Proposition 50K2216

Proposition de modification du Règlement visant à instituer une commission spéciale chargée du contrôle du commerce des armes.

General information ¶

Authors

Ecolo Martine Dardenne
Groen Peter Vanhoutte
MR Daniel Bacquelaine
Open Vld Stef Goris
PS | SP Patrick Moriau
Vooruit Dirk Van der Maelen

Submission date

Jan. 8, 2003

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

specialised committee national parliament parliamentary committee arms trade

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen CD&V Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP Open Vld MR

Voted to reject

FN VB

Party dissidents ¶

• Vincent Decroly (Ecolo) voted to reject.
• Mark Eyskens (Vooruit) voted to reject.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

Feb. 20, 2003 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

The proposal is to establish a special committee for the control of arms trade. Two proposals were submitted. A discussion took place to determine whether to decide on a common text or whether to take as a work reference the proposal that had gathered the most signatures. It was the case of Mr. Van der Maelen and his colleagues who were examined.

This includes the creation of a special commission for the assessment of the import/export of weapons and the establishment of a place where the intermediate reports concerning these sales could be examined. The following model is based on the subcommittee for military procurement. Confidentiality must be guaranteed. In this regard, the proposal provides for the organization and adoption of an internal rules of procedure. Finally, an administrative protocol between the executive and the commission must be developed. This committee will consist of 13 members. We supported this proposal in the committee from the beginning.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, this proposal is the conclusion and completion of an important bill on arms exports. By approving this today, we will also install a special commission that will oversee the control of this arms trade. We have always supported the establishment of this special committee. This is the content of the proposal today. We have already shown ourselves in favour of the previous legislature to eventually add this to the Army Purchases Committee. This committee, of course, has a different finality, but it is still very similar in terms of composition and procedure to what is on the table here for voting today. Their

As Vice-President of the Army Purchases Committee, I can testify to all colleagues in this House that the establishment of this committee has proven its usefulness many times. We work there in a good and efficient way. We, as parliamentarians, can exercise our control as it should. There is great transparency. This transparency applies to at least a limited number of members of Parliament. This immediately guarantees serenity and confidentiality. Their

A similar procedure is now being proposed. Thirteen members will be appointed. This will be done according to the political strength ratio. It will be these members who will control the arms trade. This is done within a domestic regulation. These relations are governed by the protocol just cited by the rapporteur. The committee will review the reports every six months. She will finish her work behind closed doors with a duty of confidentiality for the members. This seems to me essential. It was also an important question for the industry. I would therefore like to emphasize here that this is very clearly included in the agreements. I repeat that the duty of secrecy is essential. Their

Therefore, the proposal of colleague Van der Maelen, myself and other colleagues of the majority deserve to be preferred to the proposal of colleague De Crem. We believe that in this way we can make the most of our control function in all areas and that we can work quickly, efficiently and rationally around all arms trade files. In this way we can avoid crises in the future, for example in Nepal. Their

Nevertheless, I would like to insist through this forum that progress is made in the Senate as well with the handling of this case. I suppose there is some delay there due to procedural or other reasons. Nevertheless, the global proposal on arms exports is a very solid, consistent and coherent proposal that is transparent and that is in every way an improvement over the past. Through this path, I would therefore like to call on our colleagues in the other chamber, in the Senate, to move forward with their work and to approve the proposal for the new legislation on the arms trade. In this way, we can start a proper lease and a new procedure there too before the end of the work in this Parliament.

Mr President Mr. Goris has just recalled what this new provision of our Rules is about to be incorporated into, that is to say, the law that was adopted here on January 16 and which is in the process of evocative examination in the Senate. I must say that by discovering the text of this amendment to our regulations, I saw my intuition confirmed that an implant fixed to lies cannot be well resounding, because this law is really a lie. When we indicate in every wind, in the streets and in the press, that, tomorrow, the Belgian arms trade will be more ethical, that the sales of arms to countries in war or to countries violating human rights will be more restricted, and even that the European code of conduct is now integrated into Belgian law, we are not limited to simply saying things that are not accurate, we are lying!

