Proposition 50K1688

Projet de loi concernant les méthodes particulières de recherche et quelques autres méthodes d'enquête.

General information ¶

Submitted by

Groen Open Vld Vooruit PS | SP Ecolo MR Verhofstadt Ⅰ

Submission date

March 12, 2002

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

judicial inquiry fight against crime criminal procedure

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen CD&V Vooruit Ecolo PS | SP Open Vld MR FN VB

Abstained from voting

LE N-VA

Party dissidents ¶

• Martine Dardenne (Ecolo) abstained from voting.
• Richard Fournaux (MR) abstained from voting.
• Karine Lalieux (PS | SP) abstained from voting.
• Peter Vanhoutte (Groen) abstained from voting.

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Discussion ¶

July 17, 2002 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, this delicate bill was discussed by the Justice Committee during a number of meetings. The introductory presentation was held by the Minister during the meeting of 30 April. Then the bill was further discussed on 28 May, 4, 5, 11, 12, 18 and 25 June and finally on 2 and 9 July last.

Before I publish a brief report of the Minister’s presentation, I would like to briefly outline the history of this bill. The three main research methods regulated in this bill are infiltration, observation and informant action.

In addition, five other methods are regulated, which are not so much described as special detection methods, but which are closely linked to them. These include the inquiry operation, the interception of mail, the surveillance of bank transactions, the direct interception and the postponed intervention. These three specifically described methods are incorporated by this bill in the Code of Criminal Procedure, more specifically in the chapter Investigation Investigation. Their

As for the history of this draft, it goes back to the various parliamentary investigation committees that have bowed over an efficient approach to organised crime. These are the recommendations of the so-called Joint Committee and of the Dutroux Committee. Their

Why are the previously listed techniques special now? On the one hand, because its use can undermine fundamental human rights. After all, especially the right to privacy can be violated by these methods. On the other hand, they are also special because of their secret character. These investigation methods are used in the context of a judicial investigation or in the context of an investigation. Furthermore, the Prosecutor’s Office always exercises control over its use. Their

The general principles contained in this draft law are already founded in a number of ministerial circles. Because they are formulated so vaguely, they are clearly described in the present draft. These are four principles: subsidiarity, proportionality, prohibition of provocation and prohibition of committing crimes. I will briefly discuss these four principles with you. Subsidiarity means that the measures taken can only be taken if the magistrates concerned consider that other investigation measures will not produce the desired result. If the same result can be obtained with other classical methods, the latter will be preferred. Their

Proportionality means that the measure used must be proportionate to the severity of the crime and to the purpose. These two general principles do not apply to informant activity. In the present case, the prohibition of provocation consists in the fact that the investigation method used must in no case give rise to the incitement of the crime. A police officer must therefore not lead an offender to commit crimes other than those to which his intention was previously aimed. Regarding the consequences of provocation, the bill is concise and clear. Evidence obtained through provocation is not taken into account.

As regards the prohibition of committing crimes, the draft mitigates the general prohibition of crimes. After all, in certain cases, the police officer may be forced to commit crimes in order to carry out his task. The weakening provided for in the draft consists in providing for a penalty of exclusive bailout for police officers who were forced to commit a crime. Specifically, this means that the reason for compensation concerns only the punishment, while the civil law consequences of the offence persist.

In addition, the draft law makes a distinction between predictable and unpredictable crimes. Foreseeable crimes are those crimes that can be suspected to be committed when using the special detection methods. For example, I think of the situation in which an infiltrant must assume a false identity, which is a criminal offence. Foreseeable crimes are all those crimes that both the magistrate and the police officer know will be committed. Unforeseeable crimes, on the other hand, cannot be foreseen and are not yet known to the magistrates at the time of their commission. Again, the example of the infiltrator is cited. After all, it may be that an infiltrator is unexpectedly contacted by the criminal organization to participate in a specific crime.

In such cases, the police officer shall inform the magistrate as soon as possible.

During the meeting of 30 April, the Minister of Justice came to give his introductory presentation. He pointed out that the draft was already approved by the Council of Ministers on 1 March 2002. It was then a second reading because the draft was adjusted on a number of points to the opinion of the State Council, which had already been requested on 30 November 2001.

The draft is in line with the government’s policy on an efficient approach to organised crime and banditism. In addition to infiltration, observation and informant action, this draft also regulates a number of other research methods that now have a rather precarious legal basis. I have listed them for you.

Before going deeper into the special detection methods, the minister gave an overview of a number of points of the law that were sensitive. It concerned, inter alia, the role of the investigating judge as well as the notification of the use of the special detection methods to the person who made it the subject of. In that respect, a problem may arise if it turns out that the detection research for which the methods were used has remained ineffective. Their

The control over the use of the special methods of investigation belongs to the Prosecutor of the King. Furthermore, the draft stipulates that the King’s Prosecutor must notify the Federal Prosecutor whenever special techniques are used in his district. Their

Until now, in a note, the history of the draft, as well as the introductory presentation of the Minister. For the report on the presentations of the various members and the hearings organized by the committee, I refer to the report of my fellow rapporteur, colleague Geert Bourgeois.

Mr. Speaker, I will continue the report presented by Mr. Hove on the general discussion as it took place in the committee.

I will first express the views of the members of the Commission during the first general discussion.

Mr Coveliers emphasized the great importance of the present bill. He referred to the various parliamentary investigation committees that concluded that the police services have insufficient resources to combat organized crime. Therefore, they advocate legislation governing the special detection methods. This should be possible for him, even if a breach of private life is possible. He points out that the bill is balanced and incorporates sufficient control mechanisms.

Mrs Dardenne calls for attention to the ethical aspects of the present issue. The police services that use the special detection methods bear a great responsibility. Furthermore, this speaker asks for a number of additional figures that shed light on the effectiveness of the special detection methods.

Mr Erdman, Chairman of the committee, is also pleased that the special detection methods already used on the basis of circular letters will be regulated by law. However, he wants clarification on a number of points, in particular on the distinction between the special detection methods, the other investigation methods and the police investigation techniques, on the feasibility of limiting these methods to the crimes listed in Article 90ter of the Criminal Procedure, on the legal effect of a claim for facts initiated and, finally, on the role of the public prosecutor and the investigation judge. This speaker also warns that these methods can only be used for major crime. Their

Mr. Giet asked the Minister for further explanations on how special detection techniques have been used so far.

Mr Van Parys defended the idea of a legal arrangement, but formulated a series of questions and comments:

First, is it appropriate that subsidiarity and proportionality are always applicable to special detection methods, whereas for the techniques it is only so to the extent that they are used within a method?

Second, the criminal offences that may be committed by police officers should be specified further. In addition, it is also necessary to consider the regulation of the civil interests of those who have been harmed by the crime of the police officers.

Third, the relationship between the prosecutor and the investigative judge is a delicate point. Can the investigative judge play his full role in the draft?

Fourth, in certain cases, the distinction between the home search and the inquiry operation threatens to become flinterdun.

Fifth, the speaker notes that the draft creates a predictable battle between the federal prosecutor’s office and the college of prosecutors-general.

Finally, this speaker calls for attention to the balance between the needs of investigation and prosecution and the principles of fair trial.

Finally, Mr Schoofs raised a series of questions of a practical nature, in particular whether the government has sufficient resources to implement this draft law on the ground, whether the police officers have already been able to take specific training and whether the minister has been able to be assisted by experts.

The Minister’s response shows, in the first instance, that in 2001 there were 1,149 applications for special detection techniques. Four-fifths of these are related to drug trafficking, robberies, theft, aggression, vehicle fraud and human trafficking. The questions come mainly from Brussels, Antwerp and Gent. 140 to 150 officers are involved. Only 14 officers work undercover. The necessary budgetary resources are available for this.

The Minister further clarifies that the police investigation techniques support police investigation methods and that they are only applied in the context of police investigation methods. It follows that the conditions of subsidiarity and proportionality apply both to the special detection methods and to the police investigation techniques.

The Minister accounts for the large role of the Public Prosecutor as follows: first, the trust magistrates are best acquainted with special detection techniques; second, that allows for a uniform approach and finally it is the trust magistrates who hold the confidential file.

Police officers who commit a crime must respect the principle of proportionality. Since the commission of a crime in the context of special detection methods (BOM) constitutes a decisive justification, the victim will always have a civil claim.

The Minister is opposed to a list of excluded or permitted crimes, as that would be the best means for criminal organizations to verify whether or not someone is a police officer.

Following the Minister’s speech, Mr. Giet, supported by Mrs. Herzet, Mr. Erdman and myself, urged hearings. Between Mr. Erdman and Mr. Van Parys there was then a discussion about whether or not it is desirable to limit the scope of special detection methods to the large crime. The Minister responded that it is not the Government’s intention to limit the scope of the special detection methods to the major crime. Furthermore, he argued that the examination judge’s control in the draft is greater than in the current scheme that works on the basis of circular letters. In the light of the recent verdictVercauteren, I have addressed the problem of the purification of the nonsense. The Minister responded that the judgment-Vercauteren is not relevant in this context.

I come to the report of the hearings. The Justice Committee held several hearings.

Attorney General Schins stressed that the College of Attorneys General attaches great importance to the legal framework for the use of special detection techniques. He considers such a legal arrangement absolutely necessary, not only from the point of view of the rule of law and from the point of view of the Prosecutor’s Office, the investigative judges and the police services, but also because a practice based on ministerial circular letters is increasingly less likely to pass the test of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.

The speaker, Attorney General Schins, formulates a number of findings regarding the bill.

First, it is a difficult exercise of balance, which must ensure, on the one hand, that the public prosecutor, the investigative judges and the police services are adequately armed in the fight against organised crime, and, on the other hand, that the individual rights and freedoms and fundamental rights remain adequately protected. Second, it is important that the legislation is qualitatively on the level and that it is conclusive. After all, the criminal organizations will be on the lookout to develop counter-strategies from the outset.

Third, the legislation has an immediate impact on the physical integrity of the persons involved in the fight against organised crime.

Fourth, all this has the effect that the investigative magistrates and the people of the field must be closely involved and continue to be involved in the creation of legislation. The Attorney General is happy that this is the case. Several moments of consultation have led to some improvements, but the speaker still finds it desirable that some additional upgrades are made, for example in the area of the inquiry operation, the observation with technical tools and the protection of the confidential informant dossier.

Fifth, the current legislation should under no circumstances represent a deterioration from the current situation. The struggle of society against organized crime must be able to keep pace with the criminal environments. Belgium should not be left behind in the international context either.

Sixth, the speaker emphasizes the control of the use of special detection techniques, which is present at various levels, in particular within the police services themselves, by the prosecutor’s office, by the investigative judge, by the investigative courts and finally by the judges on the ground.

In that regard, the Attorney General makes a reservation against the draft article 47undecies. The General Prosecutor’s College would rather see this article disappear, as it would install a judicial review on the prosecutor’s suspension policy.

According to the Attorney General, it is not the duty of a judge to give an opinion. This takes too much time and is contrary to the classic rules of the sitting magistrates.

Also the second speaker, investigative judge Vandermeersch, welcomes the legal anchoring of the special detection techniques. This serves transparency. The speaker, however, calls for continued attention to potential breaches of privacy. This implies that the special detection techniques should be limited to the most serious forms of crime. The draft does not fully comply with this: the scope of the law is very broad, since, on the one hand, it refers to a minimum penalty of one year imprisonment and/or to the list of crimes for which telephone calls are possible.

Mr Vandermeersch also draws attention to the fact that the bill opens the possibility of proactive investigation and special detection possibilities for fishing and obtaining intelligence under judicial protection. Then the speaker comes back on a number of points. First, he reiterates the too wide autonomy left to the police services. Second, the King’s Prosecutor, who will have a central role in the control of the special detection methods, may not be sufficiently armed to constitute the democratic counterbalance for the implementation of the special detection methods. Third, in the field of protection of individual rights and freedoms, there is a shift from the judge to the prosecutor’s office. Fourth, in several ways, the draft law sets out the investigative judge in his role of guardian of individual rights and freedoms. This is the case, for example, with the inquiry operations, which can be requested through the minion survey. However, contrary to the usual rule of the minion investigation, the investigation judge may not draw the file to himself. Another example: the law stipulates that the special investigation methods are implemented by the King’s Attorney. According to the speaker, this will result in the investigation judge no longer being able to fully exercise his responsibilities as the head of the investigation à charge et à décharge and as the supervisor of the legality of the evidence.

Finally, the speaker also refers to the control of legality by the investigation judge, the latter still acting only as an alibi.

Fifth, according to investigative judge Vandermeersch, the right to contradiction is threatened by the bill. This is mainly reflected in the confidential file that is not sufficiently subject to the contradiction of the parties to the proceedings.

Finally, the speaker gives a few special considerations. I will formulate the main of these in brief. The observation should be accompanied by stricter guarantees than those provided for by law. It is a dangerous technique to delineate the scope of a rule by referring to a measure defining the scope of another measure. In concrete, the speaker complains that undercover agents and tip-givers can be used for the crimes for which telephone calling is possible.

The speaker complains by decision the troubling shift of the powers of the judge to the prosecutor’s office. The possibilities of contradiction are mortgaged in the draft. Finally, the investigation judge argues that the draft is subject to criticism due to the European Court of Human Rights.

The third speaker, Mr Van Laere, gave a brief explanation of the concrete implementation and control when using special detection methods.

From his experience in cross-border operations and his contacts with foreign governments, federal prosecutor Brammertz, in turn, emphasized the importance of the legal anchoring of the special detection methods. In response to a number of arguments in the Justice Committee, Mr Delmulle agreed to the confidential file. According to this speaker, the principle is that everything in the open file is listed unless elements contradict it, such as the covering of the technical means used, the safeguarding of the security and the covering of the identity of the informant or the civil expert.

This speaker defends the role of the prosecutor’s office in the design. He points out that the threshold of one year imprisonment is justified by the international obligations of Belgium. Furthermore, he argues that a much more intrusive measure, namely the provisional detention, can also start from one year in prison.

According to Mr Delmulle, the draft still needs to be refined, in the sense that for an observation on a home, no authorisation of the investigation judge should be requested.

Mrs De Rouck sought to remove the mistrust that exists in the confidential file by suggesting that, as soon as possible, a transition from the confidential file to the open file should be made.

Investigative Judge Van Cauwenberghe has no problem with the low threshold of the special detection methods, but rather with the too limited role of the investigative judge.

Mr Vandermeersch asks the legislature to clarify some other matters, such as the question of which documents belong to the confidential file and which not, or the question of what should be understood under proactive research.

The article-by-article discussion was quite extensive and interesting. I draw the attention of the plenary session to this ⁇ interesting discussion of the articles and to the discussions held following the various amendments. For those who want to have a full view of the content and the scope of the present draft, I recommend the reading of the article-by-article discussion. However, further explanation of that discussion would lead us too far here, although there were some principled discussions during that discussion.

The draft was adopted with 13 votes against 1 abstinence.

Can I ask a question to the rapporteur?

To do this, you must sign up for the general discussion.

Maybe I could put it on you? This is a matter of procedure.

If you appeal to the Regulation, I give you the word.

Mr. Speaker, you will judge the correction of the appeal to the Rules. by Mr. Bourgeois and Mr. Hove has just submitted a report for the entire plenary session, which includes 149 colleagues. by

by Mr. Bourgeois concludes his presentation by saying that if one wishes to have the substantive softness of the content of the discussions in committee, he proposes to take note of the discussion of the articles in committee. I think this would be useful for a good parliamentary work. by

Many of us received this 157 page report an hour ago. Some may have received it this morning by mail if they left their home relatively late, but many will receive it only tomorrow. Therefore, do you think, Mr. Speaker, that it is technically possible for parliamentarians to read this document while Article 66 of our Rules of Procedure provides for a minimum of three days between the time when a report is communicated to the plenary session and the time when our general discussion is started? by

The three-day period will therefore not be respected in the facts, nor in relation to the beginning of the general discussion, nor, I fear, in relation to the moment of the vote in the plenary session. I know that the government has asked for the urgency and that Article 40 allows it and allows us to move forward. As for the last proposal made by Mr. Bourgeois, I believe that we are not technically able to meet the will he has issued.

I will try to explain this, Mr. Decroly. I understand your questions. As you pointed out, the urgency was granted by the Chamber (Article 40 of the Rules of Procedure). To avoid misunderstandings: the urgency means that all the rights of all parliamentarians, at the level of the committees or the plenary session, remain entirely identical. Only the deadlines can be shortened to the extreme.

Second case, and you have the experience like other colleagues, it may happen that the unanimous committee gives its green light for an oral report. Very often, under these conditions, the rapporteur’s exposition is a little longer to allow colleagues in plenary session who do not yet have a written text to have as much information as possible through the rapporteur’s voice.

In the third case, this is not the case here, it also often happens that the rapporteur refers to his report. In general, these are topics on which consensus has been found.

Here we have a fourth case. The report has been distributed to the banks, as you pointed out in a relevant manner. From a regulatory point of view, this is correct. The report is here and I cannot ask Mr. Bourgeois to detail article by article, which he can of course do. In a sense, this type of work does not promote in-depth knowledge by a member who has not followed the committee’s work of all the discussions that took place there. In this regard, you are right. In addition, the House granted the urgency for this project, by consensus I believe, and this is one of the consequences of the urgency.

The regulation allows it. I am not a very big advocate of frequent emergencies, I tell you very simply. by

Here, it is correct; I cannot make any regulatory observation, finding that it is true that it is necessary to browse the report submitted now for those who have not participated in the commission. I recently said that the rights of parliamentarians who are not members of committees are as full and whole as those of members who are of course favored because they have followed the committee debates. by

So I understand your observation, but from a regulatory point of view, the procedure is perfectly accurate, as you yourself pointed out.

Your explanation is obviously correct. I want to make a nuance. In the case of a draft law, the Chamber may not take a decision — I regret that — on the urgency. If the government requests the urgency, it is granted automatically. Only in the case of legislative proposals can the Chamber decide on the urgency.

I also want to add a nuance. When it comes to a matter referred to in Article 77 of the Constitution, we must speak about the urgency. In the case of a matter referred to in Article 78 of the Constitution, the Government requests the urgency on the basis of Article 80 of the Constitution. I am becoming a bit technical. It is for the experts.

Seven speakers were registered in the general discussion: Mr Van Parys, Arens, Erdman, Mrs Dardenne, Mr Coveliers, Giet and Mrs Talhaoui. The speaker list is not yet closed.

Mr Van Parys has the word.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, the use of special detection methods is currently being made on the basis of circular letters from the Minister of Justice. Currently, the special detection methods are used in investigations based on the 1990 circulation letter, which was amended in 1992. Fortunately, we can have these special detection methods at our disposal, otherwise we would not be able to find solutions in any important matter.

