Proposition 50K1280

Projet de loi spéciale portant transfert de diverses compétences aux régions et communautés.

General information ¶

Submitted by

The Senate

Submission date

March 29, 2001

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

transfer of competence regionalisation

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V FN VB

Voted to reject

Groen Ecolo PS | SP Open Vld MR

Abstained from voting

LE

Party dissidents ¶

• Georges Clerfayt (MR) abstained from voting.
• Richard Fournaux (MR) abstained from voting.
• Olivier Maingain (MR) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

June 27, 2001 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen ministers, colleagues, at the beginning of the report, the Speaker paid tribute to the Legislative Secretariat of the Chamber, which took a ⁇ good initiative by making an overview table with this law. This table shall be attached to the report. By the way, it is almost impossible to understand the texts without that table. I would like, together with rapporteur Poncelet, to join this thanks and to congratulate the Secretariat for the ⁇ adequate way in which this report was prepared in a relatively short time. It is therefore a pleasure that we, colleague Poncelet and I, together can patronize this report. Their

In this session, I will try to reflect what has been highlighted in the general discussion. Mr Poncelet will then take the discussion of the amendments into account. I will try to refrain from the papers that are merely about political stance. In fact, I assume that the speakers who have already put something forward in the committee will do so in this plenary session. Moreover, subjectivity is quite easy to get into such argumentation. If I have been somewhat subjective in the treatment of any argument, I apologize for that already. I try to explain everything as objectively as possible. Their

The introduction was given by Minister Van den Bossche. I take this opportunity to — on behalf of the whole Chamber, I suppose — wish him a prompt recovery. He has in it, in a historical overview that I will not repeat here, referred to what has happened to state reforms. There were three waves of state reforms that eventually led to what was mentioned in the 1999 Government Agreement, to the current reform that summarizes the Lambermont Agreement, named after the building, and the Lombard Agreement can be called. On the one hand, there are changes to the legislation on competence and financing, on the other hand, to the laws of the Brussels institutions. These are amendments to the Special Act of 8 August 1980, as regards the transfer of powers, and to the Act of 12 January 1989, as regards the Brussels Institutions. Their

The first chapter deals with Agriculture, where the Act of 8 August 1980 retained the competence for Agriculture at the federal level. It is now the reverse. The general competence goes to the regions, while there are a number of exceptions that, on the one hand, remain at the European level, on the other hand, are implemented at the Belgian level. Specifically, this means, for example, that the competence for consultation and implementation of the common agricultural policy – and with common meaning the level of the European Community – remains with the Belgian State. The regions together determine the criteria for the award of European standards. The establishment and control of those standards also applies to the regions and the compensatory measures for activity reduction as well. However, there is a special exception here, in particular that the income replacement measures in the event of early retirement of older farmers — an important concept — are roughly equated with the bridge pension and that this remains a competence of the federal government. The structural support goes to the regions.

The second important package is Foreign Trade. It can be read on page 7 that Article 3 of the draft regionalizes a number of aspects of the sales and export policy without prejudice to the competence of the federal government in two areas, namely the granting of guarantees against export, import and investment risks — which, by the way, is recalled in the general discussion by a number of speakers — and in the field of multilateral trade policy: the world organisations WTO, FAO, OECD and so on.

The next point is development cooperation, where a working group is created to prepare the overhaul of the necessary financial resources, in accordance with a number of distribution keys.

You can find the text of this in the report on page 8 at the top. This text again clearly refers to the principle of implied powers, in other words the powers that are in the extension of the powers of the regions and communities and which are in general transferred to the regions and communities. On the other hand, one can read a ⁇ interesting text on implied powers from the hand of our former colleague, Herman Suykerbuyk, when he spoke about the decree on the appointment of mayors. He wrote a groundbreaking text on this.

The fifth point concerns the regionalization of provincial and municipal laws. In this regard, there is a red thread to be noticed that is repeated in the discussion, namely the question of whether or not Article 162 of the Constitution should be amended. The Minister is of the opinion that this is not the case because in this article 162 it is a law, but it is about the competence of the legislative power in contrast to the executive power. The Minister referred to the report of the Senate. In this report you will find the full reasoning and argumentation. One statement, which is used by the State Council, states that Article 162 of the Constitution must be amended. The Government, supported in this by the Arbitration Court and by the precedent of the amendment of Article 184, on the other hand, considers that this Article 162 should not be amended.

The implementation of the Lombardy Agreement was discussed by the Minister. A number of amendments were adopted in the Senate, amending the agreement, which was concluded among Brusselsers to improve the functioning of the Brussels institutions. This agreement consists of three major chapters. A first chapter concerns the distribution of seats in the Brussels Capital Council: 17 Dutch-speaking and 42 French-speaking. In this regard, the percentage of 19.1 was discussed, which is clearly not 20%. The second chapter relates to the institutions. A certain group argued in the discussion that this is actually a correction of the election outcome. According to the same persons, this is not democratic because voters from other bodies will be used in determining the institutions. The third chapter deals with the six Brussels Flamings who are directly elected in the Flemish Parliament.

I would like to point out that the Minister has clarified in his speech that this is a step in the framework of state reform. According to the minister, this is a step in line with the steps that have already been taken in the past, since 1970.

I will try to summarize what was said by a number of speakers during the general discussion. You will have noticed from the reading of the report that certain things are repeated. Thus, during Mr. Laeremans’ speech, subsequently supplemented by Mr. Bultinck and Tastenhoye, there was a reference to a brochure that was displayed liciously. I will not return to this. Maybe the speakers will do it themselves. I would like to sum up the arguments of this group.

First, with regard to Brussels, it is alleged that it is a falsification of the election results.

Second, the trinity of the state order, which is not accepted by this group, is once again confirmed.