Today, what is it about? It is about changing our rules and ensuring parliamentary control. Therefore, I would like to focus my speech on two aspects, two questions regarding this parliamentary control. First, what type and what method of control? Second, and it is essential, a control of what object, ultimately?

As for the method, let us put things back in historical perspective and remember the beginning of the previous legislature, in 1995-1996. At the time, there was an annual report on Belgian arms sales. This was a relatively confidential report but could nevertheless be consulted with the Secretariat of the committees of our assembly. In terms of content, it was a relatively little detailed report, with little information, but it was a report with Mr. Vanoost and my then friends from EcoloAgalev, we had brought out. To such an extent that at the end of the previous legislature, so in 1997-1998, we were faced with the following situation, which is not uninteresting to recall — you ⁇ remember Mr. Van der Maelen because you were already there, our parliament had a report that was handed over to all members, which was much more detailed than at the beginning but which, it is true, was sometimes handed over with a certain shift in time. Indeed, the arms sales of the year 1997, for example, were communicated — I quote from memory — in 1998 or even in 1999. But this could have led to quite interesting exchanges of views and even to discussions in the Foreign Relations Committee of our assembly, during the previous legislature.

Then came this legislature of "political renewal, transparency, revaluation of parliament", and I go on. And what do we find at the end of this legislature? If I read the report discussed today, we find a special committee, according to Article 25bis of our Rules of Procedure. A special committee? Does this committee, like all special committees, and according to the principle enshrined in Article 25bis, be public? No, this will not be public. It will be a closed-door committee. It will therefore be a commission that will be taken back in the exceptions provided for in the principle of publicity of special commissions. The first little disappointment for me, you can imagine, and the first downturn from what was done during the previous legislature in the area of parliamentary control over arms sales.

Let us continue. It is a special committee, it will not be public, it will be closed door. But, being behind closed doors, will this special committee nevertheless be able to give access to deputies who would not be members in its main title?

Article 25bis, point 3, paragraph 2 of our Rules of Procedure provides for the possibility of giving access to the work of special commissions, even when they sit behind closed doors, to members of our assembly who are not members of these special commissions. In this case, this faculty was not retained. Not only will the meetings not be public, but they will take place at closed doors without possible and optional access for other members of the Chamber who would not be members of the special commission. by

It is therefore not at the beginning of the previous legislature with the possibility of consulting the report in a very restricted and confidential framework at the secretariat of the committees, but before the beginning of the previous legislature. If I count correctly, this is more than 8 years backward in the practices of parliamentary control! More than 8 years with this super closed door dedicated by the proposal discussed today!

Furthermore – and this is an incidental note – if the frequency of reports requested to the executive is increased compared to the previous legislature, which is interesting, the time limit for the communication of these reports to Parliament is still not planned. Thus, for example, the House could not have the report on the deliveries made from January 2003 to June 2003 as part of the order of the 5,500 Minimi rifles from Nepal until 2005, or even later.

As for the method, I will finally keep in mind that three of the main tares of the old control method are preserved. This is always a reverse control. It is always a case-by-case check, while in the bill I had filed with Ecolo/Agalev at the time, we proposed a check based on a previously established list. It is always a control without a strict deadline. by

Furthermore, we are back to a super closed door when the previous legislature had marked positive and significant developments in the possibility given to all members of our assembly not only to have access to the documents but also to discuss them in a quite transparent and open manner.

I now come to the second aspect of my speech: the subject of parliamentary control. Control of what? Although we control more often and possibly with allegedly more detailed reports, the problem is that when you read the law passed here on January 16, you can not get away from the impression that there will be no more thing to control!