It is mainly about observation, infiltration and the use of informants. The invitation of the Minister of Justice consists in developing a legal framework for these special investigation methods. Everyone will agree that in principle such a legal arrangement is necessary. This was also a recommendation from so many parliamentary investigation committees. What is the purpose of a legal regulation on special detection methods? Their

First, we have the responsibility to provide police officers, detectives and magistrates with the necessary legal certainty. It is obvious that if detectives at this moment use observation, infiltration and informants, they dance on the sluggish rope. If they ⁇ results in important investigations, they are lauded, but if they go wrong, they are pointed with the finger and threaten to be held accountable. Therefore, we must be able to manage through a legal framework to provide legal certainty to the detectives and magistrates involved in these techniques in order to better combat crime.

The second objective is the legal certainty of the investigation and prosecution. We have experienced so often in trials on important files that investigative methods were challenged, that evidence was not accepted and that as a result the perpetrators of those facts were freed. Certain research methods have been used inappropriately. It must therefore be intended to create a situation in which the evidence collected in the context of important criminal records is less quickly challenged. The intention is therefore clear. There must be legal certainty for investigators and magistrates and there must be greater certainty for the investigation that should be questioned as little as possible. The evidence must be established very clearly and irrefutably.

The establishment of a legal framework on special detection methods is a ⁇ difficult balance exercise. First, we all want to strive, especially at this moment, to fight crime more efficiently. We all agree that we must enable the police services, the judiciary and the prosecutors to ⁇ better results in the fight against crime. First of all, there is the need for greater efficiency. On the contrary, there are the rights and freedoms of the people. That is the subject of the balance exercise that had to be done. This includes the rights of defence. However, the rights of the defence have received a pejorative response. Let me give a very concrete example. If, through this legal regulation, it becomes possible to carry out a “puppy operation” in your or my home — if we were not members of parliament — or in the home of a citizen, then this could be done without the knowledge of the owner.

It is evident that such extensive investigations — an inquiry operation in private places without the owner’s permission — adequately take into account, inter alia, the right to privacy.

How can this need for efficiency be combined with the rights and freedoms of everyone? That was the challenge of the bill. During the discussion of the draft law, this issue was, by the way, constantly discussed. The risk of a legal regulation versus a regulation in the form of a circulation letter is, of course, that one threatens to give his strategy a price to the criminal environment, to those with criminal intentions. A legal regulation, of course, implies a much greater transparency than a regulation through communications that have a confidential character.

We should not take the risk of disclosing our strategy through the legal regulation, and that we will no longer give assets to the investigators and the prosecutor’s office, while giving the criminal environment as a matter of fact insight into the strategy that is followed to resolve crimes. Therefore, the major challenge was to ensure that the legal framework was not a step backwards from the current system by sending letters. If that had been the case, the new scheme would not be good and then one would have better adhered to a scheme based on circulation letters. In this way, we would have offered the detectives and the parquets fewer opportunities than they now have.

I will then come to the essence of my argument, which will be brief. Mr. Minister, you have flirted with the risk of taking a step back from the current scheme through the circulation letters. You flirted with that risk by inserting an article into the bill that was subsequently confirmed with an amendment. That article stipulates that a legality check must be provided through the Chamber if informants are used during the investigation. That arrangement, which was included both in the draft law and in the amendment submitted by the Minister of Justice after majority consultation, was a step backwards from the current arrangement, because at the moment the investigation of the investigation — even when the use of informants — is not subject to the control of the council. The risk was very real that the text as discussed and the amendment as submitted by the Minister of Justice would be a step backwards from the current situation.

The relevant article and amendment were a demand of the Socialists and the Greens. They demanded that a legality check be carried out on the use of whistleblowers when whistleblowers are used during the investigation. The Minister of Justice has responded to this request of the Socialists and the Greens following the inter-kabinet consultation at the submission of the draft law and at the end of the discussions in the committee with the submission of the amendment, thus unambiguously introducing the legality control on the use of informants.

Mr. Minister, this was in my opinion reckless. This was reckless because it was life-threatening for the informants. You have to imagine the situation. If it is true that due to the use of informants the investigation investigation must be reviewed by the council, then of course not only the suspect knows, but then also the criminal environment knows that in that investigation, as it is submitted to the council, informants have been used. Then it is a relatively cold trick for the criminal environment or for the suspect to find out who this informant would be. I do not need to clarify that when we are talking about important files, at that moment in reality the life of the informant is threatened. This risk was taken, this was the reckless behavior because of the government in this file, because of the majority and because of the Minister of Justice. Their

But actually there is more. Which informant would be more inclined to cooperate with Justice and Justice if it is known that at the end of the investigation investigation through the review by the council chamber the real risk arises that the informant can be identified? This would have put all the informant work that we know at the moment through the circular letter on the slope. This is indeed not an opposition language; it was the collegium of prosecutors-general itself that had explicitly warned of this in its opinion to the committee and in the hearings that were just mentioned in the report. This lawfulness check by the Chamber held the risk that whistleblowers would be at risk for their safety and that the entire whistleblowing activity would be put on the slope. It was, by the way, also the various parquet magistrates and investigators who had communicated this. Despite this warning, this article and this amendment had nevertheless been introduced. Colleague Coveliers who knows the matter had realized this. He had envisaged an amendment that would keep the informant’s work outside of the council’s legality control. It was only so that at the end of the discussions colleague Coveliers tended to no longer defend this amendment. Their

At the end of the discussions we were faced with a disruptive choice, Mr. Chairman of the Justice Committee. As the CD&V group, we had very clearly seen the threat and the threat coming. We knew that if the article and the amendment of the government were to be adopted, it would at that moment be the end of the informant work. We have therefore, precisely at the last session before the voting, so ⁇ fulminated against this article and again explicitly pointed out what the prosecutors-general and the investigators had said: life-threatening for the informants and a risk for the whole of the informant activity in particular. We were facing the choice: either we would let the government and the majority go on their mouths, or we would take a constructive stance. We have chosen the latter. We have offered and provoked an alternative majority, with the liberals. In the end, this has ensured that through this bill we can effectively have an efficient informant work without legality control due to the council on the basis of a legal regulation. This alternative majority was to provide the opportunity to do effectively what is required of us.

Mr. Van Parys decides whether he accepts that I interrupt him or not; I do not want to bother him in this regard, and I appreciate, as always, his interventions. by

You have just made the history of the problem of the amendment of Mr. Coveliers and you highlight the undoubtedly important problem of the security of informers. The amendment of Mr. Coveliers was voted. Therefore, the Chamber of the Council does not exercise, in the draft as we voted, control over the use of informers and indicators. by

Can you tell me how the control of the Council Chamber, which does not exist, is different from the control of the main court, which will exist to it anyway? by

Therefore, the risk you are denouncing inevitably arises — so far as it exists, but that, it’s another issue — before the main jurisdiction for any file, about indicators, I say right. That’s all I wanted to tell you, and I let you continue.

The danger of the draft law, article and amendment in question lies in the fact that a second prior moment of risk was incorporated, in particular at the end of the investigation. This required the investigating judge to report to the council, so that both the suspect and the criminal environment — by the fact that a file was submitted to the council — knew that informants were used. I just need to quote from the advice of the College of Attorneys-General, Mr. Giet. After all, you are well placed to understand a Attorney General in his undoubtedly good intentions. In that opinion, the college says that, if that measure is implemented, the criminal environment, more than in its own defense, will be interested in the identification of the informant. The environment could ⁇ do this quite easily.

Can we take the risk of introducing, in respect of the informant activity, which the council does not currently exercise legality control, a procedure which, firstly, threatens the life of the informant and, secondly, in general, no one will dare to take the risk of providing information in important files? That was the big challenge of the debate. The challenge was to counter the demands of the socialists and the Greens and yet to have the legality control included in the text. It is only because the opposition has repeated this argumentation again and again with conviction that one is eventually found willing to form an alternative majority, in order to prevent that ⁇ heavy mortgage being laid on the informant action.

I am convinced that in this way the opposition has taken a ⁇ constructive stance, which has prevented this. First — which interests me less — is to prevent the Minister of Justice from walking on his mouth before his prosecutors-general, his detectives and his prosecutors. After all, he had denied them by putting their advice away from him initially. Our constructive attitude has mainly resulted in saving the informant work and that is what we were talking about. Their

I am convinced that the initiative, because of the opposition, is an important precedent, colleagues. I end with that. After all, I note that the Socialists and the Greens have long blocked important security files. I think of the problem of street crime. I think of the problem of youth crime. Again and again, we find that we cannot find solutions to major societal problems because socialists and Greens are preventing it. The problem was that the Minister of Justice has always been involved with this until now. He has done so again now, through the article and through the amendment, thus threatening to lose the role of informant. Imagine yourself . The precedent lies in the fact that the liberals have for the first time responded to our explicit request, our repeated initiative to bypass the veto of the socialists and the Greens with an alternative majority. The result, Mrs. Herzet, we have achieved. We have achieved this because, through a parliamentary majority, we have succeeded in establishing an informant action that is proper and based on a legal framework.

I think we should continue on the same path.

Mr. Minister, there is a majority in this Parliament in favour of the law on youth sanctions and for a regret-optant scheme. This is of course the case. The double division in this Parliament proceeds on this line. Colleagues, let us use this majority as we have now done following the informant system. We again offer, from the CD&V group, an alternative majority, which should allow us to solve the fundamental societal problems that you and I face daily in the major cities and in the municipalities throughout Flanders and Wallonia. The majority exists. Let us use them. We offer you to form an alternative majority, also for the youth sanction law and for the regret-optant scheme, as we have done following the informant work in this bill.

This is the real parliamentary democracy. In theory, you have talked many times about new political culture. What we have done here is the real parliamentary democracy. A majority of the Parliament has taken its responsibility, bypassing the fact that a minority vetoes essential, fundamental solutions to societal problems. Their

It is from this constructive opposition that we call on the actual majority in this Parliament to work with us to solve those societal problems, including with regard to the law on youth sanctions and the regret-optant system. It is from this perspective that we have made the informant scheme possible and that we place you under your responsibility to resolve urgently the problem of youth crime and the problem of regret-optants together – following a proposal of law that we will submit. By the way, it is in this spirit that we will approve this bill on the special detection methods.

I would like to ask Mr. Van Parys really complains about it. Since the beginning of this legislature, the scope of the provisions of common law as regards criminal proceedings has continuously expanded. by

All the priorities, which were put forward in your electoral programme and others elsewhere, were met by this majority. by

I therefore propose to make an alternative opposition, i.e. an opposition that, from time to time, on such subjects, does not vote for or do anything other than abstain. by

For my part, when I feel that a text is not good, I vote against. It doesn’t just make me friends, but at least I stay in line with my ideas. Do the same and stop complaining. by

In fact, the PS, Ecolo, MR and their Dutch-speaking friends give you right all the time. Alternative majority is not necessary because it votes like you.

Mr. Speaker, I am afraid that I do not have the same opinion as Mr. Decroly. However, Mr Decroly must realize that now that we, against the will of socialists and Greens in, have made informant work possible without the control of the council chamber, we are facing two new major challenges. I refer to the approach to youth crime, where we have had to reaffirm that the preliminary bill drafted by the Minister of Justice is again blocked by the Socialists and the Greens in the majority. We will only be able to tackle youth crime in the cities and municipalities if we use the majority that we obviously have. The beautiful precedent of this design is that for the first time we have been able to use this alternative majority. This gives us the prospect that we will be able to do so again in the future, not because of the political game, but because in this way we can effectively solve societal problems on the basis of a real and animated parliamentary majority present in this hemisphere.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the bill that is submitted to us aims to legally frame the use of particular research methods. It is part of the fight against organized crime. by

First of all, we are in favor of such a bill, for several reasons:

1 of 1. Police officers who, in the course of their duties, use special investigation techniques should be able to enjoy legal and material security in the exercise of their duties. It is not normal for them to work in clandestinity, in permanent insecurity and sometimes even in inequality. by

2 of 2. The adoption of a precise and binding legal framework enables not only to establish the legal validity of the means of evidence resulting from the use of special research techniques, but also to facilitate access to contradictory debate in favor of judges and lawyers. It is thus avoided that in the future, persons who have actually committed criminal offences are acquitted because, in the absence of a law, the question of the legal validity of certain special methods of investigation was not resolved.

3 of 3. It is necessary to clarify the tasks of each other. We think of the mission of trusted magistrates, but also of the officials of the relevant departments who carry out the first-line checks in relation to the application of particular research methods.

Therefore, the field actors are demanding such legislation.

In addition, several parliamentary investigation committees have shown the need to provide for an adequate legal regime for special research methods. by

In a democratic state, it is not good for such a delicate matter, such as that which concerns us, to be regulated by simple ministerial circles.

If one can agree with the principle of such legislation, one should not ignore the delicate points of such a project. In fact, this bill tends to ⁇ a delicate balance between, on the one hand, a more effective fight against large crime and organized crime and, on the other hand, respect for the fundamental democratic rights covered by the bill (the right to privacy, the right to a fair trial and the exercise of the rights of defence).

Every aspect of this bill is sensitive. For some of them the CDH makes some reservations on the text as it is submitted to us. by

The legality of proactive research should be considered with the utmost caution. A serious reflection must be carried out on what constitutes the regulatory character of such a preventive approach to organized crime.

We refer to the infringement threshold. In particular, it is necessary to verify whether there is a proportionality between the intrusive nature of the means of investigation envisaged with regard to the fundamental rights invoked and the infringement threshold required to justify the proactive use of special research methods.

The threshold corresponding to one year of main imprisonment is hardly justifiable for us. As you have repeatedly stated in the committee, the use of special research methods must remain an exception and be limited to combating the most serious forms of crime.

Next, it is also important that the question of criminal liability of police officers involved in the conduct of particular investigation methods is not ignored. Both internal control within the police departments concerned and the control exercised by the prosecutor’s office and by the judiciary must ensure that the officers comply with the obligations laid down by law. For this purpose, it is important that a minimum access to information is secured, without thus endangering the safety of agents operating on the ground.

We believe that this information can only be guaranteed if a fairly short period separates the commission of the offence by the agent, from the written communication by that agent to the competent King’s prosecutor of the facts surrounding the offence committed by the agent. by

Furthermore, a debate on the nature of the offences that police officers are authorized to commit must take place. In this regard, the CDH is oriented towards a qualitative approach. In this regard, we believe that the commission of certain crimes should be prohibited in the light of respect for fundamental democratic rights as envisaged by the European Convention on Human Rights. That is why we maintain our amendment — which has been re-deposed — providing that no agent in charge of applying any particular method or technique of research can voluntarily attack the physical integrity of any person. This amendment, which merely aims to insert a new paragraph between paragraphs 2 and 3 to Article 47quinquies, § 2, is worded as follows: "In any case, any voluntary infringement on the physical integrity of persons is prohibited." It was at the request of great legal experts — and I quote Professor Bofflie — that we submitted this amendment. I hope other political groups will join us in the course of this discussion. by

We may not claim it sufficiently today, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, but we will put this amendment to the vote of the plenary assembly tomorrow.

As I have already said, the commission of offences by police officials involved in the operations of particular research methods must enter into a legal framework, binding and inspired by a qualitative approach. The protection of the physical integrity of persons must be applied; as such, any voluntary offence against persons must be prohibited. We hope to join us in the voting on this amendment.

The bill appears to give a preponderant place to the King’s Attorney in controlling the course of criminal investigations that involve the use of particular methods of investigation. However, the Franchimont Act that we voted in the previous legislature consists of the function of an investigation judge as an essential element in the course of criminal investigations. by

When examining the bill, we see a change in orientation regarding the role of the investigative judge in the future. It is in the light of the infringements that certain special methods of investigation may bring to certain fundamental rights that reflection must be made on the distribution of powers between the King’s Prosecutor and the Investigative Judge in the implementation of special techniques of investigation. Furthermore, it is essential that the investigating judge has sufficient instruments to exercise permanent control over techniques that are executed as part of his instruction. by

We believe that it should have been more precise as to the fate to be reserved for information collected by the competent police services as a result of a particular method of investigation. The existence of confidential records concerning the use of the three particular methods of research must be sufficiently limited by law. Based on the case-law of the Court of Human Rights, it turns out that compensation at the level of the rights of defence must be made for the accused. by

It should be able to challenge the information contained in such confidential records. Our concern to ensure a reasonable balance between the confidential file and the procedural file is guided by our concern to ensure that the main judge can perform his work in compliance with the conditions prescribed by the European Convention on Human Rights.

Without sufficiently convincing elements in the procedural file, we are also at risk of seeing the possibilities of acquittal profiles.

Finally, we can only be satisfied that the Minister has resolved the issue of professional secrecy, at least with regard to lawyers and doctors, through an adaptation of Article 90octies of the Code of Criminal Instruction, which is applicable with regard to the protection of professional premises, lawyers and doctors with regard to telephone listening. At this level, I would like to add the professional premises of psychologists and social workers. by

In conclusion, we believe that this bill is a step in the right direction if we want to tackle certain forms of serious crime more effectively. However, by nature, its application is delicate. That is why our concern was the submission of amendments in order to circumscribe its implementation in the best way possible. Additional marks could have been provided in the law. Such labels would aim to ensure that the authorities responsible for applying the special research methods do not do anything other than what is provided in the bill. In other words, we say “yes” to the neutralization of what constitutes a real threat to the security of our fellow citizens but we say “no” to a logic that would be to proceed, through this law, to pure intelligence, without judicial prospects.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I have already said that this is a ⁇ important draft, especially because it confronts us with fundamental options and fundamental approaches in this society.

To those who believe that today the classical means are sufficient in a society facing phenomena that can no longer be captured and combated within its boundaries, I want to say the following. When the criminogenic effect is organized internationally and difficult to localize, when more and more — including by those who fight against this type of legislation — is pressured to international cooperation, when it comes to choosing between, on the one hand, safeguarding the rights of the individual in a society and, on the other hand, enabling this society to continue safeguarding those rights, then one is ultimately forced to take certain options to which, however, certain conditions must be attached in advance.