The following argument of this group was that the delegation of powers would be too limited. The agricultural policy is too fragmented. The report also contains a whole passage about the Meise Plant Garden, but I will save you that. This botanical garden will soon be transferred to the Flemish Community. There needs to be a further agreement between the communities so that both language groups can still enjoy the scientific and other benefits of the plants there. I assume that this issue will be discussed in the discussion.

With regard to the competence in foreign trade, it was noted that it was too limited. The overthrow of Development Cooperation called these speakers an absurd arrangement.

Mr Viseur spoke on behalf of the PSC. He talked about the unconstitutionality, thus about the whole problem surrounding Article 162. The Government responded to this at the end of the general discussion. I will return to this later, and maybe this will also be discussed during the debate. The statement that was formulated is that the repeal of the municipal and provincial law would expose the French-speaking inhabitants to a number of dangers, with which more specifically the guardianship of the Flemish Region over a number of municipalities was meant.

Collega Viseur also made an important comment in his argument, with which one does not necessarily have to agree. He called these agreements a first step towards confederalism, whatever this word might mean.

Further, reference was made to the jurisprudence of the Arbitration Court, but it was about a different jurisprudence than the one cited by the government. It also challenged the examples raised in connection with Article 184 of the Constitution. Following the transfer of powers from the administrative police, which was transferred to the regions without a constitutional amendment, the government had formulated the argument that the Constituent apparently interpreted this norm in the same way as we now do.

Then there was another explanation about the Lombard Accords and the elections. The discussion will also show that there is a contradiction between two visions. On the one hand, it was said that the flames were harmed. On the other hand, it was said that this is wrong, because that the number of votes needed to obtain a seat is more advantageous for the Flamings, which cannot.

Mr. Viseur also held a long presentation on the inhabitants of the facility municipalities. This statement is presented extensively in the report. It comes to a large extent, but not completely, in accordance with what the next speaker, Mr. Clerfayt, said. He spoke almost exclusively about the French-speaking inhabitants of the Brussels border. He estimates their number at 80,000. We mentioned this number in the report, but the responsibility for its accuracy lies, of course, with Mr Clerfayt.

On page 37 of the report, at the bottom of the report, you can find a list of the conditions that colleague Clerfayt set in order to eventually remove him from his intention to vote against the law. I will give them to you very briefly.

First, Mr Clerfayt was of the opinion that the regularization of the municipal law can only come into force after the revision of Article 162.

Second, the regularization of the Municipal Law can only come into effect after the ratification of the Council of Europe Framework Agreement for the Protection of Minorities. This, too, has been debated for a long time. First, the European Charter for Local Autonomy must be ratified.

Fourth, there must also be Protocol No. 12 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It is interesting to mention that this Protocol deals with discrimination on the basis of language, which is of course prohibited.

Another position was taken by Mr. Danny Pieters. He stated, among other things, that he considers the law on the transfer of powers and the law on financing as one whole. During the discussion, discussions were held over and over between certain parties, which I will not continue here because they do not impair the argument. Probably the parties themselves will come up with something later. Mr Danny Pieters makes it clear that he separates any discussion of the Framework Convention or Framework Convention from the current discussion. He does not wish that, in the light of this discussion, also the possible ratification of the Convention, with or without reservations, by Belgium and the three parliaments would be anticipated. As a basic statement, he says that the limitation of powers would not result in better governance and he gives a few examples. Their

On agriculture he says that it is transferred, but that the safety of the food chain is used as a justification for a number of exceptions, while the motivation itself will eventually become an exception. Minister Van den Bossche will respond to this and announce another statement, namely that it is a goal, a teleological approach: the goal is the safety of the food chain and that is not an exception in itself, only a goal. This is an interesting discussion that can still be conducted.

As for the plant garden, I will not repeat everything, others will talk about it. Their

Comments on the transfer of Foreign Trade and Delcreder Service were also made. For the Delcreder Service, a system of joint management is predetermined and discussed. Regarding the repeal of the Municipal and Provincial Law, a comment was made on the unclear delimitation of the competence of the regions to the police. Unless Mr. Peters contradicts me, this has been followed. In the text approved by the committee yesterday, this has happened. Another issue is whether you agree. Their

Mr. Pieters also breaks the proverbial lance for the interests of the German-speaking Community. Furthermore, I do not use symbols, because the jaw strikes, grief trommels and the like that were much discussed in the committee, I leave further out of consideration. The Minister will answer that this is not the essence of the text and that the German-speaking Community will have to settle this itself with the French Region. Furthermore, a consideration-worthy argument was developed: it was criticized that certain powers are transferred, but at the same time it is also determined how those powers should be exercised. A number of criteria are prescribed and this leads to the question of what should be done in the event of any change in those criteria: can it be done by the government that receives the powers or must it be done by the government that has transferred the powers? The Minister will answer, if I am not mistaken, that it is the transferring government that may eventually change the standardization, even if that was not said in so many words and that is still subject to discussion. Their

Mr. Verherstraeten and Mrs. Creyf took part in this discussion on behalf of the CVP and in a long passage, which was also included in the report, Mr. Verherstraeten addressed the PSC. From this I quote the following sentence: "Will history repeat itself and is the PSC already preparing to take a second Lambermont turn?"

The basic note made by a few examples is that this is merely consumer deregulation, which is somewhat contrary to the PSC’s argument that it is confederalism. Mr Verherstraeten, however, advocates that it is consumer deralism, in the sense that a number of matters are transferred, but that the financial and political responsibility for the policy to be carried out is not placed on the policymakers.

Mrs Creyf ⁇ criticized the Brussels Costa in a long, motivated explanation largely reflected in the report, which summarizes that the proposals are unbalanced, do not sufficiently take into account the Flemish interests and do not have sufficient eye for a long-term vision. The latter means that a number of matters are currently being settled that may be better settled later, often because of favorable and unfavorable financial outlook. This is the Brussels flames. Furthermore, Mrs Creyf argued that the scheme demonstrates a lack of basic political decency.

