Proposition 50K1871

Projet de loi fixant les dispositions générales applicables aux budgets, au contrôle des subventions et à la comptabilité des Communautés et des Régions, ainsi qu'à l'organisation du contrôle de la Cour des comptes.

General information ¶

Submitted by

Groen Open Vld Vooruit PS | SP Ecolo MR Verhofstadt Ⅰ

Submission date

June 18, 2002

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

budget public accounting national budget

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

FN VB

Voted to reject

Groen CD&V Vooruit Ecolo PS | SP Open Vld N-VA MR

Party dissidents ¶

• Vincent Decroly (Ecolo) abstained from voting.
• Richard Fournaux (MR) abstained from voting.

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Discussion ¶

March 19, 2003 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, the three proposed bills aim in part to increase the efficiency of the accounting and the parliamentary control on it.

I propose that we take a similar action in the context of increasing the efficiency of parliamentary work. For the most part, I refer to the report.

However, first and foremost, I would like to point out that colleague Dirk Pieters, specifically with regard to the Court of Auditors, needs some time. In the end, I think that for Parliament and parliamentary control is the crucial part of the entire discussion of the draft legislation in question. He must be given some time to go into a number of aspects in detail so that we can go deeper into them during the exchange of thoughts.

Second, as regards the other designs, I would like to point out that there are two important things. First and foremost, there is the question of how, in a contemporary way, the transition from the existing accounting and budgetary technique to what we could describe as a budgetary accounting, can be achieved smoothly and efficiently. This was the first major leak in the discussion in the committee. The second element was to focus on the whole problem of, on the one hand, the prior visa and, on the other hand, how we as Parliament can continue to exercise efficient control in the future and how the control can be carried out from the regions and the Communities. Mr. Peterson will be discussing this in the near future. This applies in particular to the way in which this control by Parliament can be carried out in an important, efficient and meaningful manner, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the members of Parliament. In other words, it is necessary to ensure that the right of access remains at a minimum to what it is now and is strengthened where possible. We will discuss this in the course of the debate in the coming hours.

Finally, I would like to point out that a number of important contributions were made during the hearings, including by Professor Herman Matthijs of the VUB.

His criticisms, with which we should of course not agree, also indicated in broad lines what were the problems that were signaled by various members from different groups during the discussions. Their

On the other hand, Mr. Speaker, I refer to the report.

Mr. Speaker, as already announced by Mr. Vanhoutte, my contribution will be limited to and focus on the problem of the prior visa of the Court of Auditors. The Rekenhof Subcommittee has already held an extensive debate on the abolition of the prior visa. This showed that its abolition does not seriously weaken parliamentary budgetary control, as the prior visa is in itself a less powerful control instrument than is generally thought.

In addition, the abolition of the prior visa will be compensated by the permanent online access that the Court of Auditors will have to the full informed accounting system. This will enable the Court of Auditors to continue to provide answers to individual questions of Chamber members. The subcommittee considers it useful that the Chamber could order the Court of Auditors to initiate an examination of the legality and regularity of specific spending programmes.

Also in their presentation in the Committee on Finance, the representatives of the Court of Auditors relativise the importance of the prior visa. According to them, the prior visa is, for example, in the case of the first chairman of the Court of Auditors, Mr. Dumazy, only a means of control and ⁇ not a purpose in itself. The Court of Auditors complies with the Parliament’s decision on the matter, which is the abolition of the prior visa under the new accounting regime, which is set out in the three draft laws under discussion.

Mr Alain Trosch, first auditor-director at the Court of Auditors, supported the argument that the abolition of the prior visa does not result in a significant loss for the whole of the information and comments provided by the Court of Auditors to the Parliament, nor for the Court of Auditors’ actions. Their

In recent years, the Chamber has charged the Court of Auditors with other tasks for which no prior visa is applied. Speaker mentioned on this subject the example of the control of certain institutions of public utility, the general control of the transactions relating to the establishment and collection of duties owed to the State and the provinces including the tax receipts, the control a posteriori of the proper spending of the state money, the role of the Court of Auditors on budgetary information on the control of the accounts of the state accountants. In addition, the speaker states that the prior visa has no deterrent effect. Their

Finally, the speaker formulates 3 results that could be achieved with the prior visa: first, monitoring the budget, in particular checking whether sufficient appropriations are available, second, checking the legality of the expenditure and third, obtaining sufficient information about public expenditure without having to go on the spot. He argues that this leads to an efficient control of public transactions but that the current reform allows the control to be organized equally or even better. Their

First, the follow-up of the budget can be made through Article 61 of Bill 1870, which, at the request of the Council of State, provides that the Court of Auditors will be able to systematically and immediately check the existence of the appropriations for each expenditure separately. Their

Second, lawfulness will be more effectively controlled through a system that regularly inspects all transactions of a service. Their

Third, the presence of staff members of the Court of Auditors in the various departments allows the Court of Auditors to provide up-to-date and complete information on the operations of those departments. Their

In the general discussion, however, the debate was resumed. Representative Leterme noted that although the opinion of the subcommittee before the Court of Auditors was ⁇ sound, this does not mean that the Committee for Finance should no longer conduct a fundamental debate on this subject. The speaker expressed concern that the readability of budget documents will not be improved by the current reform and referred to the steps taken at the local level to apply the basic elements of corporate accounting to the public finances.

Furthermore, the speaker stated that the budgetary accounting should not be subordinated to the economic accounting. For Parliament, budgetary accounting is crucial in fulfilling its role as a budgetary authority. Both accounts must therefore continue to exist. The accountability to Parliament should not affect the primacy of budgetary accounts. Parliament should not rely on the results of the internal audit because it is primarily an instrument of the government manager.

The Court of Auditors should therefore continue to carry out thorough checks at the level of commitments so that the legality of a government commitment can be verified in a timely manner. The statement that the prior visa has no effect on the rights of third parties because it is a mere internal administrative act is not considered by the speaker sufficient to advocate its abolition. Rather, it is an argument for ⁇ ining and even strengthening the control of the Court of Auditors at the level of commitments. Audit at this stage allows to prevent the executive power from exceeding the mandate it has received from the budgetary authority, in particular the Parliament. Therefore, an abolition of the previous visa can only be achieved provided that there are solid guarantees that both the control of the commitments and the internal audit function properly. He proposed to oppose a replacement of a priori controls by a mere a posteriori control because it is unacceptable that the Audit Court’s control possibilities were restricted in such a way.

Later it turned out that the submitted amendments were eventually accepted. Here is my oral explanation. For the rest, I refer to the explanation already given by the co-rapporteur, Mr Vanhoutte, and to the written report.

I had asked Mr. Leterme in the reading room. Would you call him? I have currently registered the following speakers: Mr Borginon, M. by Weddingen et M. The letter.

I would like to remind you that many committees are currently underway.

There are many committees where our colleagues are present.

Our colleagues do not have the gift of ubiquity! You know the famous phrase of Mr. President Van Acker, who was accused of the absence of some parliamentarians: “If they are not here, they are elsewhere!”

First of all, I would like to thank the rapporteurs of the two committees (the committee and the subcommittee), as well as the secretaries of the committees, for the quality of the report they delivered to us.

The three submitted projects, which form a whole, modernize the accounting of the State and federal entities, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, adapt the control of the Court of Auditors. These projects are the result of ten years of work of a group of experts, which I would like to thank here.

These projects thus transcend the traditional political divisions. This is why the goal was, throughout their examination, to try to reach a consensus. They were first examined in the Subcommittee on Finance where consensus was easily reached and the opinion submitted to the Committee on Finance was unanimously adopted. In the Finance Committee, new objections, otherwise legitimate, were raised. Their review was very attentive, as evidenced by the large number of meetings devoted to these three projects.

The main concern, already expressed in subcommittees and widely relayed in committees, relates to the maintenance of the effectiveness of the Court of Auditors’ control after the abolition of the prior visa. There have been numerous hearings on the subject, from which we can legitimately conclude that the effectiveness of the prior visa is far less effective than it seems at first glance and even has the perverse effect of backing up everything that has not been the subject of a visa refusal, while the vast majority of the expenses are in fact not examined.

On the other hand, the project carries a remarkable step forward, by reversing the rule that determines the scope of the Court’s control. Currently, a public body is subject to control only if a specific legal provision so provides, while from now on the basic rule is the automatic control of the Court, unless a particular provision exempts a specific public body from it. This is true for both the federal state and for federal entities.

In addition, the Court of Auditors will have permanent online access to all computerized accounting systems.

Third, Parliament will be able to charge the Court of Justice to ensure a deeper control (legality control, regularity control) of certain spending programmes that it will define.

Finally, the individual viewing right of parliamentarians will be extended.

It can therefore be concluded that control will not be weakened but, on the contrary, – that was the goal – will be strengthened.

As regards the establishment of a standardized accounting plan, based on the principles of double-part accounting – these are the other two projects – it should allow, in particular, through IT, to accelerate the establishment of the general account of the State. And if a huge catch-up was needed and was done under this legislature – ten years of catch-up! - the projects under consideration should allow to avoid the accumulation of further delays in the future.

