Proposition 51K2721

Projet de loi tendant à lutter contre la discrimination entre les femmes et les hommes.

General information ¶

Submitted by

PS | SP MR Open Vld Vooruit Purple Ⅰ

Submission date

Oct. 26, 2006

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

EC Directive anti-discriminatory measure sexual discrimination equal treatment gender equality

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP Open Vld MR

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Discussion ¶

March 29, 2007 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

by Mr. Libert, rapporteur, refers to its written report.

I registered as speakers Ms. Deom, Genot and Van der Auwera as well as Ms. Laeremans and Denis Ducarme.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, today we are voting on four draft laws on discrimination, which together represent about 600 pages of text. That is counted without the report on the hearing with the experts, without the 88 amendments and without the additional opinions of the Council of State on a number of amendments, sufficient for another more than 20 pages of relevant analysis. This is also counted without the decision of the Arbitration Court, which has 47 pages and with a clear and well-founded overview deals with the "to do" and "don't do" on discrimination legislation.

I would like to interrupt you for a moment. Per ⁇ I will get permission from the President to interrupt you for a moment.

You refer to the report and the like. What I miss – I was out for a while – is the reporter, Éric Libert. Where is the reporter?

Mr. Libert is here.

Has he issued a report?

I was a little quick. I went a bit fast. He is there.

Yes, Mr. Speaker, but has he also issued his report?

and no. Since Mr Libert was not present, I acted as in the case with Minister Flahaut, afterwards. I cannot give what I do not have!

Mr. Libert, will you report? Are you presenting your report? (The Assentiment)

Mrs. Van der Auwera, I must allow this to the reporter. After that, he was not present.

Mr. Speaker, it is your duty and not Mr. Laeremans’ duty to keep an eye on such matters.

I kept an eye on it, but he was not present. You would ⁇ want me to scratch again. If I have to suspend for everyone who is not present, we will not get far.

Mr. Speaker, you were not in the Chamber then, but I remember the reform of the Chamber, with which we went from 212 to 150 members. I remember the days-long debates we held here about the re-evaluation of the necessary task of the reporter. Your predecessors, the gentlemen Langendries and Nothomb, will be able to tell you about the issue in detail. From the importance they attached to the above-mentioned task, I inferred that you would also attach importance to it.

Now it turns out that if the reporter is not present, you will not be given a report.

Mr. Annemans, we have gone through some resolutions and designs quickly. At some point I find that the reporter, Mr. Libert, is not present. I thought to myself that if he is not present, he is elsewhere and therefore he refers to his written report. Then Mr. Libert came in.

[...] refers to the written report.

That I supposed to be allowed to say. Since he is there, he will now explain it to you.

by Mr. Freedom, please present your report now.

Mr. Speaker, I protest against your interpretation so that it will not become a precedent in the future. We have already had a lot of things, but what will follow?

That is obvious. It is not because you are not there that this happens automatically. Sometimes I get a note – I just have one here lying in front of me – saying that one refers to the report.

Mr. Speaker, in this case, I found Mr. Laeremans a better president than you.

That can still come.

I said “in case.”

We need a little humor.

We removed Mrs. Van der Auwera, who was very busy, from the speech hall.

Mr Liberty, be concise!

by Mr. Minister Dupont, in his introductory explanation, expressed himself in these terms: "Contemporary democracies have built themselves around the principle affirmation that the differences between individuals are not, a priori, valuable, neither in law nor in the relations of social life. These differences cannot justify discrimination between persons.”

The committee, which made this statement, examined in the Justice Committee, on 7, 13, 26 February and 13 March 2007, the three bills I present to you today relating to the fight against discrimination.

These are the draft law amending the law of 31 July 1981 aimed at repressing certain acts inspired by racism and xenophobia; the draft law aimed at combating discrimination between women and men; the draft law aimed at combating certain forms of discrimination.

These three projects follow the desire to improve, coordinate, clarify, and perfect the Belgian legislative arsenal in the field of combating discrimination; the decision of the Court of Arbitration of 6 October 2004 which annulled certain provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act of 25 February 2003; and finally, the obligation for Belgium to transpose certain European directives, namely:

Directive 2000/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on the implementation of equal treatment between persons, without distinction of race or ethnic origin.

Directive 2000/78/EC of 20 November 2000 establishing the general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.

- Directive 2004/113 implementing the principle of equal treatment between women and men in access to goods and services;

- various directives on equal treatment between women and men in the field of social law in the broad sense.

We will address successively, but succinctly, the scope of projects, the prohibited discriminations, the arrangements aimed at sanctioning, the burden of proof, the right of collective action and finally the institutional actors.

Let us start with the scope of application, to distinguish the personal scope of application from the hardware scope of application. The first includes the list of grounds for prohibited discrimination.

The "racism law" concerning her contains a closed list of grounds for prohibited discrimination. These are nationality, alleged race, skin color, descent or national or ethnic origin. Then the “gender law” also contains a closed list of grounds for prohibited discrimination. This is about sex and assimilated situations. Finally, when it comes to the "anti-discrimination law", the government considers it advisable to also adopt a closed list of criteria for prohibited discrimination.

Such a choice is explained as follows. The law of 25 February 2003 had initially opted for a closed list, which excluded language and political convictions. Considering that such exclusion violated Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution, the Court of Arbitration cancelled the list thus drawn up. This resulted in a situation where, with the exception of what remains of its original criminal component, the Act of 25 February 2003 currently operates on the basis of a fully open list of grounds for prohibited discrimination.

In the absence of a list, it extends its empire to any form of treatment distinction, regardless of the criterion used.

The Government considered that the situation was not satisfactory, because the amputated law no longer contains express reference to the grounds of prohibited discrimination arising from European directives such as race, origin, ethnicity, religious and philosophical convictions, sex, disability or sexual orientation. However, in the notice addressed to Belgium concerning Directive 43/2000, the Commission held that this situation disregarded the imperatives of transparency and legal certainty imposed by those directives.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the answer to this objection by the Commission could have been that of the so-called exemplary open list. Indeed, this procedure of the exemplary open list is that which is ⁇ ined precisely in international instruments of protection of human rights. However, since the "Anti-Discrimination Act" is intended to apply also in horizontal relations, i.e. relations between individuals, the government considered that at this level, a higher degree of legal certainty was necessary.

Now we come to the material application. This includes areas of combating discrimination.

The three laws have a completely identical material scope of application.

The scope of application assigned to the three legislations combines the legacy of the laws of 25 February 2003 and 7 May 1999, plus the areas of application of the Community Directive with the largest extension ratione materiae, namely Directive 43/2000.

With regard to prohibited discrimination, in the utmost accordance with Community Directives, each of the three laws, under the generic term "discrimination", encompasses four types of behavior:

the direct discrimination;

the indirect discrimination;

and harassment;

order to discriminate.

In the “Anti-Discrimination Act” and in accordance with Directive 78/2000, the absence of reasonable adjustments for the benefit of the disabled person is mentioned as a particular form of discrimination to the detriment of that person.

As regards sanctions arrangements, in accordance with EU directives, the objective to be achieved is to define sanctions "effective, proportionate and dissuasive". They are essentially of two orders, namely civil order and criminal order.

In the civil chapter, the three proposed laws put in place a series of perfectly identical arrangements that can be summarized in five points:

1 of 1. An arrangement of nullity of contrary provisions and clauses of waiver for the benefit of the protection of the law concerned.

2 of 2. Protection against retaliation in employment relations.

3 of 3. Protection against retaliation in non-working relationships.

4 of 4. A fixed compensation. In certain specific circumstances and as an alternative to a common law compensation, the three proposed laws provide the victim with the possibility to claim a flat-rate compensation.

5 of 5. An action in cessation. Each of the three laws creates an identical cessation action, whose basic model taken from the cessation action created by the Law of 25 February 2003, has been improved by the addition of arrangements from other particular laws which established cessation actions. The highlights of the proposed device reside in three points:

- the possibility to give the cessation judge to condemn the perpetrator of the disputed discrimination to the fixed damages and interests established by the three laws;

- the granting to the public prosecutor or, where appropriate, to the labor auditorate the right to initiate the suspension action itself;

- the introduction of the offence of "contempt of court", i.e. the penalization of the conduct consisting in not complying with the orders sent by the court judge of the cessation.

Regarding the criminal provisions, we note that regarding the "gender law" and the "anti-discrimination law", we distinguish, the offence of incitement to discrimination, the discriminatory behavior of public officials and the abject motives.

Regarding the "racism law", we find this same increased core of the penalization of the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, the penalization of participation in organisations that incite discrimination and the acts of discrimination currently sanctioned by the Moureaux Act.

This comes to the burden of proof.

In accordance with the requirements of the Community Directives, each of the three laws contains an identical chapter relating to the "reversal of the burden of proof".

In fact, it is more about sharing the burden of proof. The complainant shall be responsible for presenting facts or any other evidence that may give rise to a presumption of discrimination. The defendant will have to overturn this presumption.

As mentioned in the proposed legislative texts, this sharing of the burden of proof is intended to apply to any judicial proceedings aimed at the implementation of those laws – including ordinary proceedings before civil courts and proceedings before the State Council – with the exception of criminal proceedings.

Let us then briefly address the right of collective action.