Mr. Maingain gave a legal approach to the Framework Agreement — or is it the Framework Agreement; one should clarify the exact name — regarding the protection of minorities. This statement, which also refers to a number of articles of this Agreement and to the possibilities that some who believe they can resort to, is also included in the report.

In conclusion, Mr Maingain says that he is prepared, without wanting to put the overall layout of the agreements on the slope, to partially approve these agreements, provided that Belgium ratifies the Framework Agreement on the Protection of Minorities and implements it uninterruptedly.

For the future, Mr Maingain adds that sooner or later the Belgian State will have to approve the framework agreement, because the European institutions have expressed this wish. By the way, fifteen countries have approved the text of the aforementioned agreement with reservations; Belgium and France have not yet granted their approval.

On the memorable Tuesday, just before he was unfortunately involved in a traffic accident, the Minister provided a response to these statements, which I will present summarily as most of them appeared in the Memory of Explanation, in the Senate report and in the introductory statements of the Minister.

First, as regards constitutionality, it was very clear, in the sense that Article 162 does not need to be amended because it provides that it can be amended by law.

Second, the competence in agriculture belongs to the federal government. In response to Mr. Pieters’ argument, the passage follows: “The protection of the food chain is not an exception, but is a goal that is pursued. As a result of that objective, a number of exceptions are provided." The cooperation agreements were also overrun, up to the distribution of the cemeteries in the Brussels region, which will belong to a particular region in function of the gate that leads to it.

The technical explanation on the National Delcreder Service and the way it is organized, I do not need to repeat here. The Plant Garden of Meise is also transferred to the Flemish Community. This was confirmed by the Minister in his reply. A cooperation agreement between the communities will be concluded.

For the other, rather technical comments of the Minister, I refer to the written report.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Minister, Mr. Minister, I would like to refer to the conclusion formulated by Mr. Van den Bossche during the general discussion. He has rightly determined that there are different starting positions and options. The proposers of the draft — the majority parties and the government — make it clear that this is not the end of the discussion. It is a stage in the state reform that has always taken place in stages since the establishment of the language boundaries in 1963, and that may continue to follow this dynamic. Others argue that this is either a wrong step or an unnecessary step, because this country should not be preserved. They believe that this country should be separated and reasoned from that separatist vision. Nevertheless, the Minister declares that this is a realization because one — and I quote him — “has refused to conduct this discussion for years.” I think he rightly says that.

So far, Mr. Speaker, my as objectively as possible summary of the general discussion of this bill.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker. Coveliers with regard to the services of the Chamber who, indeed, have once again demonstrated their professionalism and the quality of their work by providing us with a tool perfectly suited to our own work today in the plenary session and ⁇ also to historical references since, it seems, we also work for posterity. In addition to the general exhibition, which was widely commented by Mr. Coveliers, I would like to browse through all the articles, some longer than others, in order to emphasize, with the subjectivity that is, unfortunately, linked there, on the most important political aspects of our discussions. But in advance, without wanting to offend anyone, I would like to clarify that during our discussions, if the opposition has expressed itself a lot, the majority, it, remained extremely discreet and, I dare to say, the government has been even more, since the minister who was present during our meetings very widely referred to the Senate report and referred to this report most often without adding personal comments. by

Therefore, you will not be surprised that many amendments come from the opposition. The discussion mainly took place between the opposition and the government. by

There are 41 articles. No amendments have been adopted. Therefore, I will not make a balance of the amendments adopted or not on each of the articles. On the other hand, there were three technical adaptations of the text to Articles 13, 14 and 22. Those of you who wish to do so will find, in a quite complete way, at the end of the report, on page 125, the errata that have been introduced in articles 13, 14 and 22, in particular at the instigation of the legislative services of the House. by

As agreed, I will therefore go through these articles by first mentioning, concerning the title of the project itself, an important amendment submitted by Mr. Annemans on behalf of the Vlaams Blok and which aimed to replace, in many places, the entire device. I will not return to each of the articles on the consequences of this amendment; it was ultimately deposited with regard to the title and article 1 er, but it concerns the entire arrangement. by

In fact, Mr. Annemans and his colleagues wanted to replace the bill as a whole with a new text, which highlighted that the state structure, according to the authors, should be based on two communities each with a well-defined territory, and that Brussels, which in the long run should be an integral part of an independent Flanders, would be placed while waiting under the tutelage of the federal authority. We find this claim in each of the subsequent articles.

by Mr. Verherstraeten, on behalf of the CVP, proposed the introduction of a new article 1bis, which would state that health care and family policy, including family allowances, would be fully transferred to communities and that this would of course aim, in another amendment announced, to replace the federal exclusive competence in social security. by

Article 2, which deals with the agricultural policy, as recalled by Mr. Coveliers, the same Mr. Verherstraten, on behalf of the CVP, proposed that agricultural policy and maritime fisheries, including price and income policy, be fully transferred to the regions. He also submitted an amendment to ensure that federal jurisdiction on income replacement measures in case of early cessation of farmer activity is also transferred to the regions.

Finally, a third provision aimed at removing the federal jurisdiction concerning the Belgian Intervention and Restitution Office.

by Mr. Maingain, on behalf of the PRL FDF MCC group, requested a large number of clarifications by questioning the exact descriptions of the missions and tasks transferred in the agricultural policy as well as the concrete consequences of the regionalization of the agricultural policy and fisheries on the ground.