During the hearing of Attorney General Schins in the committee, very important elements were highlighted in his presentation. Of course, I do not agree with everything and not specifically the view of the Attorney General will guide me in the approach to this problem. He said that the legislation must be very clear and not subject to interpretation, so that the boundaries of what may and cannot, of what can and cannot, of what might be considered unacceptable in the context of good judicial administration and with respect for all rights of everyone involved in the proceedings, would be clearly defined. Their

I come to my second observation. In what is on the table here, we should make a clear distinction — there may be some confusion in the approach of the whole — between trying to organize judicial investigation situations that either or not lead to prosecution and a system of intelligence services. We may have known in the past — some police services are still inclined to do so — the evolution of police services at the level of intelligence services moving apart from the finality of intelligence and ultimately almost around intelligence. This, of course, is not the task of police services. This is provided for in another legislation. Therefore, by the way, in the wisdom of the legislator, we have two separate accompanying committees. On the one hand, there are the services specifically dealing with the intelligence cage, the services specifically tasked with obtaining intelligence, regardless of what may happen after the removal of such intelligence at the police or judicial level. On the other hand, there is the loophole of police services within the framework of the judicial apparatus in view of the specific tasks assigned to them. Overall, this design has obviously put us in the face of difficult choices, but it fits into the approaches I have just outlined.

Mr. Decroly, you are right, this is not a single design. Other drafts included aspects in which we specifically arranged the judicial investigation or prosecution when it concerned the fight against serious crime.

Now come to the first delicate point, namely, what is the purpose of this type of legislation. During the committee discussions, I said at some point that it might ideally be necessary to draw up a Code of Criminal Procedure, what I would call the current Code of Criminal Procedure, and an exceptional Code of Criminal Procedure that would make certain arrangements specifically with regard to certain crimes. This is, of course, not so easy for the very simple reason — which has also been the reason why it was so difficult to make decisions on certain points — that when initiating a judicial investigation or a police investigation one does not know where one ends.

At the time, I already said in a boutade that the one-year limit, where arrest warrants are allowed in our Code of Criminal Procedure, is an illusion because initially the qualification can be expanded so that one year is always reached, since at the end of the ride it turns out that the crimes have not reached that ceiling at all. This does not make the procedure as such unacceptable.

Indeed, there are very difficult approaches and the main goal – which has been repeatedly stated in the committee – is to combat those phenomena in the context of crime that undermine democratic values and that must be stopped in a certain way.

That search for the rights of the individual, liberated in a free society on the one hand, and, on the other hand, arming a society to continue safeguarding those rights, is indeed the exercise of balance that we must have done. I am not saying that we have fully succeeded. In any case, we made an attempt. Who thinks that — I have already received echoes in that sense — the text coming from the committees is even worse than the text originally submitted by you, Mr. Minister, I invite you, in any case, to carefully analyze all the work and to place the texts side by side.

I will not go into the technical adjustments and defining the correct terms and principles. I am only fixing and summarizing what, however, very specifically with the agreement of the government is included in this text:

First, it has always been said that every police service will now be able to apply special methods in every possible way. This will be the police state by exception. It is now clearly defined that only those specific police services will be designated to perform those specific tasks.

Second, there is a clear description of criminal offences that could be committed by police officers and this specifically with – a supplement to which some doubt the necessity – the emphasis on proportionality, namely, not to commit acts that would be worse than possibly the facts that one would wish to prosecute. Organizational measures were taken for the safety of police officers.

The Attorney General was associated with the Federal Attorney to make specific proposals in that sense.

Specific reasons for reconciliation for facts committed in that connection were embedded. Their

Regarding the observation, a clear distinction — a very important point — was made between two phases in the detection study. On the one hand, there is the famous pro-active research that was already mentioned in the Franchimont Act. The area in which proactive research is or can be required and permitted has been clearly defined. This terrain delimitation did not occur for the search investigation that has a different facet and a wider terrain. The distinction was made and it has been ensured that pro-active research cannot go beyond its boundaries.

Mr Van Parys, I will return to the famous undicies and amendment 11.

The system of professional secrecy is fully embedded in the legislation, both for the lawyer’s profession and for the doctors. Their

The distinctive role between the investigative judge and the prosecutor of the King — n'en déplaise à M. Coveliers — is stressed. The investigative judge has a very specific role. He has the lead of his research, he will retain the lead. He has access to the secret file of the Procurator of the King. Certainly do not give him control as such over the special detection methods. After all, with such a control power, he is no longer the independent magistrate who must investigate for and against and gets with a completely different legal figure. As long as the investigative judge is intended to remain an independent factor in the judicial investigation, it should be allowed to stop at any given moment, to make changes, and possibly to bring a claim to the Attorney General. The distinctive role is clearly delineated.

As for the confidential file, I fear that many have created confusion and released fears.

Mr. Erdman, I would like to ask you about two aspects that you have just mentioned. by

The first concerns the relationship between the use of proactive research methods and specific research methods. You refer to Article 28bis, paragraph 2, which establishes a link between the two. However, I cite Article 28bis in question: “In order to initiate a proactive investigation, the prior written authorization of the King’s Prosecutor (...)” – it is the public prosecution in general – “is required, without prejudice to compliance with the specific legal provisions relating to the particular techniques of investigation”. But the expression "without prejudice" does not imply such a clear link between the two kinds of possible measures. On the contrary, this expression allows even a specific and differentiated regime between, on the one hand, what limits the recourse to proactivity and, on the other hand, what covers the regime of particular research methods. by

When I hear you comment on this article 28bis, this is the first question that comes to mind.

My second question concerns the power of the judge of instruction. This is an old debate that has been repeated regularly since the beginning of the legislature. But if we read article 14 of the draft that we are discussing here, which is related to article 28 septies of the code, is the power of the judge of instruction out of it, as you seem to claim, or is it stripped? Because the article I refer to is an article that regulates the evocation power of the judge of instruction in the mini-instruction scenario. This is in particular the content of Article 28 septies of the Code. You create, by article 14 of the project that we are discussing, an exception by saying that this paragraph does not apply to the instructive acts referred to in 56a and 89b. In fact, this means that you take away from the investigative judge his evocation power, that is, that kind of self-sealing power that he sees himself recognized, in the event that, precisely, in the scenario you have just mentioned, he believes that it is necessary to stop or that an additional control is necessary. The code, in general, allows the investigative judge to claim a much more precise control than a wave of remote control and regularity on what is being done. That power, you take it from him. by

So how can you say that the judge remains the judge of instruction and will not be able to become the judge of instruction? How can you say that its power, in the general economy of the powers provided for by the Code of Criminal Investigation, is intact, when, by provisions as concrete and precise as those provided for in article 14, it suffers further erosion?

Mr. Decroly, you do well to ask both questions. by

As regards the first, which relates to Article 28a, it was introduced in the Franchimont Act. At that time, we were faced with some police operations. Remember the famous “rebel” case. No legislation regulated proactive searches initiated by police services, which an investigation judge, during audits, called the operation “fishing”. We were going to see what we were going to see and maybe this research would lead to a positive element. At the time, there was no regulation regarding research methods. It was the idea that it should be possible, within the framework of the investigation conducted by the Prosecutor of the King, to have a proactive phase.

Nevertheless, first consideration, it was well delimited the terrain in which a proactive operation could take place, namely the offences provided for in 90 ter . Remember the law on intercepting establishing a list of major crimes. I admit that this list of 90b has already experienced a lot of extension since its introduction. It is the responsibility of the legislator to have effectively considered that certain offences that, originally, were not included in it, were added, probably on the basis of the experience of one or the other file that had generated this problem.

Nevertheless, there was no regulation regarding the methods to be used. Therefore, when you refer to the provision of Article 28a, "without prejudice", it is because at that time the legal clarification of the situation regarding special police methods had been announced.

Therefore, Article 28bis is not in contradiction with our text. Second, in order to avoid any possible discussion, we have clearly determined that two phases can be distinguished as part of the investigation conducted at the level of the King’s Attorney. by

If, in the second phase, for some methods, indeed, the level of one year of punishment could be accepted, observation for example, with regard to the proactive phase where nothing had yet happened, it was clearly required that the tags introduced by the Franchimont law be respected. In this perspective, we have, twice, if I am not mistaken, actually clarified the situation. by

Therefore, the "without prejudice" has been reaffirmed here since we refer to Article 28bis with regard to labels.

Let us now come to the power of the judge of inquiry, to the extent that he is eventually brimmed in his action. It should be noted that during all investigations, we will call on an investigation judge. This may be an approach that some people have taken by saying that the use of special methods required the appeal to an inquiry judge. However, this is not the path we have chosen. We can discuss the possibility of doing it or not. Nevertheless, it is not obvious to determine that, in each case, a judge of instruction will actually have to be charged with the investigation if special methods are used.

On the other hand, it was clarified that from the moment that an investigative judge intervenes, — arrangements requiring his intervention, for example the search — he has access to all possible documents, including the famous dossier considered confidential, and this, for example, to protect officers from special methods. It is true that he is not, at that time, part of an investigation because, in other situations, one does not appeal to him.

I would like to return to the confidential file. It is an important finding that one has to defend himself only for the facts that are actually accused in the court file. All elements that are not presented in the court file are not charged and are not used as evidence. It is repeatedly stated that processes-verbals must be drawn up when special detection methods are used. These process-verbals must be entered at the latest before the closing of the judicial file. Their

Mr Van Parys, I come to the “political approach” of the problem you have addressed. When working with infiltrants, it is clear that in the face of suspects and defendants only those elements that are cited in the criminal record can be charged. The draft, which was accepted by all of us, makes it clear that the King’s Prosecutor can only use elements entrusted to him through informant action in the file, provided that he processes it in a process-verbal.

With the exception of the informants 02.16 and that is an important restriction.

Indeed, these are the two conditions under which a responsibility rests with the Prosecutor of the King. I continue to note that the review that would have been carried out in the context of the procedure before the Chamber after the procedure has been completed on the legality of the resources used could also work in the face of informant activity. I must honestly say that I have read the opinion of the Attorney General again and with great attention. I can very well imagine that, with regard to the management of informants, one fears that sources will be dried up and that possibly persons will be put at risk. You have installed the reserve that ensures that, as soon as the King’s Prosecutor cannot guarantee the security of the informants, he may possibly not use those elements. Finally, after discussion, after discussion and after your call, a majority was found to vote on the famous amendment no. 11 to vote, which did not make informant activity a prerequisite for organizing a procedure for the council chamber absolutely; and in doing so the majority did not vote against another opposition. I can best follow you when you say that there is an alternative majority, because you and the liberals have suggested that. The other members, except for one, abstained because they were indeed of the opinion that it did not contribute much more. But well, the text is as it is, and at that moment one will use it.

Mr. Speaker, I have one more comment and a prayer to you and to the Chamber. At some point we voted on the famous Vandermeersch amendments. In fact, investigative judge Vandermeersch has said that there is always a discussion of "decisions" and "ordonnances", although that is up to the investigative judge. The Procurator of the King does not take "orders". We then changed that to “decisions”, in French. This has not changed in Dutch. So there is now a Dutch text with "decisions", originally "ordonnances", while those "ordonnances" were changed into "decisions". Since everyone agrees to change those "ordonnances" into "decisions", I suggest translating those "decisions" in Dutch as "decisions", as it should. This provides a correct approach. This observation was made by the services.

in order .

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will come to a final consideration.

Hopefully we have been delivered from that vague situation, where everything described in this design is applied today on the basis of circular letters. No rights were created for those involved. It was impossible to defend itself in any way, and with regard to certain aspects of this draft it was not even found in the file trace of the origin of certain intelligence. I always used the next boutade. There are many points in a file, where you always wonder what is behind the point: “I deny everything. The point. Now I will confess.” What is in that point? In a file there is just as much information that comes "from well-informed sources". Every day we find this in processes-verbal. Let us hope that with this scheme we will at least get out of that vague structure, where the effectiveness remains limited in comparison with the goal and in genes partly deviates to other approaches.

Moreover, on this point, however, it has been attempted to capture very clear signs in the text. Regarding the rights that are compromised by this, those who have to judge about them will also clearly open the beacons at times. In that spirit, we will approve this text.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, I would like first to thank the rapporteurs and the services, who have provided considerable work in order to arrive at delivering us the report of our work. Some consider it a bit late, but given the scale of the task, I think it should be greeted. by

It seems to me interesting, at the time of the discussion of this project, which can be said to be controversial, to return to the second interim report of the Commission of Inquiry on Organized Crime in Belgium. This report was precisely devoted to special techniques of inquiry—the subtle distinction between method and technique, and their use, had not yet been made at that time.

I will therefore refer to some elements of this report to try to support and frame my main remarks because I will not turn around the question. It is difficult to be exhaustive in this kind of case.

From the very beginning, in response to the criticism of the lack of legal basis, the report of the commission of inquiry stated: “The democratic debate about the sacrifices that our society is willing to make with regard to individual freedoms in the fight against organized crime has not taken place. The question of what types of offences are willing to restrict individual freedoms, under what conditions and under what guarantees, has never been raised in a parliamentary debate.”

To this, we can answer today that we legislate and that a legal basis will finally be given to practices that, so far, are used and only regulated through ministerial circulars, whether they date from 1990 or 1992. In fact, like my colleagues, I believe it is necessary, in view of infringements on privacy and the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms that these methods may entail, to frame them precisely, under what conditions and under what control, and to determine with the greatest rigor for what types of infringements we are willing to restrict our individual freedoms, as indicated in the report, and therefore to legislate. However, I am not sure that the method adopted, discussions between cabinets and in the kern before any other discussion, really favoured the democratic parliamentary debate that the commission of inquiry called its wishes. Although, as a committee, we have been able to extend the debates and significantly improve the texts, I still have a number of dissatisfactions with regard to the outcome, especially if I compare it with the fundamental principles set out in the same report of the commission of inquiry, such as the conditions related to the implementation of these techniques, in particular that of proportionality and subsidiarity, in so far as it can be considered that the act of legislation meets the principle of legality.

As regards the principle of proportionality, I repeat what the commission of inquiry said: “It must be a crime or a crime, either serious or organized in the sense that it is committed in the context of the criminal activity of a group of individuals. The application of the principle of proportionality raises the double question of when a special investigation technique can be used and for what types of infringements it can be used.”

Does the implementation of a special technique presuppose the existence of objective data? Only a positive response can verify that the chosen method is well proportionate to the aim pursued. There must be sufficient information regarding the existence or preparation of an offence or allowing to assume that certain persons have illegal activities or are about to commit offences. It must be ensured that the special investigation technique does not become a technique for collecting information.”

Regarding this latter observation and this possible confusion between the judicial task, consisting of finding offenders, and the collection of information that falls within the scope of intelligence, I would point out that, in my opinion, Article 47ter, paragraph 1 iir, of the draft as it is proposed to us, is not yet sufficiently precise although it has been amended. Most of the proposed amendments have not been adopted. It was intended to indicate that research, collection, data processing must be done in order to prosecute the authors. For me, these are not two separate elements, as is the case in the text: “The methods are implemented, first, in order to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes and, secondly, in order to search for and collect data.” The research, collection, processing of data can only have a specific judicial purpose, otherwise we risk opening the door to all sorts of derivatives such as, for example, the one mentioned by Mr. Erdman as part of an operation that remained famous, the Rebel Operation, consisting of filing and inventory a whole category of the population.

The principle of proportionality, according to the commission of inquiry, also asks for what type of infringements these methods can be used. According to the explanation of the reasons, the objective of the bill in the draft is to fight against large crime. Nevertheless, the scope of the present draft extends to virtually all offences, since they cover all those that are likely to result in a prison sentence of one year or more, that is, all the offences provided for by the Criminal Code with the exclusion of only offences and a few offences such as family abandonment, poisoning of horses or theft of gasoline. I regret that we have not been able to clarify the scope of these methods.

Another problem related to this question of the scope is the systematic reference to Article 90ter of the Code of Criminal Instruction. This provision which regulates telephone interceptions already refers itself, in particular to article 114 of the law of 21 March 1991 on the reform of certain public economic undertakings, article 114 which itself refers to article 111 of the same law which sanctions any communication infringing on compliance with the laws. This example, which is not mine — I am not able to do so, I borrowed it from the SAD note — shows how this cascading referral can prove dangerous in a legislation since it is enough to modify an element of the chain so that unintentional consequences appear at one or the other end of the chain. Thus, each time the 90ter is amended, the scope of this law will be expanded.

Does the principle of proportionality still exist? I think we have the right to question. The principle of legality itself is misled as the legal text lacks the desired rigour and accuracy. I will not even say anything here about the notion of proactivity for which I have always had the greatest reluctance. Those who were sitting at the same time as me in the Senate will remember it. by

Also concerning the scope, I would have far preferred, as the commission of inquiry suggests in its interim report, that we proceed with a limitative listing of the offences for which special methods could be used, taking into account the fact that the penalty rate alone is an insufficient criterion — I read the conclusions of the commission of inquiry — that it is necessary to take into account the organized character of the perpetrators, the repetition of facts or their relationship with others. by

This is the principle of proportionality.

Regarding the principle of subsidiarity, the statement of reasons of the bill we discuss today states that: "Subsidiarity implies that particular research methods are of such intrusive nature that it is therefore necessary to verify whether the same result can not be obtained by other means of research." That said, I do not find the enunciation of this principle in the definition of the notion, nor in the general conditions for the use of particular methods. The only mention of this principle is made in Article 47cties, §2 which deals with infiltration. Do I have to deduce from this that the principle of subsidiarity applies only to this particular method?

Furthermore, in my opinion, the bill introduces an erosion of the prerogatives of the investigative judges to devote the central role of the King’s prosecutors, in particular in the control of particular methods of investigation. Do not think that I make a fixation on the judge of inquiry or on the prosecutor of the King, or that I have absolute confidence in the judges of inquiry and a very strong distrust towards the prosecutors of the King. For me, that is not the question. This is not a problem of anyone. But let me give you a few structural considerations or institutional analysis. Indeed, in their respective functions, the King’s Prosecutor and the Investigative Judge occupy different positions. Thus, the King's Prosecutor represents the public prosecution and is a party to the case, the investigation judge trained in charge and discharge. The public prosecution — or the public prosecution — depends directly on the Minister of Justice, and therefore on the executive power. The judge of instruction, on the other hand, is part of the judicial power, separated from the executive power.

By the very definition of its function and the separation of powers, the judge of instruction, not as an individual but as a holder of a function, presents "systemic" guarantees of impartiality and independence, necessary for the principle of loyalty in the search for evidence and for the safeguarding of human rights and fundamental freedoms. by

However, the project hopes, by eliminating and instrumentalizing the judge of instruction, a slide that, for me, cracks the separation of powers and allows a certain control of the executive over the judicial power. I do not claim that this is what we are doing today, nor even that this is what is going to be done. But I warn you: the organization is set up that would allow it, which I think is dangerous for democracy. by

Of course, during our work, we have been able to make some improvements to the project. Some are purely formal, but others are more substantial, such as the dedication of special measures, where special research techniques involve physicians and lawyers or persons subject to the obligation of professional secrecy. That would be a big deal of course!