Community directives require the recognition of a right of collective action for the benefit of associations, organizations and legal persons. Named “interest groups”, the associations to which this right of action is recognized by the three laws are the same as those currently covered by the combined arrangements of the laws of 25 February 2003 and 7 May 1999.

Finally, we come to the point concerning the institutional actors in the fight against discrimination.

Under the "racism law", the institutional actor designated for the purpose of promoting equal treatment will be the Centre for Equal Opportunities.

Within the framework of the “gender law”, the designated institutional actor will be the Institute for Gender Equality.

As part of the "Anti-Discrimination Act", it will be the Centre for Equal Opportunities.

Note that the competence regarding language-based discrimination, prohibited by the "Anti-Discrimination Act", is entrusted to a specialized public institution, the Government having considered that due to the existence of the complex legal regime on the use of languages and the institutional structure of our State, it was preferable that an institution specialized in the existing legal regime on the use of languages and the institutional organization of our State be responsible for this competence.

For the surplus, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, I refer you to the report.

Please allow me to speak personally.

Please please, Mr Freedom.

Following the report, I would like to speak on behalf of the group. The subject of discrimination is a theme of crucial importance in a democracy like ours. Therefore, from the beginning of the work, we have been very interested in the bills submitted by Mr. The Minister Dupont.

I would like to highlight two points of this legislative reform that I find fundamental.

First, I would like to emphasize the importance of ⁇ ining the penalization of racist acts. In fact, we could not give a signal of this decriminalization. The achievements must be ⁇ ined and the draft law will take care of them from now on.

Secondly, this legislative set would not have achieved its purpose without providing for a future evaluation. The laws that will soon come into force will be evaluated after five years. This assessment will allow us, if necessary, in particular on the basis of jurisprudence, to adapt our laws to eventually adhere more to the aim pursued. For example, will it be interesting then to ask the question of possibly resorting to exemplary criteria, instead of today’s closed criteria?

I thank you.

Mrs. van der Auwera, with my apologies, for which I thank you for accepting them, you will be given the word in the general discussion, in which you had subsequently started.

Mr. Speaker, I will start again.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, today we vote on four draft laws on discrimination, together in favor of and at the six hundred pages of text, divided over the four drafts. That is counted without the report of the hearings with the experts, without the eighty-eight amendments and without the additional opinions of the Council of State on some of those amendments, sufficient for another more than twenty pages of relevant analysis. That is also counted without the decision of the Arbitration Court, which is forty-seven pages thick, with a clear and reasoned overview of the ‘do’s’ and ‘don’t do’s’ regarding discrimination legislation.

The time spent by the Chamber Committee on Justice on the four drafts is as follows: a half-afternoon for the hearing of the interest groups and the legal experts, who each received five minutes to share their years of academic or field experience with the committee members and two days committee meeting on the design and content of the text and about, all together, more than one hundred and forty articles.

The committee has worked very well, it could be said, to an average of discussion of about seventy pages of scientific text and explanation per hour. That’s faster than even the chairman of our meeting, a notorious fast reader, can read.

That power turn was realized, not for any technical adjustment, not the opposite. That top performance is set in a field that really concerns everyone and changes the legal status of every resident, every visitor, every business and every administration. Those laws passed in a hurry and without the possibility of serious discussion have not just an impact on the ten million citizens of our country. They determine their right to speak and act and even their right to think in multiple sociological qualities, as a man or as a woman, as a worker or employer, as an autochtoon or an immigrant, as a disabled, as an elderly or a younger, as a owner or a tenant, a believer or an atheist, a prosperous or a supportive.

The opinions of the State Council were treated by the majority as irrelevant. The yet clear position of the Court of Arbitration in its 2004 judgment was considered nonexistent. The arguments of the opposition were bluntly blunted, on the basis of the so-called necessity of compliance with international treaty obligations and European directives.

All this while it is clear to all specialists that at the breaking points of this new legislation are made merely ideological choices and not compelling legal choices. Not that in a parliamentary democracy no ideological choices should be made by a majority, as this majority has opted to not explain the option or exception to Article 5 of the Directive on the application of the principle of equal treatment of men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. This exception allows, according to the gender of male or female, a distinction in terms of the amount of the premium or the nature of the services offered. Based on the statistics of insurers on non-life insurance and the life tables for life insurance, it can be argued that gender is a useful criterion for the assessment of risk factors and is therefore useful for determining the premium. There are some differences between men and women found in these statistics and lifestyle tables. By not lightening this option, women in Belgium will have to pay 10 to 20 percent more for their car insurance. For life insurance, the consequences are even greater, namely up to 50 percent more expensive. If the majority submits an amendment to clarify this option, we will support that amendment.

As mentioned, in a parliamentary democracy, choices can be made by a majority. That is not the question. The real point is that these ideological choices create more inequalities than they eliminate, which we will be able to re-establish to the shame of the purple majority within a few months, when the Arbitration Court will have to re-establish that the various laws contain unconstitutional provisions on important points. The Court of Arbitration will have no difficulty in demonstrating this. It can simply, as in the previous judgment, take the arguments of the State Council against this legislation literally and so again painfully make clear that purple has not wanted to hear again, and therefore will have to feel.

That gives me quite the awkward feeling that purple actually does not want working anti-discrimination laws. Red and blue wraps and let the Arbitration Court have it. In the meantime, each worried voter can tell his own story. Yes, finally the great ideals of equality have been achieved, on the one hand, and no, because it will never be made applicable, on the other hand. Thus, the electoral public of each is reassured and it is later the fault of the unwilling judges at the Council of State and the Arbitration Court.

A clear example of the fog spraying on socially important topics has been the reporting of the majority parties on the practical tests.

On the day of the committee session on the new anti-racism law, on 7 March, Mr. Borginon spread the message in De Standaard: "The practical tests are indeed gone." One day later, in the same newspaper appears the message of a number of sp.a-mandataries stating that the practical tests are back entirely. The latter is true. Everyone can now, within the framework of the fight against racism, and only within that framework – all other possible discriminated groups are simply forgotten – make statistics, collect data, play reference person and so on. In short, an opening to one’s own direction of which every sensible person knows that this will never resist the test of the principle of legality and privacy. It is in the law and everyone is satisfied. The repair law should come after the election.

The practical tests are ⁇ not the only part of the designs where the government is completely out of the curve.

Mr. Speaker, can I ask a question to Mrs. Van der Auwera?

We are of CD&V of course just that certain groups such as the ACW, the Boerenbond and so on, proclaim different opinions. Specifically, I understood from the discussion in the committee that Mrs. Van der Auwera has very much fulminated against the practical tests. I then saw Mrs. Lanjri, who is not there now, ask a question on 18 January saying that the practice test must absolutely come. I quote: “I’m curious if the government thinks so and will introduce a KB that really makes it possible to conduct the practice tests. It should not be a cloth for bleeding.” So I wonder what CD&V’s position is on this subject. This may be clarified at this plenary session.

I would very much like to do that, Mrs. Taelman. The CD&V position on practical tests is very clear. What I fulminated about in the committee is that the practice tests are introduced without respect for general legal principles and the Constitution. It is simply assumed that anyone who can reduce practical tests. There are no formal conditions. Our view is that this should be done under the supervision of a test manager. He must be carefully screened and trained and must also have taken an oath in labour law. The test must be carried out by a member of the Social Inspection with specific training, possibly recruited to ensure anonymity, and under the authority and guidance of a senior member of the Inspection.

The tests themselves may be carried out by designated test persons, under the supervision of a sworn official and bodies recognised by the Minister. There should be a ban on provocation, in other words no texts without a ⁇ suspicion of discrimination in a particular case. In the case of a positive test, mediation should first be carried out and in the second instance there are civil sanctions. Only in the last instance, in the case of recidive, must criminal action be taken. The tests should be carried out with the necessary safeguards regarding privacy and other fundamental rights. Not only the tests on racist discrimination but for all forms of discrimination should be done in the same way. This is also lacking in the designs.

I just wanted to move to the State Council’s opinion on our amendment.

Can Mrs. Taelman interrupt you for a moment?

I have heard the opinion of CD&V. I am pleased that here today is confirmed that one apparently agrees. You would like to appoint social inspectors, i.e. officials, to perform the practice tests. You say there is no incitement. If you hire officials, they have to do their job and will not sit down with their fingers. Where will this turn out? For us as the VLD, it was ⁇ important that a civil servant could not go on the spot to incite discrimination.

I do not want to bother with the content. I leave this to my colleague, who is doing well on the subject. Thus, labeling social inspectors as provoking means that social inspectors, who go to fields to check the working conditions or safety at work, are provokers. Will these inspectors ensure that there are work accidents or occupational diseases in order to keep his job? These are heavy statements, very heavy statements.

You distort my words. You are not talking about the anti-discrimination law, which I am talking about.

You said that sending inspectors to the field is equivalent to provoking. That is not true.

I did not say that. In this context, these people will not sit with their fingers? They will be recruited for a specific purpose. What will they do? There is a great difference with the control of whether or not compliance with safety regulations. This is not a provocation. In this framework, people will be recruited to do their job and they will therefore go on the spot. We believe that this comes down to provokation.

So, Ms. Taelman, you have more confidence in the first best private person who collects statistical material somewhere on his own hand than in someone who is a sworn official and who is trained for this or in a court guard.

No, there must be discrimination. If they exist, data can be collected. So it is not so that one can go everywhere to see where one can call someone on the mat because he would discriminate.