One point remained in waiting and was the subject, last week, of a first review in subcommittee. It concerns the control of autonomous public enterprises and enterprises in which the State holds a significant stake. The recent example of the Sabena largely justifies considering without delay the mode of control to be implemented. The subcommittee will make a first report to the Finance Committee before the dissolution, we still hope, probably next week or next week.

Finally, a correction that can be qualified as technical, unanimously desired and recommended by the subcommittee, aims to ensure that after the cassation of a judgment of the Court of Auditors, the referral takes place before the relevant federal or federal instance, and not exclusively before the federal parliament. This obvious amendment, which requires a law by special majority, could not be adopted by amendment in a committee and has therefore been the subject of a separate proposal that I hope to see adopted before the end of the legislature.

In conclusion, I welcome both the work of the experts and that of the Court of Auditors. I hope that after such an in-depth examination in commission — and I turn to mr. Leterme—these three projects will be able to gather the unanimity they deserve.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, what we are discussing this afternoon is of reverse proportional importance to the interest in this Chamber.

Colleagues, I must bear in mind that, in addition to the dramatic events that threaten a country far away here, but whose future concerns us all these days, I must note that when one meets citizens in the last days, in general, the problemology of the Antwerp files and more specifically the way in which community funds are used in the city of Antwerp and the discussion about the control mechanisms, constitutes a point of public discussion. People don’t often talk about politics. However, in the last few days, although not in the way and in the terms we would like, we are talking about politics and more specifically about the city politics in Antwerp. A lot of people are discussing this and taking positions regarding what has come to light in connection with the use of tax money in the city of Antwerp.

At the beginning of this debate, I must confirm and regret that I am only staying in the presence of colleagues Gerkens, Laenens, van Weddingen, Lano, Borginon, Van Hoorebeke, Bouteca, Goyvaerts, Van den Broeck, Dirk Pieters who was an excellent rapporteur and of course of the chairman of the Chamber. This means that at the moment...

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I am talking about party boundaries. Today I must conclude that about 140 people’s representatives, some of whom, of course, are active in committee meetings, are absent. The topic that concerns the entire population at the moment when it comes to politics and which is being discussed today enjoys too little interest in this plenary session. We will today — and the reporters have referred to it in an excellent way — experience the consecration of a work that has taken ten to fifteen years. The aim of this work was to improve the national accounting, the accounting of the use of public money, to modernize and more adapt to contemporary techniques and circumstances.

Today there is a triple. I regret that we cannot discuss this issue with more interest than during the discussion in the committee. Colleagues of the majority, you will forgive me for mentioning that this was not always or not so extensively the case.

Nevertheless, I would like to remind you that the more than one hundred article bill, which should form the basis for the federal accounting of the future, was drafted in less than half an hour. Zonet has made a call to a colleague from Weddingen to approve the relevant bills as unanimously as possible in closed ranks. Dear colleague of Weddings, I will answer you. This is the main bill that should lay the foundation of federal accounting for the coming weeks, months, years, and possibly decades. Well, you have achieved it as a majority to do about this about half an hour and to wipe down all proposals, all amendments of the opposition to improve the texts. Many experts even agreed that our proposals would lead to improvement of the texts. You have succeeded in wrapping out all those proposals and in half an hour playing the discussion of such an interesting design.

Nevertheless, the operation we are currently preparing in the Chamber is fundamental.

Mr. Speaker, by subordinating the budgetary accounting to the economic accounting, it is likely that in this regard we will rather weaken than strengthen the control capabilities of the Parliament as a budgetary authority. In this context, I invoke your sincere sensitivity with regard to the control capabilities and the content of the principle of the Chamber as a budgetary authority.

Colleagues, I will not be convinced of the opposite, as, among others, a colleague from Weddingen wants to do. Indeed, the planned abolition of the previous visa of the Court of Auditors was entirely inspired by the wishes of the executive power. It was the government’s desire to make the procedures for deposit and commitment run faster and smoother. I admit that I mean the word "flotter" in part also ironically.

The designed internal audit should actually fill the control vacuum hit by the abolition of the previous visa. I admit that some aspects of the abolition can be questioned in terms of effectiveness and meaningfulness. The designed internal audit, which should fill the control vacuum, has not been sufficiently expanded today. In addition, even if the audit would be extensive, it is still not sufficiently independent to properly fulfill the role of efficient control of expenditure. This is according to the texts that are now available. This is mainly due to the laws and decrees, which have been passed in the meantime.

Mr. Speaker, it is therefore essential for us that the Court of Auditors, as an external auditor on behalf of the Parliament, the nation and the population, can carry out permanent, effective on-site checks on the legality of transactions at an early stage — from the commitment of credits. In this regard, I immediately come to the announcement of a number of amendments that are still pending.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker. During this discussion, various stakeholders pointed out the absolute need to have the automation of accounting technically fully controlled by the government. After that, economic accounting can then be used as the basis for receiving credits. Today, the reality is that if this were not the case, there would be a huge loss of data. There is a huge risk of loss of data with regard to Parliament as a budgetary authority. The Parliament is called to approve the budget, which is the authorisation for expenditure.

In addition, during the preparatory work in the Rekenhof Subcommittee, the experts emphasized the need to initiate a full internal audit. They also emphasized the need, in accordance with the mandate of the Court of Auditors, to provide the external audit with the widest possible scope. We also heard the representatives of the Flemish Community in the Committee on Budget and Finance. They pointed out that there should also be guarantees for Flanders for the independence of the internal audit. These guarantees would be more or less fulfilled.

At the federal level, the stated guarantees are lacking. We are therefore still facing the problem that the internal audit is under the hierarchical supervision of the minister responsible for the relevant FOD and under the hierarchical supervision of the chairman of the FOD and thus must operate. Their

The question remains who ultimately – that is a question I ask the people’s representation, to the members of the budgetary authority, among whose main tasks it should be to exercise control on behalf of the people on the proper use of the financial resources – still controls the minister and the chairman of the FOD, the highest official. It is a rhetorical question, because in the light of the new designs that we are called to discuss here and on which we must speak, this is not arranged. As for us, there must therefore be guarantees for the independence of the internal auditors.

Colleagues, the abolition of the preliminary visa of the Court of Auditors — the Court of Auditors as a stick behind the door with the exception of the external supervisor — is for us only acceptable insofar as the Court of Auditors also has access to the database and to the files relating to expenditure of the building, that is to say of the budgetary commitment of the payment obligation of the government. It is, in fact, the moment of commitment that is juridically crucial because it is at that moment that the choice of the government for a particular supplier, for a particular payment method, for a certain legal description of an obligation is materialized in the context, for example, of the Public Procurement Act. The actuality reminds us that it is at the time of capture that the government is most vulnerable to influence.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, in the context of this debate, we also think that more clarification is needed — but I do not make myself much illusions — about the relationship between, on the one hand, the economic accounting and, on the other hand, the budget accounting. It is, in our opinion, impossible that, under the guise of economic accounting and of the establishment and argument that economic accounting functions within the enterprises and is thus most suited to know the actual value of its possessions — as is approximately described in the memorandum of explanation — the budget accounting would be subordinated to economic accounting. We are the budgetary authority. Those drafts threaten to make the budgetary accounting, which should be the basis of parliamentary control, in fact subordinate to the economic accounting. In this sense, our group disagrees with the developments outlined by the representatives of the Flemish Community for the Flemish Community. We believe that the public sector is large enough to develop a specific accounting package. As far as we are concerned, the recurrence to a standard package for the private sector, which must then be encrypted as much as possible in order to make it somewhat adapted to the government, eventually comes to a self-developed system. There is no argument in this.

Mr. Speaker, it is essential in a democracy that it is a budgetary authority that allocates the resources to the executive power for the implementation of a particular policy on which a public debate on behalf of the population is held by the people’s representation and over which subsequent control can be exercised.