See Article 4, paragraph 1 er, 4°, a). Will we really be able to control this article? Will we be able to control in Parliament, for example, if deliveries have taken place – and I quote the law you passed – “despite sufficient indications that in the country of destination the arms delivered have contributed to a flagrant violation of human rights”? In my opinion, this is hardly controllable in the current formulation of the legislation you have adopted. What will the Minister respond to you? He will tell you that he had indications but that they were not in sufficient number and that therefore he was well-founded, in his assessment of things, to authorize the delivery of weapons. He will tell you that the delivery of weapons is manifest, that it clearly contributes to human rights violations in the recipient country, but that these are not flagrant violations, only manifest violations. by

In the law of 1991, with a case like this, the export license was rejected. Here, the violation of human rights must be flagrant, and the Minister will have a good play to prove to you by "A plus B" that it is not flagrant, that it is only manifest and that even if it is flagrant, there are not sufficient indications in this sense.

He will even be able, and you offer him a new escape with this 1991 law, to tell you that these arms delivered are to a country that flagrantly violates human rights, but that they do not contribute to these violations of human rights. They are used in other regions by one of the squadrons that engages the least in human rights violations. I do not know exactly what will be controlled under the text of Article 4 and the paragraph I cited.

We may also be able to control — and I asked myself the question, text-in-hand — whether there have been deliveries to countries where serious violations, this time, simply “serious” violations of human rights would have been found in a framework where the minister would not have proved, taking into account the nature of the equipment, special caution and vigilance. The minister will tell you, "yes, there have been human rights violations, I acknowledge that they are rare but we delivered well with vigilance and prudence and taking into account the nature of the equipment." That is what you will be told.

The law says that if vigilance and prudence were there, the delivery was not contestable and that the minister cannot be put in trouble in this regard while in the 1991 law, as soon as there was a “manifest” violation, the license was automatically and legally rejected.

Will we be able to control article 4, paragraph 1, 4°, b) of the law that was adopted here on January 16. In other words, can we control whether there have been deliveries despite the fact that they would cause, prolong, aggravate tensions, conflicts or civil wars?

Under the European Code of Conduct, this scenario is rejected; under the 1991 Act, it was also rejected, but under the 2003 Act, it is not rejected. It will be necessary to verify what was the nature of the tensions of the civil war and I quote the law of 16 January 2003: "it will be necessary to verify with rigour what are the responsibilities of the protagonists of these tensions or of this civil war (...)".

Mr. Decroly, this is the proposal for Regulation, we are not discussing the law.

I speak here of the object on which control, under this amendment to the Rules, is supposed to be carried, and all my explanation tends to demonstrate that control is literally empty of its object, Mr. Speaker.

I almost finished it.

It will still have to be checked – and this is really the nail of the last few months – whether it is a democratic regime whose existence would have been threatened. We will tell you, Mr. Van der Maelen: “Yes, arms deliveries cause, prolong or aggravate tensions, conflicts or civil wars.” Isn’t that Mr. Vanhoutte? And you will be told, “but we have checked the nature of tensions and the civil war, we have checked the responsibilities and we have even done it with rigour, so feel happy. Moreover, this is a threatened democratic regime.”

The whole question is what is, for a government like this or the following, a threatened democratic regime and what is democracy.

From the moment when there is no very clear and objective definition of this notion of democracy, many things are possible.

I will give four examples.

The regime of President Chavez in Venezuela, a regime that constitutionally provides for four forms of referendum of popular initiative, including the possibility of removing for half-term, any chief executive, from the municipality to the level of the federal states and the Venezuelan federal state, is considered by Mr. Chavez. Michel as a backward regime that clings to dreams of the past and makes a dangerous turn in Venezuela.

For example, for Ms. Neyts — and this is not indifferent, Mr. Van der Maelen, because she is the co-decider for certain types of files depending on the language in which they are introduced — Kuwait is a parliamentary regime that can be improved but respected. Nepal is not a young democracy. What about Libya? Not long ago, during the election of this country to the presidency of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, the Geneva Human Rights Commission, the representatives of our country abstained. They did not say that it was not about Libya to be chairman of the Human Rights Commission; they abstained. So where is democracy and how will we appreciate this notion not only under the reign — if I can say — of Mr. Michel and Mrs. Neyts, but also under the ministry of those who will succeed them? by

Finally, will it be possible to control the application of Article 4, paragraph 3? Will you really be able to control this article that concrete in a text of law, that is, in Belgian law, your impénitent schizophrenia? I do not resist the need to read it again because I think that some of you did not read this article before voting for it: "Article 4 Paragraph 3: Where appropriate, the impact of this License on the economic, social, commercial and industrial interests of Belgium may be taken into account" — first member of Article 4bis Paragraph 3 — "without however that these factors may influence how the criteria referred to in Article 4 are applied." How do you want to control this?

