should be a guarantee for allowing loans between banks. Less than 12 hours later, a draft law is already ready. Well done, the government. worked very quickly.

Worked quickly for the banks and not worked for the savers. We are now going to give you all the opportunity to correct where the government has done nothing for the savers last week that today.

I will give you the explanation Minister Reynders subsequently gave in the committee. What does Minister Reynders say? Reynders says that we should not regulate this for the savers through the law. The government can decide this by royal decree. That goes in principle much faster than passing a law through Parliament. So the Minister has had more than a week of time to prepare that KB. I note today that there is no text of a KB yet. I see nothing. I only see a bill for banks.

Colleagues, on behalf of the SP.A, I want to say clearly and clearly that we will approve what is good. We will approve the bill presented by the government today because it is good. The question is whether you, CD&V, Open Vld, also want to approve what is good and what comes from the opposition. That is the question tonight. Are you willing to stand up for the savers and not postpone the case further? Today is the lakmus test, today is the time to add the act to the word and approve what is good. We are curious whether this majority is indeed willing to endorse what is good.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, I will respond in this way to Mr. Vanvelthoven, whom I accuse of some poujadism. He says that the government has all the time and that the bill only serves the banks. That is the great story of sp.a, where everyone knows of course the problem of the banks and the derivatives. Only he says here that his proposal is exactly what we need to approve in order to solve the problem of the saver and, in the case of derivatives, to apply the European proposal.

The [...]

Well, Mr. Vanvelthoven, you get nervous even before I started well. Maybe because you already know what I’m going to say?

The truth has its rights. In fact, the design that presents gives the government exactly the authority to do what you propose, only with a number of framed elements that make it sufficient and efficient. So, what you are proposing, namely, “Comrades, let us make sure that the guarantee for the saver can increase,” that is exactly what we will do, because that is the draft that the government is proposing today.

Instead of trying here to hang out the cleverest of the class with a – ⁇ – falsehood... You pretend that, if we pass that law today, the problem of the saver is not solved. That is not correct. (Applause of Applause)

Do I understand Mr. Daems correctly? According to the majority, the problem of the savers can only be solved by giving the government a mandate. Mr. Daems, that’s what you come to tell us here!

Mr. Vanvelthoven, you are going through the curve again briefly. The government is proposing – you know it perfectly well – a law that offers a number of possibilities, indeed in exceptional circumstances, to solve some problems. One of the matters that cannot be solved without that law, but can be solved by that law, is in particular the increase of the guarantee for the saver from 20,000 euros to 100,000 euros, whatever the minister will do, because he has confirmed it in the committee and he will confirm it again here. That is the reality. (Applause of Applause)

In other words, it’s a little too easy to proclaim this or that. It is late and the press may be less alert, but the truth has its rights. What is the point?

This is not a serious comment.

You repeat that the only way to raise the guarantee for the small saver from 20,000 to 100,000 euros is through this law, which gives powers to the government. I tell you that the minister could have arranged this without the law. I tell you that the Minister has not arranged last week. I ask you to arrange it tonight. That is what I ask you.

Mr. Vanvelthoven, I will say it simply again. You stand on the table and you say, why has that royal decision not yet been taken, which has been discussed in the committee? Well, because there is still no law that allows the royal decree to be taken. This is the law that we will now pass. That is the reality. So simple is that.

This is exactly what the Minister has said. I listened well, and I know something about these things.

Mr. Van de Velde also wants to intervene.

Mr. Speaker, if the government partners are so blind to the truth, I would like to ask that these so-called very proactive government participants take a look at their press archives. In fact, on 14 July we already requested to increase the guarantee. But at that time, like Louis XVI, they were still sitting in their ivory tower thinking that the Bastille was not on fire. It was already on fire at that time.

Every time it becomes clear again and again that one comes too late and with too little. I would like to add to that.

Mr. Speaker, I will once again address this element, and then I will continue with my general argument. We can repeat it six times, but well.

It is clear that at the first possible moment the government has come to Parliament, namely today, in an exceptional procedure, with which we agree unanimously, to subsequently pass a law, hopefully unanimously, that resolves exactly the concern that you and we all share by enabling to increase the guarantee for the saver, as determined by European. The present law gives exactly the authority to do so to the Minister. That is what she does.