Mr. President, Mrs. Van der Auwera, I have a very brief question for explanation to you. You say that the arrangement as it is now included by the amendments in the draft on the collection of evidence is unconstitutional.

It is purely technical. I would have liked to know from what that unconstitutionality consists and to what extent the proposal you just refer to, your own proposal, or the constitutionality test passes.

As far as I know, this was not a point that the Arbitration Court had deemed unconstitutional. The principle of the practical tests had to be further elaborated by a royal decree. That was, however, not one point that the Arbitration Court was stumbled upon in its judgment of 6 October 2004.

Mr. Casaer, I can answer this very simply by referring to the opinion of the Council of State on the amendment in question, which was destructive for that amendment. I will come back to that later. I do not want the few present in the plenary session to remember.

Mrs Taelman, I note that you accuse colleague D’Hondt that she would distort your words. However, you distort my words very conveniently and smoothly. By prohibition of provocation we mean that no tests should be carried out without a ⁇ suspicion of discrimination in a particular case. This means that officials are not allowed to take a provocative attitude on their own without acting in a concrete situation. That pink looks down on the officials, we already know. This is again a beautiful piece of steel.

What is most disturbing, Mrs. Taelman, is the following. In some publications you are joking that the practical tests would have been abolished, while they are now actually more than back. Our group expressly and formally binds conditions to it. Now you are beginning to fulminate against us in the plenary, while we in the committee have had to establish how painful the gap between blue and red in the case is and how painful the ear-drinking silence was, because there was no debate about it was possible. I find your comments at our address completely wrong.

I come to the opinion of the State Council on the famous amendment number three, by the gentlemen Giet and consorts. The Council of State states about the practical tests: “An issue as difficult as the detailed rules concerning the practical tests, in which constitutional principles may come to a slope, should not be left to the King, but should, at least as regards its essential principles, be settled by the legislator himself, who must seek a fair balance between the promotion of equality and non-discrimination and the respect of other fundamental rights and freedoms and thus ensure that practical tests cannot be imposed that they are accompanied by provocation or deloyal acts.”

I further literally quote the Council of State: “The requirement of legality, thus reminded, which implies not only that the possibility of conferring powers on the King in the matter is limited, but also that the text of the law must be made clear and accurate, applies to all procedures that allow the burden of proof to be reversed.”

The provisions of the relevant directives relating to the distribution of the burden of proof relating to discriminatory acts, which have been reminded of this, instruct the Member States to provide for the establishment of a system for this purpose. Naturally, they should adhere to the fundamental principles of their legal system in those matters, including the principle of legality.

The drafting of the present amendments appears to be insufficient on this point. For example, the data contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the provisions proposed to determine which facts may give rise to the presumption of the existence of discrimination shall be summarized only by way of example. In addition, concepts such as a particular pattern of adverse acts, various separate reports, reference persons, general statistics, facts of general publicity and elementary statistical material should be clarified in the text itself.”

You will remember that during the discussions in the committee, various political groups were asked to clarify those concepts and that they simply referred to the terminology from Europe. Apparently, what comes from Europe does not need to be explained. We do not need to understand it ourselves.

“Finally, those provisions which are proposed in the amendments” – continues the Council of State – “although no longer provide for the use of practical tests, so that it can be sufficient at first glance to find that the assignment of authority to the King in relation to the detailed rules relating to them is omitted. Nevertheless, subject to the foregoing, it cannot be ruled out that this procedure is used in certain general formulas and that this appears to be unacceptable, given the principle of legality, which has been recalled in the preceding paragraph. In fact, there would no longer be a legal framework for the assessment of the validity of the processes used, since the legislature itself must create a framework for this. This is especially true, since the concepts used are much less clear than the concept of practical tests.

The question therefore arises whether the reversal of the burden of proof – I still quote from the opinion of the Council of State, colleague Casaer – “can be applied also outside the context of equal remuneration on the basis of the elimination of other factors. If two employees perform equal work, it is reasonable to expect that they will be equally remunerated. If this is not the case, discrimination can be reasonably suspected. In other cases, in particular those where a choice must be made between different persons concerned, such as recruitment, promotion or dismissal or the sale and lease of a property, it is not reasonable to derive a presumption of discrimination from the mere difference of treatment. In fact, the employer, the seller, the tenant are in a number of cases caused by the nature of the act itself to make a distinction. From what goes ahead," says the State Council," it shows that the legislature should create a more precise framework for the mechanisms to introduce the reversal of the burden of proof, as proposed in the amendments".

The Council also correctly cites the possibility that Member States have to not reverse the burden of proof if they provide in their legislation that a court or other competent authority may investigate the facts.

This is also done by the legislator by stipulating in Article 34 that, without prejudice to the powers of the officials of the judicial police, the officials appointed by the King shall supervise the observance of the law.

The reversal of the burden of proof is therefore in this view no longer a European obligation at all, but an ideological choice which, according to the Council of State, makes it difficult to impossible for the accused to deliver the counterproof. This may be contrary to the rights of defence and weapons equality.

The government formula is one for the organization of disasters, individual settlements and self-direction. As I have cited in the committee, and as the hearings also showed, this legislation aims to protect certain groups vulnerable to discrimination. We want them to be optimally involved in the provision of goods and services.

However, we think that because there is a simple reversal of the burden of proof by formulating assumptions on the basis of which one can point directly with an accusing finger to someone, this will have the opposite effect.

If someone offers a property for rent, he will search in limited circles for potential tenants, to avoid complaints being formulated for discrimination, and he will thus feel sure that nothing can happen to him. So one will get people whose world will become smaller in offering goods and services. That would be very regrettable.

Then there is the point of the open or closed grounds of discrimination. In its 2004 judgment, the Court of Arbitration destroyed the closed list of grounds of discrimination because, according to the Court, some essential elements were lacking. The longer the list of grounds for discrimination, the greater the likelihood of such destruction. I think of what Professor De Vos said about this during the hearings.

The State Council also had serious questions on the closed list. Despite the suggestions of the Council and the judgment of the Arbitration Court which included social origin and language, a number of grounds essential to the Council remain not protected and the Government does not address the question of objective accountability for these exclusions.

This new anti-racism law introduces a flat-rate compensation of 650 euros for moral damage resulting from discrimination due to evidence difficulties relating to the damage actually suffered. With considerable speed, an amendment was adopted that reforms this flat-rate moral damages to two steps. In particular, there is a second level of EUR 1,300 when the accused cannot prove that the contested act would also have been taken on non-discriminatory grounds or due to other circumstances such as the particular seriousness of the moral damage suffered.

This means, therefore, that every employer-leasing owner will have to expressly and circumstantially answer a decision regarding employment or promotion of or lease to a particular person at the very moment – otherwise this would happen in tempore suspecto – why he chose this or that person over another. Otherwise, he threatens to be fined twice as much as the ordinary fine.

For example, scientists who research the average intelligence quota of so-called races, often an indication of social success, will always be condemned to the maximum flat-rate compensation on the basis of this article. After all, if their research shows that they treat this or that group more detrimentally, in other words, declare less intelligent, they can of course not prove that they would have come to the same results on other grounds, for their findings are now just the result of their scientific argumentation. For a direct distinction on the basis of ethnic origin or so-called race – article 7 of the Anti-Racism Act – which they make by definition, there is no exception to the legitimate purpose and the necessary means that apply to the nationality. The only other exception that is eligible is Article 11, in particular where such distinction is imposed by or under a law.

Even the strictly objective determination by a historian or sociologist, that the majority of terrorists today would have a certain ethnic origin, is better not done to avoid persecution. Human scientists, be careful.

Is the Government aware of the urgent need for a law to protect scientific research in order to distinguish between the protected criteria of Article 7 from prosecution, both in civil and criminal matters? Not only civil law threatens persecution. As already under the previous law, public incitement to hate against a person or group is criminalized. Feeling is not always a bad advisor, but it is certain when defining criminal acts. What is actually criminal? That is to know that with a certain statement, opinion, analysis, one can cause a feeling of hatred to arise in this or that person. Is it then intended to keep a battery of psychologists and psychiatrists ready for every persecution on this ground, who must then clarify this for each individual case? Furthermore, this provision, as, by the way, for all criminal provisions in these laws, lacks the description of a particular plan, however a conditio sine qua non set by the Court of Arbitration and the Council of State in order to meet the principle of legality in criminal matters and thus the Constitution.

The Council of State also lacks any accountability for the difference in the criminal approach between racist acts and acts committed against other protected groups such as women and disabled persons. The Court of Arbitration may find that this distinction is contrary to the principle of equality, but it has been shown several times that purple attracts very little from the Constitution. Recently, a publisher was sued by a protected group for re-releasing a pamphlet from World War II. The judge rejected the claim of the minority group and stated that it could be inferred from the introduction of the issue that it was only the intention of the publisher to keep the booklet available for research and the general public and not to let it go lost, as was also said in the introduction. The judge released the publisher.

If we can believe Jogchum Vrielink, co-author of, among others, the authoritative “Handbook Discrimination Law” will no longer be so obvious in the above case. In fact, it is no longer necessary to demonstrate that there is also substantial incitement to hatred. There should also be no special intention. Therefore, one must no longer prove that someone intentionally and knowingly incites racism with the intention of harming. This follows not so much from article 20, but from the new article 21 of the anti-racism law, which criminalizes the mere dissemination of “thinkings based on racial superiority or racial hatred.”