We also introduced a clarification regarding the crimes that may be committed by police officers, emphasizing compliance with the principle of proportionality, and the requirement of drawing up a record at each stage of the implementation of particular techniques. by

As has already been pointed out, the main judge will always be able, at the end of the proceedings, to express his reluctance regarding the non-compliance with the principle of loyalty in the search for evidence. But ultimately, do we legislate to ⁇ this effect? To result, as said by Judge Vandermeersch, in that evidence collected in secret and which cannot be the subject of a real contradictory debate, in particular as to how it was obtained, be disqualified by courts of substance and lead to a technical acquittal?

In this case, too, the goal of fighting organised crime will be missed. by

Therefore, I can only regret the lack of honesty and accuracy in the text that is proposed to us. Mr. Erdman, you also attracted attention to the statements of the Attorney General of Gand, Mr. Erdman. Schilz, according to which high precision and high clarity are necessary if the principle of legality is to be respected. In my opinion, this is not the case.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, the draft we are discussing today is a very important draft. In this regard, I refer to the various investigative committees already known to Parliament, which have always pointed out the need for legislation in relation to special detection methods.

I would like to congratulate the Minister of Justice for the steadfastness and determination with which he accompanied the draft in the difficult journey to the plenary session of the Chamber.

The draft is also especially important — which was also evident from the discussions and the exhibitions of the latter — because precisely in this form of legislation a number of pain points are exposed about the future way in which one will have to try to protect the community against norm breachers — I mean, therefore, protection against those organisations and those norm breaches that are very harmful to fellowship — especially because that will have to happen simultaneously with the action against the common crime which may have a much greater impact on public opinion than organized crime. I am well aware that printing a handbag for very many people — ⁇ rightly — is much more acceptable than a giant organization that can earn billions thanks to very fine-tuned criminal activities.

Therefore it is also interesting — I will not bother you with this for a long time — to read some predictions or prospects. This has long been done only in economics, but now, fortunately, it is also done in criminology. Based on the evolution of society, we look at what society will look like in 2010, for example, and how it will need to be played in order to be able to control the crime that will then prevail. With a few strange exceptions, I think everyone agrees that we lose a fight against crime anyway when it comes to controlling crime.

There was a very interesting study done, before the recent elections in the Netherlands, by three professors, two men and one woman. Professor G. Bruinsma, Professor H. of the Bunt and Professor I. Marshall Haen published research into the knowledge questions about crime and crime control in 2010. They also refer to an English study on the subject. Even in Belgium, some criminologists have devoted themselves to this. I refer to T. Peters and J. Goethals, who under the title "Criminology and the Integrated Criminal Law Sciences: A Report from Leuven" in "Delikt and Delinkwent" already in 1997 have actually put forward a number of elements on this.

From this study, I would like to summarize two quotes. First, the Dutch say: “The fight against crime has become part of a more general policy to mitigate insecurity due to the increasing involvement of non-criminal services.

Combating crime is not an exclusive task for police and justice. The involvement of many others with specific perspectives and interests will generate important new insights on crime prevention and combat.”

This is also of the greatest importance for this matter. Too often, however, it is assumed that the perpetrators are being sought. No, they are looking for organizations and not specifically for perpetrators. We need to look at the organizations in order to be able to capture them. If one can bring the perpetrators before the court — which is of course the intention — so much better. Peeters and Goethals say: "Criminology involves a specific approach or way of viewing, interpreting and expressing that does not coincide with a purely socio-scientific analysis or with a purely normative, ethical or legal. In criminological view, facts and norms are intertwined.”

Why this as an introduction to the law on the special detection methods? Well, if one looks at this draft in the way one looks at obsolete but still existing forms of crime, which also need to be controlled, then one will make comments like we have heard from representatives of certain leagues who are actually completely drawn out of their context and misinterpret these texts. I refer to the Crime Prevention Panel in the United Kingdom, which has made a number of ⁇ important comments on this subject.

It is therefore of the utmost importance that we try to understand this form of crime, the organized crime.

Mr Coveliers, Mr Decroly wants to interrupt you.

With great pleasure, Mr. President.

I know that after the “snelrecht” we have reached the “snelwet”. However, I would like to ask Mr. Coveliers to be more moderate when criticizing human rights leagues and to be less despicable towards them.

Remember that it is the same leagues that, along with other associations in the judiciary world, had drawn the attention of our parliament on the risks and dangers that the project on immediate appearance involved. It was not necessary for the parliament to self-regulate itself, given the form of packaging which has become customary for it since then, but for the judiciary to personally put an end to some excesses and eventually annul most of the most significant provisions of this bill, which had been adopted here by a large majority. by

In your place, Mr. Coveliers — I allow myself to make your remarks because you have been an ardent promoter of this bill — I would be a little less critical with those who sometimes ring the alarm clock with a few months in advance on the reality that is imposed afterwards.

Colleague Decroly, I appreciate that you are working hard to defend views that feel to me, and you have the right to differ, somewhat overlooked. By the way, I come back to it so quickly.

I think we need to find a clear balance and Mrs Dardenne has rightly referred to the Senate report, which I know of course. Mr. Decroly, as a convinced liberal, what you probably are not at the moment, I assume that it is the core task of government to try to give every individual as much freedom as possible. However, I am not naive and I know that some individuals will abuse the given freedoms. I ask the government to seek the right balance between the freedoms that are taken away—when freedoms are taken away from criminals, of course, they are taken away from non-criminal citizens, by the way, one is not a criminal at all—and the remains of freedoms that must be guaranteed.

That is why I say, if I want to be free, I want to be free to go on the street. I also want to make sure that criminal gangs are detected. I find it then somewhat exaggerated that a quarter of the gross domestic product is closed away by organised crime in the parallel circuit. Therefore, adapted, modern means must be available to counteract this form of crime. Of course, these resources must be well controlled. I have my ideas about that control. I will also immediately communicate to you my view on the investigative judge and the investigative judge. I realize that I am not supported at that point, but I still notice an evolution in the right direction, not only in Belgium, but also in other European countries. I see that evolution also in the European corpus iuris, which clearly refers to le juge des libertés and not to the investigative judge. In organized crime, there are no more spontaneous crimes. The cause of the crime is not to be found in any form of social disadvantage — which still exists, but not here. Here, after planning, all possible legal means are abused in an organized manner with the aim of generating illegal profits. The democratic system is ⁇ affected. This type of crime should be tackled by adapted methods that are properly controlled. I respect that you have a different opinion; however, I praise myself fortunately that not very many share your opinion. This law is, in my opinion, a very good opportunity to defend against organized crime.

The traditional technique of interrogation after the facts has no effect. The investigation has no effect, given the organized nature of the crime. Let me take the example of the first joint committee. In the second Bendecommission, the tracks were traces of error, in which even renowned journalists gardened. Only years later could we see it. I think of the robbery at the Colruyt supermarket, the theft of the bottles of champagne, and the murders committed at the time. Those robberies were merely traces of deception.

I come to the use of witnesses. Usually there are no witnesses. We need to pass laws so that anonymous testimony is possible. Otherwise the witnesses will be liquidated. We have passed a law to protect witnesses and eventually give a different place of residence. We do this because those organizations know that working with witnesses was one of the classic methods of investigation. It is also not necessary to rely on documents to conduct an investigation.

Therefore, the adaptation of the detection methods is appropriate. This new way of tracking will be adapted to modern crime. The requirement of subsidiarity and proportionality follows from this. It is clearly stated that, if other means are possible, one should use them. When it comes to relatively small facts, one should not use the big resources and shoot a mosquito with the proverbial cannon. The specific and new of these methods is that they have a secret character. Without that secret nature, of course, one can do nothing against an organization that programmes the police measures in advance. When one waits until a fact is committed, the person in an organization who has programmed the fact knows what one will undertake. In this way, you always lose. The result is that one will live in a society where many crimes are no longer solved. Around those crimes, fantasies are then formed, which are fed worldwide. In fact, the failure to resolve these issues undermines the democratic character of a society.

The secret nature of the research methods is not new. In the recent past, I have submitted a bill in this Chamber describing those techniques. It was a legal translation of the then existing circular letter.

I will never forget that the then Minister of Justice, Mr. Wathelet, though in French, when said, "the wounds are still too fresh." Then, during the discussion of the law on the police office — which was originally called the police office, a much better name in my opinion — in the House, when Mr. Tobback was Minister of Home Affairs, an amendment was submitted late in the evening. Mr Tobback then said that the amendment should be withdrawn and that it would be settled later. He continued that we were right and that this should be arranged. At that time, however, we would not have gone through it. He was right, we didn’t get through it. I voted in favour of the bill, but did not insist further. Their

Mr. Decroly, I was by the way not the first with this and you will surely find it interesting. In France, there is also a movement to order the police. During a discussion about the former police, it was found that in 1720 the Bureau de Sûreté de Paris actually applied this method already mutatis mutandis. So this is not new. We need it now and I hope we can apply it now.

It has existed since 1920. If we took these measures at the time, we cannot really say that it arranged things.

I think you are mistaken there. If we look at the reversal of the possibilities in the second half of the eighteenth century, I think this is a good example of applying these matters mutatis mutandis now.

I will no longer talk about the content of this text, because it has been discussed long enough. I think it is a good idea to talk about detection methods that highlight informant management, observation — with Mr. Erdman’s comment on that — and infiltration. Subsequently, it is then extended to techniques such as inquiry operations, mail capture, recording of calls and other elements. You should check how many articles of this law contain control measures. One must do this and one must do it, a PV must be drawn up which, though, must come with the confidentiality of the informant in the file. This should be compared to the restrictions imposed on the criminal. Compare this with the reduction of freedom in the context of researching organizations that specifically through their counter-strategies ensure that they remain out of shoot through the original, old methods. Well, I think the scale clearly does not pass through. Society also has the right to protection. Human rights are sacred and must not be undermined in any way. The concept of man, however, also includes the others, the people who are not involved in these facts. They also have the right to protection. They must be able to live in a free way. This can only be done if one tries to find those who want to abuse it.

Mr. Coveliers, I can follow you and, by the way, I have said myself that finding that balance is the most difficult. However, I cannot accept — ⁇ it is a lapsus of yours — that you are going to compare the safeguards, control elements, beacons and restrictions listed in this law with what you call the freedoms given to criminals. I think this should actually be judged from a different perspective. One must start from the presumption of innocence of everyone. In any case, despite proportionality and despite the possible subsidiarity embedded herein, one must take into account the fact that one must seek a balance between the rights of the individual — whoever it is and until he or she is convicted — and the means given to a society to safeguard those same rights for everyone. This is the balance that must be sought. So I think it was a lapsus of your way when you talked about the large number of restrictions and regulations imposed on prosecutors and police officers while criminals can do anything. If you mean that we need to find resources to combat the activities of these criminals, then I can follow you. However, it is not the balance as you stated that matters, but the balance between the rights of each individual and the resources that one should give a society. I think we’ve heard the terminology of the armed administration somewhere. One must arm society in a certain way to guarantee the same rights for everyone.

Mr. Speaker, it was my intention to make it clear that the control of the police services and the prosecutor’s office must be proportionate to the restriction of the freedoms applicable to all citizens, including those who violate norms. At this point, the balance should show a certain balance. Freedoms are granted to everyone. In a democracy, one cannot grant the norm offenders more or less freedoms. Their

Mr. Erdman, it is important that the research into the organizations is taken into account. For a long time, the focus has been on out-of-the-source research. This is an important aspect. They are trying to locate the prey and confiscate it. Then it was said that the financial aspect should also be examined. I think it is now becoming clear that the research should now focus on the organizations. At this point, there is a different balance. After all, when investigating an organization, one will not have to account for the same restrictions because there is not immediately an individual, but a criminal organization. It is especially important not only to seize the lowest pion, who commits the crime. After all, in the new, horizontal crime structure it is intended to address the entire organization and not just the top or the base. In my opinion, by the way, it can be objectively established that the federal police have succeeded at this point in a number of matters. There are examples where one has managed to roll up entire bands through crime analysis and no longer 1 or 2 subordinates.

Mr. Speaker, I will return to this issue because I think the figure of the investigative judge is opposed to this approach. I fully agree with colleague Dardenne who says that the investigative judge should be an independent magistrate. Forget the illusion that the investigative judge will determine which police service can do what. The investigative judge and the prosecutor direct the police on the legal level. At that time there is prejudice because one wants to solve the case. For this reason, it is ⁇ interesting that, in order to protect the individual citizen, there is an independent, seated magistrate who is not directly involved in the investigation but who, like the Ermittelungsrichter in Germany and the judge-commissary in the Netherlands, says against the prosecutor’s office that one goes too far. If there are insufficient elements to apply a particular method, this will be prohibited. In my opinion, however, it is impossible that this assessment should be made by someone who is involved in the research itself. It may be a caricature but when one used to pick up a stroper, this could be but in the current crime fight this seems to me impossible. The figure of the judge des libertés — I find the term as it appears in the European corpus juris, by the way, brilliant — is a judge who protects the freedoms, who is independent of the investigation and therefore cannot be influenced by the prosecutor. As a sitting magistrate, he will be able to decide, for example, whether or not to carry out a home search in a particular case.

Mr. Van Parys has long spoken about Article 47undecies. The amendment I submitted to this article was, frankly, initiated by a hearing by the College of Attorneys-General. I knew from the consultation between the various majority groups before the vote that this amendment would be approved.

Mr Erdman correctly stated that, after one colleague, this amendment was not voted against, but was abstained on the basis of a number of elements. However, this amendment was approved. CD&V and also the Flemish Blok have approved this. CD&V thus approved this, and rightly. So I also believe that informant management would have become more difficult, although it may not be impossible. There is the criticism of Mr. Van Parys, who, from his position, ⁇ what is intended, is fundamentally correct. Hence the proposal. I am very pleased that this has finally come into law.

We also need to look at the structure of the law. Article 47 undecies is a colossus when it comes to control. This must be said clearly. If you look at it from a legal economic perspective, it’s somewhere on the horse. This actually does nothing to do with it. Suddenly there is an article. In the consideration, this does not bother me so much, but it bothered me that informant management was there because it is also known from practice that this was completely impossible.

I, of course, share the view that Article 47 undecies is a colossus, which puts the whole problem on the slope. In view of the objectivity of the presentation of the debates, I wanted to put the following in the middle.

I still remember perfectly the discussion when the government submitted the amendment which stipulates that the council has full control of legality and that this is done on the basis of Article 127, the addition that was included in paragraph 1 of undecies. I then asked the government whether this amendment should be read together with the Coveliers amendment. The Minister then stated very explicitly that this was not the case. This is also stated in the report. I still remember vividly the statement of the chairman of the committee after I had once again pointed out the problems raised by the College of Prosecutors-General with regard to the threat to operating with whistleblowers. The chairman of the committee then took a position that very clearly defended the text of the draft law and the amendment. It is only due to the tenacity of the CD&V Group that this amendment has remained. This is the reality.

Liberals need to know what they want. Either they are looking for allies to solve a number of fundamental societal problems, or they are not looking for them. The truth in these is that if there had not been the support and voting behavior of the CD&V group, at that moment the article and the amendment of the government would not have remained. Then, of course, you are right to say that at that moment we were facing a colossus of an article, which made any serious informant action impossible. This is the reality of things as shown in the report. I also invite the rapporteurs, who have been present so far, to be witnesses.

The historical version of the facts given by Mr. Van Parys is correct. He has indeed, on behalf of CD&V, given quite strong support to my amendment. I would, of course, say that if the amendment had not been present, it would not have been supported. I am pleased that this amendment has been implemented, because I believe that this will indeed make informant work easier and better and will be less disturbed. Their

We agree on that.

Mr. Chairman of the Chamber, I want to come back to that “colos”. We must not lose sight of the fact that this article was originally asked for an opinion from the chairman of the KI. Ultimately, we must now rely on the reports that the college, the GP and the federal prosecutor will submit about the use of these methods. From this we must draw our own conclusions and we will have to take our responsibility for this. There is no explicit mention of ‘statistical material’. No, at the same time, explanations on the application of those methods were requested. It is therefore essential that we have imposed ourselves in that law to include our responsibility in the assessment.

Of course this is true, but one should not be confused with the other. One is about the control of the individual file, the other is about a state control. I agree with the chairman of the committee when he says that this has been introduced — rightly in my opinion — rather than the opinion of the chairman of the Chamber of Accusation. Mr. Speaker, I would like to remind you of this statement, when any group will ask to discuss these reports after they have been submitted. I wonder what interest there will be at that time in the Justice Committee for such things. We have already been imposed so many reports, which in the end have not been paid any attention to. Let us, however, assume the good intentions of our colleagues. That must also be the intention.

Mr. Speaker, maybe the term "kolos" is a little misused but also look at the economy of the law. Section 6 is a bit strange. He could have stood elsewhere too. Finally, chapter 3 deals with "Other Research Methods" and no more is discussed in it. In addition, each article in turn discusses control measures. So, Mr. Van Parys, if the Chamber did not conduct this discussion — which of course will not happen — then there is still the guarantee of individual control in the various articles. Add to this the general control of the police services and the control exercised by the college of prosecutors-general on the quality of the prosecutors. There is, therefore, sufficient control, but we will indeed have to take our responsibility and discuss that. Their

I would like to conclude with a final comment. Those who think that with this bill we have the nec plus ultra of the detection methods are mistaken. We will need to regularly update and evaluate. What does society need? Where should this society be protected? What is too much? There may also be too many measures. We will need to evaluate this regularly. We will regularly need to have the courage to abolish some things. I tried it once in the Senate with the pigeon union and it took four years and then it still existed, because there were apparently too many interests involved. I think it is a great achievement of the Minister of Justice that he has brought this text to this point. We will also be able to use this text especially well in the control of crime, with all the control capabilities involved and with the prospect that we will have to re-adjust it sooner or later. We will therefore approve this text with great conviction.

The importance of fighting organised crime is undeniable.

Even if, given the evolution of crime, it is important for democracy to defend itself by recourse, where appropriate, to new methods of investigation – which are now used on the basis of simple ministerial circulars – it is not healthy, in a rule of law, not to specify the rules for meeting two fundamental but sometimes antinomial goals: respect for individual rights and freedoms and collective security.

The Socialist Group considers that the project to provide a legal basis for certain investigative methods is a positive approach because we are convinced and fully support the need to end a hypocritical situation. At least two parliamentary committees of inquiry have also repeatedly insisted on the need for a legal framework.

In fact, it is undeniable that the absence of regulation has resulted, in police services, in marginalized or tolerable behavior.