It is essential that in a democracy the Parliament is the budgetary authority. It allocates the resources to the executive power. It is equally essential in a parliamentary democracy that the budgetary accounting remains the most important. It is essential that budgetary accounting should never be subordinated to economic accounting. When government managers, in addition to budgetary accounting, also consider economic accounting useful, then technically there can not be such an insurmountable problem to link these two. Their

I make a little misuse of the presence of colleague Coveliers. In the Antwerp dossier, he has indicated in the last few days the direction to which at the local level – in Antwerp – maybe a little more attention should be paid. Some more attention should be paid to the control of spending, to the transparent control of spending and to the follow-up of the entire decision-making circuit surrounding decision-making. I appeal to his presence to emphasize the importance of the debate we are conducting here, colleagues and colleague Coveliers. All proportions are observed. It is a different level of policy and administration. Their

Colleague Coveliers, in discussing these three drafts, it is essential to discuss the same core issues as those that are also at the basis of your initiatives and your implication in what is currently commonly called the Antwerp Dossiers. It is all about reflection, thinking and organizing a debate and an exchange of ideas about decision-making. In this way we can then see how we can most efficiently and most effectively control the correct spending of tax money and the correct spending. The proper use of tax funds and the proper use, that is, the expenditure in accordance with the legal objectives and the budgetary objectives set by the budgetary authority. This budgetary authority is the municipal council in Antwerp and the Parliament here. In fact, it is about that. Their

Coveliers, you were not present at that time. I repeat it again. This discussion is essential and does not happen every year. I regret a little to have this discussion with such a few occupied banks. This should be while the Antwerp actuality dominates the political debate in our country and also among the population for a bit. Their

I return to my reasoning. I would like to ask again from the group. Given the fact that there were doubts in the hearings and that the two still stand side by side in the bill in question, I would still like to emphasize again, Mr. Speaker, that we would make clear in the context of this debate that there is a primordiality. I would like to emphasize that there is a primordiality between budgetary accounting and economic accounting. Budgetary accounting has the primordiality between the two. Budgetary accounting prevails over economic accounting. It does so precisely because the budget accounting is the instrument for fulfilling our mission as the House of Representatives as a budgetary authority. The House is a budgetary authority that authorizes certain expenditure. She also carries out control. She does it collectively and as a body, but she does it also individually to the level of each chamber member.

Colleagues, the hearings also showed that the legislative power actually has nothing to do with the internal audits. These internal audits are a good tool in the hands of managers or ministers. However, they have no effect on Parliament and on the House of Representatives as a supervisory authority. It is therefore essential that the Court of Auditors would already carry out organised checks at the level of commitments. This is essential to enable the Court of Auditors to function as a branch and as an extension of the House of Representatives as a budgetary authority. It is essential that the Court of Auditors would already carry out organised checks at the level of commitments.

In fact, the control of the level of commitments, to which I have already referred hereafter, allows the best way and at a useful time to verify the legality of the commitments undertaken on behalf of the government. Allow me to emphasize this very explicitly, especially with regard to this government. This government will remain book-studded, in particular due to the negligence with which it has jumped over in recent years with, for example, the law on public procurement. When one sees that, then it is not a superfluous luxury to continue to demand that at the moment it is fixed and therefore an obligation arises in the head of the government, in this case the Belgian State, a very sharp, clear, transparent, performance control will continue to exist.

I give a few examples. I remind you of the dossier of the International Press Centre or IPC. The government came into that file by its own tribulation in time need. We have then seen what ministers who have sworn here the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and to the laws of the Belgian people with respect to the King have done. The Prime Minister then pressured Minister Daems to act unjudicially with regard to the IPC dossier — I do not hesitate to use that word, Mr. Speaker, because it is also used.

Mr. Leterme, have you held all your interpellation? I thought about it afterwards.

Mr. Speaker, fault the fighter, I still sit on my hunger. The minister, I think, still has a good reason to apologize until now. He still has something too good of me. The interpellation is hanging. I will ensure that it does not remain hanging until after the dissolution of the Chambers.

I come back to the point I wanted to bring forward, which is perfectly illustrated by the IPC dossier. The Belgian government knew that a European Presidency was coming. For this, the agenda is not checked to see when such a presidency can enter; no, that is fixed long before. The Belgian government was therefore aware — previous governments had, by the way, given a reason to do so — that an international press centre would be established in order to allow that European Presidency to take place in good conditions. My group could still understand this somewhat. The problem, however, was that, when the government was caught in a time-strike to carry out that policy objective — on the basis of which we can have a debate; that is the responsibility of the government and the majority that supports it — it got caught with la main dans le sac. Even with the Prime Minister and Minister Daems, we are not scared at the time of the commitments, the taking of the commitments on behalf of the government, to simply whisper the law on public procurement and to lay aside a number of other legal provisions, as inscribed in some articles of the laws on the national accounting. They even anti-dateed pieces. I’m not just saying this, but I was the first to say it. My words have once been questioned, but you will, with me, have found that the report of the Court of Auditors on this subject is very clear. Black on white proves this.

I am still waiting for the announced argument. Suddenly, on a Sunday afternoon, Minister Daems told the Chairman of the Court of Auditors that there would be some additional argument concerned about the anti-data of the documents. Again, I have a great understanding of the state of health of the Minister of State Companies. However, two weeks before the dissolution of the Chambers, the Minister of Public Enterprises, who is responsible for the Management of Buildings, has not been able to refute my position and also that of the Court of Auditors, in particular that in the dossier of the International Press Centre was knowingly and intentionally violated legislation of mandatory nature and public order, up to the anti-data of documents. At the local level — you, like colleague Van Aperen, have even more expertise-experience in this regard than I do — you know that if a mayor would perform that, there would be quite a few other consequences associated with that which has been assigned to Minister Daems so far.

That example perfectly illustrates the importance of making the control of the Court of Auditors with regard to the file of commitments effective and efficient.

As regards the IPC dossier, we note that by its own trick, the government has been put in time shortage and that, unlawfully, on the initiative of Minister Daems, but under pressure of the Prime Minister, a concession agreement was concluded for something that could only be considered a market of services and goods. Furthermore, the contract was anti-dateed and the avenant to the contract, which must include the practical parameter for determining the rights and obligations of the contractual parties, has not yet been concluded.

However, the sanction in this is null and therefore I interpelled the competent minister. Furthermore, what would otherwise be the responsibility of a parliamentary member who determines such a thing than to interpell and test the behavior of the minister on all the facts he could collect? However, I had to conclude that some members of the majority, who are also present here, signed a simple motion. I again submitted an interpellation request, but in the meantime the Court of Auditors decided to examine this file and whether or not the laws on national accounting and other legislation have been complied with. The Court of Auditors concluded that in this case it is faced with manifest violations of the legislation, in the sense that the oath made by the minister to the King was violated. Consequently, I interpelled the minister again and put him in front of his political responsibility.

Even this parliamentary control activity could not take place if the findings were not properly checked in a timely, efficient, transparent manner and with access to the findings in question.

I now come to my second example and for that I address myself more specifically to you, Mr. Minister of Finance. You conducted a advertising campaign in newspapers and on the radio in January, for the reform of the personal tax. I will not discuss the opportunity of this advertising campaign, which should have been an information campaign, because this has already been discussed in the Audit Committee and I agree to the decision taken there. My point, Mr. Minister, in the light of what concerns us, in particular the revision of the law on the national accounting, is that from the documents I have requested it appears that the payment for the execution of the contract with the advertising agency that outlined the campaign will be fixed only in the middle of February. After collecting information, including from the Court of Auditors, I can prove black on white that the appropriations for the payment of the contract to conceive the advertising campaign carried out in newspapers and via radio during the month of January and for which the opportunity was favorably assessed in the mixed audit committee, were not fixed until mid-February. This is a manifest violation of the laws on the national accounting, since the commitment of the credits occurs only after the performance has been delivered. This is illegal, Mr. Minister.

You are present here, Mr. Minister, and I greet you with the respect I have for you — and you know that — but I challenge you to refute my position hic et nunc, according to which this has been done unlawfully and that the law has been violated.

My statement, Mr. Minister of Finance, is that if you take a loan in mid-February to pay for an order that was executed at the end of January, this is done in an unlawful way. You have sworn not in respect of the Parliament but in respect of the King to obey the Constitution and the laws of the Belgian people. I ask you very explicitly, Mr. Minister of Finance, that you raise your head against me when I say that this is unlawful, that these are breaches of law.

Didier Reynders: Mr. Speaker, I will give a general answer to all stakeholders. You can go on, Mr. Leterme.

I think the Minister’s response speaks for itself. The Minister has no arguments to refute my position. There are also no arguments. This is about engaging a million issue in Belgian francs at the expense of the taxpayer to which a number of laws apply in order to protect the public interest. The Minister of Finance has sworn allegiance to these laws. He is rewarded — ⁇ somewhat sober in his opinion — for respecting those laws. The Minister of Finance cannot deny that there are manifest violations of the law and unlawful use of public funds. What is the sanction? We can interpell and ask oral questions. The sanction is of a purely political nature. For a coalition where shame is among the most exotic products, such an interpellation can make little chance.

Mr. Speaker, I wrote to you last week about the planned information campaign of Minister Daems. This information campaign would start on 7 April. I don't know if you know what's going on on April 7? That is the week between the Tour of Flanders and Paris-Roubaix but that is also the week in which...

This is the day after the Round of Flanders.

It is, in any case, a date, Mr. Speaker, which roughly coincides with the dissolution of the Chambers and with the beginning of what I would dare to call in the language you love the "tempore suspecto". I think we agree on this. Minister Daems performs the task of asking the Election Expenditures Control Commission for permission for an information campaign. It is specifically about registering all entrepreneurs in this country through the address database of the VBO. I have big questions about the role of the VBO in this but I will clarify this with the VBO if necessary. I note that Minister Daems shamelessly asks for permission from the Control Commission to make such a mailing to all entrepreneurs on 7 April. This is an opportunity discussion that we have talked about and a wise judgment has been made in the Audit Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I find it ⁇ interesting to see how Minister Daems thinks he is funding this advertising campaign. I don’t know if you checked it. Minister Daems is considering funding this advertising campaign through a division of the assignment. One part of the expenditure will be borne by the BIPT as regulator and the other part will be borne by credits for scientific research. These are credits that have little to do with the goal of Minister Daems, which is his personal listening. If there is already an objective of public interest, it will not really have to do with scientific research and ⁇ not with the functioning of the BIPT as a regulator of the telecommunications and postal sectors.