Unfortunate for the historians and philosophers among us. Fortunately, they still have the Arbitration Court, but they will not have to rely on the majority.

Today, I must also address a warning to the Prime Minister of our country. Today the Prime Minister is present at the presentation of the translation of the philosophical work “An Open Society and its Enemies” by Karl Popper. Even worse, he goes out to read. For his own good, I hope he will not read from the first part “The Enchantment of Plato,” in which Popper, in a very own way and through quotations, unmasks Plato as a thinker who was only burned on the extinction of democracy and who repeatedly sinned in racism.

From various statements of Plato, Popper distils Plato's vision of the Greeks, or part of them, as the Lord People. Let us go back to Article 21 of the Anti-Racism Act. “With imprisonment from one month to one year and with a fine of 50 euros to 1,000 euros, or with one of those penalties alone, is punished: the one who, in the circumstances referred to in article 444 of the Criminal Code, spreads ideas based on racial superiority or racial hatred.”

Our own prime minister is reading this evening, in the public, with cameras, from a book containing ideas based on racial superiority or racial hatred. Hopefully, the thought police are not present.

We abstained from this discussion.

Thank you, Mrs. Van der Auwera. Before you leave the sitting, Mr. Laeremans wants to say something more.

Mrs. Van der Auwera, I can perfectly follow the reasoning. It is also our own. But I hear you say at some point: fortunately we still have the Arbitration Court. Against the previous anti-discrimination law, which we, as the only party, then voted against, we went to the Arbitration Court. Thankfully, because that is the basis of this reform. That sentence was very important. You also quoted it. Fortunately, we still have an arbitration court. Can I infer that you will go to the Arbitration Court this time? This can strengthen our argument.

There are a number of people in the process of examining the petition to eventually go to the Arbitration Court and to crack arguments together.

Thank you, Mrs. Van der Auwera. Now it is Mrs. Déom’s turn, and then Mr. Laeremans, Mr. Ducarme, Mr. Casaer, and Mrs. Genot. I will close the speaker list.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, I will speak briefly on behalf of the PS group in the debate on the draft law "discrimination".

How can we not react to the rise of racial hatred? How can we not react when a recent CEGES report highlights the role played by our country’s authorities during and after World War II in the persecution of Jews? How not to react when wage differences exist between two people only because they are of different sex? How can we not react when people with disabilities find it increasingly difficult to find employment, accommodation or access to the services they are entitled to, like anyone else, under decent conditions? How can we not react when young people of Maghreb origin are almost systematically denied entry to many discos? How can we not react when homophobia continues to deceive the smallest minds?

The examples are infinitely multiplied.

This is a situation that cannot be tolerated. Treating someone differently simply because they are different, without these different treatments relying on the slightest objective and reasonable justification, this is what is not acceptable and this is what we must fight with firmness!

Democracy is damaged whenever the rejection of the other is expressed.

These are, once again, the objectives pursued by the bills, even though this struggle did not date yesterday and considerable progress had been made in 2003 by the Discrimination Act. We must continuously improve our legislation to combat this real plague.

The proposed reform, which responds to the partial cancellation issued by the Arbitration Court with respect to the 2003 "Discrimination" Act, was indispensable for more than one title. It was indispensable not only for the reasons I just mentioned, but also from a European point of view. Indeed, several European directives require Belgium to revise its system of combating all forms of discrimination. The projects thus put Belgium in full compliance with European requirements. Furthermore, this transposition provides undeniable guarantees in terms of effectiveness and sanction. It is also important to note that this is a comprehensive reform of the subject as the three projects aim to cover all forms of discrimination. We are harmonising our legislative arsenal, which will be beneficial in terms of readability.

Many points could be highlighted, but I will focus on the three that I find the most significant, the most important and the most concrete for victims of discrimination.

First, an important point concerns the compensation of victims. Previously, when the proceedings ended, the compensation allocated to the victim was often ridiculous or simply symbolic.

Victims of discrimination will now be offered a flat-rate compensation in compensation for moral damage, as an alternative to common law compensation. If the choice is still up to the victim, it is obvious that the flat-rate compensation offers a double advantage to the victims.

First, it is effective and substantial, and more only ridiculous or symbolic. Then, it avoids the victim who makes this choice, the heavy task of proving the extent of his damage.

Finally, this compensation can be directly pronounced by the judge of the cessation action. This has the undeniable advantage of reducing the procedural time as much as possible. Indeed, previously, in order to assert its right to compensation, the victim had to initiate a separate proceedings in the substance since the discussions concerning the extent of the damage were not compatible with the speed of the so-called “as in reference” proceedings of the cessation action.

Secondly, always in the interest of best accompanying victims, a mechanism for sharing evidence is established for the civil aspect of the reform. We know how much bringing positive proof of discrimination is a challenge for victims. That is why such a system of sharing has been established. It is essential to note that we are talking here about sharing the burden of proof, not about reversing it. When the victim invokes facts that allow to presume the existence of discrimination, it is up to the defendant to prove that there has been no discrimination. We therefore see well that this is not a mere reversal of the burden of proof, since the victim must first provide sufficient elements to show a possible discrimination.

In this regard, an agreement was eventually reached to further facilitate the victim’s task – and ⁇ still embarrassing in the eyes of some, and that’s so much better! - since the project makes available to the victim several possibilities to bring the beginning of the required proof. The list of these means - which is not limitative - provides, among other things, a recurrence test and a comparability test of situations. This is a major step forward that will provide victims of discrimination with new and more effective means of obtaining compensation and to put an end to the alleged discrimination.

Finally, the third point on which I think it is important to insist concerns the maintenance in the draft “racism law” of the substantial part of the criminal arrangements previously contained in the law of 1981.

While the various arrangements implemented by this reform have the obvious advantage of ensuring the effectiveness of the sanctions and facilitating as much as possible the role that the victim must play in the proceedings, it was nevertheless indispensable to maintain the criminal prohibition contained in Articles 2 and 2bis of the Law of 30 July 1981. Indeed, for social and symbolic reasons, it would have been detrimental not to maintain the substance of these criminal arrangements.

In conclusion, on the three points I have just mentioned, and on many other aspects, I am pleased to find that the reform now under voting perfectly meets the demands of the various equality-promoting bodies who were concerned about the inefficiency of the anti-discrimination legal tools that existed until then.

For these reasons, combined with the European requirements and the decision of the Arbitration Court partially repealing the 2003 law, it is with conviction that the Socialist group will support all these projects.

We must never lose sight of the fact that in any democratic state, it is essential to ensure that the struggle against racism and against all other forms of discrimination is always strengthened. The vote on these projects will, we are convinced, contribute to reinforcing this struggle.

More than four years after the entry into force of the so-called anti-discrimination law, we are here again. We are not here to let common sense triumph and throw overboard all the unreasonable and excessive that is contained in this law and in the anti-racism law. On the contrary, with the four designs we discuss here today, everything becomes much worse.

With these drafts – and this ⁇ after the amendment in the committee, in an extremely bad sense – a giant repressive machine is being created more than ever. The speech of the colleague of the PS confirmed that in all capacities. A new machine of repression is being created for everyone who dares to leave the paths of political correctness, for everyone who does not act and think in his or her private life as the State thinks he or she should act and think.

More than ever, the battery of laws presented here today provides instruments for a big-brother society which restricts the freedom of action of the people, imposing on the people a unity of thought and action that makes them robots, clones of the State.

We continue to oppose this kind of totalitarian laws. They are fundamentally against human freedom. It is inherent to man and inherent in human life that we constantly make choices. Dozens, often hundreds of times a day, a person makes choices in his private and public life. Usually he does this on semi-frational or non-rational, unreasonable grounds and fortunately but! Humans are not robots. Humans are not beings that are guided by a single ratio. Humans are not puppies hanging on the ropes of some large rowing passenger. In their interaction with other people, 101 facets play a role that helps determine the choices, which make us distinguish between people. In this way we influence each other. This may have to do with arbitrariness. This may have to do with trust. This may have to do with intuition or tradition. However, this rarely or never has to do exclusively with pure ratio. Again, fortunately, because this is about the core of our human being. Each human being is different and unique. As a result, he is different in his thinking and acting, in his or her behavior towards other people.

It is this freedom that wants to bind the former and the present majority. Almost all possible human behaviors in the economic, social and cultural sphere, almost all acts outside the family life fall under this legislation. Consequently, the consistent application of this means that we must rationally answer all human behavior, that every human being is constantly accountable for his behavior and can be sanctioned.

This no longer includes the germs of a totalitarian policy, which is a totalitarian policy of course.

I refer here to what the State Council had already written in 2002 in the anti-discrimination law of the time: "A government must, in its action, watch over the distinction it makes. But with private individuals,” the State Council warns, “it is different. Their behaviors are not necessarily rational and cannot always be judged by utilitarian criteria. The sphere of activity, says the State Council, "is not limited to a specific domain, such as labour law, but includes the whole of social life in its entirety. Well, the legislator must not compel the citizens to embrace in all acts of public life and in the expression of their opinions the ideas of the government on combating discrimination."

A warning that could count. The anti-discrimination legislation forces people to think as the government thinks, forces people to reason in all their actions as a government should do. This is dictatorship in its purest form, dictatorship in its most totalitarian form.