The balance — a word I’ve just heard from many — between respect for privacy and individual rights, on the one hand, and efficiency, on the other, is still precarious. If, at the present stage, the balance sought, in my view, has been improved or not achieved (but I leave it to everyone to judge), it will be necessary to strive to find it in reality and to ensure that it is ⁇ ined in time.

Therefore, when implementing, particular attention will need to be paid to certain methods (discreet visual inspection, observation in a home, opening of mail) that may infringe on a number of fundamental rights. Therefore, we are pleased to find that the use of such methods remains subject to the authorization of an investigative judge, guarantor of individual rights, and remains, as appropriate, subject to the control of the Chamber of Councils.

Parliamentary work has significantly improved the original text through intense and creative discussions from all democratic political groups. I would simply like to pinpoint, as others have done here, the new provisions on the problem of the professional secret of lawyers and doctors, provisions which were entirely absent from the text that was proposed to us.

Let us also highlight the problem of the confidential file of which we have talked a lot and which – as I have already said and repeated – is the Trojan horse of particular methods of investigation compared to a good outcome of the prosecutions. This confidential dossier seems to me, in the current state of the text, better defined than it was before; indeed, what was previously planned was the possibility of drawing up a minutes, whereas the current text provides for the obligation of drawing a minutes, that is to say a document that appears in the final repressive file subject to the contradiction of the parties.

Finally, it should also be noted that the legal control has improved. by

Indeed, first of all, it clearly establishes this time, by reference to article 127 of the Code of Criminal Investigation, a debate before the Chamber of Councils, a contradictory debate allowing the application of the law that reformed the criminal procedure, in particular with regard to the request for additional duties and the possibility, by common law, for the Chamber of Councils, to return the file to the prosecutor's office, with certain questions. by

The control of legality is also improved to the extent that the possibility for the judge of substance to raise public order remedies remains in our Criminal Instruction Code.

Furthermore, it was not unnecessary — we had also asked — to hear the people on the ground in order to know the difficulties of the practical application of circles. Moreover, although this has not been done officially, we know that most Commissioners have had the opportunity to meet with certain external groups, such as, for example, the Human Rights League.

The amended text and the arbitrations that have taken place may seem sufficient, but I cannot help but insist on the need to ensure a certain degree of transparency as to the methods used in order to avoid any abuse and harmful shifting. Special methods and techniques should be used in exceptional cases and a distinction should be made between large and small crime in their application.

In this regard, Mr. Minister, it seems to me that a directive of the College of Prosecutors-General should be promptly brought to the attention of the Prosecutors of the King, as regards the use of particular methods of investigation and their scope, being understood that it seems to me that in all our discussions it is organized crime and serious crime that have been selected as the scope of application.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask for some clarification in the light of this important statement by Mr. Giet. If I have understood it correctly, the PS asks the Minister of Justice – once this law has been adopted – to draw up a circular letter because of the College of Prosecutors-General to the various prosecutors according to which this law must be applied in the first instance to organized and heavy crime. Did I understand Mr. Giet well in that sense?

The text we will vote on contains specific provisions referring to Article 90b and Articles 324a and subsequent. Basically, these provisions do not cause us difficulties. by

On the other hand, the problem arises when it is said that this applies to offences that are punished with a prison sentence of one year or more. We explained this border in relation to Schengen and the limit allowed to issue an arrest warrant. It is clear that this would allow for criminal offences, which are basically not part of what is agreed to be called organized crime and serious crime, to be applied specific methods of investigation. Since our intention is to reserve these particular methods of investigation to organized crime and serious crime, this should be specified in a directive of the College of Prosecutors-General.

Mr. Speaker, in view of the report, I would like to say very clearly that the reason is being created here is to limit the scope of the law by means of a circular letter in relation to the text of the law itself. The law itself states that a number of special detection methods are possible for crimes for which a sentence of imprisonment is more than 1 year. If the position of the PS was to restrict the scope of the law to organized and serious crime in the form of a circular letter also for this provision, then I already feel what the manoeuvre is. I was already somewhat concerned after the debate of the Greens in this debate. Again, it shows that it is still not well understood that this law has a wider scope of application than Article 90ter and organized crime.

It has been given that there is no longer legality control from the council chamber on, for example, the informant work is not properly digested. I will not accept — and we must monitor this from Parliament — that by any means, for example, by a circular letter, there is into the scope of the law. is tortured. This cannot be done under any circumstances. It will be the law and only the law that will determine the scope of application. Therefore, any restriction or interpretation or restriction through circular letters will not be possible. If it is intended to escape this law in this way again or to give them a certain direction, then we do it better through the circular letter as it is now. I feel the Socialists and the Greens are coming back in this already.

Mr. Speaker, the statement of Mr. Van Parys surprises me unless it can be politically interpreted. However, I have already, together with Mr Coveliers, very clearly emphasized that everything that this law allows must be considered within the framework of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. Even if you link certain areas of application in this law for certain methods to criminality in that year, it is still linked to the content of that law and in no way violates the law and the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. I have, by the way, heard Mr. Coveliers say in his own way: “You don’t want to have the means to apply this to everything and something else?”

There is still a very great difference between what Mr. Erdman says here and what Mr. Giet explained in connection with the circular letters. A circular letter would make it de facto impossible to invoke this law for matters other than those related to organized crime It is very clear that the minister must take a stand in this file or in this issue. Finally, soon, with the answer to the various questions, I expect the Minister of Justice to clearly say whether there is a...

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Yes, a circular letter can ⁇ be contra legem, Mr. Minister. We have also experienced in other cases that a circular letter can be contra legem. I hope you clarify this later and put Mr. Giet in his place.

It is obvious that a round sending letter cannot be contra legem. If the circular letter is formulated as Mr. Giet does, then he is contra legem. Then I would like to ask the Minister of Justice to expressly confirm that the scope of application is the scope of application of the law and not the scope of application as colleague Giet demands it, through a circular letter that would bind the parquets to hands and feet.

I have noticed that mr. Van Parys discusses on 02.40 of intentions, which becomes difficult at some point.

I remind you that we voted, in the previous legislature, a law on the College of Attorneys-General which allows very clearly to take guidelines on criminal policy. As your former Minister of Justice, Mr Van Parys, you know very well that conducting a criminal policy means making a choice between the application of several laws or the scope of a law. This is the daily life of a substitute, a prosecutor, a general lawyer, a general prosecutor and a federal prosecutor. This does not mean not applying the law. This is simply making choices, because the public prosecutor cannot apply laws to all situations, at all times and at every moment. This law on the College of General Prosecutors, you wanted it, just as I wanted it, since I also voted for it. Basically, this is just the implementation of criminal policy and we know that it is indispensable.

But not against the law.

Of course, not against the law, Mr Van Parys! You know well that if laws are not enforced because we have to make choices, it does not mean that we are against the law, but it is because there is a fundamental inability to prosecute all the offenses. I regret having to recall the obvious facts before virtually all members of the Justice Committee.

As part of our committee work, I see the unanimous will, expressed in the exhibition of the reasons of the government, to fight against organized crime and against serious crime. I would also like to recall the figures that the minister delivered to us in committee so that we realize the reality of particular research methods today.

In 2001, 1149 applications were submitted, of which 512 concerned only technical support. When I refer to the list of crimes that required this application, we find ourselves very clearly in organized crime and serious crime, drug trafficking, armed attack, theft, assault, car trafficking, human trafficking, etc. You will find all this in the report. by

Basically, where is the problem and what is it changing from the criminal policy as currently determined?

I am surprised to hear Mr. Giet explains to us that, in a certain way, one could defeat, at the level of the judicial power, at the level of the judicial order, what Parliament would have done. I find it extraordinary to hear regularly here people frustrated — I understand them — of the turn taken by some compromises in a parliamentary committee, telling us that through the report of parliamentary work, and now a directive, we will be able to recover the sauce that we will have left badly taken during our parliamentary action.

I find this regrettable. by Mr. Giet knows, however, very well that his proposed directive will not have more legal force compared to the limitation of the scope of an act like this than a white card he would publish in a daily newspaper, even at very large printing, of our country.

I find that, in the end, the nuance he brought with regard to his personal adherence to the text, indicating that in his eyes, its scope should have been only on the 90 ter and 324 a, signals, in all letters and black on white, the failure of those who say they are progressive in limiting the damage of such legislation. This is what Mr. Giet is busy confessing to us. And let him not make us believe—because much is gestured and in the coming months it will increase and embellish on the so-called left-wing banks of this assembly—that by directives, it will be possible to repair the damage it leaves to do for the moment to the parliament. These damage are all the more disturbing in my opinion as they manifest, in addition to the dangers of this legislation, which, as Ms. Dardenne has just recalled, create an additional shift of power from the judiciary to the executive power, and show — Mr. Dardenne. Giet testifies to this by the type of argument he has just developed—a shift from the legislative power, in the sense of parliamentary power, to the judiciary! Indeed, it seems that the parliament can delight in all quietness, including at the big V speed, as during the consideration of such a major bill. by

It does not matter. We rely on the public prosecution or on the magistrates not to use or abuse all the latitudes that this legislation opens to them, which has a too wide scope of application. by

by Mr. Giet talked about the daily work of the College of General Prosecutors. I find that the daily work of parliamentarians has not been done properly.

Mr. Speaker, I will return for a moment to Mr. Giet’s presentation. Mr. Giet will remember that Ms. De Rouck, the first deputy of Gent, held a very clear and sharp speech at some point in the hearings. It stated that, to the extent that we would limit ourselves to Article 90ter or to organized and serious crime and we would not comply with the scope of some detection techniques for those crimes with a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year, we would take a step back from the current situation.

Ms. De Rouck has said that these detection methods are necessary for the sale of weapons, for the sale of counterfeit ammunition, for the sale of drugs, for the sale of cars, for false writing, for theft with vomiting and for garage theft. Their

If the interpretation that Mr Giet wants to provoke through the circular letter is what he intends, then, in relation to the current situation for these crimes, the special detection techniques that are possible for crimes with a prison sentence of more than one year will no longer be able to apply. Their

I refer very clearly to the argument of Mrs. De Rouck, who, as a Magistrate of Confidence, deals with this matter. Therefore, one must know what one does. It is very clear that one here little by little, an attempt is made to bring in what one has not achieved in the discussion because others have made it possible.

Mr Decroly, I would like to admit that we are bathing in the illusion that all the criminal laws we vote are applied day by day and without any problem by the prosecutors. But I think you are ignoring all the problem of criminal policy which is yet part of our debates at a rate almost daily. by

Targeted policy is to make choices regarding the goals to be pursued. And we can vote as many laws creating new articles of the Criminal Code as we want, as long as the system remains the one we currently know, we will have to make choices and there will be laws that will not be applied daily by the prosecutors, because they are in the material impossibility to do so. That is all I wanted to indicate. by

And when the law on the College of General Prosecutors is voted and the latter is given the opportunity to issue directives, criminal policies that, contrary to what you might believe, have a power, a compulsory force over the prosecutors, this clearly demonstrates that this parliament is aware of what choices should be made in matters of criminal policy. And the prosecutors have their word to say in this criminal policy. It is, in my opinion, an excellent thing that the executive power, controlled by the legislative power, can indicate what are the priorities in terms of prosecution. by

In this context, I believe that we must also be aware that the fight against organized crime does not only pass through legislative texts. It requires serious police and judicial work. Therefore, like any law in this field, we know that its proper application will depend on the wisdom, in the broad sense, with which the magistrates will be able to apply it.

Mr. Minister, the Socialist Group will vote on this draft in so far as it puts an end to the clandestinity slander, insisting that this reform must be supported by an appropriate budget and by the development of specific training programs, not only to the attention of the police officers responsible for the use of special techniques, but also and above all to the attention of the magistrates of the prosecutor’s office and of the seat responsible for encadring and monitoring them. Let us not forget that the control of legality is entrusted to them and, as I have already said in the committee, it is fundamentally the heart of the project that is submitted to us. Furthermore, the Committee on Organized Crime Investigation had clearly emphasized this point and I wanted to mention it abundantly in the report. The King’s Prosecutor and the Investigative Judge, at the time of enforcement, the Chamber of Councils, the Chamber of Accusations and the Judge of Fund in the follow-up of the case have an essential supervisory task.

Mr. Minister, your responsibility in this regard is to strengthen the ability of these magistrates to be able to control the police services. I think you would miss your most basic tasks by not taking care of them. Respect for democracy is at this price, namely the establishment of effective counter powers. If we approve this project, it is at the same time clear that one cannot be fully assured about the correct automatic application of a law text. The Parliament, through the report of the College of Prosecutors-General, must not omit exercising this political control. Therefore, I am somewhat surprised that some sometimes consider that these considerations about the difficulties of applying a law or the concern that one may have regarding the respect for individual freedoms and rights, are out of debate while, in my opinion, in this matter, nothing is definitive. Taking risks in this regard indeed requires that it be debated and that sufficient guards are found. The Socialist Group would like to emphasize that what is also in debate in matters of organized crime, in matters of economic and financial crime, is our democratic balance because it is crime that undermines our democratic foundations. We must therefore be attentive to them, fight them, and give ourselves the means to do so. We must make choices, we must find a balance – and I return to that word, it is our responsibility – listening to everyone’s opinions, of course, but ultimately we must take responsibilities and that is what we will do.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Colleagues, I will begin my presentation by stating that in fact practically everything has already been said and I will therefore limit myself to the political statement that the Flemish Bloc wishes to make regarding the special methods of detection.

The discourse of Mr. Giet, which he has proclaimed from the speech hall, however, somewhat disturbs me. I am looking forward to the Minister of Justice’s response to the question of whether there should be a circular letter. In my opinion, this is ⁇ not necessary yet, and one must first let the special detection methods go quietly and see their application in the field of work in all the domains for which they can be used. Over time, an evaluation may be made, after which the Minister could eventually update the policy via a circular letter. Hic et nunc, even before this law was passed, sending a circular letter to the parks, I find a somewhat wrong signal.

However, I would like to emphasize the importance of this bill. I agree with the previous speakers.

The special detection methods and other research methods are ⁇ the most spectacular and imaginative. After all, one ages on the ground, more than ever in the underworld itself. This is not without danger for the police. This bill is undoubtedly a renewal and refinement of the instrumentarium in the investigation and prosecution policy because it increases the arms of police and prosecutor. With the transformation of the circular letters into a law that primarily tries to grasp organized crime but not only these crimes, there will be much less scorn for the people on the ground and much more courage, security and legal certainty to act.

However, after the praise statements on the draft law, I repeat once again and again emphasize that Minister Verwilghen’s criminal justice policy is still far from being implemented. There must be a regret-optant arrangement. This regret-optant arrangement will be the queen-in-part of the approach to organised crime. Only with this regret-optant system can we effectively combat organized crime.

I am pleased that the Flemish Bloc has provided for the alternative majority. I am also pleased that those forces that in the past have always succeeded in removing the approved laws on crime and organized crime and jeopardizing their implementation on the ground, this time have not succeeded. The Flemish Bloc is pleased to be able to be part of the sweet joy of the sounding victory of the opposition together with the VLD in an alternate majority. My group is looking forward to the fact that this bill that we will pass will become a law.

Thank you Mr. President. Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the project that is on our banks today is the result of long work. For many years, we have been demanding the definition of strict legal regulation with regard to specific research methods. To date, the methods have been applied on the ground only on the basis of two ministerial circles dating back about ten years. However, as we all know, the use of particular research methods is not without causing difficulties. by

These methods are specific to more than one title. Their application is likely to infringe fundamental freedoms and rights such as the right to privacy. These methods are also likely to undermine some fundamental principles of criminal proceedings such as the principle of loyalty in the collection of evidence. To the extent that particular methods of research directly concern individual freedoms and rights of defence, it is up to the legislator, I would even say, the legislator has the obligation to give these methods a legal framework. Articles 12 and 22 of the Constitution require us to provide for legal regulation for these particular methods of research, and I allow myself to quote them: "No one can be prosecuted except in the cases provided by the law, and in the form prescribed by it" and "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, except in the cases and conditions fixed by the law".

By providing a legal basis for particular research methods, the bill concretizes the recommendations of various parliamentary inquiry committees. These different committees had admitted that the use of these particular methods of investigation is indispensable in the fight against organized crime. In the second interim report dedicated in particular to the use of special techniques of investigation, the parliamentary commission in charge of investigating organised crime in Belgium wrote: “Criminality evolves and, to the ‘rather spontaneous’ crimes are added the acts of highly organized and supported criminal enterprises, with the consequence that the classical police no longer allows to protect society against the complex forms of crime. The need to use special investigation techniques is undeniable, but these methods impose a very heavy responsibility on the police services, as there is concern that they pose a threat to the democratic legal order. When conventional criminal investigation is no longer sufficient, legal precautions should be taken with regard to procedures and content to prevent such methods from undermining the democratic legal order and individual freedoms.”

Before being submitted to the House, this project has been the subject of many discussions at the government level. A dozen inter-cabinet meetings were held to reconcile the views. The Council of Ministers has repeatedly examined the provisions in the draft. The Justice Committee, on the other hand, continued this work by refining the provisions in the draft and clarifying certain concepts that actually deserved to be. The Justice Committee took the time to reflect and conducted the hearing of the persons who will be responsible for applying and controlling the particular research methods. Representatives of the public prosecution and law enforcement agencies long explained to us under what circumstances they applied the particular methods of investigation, what were the procedures to follow and what were the checks carried out by the hierarchy and magistrates. by

To those, I answer that a theft of military weapons has been resolved and that five criminal organizations active from Brussels have been dismantled through the application of particular methods of investigation and this within a few weeks.

In doing so, our magistrates and our police forces prevented organized gangs from committing the hold-ups they were busy preparing.

Other criticisms have obviously been invoked against the original version of the project. These criticisms have been the subject of extensive discussions that have enabled the text to be improved on various points.

Conditions for the application of specific research methods in a proactive framework have been specified. It is now referred to Article 28bis, §2 of the Criminal Investigation Code. This means that the conditions to be met to be able to conduct a proactive investigation will be imposed on specific research methods applied proactively. Therefore, the application of MPR in a proactive context can only be possible for crimes falling within the scope of organized crime or referred to in Article 90ter of the Criminal Investigation Code. by

Moreover, a government amendment also clarifies that reasonable suspicion is not enough, it will require serious indications that violations will be committed or have been committed in order to be able to resort to these methods.

The text was further accused of not containing the principle of prohibition of police provocation and of unlimited authorization of police officers to commit offences. This is completely false and I find it irresponsible to carry out such ideas. The prohibition of police provocation is explicitly inserted in article 47quater in the draft and this in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Cassation.