Mr. Vanvelthoven, it can be solved in a number of ways. Only this is the way the government chooses, because some framework measures are needed for this very important matter. That is the reality.

In other words, saying “with us it can and with you not” is just not right.

I have a few general concerns, Mr. Minister. First, there is a problem of credibility in interbank credit formation. They no longer believe each other. The banking system operates on the basis of lending money to each other. We do not need to give courses on this now. I wonder what is hidden in the closet. In other words, what happens here is not the fact that the market works but that the market fails.

Banks are solvent. The CBFA states that banks are able to repay their debts, but they can no longer incur debts. The market no longer works. That is why I think it is only normal that when the market does not work, there must be an intervention that can put the market back on track. That is counting what we have seen of this government in a ⁇ rapid and good way, in particular taking the place of an actor in the market by putting a guarantee on the table so that the interbank liquidities get back on.

Between hooks, that is also something that is not clear. Giving a guarantee is not an expense. This is the impression that is created here. Giving guarantees does not necessarily mean costs; just as participating the government in a business, by acquiring shares, would necessarily be costs. The government takes a risk, but giving a guarantee to restore liquidity in the banking world – and thus also the loans to the people on the street – does not necessarily involve costs. For this reason, the control must be carried out very securely because it is absolutely impossible that, for the sake of a state guarantee, the banking world tries to lose its bad products. In this way, the taxpayer will remain with the rotten apples. Control is therefore essential in this area.

Mr. Minister, I also think that the existing interbank financing system will not last long. I think there will be new systems. Elements that make this impossible today, such as having to book a market value in which the equity falls into dungeons, are no longer sustainable. In other words, somewhere a new type of funding will need to be found. I said at the first committee meeting that at some point there will probably be a guarantee fund so that the state can get out of this situation. It is not the responsibility of the state to provide these guarantees.

However, in addition to the attention to the saver, which we all have with a law that will enable to resolve that, I will not enter into the aspect of the small shareholder when the State has interfered – I think of Fortis – nor further into municipalities and provinces. The Minister has committed to considering the liquidity problem in a positive sense, including the municipal holding.

However, I would like to add an additional point. The consequence of this banking crisis will inevitably be that obtaining credit in the economy will become very difficult; that is, by the way, already the case today. If yesterday a simple small and medium-sized enterprise had to put on the table one hundred euros, twenty euros of own money for an investment of a total amount, then today the bank already asks for forty or fifty euros. Therefore, simply speaking, only half can happen, because one does not have all that capital. So I want, in addition to attention to the saver – important! –, in addition to attention to the small shareholder – important! – and in addition to paying attention to aspects such as municipalities and provinces, so the taxpayers – important! –, very clearly ask the government to come forward in the short term with a number of elements that will in some way supplementally facilitate the upcoming credit difficulties for small, medium and large enterprises, in addition to the guarantee for interbank liquidity. The latter will indeed ensure that the banks do not go bankrupt and that there is oil back in the system, but it will not yet ensure that the banks, as yesterday, provide credit to companies to keep the economy functioning.

I ask very clearly that the government put in place a number of aspects in the short term so that the short or medium-term guarantee of the State to the banks also translates into the smooth provision of loans that at least keep the economy running. This is about jobs, about income; in other words, it is about purchasing power. We must not lose sight of this aspect. This is inevitably caused by this crisis.

Mr Daems, this is the second time that you insist that urgent initiatives are taken to allow SMEs to obtain loans more easily after the nationalization you supported.

You said that governments that take shares in companies or take over companies altogether do not per definition do anything losing. I would like to hear you say that. I would like to come back to your exact proposal, precisely because you have already said it twice as affirmatively. I suspect that it even threatens to become an Open Vld position. However, I wonder what you mean exactly.

Are you advocating for an investment fund at the federal level that provides some additional guarantees or additional financing as we have known it for a very long time, or are you on the other hand returning to methods such as the national sectors of the 1960s, effectively offering a number of guarantees to companies from certain sectors?

What do you mean exactly? For which companies do you want to see what happens at the federal level to allow the companies involved to obtain more and more easily credit?