Well, it is important — I refer again to the situation in Antwerp — that we as Chamber members, whether we are in the majority or in the opposition — which is variable, I have already understood — must have permanent access. If there is nothing wrong, nothing should be hidden. There must be access to verify whether public funds are used correctly and whether, in this sense, they are used at least in accordance with the legal provisions. These are all situations, in fact malversations and breaches of law, which are not brought up by the internal audit of Minister "Copernicus" Van den Bossche. They can apparently only be raised by parliamentarians, as a member of the budgetary authority and as a member of the Chamber with its audit task, by means made available to the Chamber in accordance with the Act on the Court of Auditors.

We therefore demand, to the extent that the prior visa on the expenditure is abolished, that the Court of Auditors continue to carry out a thorough audit, though by sample, but also at the request of members of Parliament. To this end, thanks to the efforts of colleague Borginon, a number of amendments from our side were finally accepted last week. I congratulate this. I regret a little that this has to happen after a number of incidents and violations of the traditionally good atmosphere in the Committee on Finance and Budget, but thanks to the good care of colleague Borginon — honour who deserves honour — a number of amendments have been drafted in concert that were eventually accepted. For example, a supplement "a posteriori" was inserted, happily removing the pass that would prevent the Court of Auditors from still acting preventively. I will explain this last point even more clearly. By adding the words "a posteriori", the addition that prevented the Court of Auditors from still acting preventively was happily deleted.

Another amendment, colleagues, explicitly stipulates that the Court of Auditors can or should also control the accounts and, in our case, preferably in a detailed manner. However, this amendment must now also be extended in a modification of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber. For this I would like to turn directly to you. I have already done this at the Conference of Presidents. The amendment to the Rules of the Chamber — on which colleague Tant intervened last week and in which the Court of Auditors will be asked for an alternative to the Rules of internal order of the Court of Auditors or the Rules of the Chamber — is for us, Mr. van Weddingen, inseparably bound to the approval by us of the draft law to abolish the prior visa.

Mr. Leterme, if I am not mistaken, the answer was given at the Conference of Presidents. What you request is an internal rules of the Court of Auditors. We would add this as an addition to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber. I intended to understand it then, but I have not yet been able to verify it. I will be Nazis.

We have been working on this for months. We are literally in extremis. I would like to emphasize once again, before the conclusion of the general discussion — to you, who have been concerned for years with the functioning and efficiency of the functioning of the Court of Auditors — that we receive your assurance — also be placed in possession of the relevant opinion of the Court of Auditors — about the inclusion of this correlarium in the Rules of Procedure or in the Annex to the Rules of Procedure.

In the latter case, I would like to see what is the legal force of the Annexes to the Rules of Procedure.

The Annexes shall have the same legal force as the Rules of Procedure if they are approved by the Chamber.

Then it is sufficient to again expressly request that we be placed in possession of the opinion and that you, as Speaker of the Chamber, undertake that it be effectively entered into the Annexes to the Rules of Procedure. Indeed, it does not make sense for us to permanently include the rights of MEPs in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Auditors. It is best to do so in the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber, if applicable in the Annexes to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber. After all, it is important that we do not always instruct the Court of Auditors – the not-so-pleasant task – to submit the rights of Members of Parliament to access files and to access files to the Court of Auditors. The interpretation of the rights of the Chamber members is best done by the Chamber itself, rather than by the Court. Moreover, it is only by incorporating the control rights of parliamentarians into the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber and by providing opportunities for a minority in the House to assign tasks to the Court of Auditors that a control culture can be created in which executive officials in the ministries are supported by the Parliament, when ministers and cabinet members — I speak from experience and think of recent files — point out legal provisions that must be respected, also by ministers who see such legal provisions primarily as obstacles to the fulfillment or realization of their highest personal goals. by

The problem is — Antwerp teaches us this too — that the question of who controls the chef in these designs is actually not explicitly unambiguously answered. If we want to promote, as the Prime Minister put forward here last week, a culture of integrity in the organization – also in the organization of the federal government and of the Regions and Communities – then it must also be clear, colleagues, that no one is above the legal provisions, not even the head, not even the Minister of Finance, not even Minister Daems. Minister Daems, for example, said that for one or another reason, forced by time — he was somewhat bothered with his timing — the advertising campaign related to the personal tax would be best conducted at the end of January. We are now, of course, facing the problem that the assignment has not yet been granted. Even in those circumstances, it should not be that ministers, the chiefs, consider themselves above the law. There must therefore be guarantees that there is an effective control of the Chamber in this area.

Let us not forget that the legislation on public procurement and the laws on the National Accountancy do not impose unnecessary procedures or an unnecessary administrative burden, but that, on the contrary, they guarantee the taxpayer – the Antwerp examples show how up-to-date and how important this is – that tax money is used in accordance with the appropriate legal procedures and that the government is protected from, what I would call, human weaknesses, which causes errors to become norm-weakening and induce corruption and personal enrichment.

In this regard, Mr. Speaker, it is shameful how the Court of Auditors still — and I will formulate this very clearly — blocks the legal right of access of colleagues such as Mr. Verherstraeten. I am very clearly addressing the Court of Auditors: the way in which the right of access of colleague Verherstraeten is blocked and delayed is a shame. I hereby announce that in the coming days we will take initiatives around it to show in a very transparent manner which game is currently being played.

I find it shameful that the Court of Auditors, in particular a number of councillors, speculates and plays with the timing, in order to be able to postpone the granting of the right of access to colleague Verherstraeten until after the dissolution of the Chamber.

The interests served by these people are not the public interest. They are not the interests of the taxpayer. It has the right to supervision and to an efficient, transparent control of the correct, lawful use of tax money. I repeat that I find it shameful how some in the Court of Auditors consider that the right of access of colleague Verherstraeten must be blocked. Certain things must be hidden. Certain things must be hidden. I repeat it. We will ensure that in the coming days the responsibilities in this regard are identified, including from the Court of Auditors. I do not hesitate to say this very strongly.

Members of Parliament should have immediate access to files when they personally enter the Court of Auditors. This access is independent of the Court’s advisory role. In its advisory role, the Court of Auditors can effectively interpret the data. It can also add comments to the data from its assignment to expertise and legality check.

The first draft law of the triple league, which is presented today, is the draft law to implement Article 50 of the Special Law on State Reform. The draft law creates the framework within which the counties can write out their own accounting decrees. Our amendments, including those relating to better control of grants, were accepted. Furthermore, the framework for the choice left to the provinces to retain a priori control by the Court of Auditors, if desired, is neutral. For these reasons, we will be able to approve the bill.

The second bill amends the laws of the Court of Auditors. The essence of the provisions of the draft is the effective abolition of the prior visa of the Court of Auditors. We are pleased that our amendments were finally accepted. In this context, I would like to thank again the Speaker of the Chamber and Mr Borginon, as well as the other colleagues who have contributed to this. By accepting our amendments, the Court of Auditors will be given the explicit authority to initiate preventive investigations against commitments made.

Mr. Speaker, I have already pointed out that the provisions should be further implemented through the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber. I have already asked you to clarify this issue in the general discussion. There must indeed be a solution to the problem of the confidentiality of some data. The principle of confidentiality is in fact applied too quickly and too inappropriately by ministers. In a timely and inappropriate manner, ministers maintain the confidentiality of some data, especially when it becomes too hot under their feet. I find it unacceptable that a member of the municipal council has a wider right of access to the ship college than a member of the parliament has to the government. I am quoting you in this. In 1996, you literally used the same sentence when accounting for an amendment to a text that was then in place. Looking backwards, I personally regret that the text could simply be approved. In any case, we consider that it is up to the Chamber itself to determine in the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber how the right of access can be effectively exercised.

It is also important that the rights of the minority in the House are guaranteed. In this context, I would like to refer to the arrangement contained in the Rules of Procedure concerning the consultation of the Council of State. If the necessary safeguards are provided at this point, we can also find ourselves in the modernisation of the control by the Court of Auditors on behalf and on behalf of the Parliament.

Colleagues, one point that we unfortunately could not pay attention to during the discussion in the committee is the reason why the authorised ordersers are no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Auditors while the accountants remain subject to that jurisdiction. In the light of the Constitution, Articles 144 and 145, the comment given in the memorandum of explanation attached to the draft law on this subject is, however, strange.

As the assessment of the authorised ordersers would be difficult, they are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Auditors. Their liability should be assessed at the administrative or criminal level. The accountants remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Auditors, but we must ask ourselves questions about the different and unequal treatment of, on the one hand, the authorised authorising officers and, on the other, the accountants.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, the question is whether this is a civil law or a political law where Article 145 of the Constitution gives the legislator the possibility to remove this matter from the ordinary courts by exception. How are accountants defined in this law? Given the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Auditors, this seems to me to be an important question.