In this regard, the Minister noted that the amendments of the Blok proceed from a completely different logic, since they aim to replace the entire arrangement. According to the government, these two logic seem completely incompatible. by

Finally, the Minister answered Mr. Maingain, who asked for numbered clarifications in terms of budgets, officials, etc., that this was a prerogative of the executive and that, in the past, it had never been answered in this way in matters of special law. by Mr. Maingain then completed his speech by recalling a number of requirements for clarification of the text. by

Article 3 of the Regulation relates to foreign trade. Several amendments have been submitted. View first, in order to delete the article and by MM. Verherstraeten, Annemans and Maingain on the background of the subject. by Mr. Maingain also raised a very long list of questions and made a large number of comments on the consequences of the regionalization of foreign trade. More specifically, he expressed himself on a half dozen very precise points of the current functioning of the system. The Minister replied that Mr. Maingain was wrong on a number of things, especially on the cooperation agreement. You know that any foreign trade issue will be settled by a cooperation agreement, which will be discussed here. The Minister has therefore referred to the discussion that will take place on this occasion.

Article 4 contains one of the major provisions of the bill, as it aims at the regionalization of the organic laws of provinces and municipalities. A number of amendments, including one by Mr. Viseur and I, aim to remove Article 4, arguing that according to the opinion of the State Council, this provision is contrary to Article 162 of the Constitution, which has not been submitted to revision. by

Other provisions have been proposed by the same authors - Mr. Visitor and myself – in particular to recall the need to ratify the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe. We also raised a number of exceptions regarding the appointment of mayors and provincial governors. We spoke in particular of regional competence in matters of disciplinary regime, given the removal of the condition that the disciplinary sanction against mayors may not be based on the notorious misconduct of the mayor, but rather on the non-compliance of a law, a decree, an order, a regulation or an administrative act. by

Another observation by the same authors concerned the status of church factories and the financing of cults which, according to them, justified the maintenance of this homogeneous block of competences at the federal level. by

by Mr. Verherstraeten, on behalf of the CVP group, requested that the reference to the rules of the so-called pacification law, contained in the proposed article 6, be removed from this arrangement by reference to the provisions of the State Council. by

Finally Mr. Maingain extended in the sense already proposed by other stakeholders, namely that the implementation of this agreement, and therefore of Article 4 regionalizing the municipal law, should be subject to the prior revision of Article 162 of the Constitution. by Mr. Maingain raised a number of arguments in support of his thesis, referring to legislative arrangements, jurisprudence and even, at some point, a statement by the former prime minister. The government ⁇ ined its position, confirming that, in its opinion, despite the State Council’s opinion, a revision of Article 162 was not necessary and that a special law was sufficient. by

There was then a proposal to insert an article 4a, submitted by Mr. Viser, concerning the election of the schevins belonging to a minority linguistic group in the municipalities of the periphery, in Comines-Warneton and in Fourons. The author emphasized the particular case of the municipality of Comines-Warneton. The Minister also confirmed his disagreement with this proposal. by

An article 4ter (new) was also proposed by the same authors, aimed at supplementing article 107 of the new municipal law, in such a way that consensus is required within the college of mayors and shovens only in the case that the shovens were directly elected. by

Articles 5 and 6 have less political content. Several amendments have been submitted to these articles.

I now go to Article 7 concerning the administrative guardianship of decisions taken in disciplinary matters against the local police. by

Several interventions were made in connection with the Community Peacemaking Act of August 1988 for which, according to Mr. Maingain, on behalf of the PRL Group FDF MCC, the guarantees are not sufficient. by Mr. Maingain therefore wishes, by an amendment, to make the federal authority competent for the administrative tutel on the peripheral municipalities and the municipalities of Warneton and Fourons. by

In Articles 8 and 9, there has been a broad discussion of existing guarantees for the benefit of peripheral residents, individual rights, individual and mandatory rights, as well as collective rights. Amendment to Article 10 was submitted by Mr. Visitor, asking to ensure the impartiality of the judge, and therefore explicitly asking that any norm or any act be suspended in this case only by the Arbitration Court or by the General Assembly of the Council of State. Amendments have been submitted in this regard. by

I continue to comment on several of these articles and would like to be interested in Article 28 of the arrangement on which several remarks have been made, trying to express - I entered into the logic of the composition of the Brussels Council - that these articles are considered unconstitutional by MM. Visitor and Maingain. by Mr. Maigain added that this provision and the way the Council is composed is contrary to the right of every citizen to free elections and the equal treatment of all citizens. The Minister recalled that there are precedents and that it is not exceptional that the principles of proportional representation are infringed. This is also the case for the European elections and for some senators. by

Finally, in Article 33, several amendments were proposed to remove this article – the arrangement appearing unacceptable to several speakers – and the minister explained why, referring in particular to the work of the Senate, it should be ⁇ ined.

The new Article 39bis is intended to confirm the wish I have expressed earlier, that any annulment of an act should be made by the General Assembly of the Administrative Section of the State Council. The Minister considered that this amendment did not relate to the subject of the special bill and therefore requested its rejection. by

Finally, in Article 39, there was the proposal for a new Article 39ter by Mr. Maingain about the 1963 law on the language regime in teaching, which the government has not accepted. There were also some amendments by Mr. Annemans and colleagues aimed at ⁇ ining special majorities in each language group of the council, when voting occurs.

I come to the last article of the arrangement, Mr. Speaker, Article 41, which determines in particular the entry into force. Many amendments have been proposed, ⁇ by Mr. Viseur and Maingain aiming to link in a certain way the entry into force of the entire arrangement, either to a revision of Article 162 of the Constitution on which I have already expressed myself, or to the signature or ratification of the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, or even by linking the entry into force of the entire arrangement to the ratification of Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights. It was for the authors not to allow the entry into force of this arrangement until other conditions were met, in particular in institutional matters. by

by Mr. Maingain has also long recalled the exact scope of the European Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, illustrating the consequences of this implementation in the Brussels region and throughout the country. The Minister recalled for his part that this convention may have been signed by many states, but according to him, with very many reservations for each of them. by

This concludes my comment, Mr. Speaker, since I announced that all articles had been adopted without any amendment or correction, with the exception of the three form changes I just mentioned and which I recall are explicitly indicated on page 125 of the report, but are errata in articles 13, 14 and 22. by

With the unfortunate subjectivity involved, Mr. Speaker, I think I have done my job as a rapporteur for each of our colleagues.

Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that you have just said that you would like to clarify this matter immediately after the rapporteurs have presented them. Furthermore, we request this vote in application of Article 46, paragraph 7d.

This is the main vote. I let you call. However, I must also ask who is for or who is against this request. Colleagues, if this is sought, may, according to the Rules of Procedure, speak a speaker who is in favor of the request. Will anyone speak or has the matter already been sufficiently clarified, Mr. Leterme?

Mr Coveliers, you are against the request. You will have the floor on Mr. Leterme’s claim. After that, the government can also express its position.

Mr. Speaker, I find it strange that the opposition is trying to determine who should be present here on behalf of the government. There is a member of the government responsible for institutional reforms, and there is another member of the government present. Therefore, I do not understand why the presence of another third member of the government - the prime minister - should be requested.

In addition, I would like you to apply the Rules of Procedure when discussing this case. You have clearly asked if there is anyone in favour and no one has responded. Then you asked if anyone is against, and since I am speaking now, there are suddenly two others who want to respond. The Rules apply to everyone. There is always an attempt to interpret the Rules in their own advantage. Therefore, I insist that it will be applied this time too.

I always have to ask who is for and who is against.

Mr Coveliers, according to the procedure, one may speak for or against the proposal for a maximum of five minutes per group, after which the government speaks before voting. I asked Mr. Leterme to start. Now you have begun, but Mr. Leterme has the right to speak for the proposal, as does Mr. Annemans; no one will speak against the proposal; we must not call each other a lie bed.

Mr. Leterme, you have five minutes to defend your proposal.

Mr. Speaker, I will not speak too long to avoid that colleagues should stop too long in this plenary session.

Mr. Coveliers, on the basis of the Rules of Procedure, we correctly request - referring to the articles - the presence of a member of the government. It is still the parliament that decides who of the government should be present; there should be no misunderstanding about this.

Furthermore, the Chairman of the Chamber can testify that I have then raised my finger to ask for the word on this subject.

We ask for the presence of the Prime Minister because it is very clear that the anti-Christ-Democratic anti-CVP coalition in June 1999 could only be established through out-of-hand agreements. In the autumn of 1999, we saw how the 2.4 billion francs could not be the case, until Olivier Deleuze promised himself in a Dutch-speaking television broadcast.

What at this moment all and cascade falls upon us, also to Flemish concessions, is the result of concessions and mandatory provisions of the Prime Minister who saw in these concessions the only means to be able to take up the prime ministry. The CVP considers that the person responsible for these Flemish concessions must assume responsibility.

It characterizes the character of the prime minister that he is not there when it gets a little difficult. Three weeks ago it was no different. On Wednesday, he was everywhere except in this Room. On Thursday, when the sale was closed, he came to glorify in this hemisphere. Their

For the CVP, it is clear that the prime minister must do his full job and take responsibility for all the agreements made under the table at the formation of the government and which are nothing more or nothing less than the maximum fee of the Flamings for crumbs of powers. That the Prime Minister comes to explain this today, explains the sale he concluded in June 1999 and answers our objections!

Mr. Speaker, that we demand the presence of the Prime Minister is not to interrupt his undoubtedly important work but because we would like him to come for once.

Mr Coveliers, you blame the opposition for determining who represents the government during the debate. No, the Chamber will decide that! The Rules of Procedure stipulate that the Chamber shall determine this. You have already announced that the majority will impose its will.

Where do we get it from to advance the Prime Minister? We are not doing this to bully him or get him out of the Congo or to prevent Mr. Morael from playing the role of the Congo. No, we do this because in the weeks that the discussions in the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution and the Reform of the Institutions lasted, we have seen Aelvoet, Vandenbroucke, Van den Bossche, Michel, Vande Lanotte, Reynders, Durant and Daems in succession but never the Prime Minister. We only felt the prime minister present at the moment it began to knock, the vote began to stroke and Vande Lanotte had to walk over and over between the 16 and parliament. At that moment we felt that there was a prime minister.

You should not be surprised now that the opposition asks that at the plenary discussion of Lambermont’s draft power, on the fatal date of 27 June 2001, the prime minister should be present, even if it were only for a day or a day and a half.

Mr Coveliers, you have the word for a short interruption.

Mr. Speaker, if Mr. Annemans permits me for a moment, I would like to point out that, of course, I have no objection to his democratic right to ask what he wants, but I assume that he can say with the same democratic right whether we agree or not. Second, the fact that all ministers were present in the committee demonstrates how interested they are in all these matters and proves that they follow the matter very well.

Mr. Speaker, that proves, as Mr. Coveliers claims here – in addition, welcome Mr. Prime Minister – that Mrs. Aelvoet, Mrs. Durant, Mr. Vande Lanotte, Mr. Van den Bossche, Mr. Michel, Mr. Reynders and Mr. Daems are interested. Unlike the Prime Minister, who has not yet expressed interest.

The prime minister used his trip to the Congo as an argument for his absence. He enters the parliament, throws a document on a peace plan for the region of the Great Lakes in Congo and the surrounding area, and says that this should be discussed now. He first forced the Committee on Foreign Relations. He then force that he should not be here for the discussion of Lambermont on the days that we discuss the draft. We cannot accept this. Mr. Coveliers, we cannot tolerate the doll cabinet that your VLD and consorts organize. While Mr. Poncelet stands here speaking, at the same time here outside Mrs. Milquet, like the oracle of Delphi, stands twelve journalists speaking, at the same time as her own group chairman is explaining what the PSC is going to do. We are no longer involved in this. Things must be made clear and clear. Here is the Prime Minister, here is the Parliament and the debate must take place here and now and thereafter.

Mr Coveliers you will be given the word briefly.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs has requested the presence of the Prime Minister. We are of the opinion that the discussion of this text can take place without the presence of the Prime Minister being required. Therefore, he should not be present here at this time, but in the Committee on Foreign Relations. Therefore, we will vote against the question of the recruitment of the Prime Minister.