Honestly, we are here in the regime of parliamentary and political prestidigitation and my faith, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Michel, at least has the courage to not hide from it, he who, to a question from Mrs Frieda Brepoels who asks her about the transformation of her legislation into a real empty shell, answers, on January 15: "Madame, ladies and gentlemen parliamentarians, reassure yourself: there remains ( and this word has all its importance ), there remains always the political responsibility of the minister who evaluates a dossier. Parliament may judge a minister in this regard and, if necessary, overthrow him." Bacquelaine added: “The coherence of this legislation is ultimately guaranteed by the fact that the Minister of Foreign Affairs will be able to decide on its own whether to grant a license or not. My team will trust him.”

Here is where we are. It is the Minister who decides and who controls. With such blurred terms, so blurred and boulevards open to the possibility for him and his Dutch-speaking colleague to approve everything and anything in terms of arms export licenses, the control we discuss here is absolutely empty of object and so to speak empty of meaning. This is what I would like to remind my colleagues.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will be especially concise. Mr Decroly’s speech was worth listening. Maybe he could be a futurologist. After all, it leads to nothing to make all sorts of considerations and to draw out scenarios about all that can happen. We have no crystal ball and cannot say what will go wrong in the future.

This proposal gives Parliament — including our successors — a number of specific powers to control arms exports in an efficient and efficient manner. From my experience in the Army Procurement Committee, I know that this is a good system. The present proposal is a system that has all chances of succeeding. Mr Decroly, whether this is a success or a failure, is in the hands of Parliament. It is up to Parliament to become strong and to force that this committee does a good job and the Minister to report on a regular basis to Parliament and to the committee in particular within the limits of what was previously defined in the Arms Act. This is the content of the proposal, there is nothing else in it.

For the Greens, this is a very good proposal. The establishment of the special committee makes it clear that this is a matter that Parliament is not only willing to address, but must also address, and on which it can and will make clear statements in the future.

I did not intend to intervene, but I heard Mr. Decroly resumed the entire debate on the Arms Export Act rather than clinging to today’s proposal.

He was able to speak.

In any case, it did not leave me an indelible memory!

In this case, we wanted to meet two objectives. First, introduce socio-economic criteria alongside ethical criteria, which has been done. Second, guarantee confidentiality in debates on parliamentary control. Having created this closed-door commission guarantees, I think, the possibility of introducing a real debate.

Some might have preferred that this commission would not be closed-door so that it could continue to polemize. I can understand this subversive interest from time to time and that one likes to want to polemize about everything to interest the media in its positions.

Here, it is not about interested media in their own position, it is about interested the whole country in the possibility of managing the arms trade, taking into account ethical and socio-economic criteria. This is the purpose of this proposal and it is pleased that the Minister, in the end, retains the political responsibility of the decision. Without this, we are actually in a system of irresponsibility.

In the case we are concerned, there is a political responsibility. It is the ministers in charge of the dossier who make the decision "in the end" whether to give the license or not. In both cases, responsibility exists. For example, if some people prefer to arm terrorists rather than help democratic regimes, that’s their business. Everyone must take their responsibilities and the system we have imagined, including the creation of this committee, will allow Parliament to play its role.

Like the mr. Vanhoutte said, it is the Parliament that is responsible for how it will play its role effectively. This will depend on the parliamentarians members of this committee who will have the task of carrying out this control.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, since the existence of the law of 1991, many proposals and amendments have been submitted in this Chamber to amend that law. Between 1991 and 2002 none of these proposals or amendments were accepted. I am pleased to announce today that in the last one-and-a-half year of this legislature we have made a movement in three phases that led to a modification of the law of 1991.