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I repeat the question to the Minister how the concept of accountants is defined in this law. Given the scope of the law — the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Auditors — it is nevertheless not insignificant to hear exactly from you — and the preparatory work in the discussion of those drafts is important in this — which is the definition, very sharply defined, which we must give in this to the concept of accountant.

I will give you an example. Mr. Minister, what is the situation when an accountant under pressure from an ordinary officer proceeds to an unlawful expenditure? Will only the accountant be punished? How is it exactly? Why do ministers, by the way, go to the ordinary criminal judge instead of the Court of Auditors in large cases of fraud? Is the Court of Auditors not the normal judge to judge these kinds of errors? The problem is that the Court of Auditors, for example, when the person concerned is dismissed by the criminal judge, faces difficulties, in the light of that judgment, to proceed to recover any deficit, which is, however, a legal obligation.

Colleagues, we have together with Mr. Dirk Pieters submitted an amendment to make the entry into force of this legislative amendment coincide with the entry into force of the law on the general principles. In our view, it would be inappropriate if the new regulation for the Court of Auditors entered into force without the states having completed their accounting decree. It therefore testifies to poor legislative work to correct this in the next program law, as the minister has suggested. This is poor legislative work. However, it seems that everyone can and everyone accepts that. This just passes.

Colleagues, with the third bill, namely the draft holding organization of the budget and accounting of the federal State that the new accounting bible — apologize for the some Christian approach to this file — should be for the federal government, we have a lot more problems. Mr. Speaker, we regret that the majority in the committee has not even taken the time to discuss this draft in an article-based manner. Unlike the first two drafts, this third draft ⁇ does not seem to be mature for the decision-making to which we are called.

For example, I am curious, Mr. Minister, what is the relationship between the legal basis provided by Article 31 of this bill for the internal audit in the public services, and the internal audits already organized on the basis of the Royal Decree of 2 October 2002 on the internal audit in the federal public services.

Are we talking about the same internal audit? There is therefore, on the one hand, the internal audit in the Royal Decree of 2 October 2002 and, on the other hand, the internal audit in this bill. Is it two times the same audit or are they different things? I wish I had more explanation on this. In fact, I must conclude, as regards the audit organized by that law, that the law provides for reporting to the Minister of Budget, whereas in the Royal Decree of 2 October 2002, the internal audit reports to the chairman of the relevant executive committee. Therefore, I would have liked to hear from you, but you do not even listen, what is the relationship between, on the one hand, the internal audit in accordance with the Royal Decree of 2 October 2002, and, on the other hand, the internal audit provided for in the draft law in question.

Through this bill, the Minister of Budget gets an exceptionally high power over his other colleagues. In this regard, I would like to quote, however, article 34 of the bill, the third bill in our triple league, which in fact appoints the Minister of Budget as a kind of Grand Inquisitor for his colleagues: "On instruction" — I emphasize the word instruction — "from the Minister of Budget the inspectors of Finance can be charged with an investigation assignment at all services subject to this law." The most extensive research competence. Colleagues, I, together with colleague Pieters, propose an amendment to remove these inquisition attributes and powers from this article.

Following the discussion of the draft general provisions bill, the Minister of Finance, Minister Reynders, found that it is desirable to provide for the filing of accounts only at the end of August and not at the end of June. Together with colleague Pieters, I found this effectively reasonable, given the deadlines that are also used in business. I find it more reasonable that the law pushes forward feasible deadlines, and that those deadlines are therefore fulfilled, than that deadlines are used that are not realistic and result in the fact that a deadline is de facto no longer fulfilled.

My surprise, however, is great when I find that the federal government proposes its billing on 1 March and 31 March. I therefore expressly ask the Minister of Finance whether these are effectively feasible and realistic deadlines. If not, if the Minister of Finance has doubts and cannot guarantee that these are realistic and feasible deadlines, I suggest to adjust these deadlines in accordance with what we have agreed within the framework of the law on general principles. I refer to Article 72 and following.

Colleagues, the heaviest criticism of our group concerns the provisions in Chapter 3, relating to the administrative public institutions. There is criticism from the State Council. Despite the State Council’s criticism of the procedure contained in Chapter 3, and despite the precedent in the Act on Parastatals of 1954, the Government refuses to draw up an exhaustive list of the administrative public institutions with ministerial administration and those with management autonomy, respectively.

In addition, the Memory of Explanation gives examples of private-law institutions of public utility whose accounting is imposed in accordance with the Act of 1921, amended in the meantime, and which should carry out two accounts. This is completely unacceptable. According to CD&V, the provisions at issue do not sufficiently take into account the sometimes significant own income of public institutions with legal personality. Their

I urge you to read Article 88. Article 88 of the draft is unacceptable for public institutions with a separate legal personality. I would like to address in particular Mr Borginon, who followed the debate in the committee very closely. Article 88 imposes on the administrative public institution, including the public institutions with separate legal personality (...

Mr Leterme, can you conclude?

This is not an insignificant point. Article 88 of the draft provides for the administrative public institutions, including those with separate legal personality, de facto a special guardianship of the Council of Ministers. Mr. Speaker, I invite you to examine Article 88 of the third draft. This article imposes on administrative public institutions, including those with separate legal personality, de facto a special guardianship of the Council of Ministers. This problem was not resolved by replacing the terms "decisions taken by the Council of Ministers" with "the acts taken by the Council of Ministers" as the Council of State had suggested. This is a legal crap but does not change the nature of the decision of the Council of Ministers in this. It would, in my opinion, be recommended that the State Council be consulted on this particular point. According to CD&V, it is unacceptable and contrary to the autonomy granted by the applicable organic laws that the Council of Ministers, pursuant to Article 88 of the third draft, engages in the general content of that budget by means of directives on the budget. At this point, we will later defend our amendments.

Mr. Speaker, I come to my decision. The triangle that is presented to us contains meritorious pieces. I would like to pay tribute to the officials who have worked on this for many years in the light of the so-called CNOC commission. A modern accounting that perfectly matches the European requirements is an important policy tool. However, CD&V can only regret that the majority has not even wanted to discuss the big draft law on federal accounting thoroughly. This draft is unacceptable for us given the unacceptable interference organized in the public institutions with legal personality, which makes it impossible to conduct sound and responsible governance based on legal autonomy. This draft deserves a reference to the committee and a more thorough and expert treatment.

Mr. Leterme, you will not be able to blame me for not giving you much time to keep your exhibition. You spoke for 53 minutes.

As regards Mr. Tant’s question, I will answer after Mr. Borginon’s speech.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, first and foremost I will formulate a few concerns, in part in response to a number of statements by Mr. Leterme.

First, as regards the famous third draft, it is clear that the draft was not drawn up on a draft, but that it is indeed the result of a thorough technical preparation by the committee that was just mentioned. In that sense, the atmosphere should not be created as if the third draft — and each draft can be improved — is being chased by Parliament on a drafte. Their

Secondly, you mentioned the example of the right of access refused to Mr. Verherstraeten. It is almost funny, but during the preparation of this debate I read a number of documents on a similar debate during the previous legislature, in which I found statements of our honored House Speaker who in almost the same terms as you at the time, very sharply came out of the corner with respect to the representatives of the Court of Auditors, in particular around a refusal of access to him. That is indeed a problem, but that goes beyond just this legislature and I hope that we can remedy it in the further development of the parliamentary control right.

Third, the famous element that you call the Inquisition Law of the Minister of Budget in relation to his colleagues and about which you are quite stumbling. However, I think this can be defended. In the absence of the members on the socialist banks, I may want to defend the Minister of Budget in these. In fact, there is a shift in the techniques around which budgetary control de facto takes place. This evolution began already around 1981. Indeed, from the government of Martens V it is noticed that the figure of the Minister of Budget is becoming increasingly important and that in the government someone is charged with the final responsibility for the observance of the budgetary orthodoxy. In my opinion, this provision in that bill provides the Minister of Budget precisely with an instrument to strengthen the ultimate responsibility that he bears on the political level. That, in my opinion, must be seen in that historical line, and it ⁇ does not have to be a negative element for the maintenance of the budgetary balance.

These were some prior concerns. In my actual discourse, I will limit myself to three major themes, in particular the discussion on the prior visa, the discussion on the parliamentary control right, and the discussion on the extent of what I would call the downstream control.

We have had a long and extensive discussion on the previous visa and I think it is appropriate to repeat for a moment how it was de facto arranged. There was a budgetary approval in the form of a fixing and ordonnancing credit executed by the executive power, in which a number of contracts were concluded. At that time, the government was legally bound in relation to third parties. It was only after those contracts were effectively secured that the file was sent to the Court of Auditors through the ordonancering. There works a series of highly skilled and highly trained officials who have huge stacks of small maps in front of them. They must open each folder for a moment, check that all pieces are in order and then close the folder back.