Furthermore, the bill clearly sets out the principle that the police officer in charge of executing MPRs is prohibited from committing offences within the framework of his mission. It is true that the text provides for a possibility of exemption from punishment, but this exemption can only be granted under well-defined conditions. An exemption from punishment shall be possible for the policeman who, within the scope of his mission and with the consent of the Prosecutor of the King, commits an offence absolutely necessary. The original bill already stipulated that this breach must be absolutely necessary for the success of the mission or for the safety of the people involved in the operation.

In order to unambiguously translate the principle of proportionality, a majority amendment clarified that this offence may not be more serious than the offences for which particular research methods are applied. There must therefore be a proportionality between the offence committed by the policeman and the offences investigated.

The amendment also stipulates that the offence committed by the police officer must be proportionate to the aim sought. This means that proportionality must also exist between the severity of the offence committed by the policeman and the need to ensure the successful performance of the mission or the safety of the persons involved in the offence.

Thus, to those who claim that the bill gives a white seing to police officers giving them the authorization to commit unlimited offenses, I answer that they are mistaken and that they have an incorrect reading of the bill.

A number of criticisms also aimed at creating a confidential file. According to some, the existence of this closed file violates the right to a fair trial. The confidential nature of this file would not allow the party prosecuted by the King’s Prosecutor to validly prepare its defense.

Indeed, one was entitled to question the concrete content of this confidential file and to fear that the most significant information enabling the court of instruction and the court of substance to exercise their control could not be found in this closed file. This fear was removed by a government amendment.

The police officer who leads the operation will actually report confidential to the King’s Prosecutor, but this officer will also draw up minutes at each stage of the operation. These minutes shall not mention any element that may compromise the technical means and techniques of police investigation used. The minutes shall also not mention elements that could jeopardize the security and anonymity of the indicator and of the police officers responsible for the execution of the particular search methods. These items will only be included in the confidential file. Indeed, it is unthinkable to imagine conducting an investigation requiring the application of particular research methods by revealing the identity of the infiltrating agents and the details of the techniques used.

Improvements have also been made in the management of indicators. The bill organizes the use of indicators by providing a number of guarantees and controls. However, one aspect of the problem was still not resolved by the bill. Indeed, if it appears that the information provided by an indicator is flawed or unreliable, the King’s Prosecutor must have the possibility to formally prohibit police forces from continuing to work on certain information provided by an indicator. A government amendment has resolved this issue.

Another fundamental criticism that had been formulated concerned more specifically the application of certain particular methods of research on premises used for professional purposes or the residence of a lawyer or a doctor. The original bill did not provide for any reservations, no limitations on the level of respect for professional secrecy. In this regard, the bill has been fundamentally improved.

From now on, discreet observation, infiltration or visual inspection involving premises used for business purposes or the residence of a lawyer or a doctor can only be carried out with the permission of an investigative judge. Additional condition, the doctor or lawyer must be suspected of having committed an offence referred to in article 90ter of the Code of Criminal Investigation or an offence within the framework of a criminal organization. These methods may also be used if precise facts suggest that third parties suspected of committing one of the offences I have just mentioned use the premises and the residence of the doctor or lawyer. The text further specifies that these measures cannot be carried out without the steward or the representative of the provincial order of doctors, as the case may be, being notified. by

As you have noticed, a number of adjustments have been made to the original text. I will quote a few of them today. by

It was necessary to clarify the concepts used, at the risk of not meeting one of the main objectives of this bill, namely to ensure the legal security of our magistrates and our investigators in the struggle they lead against serious and organized crime. The use of blurred concepts or legal concepts with imprecise contours could only have proved counterproductive. by

In conclusion, this bill determines the specific research methods that may be used by judicial and police authorities. This excellent project respects the principle of proportionality by determining the nature of the offences for the investigation of which particular research methods may be implemented.

The proposed regulation clearly defines the respective powers of the police, the King’s Prosecutor and the Investigative Judge. The use of special research methods is subject to the principle of subsidiarity. It will be up to the judicial and police authorities to verify whether the same result cannot be obtained by other means of search. by

The draft text sets out the conditions under which police officers will be allowed to commit offences in the framework of their mission and ⁇ ins the principle of prohibition of police provocation. by

Finally, the proposed regulation seeks to find a fair balance in order to safeguard the rights of defence and the right to a fair trial, while ensuring the security and anonymity of police officials. by

So we can soothe the fears that have been expressed by some. The Justice Committee has taken time for reflection. She examined the provisions in the project in depth. It conducted the hearing of magistrates and police officers who already apply these particular methods at this time and who will be called to apply the text we are about to vote on. It introduced a series of amendments to clarify the scope of the text and to fill the gaps.

For these various reasons, Mr. President, Mr. Minister, Dear colleagues, the MR group will support the proposal of the Minister of Justice, as it has been amended in committee.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I would like to thank the two rapporteurs for their report and the time they have spent on it.

The draft we discuss here today fits into the context of combating organized crime. In the Government Agreement of 1999, this government took the fight against this form of crime as a priority. This is also an important priority for us, the Greens, to which we have given and will continue our full cooperation, because this disease does not belong in a democratic society.

The draft law provides a legal basis for the special detection methods. This is a substantial and necessary improvement to current practice, in which fuzzy circular letters unknown to the public give a false legitimacy to the use of these techniques and in which any democratic and legal control is far-reaching. A regulation also urged from the point of view of the rights of defence. Positive in the bill is that incitement or provocation remains prohibited. This is explicitly stated in Article 47ter, in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Madame Talhaoui, you’re going too far! When you say that police provocation is explicitly prohibited, if I have well understood the interpretation, you say exactly the opposite of what is. It is not explicitly prohibited. Police provocation, if it were explicitly prohibited, would appear in every letter to Article 47c in the draft. I challenge you in this article which contains only seven lines to find me the words "provocation" and "police". You can say anything you want, but to say that police provocation is forbidden, I’m sorry!

Mr. Decroly, as I just said, I have the guarantee of the European Court of Human Rights, which declares that provocation and incitement by police should not be allowed.

What Mr. Decroly says is wrong. Article 47c stipulates: "A police officer shall not, in the implementation of a special method of investigation, lead a suspect to other criminal offences than those to which his intention had already been directed." As Ms. Talhaoui says, this is in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.

And I have the guarantee of the European Court of Human Rights.

It is also important that the civilian infiltration does not occur in it, due to the danger associated with it.

Colleagues, the debate on the special methods of investigation simultaneously leads to the discussion on the respect for some fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to respect for private life. Among other things, the observation, the insight operation, the direct intercept, the interception and the reading of mail penetrate the private life. The other principle is the rights of defence, the equality of arms. In other words, it is about the delicate balance between the necessities of an efficient crime fighting in which society must have armed governance, on the one hand, and respect for fundamental rights in a democratic society, on the other.

Therefore, the Green Group is cautious when it comes to limiting or abolishing these rights, even when it comes to the efficiency of combating crime. These rights are so fundamental that violations of them must be proportionate to the objective pursued, in particular the fight against organized crime and its control by an independent body. After all, the past has taught us that different discharges are possible. I refer, among other things, to the case-Othello and the case of Commander François, which apparently came up in one of the Bendecommissions. Even within the framework of proportionality and due to the exceptional nature of the special investigation method, we found that the criminal offences committed by a police officer during an assignment or authorised by the prosecutor should not be more serious than the facts attempted to find out through investigation using the special investigation method, so that the proportionality with the aim sought should always be considered as a criterion.

Therefore, we submitted an amendment because we felt that the text itself, which is “strictly necessary”, was nevertheless not sufficiently clear.

Despite the improvements to the original text and the clarifications in the Committee on Justice, to which the hearings, at least for me, without practical experience, have ⁇ contributed, we would like to once again emphasize the exceptionality and peculiarity of the BOM. A scientific support for that design has not occurred, but might have been in place here, even if it was only to demonstrate its efficiency. I can already announce that a doctoral study will apparently be defended at the University of Antwerp.

The draft speaks in its Memorandum of Explanation on the approach to heavy crime, heavy banditism and crimes against humanity when it comes to the scope of these techniques. However, there may be doubts about the scope of application because the threshold for the implementation of some bombs is, in my opinion, relatively low. I am then talking about the criterion of the correctional prison sentence of more than one year or the use of some bombs without providing a threshold or mentioning certain categories of crimes. I am aware that that threshold is the result of a compromise, namely the reference to our provisional detention law or to an international commitment, such as Article 40 of the Schengen Convention on the deadline for extradition. Nevertheless, I cannot get rid of the impression that we are therefore at a sloping level and that there is therefore a certain vigilance to not fall into abuse. Therefore, many colleagues also in the committee meeting have hammered on the concept pair that in this context something can be done only with "serious indications".

I would like to highlight two fundamental rights, namely privacy and the rights of defence, on which I will briefly comment.

All the measures envisaged in the draft law, one more than the other, enter deep into the private life of citizens. In our criminal law, it is the investigative judge who supervises possible violations of it as an independent body. In the draft, he uses some investigative methods to grant authorization, but in the other investigative methods, only the King’s Prosecutor, which in terms of legal control, actually creates a shift from the investigative judge to the King’s Prosecutor on respect for the right to privacy. We would rather have seen that the investigative judge, according to Franchimont, would have remained the guardian for all bombs that violate the right to respect for private life.

The second fundamental principle is the rights of defence. As for the rights of defence, we are in the context of the BOM with the confidential file, an annoying but necessary evil because the physical integrity of police officers must be protected. It is a confidential file containing all confidential reports and is not accessible to the defence or to the judge of facts. Even the investigative judge has no grip on the confidential file because he is not allowed to use the elements contained therein. Our concern remains in the sense that the right to a contradictory debate may sometimes be compromised because the defense does not have or know all the documents or information. The other side of the medal is that the fact judge may sometimes cancel the proceedings because of the irregular use of a bomb and even possibly give a technical exemption.

Mr Talhaoui, I would definitely like to answer clearly to the claim that the rights of defence are compromised by the confidential file. This is not true. With regard to the confidential file, it cannot be argued that the rights of the defence are compromised, since the elements contained therein that would not have been converted into a minutes attached to the file cannot be invoked against you. As such, they are not evidence. The only evidence comes from the elements contained in the court file. Those elements of the confidential file that the King’s Prosecutor intends to use against you must be converted into a minutes to be attached to the criminal record — this is repeatedly stated in the text — before closing it.

As I have done in the committee, I also point out that under the present circumstances no one can force the King’s Prosecutor to add to a case elements which may have been brought to his knowledge or which he has knowledge from other files. He decides on the provision of evidence and one can only invoke elements in the context of the proceedings. This is the case of the Court of Cassation. It’s always sad to know that there’s something secret about you and me. For me, it is hard to keep secrets about you.

He knows more than me.

You are an open book. Under these circumstances, there is no problem. In all seriousness, this is always annoying, but you should put this in the context of the legal debate. The legal debate is conducted on the basis of what is in the criminal file.

It is precisely that annoying that may make the rights of defence even sometimes ....

I would like to give you a small example. At some point, one knows that someone has traveled from one place to another to commit a crime. What will be stated in the process-verbal will be that one has seen him in action from that moment to that moment. What will not be in the file is that a police officer was set up on the first floor of the building opposite it, with the permission of the owner, and that he has established something and something with a rocker. This will not be involved and it does not need to be involved. The essential thing is that one must defend itself against facts and they can only be the subject of discussion if they are also included in the process-verbal, which is an integral part of the dossier.

Are infiltrators an exception?

In the case of infiltration, it will per definition not be included. One will report that one knows what is happening, but one will not mention that Mr. Jef Janssens has said it, because then he will only be able to say it once.

Thank you for the explanation. As regards informants, I would also like to emphasize that while there is a national and local informant management to verify the credibility of informants, it cannot be denied that the same equality of weapons may still be endangered.

Mr. Minister, in connection with the postponed intervention, I would like to ask you another question related to human trafficking. Does this delayed intervention also apply if police officers are faced with human trafficking in which a cargo with people is detected? Will they just let them pass—I remind you of the Dover drama—or does this delay only apply to goods or things? In the case of human trafficking, I ⁇ ’t really feel comfortable.

Mr. Speaker, the example of Mrs. Talhaoui was addressed by the Attorney General of Gent himself. He dealt with a case in which, at a certain point, a request was made for the use of a special detection technique. Victims of human trafficking would leave from a Belgian port. One would wait until the territorial waters were abandoned to then strike. The Attorney General rightly refused. He also explained the conditions for this. This is the real application of proportionality and subsidiarity. You do not play with people. That may be clear. Following your example, I would like to clarify this.

I just wanted to know for sure. After all, in the drama of Dover it becomes more and more clear that apparently some form of delayed "intervention" has taken place. That is why I addressed my question to you.

I want to conclude. Special detection methods should only be used for organised crime and ⁇ not only for the collection and storage of personal data. No fishing, said Mr Vandermeersch. No Operation Rebel, please. In a democratic society, fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to privacy and the right of defence, cannot be restricted or infringed. Even research management cannot be endlessly pushed through without legal control.

I think that this draft, if it becomes a law, sooner or later will have to pass the review by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. We will immediately know where we are.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I will take my responsibility for my part, but not without a healthy dose of vigilance and restraint.

July 17, 2002 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, this short interruption was undoubtedly useful, not to make an infrared camera run but apparently to make another camera run.

Mr. Minister, colleagues, this bill, after the bills relating to the anonymous witnesses, the threatened witnesses and the confiscation of criminal assets, is the next in the legal arsenal necessary to combat organized crime. It is not the last design that is needed. One essential element is still missing, in particular the law on the regret optants. Among other things, for the investigation of the Bende van Nijvel, this is absolutely necessary, according to the prosecutor’s office and the police services. However, this legislation on the regret-optants will not come, just like the balanced youth sanction law demanded by almost all of Flanders and actually even by the majority in this assembly, this because of the veto of Mr. Di Rupo. In an incomprehensible way, he has made huge objections to the law on the anonymous witnesses. To my surprise, I did not hear him during the discussion of this draft that goes much further and is much more delicate, not to say contains more dangers than the previous legislation.

The N-VA is the requesting party for legislation concerning special detection methods. Mr. Minister, in this term, I was probably the first interpellant on this subject. I have repeatedly called for legislation, both in the proactive and in the reactive phase. Since Franchimont, we had entered a number of things in the law, but in the meantime we had to continue to do so with sending letters. It is not unimportant to remember for a moment the law-Franchimont. Since the Act-Franchimont, Article 28bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure states the following. First, the investigation is conducted under the direction and authority of the competent prosecutor of the king. Second, proactive investigation, i.e. in relation to facts committed but not disclosed or facts not yet committed of which there is a reasonable suspicion, falls within the scope of the investigation. Third, the establishment of proactive investigation cannot be done without the prior written consent of the Prosecutor’s Office. Fourth, this shall be without prejudice to compliance with the specific legal provisions governing the special detection methods. This is exactly what is intended with the present draft. Fifth, investigative acts should not contain any coercive measure in violation of individual rights of freedoms, subject to the statutory exceptions. These legal exceptions were not included in the Franchimont Act but also specifically constitute the object of this draft law. The law-Franchimont dates from March 12, 1998, so this bill does not come too early. Special detection techniques and methods are being developed until the present draft is still regulated by sending letters. The N-VA is therefore satisfied that there is finally a legal arrangement so that the grey zone is left. Grey zones are not really welcome from a legal state point of view.

The workplace is also a highly demanding party, as evidenced by the hearings. That is normal and right. Those who are engaged in these practices every day prefer to have legal back cover.

How does the N-VA assess the bill that is under vote?

As I have already emphasized in the discussion of previous draft laws to combat heavy and organized crime, one as a Democrat has a double feeling about this type of draft laws. Democracy is there to protect fundamental rights and freedoms. Every day we continue to work on its refinement. On the other hand, a rule of law has the obligation to act against those who violate the rights and freedoms of others in a criminal manner.

Faced with modern, heavy crime, one comes to the conclusion that police and justice can no longer do without special methods of investigation, if they want to engage with some chance of success in the already unequal struggle with crime.

However, we must also relativize some things. I refer in this regard to the figures provided by the Minister in the Committee on Justice. These figures show that of the 1,149 requests for special detection techniques in 2001, a large number were related to what I would dare to call “middle class” crimes. Although there were also a number of serious criminal acts, it is clear that really serious facts are not discussed. I found nothing in the figures that related to criminal organizations, hormone mafia, VAT carousel, arms trade, terrorism and so on. Let’s relativize the figures somewhat.

I find it really interesting to learn about the doctoral thesis that, according to colleague Talhaoui, is apparently being prepared at the University of Antwerp. In this way, we will get a scientific view of the special detection methods. I remember that in the United States, out of a total of 1 million phone calls, only 5% effectively related to criminal acts. This must, however, encourage us to relativise some things and to demonstrate great caution and restraint in the legal regulation of such special methods and techniques.

For the N-VA, the fundamental principles of the rule of law must be ⁇ ined: everyone has the right to a fair trial and to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. Violation of certain freedoms can only occur upon court order.

In addition, we are very reluctant to commit crimes by the government, by the police.

We want to ensure that the principles contained in Article 28a on criminal proceedings are guaranteed as far as possible.

Finally, of course, the physical integrity of police officers, informants and cooperating citizens must be guaranteed.

Ensuring all these objectives is indeed a delicate task, a difficult task in the field of legistics.

The draft law is largely profitable where it presents the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. Since then, in certain discussions, it has again become clear that they should never be lost from the eye. We cannot repeat this enough, especially also for the people of practice who, dragged by their enthusiasm, might sometimes lose sight of the great principles. It is also important that the Prosecutor’s Office is in principle charged with the leadership and authority and that maximum guarantees for the physical integrity of the police officers are incorporated.

The design was also improved on many points during the hearing in the committee. I think, among other things, of better protection of the professional secrecy of doctors and lawyers. In this regard, the initial design went too far. I have made reservations on this subject from the very beginning and am pleased that we were there with sufficient support to turn the draft into an acceptable provision on this subject. Their

I also think of the limitation and proportionality of the criminal offences that police officers can commit. This improvement was made in the committee. I think, for example, of removing the uncertainty regarding the application threshold of the special detection methods relating to proactive research. Initially, the texts could be read in two ways. This was explained and clarified. The higher threshold for proactive investigation, contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure under the Franchimont Act, remains in force and can therefore not be reduced. In addition to these important principles, merits and improvements, however, we believe there remain a number of important shortcomings from a rule of law point of view.