The track that can be followed is not the track where the government invests in SMEs. The existing instruments were nota bene through the laws of 1956 and 1970 on the financing of the national sectors, which you also know, partially regionalized. These include capital guarantees and capital investments or interest subsidies. These are things that are downward. That is not the track.

The point I want to point out is that today, as a result of the banking crisis, where the mutual guarantees are no longer trusted, the business will be asked for too many guarantees. Indeed, it is necessary to examine whether, in any way, a supplementary guarantee – let me say – can not be offered, leading to the formation of credit. In what form this happens, is a matter that the government should look at.

The intended creation can take various forms. It may be the classic system of the old Guarantee Fund, which I am not a supporter of. The aforementioned, old Participation Fund still exists note bene. I am not in favour of this.

I just want the guarantee that the State gives to enable liquidity between banks to be transferred in some way to credit formation. The elements, systems and techniques must be examined.

However, if we don’t do anything about the problem – that’s my point – or at least not pay attention to it, credit formation will stop in the next six to eighteen months, and the economy will get an additional strain. The result will be: employment that is lost and cannot be retained. In addition, the purchasing power that is so important for you will also be lost.

You enter open doors when outlining the problem. We all get enough testimonials from all sorts of companies that have trouble getting credit or removing projects. Situating the problem in the way you situate it, therefore, is entering an open door.

The only thing I hear you telling is that we absolutely urgently need to do something about the problem. However, if I ask you what to do about the problem, you answer that the government should only look at it.

I thought you were working on a kind of Open Vld proposal. However, it is waiting for the government.

I am therefore very curious about what the government will do on this point, because the problem is indeed very acute.

Because there is a banking crisis. The problem was not acute a month ago. That is the reality. In other words, it is now necessary to understand what the future problem is. In order to do this, a number of measures must be put forward.

Mr. Daems, I am surprised by your words. For years, banks have not borrowed to SMEs and small self-employed, even small sums. There was Basel I, there was Basel II, and that doesn’t stop. The only solution you advocate is a state guarantee to support the risk of banks. You therefore integrate the fact that lending to SMEs involves a significant risk requiring a state guarantee. At no time do you say that it is the business of banks to take risks and invest in a business that is safer than speculation, which they tended to do a little too much.

I think your proposals should be amplified and reviewed.

It is not true to say that, previously, the big problem was the fact that banks no longer lend to SMEs. There were no bad loans with bad guarantees. There was, however, the formation of loans for SMEs. All economic growth rates are there to prove it!

Now, because of the banking crisis, banks have a problem in their own balance sheet. They will therefore be extremely – ⁇ too – cautious and will require much more capital from SMEs, while SMEs simply do not. As a result, the formation of credits will not be done.

You seem to suggest that banks should take risks. No to No! Banks are not made to take risks. This can be seen in the current banking crisis. A bank is made to have depositors and it must place the money of these depositors in the safest way, among other things in the formation of credits.

Alongside the formation of loans, there are guarantees from private sector companies. The problem then arises that too many guarantees will be required. I simply draw attention to the fact that the problem does not date from one or two months ago but that because of the banking crisis, the problem will arise in the coming months. After providing a response to the savers, small shareholders and other things, we will also need to think about and address this problem. Otherwise, the economy will pay for it in terms of jobs and purchasing power.

Can you conclude, Mr Daems.

I am going around, Mr. President. In addition to the existing instruments, a number of new instruments may also be introduced. One can, for example, indeed build a kind of guaranteed, with capital supported collectively, a word that you should sound good in your ears.

No, no necessary tax money. That support can be a settlement for the lack of capital and thus a guarantee for SMEs.

I turn around, Mr. Speaker, because one is bored when one says a few things to the socialists. Particularly Mr. Dedecker is bored by this.

In the near future there must be a reflection – you rejoins là peut-être un peu paradoxalement l’opinion de M. Nollet – about the difference between investing and speculating. I say that as a liberal. Investing is a market event that creates added value. It is a matter of one plus one is three. While taking positions on the financial markets were insurance attitudes, speculation today is rather a matter of profit and loss, where plus one is equal to minus one and is not associated with any economic added value. So I also think that there are limits to uncontrolled speculation. A well-known economist recently said that one cannot regulate greed by itself. I think he was right.