That map goes back and ends up on the stack. I quote from the hearing: “In 99% of cases, the control consists of opening and closing payment folders that are disconnected from the context in which they occur.” In the overwhelming majority of cases — I get that back from the hearing — it turns out that, in response to that request for further explanation, there is actually nothing going on. This is the prior visa in practice.

After that, the procedure continues. It is true that the prior visa had some practical advantages when it came to collecting documents before the Court of Auditors, in order to obtain a certain transmission of information about files in which something might be defective. But it is equally true that the prior visa, which is declared sacred here by some, had very little impact in terms of the efficiency and efficiency of the spending of the resources. The question of whether or not the government works properly with the Community funds could not be answered by means of the prior visa.

The key question is: will we invest the limited resources available for the Court of Audit in the administrative handling of files, regardless of their context, or will we invest those resources in a more audit-oriented and more structural, procedural approach to internal control? I think the choice in these designs to go for that second is the right choice, which also corresponds with what happens in other calculation rooms.

Our system is a system that indeed came into existence in 1846 and has since changed very little. In that sense, this debate is very historical, since it is only the third modification of that system since 1846. That system was based on a state that is the classic “minimal state” as it existed in the early 19th century. The total budget spent by the government was limited. The areas in which the government demonstrated activities were very limited. To think that the control mechanisms, which in that situation with a limited government could indeed function reasonably, could also function in the modern welfare state as we know it today, is, in my opinion, a mistake.

If everything goes well, in the new system, we will focus the control by the Court of Auditors on two things. On the one hand, it will be the process monitoring of the internal control. On the other hand, through all kinds of audits, we are given the opportunity to conduct a more thorough investigation specifically on a particular sub-area.

Mr. Leterme, afterwards you said that there is a problem. In the internal control within the ministries, the internal control services are ultimately hierarchically subordinated to the minister and the head of the Federal Public Service. You feel it as problematic. I have fewer problems by myself. If we compare the comparison with the private sector — I know since the Enron scandal that that comparison is not always obvious — we find that there are also in all large enterprises extensive internal audit services, which in fact suffer from the same evil that you accuse the internal control services in the new system within the federal government.

Ultimately, internal auditors at a large company are also under the hierarchical supervision of the company’s top. Notwithstanding that, on average, they still exercise their control in a way that gives rise to the satisfaction of those undertakings. There is also a discussion with the external control. There is a difference. You are blind to the existence of the auditory. That is true, but the audit board is not the only audit modality in the private sector, on the contrary. All large companies have two types of control. On the one hand, there is the audit control, which is indeed external and is directed to the shareholders. In addition, there is the internal audit that, unlike the audit board, is often much better informed of the company’s daily riding and sailing. This detects a lot of financial malversations. Their

If you look at any large company, you would find such internal audit functions and then you could also find that many of the potential problems are discovered by the internal audit rather than by the audit board, with which I mean nothing about the quality of the audit board. I think that in this new system we are closer to the operation of large private enterprises than you yourself think is possible. Their

I will come to a few other aspects of that previous visa. Their

The online access of the Court of Auditors to the entire accounting is indeed a revolution. We must ensure that this access is also effectively organised and can become a source of information for parliamentarians as soon as possible. Their

I would like to come back to the objectives of the discussion on the prior visa. In fact, I think that in the future we may indeed be able to detect some smaller files less easily than it is now.

Mr. Speaker, if colleague Borginon puts the words that in the future we may be less able to find some small files and do our work, I cannot, of course, fail to turn back to the actuality. This may interest the public. Can he explain to me how we — given the time climate, with what is happening in Antwerp — under the new laws anticipate steps to get on the track of — I give a fictitious case as an example — a minister who gives himself a visa card with which he would finance an excessively personal title? Can Mr. Borginon tell me how, with these laws, on which we are called to vote, we will more effectively put this kind of possible malversations on track?

That is a good question. I think the core of the matter lies in the following. We will still be able to find such a case in the future. If one of us would take the initiative to ask for information about this, this will be possible in the future.

Collega Borginon, I have just mentioned this: do you know that Collega Verherstraeten currently wants to check some cabinet expenses of certain ministers at the Court of Auditors and that he is denied that right?

On that I come later. I will ⁇ deal with that.

I note that at this time the Court of Auditors itself decides — in the coming hours and days we will continue to discuss it, here and elsewhere — that Mr. Verherstraeten is denied the transparency of the audit by denying him access to evidence documents relating to cabinet expenditure.

I will answer them now. I wanted to do it later. First and foremost, also in the past, MPs have had the opportunity to look into cabinet files in terms of spending. Only since the new system replacing the old Article 34 was introduced, a number of restrictions have begun to be added. There is the additional problem of privacy protection that is sometimes raised. Well, I think that when one makes the comparison with the local situation in Antwerp — as you just did — and says that it is not possible that a member of the municipal council can do it and we can not, there is still a nuance to make. The municipal council member can indeed invoke the full right of access, which we should in the best case also be able to, but I am not convinced that the legal provision which gives access to municipal council members to, among other things, Visa extracts automatically means that the municipal council members are discharged from all other legal obligations. It is not because in the facts that documents have been inspected and that in the media has been thrown that the latter situation would simply be legally permitted.

I can imagine — and I do not want to include the defence of the parties concerned — that if one would build an argument on the basis of the Act of 8 December 1992 on private life, those creations would have a point in this regard.

Mr. Speaker, do I understand Mr. Borginon correctly? Does it state that, when a person who has a public authority and is subject, as a member of the executive power, to the control of the budgetary authority, uses resources that the budgetary authority has allocated for a specific purpose, and when a member of the control authority concerned wishes to verify whether those resources have been effectively used in accordance with the purpose, that latter right would be subject to the legislation on the protection of the private sphere? I repeat: it is therefore a case in which the person concerned may have used public funds for certain purposes, which the representative concerned wishes to check. This is how you expressed yourself, Mr. Borginon.

Yes, but you must let me speak first.

Collega Verherstraeten requests access to files relating to the use of funds — not secret funds or something like that, we are not here in France — which are housed under a certain credit, under a certain budgetary article. Are you saying that the right of access of colleague Verherstraeten and the use of that information — then we are already a step further — could be subordinated to an assessment, from a different perspective, based on the legislation on the protection of the privacy?

I say that, on the one hand, the mandatar has the right of access to documents and, on the other hand, that this fact does not prejudice the functioning of legal provisions. I want to draw it on a terrain that is less dirty in nature. It can be imagined that for matters relating to State Security, or that have military aspects, there exists a legislation — I think it exists — which sets rules on certain information. Well, one has the right to view that data but before using the information one does not escape the operation of all other legal provisions.

That is the problem. I also wanted to explain it in the second part. That is why I think we should work on a sort of code of information rights and rights and duties associated with it. Today, there seems to be a contradiction. On the one hand, there are the rights of parliamentarians or municipal councillors to view certain documents. On the other hand, there are laws that restrict the use of certain information. I will return to this in the section on parliamentary control.

There is discussion about the aspect of budgetary accounting versus economic accounting. It is indeed true that a classic budgetary accounting is most likely more readable for a large number of MPs than a more economically oriented accounting. We should not exaggerate on this point either. Take for example the budget of the Ministry of Defence. I am referring to the budget documents. I then note that very large spending items are simply displayed as: "Personal: x euro". We can then see that the amount is spent on the Branch Personnel. Whether the money is spent efficiently cannot be tracked on the basis of the budget accounting. In that sense, the choice between the old and the new system — the introduction of a visa and a more budget-oriented operation — is primarily a choice of determining the priority for the community to control. Is the priority finding all sorts of smaller, intriguing files in which someone has gone wrong? Is the priority rather the permanent monitoring of the efficient use of public resources and the structural monitoring of the proper use of resources by each department?

I want to make it clear. I hear colleague Borginon in his speech suggest that it is less important to check whether the constitutional oath, which the members of the executive power have sworn, is properly observed. He also considers it less important to check whether they perform their duties in an ethically correct way. He thinks it is more important to keep an eye on large cash flows. Mr. Borginon, did I understand you clearly?

I say that it is more important for the interests of the community to ensure in a permanent way that there is no inefficient spending of the large cash flows. I think that control is more important than having to look at smaller files over and over again.

Are you completely subordinate to these files?

Mr. Leterme, that does not mean that it would not be possible to visit a file. It is still possible. I would also like to contribute to the continuation of the search. However, the conclusion is that in recent decades we have paid very little attention to the care of the correct course of the large cash flows. I find it unimaginable that one has waited so long to install a good system for this purpose.

In short, I think that the shift from a priori and document-oriented control to a process and audit control is worth supporting. This does not mean that in the long term it may be possible to update based on a certain experience. It is about the experience that in the transitional phase, when the system is not yet fully functioning, there are a number of years in which the old system is already abandoned, but the new system is not yet working optimally. On that point I give you right. However, it is a transitional phase that will be there anyway, even if the system would be implemented within roughly ten years. I think we need to go through that phase.

I will then come to the second layer, in particular the parliamentary control right. We have already talked a little about it.