First, we believe that there are insufficient guarantees for the direction and control of the prosecutor’s office on the informant’s work. As the annual report of Committee P shows, fortunately, the vast majority of police officers are honest, loyal and correct. Unfortunately, a limited number does not and there are even some corrupt. In those circumstances, and even if it was only because I do not want to live in a police state, an efficient direction and control by the prosecutor’s office is absolutely necessary, especially when it comes to special detection methods and techniques such as observation, infiltration, informant work, post interception, search operations and direct interception. Precisely in one of the domains where the danger of osmosis, provokation, false evidence and so on is very large, if not the greatest, and where certain police officers could easily be tempted to cross certain boundaries because they must permanently move in a world where there are no boundaries, precisely there it is still a pity that the leadership of the prosecutor’s office in this domain is not intended. It is the police that designs, executes and regulates the informant work without too many pot watchers. Informants are activated without the intervention of the public prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor’s Office receives only a general report on the informant’s work. Their

I find it difficult to understand the whole heisa on amendment 11, since the Prosecutor’s Office itself, strictly speaking, does not apply informant action in its investigation. The public prosecutor acts only after working with informants. Furthermore, it only makes this process-verbal if this does not jeopardise the safety of the informant. In other words, why exclude the prosecution from prosecuting the investigative judge and reporting to the council, if that prior security guarantee is already provided by law?

Mr. Speaker, I would like to clarify for a moment, Mr. Bourgeois, what was the problem with the texts. In the text such as that preamble in the draft and amendment of the Government, it was stipulated that as soon as an informant was used in the investigation investigation, the case must be brought to the council Chamber through the report of the investigation judge. The mere fact that at the end of the investigation the council chamber was activated meant that the environment and the suspects knew that an informant was used. Their

The only fact that the council was caught proved that, for the sake of the application of the law. That means that the criminal environment itself would undoubtedly take initiatives to detect them. Then we run the risk that he or she will be identified, with all the consequences thereof. Another risk is that informants would no longer be willing to do so.

When the case comes to court, the situation is completely different. After all, if the King’s Attorney at that time considers that a process-verbal should be drawn up for the protection of the informant, which uses formulas such as “we know that...”, then at the time of the trial before the judge it is essentially impossible to find out that an informant has been used in the investigation. That was the objection: it was automatically known that an informant was used as soon as the case came to the council after the investigation. That was the problem. Therefore, this was life-threatening for the informant, also according to the college of prosecutors-general.

Mr. Speaker, I fully support the concern for the safety of the informants, including your basic care in it, Mr. Van Parys. However, I am not convinced by your words. I do not have the text with me now, but I remember well the interruption of the President, who explicitly referred to what was already stated in the legislative text, in particular that a process-verbal is only drawn up if the security is guaranteed. Therefore, the investigating judge has no knowledge of this, if there is no process-verbal that provides guarantees regarding safety. I therefore share your concern, but I remain of the opinion that it was not necessary to approve the amendment in question, precisely because that warranty was registered. She was already in there. I remember very well the discussion in the committee that referred to what was already in the draft.

Mr. Bourgeois has sufficient insight into the matter to understand it correctly. The Prosecutor of the King shall draw up a minutes in the context of the importance of the file and in the context of safeguarding the integrity of the informant. If he is of the opinion that the informant threatens to be in danger, he shall draw up the process-verbal in such a way that it cannot be detected that there was an informant. You know the famous expressions such as “We know that...”. On the basis of this, it is not possible to find out in the file that there was an informant. However, one would have come to know it by the mere fact that after the investigation investigation the case came before the council. Therefore, it was evident that an informant was used, since the legality control could only be carried out at the moment that an informant was used. That is the big problem.

I appreciate your attempt to give me insight. Otherwise, I will come down to take the text. It is not so inscribed in the law. A minutes shall only be drawn up if that double condition is met, in particular if the safety of the informant can be ensured. The case cannot even go to the council room, because it all belongs to the confidential file. It is not even in the criminal record. So I think the security guarantee is arranged in a different way.

In the Explanatory Note to the Articles-by-Article discussion, page 80, it is clearly stated that Article 47undcies is a mechanism used in the event that the King’s Prosecutor either wishes directly to prosecute or wishes to suspend. Their

What is the problem now? Precisely by the fact that the King’s prosecutor had to go to the council chamber, it was known that informants were used. Most informants have information that not everyone has. It is quite easy in an organization to know who said something, and — I repeat — then he will probably not be able to say it twice. That’s why that piece has been removed. Mrs De Rouck and Mr Schitz also said this during the hearing.

I will not take part in the last interruption. The respected member of the Chamber stated yesterday that he was pleased not to have understood what I said and he also found that a very good thing. I will continue with my presentation.

The second delicate point in the discussion of this draft concerns the reduction of the role of the investigative judge. Violation of rights and obligations can for me in principle only after a court order. Here this limit is crossed and you give a number of powers in this regard to the prosecuting party, in particular the prosecutor’s office.

This contradicts the recommendation of the Dutroux investigation committee, which called for a greater role to be given to the investigation judge. It also contradicts the concept of the lawFranchimont. I agree with Mr. Erdman. It is not up to the investigative judge to lead a pro-active investigation. This would remove him from his role. It is, by definition, only re-active. Nevertheless, I believe that in the case of very extensive interventions in the fields of rights and freedoms and privacy, the investigative judge should in some way be able to play a controlling role.

Furthermore, the investigation judge cannot attract the entire investigation, which is a huge contradiction to the law on anonymous witnesses, where the same majority has approved a provision that a full judicial investigation must be conducted every time an anonymous witnesses are involved. Most people were of the opinion that this was a very overdue decision, which could somehow put the applicability of the law on the anonymous witnesses on a slope. I therefore find it regrettable that the opportunity was not used to finally clearly define the position of the investigative judge. The investigative judge is still legally in charge of the judicial investigation, but with the law-Franchimont and now even more its jurisdiction is thwarted. Their

Furthermore, in the present draft, the investigation judge is not even the guarantor of fundamental rights and freedoms. He is no longer the judge of the investigation or the judge of the freedoms, for which some advocate. Their

If the majority, as in the present case, wanted to grant the public prosecutor a number of extensive powers, the investigative judge would have to have been granted a number of control powers as a counterbalance. As you evolve more and more in the direction of harvesting the principle of judicial investigation under the guidance of the investigative judge, you must be consistent and you must indeed somehow create a new figure. You may need to create the Court of Rights and Freedoms or the Court of Investigation. Now you are on a double track and take out the existing guarantees. Their

I come to my third point of criticism.

Mr. Bourgeois, I share your concerns in general. I truly think that the debate will one day have to be carried out to the ground, but you should not dismantle this as an academic exercise. Their

I am referring to any investigation that the Public Prosecutor’s Office could initiate for the purpose of an inquiry, using certain methods.

You and I know that it will not take long or one has to go to the investigative judge. It is sufficient that a person must be held in the investigation in order to also refrain from an investigation. If, under certain circumstances, a home search operation is actually to be claimed, not an inquiry operation, then an investigative judge is needed. Many of the concerns that you now raise correspond to the criticisms already expressed, including the shift to the prosecutor’s office. As was essentially stated during the discussions, the respective role of both in that investigation must be specifically defined. Why have we left the control of the investigation methods to the prosecutor, even in the judicial investigation? To ensure the independence of the investigative judge. Without prejudice to the fact that the investigation judge can still order termination or modification, the control remains with the Prosecutor’s Office. Beyond ⁇ the fact that pro-active research can very quickly, as Mr. Vandemeirssche very clearly stated, turn into a re-active research, I see a long re-active research — ⁇ a long preparation that may take some time — not sitting straight. At the end of the journey and at the end of the investigation, you do not necessarily have to go through a judicial investigation.

I know from the discussions in the committee that we share the same concerns on this point. But I’m not sure that this is just an academic exercise. It is indeed the reality. I agree with you that the investigation judge can play the role it must play and can play in the context of the judicial investigation once the cases are in the phase of the judicial investigation. Here we are, of course, with a number of preconditions in which he cannot play that role, in which he cannot always draw the matter to himself — as he may wish — and in which he cannot play a controlling role precisely where there is an infringement of rights and freedoms.

I come to a third point of criticism: the lack of a regulation that allows a sufficiently contradictory review for the judge. One of the important things here is the confidential file which I will return to later. During the discussions in the committee, I have pointed out and insisted on two things. Their

The first point concerns an adaptation of the rules on the purification of invalidities. I know that this is not directly covered by the draft in question. However, this was discussed during the hearings. I think we have once faced a ruling of the Arbitration Court in the Vercauteren case. I am quoting the arbitration court’s ruling again because it is so important in the light of my further argument. I quote: “The absolute impossibility of applying to the court acts that have been substantially annulled is not proportionate to the aim of avoiding legal uncertainty. The purpose of the rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely the finding of truth for the purpose of punishing crimes, is not less necessary when the file of irregularities has been cleared. By providing, in an absolute and general manner, that documents declared invalid by an investigation court may not be viewed and used in criminal proceedings, even if they contain elements which may be indispensable for the defence of a party, the contested provisions disproportionately prejudice the rights of the defence.”

In my view, the present draft constitute an excellent opportunity to replace the annulled provisions of the Franchimont Act. As you know, this is a sentence in Articles 131, paragraph 2, and 235bis, paragraph 6, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in particular, and I quote: "The documents deposited at the office shall not be viewed and shall not be used in the criminal proceedings." I think that this draft regulates extremely delicate matters because the debates, the discussions about invalidities will increase precisely with these.

My great criticism at the time on the design-Franchimont was related to the purification. I have always found it bad that the purification took place in respect of certain parties in a non-contradictory manner, that before the judge in essence the debate on this subject could no longer be conducted. There may be situations where purification has occurred before certain parties have access. In my view, from the perspective of the rule of law and of the citizen’s confidence in the judiciary, it is important that there is a different arrangement for the purification of the nullities.

My second consideration concerning that contradictory review, which was also cited by other colleagues, relates to the confidential file. I know that my comments have been wiped away. This has happened again afterwards. I noted that colleague Giet spoke of the Trojan horse in connection with the confidential file. I am not so sure — I have also listened to the dialogues thereafter — that all this has no repercussions. One can, of course, assume a very simple example, as the Minister subsequently formulated. Indeed, it can be argued that the evidence must be contained in that file and that the burden of proof must be thus secured. What happened outside the confidential file is not in the face of the judge in substance. All kinds of possible situations can naturally be imagined — I refer mutatis mutandis to the case-Vercauteren — in which people, witnesses, accused, accused say that their innocence can be proved by means of. It is not always so that it is stated that the public prosecutor can only invoke what the file contains. There are also various discussions with various parties in this process.

As I have already mentioned, the role of the investigative judge is undermined. This is in sharp contrast with the law on anonymous witnesses, where a full judicial investigation must be initiated every time. Their

As a proof, I quote from the Minister’s explanation on page 8 of the report: “The permanent control over the implementation of special detection methods lies with the King’s Prosecutor, even if they were ordered by the investigative judge. It is evident that in the case of judicial investigation the investigation judge himself decides which methods he orders, changes or stops. Nevertheless, even in that case, the Prosecutor of the King shall continue to exercise his control powers. The authorisations granted in this regard by the investigative judge shall be executed by the Prosecutor of the King. The confidential file belongs to the Prosecutor’s Office. This will be the prosecutor of the King or the magistrates he designates, the so-called trust magistrates."

The investigative judge has only access to the confidential file.

I am not at all convinced that consideration B.6.2. of the Court of Arbitration in the verdict-Vercauteren — consideration which I have read subsequently — will not be invoked mutatis mutandis or will not apply to the confidential file. Evidence collection in criminal cases affects fundamental rights of defence. Once the legislator has ensured the protection of the physical integrity of police officers and staff of police officers, it is not at all certain that the shielding of the confidential file, keeping it out of the debates before the judge on the ground, will pass the test of the Arbitration Court.

Per ⁇ it is a pity that no additional advice could be given on this point, either by the State Council or by experts.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deciding. The N-VA stands firmly behind the necessary measures in the fight against serious organized crime. In addition, from the perspective of the rule of law, there are too many fundamental objections and questions that are unanswered. The N-VA will therefore refrain from this draft — as in the committee.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, I would like to begin by pointing out two points of convergence between the analysis that I would like to develop of the project that is submitted to us and the views that were expressed before me in this tribune.

According to the first point, there are indeed areas where the fight against organized crime must admit a number of derogations from fundamental rights. In parliament, we must consider the fact that real risks are taken in relation to acts that can endanger our country’s institutions or even democracy.

In view of this kind of risks, it must be considered that there are also activities on the part of certain environments of organized crime that undermine human rights, democracy, which are in a way to discredit these institutions. It is on the basis of these risks that the risks taken when using specific research methods such as these must be assessed. This is therefore a first point on which I believe I can share the nuanced point of view developed in a balanced way by several speakers.

There is a second point on which I totally agree with most of my predecessors. It is the idea that legislation is needed. This idea draws its legitimacy from Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which orders respect for privacy, family life, home and correspondence, while explicitly specifying the possibility that certain derogations from this fundamental principle are made by a law. by

The same principle is found in Articles 22 or even 29 of our Constitution which concern respect for private and family life or the secret of correspondence. Here too, the Belgian constituents had, from the outset, indicated that exceptions could be enunciated in laws. In this regard, I share the views expressed before me, but the end of the road I can go with my colleagues already stops here, in particular the end of the road I can go with the majority rainbow. After three years of legislature, we can begin to make a balance sheet. I feel that with this majority, whenever one acknowledges the existence of a problem in the field of crime or criminal law, one finds himself, by virtue of a kind of ideological and political dynamic, packed in a spiral of which many of us find it difficult to get out.

This is how socialists, Flemish Christian Democrats, liberals and even Greens are found side by side in positions not only security, but which can eventually even prove counterproductive, ineffective in any case, in relation to the stated objectives of the fight against organized crime.

For example, in the case of immediate appearance procedure, in the case of youth rights, in the case of anonymous testimony, in the case — Mr. Erdman had acknowledged it just recently — extending repeatedly since the beginning of this legislature the scope of Article 90ter of the Criminal Code, each time we started from an honest intellectual agreement that I was able to share at certain times, with liberals or socialists within the majority. Thus we start from a correct debate on the substance and, through a kind of packaging that could be called magical if it was not so dramatic in its potential effects, we find ourselves on proposals severely derogatory from common law procedures and fundamental principles.

For example, when Mr. Coveliers, in 1993 or 1994, deposits in the House or in the Senate, I do not know more, a proposal of law legalizing in some way the essence of the two circles that regulated the matter we are debating today, I applauded obviously. I found it important to bring out the shadow of the techniques that, until then, were left in a certain clandestinity and put those who were supposed to apply them in a situation of permanent legal insecurity.

The text that we are examining here goes further, too far, especially since in a number of cases, the legislative package that I have just talked about may prove counterproductive in its effects compared to the fight against organised crime and against ordinary crime.

In relation to the fight against organised crime, I fear that this excess of frenetic legislative excitement will unfortunately respond to a comparable excitement, if not the judicial circles, ⁇ the police circles that we know well. I believe that this kind of climate will eventually prove to be clearly detrimental to the admissibility of evidence, for example, if the essential conditions of necessity, subsidiarity and proportionality that everyone recalls here are so poorly assured, so poorly anchored in the reality of the text submitted to us.

Counter-productivity or risk of counter-productivity is also significant in the fight against ordinary crime. The unnecessary or disproportionate use of such particular methods of investigation to collect evidence that could have been ⁇ otherwise may lead to the pure annulment of such evidence.

An example on page 17 of the explanation of the motives: "Curse that may favor the commission of an offence is permitted if there was pre-existing criminal intent, when it is a police officer who incites someone to infiltrate a criminal environment." I think it is clearly the kind of disposition that will sooner or later lead to a Strasbourg condemnation. As soon as possible, but I fear that to get to Strasbourg, we have to wait a few years and that is the problem. Because the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, in a judgment, for example, of 9 June 1998, quite clearly condemns in its paragraph 39 any police influence capable of inciting an individual to commit an offence. I would like to come back to the discussion we had just recently. Why has Bon Sang not agreed to explicitly include in the 47quater the notion of police provocation which seems quite finely defined by the existing jurisprudence? I know that there is a kind of approximately similar circumcision in the current text of the 47quater but I think that this circumcision is not quite superposable to the notion of police provocation and to the jurisprudence that has emerged over time in our jurisdictions.

On the other hand, and this is another gap of this 47quater, the inadmissibility of prosecutions is well indicated there, but not clearly enough because what the case-law, the European Court of Human Rights, specifies is that there is not only inadmissibility of prosecutions in a context like this, but also inadmissibility ab initio and definitive because, I quote the judgment of June 9, it is considered that the deceit in question has deprived "ab initio and definitively the applicant of a fair trial".

Because of these shortcomings, because of these shortcomings, I think that we will actually find ourselves at a given time facing situations where evidence will be considered unusable and where eventually Belgian judicial decisions will be condemned by the court of Strasbourg. I find it also significant (and it is also a big deal of how the majority has worked for three years) that there have been no serious studies on the cost-effectiveness of these measures to combat organized crime. The most precise details I have heard so far refer to some recent press articles, and in particular to an operation that was conducted in Thuin, I think, after a gun theft in a military barracks. We are told that without the special methods of research, this victory would not have been achieved. I ask to see. by

It is true that in this case, it seems that the particular methods of research have been used, but do we have a precise indication, I in any case do not know the dossier, of what would have happened if we had resorted not to particular methods but to traditional methods of research? In addition, I would like to refer to a case that I know well. I am talking about the Dutroux case and the period that preceded August 17, 1996. I would like to remind you of one element that seems to me likely to reduce some enthusiasm for particular methods of research in the light of the Thudinian experiment. In Charleroi, for several months, special research methods were implemented with the famous Othello dossier to result in the known catastrophe. I therefore think that it would have been useful to conduct a thorough study other than merely event-based of the actual cost-effectiveness of these measures in the fight against organised crime.

I come to the second problem.

To regulate and do so on issues like these, it is likely to allow a number of behaviors, including police officers. It also makes other measures, including control and precautionary measures, mandatory. But it should also be prohibiting a number of things. I have the impression — I will return to it — that in this case, a lot of things are allowed. There are — it is true — a certain number of provisions and guards. But these are nothing more than façade guard. In fact, not much is forbidden.

Mr. Decroly, I can understand that a scientific study, demonstrating that these methods will have a positive effect in the context of the fight against major crime, can reassure you. by

Unfortunately, a scientific study is not necessary to establish that normal methods are not sufficient to combat organised crime. This is the drama.

As it is observed that traditional methods are not sufficient to combat crime, these methods must be adopted, even if it is counter-hearted, by harvesting the fruits of the experience acquired abroad. Moreover, in several legislations, these methods have been legally confirmed. The opposite is therefore ⁇ an argument that is as valid as the absence of study.