Mr. Speaker, I think that a reflection in the near future is needed on how to somehow ban speculation from the market, because it is not marketed. This is a challenge, especially for liberals. I would like to address this challenge on an ideological level with my colleagues from the left.

Here are some elements of my speech, Mr. Speaker.

State guarantees for loans from the National Bank of Belgium are important. You hear me say it well. They are important because they can restore confidence in the interbank market.

However, as you all well understand, this is not the only thing that is urgent. Also the care for the savers - this afternoon still with a lot of applause brought forward by the prime minister - is important. The concern for the citizens, for the vulnerable groups in our society, for the asylum seekers who, once again in a row, remain hungry, even for the climate, all suffer from the crisis of today.

Just in the committee, Mr Van Biesen, a member of Open Vld, still openly regretted that the announced increase in savings benefits was not included in the present bill. A liberal who tells what the socialists and the Greens ask. It is strong. However, it is not for today.

I want to do two things. I would like to discuss the bill in a substantial way and draw a parallel with a fundamental discussion about the market as it is. Both are closely related, not only practically but above all substantially.

As for the design, and I hope you take the effort to listen, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister. I know that this is not the strongest side of the majority and of this government. Take a look around yourself before you start with boogie calling. and broadcasting.

Government requires special powers. We understand that in difficult times one must make difficult and courageous decisions. We are also of good will. We would like to approve this law, unless there are some fundamental problems.

We are hoping that this crisis will not last. The measure will have to restore confidence. The question is, why is there no deadline? In the European Union, you have agreed with 14 other countries to keep the deadline until 29 December 2009. We really do not understand, dear colleagues, why this government does not incorporate into law an agreement it has made in Europe. I cannot participate in that. Do you yourself not believe in recovery, or not to the extent that it could happen in the next 10 or 20 years? Do you not believe in the commitment you express on European forums but do not dare to put into a bill in Parliament? Let’s be honest, if necessary, a period can always be extended. You can ask the Parliament. We are reasonable, we want to discuss, but giving carte blanche is a bridge too far. The crisis has gone through several stages. It was a crisis in the mortgage market, it has become an international financial crisis, a crisis between banks and eventually a recession. Some economists speak of a starting or approaching depression. Each of these factors requires a different response and adapted measures. Now that this measure is concrete without deadline is therefore ⁇ stupid. A fixed deadline for those special powers seems, in my peasant mind, to be a good method.

Dear colleagues, dear members of Open Vld, there are currently no specialists or economists that make statements on the long term. However, today you are fixing that long-term.

A mandate without a limit also does not mean a backlink to Parliament. I watched the CD&V. This means that the National Bank of Belgium can actually go its way without supervision. Just because the financial crisis costs whatever it costs to be stopped, this supervision is extremely important. In this way, it can be played into a situation. A good framework is needed. That framework, dear colleagues, also means a ceiling. My colleague recently cited that in all other countries the amount is limited. This is not about small amounts. It is about 312 billion in Britain, 200 billion in the Netherlands, 300 billion in France, 100 billion in Austria and Spain, and 400 billion in Germany – also a neighboring country.

I don’t understand why this government can’t do that. I do not understand. Some in Parliament have in the past called what is happening now, simply, without a framework, go your own way, leave no supervision to Parliament, less beautifully called a puppet parliament. That’s not my words; it came from an honorable majority party.

My second important criticism is the following. Article 6 of the bill is, as far as I am concerned, a serious eye-opener, an eye-opener that shows where the priority and above all the thoughts of this government lie. It shows that you are looking first, again, at a neoliberal system that has failed.

The state guarantee as proposed now implies that the government bears 100% of the risks, but in the case of income, it does not generate 100% of the income. That is not fair. We give a full and unlimited guarantee to the loans of the National Bank of Belgium, but given the shareholders structure of the same National Bank, consisting of 50% private shareholders, the government will only regenerate above 3% of everything, and under 3% will have to share one and another with the private shareholders, who have not carried any risks. Do you find that normal? Is that where your priority should be?