Colleagues, the Rules of Procedure clearly stipulate that in this debate one member per group is heard. I have heard of a member of the CVP, a member of the Flemish Block Group and one of the VLD Group. Now it is Mr. Bacquelaine of the PRLfraction's turn.

I do not agree with the interpretation of Article 38a. It stipulates that the Chamber may require the presence of a member of the Government. One is an indefinite article. This is not an ad hominem request. I think the interpretation is abusive. I propose that the Chamber declare itself against this illegitimate request.

Mr. Speaker, we are very strongly in favour of making the Prime Minister, like the other ministers, available to Parliament. At the Conference of Presidents last week, we agreed on a working arrangement for a plenary session and a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations dedicated to Congo for today. Since the Prime Minister can only be present in one of the two places, we believe it is right that he follows the Congo debate.

Does anyone ask the word? (Mrs. Claudine Drion asks for the word.)

I cannot give you the word, Madame Drion. by Mr. Tavernier spoke on behalf of the Ecolo-Agalev group.

Does anyone from another group ask for the word? (No to)

I have two proposals. There is the proposal of the Leterme and Annemans to invite the Prime Minister for this debate in the plenary session and a proposal according to which his presence is not necessary.

We vote on the request for the presence of the Prime Minister. We vote on the request to request the presence of the Prime Minister.

Beginning of voting / Beginning of voting. Has everyone voted and checked his vote? All the world has voted and verified its vote. End of voting / End of voting. Results of the vote / Results of the vote.

(Voting/voting 1) Yes 37 Yes No 75 No Abstentions 2 Abstentions Total 114 Total

Consequently, the Chamber rejects the request to demand the presence of the Prime Minister. Consequently, the Chamber rejected the request for the presence of the Prime Minister.

Mr. Speaker, I refer to the Rules of Procedure and ask on behalf of eight members to challenge the plenary discussion until the Committee on Foreign Relations has completed its work.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have a proposal to amend Mr Annemans’ agenda to challenge the discussion until after the Committee on Foreign Relations.

We vote on the proposal to amend the agenda. We vote on the proposal for modification of the order of day.

Beginning of voting / Beginning of voting. Has everyone voted and checked their vote? All the world has voted and verified its vote. End of voting / End of voting. Results of the vote / Results of the vote.

(Voting/voting 2) Yes 27 Yes No 77 No Abstentions 10 Abstentions Total 114 Total

Consequently, the House rejects the proposal to amend the agenda. And consequently, the Chamber rejected the proposal for modification of the order of day.

Reasons for Abstinence? Reason of abstention?

I abstained for the following reason. The procedural debate may seem pointless to the members of the majority who are all eagerly waiting for the many cents that the Lambermont agreement will bring. We only wanted to show that there is a very dynamic majority, supplemented by the PSC, to quickly approve the Lambermont Agreement and let the prime minister do what he wants. She will do whatever the government requires to pursue the Lambermont Agreement through the House in accordance with the rigid scheme of Mr. Guy Verhofstadt. It is good that we make this clear to the public opinion at the beginning of the discussion.

Mr. Speaker, we have never associated with a Vlaams Blok proposal and it is not today that we are going to start!

The incident is closed. The incident is closed.

The procedural issue of this morning was not accidental. Let me consider the discussion of this draft in the committee. Not only have we never seen the Prime Minister, but neither have the ministers been responsible for this matter.

Mr. Vande Lanotte, you are present now. I would also have wanted the competent minister and Deputy Prime Minister Michel to be present here. I would like to congratulate him for everything he has brought in together with the French-speaking opposition.

Colleagues, there are enough rooms in this House where you can conduct your conversations. Only those who want to listen remain in the hemisphere, the others leave the hall. Your conversations are disturbing for the speaker and also for me.

Mr. Speaker, I would have wanted to congratulate Mr. Michel for all that he, together with his friends of the French-speaking majority and the French-speaking opposition, has brought on the back of Flanders.

In the committee, the responsible ministers gave forfait or failed. We have seen calls from ministers. Mr. Minister Van den Bossche was present until a painful accident happened to him. Subsequently appeared Minister Vandenbroucke, Minister Daems and Minister Aelvoet. However, we never saw the Prime Minister nor the competent ministers. That says a lot about how this debate was conducted and what it actually was about in this draft. The room became a kind of footmat. It was not about what was discussed here.

Mr. Speaker, allow me to ask a brief question. Mr. Verherstraeten, I have not been able to experience all the discussions.

Mr Leterme, that is true. At some point, Mr. Daems was present at the discussions.

Mr. Speaker, the “record” of Mr. Daems of the last two years, as it is called in English, shows sufficiently clearly the quality of the construction that is now set up.

I would like to respond.

Mr. Coveliers, one must be able to face a blow in politics.

Mr. Speaker, in the hypothesis that Mr. Leterme would have been present at the moment that Mr. Daems responded to a number of questions asked in the committee, he could have determined that Mr. Daems knows this matter.

Mr. Speaker, I take note of the statement of Mr. Coveliers. Mr Coveliers wanted to emphasize that Mr Daems had some knowledge of the dossier this time. This is interesting and contrasts with his knowledge of other files.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to respond.

We all have a little elephant nebula. Those who don’t have it yet should make sure they get one.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Coveliers, together with you, I had the pleasure to hear the phenomenal replies of Mr. Daems. In addition, Minister Aelvoet did not have to subdue for him.

In other words, Minister Aelvoet should not subdue for him. I have questions about the distribution of work in this government. While Sabena is dying after death and the employment there is in great danger, Minister Daems is just sitting listening to a commission. When we were to deal with the files of Sabena, the competent ministers were required to be present at the committee meeting. If this had not been possible, you could have sent Minister Gabriel. After July 1st, there will be no more powers.