You are right, but I observe nevertheless that during the previous legislature, on questions such as these, it happened quite frequently that one could have, for example, notes and sometimes substantial studies of a service of which one no longer hears, Mr. Minister. I am talking about criminal policy.

I also think that a study like this would not reverse things. I did not say that there was no need for special research methods.

I contend that the change of method—passing from conventional methods to particular methods—is the only way to fight organised crime more effectively. There are other means, such as everything that relates to the training of police officers and the traditional means that they are endowed, including on the budgetary level. Again, what I said there was not in the sense of a principle rejection of any particular method, but rather came in support of a criticism of the extent of the scope of application and the little clarity of the limits laid on certain points by this bill. Furthermore, I think there would be non-directly repressive alternatives to the fight against organized crime that our government and the majority that supports it in parliament have become accustomed to despise. I think in particular of a stronger association of victims with the criminal procedure. At each debate of this style, I remind you of a bill I filed two years ago and which echoes the commitment to proceed, beyond the small Franchimont reform of March 1998, to a more important Franchimont reform, a commitment that was taken by everyone here at this tribune and in the electoral programs on which many of us were elected. by

In my view, a better fight against organised crime requires the strengthening of the civil party’s rights of defence and the recognition of actual rights for the victim to be more systematically involved in certain phases of criminal proceedings. In any case, in this struggle, we must not neglect the possible contribution of the victims and a legislation that, in the field of criminal proceedings, would go a little further in the idea of equality of weapons and of association of civilian parties to the work of justice to arrive at neutralizing certain perpetrators or bringing out certain truths.

Instead, I have the impression that this majority has put not only the rights of the detainees in the closet but also the rights of the civil party in parentheses since its advent while, for many of us, Mr. Minister, this kind of theme has been at the origin of our election, our re-election or the success of our parties.

I come to the question of the scope of the bill, which seems to me quite contradict the beautiful discourse that is heard here and outside the parliament on the strictly exceptional character that must have the use of particular methods of research. It is good to say it, but it would be better to do it, to write it in the texts! This is the case when mr. Giet indicates that he “hopes” — he said it practically like this — that a directive of the College of Prosecutors General will in fact allow to restrict the scope of application to only the threshold fixed by Article 90ter of the Criminal Code and by Article 324bis of the Code of Criminal Instruction, I think it would have been very useful to bring in the text of the law itself this kind of more precise limitation.

Indeed, for me, the fact that there is no infringement threshold required, either to proceed with a simple observation, such as a filature, where no special technical means is used, or to resort to indicators or to delayed intervention, raises questions about the type of regime that one takes the risk of inducing. by

Too low also, the criminal threshold fixed for offences punishable by a minimum of one year in prison, for observations with technical means, the interception of mail or the collection of bank data. by

For me, these two chapters of the project are too much. I really think that with the third, the one I recently cited following Mr. Giet, we had much of what to counter the real organized crime and the real serious crime. In light of what exists in the text of the project, the principle of proportionality, of which many gurgle, seems to me in reality to be violated. In my opinion, there is no real legislative will to limit the commitment of particular research methods to the fight against organised crime. Furthermore, given the fact that since the arrival of the so-called rainbow majority, the scope of Article 90ter has been "blown" repeatedly, we end up with something relatively disturbing, especially since the notion of proactivity legally established by the March 1998 law, combined with this legislation on particular methods of research, risks giving birth to a sort of legislative "Dracula". by

When all this is combined with the fact that offences, which are not yet committed but are likely to be committed, may be the subject of such particular methods, one can wonder what will fall outside the scope of these legislations and what will remain concretely of the right of all citizens not to be unjustly suspected of acts they have not committed. by

I also notice a shift in the way the terms are used. Between Article 28bis dated from the Franchimont era, where one spoke of punishable facts that are to be committed, and the speeches that are held today – now one speaks of punishable facts that are to be committed or of authors who would commit these facts –, one thus passes from the immediate future to a simple future or to a conditional present. This shows that one is moving away from a logic of proactivity in the strictest sense and that one is slowly taking the path of proactivity in a much broader sense.

Also about the principle of proportionality, I will refer to an article of a field man, Mr. by Christian de Valkeneer. It is entitled "The Fraud in the Administration of Criminal Evidence". It was published in 2000. It therefore takes back quite contemporary considerations, issued by an actor who cannot be considered as an observer presenting strictly abstract and academic considerations. What does the author say? by

It says that there are limits to the authorized commission of infringements and even exclusions. I quote them: "There should be excluded attacks on the psychological or physical integrity of persons, whether directly or indirectly." If a judge decides on the matter, this should draw attention. In particular, on the question of the facts of morals, to which Mr. The minister seems to be very sensitive, it seems to have forgotten these fairly cracking but yet worrying facts. by

Let us remember the magistrates and some police officers of the Nihoul movement in Brussels, who frequented assiduously the fine parts of the Atrebates street in the name of their will to infiltrate the criminal circles. I believe that this type of process raises a number of questions. Not excluding them from the scope of this law risks further strengthening those who fell into this panel yesterday, with the conviction that they can continue to do so. by

The Council of State, by the way, in its opinion on this project makes a clear distinction between offenses without victims and offenses that cause harm to others. I regret that this distinction could not be held. It cannot be enough to say that offences are necessary and that they must be committed at any cost to reassure the infiltrated medium about the loyal character of the infiltrant.

by Mr. De Valkeneer also says that repeated commission of infringements should be excluded. As much as one can imagine an occasional aid provided to a criminal or criminal act to commit an offence by a person infiltrated in the medium, so, from the moment that this type of aid becomes a recurring act, the concrete problems arise. It also proposes to exclude acts that enable crime to flourish without sufficient guarantee of achieving the objectives pursued by the operation implementing particular methods of investigation. It is for situations that present a too high risk of not achieving these goals, or even catalysing those of crime.

This type of exclusion should have been more explicitly, more clearly formulated in the text submitted to us. I would add that it would have been useful to exclude from the scope of the infringements committed during the observation or contact with the indicators. I do not see why, when observing or in contact with indicators, one should be allowed to commit violations. I remember Mr. Zicot and how in the end, by means of contact with indicators or infiltration, some police officers find themselves — with their body defending or not, we may one day learn — on the other side of the barrier.

Similarly, police provocation should have explicitly appeared in the exclusions, as well as the offences against the State Security. I am surprised that a majority of those who have expressed their support for Mr. Bush, in his major anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, does not even think today of explicitly prohibiting behaviors that could endanger State Security in legislation like this. In the current text, this type of infringement may possibly be permitted. In the light of events of the early 1980s, for example, and of threats that, in my opinion, still guard the democratic order of our country, I find quite dangerous the door so opened.

Regarding the control exercised over police officers, I acknowledge that an amendment to Article 47quinquies, §2, in the draft, establishes a form of internal proportionality between the act committed and the act the police officer is supposed to avoid, but my satisfaction can unfortunately be only partial. These offences cannot be more serious than the offences for which the methods are applied. They must be proportionate to the target. These offences may be as serious as the act against which they are carried out. In this regard, I think that the basic ethical questions arise again in how one should weigh whether or not to resort to these methods.

Similarly, it can be read that the Prosecutor of the King must mention in advance and in writing the list of offences he authorizes to police officers. I think this is a good disposition but it is practically neutralized a few lines further, where it is stated that police officers must formally warn the King’s Attorney as soon as they commit an offence. This means in fact that they can do so without prior authorization but with a simple a posteriori authorization. On this level, I think that after trying to frame things somewhat, we reopen a real boulevard to abuse.

I see you impatient, Mrs. Herzet, but don’t be afraid, all the steps have been taken so that things go quickly and do the least harm possible, Mrs. Dardenne.

The principle of recourse to the investigative judge whenever a particular method of investigation is used is not repeated. I think that in terms of the control to be exercised on the police officers, it is a little less. Moreover, the fact that, even during the instruction, the prosecutor’s office will, in fact, keep the high hand on these methods and their use. And more and more — this is an unfortunate background blade that also animates the rainbow coalition — the judge is gradually reduced to a role of regularity control, even in such delicate contexts as the preservation and protection of fundamental freedoms.

It is the public prosecutor who is ultimately responsible for both the execution of particular research methods and their permanent control. I think it will be difficult for a number of public prosecutors to exercise this control, while also being in charge of the execution of these methods, with all the serenity and impartiality desired. by

I will conclude by saying that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and everything that relates to the fair trial is also questionable. I remember that we had a lot of discussion a year ago, about the Bill on Anonymous Testimony and the probative force that anonymous testimony can have. I believe that, mutatis mutandis, it would also have been useful to clarify that a criminal case cannot be limited to evidence collected by means of particular research methods or that at least a conviction cannot be based neither exclusively nor decisively on such elements. I believe that by analogy with European case-law on anonymous testimony, this would have been a significant contribution to limiting the damage that this law could cause. by

Finally, I find that we are here, after just a few weeks of debate in a committee, in the presence of a draft ready to vote, probably in a few hours, less than 24 hours after the distribution of the report, and ⁇ even without the possibility of a senatorial evocation since I perceive it as a fairly broad consensus. Despite a number of reproaches, grievances, and teeth grinding that are being heard, I have the impression that at the time, even the most frustrated and sad among you will make the right gesture to back up again and again the government of which they are so unhappy in the facts. by

I find that, apart from the amendment which provides for special safeguards in the protection of the professional secret of the lawyer or doctor subject to an investigation with particular methods of research, the real improvements made to this project since its exit from the Council of Ministers are really rare and superficial. Political decisions are not really made in parliament. They are replaced, like Mr. Giet seemed to indicate it just recently, through criminal policy choices that are made, let us recall, under the auspices of the executive. I find that in the commission, eventually, technical and legal work is done sometimes useful. But the real political choices should have been made there and ⁇ should still be made here and not in the College of General Prosecutors.

That is why, in the light of the risks of counterproductivity that I was trying to outline just recently and what will ⁇ be the behavior of the majority of this parliament with regard to the amendment of Mr. Trump. Arens, who excludes voluntary attacks on the physical integrity of people, from the scope of this law, I am preparing, unless surprising tomorrow, who knows, to vote against this bill.

the importance of a fair trial, the importance of the rights of defence and the desires of the police officers acting.

And in all cases, Mr. Le Président, you voudrais souligner that this project of law is not a fact isolated. It is part of a global approach of the government in the fight against organized crime and the great banditism. You understand naturally that it is demanded that the clarity be made on this point. But you must know that it is in the but of the fight against this crime organized that other projects of laws have been initiated. Therefore, I understand that, among other things, colleague Giet made a comment. I did not understand his comment as a limitation of the law, because the law is clear and clear. However, I can imagine — this is, by the way, a suspicion which I have also observed on the ground among the magistrates and the police officers who have collaborated — that one has been asked to make a series of clarifications at a given moment. The future will show whether it is necessary or not. In any case, that will not happen contra legem, let that be clear. For this, the signs provided in the law are sufficiently clear. This was also not the tone of the speech of Mr. Giet. M is Giet demanded above all that we focus on the infractions that are committed within the framework of the fight against the organized crime and the great banditism. En ce qui concerne cette problématique, permettez-moi de me référer à l'approche sur ce sujet d'une magistrate de confiance de Gand, Mme De Roeck.

N'oublions pas la loi relative à l'anonymat, à la protection des témoins, au recueil des déclarations via des moyens audio-visuels ainsi que le projet de loi portant extension des possibilités de saisie et de confiscation en matière pénale. Il ne faut pas non plus oublier le parquet fédéral qui a également vu le jour. Mr. Speaker, now I want to return to the bill — revenons à nos moutons. Of course there have been some delicate points, and it would be a great naivety to think that this bill could have passed through the House like a penny flute. For this we needed ten sessions, between 30 April and today. In this, of course, a number of problems have been addressed which demonstrate the history of this law and at the same time its degree of difficulty.

Now, however, there has been a result. This result has come in spite of unrelenting unhealthy news and unhealthy predictions. Some have argued that this draft would not reach the Council of Ministers. And when it came through the Council of Ministers, they said it might be stuck in the Committee for Justice. That has not happened. We have succeeded in bringing this to a good end, although I must say that those delicate points should not be avoided. I will touch them, only on the political level.

First, I will talk about the role of the investigative judge. Given the potential threat to fundamental rights in the application of the method set out in the draft, some MEPs wished to confer the power to apply it exclusively and exclusively on the investigation judge. In this way, of course, the reality was not taken into account. This reality was further reinforced by the Franchimont Act, which makes the investigative judge per definition in the reactive part of the investigation. This implies that under those circumstances, it will not be possible to make use of special detection methods for the purpose of proactive search, which we have limited. It is good that comments were made on this subject, at least on those sections which relate to the criminal organizations and the applications of the tap law.

A second problem that has long been discussed is the problem of the legality check on the special detection method. Initially, no procedure was provided. In order to ⁇ the political balance, a procedure was provided. Some aspects are so important that I want to emphasize them. There was a political control aspect, about which almost everyone was on the same line. The problem has only been raised with the individual dossiers, and more specifically with the individual dossiers that would not give rise to any prosecution.

Colleague Van Parys, I admit that in your discussion you have once again put into the light the position of the College of Attorneys-General — and more specifically that of Mr Schins. You referred to your own amendment, which actually demanded the same as Mr Schins, in particular the disappearance of Article 47undecies from the legislation. You have given that power. There has been an amendment by colleague Coveliers, who argued that with regard to the special method of detection, the informant’s work should be ignored. The amendment was eventually suspended after a long discussion.

From that long discussion, I remember that at some point the problem was actually proposed a little “in overkill.” I am not saying that you had no point to come back to it, but the consequences you attach to it are not the same consequences as, for example, the chairman of the committee or Mr. Bourgeois attach to it.

I have also made some comments to state that the great danger that may exist must be nuanced and, in any case, reduced to a different proportion.

That idea was approved, but not with an alternative majority. In fact, approval by an alternative majority would have meant that within the majority there was a stance in favor and a stance in opposition. Mr Coveliers submitted his amendment and continued to maintain it. You supported that, which I will not dispute. Ultimately, this amendment could take away everyone’s approval. To be honest, I think this is a balance that can ⁇ and firmly deserve its place in the text.

The indicator was exempted from the mandatory passage before the Board Chamber after information and, in addition to the control of non-sequential classified files in which the particular research methods were carried out, was ⁇ ined within the public prosecution hierarchy. However, a system of political control has also been adopted, which I welcome because it will require that we return to the issue each year. Mijnheer de voorzitter, graag wil i nog even stilstaan bij de doelstellingen van de bijzondere opsporingsmethoden. In discussions, die heute vrij technisch waren, sind wir daaraan vielleicht wel delels voorbijgegaan. De gerechtelijke finaliteit is de finaliteit bij uitstek van de bijzondere opsporingsmethodes. Officials of the police offices will carry out the special opsporingstechnieken weliswaar, but that will they always do under a permanent control of the magistrature. Over the control I want yet even the next understrepen. by Mr. Giet said that a budget would need to be available to allow the use of these particular techniques and the basic training of magistrates; in fact, it is the magistrates who lead the discussion, carry out the control and guide the manoeuvre. In this regard, I see that in the last three or four years, the training of judges is increasingly taken into account. There is an effort to improve the situation; for example, in addition to the fact that expert networks have been created within the College of General Prosecutors, we also have trusted magistrates who are trained for this type of difficult and neuralgic tasks. Mijnheer de voorzitter, daaraan wil i toevoegen — in dat kan niet genoeg worden onderstreept — in dat er een bijzonder grote controle bestaat op die bijzondere opsporingsmethoden, niet alleen intern bij de politiediensten — in ik heb het dan nog niet over het feit dat men daarvoor speciaal mensen zal aanduiden. Tegelijk zal ook worden gebruikgemaakt van onder meer en external control door het committee P of en control door of inspectiediensten van de police.

Mr. Minister, you have used such decisive arguments that colleague Van Parys has fallen from his chair.

Mr. Van Parys has been sitting on his chair for as long as his chair did, if I can say so. In the meantime, he took the place of Mr. Van Peel. We will see tomorrow what happens with it. I don’t know if the repair will be done tomorrow.

Marc Verwilghen: Mr. Speaker, I already mentioned the police control and the control by the magistrate. But there is also the post factum control by the Chamber of Councils, by the Chamber of Accusations, by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, and — let us not forget that — by the land judge. I believe that under these circumstances a lot of additional measures have been taken.

Mr Decroly, I would like to emphasize that the prohibition of provocation with a sanction of inadmissibility is a ⁇ important element whose value should not be underestimated. You may say that the matter is not sufficiently clearly defined in the law, but I think that is ⁇ clear without any contradiction.

Het principe geldt dat geen misdrijven gepleegd mogen worden naar aanleiding van bijzondere opsporingsmethoden. As it happens, it is a criminal land, which is subject to a certain formal procedure. Also op dat punt biedt de wet volgens mij voldoende soelaas, net zoals de rechtvaardigingsgronden met het oog op de organisatie. I will not discuss the other methods, Mr. Speaker. I would simply like to add that as regards infiltration and the arguments developed in this regard by Ms. Dardenne, no project is currently being developed as regards an extension of the list contained in Article 90ter of the Code of Criminal Instruction.

Mr. Minister, we have just been distributed a document reflecting the legislative work carried out during the year 2001/2002 by the Justice Committee. I find that at least two projects concern this article 90ter; there is the bill amending article 90ter of the Code of Criminal Instruction (doc. 50/1271) and the draft law amending Articles 80, 471, 472 of the Criminal Code and Article 90ter, §2, 8° of the Criminal Instruction Code.

It is exact.

In a year, this article has already been changed twice!

I wanted to say that apart from these two projects that we were aware of at the time of the discussion, no bill aimed at extending the application of Article 90ter is being prepared. by

With regard to the scope of one year, I ask myself why this provision causes such a reaction when this period is needed for preventive detention.

I am sorry, but we are not proactively applying preventive detention.

This argument is correct, Mr Decroly. However, you have to make remarks that even if you have given reasons, you have not assisted at any of the ten sessions that have been dedicated entirely to the study of this project of law. It is in the course of these discussions that our work is crystallized. Finally, Mr. Speaker, I would like to make a few additional comments. I think that the control of bank accounts and monitoring is a very extensive measure. We have assumed — despite the fact that it constitutes a serious violation of private life, Mrs. Talhaoui — that we can entrust this to the prosecutor of the king. For the direct listening and the inspection operations, we have rightly retained the intervention of the investigative judge.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, this was in a brief overview the essence of the bill that precedes. We must definitely reach this milestone. It has taken long enough to concrete the recommendations of various parliamentary investigation committees on this point. In these circumstances, I invite Parliament to vote on the draft law.