The response of the Minister’s staff was therefore largely insufficient in the committee. After all, we’re talking here – you’ll notice that even when you look at the ceilings of neighboring countries – not about peanuts, it’s about billions. However, these billions can generate millions or even billions of income.

When one determines that today the taxpayer is turning up for the pit made by the alpha managers in the business world, it is no more than normal, according to the same free market logic, that those who carry the risk may also reap its fruits. But the government succeeds in not allowing that, in order to ensure that it takes the risk, but does not reap its fruits.

The government ensures that the taxpayer, who has already been allowed to recover for the crisis, is now again not fully compensated or protected. However – I may be naive – this seems to me to be the core task of a government: good governance. Justice is far away, at least.

We here, with that article 6, reward a system that fails, a system that has led to years of deregulation. I cannot participate in that.

The difference between words and deeds is shocking. The free market is dead, long live the free market! This is the adagium of this government. If one looks at the amendments that our parties have submitted to the European Parliament and the responses to them and the attitude towards them of the various majority parties that reject a European regulator, while the Prime Minister today advocates for them – then my mouth is opened of amazement. Because it was on 23 September, not so long ago, that we made that proposal.

As for us, dear colleagues, the entire financial sector must be at the service of the real economy and of society. This is the message that the government must understand. She clearly shows in her bill that she did not understand that message.

There is a great need for financial resources and investments for the reconstruction to a truly sustainable economy, to a green economy as well. If I can believe the Prime Minister on his words this morning, he has done that too. But is it in the facts? Resources are also needed to create sound and sustainable employment and to tackle aging. Capital invested in this sense may be effectively rewarded for my part. But excessive speculation, blind pursuit of wholesale profits, alienates the financial world from the real economy. This means that today we must take into account the burden on the real economy for which the taxpayer can charge. We all go, piece by piece, damage to today.

The more important is that you protect and compensate the population. Here again we see the split tongue of this government.

Stop playing firefighter and then pull you back. Adjust the system, make concrete proposals. If you have effectively engaged with the saver, the solution could have been here today. You could have further controlled the financial disorder. You could have taken conservative measures to protect the small savers. You could have proposed structural reforms. We asked you a month ago to do so. Then there was no reaction.

Our proposals have already been very extensively put forward by my colleagues. The European Supervisory Authority was abstained. We also propose the strengthening of the CBFA in its role as a national supervisory authority, by giving place to consumer organisations, and by giving the possibility to ban certain toxic products, increase the protection fund, increase transparency and control, and no longer allow commercial banks to keep special investment vehicles out of their balance sheet. The separation between commercial banks and commercial banks, such as that which was introduced after the great crisis of the 1930s but has fading since the 1990s, must come again.

( ... )

You must ask the word.

First and foremost, but I’m used to not doing it. I am not Mr. Clinton, Mr. Daems. I don’t think I look like that either.

None of that we see today. The social crisis is clearly less important. Article 6 proves that in your mind you are still trapped in a bankrupt system. We will therefore abstain from voting on this bill, which is largely insufficient.

The last speaker is Mr Bonte.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, who were in the committee then, will not be surprised that I stand here on the tribune. I had already announced this after, to my concern and astonishment, I found that I did not receive an answer to my precise questions about Citibank.

I am very pleased to read the first page of the government statement for: “People must be protected from the consequences of certain adventures and excesses in the financial sector. I urge for more ethical awareness among certain bankers, executives and managers...” It goes on for a while. I suppose you have seen that text too, Mr. Reynders.

In any case, it sounds a bit soft to call for ethical banking, without formulating a set of responsibilities for what went wrong. We all seem to get through it a bit quickly.

If one thing is clear, Mr. Minister, then it is that Citibank is not only unethical but also illegal. It is an illegal machine because it permanently violates the law. I will provide some evidence for this later. I will not even have to do this because others will do it in my place. I suspect that the Economic Inspection will also do this. As in previous years, this inspection service is permanently at the disposal of people who feel deceived or misled in that sector. These people can go to the Economic Inspectorate for years and days.