Mr. Verherstraeten, if the CVP requests my presence both in the Senate and in the Chamber, then I must inform you that until further order I can only be in one place at a time. You are not correct in that. You know very well that we met in different places at the same time. As for Mr. Daems, he has been there for about 1.30 hours. You sketch here a caricature about who was there because you have nothing to say about the content.

Mr. Minister, I don’t know if you were detained in the Senate but I want to believe you on your word. Except for mistakes on my part, you are not only competent for this, Minister Michel was also competent. When it comes to a state reform, the prime minister is also competent. We are not making a caricature of this. Yesterday, your government raised a turn-mount here, a pledge of ministers who sat here for an hour without doing anything. They sketch the caricature and they insult the parliament.

On behalf of our group, I would like to thank Minister Van den Bossche who actively participated in the discussions. This may also happen sometimes. I wish him a quick recovery. He had the accident a few hours after the discussion in the committee and we had actually spotted the fate that could happen to all of us a few hours before. In response to a question from a colleague, he replied, “We may be dead tonight by way of speaking.” I replied, “Is Lambermont deadly?”

I would like to take this opportunity to say to Minister Van den Bossche the following: "Mr. Minister, you have been crushed through the eye of the needle, we wish you all strength and a prompt recovery and we hope that you will be among us again as soon as possible so that we can go into debate with you again." Is Lambermont, is Lombard deadly? If it is not deadly, then in any case it is very harmful to health and can and will seriously harm the health of the Flammers. In the discussion of the funding draft, many arguments have already been cited that I will not repeat. After nightly negotiations, the Prime Minister called this a historic agreement. In the past, however, the prime minister had always objected to nightly negotiations. However, in the framework of state reform, he has done nothing else in this legislature. We know that this prime minister propaganda sometimes confuses with information. We know that this prime minister is a seller and sometimes tries to sell apples like lemons.

We may have the illusion that this one time with the funding design - would succeed. We no longer have the illusion that this will not succeed a second time. Minister Van den Bossche was intellectually more honest in that regard by saying clearly that this design does not deserve a beauty award. So is it. The State Council has said this too.

Regardless of legal objections, regardless of constitutional objections, I would like to make a review together with you. A review of this agreement, not to the party programs of the People’s Union, not to the party program of the VLD, not to the Burger Manifesto. I would like to review — I address my Flemish colleagues — the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament. The resolutions of the Flemish Parliament were unanimously approved and were considered by all Flemish parties on the eve of the elections in 1999 as the only starting point for negotiations with the French-speaking colleagues.

What do we see? This design fails concept. This design lacks vision. This project lacks ambition. The Flemish Christian Democrats know that a state reform cannot be done without compromises, that it cannot be done without giving and taking. Here, however, is only given, given by the Flammers to the French speakers. Here we were confronted with French-speaking colleagues, who together form a front of majority and opposition. This French-speaking front wanted money, this French-speaking front wants even some limited powers. In the past, Flanders sometimes paid in exchange for powers, as was the case with the last three state reforms, 1000 billion francs. Now we have to pay heavily for minuscule powers that the French speakers also asked for.

Faced with that unanimous French-speaking front, flamingos from the majority — flamingos who were just out to drink coffee and baking sweet cookies with their colleagues across the language border — and a prime minister who considers the maintenance of his government and the establishment of his government and a purple project of distribution more important than Flemish interests. The Flemish majority considered the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament - ⁇ they were highly grasped - already in advance as unachievable and laid them by themselves. The result was predictable. The French speakers picked up and picked up their battles at home and yet that was not enough. Billions had to be added.

This raises questions about the four colleagues of the People’s Union who are pleased with this agreement. You have loved this, but in the meantime, billions are continuing to be added. Yesterday, yesterday, when does this stop? When will you respond to that?

There is a second criticism of Lambermont: one of the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament called for homogeneous and coherent powers packages. The prime minister also wanted this before he became prime minister. He wrote in his Burger Manifesto that the state reforms were far too complicated and the powers too fragmented, and he suggested making tabula rasa and starting again. Where did this Prime Minister start again? He simply continued, with still many intermediate stations: from Sint-Elooi, Hermes, over Lambermont to Lombard. Which saints will be added? The result is that there are only partial powers. There is a piece of foreign trade, a piece of export promotion, a piece of agriculture.

If the prime minister calls this agreement historical, it will not have to do with the extent of the financial consequences of the removal of some powers, but with its limitation. Seven billion elevations are indeed historically, historically low. This agreement would have been historical if in the draft we discuss today the health cuts and family allowances would have been overwhelmed. However, there is no question here. No attempt has even been made to ⁇ this. If we had achieved a step towards more independence for the counties, then there would have been a step towards a coherent policy. Not because what we do would do better, but because what each individual does happens in a different way according to the wishes of their people and according to the ambitions of the community.

Now heterogeneous powers packages are being transferred and the State Council also has its questions. Now it is so complicated that we will have to jump from one cooperation agreement to another. Now we are even setting up – and that is historical, a unicum – by a special majority law a working group to compile a list, to discuss which powers of Development Cooperation could possibly be transferred to regions or communities. That is only historical. The delegation of powers is ⁇ not homogeneous, is very tiny and will ⁇ not give rise to better governance. This agreement also does not lead to fiscal autonomy as it was advanced, as it was promised, as it was announced. However, it is logical that a government, a government that is responsible for its own policies, is also responsible for the revenue to support that own policy. It is logical, however, that a citizen knows what he pays, to whom he pays, and what that government does with it, for what those resources will serve. Now we go further and much further on the path of consumption deregulation, which the VLD so disgraced in 1999. Superdotations are being continued: 200 billion by 2020 and that is still insufficient and apparently needs to be added. This leads to the deresponsabilisation of the government. We are already putting this deesponsabilisation on the ground.

This bill may be approved. However, even before the vote on this bill, the resources were already distributed.