Even then-Justice Minister Marc Verwilghen was on that line. I am quoting the report of the Senate committee at that time. "The definition given in Article 2 of the bill is very general and very broad: in particular, any behavior on the social level that makes a distinction based on the listed parameters without legal basis. Furthermore, every citizen who makes such a distinction must respond in two ways: there must be a legitimate goal, as well as a proportionate means/purpose ratio." Verwilghen also denied that this type of distinction is criminalized and says about this: "It is difficult to defend to impose on citizens a principle prohibition of distinction, the concrete content of which is not determined in advance."

Verilghen let the cup pass by. He did not have the courage to fight against the fanaticism of Onkelinx, and in fact already at that time put his mandate at the disposal of the Socialist Party.

It is precisely in the field of this unimaginably vague and therefore unlawful criminalization that the Court of Arbitration intervened on that question with its judgment of October 2004 and underestimated some of the penal provisions.

However, the purple majority continues to persist in anger. Despite the arbitration court’s explicit statement that only direct discrimination is sufficiently predictable and can give rise to criminal sanctions, purple also continues to criminalize the forms of indirect discrimination. Nevertheless, the Council of State also expressly states in its opinion that this is contrary to the requirements of predictability of the Criminal Code and is accused of not giving effect to the Arbitration Court. I quote: “It is not clear how the new text” – the text we are discussing today – “meets the objections of the Arbitration Court. After all, the question remains how it can be deliberately incited to a seemingly neutral behavior. Furthermore, it remains unclear how an act whose discriminatory nature is expressed only by the particular injury that may result from it can be intentionally incited. The predictability, on the contrary, appears to be even lower than in the provision as that which was abolished by the Arbitration Court."

However, the clear opinion of the State Council is again beaten in the wind. It is truly incomprehensible because it is obvious that it will result in the drafts being destroyed again by the Arbitration Court. Be assured, Mr. Minister – if you are still a minister – that new procedures will be instituted against the existing laws.

It is shameful that purple here in a flagrant and even provocative way, from a kind of sense of inviolability, enters the highest courts of our country. What a pretense, Mr. Minister!

In addition, we must note that the racism law is becoming much more extensive. Also a distinction on the basis of nationality is already becoming racist, while the government and you, Mr. Minister, who are part of the government and of the government, in the legislation constantly use the aforementioned distinction on the basis of nationality.

In addition, the punishment is reintroduced, after an initial omission and again despite the negative opinion of the State Council. More than ever, by the way, the amended anti-racism law becomes a law that can and will sanction opinion crimes. It is not only criminal who incites such kind of discrimination or alleged discrimination. Also punishable – which is especially punishable, colleagues – is the one who merely spreads ideas based on racial superiority or racial hatred, which is also the intention behind the spread.

It is very important what is in the draft. The provision, as it is stated in the draft, means that the works and books of a ⁇ large proportion of the philosophers and thinkers who have made great our Western society and our civilization, simply can no longer be distributed.

It’s not just us or Professor Matthias Storme who say this. That says even the discrimination expert, Jochen Vrielinck, author of the standard work “Handbook for Discrimination Law”, in the latest issue of “Society and Politics”, a magazine known to be closely connected with sp.a. According to the aforementioned author, the works of philosophers such as Plato – imagine –, Kant, Nietzsche and almost all the thinkers of the nineteenth century in the future can no longer be disseminated, just as much as the works of the founders of democracy, such as Voltaire and Montesquieu, who, for example, on racial theory from our point of view, have said very punitive, but today very unacceptable things that were, however, very common among the intellectuals at the time.

Also the Old Testament, the Torah and the Qur’an come in the sight of the criminal judge and even books that publish the burned passages to accuse the aforementioned passages, quotes and racial theory. Even for the above-mentioned books, on the basis of the prevailing, clear law, it is sufficient to merely quote to be condemned before the criminal judge to rather severe prison sentences.

We have already predicted this in the committee. We have read passages from the Qur’an that can ⁇ be interpreted as racist. However, our criticism was discarded, because this was not the intention of the legislator.

However, it is stated in the Penal Code. A clear penalty clause cannot simply be ignored by the criminal judge. As a result, the potential persecution as a kind of Damocles sword remains over the heads of those who spread this kind of texts, even if it is for scientific or historical purposes, even if it is to counter or accuse discrimination or racism. These texts should not be distributed anymore. The risk of absolute arbitrariness in prosecution policy is ⁇ real.

According to Vrielink, a socialist who writes in the journal Society and Politics, – I quote – “the killer becomes that freedom of expression is not absolute, a kind of carte blanche that would justify any restriction within the framework of anti-racism policy.” Moreover, it is not at all that this punishment provision should be introduced because it is supposedly imposed on us by the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. You have shielded with that authority, saying that one could not otherwise than follow that great convention on racial discrimination, and so on. Considering this point, our country, at the ratification in 1975 – that treaty is a few decades old – to the example of many other countries, made a reservation because this provision was contrary to the right to freedom of expression. That reservation is very explicit. It is again that socialist, Mr. Vrielink, who expressly refers to it. He says that the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination cannot be used here and that it is not an authority, on the contrary, because they have made reservations precisely in that regard.

You have deceived us. You have misled us by saying that we can’t do anything but literally follow that treaty, because 19 other countries that are also parties to this treaty have all said the same. Almost no example can be found of a country where this passage has been taken over because it is indeed directly against the freedom of thought, Mr. Minister.

Vrielink thus decides that this famous Article 21 may be destroyed by the Arbitration Court because this same Court also destroyed the criminalization of an intention to discriminate and thus a fortiori this censorship law – this dangerous, extremist provision – will destroy. It does not advocate the intellectual capacity of Mr. Dupont that he does not want to see this. We have clearly warned him in the committee that this punishment has extremely far-reaching consequences and asked him for foreign examples, but the examples that the minister put on paper only confirmed our great right.

We have so far only talked about the penal provisions in this new law. Normally, after that, one would go to the civil layer of the story, to the chapter of compensation, the problem of evidence and the famous practical tests. I cannot do this. The problem is that in these laws, a whole shimmer zone has been created between the criminal approach and the civil approach, as the flat-rate compensation proposed in practice comes down to a kind of fine to be paid. It is not just a fine to be paid to the government, but to the alleged victim.

The penalty is not mine. Any alleged victim who can demonstrate that he is being discriminated because, for example, a particular home is not rented to him and to another, in principle has right immediately to compensation of 1,300 euros. Therefore, you get a fixed amount of 1,300 euros without having to prove anything. That is a ⁇ high amount, which of course will lead to situations of provokation and to cheap profit. From certain circles, of course, all will be done to get as much of those premiums as possible as soon as possible, which is obvious. This will also be the case in labour law situations, where the penalty is up to 6 months of gross salary. 6 months brutoloon, introduce yourself!

It is still impossible to speak of a normal compensation. These are, in practice, compensations with a punitive character, Mr. Minister, and this is very clearly shown from your own memo of explanation which literally states that the flat-rate compensation, I quote on page 21 of the explanation to the anti-discrimination law: "it would be necessary for the Belgian law to continue to offer an effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanction against discrimination."

Mr. Minister, you are constantly on the scripture of civil and criminal law. This is also evidenced by the newly created possibility for the public prosecutor to intervene in civil proceedings. In fact, here the criminal law is bypassed and the civil law is abused to make an anti-discrimination policy much more effective, much more repressive, because the public prosecution, in the eyes of the socialists, has so far been far too little.

Why is it so important that it is actually criminal law and not civil law? The criminal nature of the proceedings, if we want to remain in accordance with European law and fundamental rights, excludes a distribution of the burden of proof. After all, it is still – and fortunately – a fundamental legal principle that a person is considered innocent until his guilt is proven. It is not up to the accused to prove his innocence, but it is up to the public prosecutor and the judge to prove or establish the guilt.

It is precisely that fundamental principle of law that is violated with the story of the burden of proof, in which the mere presentation of what presumptions and statistical material is sufficient to reverse the burden of proof and to compel the citizen accused of discrimination to prove his innocence.

That evidence will be almost impossible to provide in many circumstances, resulting in heavy fines and damages. The State Council warns against this. He says in his emergency advice on your emergency deliberations, which you submitted at eleven o’clock, that in practice it could be ⁇ difficult for the accused citizen to prove his innocence. The defendant will – and I quote – “not only have to prove that the provision, the criterion or the conduct is neutral, but also that the provision, the criterion or the conduct in question is not only in appearance neutral, which in fact will often consist of the requirement that it proves that it actually has pure intentions”. Therefore, intentions must be demonstrated. As the accused, as the defendant, one will have to prove his good intentions. In this country, therefore, intention processes will be carried out on the ongoing band. This was warned by the State Council. That is where we go.

The problem of evidence is ⁇ large. How can a business manager prove that he is pursuing a non-discriminatory policy when it is forbidden by law to keep statistics of applicants based on their race or origin? He cannot do that. He does not like that. If not, he is criminally liable. Therefore, he will not be able to prove that he does not pursue a discriminatory policy. You ask the honest citizens to provide an impossible proof. Consequently, business leaders, small tenants, will become the object of intimidation and blackmail, and one will ask those people the impossible. If they want to be careful of processes, they will be able to blackmail them and cut off money.