I have no idea what I think about Citibank. The question is very simple and I want to repeat them here in the hope that you have found some time to find an exact answer. My question is very clear, Mr. Minister: Is there now an investigation into the practices of Citibank? I have heard Prime Minister Leterme announce this on 30 September in this house. I have heard the competent Minister of Economy – we have engaging economic debates here, but he is apparently not interested in it again, I must almost say – say that he has been working on this for a long time, that he has already given an assignment three weeks ago and that within two weeks the result is on the table. I hear you later say that you have also given some recommendations or assignments.

The question I ask, Mr. Minister, is as follows. Has the government ordered an investigation into the practices of Citibank? When did this happen? Who received that assignment? When will you have the result? This is what I want to hear from you, Mr. Minister, in the hope that the government will say the same thing, that the Prime Minister will say the same thing as the Minister of Economy and you will say the same thing as the Minister of Economy. The question is clear, I hope you are equally clear in your answer.

Mr. Bonte, I don’t know what you’re doing. I do not know what this has to do with the current bill. If you want to ask a question to the Minister of Economy, you will have the opportunity to do so in the committee next week. Mr. Van Quickenborne, the Minister, has announced that he has already launched an investigation there three weeks ago and that he did not need you to do so. You will come here again. If you have a question to the Minister of Economy, ask that question in the committee. This has nothing to do with the topic of the moment.

If you had been in the committee, you would have perfectly understood why I ask that question today. We are dealing with important decisions here, at a late hour, with an unusual procedure. From the opposition, we work constructively to approve this. We will even approve it to provide collateral in a very uncertain world: collateral for the banking sector to again enable interbank loans. Our plea is to provide assurances related to the protection of the savings volumes, where you say that this should be arranged in a different way.

Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, if you really thought you wanted to go for the saver as quickly as for the banks, you might now have been able to provide us with your KB for information.

If you really need a legal basis and you will have it, once we have approved the text, you say, then the question is how it is with your royal decree. I want to see it. We will not have to wait a week to get a technical explanation.

Mr. Tommelein, you say that I throw everything on a bunch. Do you know who is thrown on a bunch? Those are the thousands of savers who believed that a savings formula was proposed to them by Citibank sellers and who must find out afterwards that it was an investment. These sellers throw everything in a bunch.

You are asking what the subject is. The subject is those savers, very often hard-working Flamings, who at the end of their career wanted to invest their savings, who got the guarantee that the capital and the interests were insured, and who today receive letters stating that they most likely no longer have to count on getting their savings.

Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, I have the following question. You just said it. You have found the time to inform yourself. Who has what mission? Where is the investigation? What research is it about?

Mr. Prime Minister, you say that I am sick. Take the word and explain more. I hear the prime minister say that he is ordering an investigation and that he has given an order to his Minister of Economy. I can quote it and I will do it when you say I’m cute. "Leterme ordered investigation into the practices of Citibank".

It is also stated that Prince Philip, in full credit crisis, in full economic panic, was walking with the Minister of Entrepreneurship, the self-declared libertine.

Mr. Bonte, can you stay on the subject?

This is stated here in the article. I say what the Prime Minister has communicated, namely that he has entrusted the Minister of Entrepreneurship and Simplification with the task of initiating an investigation into the practices of Citibank.

Mr. Tommelein, a little level. If the Minister of Economy showed a little involvement in the credit crisis, he would react differently. While the rest of the government – rightly – ends Europe, while companies on the ongoing band signal problems to get loans, from Latin America say they have been working on it for three weeks, while in practice there is no trace of recovery, does not indicate involvement. In the Department of Economy, no one knows of any assignment of the Minister of Economy. The CBFA knows nothing of the Ministry of Economy’s orders regarding an investigation into Citibank. What remains of that announcement? Please be clear, Mr Deputy Prime Minister. I give you the opportunity to help that confusion out of the world in any case.

The Minister of Finance will answer.

I am very curious.

Mr Bonte, there is a written report with a response on page 11. You can ask the same question five, six or seven times, but the answer remains the same. A study in Economic Affairs and a study at the CBFA. There are no cameras, there is no need to ask the same question in the plenary session. On the same question you will get the same answer.

Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, I know this report from the head. This is indeed in what you are reading. The only thing I’ve heard is that the Minister of Economy ordered an investigation three weeks in advance and promised that it would be done by the end of this month.

A second point should also come from my heart. Everyone speaks in this credit crisis about more supervision and control. This is literally stated in the text of the government statement. I attended the hearing with Mr. Servais. Mr. Servais says they have done their job perfectly. They have supervised and controlled everything, there is nothing to blame them. Meanwhile, we notice, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, that Citibank sells Lehman Brothers products to the current group as if it were a savings formula. Thousands of people feel deceived.

You asked a question in the committee and I answered it. Why should the same question be asked in the plenary? For the show? Why should the same question be asked? The answer is the same. You have asked who is responsible for the investigation. I gave the answer: Economic Affairs and the CBFA. That is ready and clear.

I have not received any questions regarding the draft. So I think it is a good design. I have heard a lot of comments on other points. First and foremost, I will give a report of our actions over the last few weeks and the reason why such a draft is coming now. In the first phase, we made a number of decisions. First and foremost, it was a recapitalization of some banks. In the first phase, it was about acquiring 4.7 billion or 49.9% of Fortis Bank Belgium and in the second phase to acquire almost 100% of Fortis. Also, Dexia had a recapitalization of 6.376 billion with 1 billion from the federal state.

This was the first phase of the recapitalization of various banks. In the second phase, we provided liquidity to the banks. It was an action of the European Central Bank, with a guarantee of the National Bank of Belgium. In a third phase, the federal state gave a real guarantee, directly to the banks and financial institutions, as is now happening in other member states of the European Union. We have started these activities in Belgium. Now the same thing is happening in all European Member States: recapitalization, market liquidity and a state guarantee to provide even more liquidity to banks and financial institutions.

It is in this spirit that the bill is submitted. It may be useful that in the plenary session, one may say a word of it anyway. It aims primarily to provide the State guarantee to the National Bank of Belgium to cover the obligations of this bank in the event of a crisis when it must provide liquidity to financial actors when they no longer find it on the interbank market.

This is what we are seeking to do. This is why some provisions have retroactive effect at the end of September, at the time when the National Bank of Belgium put huge financial resources at the disposal of the Fortis Group, in particular, as I recalled in a committee.

This bill also allows us to manage in times of exceptional crisis, a number of situations through legal amendments to four fundamental laws on control over the financial sector. I am responding to mr. Nollet that it is obvious that these provisions should not have an end in the middle or at the end of next year. The mechanism put in place, as in many other countries, allows to react in the event of a crisis, but whether this or another later. We will not have to repeat the same approach and return to Parliament to be able to use such an instrument. The guarantee given following the opinion of the State Council is to have ratified within 12 months, by the Parliament, the royal decrees taken in execution of this law.

by Mr. Nollet mentioned the idea of legal uncertainty, in the committee and in the plenary, because there would have been an amendment. Of course there is an amendment; indeed, in the next phase of the crisis, we not only give a state guarantee to the National Bank of Belgium, but we give a guarantee to institutions live. This is what the amendment submitted in the committee provides for: to be able to grant a direct guarantee to institutions. In fact, the Dexia Group has already made the request.

We now have a protocol agreement with France and Luxembourg on a state guarantee for the three countries concerned until 31 October 2009 and for a maximum total amount of EUR 150 billion for the refinancing of the Dexi Group and of all banks belonging to the aforementioned group.

It is a state guarantee that is therefore no longer given to the National Bank of Belgium, but directly to a financial institution. There is a cost cost for the financial institution concerned and therefore a fee for the State. Isn’t it normal to do this?

I repeat that we must do so to bring more liquidity to the markets.

The draft law, which is presented to you, essentially provides for interpretative provisions to clarify things. The National Bank remains fully independent, including in its mission of providing funds within the framework of financial stability with state guarantee. It is completely independent in its decision-making. Moreover, a number of other provisions purely and simply correct text problems in existing legislation. Therefore, we have a framework for responding to an emergency situation.