In June 2002, in this Chamber, we added a new chapter to the Act of 1991, which was aimed at combating illegal arms trade through two measures. First, we impose new, additional special conditions for every Belgian who is active abroad in the field of arms trade. Secondly, using the technique of extraterritoriality, we ensure that the Belgian who works abroad without such a permit or goes against an internationally declared embargo, would be punished in Belgium for these activities. Belgium is the first country in the European Union to adopt this type of legislation. We are, recently by the European Parliament in the discussion of the latest European report on arms trade, being set as an example for the rest of the European Union. Their

In January 2003, we implemented a thorough reform of the 1991 law. I think it is good that I repeat for a moment what, in my opinion, is the progress we make with this. First, we are the first country in the European Union to make the European Code of Conduct binding.

The [...]

We are the first country to make the European Code of Conduct binding by incorporating it into national legislation. Second, we have extended the scope of the Act of 1991 to order enforcement equipment. Third, a number of new criteria are added, such as — which I think is important — the new criterion that sets a link between, on the one hand, defence spending and, on the other hand, social spending. Fourth, better supervision of licensed production and the so important problem of final destination is possible. The latest amendment means an improvement in parliamentary control. Their

I invite my colleagues to compare the old text of Article 17 of the Act of 1991 with Article 17 of this text.

Mr. Speaker, I am listening with increasing tension to Mr. Van der Maelen. I hear him here making great statements about laws that are being tightened. The problem is, however, that the recent past shows that it is not so much a matter of tightening legislation, but simply of applying the law. The majority to which you belong and of which you are regularly allowed to play the refined conscience does not apply the law. When it comes point by point, you must swallow that conscience and you must give your support to a government that in the case-Nepal — export of weapons to Nepal, where the law was manifestly applicable and thus prohibited the delivery of a license — simply does not apply the law. The problem is not so much the new legislation. It is simply about the correct application of the existing law.

If you allow me, I will answer your question as a conclusion of my argument. Their

Parliamentary control must be strengthened. Compare Article 17 of the Act of 1991 with the new text we propose. The third phase of what we propose is the establishment of a special committee for the Rules of Procedure.

I am around my speech. I would like to address the question of Leterme. Is the law as we know it perfect? It is not perfect, but it has improved. Collega Leterme, I did not intend to enter into polemics, but I would like to point out that in the period when we were together with you in the majority, between 1991 and 1999, we have not at any time been able to advance the steps we are now doing with this purple-green majority.

I want to come back to the problem of Nepal. I have to ask you to be intellectually honest. The law of 1991...

The [...]

Mr. Leterme, I have not interrupted you either. Under the 1991 law, it has been more than once that it was supplied to countries — I will name two examples: Algeria and Uganda — by the majority of which you and my party were part, with the argument that this was necessary to protect the young Ugandan democracy and the regime in Algeria that was threatened by terrorists. What you say to me and the current majority about Nepal happened under the old law of 1991. It happened then also under a prime minister and among ministers of your party.

Mr. Speaker, it is always easy to play the big causator afterwards and read the big literature after the facts. I would like to know, Mr. Van der Maelen — and you can be confident with yes or no answers — whether you stood and stands behind the delivery of Minimis to Nepal? So simple is it.

I have answered this question several times. You know the answer. I had problems with the delivery.

Do you no longer have it?

I say now that the future will reveal who was right, those who defended the delivery or those who, like me, had questions about it. Let’s wait, the future will show it.

Mr. Van der Maelen, I think that in this way the credibility of what you have been saying for ten minutes on the floor is significantly compromised.

Mr. Vanhoutte, you have very short the word, and then it is done, because one speaks here beside the issue.

The credibility of the then CVP, and the current CD&V, is null. Between 1991 and 1999, I tried more than once to change the law, but it couldn’t. Now the law has been changed.

Stop with it. Do not aggravate it. Sparta is not like that.

I would only like to point out that at the moment there is a ceasefire in Nepal and that negotiations have begun to reach a solution. So I think that, in that regard, we have won our battle home and that despite the arms deliveries, clear progress is being made.