The State Council goes on. The State Council wipes the floor with the methods you create to get the honourable citizens close and suspicious. Mr. Borginon, at some point in The Standard you stated that the practical tests had indeed disappeared. In that respect you are right. They have disappeared, but something much worse has come into place. In place of tests with sworn officials, with trained officials, court guards and inspectors, you are launching straightforward enlightenment methods in the law, Mr. Borginon. Every pipo, every fuzzy groupuscule can now be invoked as an authority to demonstrate so-called suspicions of discrimination. Almost anything and anyone can be used and above all abused to indicate a suspicion of discrimination. All arguments are good. The State Council gets neither head nor tail to your method. Listen to the concepts that the State Council must judge and which can be a decisive criterion for determining whether there is discrimination or not.

A certain pattern of adverse treatment creates a suspicion of discrimination. Several separate opinions may be sufficient to have a suspicion of discrimination. A reference person is a completely new concept in law. General statistics and facts of general recognition are sufficient to have a presumption of discrimination and thus a reversal of the burden of proof. For example, what should be understood under "elementary statistical material"? After all, the word elementary can have two meanings: either very rudimentary, or very principled. This is extremely ambiguous. What does the State Council say about all these terms?

The State Council says that these concepts need to be clarified in the text itself. You do not do that. You are creating a lot of novelties in law, all of which will be very important in reversing the burden of proof. This is unacceptable for the Council of State. The Council of State says literally that this text is not acceptable because it does not meet the principle of legality. After that, colleague Casaer asked what is based on saying that it is unconstitutional. It is the State Council itself, yet still an authority, that says that the principle of legality is not met and that the legislative text should be made clear and accurate, a requirement that applies to all procedures that allow the burden of proof to be reversed. This applies even more to these concepts because they are much less clear – says the Council of State – than the concept of practical test. A number of things can be attached to the concept of practice test, especially if it happens with court guards or with sworn officials. Not that we were for those practical tests but that is in any case much less bad than that every groupuscule, every group of immigrants, every interest group can start provoking, start collecting statistical material, and so on. This is ⁇ dangerous. Indeed, it has been rightly stated, we are moving toward a self-directed society where business leaders, self-employed and small tenants will be intimidated with all the consequences of this.

Finally, the State Council, Mr. Minister, breaks your fraudulent reference to international law and the judgments of the Court of Justice because this reversal of the burden of proof is responsible when it comes to wage differences for the same work. This discrimination can be clearly demonstrated. It is very easy to say that two people do the same job and have different pay. This is very clear to be established. However, it is impossible to draw this to alleged discrimination in the recruitment, promotion or dismissal and in the rental or sale of a property because those situations are so complex that a multitude of factors play a role. The State Council thus wipes the floor with your argument.

Nevertheless, you pretend that nothing is going on, Mr. Minister, and you, ladies and gentlemen of the VLD, continue to pursue the Socialist Party to its most extreme nonsense. The VLD has become a trailer of the Socialist Party and does not make a difference in any way. In spite of this devastating criticism, today you are installing a decryptor system that will inevitably result in honourable citizens being intimidated and blackmailed. This ugly legislation will cause an explosion of self-proclaimed victims of discrimination in the coming years. This legislation will lead to the culpabilization of honourable citizens and to great discouragement of small owners, small self-employed and business executives who might sometimes take up their biases and close their ⁇ to avoid facing this kind of misery.

Wouldn’t anything have changed to the better of the anti-discrimination legislation we are discussing today? Is there really nothing improved? Honesty commands me to say, colleagues, that indeed something has changed. The anti-discrimination law becomes somewhat less discriminatory, somewhat less hypocritical than it was due to the destruction procedure that we had instituted against the law at the Arbitration Court. In particular, discrimination based on political beliefs is now treated equally with other discriminations under international law. The fact that this was not the case at first had to do with the explicit intention – as was shown by the Senate reports of that time – to be able to continue to exclude certain parties and members and representatives of these parties. Formally, this exception, this discrimination is now eliminated.

This, however, of course has not stopped the struggle for the exclusion of the Flemish Interest.

At this particular moment, a procedure is underway at the State Council, Department of Administration, at the request of all the Wallon parties and of spirit and sp.a. to deprive our party of its finances and therefore of its means of subsistence.

Against all legal traditions, we must defend ourselves before a bilingual court with half French-speaking, party-politically appointed judges, so that our conviction is already established in advance.

While we are still discussing the amendments to the anti-racism law here, in our committee for justice - not even in the Senate - a new amendment to that racism law has already begun. Thus, on the basis of the racism law, the smallest sentence, the smallest penalty in the future will automatically lead to the horror of the right to be elected.

We will not call each other a lithium bed. This law is also intended to affect an existing political party. Its law is intended to deprive the Flemish Interest of its image. That law is intended to remove the Flemish Interest from all its elected.

Since the voter does not want to sanction us, but instead rewards us again and again, the Criminal Court is involved, even though the Council of State warns there too of the discriminatory and entirely excessive nature of the punishment.

The same bill makes it more difficult to express the horror of civil rights for common law gangsters, for rapists and murderers. For politicians, on the other hand, who dare to say what lives with the population, it becomes an automation.

The ratio is fully sought here. Only irrational hatred can be an explanation for that kind of perverse legislation, the same hatred we may have experienced here last week at the memory of our regretted colleague Guido Tastenhoye.

I conclude my speech by emphasizing that I am ⁇ proud not to belong to a party that enslavedly executes the oekazes of the Socialist Party, proud that I do not belong to a party that approves this kind of perverse legislation. Such legislation is directly contrary to the jurisprudence of the Arbitration Court and to the opinions of the Council of State. I am proud that I do not belong to a party that eats from all the rows, but rather to a party that has taken the words of Wies Moens as its guiding motto: "Better a lean wolf in the forest than a fat dog in the chain."

I will be brief, Mr. President. Freedom has already expressed itself on the matter. Furthermore, the discussion extended in committee and the minister showed an open spirit that allowed us to amend his text. It seems that the work has already been completed.

I believe that in the context of the 2003 bill, this bill appears to be a real progress. It will give each one the means to defend himself even better against all those who despise their difference and make it a tool of humiliation, whether this difference is based on age, sexual orientation, philosophical state, political conviction, language, current or future health status, disability, physical or genetic characteristics, social origin. You have understood, I will speak here only in relation to the part of the law that tends to fight against certain forms of discrimination.

In short, the simplest will thus have even more legal tools to defend themselves against the unacceptable and without expressing myself further on the background of this dossier, I will simply ask you to answer some concerns expressed by the secular movements and widely disseminated in the media in recent weeks. Some, on the basis of the element of religious conviction, fear that this law is a limit to the freedom to criticize religions, a barrier, some claim, to the freedom to blaspheme.

However, Mr. Minister, none of our preliminary statements can allow anyone to assume that we are blessing frogs. We are convinced that the process of secularization of our societies must continue. Personally, I think, like my group, that this law does not constitute an obstacle to freedom of expression, to the freedom to criticize religions.

Caricaturists who wish to continue to represent Muhammad in kilt or Jesus Christ in Norwegian socks will be able to do so without this law posing the slightest problem. Nor will this be an obstacle to freedom of expression; all Mr. Redeker and other philosophers will be able to continue to criticize, even harshly, religion. Nor will it be an obstacle to all those who want to continue to condemn the doctrine of the Catholic Church by considering it criminal in relation to contraception.

A clarification on this subject is necessary. Some people need to be reassured. Reassure them! This text is not an obstacle to our freedom to criticize, including religions, when they deserve it.

Beyond this aspect related to freedom of expression, Mr. Minister, I would like to hear you on the eighth point of the scope. This Law shall apply to all persons, both in the public and in the private sector, including public bodies, as regards access, participation and any other exercise of an economic, social, cultural or political activity accessible to the public.

Mr. Minister, you followed, like me, a few weeks ago, the debate that opened at ULB around the arrival of Tariq Ramadan and the refusal of Rector Vincke to open the doors of the university to him again. Just read Caroline Fourest’s inquiry to convince yourself that the rector’s decision was justified and that it was the right one. Of course, it belongs to me.

My question is very short and clear in relation to this point 8 of the scope. Mr. Minister, will this allow a number of radicals to become the new discriminated in the future? Will the defenders of our freedoms, of this common foundation of values, become accused in the courts? I think, like me, you want this not to be the case. I would have liked to hear you on this subject, in relation to the scope of point 8 of the scope of this bill.

Mr. Minister, always in relation to this point 8, you know that beyond religious conviction, we speak of non-discrimination in relation to political conviction. In the electoral period, as in other periods, associations, schools, media, television, which do not wish to offer a compound tribune to some fascists, risk being considered as bodies that would discriminate against the harm to our freedom and our democracy that fascist parties are. Can you reassure me about this?

I thank you.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, considering the advanced hour, I will try to keep it brief. Nevertheless, I would like to clarify a few things.

Here are indeed four draft laws, with quite some similar principles, even to the extent that some of them are quite copy paste. It’s an incredible package of pages that we’ve had to handle, but the basic principles underlying the bills are quite limited. I have heard others talk about racism and discrimination here. That may seem like a theoretical problem, but not so long ago as this morning I received a group of young people of about 18 years of age from Zelzate in the Chamber. One of them told me that he had enrolled in an employment agency, just like a schoolmate. The schoolmate had the surname Maertens and he had a somewhat more exotic sounding surname. What have they noticed? Two days after they had signed up simultaneously, one had already been contacted several times by the employment agency and the other has not been contacted a single time.