I would like to further clarify, contrary to what some speakers have said, that the government’s intention – and we have recalled it for several weeks – is not to manage the bankruptcy of one or another banking institution but rather to guarantee 100% of the savers. The only concern that guides the government is this 100% protection. This means the continuity of the activity of financial institutions that have an impact on our economy. This also means, beyond the protection of the savers, the protection of the staff in these institutions and the protection of all those and all those who wish to work through investments in our country, whether small, medium or large companies or individuals. That is the goal!

The draft law that is submitted to you is obviously aimed at ensuring this continuity of activity. Fortunately, everyone is taking the same path today in Europe, which guarantees this continuity of activity.

Of course, we have also made commitments, like all Europeans, in case of bankruptcy: this second protection, which we do not want to see work, consists of bringing the deposit guarantee from 20,000 to 100,000 euros. We said immediately that we would go to 100,000 euros.

I would like to reassure those and those who hear a number of comments on this topic. We have made the decision to do so, so it will be retroactive at the time the decision was made. This is always the case in these kinds of warranty decisions.

Why can one afford to wait for the implementation of this guarantee by a royal decree of enforcement of the bill that is submitted to you? Simply because in the case of this guarantee, it is a direct relationship between the state and the saver, there is no intermediary. If someone is missing, the state will intervene beyond the intervention of the banking sector itself by its protection. On the other hand, here we need a law because in order to play the interbank credit and the state guarantee, it is necessary that there is a financial institution, a bank or another institution, that accepts to lend money. No one will do it without having the certainty that the guarantee is voted.

I thought I understood that on the banks of the Chamber, everyone wanted this guarantee to be raised to 100,000 euros for the savers. It is therefore without any difficulty that the government has taken and still takes the commitment to offer this guarantee, as we have decided in Europe, for a temporary period of one year that we hope to be the period of crisis.

But, thankfully, I would like to ask the members of this assembly not therefore to make savers believe, while we guarantee them completely by the continuity of activity, while we have formally taken this commitment to cover 100,000 euros in case of bankruptcy, that this is not the reality. So please stop! You all know that this is the reality, that this is the government’s commitment. This is also the commitment of the Parliament, for which I thank you.

(Applause of Applause)

Mr. Speaker, I have two questions regarding the last words of the Deputy Prime Minister.

The first question simply serves to clarify what is now. In fact, I have heard the wisdom of colleague Daems, who said that this draft so put to vote is the legal basis for allowing the government to issue a royal decree. I then heard the minister say something else, namely that he could issue a royal decree based on the law of 1993.

Mr. Minister, I quote that from the report: “It is possible to raise the guarantee for the savers up to 100,000 euros by adjusting the law of 1993 through a royal decree.”

Mr. Vanvelthoven, you must follow. I said the following clearly and clearly. In application of today’s bill, the government can issue a royal decree for an adaptation of the 1993 law. It is ready and clear!

Mr. Vanvelthoven, you had a second question.

There is another possibility, with which I come to my most substantially important point. What is the difference? Well, the difference is that this government wants to give the guarantee for rising from 20,000 euros to 100,000 euros for – listen carefully, colleagues – one year. limited in time.

Why do we want to regulate it by law? Well, we want to have this guarantee unlimited in time. This is the choice that is made here today. I just heard the Deputy Prime Minister say that he wants that guarantee but limited in time. My group and I wish that for the future, regardless of time.

This is the choice that is today for all of you. You choose here today, and you are responsible for your choice.

Mr. Speaker, if many things have been said, I would like to point out once again that, despite the importance of this debate and the issues concerned, it is imperative to see the silence of the CDH and the Socialist Party.

Mr. Speaker, I have two short questions for Mr. Reynders. Article 8 will enter into force on 28 September. Why on September 28th?

Second, the Prime Minister has overlooked over the course of the week that the National Bank has had to contribute for Fortis, especially in the Netherlands. What was it about? To what extent does this problem still exist?

Mr. Van de Velde, you could have asked this too in the general discussion.

Mr. Speaker, I have just answered the question on the entry into force on 28 September. It was the first intervention of the National Bank for Fortis in the liquidity market. I just said that. Why do you ask that question two minutes later?

I would like to clarify Mr. Nollet that I spoke in the committee; besides, he will receive a direct response on Thursday to his interpellation regarding the vote held in the European Parliament!