I would like to repeat the history of that right. Historically, there is the content of the famous Article 33 of the Rules of the Court of Auditors that granted a right of access. Mr. Speaker, then came the whole discussion around the “swaps” and the reform that followed in 1998.

Article 34 was incorporated into the Rules of Procedure of the Court. A filter was installed here. There was a lot of criticism at that time. A filter was installed to report to the Chamber of Questions of Members of Parliament and where such a delay data was installed.

We have now, after some discussion, prepared a proposal. We have found broad parliamentary support to re-examine that system, which was installed in 1998, and to try to ensure that the individual access rights of MPs are strengthened. This is an important point in the whole debate.

If I look at the contours of what I think there is a support for in this Chamber, then I think that one can agree that one gets a re-formulation of Article 33. It is clearly stated that all documents can be checked. There are still a number of discussions possible on the preparatory process-verbal of the Court of Auditors. There is a debate about the application of certain legislation. For this, a solution must be found. The solution may indeed be better found by linking it to the Rules of the Chamber.

I will submit a statement after your presentation.

You can include the parliamentary secrecy elements. I think there is also support for the research phase. Today, when a member of Parliament asks a question about an investigation that is underway, one does not get an answer until after the investigation is completed. We could go to a system in which that automation is broken. You can then go to a more qualitative criterion. The last word on whether or not documents may be viewed must indeed lie with the Chamber and not with the Court of Auditors. Also for the reporting there would be a movement that is not all more ⁇ . Only those to which no answers were given would be ⁇ . This would happen at fixed times.

I compare that with the criticism that was formulated at the time in 1998 — including by you, Mr. Speaker — on the system that was then installed. Your criticism was threefold. On the one hand, there was a criticism that I do not share. You said it became difficult to look at matters that go beyond the federal entity. We are now solving that problem. However, as you know, it was not a problem for me either. The problem that was also raised at the time was that of reporting. I think that this reporting is better formulated in the latest proposals, so that no longer automatically everyone should be aware of every correspondence that comes from one particular initiative, which comes from one member of Parliament. I think this is an improvement in the new system that we would propose.

As for the investigation phase, I think that we can also have serious improvements by the fact that it would eventually reach the Chamber, it is no longer automatic and a qualitative criterion would be introduced. I think that most of the criticisms formulated at the time in 1998, if the new system could ever be poured into a definitive text, could have been addressed. At that point, I think it is right and reasonable to say that even for the type of files that colleague Leterme referred to, more specifically very concrete matters such as the handling of public finances by ministers, a step forward is being made in comparison with the current system.

I think we need to go even further. If we should further develop the Rules of the Chamber, we must take care that we do not come into a system in which the merely majority in the Chamber depends on whether a particular investigation can be carried out or not.

We must, in my opinion, be careful that we in some way enable the rights of the minority, of the individual parliamentary member. It would, in my opinion, not be nonsense if the legislative services of this Chamber, which are highly appreciated by all of us, and — fortunately I would say — during the dissolution of the chambers were given time to recover from the hard work, during the summer vacation were searched for a formula regarding that formulation and the rights of minorities within this Parliament that satisfies everyone. It cannot be intended that the opposition is limited in its ability to control the executive power. Personally, I am a requesting party for an even more extensive discussion. This society needs a Code of Information that codifies and harmonises the whole problem of information collection, its use and the rights and duties of all kinds of professionals and categories. Our society is a place where information is becoming increasingly important, both by the functioning of the media and by the commercial element of information. Only through a thorough debate can we reach a closing system in which problems can also be solved, on the one hand, related to the manner in which privacy must be protected and, on the other hand, with the right to control, among others, members of parliament.

I come to the third point. During the discussion, we also discussed the downstream control, the discussion of the extent to which the control of the Court of Auditors can be extended to all kinds of branches and public companies. The Greens and Mr. Bourgeois have submitted a number of amendments. The Subcommittee Rekenhof has committed to prompt work on a sort of arrangement. Last week the subcommittee heard the Court of Auditors on this issue. We have come to the conclusion that a tour d'horizon should be drawn up of all that needs to happen in order to better regulate the control of these side aspects. We have learned that many legislations are affected by this. It took 10 to 15 years before the present design was completed. If we want to do good legislative work, we will have to start collecting the necessary information. A number of political choices will have to be made. After that, the CNOC committee will prepare a text that will be discussed by Parliament. Personally, I think we need to develop a system that takes into account various aspects. We need to develop a matrix that defines a degree of government impact for all forms of downstream structures. The point is to see how important the role of the government is in those structures. Is it a 100% daughter or a 20% daughter? The participation of other public authorities in those different entities should be taken into account. When determining the degree of control by the public authority, it should also take into account the extent to which the public authority adds substantial guidance. There is a difference between any remote subsidiary of the government in which the latter participates for 50% but is not subject to substantial direction and a similar case in which there is a kind of management contract in which very carefully substantially determined what must be done. We must also ask ourselves whether we should blindly look at the form in which the whole is organized. I refer to the discussion in the previous legislature regarding the so-called white elephants in development cooperation. Their

It is noted, however, that much of the discussions on the proper use of public funds did not relate to a typical public undertaking, but to the granting of large amounts in the form of subsidies — project subsidies and program subsidies — to all kinds of private VZW structures. I think we should also include this group in our debate.

I think that at some point we will have to politically tranch what criteria we will set there. It will not be easy. I don’t even see today how the verwe should go in there. I think it is clear that we must go beyond what exists today.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I can tell you that my political group fully supports the three drafts and that we will, of course, also approve them.

Before giving the floor to Mr. Minister, I would like to provide as promised a response to the requests that were addressed to me in this matter during the meetings of 12 and 13 March, and which were recalled by Mr. Leterme, a few moments ago.

It is about the right of information of the Chamber members in the files of the Court of Auditors. Article 28 of the "Household Rules" of the Court of Audit since 9 April 1831 contained the following texts. I read it in French at the time:

The secretary shall sign and issue the certificates collated and extracted from all the acts emanating from the secretary, archives and deposits. It shall be given, to any member of the two chambers who so requests, communication, without displacement, both of the large book of the public debt, of the register of pensions charged by the State, of all decisions taken by the Court, as well as of all accounting and other whatever documents resting in its archives.

Of course, this provision sounds somewhat archaic. It was changed several times. It was extended, among other things, in 1922 to the process-verbal of the general assembly and of the chambers of the Court of Auditors, and also, after some further turmoil, with the exchange of letters between the Court of Auditors and the ministers. In 1975 there were text corrections to the regulations. In 1998 there were adjustments, due to the state reform, for the possibility of obtaining copies of documents by letter and by fax.

I am personally inclined to maintain that obligation in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Auditors which we here approve. I say that for the following reason. When we put that into a law, there are three legislators: the House, the Senate and the Government. Each amendment must therefore be shared with two other, important authorities. I am therefore in favour of keeping that in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Auditors, which we, of course, approve. I asked why this was not included in the Rules of Procedure. There is no specific explanation for this. I can only say the following. If we include that in the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber, then there are two committees competent, in particular the Committee for the Rules of Procedure and the Committee for Accounting.

When I look at things practically, I note the following. The Rules of Procedure of the Court of Auditors is approved here. We may amend the internal rules of the Court of Auditors. I suggest that this be included in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Auditors. This has already been discussed in the work of the committee. But it should also be an annex to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber. In this one is right. In this way we ⁇ the two objectives. First, the obligations of the Court remain within the competence of the Chamber. They are included in the internal rules of the Court of Auditors. Secondly, the Chamber Members are notified by incorporating the internal rules of the Court of Auditors as an annex to the Rules of the Chamber. That seems to me to be the best solution to ⁇ what is generally desired.

That is my proposal. I hope in this way to answer Mr. Tant’s question, which he had asked me last week Wednesday, repeated on Thursday, and which Mr. Leterme has repeated in his presentation.

I think this is a step in the right direction. There is a lot to say for this solution. As regards myself and my group, we require that the interpretation of the scope of what is included in the annex to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber — I have taken note of your judgment that it has the same legal force — belong to the competence of the Chamber. If one comes to a contradictory interpretation — on the one hand by the Chamber, on the other hand by the Court of Auditors — it must be obvious to me that the interpretation by the Chamber prevails.

of course . That is obvious. I give an example. If the Court of Auditors would interpret the Rules of Procedure restrictively and there is an interpretation-interpretation, then of course it is the Chamber that primates.

Mr. Speaker, in addition to that element, which can thus be arranged in a decent manner if the interpretation by the Chamber prevails, we must also work on a number of aspects in the Rules of Procedure itself. I do not have a clear text on this and I do not have a clear idea of what we need to do. We still need to settle a number of aspects regarding what a decision of the Chamber means. Does it mean that the Chamber simply decides, a majority against a minority? Is there a procedure? I think we should write a piece of text on this. We should not suddenly shake it out of our sleeves, but we must prepare for it.