This week we have also been able to hear through the media the judgment issued by the Chairman of the Labour Court of Gent in the Eurolock case. We are talking about self-proclaimed victims here, but I still find this a way to banalize some things somewhat and I cannot find myself in it at all. In that case, we see that on Wednesday, November 15, 2006, at 17.15 a.m., someone via e-mail submits his candidacy for a particular position within a company. The next morning already, at 9.18 am, he receives a response indicating that he was not eligible for the job. At the bottom of the e-mail, there is another internal note from the trustee that says, “Can you defile that person? A foreigner who will sell security, I have never seen.” I don’t think there can be any clearer evidence of racism and discrimination, and I would like to warn you to banalize such elements.

I believe that the draft legislation presented provides an adapted framework for a number of elements, a more modern and better defined framework as well. On the one hand, the legal arsenal is adapted to the judgment of the Arbitration Court of 2004. On the other hand, it also takes into account the two European directives and the jurisprudence that exists at the European level.

The principles set forth in the draft laws are indeed important for every democracy and every rule of law, as well as for every society in which one wishes to see certain basic principles guaranteed. These basic principles go back to the French Revolution, for example, equality between people, and are important to promote harmonious coexistence.

Specifically in relation to the proof-making process, a fairly wide possibility of proof-making was chosen, with a low threshold. It is not intended to incur high costs for the person who has to provide certain evidence. At the same time, one does not want to go over to an excessive formalism, in order to avoid that there would be no longer evidence.

I also said it during the committee meetings: I consider it a progress that, for example, when one is discriminated at the entrance of a discotheque, one must call a court doorkeeper at night and evening or take sworn officials out of their bed. I think it is important that interest organisations and the Centre also have an important role in the proof-making process. Dear colleagues, one should not underestimate that, of course, there will always be a court, which will also take the necessary precautions.

Also that the sanctions – which before the bills were often rather symbolic, namely 1 euro moral damages – go to real flat-rate amounts, will involve an improvement on the ground.

The shared burden of proof, which has just been extended and which was said to be something incredible, is indeed contained in the European Directive, in Article 8. Article 8 of the European Directive states very clearly under point 1: “The defendant must prove that the principle of equal treatment has not been violated.”

As regards criminal sanctions, it should be noted that European directives do not exclude the possibility of criminal sanctions and that the Court of Arbitration also states in its famous judgment of 2004 that it is up to the legislator, when he decides to raise the minimum penalty applicable to certain crimes, to identify the grounds of discrimination which he now considers most repugnant. So, the legislator has indeed the possibility to say that the principle is so important to him that he demands that it also be sanctioned in criminal law.

The opinions of the State Council are indeed critical on a number of points. The latest advice is critical, I think, because not all of the preparatory work has been taken into account. I have to correct that somewhat, because it is quite easy for the opposition to say that the bills have been chased by the committee and by the Parliament, manu militari, that one has not been able to discuss and that one has not been able to think. This was stated by Mrs. Van der Auwera. (Protest by Mrs Van der Auwera)

I noticed that the number of colleagues present at a hearing was ⁇ limited. This is also a phenomenon: one first asks for hearings and then there are only a few rari nantes, a few individuals appear.

After that, we worked intensively in the committee for one and a half days. Following the opinion of the State Council, we also had the opportunity to give the necessary comments on the basis of this opinion.

I would like to come back to that advice. With such advice, one should always pay attention. Everyone, of course, finds out what supports his or her position. However, I see the following in relation to the practical tests. On page 9.7 it is stated that in the decision of the Arbitration Court the possibility to establish the arrangement from article 19 of the aforementioned law of 2003 - thus the law as it still exists today, it is indeed about those practical tests - was generally declared valid, but that the State Council had a number of questions about the extensive authority given to the King to further develop it.

This possibility is no longer included in the current texts. This is also not really an element to say that there would be an unconstitutionality here.

Mr. Casaer, you compare apples with lemons here. The practice test would cover strictly regulated matters, with officials, possibly with court guards and inspectors. This was wanted to be arranged even further.

You make sure that there is no longer any arrangement. Everything can now. All possible printing groups, all possible reference persons and anyone who has an interest in something can now provide evidence to say that the burden of proof should be reversed.

You go 100 times further than those practical tests. This is much more extensive. Here a fortiori an arrangement should be drawn up by the King or by the executive power. There is absolutely nothing happening here. What is happening now is pure chaos.

First, I only note that you have not submitted an amendment. That is a determination. Apparently you did not find it necessary.

Second, it is correct that the State Council says that a number of concepts used should be better described. I think that during the preparatory work, and even very extensively, we have received explanations from two experts on this matter. With numerous references to European jurisprudence, they have explained various concepts and concepts. It may not be considered sufficient. I have only determined that some seemed to find that by the end of that presentation sufficient. Some could not even follow at all, because just so many explanations were given.

I think there has been an extreme effort to explain the different concepts. Furthermore, the State Council itself indicates that it apparently did not have time or made no effort to fully understand European law. They claim that they have not been able to verify whether the legal elements of those judgments can be transferred into much more general matters regulated by the transposition directives covered by the draft laws in question. That is true, even though the State Council has had the necessary time to do so.

I have taken note of the speech of colleague Van der Auwera. I personally find that a little one-sided. Ms. Taelman also pointed out a little about this. I have heard different sounds from CD&V. Mrs. Van der Auwera, you referred all the time to how difficult it is made for the landlord, for the employer and the like.

However, the interests of the victims must also be taken into account. The arrangement developed takes into account the fragile possibilities for a victim to obtain evidence in such cases. This is also shown by practice.

I found, frankly, the statements meant quite one-sided.

As regards the Flemish Interest, I note that Mr. Laeremans likes one section of the State Council and seems to dislike another section of the State Council. I take note of it. For me, the Council of State is still one whole.

( ... )

With all sympathy. thank you .

With all sympathy, but now again you compare apples with lemons.

The State Council, department of administration, is a law college, which is something different from a counseling college. In our country, for decades, in court cases, ⁇ in criminal cases or similar cases, there has been a tradition that one can appeal to a judge of his language choice. In the case in question, the Raad van State is a mixed board consisting of as many French speakers as Dutch speakers. In addition, they were all directly nominated politically. Is the result known in advance? It is therefore logical that we are suspicious.

How would you be in our place if you were to appear before a court of judges appointed solely by the Flemish Interest? How would you react? Would you appear before this court? You would not even appear and just let you be condemned.

I understand from your words that it is your statement that the legislation department of the State Council is apparently not politically composed. I also take note of this.

We have heard a number of other, strange statements from the Flemish Interest. You cited extensively from the Qur’an. I assume that you, therefore, apparently take the Quran to heart and have a special sympathy for it.

I also noted during the hearings, which was a very strange finding, that you also called for additional staff for the Centre for Equal Opportunities and for Anti-Racism. This was ⁇ not forgotten by Mr. White. He accepted the sentence in gratitude, but a few days later, at a congress of you, he learned with some surprise that another member of the same party wanted to abolish the center. On this point, however, the Flemish Interest must provide some clarity.

Mr. Speaker, which we wanted to respond to during the hearing was as follows. The White, who was designated as the authority to implement the anti-discrimination law, suited for his assignment. His mandate will soon include that discrimination based on political beliefs must be prosecuted by his Centre.

It is quite logical that in that situation we would like to use it to counter this discrimination too, but then he suits. Then he says that he is not there to help us, but only to help others. To challenge that unilaterality, I have said that at that moment he must fulfill his legal role. However, he does not want to fulfill a legal role, he wants to fulfill a political role. He wants to fight us. In this context, I said that he should employ a few more people if necessary. If you didn’t understand the irony, I think you didn’t listen properly. However, if you wish, Mr. Casaer, after this parliamentary career, I am happy to offer you a thriving career at the Centre for Equal Opportunities, because there is always a need for lawyers.

Your kindness knows no boundaries. I just understand that you say that the center will get additional staff as long as it exists. I think Mr. White will be satisfied with this too.

I decide . I believe that there is a balanced whole here. Some colleagues have already announced that they will go to the Arbitration Court, the Constitutional Court. I think – I also said that during the discussion – that it is quite quickly made the analysis that the Constitutional Court would have destroyed the entire law of 2003. That is not true. A number of provisions were effectively destroyed. This cannot be denied.

We will see how the legal practice will deal with the legislation. As always, the legal practice and the legal doctrine will have to apply and further develop a number of concepts. With regard to a number of elements, such as the practice tests, one will undoubtedly proceed to a further development of so-called good practices. For us, the social signal that discrimination and racism are not tolerated and are effectively combated is a very important signal. It should not be only theoretical. It must also be able to work in practice. Indeed, it is in the interests of the victims, in the first place, that in a society that is diverse – whether you like it or not – diversity is treated in a respectful and mature manner and that diversity is regarded as a asset rather than a threat.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker. Today I would like to return to some of them.

We are often complaining about Europe. But, in this case, we must welcome the pioneering work that Europe has done in 2000 by adopting directives that have enabled to establish a widely shared framework for combating discrimination. This does not mean that the situation is ideal. In fact, there are still times when some heads of state make homophobic and racist statements. We are still witnessing a lot of overflow in our country, while this should no longer be the case. There is also a lot of “lightness” – if I can express myself so – in terms of arrangements for people with disabilities, for example. This tool is still indispensable. So we give him our support as we did at the time of the rainbow.

That said, we regret somewhat that it took so long for this text to finally be submitted to us. We hope that it will be implemented quickly. It must be admitted that the final version of this text is interesting. Once voted, this law should allow to address issues related to the current "anti-discrimination law". The difficulties in applying this law arise mainly at the level of evidence. As long as the famous royal decree, which we have been waiting for so long, was not taken, the victims had very difficulty claiming their rights in the courts. The new law will introduce a faster procedure that we hope will work more efficiently.

I would also like to address a few points that have not been in the committee or which deserve to be reviewed today.

One point has not been discussed in the committee. This is the concern of some free-thinkers over the fact that religious discrimination is banned from this bill. Mr. Minister, can you reassure them by telling them that they can continue to exercise their critical talent? Can you tell them that the project in question is in no way aimed at preventing criticism of religions and secularism?

The law also has a small gap. That is why I have submitted an amendment. Thus, according to the law under consideration, a victim of discrimination must give its consent so that an association can be brought to justice for her.

We know that, mainly in the case of people who are deported, it is often difficult to obtain their consent for filing a complaint. Therefore, not being able to request an investigation on their behalf represents a problem for us. I will re-submit an amendment calling for the consent of the victim not to be required in case of force majeure.

A third element concerns the regret expressed by some militant feminist associations about the absence of the term "sexism" in the bill. One of my colleagues had also submitted an amendment to rename the law. This seemed to us to go in the right direction, especially since we had submitted under the previous legislature and under the latter a bill aimed at clearly sanctioning sexism. This seems to us to be an important signal given by society that says, “You have crossed a limit that shouldn’t be.” That is why we regret that this term does not appear clearly in the project.

Also about women, it is recalled in the project that differences in treatment that occur during pregnancy and maternity can in no way be considered as discrimination. However, we should look again at the legislation protecting maternity, as we are witnessing on the ground many discriminations against women on the basis of maternity. In this regard, the text lacks clarity in the enunciation of enhanced protection of women who are thus discriminated against.

Insurers are worried that they can no longer discriminate against women. The Minister of Economy will have to look into this file to establish whether it is appropriate to allow, as in other countries of Europe, preferential insurance for women who, as everyone knows, are better drivers than men.

In the social field, we regret that an amendment has not been passed, because it was a historic opportunity. We regret, in fact, the non-inscription of membership in a trade union organization and trade union activity in the bill. I am reassured by telling me not to worry on the grounds that trade union activities will be included in political convictions. Let us be clear: it is enough to recall the ruling that political convictions differ from philosophical or other convictions, to see that the courts and courts interpret very restrictively the different causes of discrimination. This shows that the legislation suffers from certain gaps.

We are told that trade union freedom is clearly guaranteed. This is not a real terrain. I don’t know if you know the “salary period” in trade union terms. It corresponds to the end of the mandate of a trade union delegate, period during which he can be dismissed without cost to the company. Each pre-election period at the business level is distinguished by a series of dismissals of delegates. Many workers are not covered by this trade union protection. We regret the lack of progress in this area.

Moreover, the expression “freedom of trade union” itself is, in Belgium, very poorly protected and almost absent from the entire legal vocabulary. We limit ourselves to the recognition of freedom of association, but we clearly disregard the specificity of trade unions. Many people are not adequately protected. One could pretext the existence of a series of international conventions, the ILO, which protect these trade union delegates. But at the moment, the judges refuse to recognize the effects of these laws. There is absolutely no way to deal with this in the courts.

In addition, international standards do not provide for sanctions and are therefore not very useful. This text is a good text. As it allows for a faster procedure, as it eases the new evidence tool, it could have been ⁇ beneficial in this area. In this regard, we will re-submit our amendment, because we feel that this is indeed a missed opportunity.

There is a concern that is still circulating, but to which you have already answered: that of age-based bars. Are these bars still well protected? It is well known that in Belgium, although one can regret it, they are still ⁇ pregnant and as advancement systems through other mechanisms work poorly, these age bars are ⁇ important for workers to see their wages rise regularly. Therefore, as long as there is no other system, this system must be preserved.

With regard to part-time workers – let’s be clear, it’s mainly women – you recalled that in terms of pension, equal periods could continue to be preferred, in particular with regard to time credits and half-time prepensions. However, some concerns arise with regard to acquired rights, obtained, for example, in the financial sector. Thus, some part-time workers, who were not part of the supplementary pension schemes mentioned by you, also benefited from assimilation periods.

The answer you gave was quite restrictive and did not guarantee the fact that these assimilations in supplementary pensions could and should continue to apply. It would be interesting to clarify this again.

I heard a lot of nonsense tonight. I have heard that democracy and anti-racism are closely linked.

Now, when the creators of democracy overthrew tyranny to restore democracy, it was usually to chase the metecks into Greece. The term "metheque" obviously did not have the peyorative connotation it has today. Yet today, another term has a very bad reputation: that of repression.

Mr. Minister, of course, we all know who are the people who are suffering repression but, with your project, not only people will suffer it, but also literature. You will be forced to purify people like Aristotle, Shakespeare, Molière, Jules Verne, Jules Destrée, Hergé. All these people will no longer have the right to be published! The term “repression” is a much more dirty term than the other terms you use such as racism, xenophobia. Certainly, I am not racist, of course I am not xenophobic, but these ideas should be considered simply as ideas and should not be criminalized.

I must also say that the Centre for Equal Opportunities is always controlled by people who, politically, have shown their anti-racism but who will never be able to have a clear and impartial view in these cases. Systematically, people who will be attacked for racism will be condemned. It is an injustice!

Mr. Speaker, my dear colleagues, I would like to remind you first that these laws did not fall from the sky, that they were the subject of broad consultation with all the actors in the sector. In committee, they were the subject of long discussions; we had answered most of the arguments raised today.

I think the debate here takes place between those who really want an open society, a society, as the rapporteur, Mr. Casaer, Mrs. Deom and Mrs. Genot, in which one does not value differences but in which one considers equality as one of its foundations, and this, at least since 1789; a society in which one does not think that only horizontalization matters but in which it is also necessary that anti-discrimination be applied in relations between people.

It is not out of ideological concern that we say this, it is obviously because we are aware of what a society should be but also because this is what a number of international instruments, such as the European Court of Human Rights, which has made it clear that the duty to ensure the effectiveness of human rights and the imperative of non-discrimination even in relations between individuals are imposed on the basis of Community directives, on the basis of human rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Belgian Constitution. Without this obligation to protect equality in relations between individuals, the principle of equality and non-discrimination would not be truly concrete and effective. We must therefore apply it, as we must apply this concept of dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, which was recalled in a committee that it was applied in twenty or twenty-five countries, sometimes literally, as we do.

Sometimes there has also been a long and bad trial on the burden of proof, of which I recall that it is an imposition of European directives; it is not us who invent it. We have well measured how the burden of proof was shared; in the middle of this sharing, the truth is that there is a judge to whom facts are brought. Indeed, the majority submitted an amendment that the State Council looked closely but did not hear our arguments. This amendment explains how things can happen. In the committee, we answered widely – I did and the experts did – to justify the whole of this amendment.

In our country, proof is free. When it is said that bringing facts is not legally very grounded, the evidence is free, the judge appreciates in relation to what he hears and then turns to the defendant to ask him if he had a legitimate purpose to be able to perform a distinction.

The rest is part of a willingness to polemize and not apply a legislation of which we know how necessary it is, both persons with disabilities and those coming from foreign countries, as well as women, remain discriminated in our society.

I come to the heart of the debate: either one considers that discrimination is good, or one really wants to fight it – as the European directives impose on us – and then one wants effective laws and reactions that are also.

Then, the trade union affiliation, which Ms. Genot addressed, has been regulated by law since 1921. I also point out that, in the interprofessional agreement, it is said that the social partners will be interested in the phenomenon at the next collective agreement. So we gave them a hand on the subject.

Some of you have been concerned about the prohibition of blasphemy and freedom of thought. I would like to remind you that this law does not introduce anything new in this regard. The incrimination of insult is, of course, very old. These concerns therefore seem to me to be without legitimacy and foundation, especially since we have not seen a lot of limitations to freedom of expression on this level.

Regarding the issue of insurance, as you said, Mrs. Genot, Member States may make arrangements to differentiate insurance. It will be up to Belgium, if it so wishes, to do so before the end of 2007.

by Mr. Ducarme asked me about the fact that certain private places should continue to be considered strictly as such. It is obvious. In fact, laws apply to activities that are open to the public.

Here are my answers, Mr. Speaker. I would like to add that these laws allow us to ⁇ a just balance between the fight against all discrimination and social stability. In particular, the sharing of the burden of proof is an even more intelligent solution as it is based on the case-law of the European Court of Justice.

When we are predicted that we will enter a totalitarian society, let us know that, since 2003, we have been living with a law similar to the one we propose today. In European countries where the burden of proof is applied, there is no such derivative, there is no explosion of complaints and, unfortunately, there is not always better protection for victims.

This is what we want: better protecting victims of discrimination. Indeed, we fundamentally believe that discrimination undermines our life in society and deeply hurts people. In the end, they prevent us from living together and lock us in a society of exclusion. Yet we live in a society where we must respect differences; differences found our world and differences are never, for us, but another way of being: we are all different.

I thank you.