The Chamber approves the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Auditors and may therefore, where appropriate, ask the Court of Auditors for amendments before approving it. The final interpretation power of the internal rules of the Court of Auditors rests with the Chamber. Their

I would rather have it in an appendix to the Rules of Procedure because then there is a homogeneous corpus. We have already done this in other circumstances. Consider the renewed procedure for naturalizations. Do you remember the big debate about naturalizations? We also then made a consistent regulation, we discussed it in the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, there was a dialogue with the Committee on Naturalizations, it was approved in the House and it was added in an annex to our Rules of Procedure. The same applies to the recent procedure for the Investigation Committee, for which we have an article in the Rules of Procedure and an appendix. That seems to me the best solution. I would like to insist that the Court of Auditors is a collateral organ of the Chamber and that the Chamber therefore primates with its interpretation of the adjustments. I think that’s better than writing it in the law, because then you have to take into account other parts of the legislators. I also find it more homogeneous to have it included as an annex to our Rules of Procedure. Their

I think this is an adequate answer, at least in my humble consideration of what was asked of me.

Mr. Speaker, I will be quite brief after the many work that has been devoted to these three projects.

First of all, I would like to thank a number of stakeholders in this debate: the rapporteurs in the committee as well as in the plenary session, the chairman of the subcommittee and all those who, for a very long time, have worked on the development of this new legislation, both within the administration, in particular the administration of the Treasury, and within the Court of Auditors who have accompanied us throughout the work. I do not do it very often, I have done it once or twice during this legislature, but I would like to emphasize in particular the work done by the Advisor to the Court of Auditors, Mr. Rion, about this project and in particular during the work in subcommittee and commission. He is present among us today.

(Applause) (Applause) This work is the end of a very long journey. Mr. Speaker, you will remember that, along with others, we had already intervened a lot in the previous legislatures on how to organize the relations – I will return to it in conclusion – between the different stakeholders: government, parliament, Court of Auditors. That being said, this must always be done by respecting not only a balance but also the right instruments. I have not intervened, and I will not intervene in the debate on the Rules of the Court and the Rules of the Chamber. Every instrument must be used correctly and, as I said in the committee, there is no need to provide too many provisions on the internal organization of the executive power in the legislation, there is no need to provide too many provisions on the rights of parliamentarians in the law which is, by essence, also defined in collaboration with the executive power.

Regarding the particular issues, I know that in a general debate, what is done can be relanced through written or oral questions and interpellations. I will refer, for these subjects, to the answers that have been or will be given, depending on the case and according to the appropriate procedure.

I simply point out that in terms of control effectiveness, the evolution is still spectacular. When I arrived at the Department of Finance, I recalled it in committee, I had the pleasure of presenting the accounts of 1988, which fascinates parliamentarians, the press and the public opinion! But this does not allow a quite appropriate control of how public funds are used when one comes, twelve years later, three federal legislatures later, to correct, for example, or examine what had been done under Mr. Mr.’s last government. by Martens. If the youngest of this assembly do not remember who it is, there are historical books on the subject. So I had the pleasure of submitting to the committee and to the assembly the accounts of the last government of Wilfried Martens and then the successive accounts. We have, this time, at least submitted the 2000 accounts and the 2001 accounts are ready. I think it will be important, in the future, to work on recent accounts.

Regarding more specific questions, I recall that the philosophy pursued in these texts is to effectively focus on both economic and budgetary accounting. Technically, we will be accounting in both areas. The link between the two would be made, technically, by classes 8 and 9 of the balance sheet, which allows to guarantee the automatic match between the two accounts. Of course, the Parliament, the House in this case at the federal level, will continue to vote on the budget and vote on a budget execution account that is, by the way, developed in an economic accounting, with balance sheet and income account.

Double-part accounting derives somewhat from the same logic. It obviously allows to move towards a patrimonial accounting with better transparency, as we have already seen through the new municipal accounting that has led the municipal authorities to gradually orient themselves towards this patrimonial situation. It is a management tool that will allow important developments through analytical accounting.

De la même manière, en termes de fonctionnement de l'Etat et de ses comptes, les engagements doivent faire l'objet d'un contrôle, cela a été rappelé and sous-commission comme en commission. It is a phase of important control of the Court of Auditors, with access and permanence to these commitments. The court can then control them. This control is not all negligé but it is modernized. On essaie de le faire de plus et plus and lien direct entre la Cour et les systèmes mis en place en termes de comptabilisation des droits constatés. Regarding several specific points, a definition of accountant is already provided in a draft royal decree, a proposal from the public accounting standardization committee as stated by several members. So far, it is a proposal for a royal decree, not a draft. We will make a final decision in the coming weeks or months. There are still a few discussions ahead. Mr. Speaker, I have a list of several royal decrees needed in the implementation of the various drafts. I am willing to say that as soon as possible the law must be applied correctly and the various royal decrees must be correctly executed.

The same rationale applies to the internal audit. A royal decision has yet to be made. I think it is very useful to do that in the very short term. As regards the list of the various institutions requested by Mr Leterme, a specific answer can be found on page 79 of document 1870/004. It is a report related to the discussion of the various designs. There is a list of the various institutions pursuant to Article 22 of the first draft no. 1870. It is true that we need to go even further with some definitions, some implementation measures. I would rather go in the direction of Mr Borginon’s position. We need to go even further with other discussions on efficient control of the various government agencies. In this logic which is aimed at all a little further away, it would not be necessary to confuse two problems, namely the control of expenses, of commitments, of all that can be realized by the public powers, with the instruments used to perform a certain number of tasks, in a sometimes more modern way, within the public powers.

I give an example and I would like to talk about it. I have always advised, depending on the environmental climate, to use the credit card technique that has been talked about a lot in recent days. But this obviously does not change anything to the fact that there is always a billmaker to decide that the expenditure can actually be made and a accountant who agrees to go further. Whether it’s an invoice or a credit card bill, that doesn’t change anything. Once the expenditure is made, one is a step too far if it does not correspond to obligations arising from the public service. As I said, I have so far discouraged the use of credit cards; due to a certain climate around this problem but I do not think that the instrument itself is a problem. The needs of control and the instruments used in terms of expenditure should not be confused.

We should not confuse the balance of powers. Mr. Speaker, I said that I would not intervene in the debate on whether or not certain measures should be included in the Rules of the Court or in the Rules of the Chamber. I simply point out that our legislation and our constitutional system also give the Court a somewhat particular position, which imposes it, for example, to consider that if the interpretation of the Chamber is indeed correct, the latter cannot, through its regulations or through the regulations of the Court that it would approve, change the Constitution or the laws of the Belgian people, to regain the formula of the oath pronounced by a certain number of persons in our country.

There are laws that the Court must comply with. This is the balance that must be found. You know, I have pledged enough so that one can go very far in the control, including individual, of the members of the House, to make sure that the door is the widest open.

In the balance of powers, when I hear that it is necessary to be careful not to see too strong interference, for example of the executive power within autonomous public enterprises, I answer that it is necessary to keep the right. One cannot demand that there be an individual view of parliamentarians in autonomous public enterprises, or even in their subsidiaries, and leave the government outside the capacity to go and check what is happening there too. In the balance of powers, I ask that the whole be taken into account. I hope that this will be feasible, including in the rules of the House and the Court.

Mr. Minister, what I will point out later on that point in the discussion of the articles discussion is that in Article 88 of the Third Bill it is about instructions. It is not so much about the supervision and the insight into what is happening in those institutions with a separate legal personality. You make the comparison between the request of a number of colleagues to have access to financial actions and transactions of public companies with our opposition to what is stated in Article 88. But these are two different things. Article 88 refers to instructions given, orders, orders. I will further argue that this is in flagrant contradiction with the existing legislation, including the legislation of 1954 on this subject. I think it would be better for you to take examples that I myself have quoted and that touch you more closely. For example, you can now — or maybe next week — respond to the question of why you are launching a tax reduction advertising campaign that was carried out at the end of January while its recording dates from mid-February. This is, in my view, a flagrant violation of the legal provision in question.

Didier Reynders: Mr. Speaker, I have already said that we will answer those questions or interpellations. It is very interesting now in the plenary session to hold a discussion on various issues such as the problem in a particular city. I have heard a lot of comments related to Antwerp. But I think we might better now continue the general discussion of the three drafts. I am prepared, as I was in the past, to provide all necessary answers to questions or interpellations in the committee or to written questions.

I thank all members of the Parliament for their important work. I also thank the members of the administrations and of the Court of Auditors who have allowed us to finally reach a system that may one day allow a colleague of the Budget to come to defend in the Committee of Finance to defend a budget that he has even presented through the accounts that we will submit to Parliament.

This begins to be the case with the accounts of the year 2000. This is, in any case, the major revolution. I hope that this is a change of attitude that will allow to extend the control of the state accounting. Per ⁇ this is where real progress lies, through the various devices and the working method of the Court of Auditors and the Treasury.

I would like to conclude the general discussion. My budget colleague is now among us. As I told you, I have to go to an Ecofin meeting this afternoon. I didn’t ask participants to wait for me, but they started since 16:00.

We knew you had to leave us around six o’clock. There is no problem, my colleague. Vande Lanotte will replace you.