The Brussels Costa does not make this Lambermont Agreement a good deal. Brussels is something special. It is not only the capital of our country, it also houses the seat of the Flemish and French Communities and it is also the capital of Europe. All this requires individuality. If Brussels wishes to fulfill that task, it will have to feel connected with the two counties it houses. This bill does not take into account the anchors of previous state reforms.

In the memorandum of explanation it is clear that the position of the Brussels Flamings is linked to that of the French speakers in the Rand. This is a historical link. This connection cannot. The only consideration that could and should have been made was that of the Brussels Flamings and that of the French speakers in Belgium. The regulation of the Brussels Coast is therefore largely insufficient. They get money, a lot of money, and we get possible creation for that. These creatures, however, are not enforceable and they may not have powers, financial resources, or influence. And what should we pay for it? We have lost our guaranteed double majority. This is a trade trade that can lead to bankruptcy.

Let’s overcome the billions that this deal costs. By 2020, this agreement will cost 200 billion Belgian francs, of which 89 billion for Wallonia. 2.4 billion francs for the Saint-Elois Agreement, 2 billion francs for Brussels, 1 billion francs for the Flemish sheep and then I will not mention the inflation of parliamentarians and the money for the draw rights for regional employment. However, all this was not yet sufficient. There had to be added. There should still be 3 billion for Brussels instead of 2 billion, and 1.1 billion more for French-speaking education through a reduction in the VZW tax and registration fees. This is then sold as a Flemish victory. This is a Pyrrus victory.

In addition, I would like to remind you of the possible consequences for Brussels. During the previous legislature, Father Anciaux resigned as minister. The Flemish Liberals and Democrats were then playing games to block the Treaty of Amsterdam. The former senator and member of the Brussels Capital Council, Mr. Goovaerts, did not want to block and sabotage. He was stopped by two colleagues: one was a party member and currently minister in the Brussels government while the other was party chairman and currently prime minister. These latter were rewarded for their games while then-Senator Goovaerts was put aside. Those who then abused political games will now abolish that double majority in Brussels in order to deprive others of their bad example.

We also regret that some decision-making mechanisms have not changed. If the Constitution is to be amended again later, the provinces will in any case directly escape it. We have, of course, the community senators, but the counties will not be directly involved, as is the case in other countries such as Germany.

From the State Council there were criticisms that had much to say about. However, the government passed it too quickly. The unconstitutionality has been discussed a lot in the commission. Collega Tant was often quoted following the discussion on the declaration for the revision of the Constitution, when it was about whether or not Article 162 should be included in order to enable the repeal of the Municipal Law and the Provincial Law. His statements were not accepted by the majority in Parliament at that time. Even earlier statements, following other state reforms, also pointed out the opposite. During the debate on the revision of the Constitution, the current Prime Minister of Flanders, Mr Patrick Dewael, even called the draft "institutional bricolage". When Ludwig De Caluwé later recalled his words in the Flemish Parliament, he emphasized that he had been persuaded by Mr. Dehaene. I find this very strange. Mr. Dewael did not let himself convince. He even submitted amendments to make Article 162 subject to revision. During the debate on the revision of the Constitution, Mr. Dewael stated: "The VLD will be guided by the five-point program of the Flemish Parliament in the next state reform." We have seen it. The former Prime Minister of Flanders had at least ambitions. He may not have been able to realize all of them, but the current prime minister even lacks those ambitions. Mr. Dewael apparently did not steal his family name. And the VLD may remove the first letter from its abbreviation. That would only testify to an open debate culture, which would only testify to fair governance. That would be more than appearance.

During the discussion in the committee we talked about the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities. In this House, the Prime Minister has clearly responded to a question from a colleague that the current draft is not related to the possible ratification of the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities. There is no connection with state reform, he said: the bond has never been laid, and that possibility has never been on the table in the government. This is a non-existent file. Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, is this still the case? Does this issue not come to the table in the federal government? Or is there still a speed acceleration noticeable in this file, and are the previous statements of the Prime Minister wordless?

I would like to point out to my Flemish colleagues the unanimity with which the Flemish Parliament and the Flemish Government said in 1997 that they did not oppose the ratification of the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities. However, they made their reservations, as did other countries. Their reservation clearly stated that Flemish and French speakers are not a minority in this country.

In recent years, we have often talked about new political culture. We have seen how this concept is now being fulfilled. Politics becomes a commodity. Obviously, the purpose justifies the means. Everything is for sale. If what is whispered in the hallways is true, if what we can occasionally read between the lines is where is, if this design needs to be approved with money and items and I know what more, then a number of questions still arise. A word does not count, except apparently to mislead someone. This reform will not create added value for the people, will not give rise to better governance, will not lead to greater responsibility for the counties, will not be able to rely on a large majority in both communities but on a quasi-unanimity in one community and a narrow majority in the Flemish Community. That says a lot about the balance of these designs that are presented to us.

This agreement is not historical because of its content, but because of the way it came into being, because of the way it degrades politics into a commodity. This unconstitutional arrangement leads to contempt for the Council of State. Not to mention the demands of the Flemish Parliament. If we examined this draft on the proposals of the Senate Committee on Institutional Reforms of the previous legislature, it would be largely insufficient. This is a cynical arrangement with marchandise until the last moment: Macchiavelli has always looked over our shoulders.

Mr. Minister, colleagues, the day when economic growth will slow is not far away. The day when interest rates will rise is not far away. The day when employment will stagnate may not be far away. Someday, the tax reforms that will be dealt with in the coming weeks will be in full swing. Someday, Lambermont’s superdotations and the millions promised to be added to the French speakers in the last few days in the margins will be on full swing. The federal government is there with almost empty hands. I’m not saying: in her shirt, but still: in her shirt. Then the question arises whether that federal government can provide answers to the questions and needs of its people, of its people. At that point, questions will be asked again about transfers from the North to the South. Lambermont is a gentle French-speaking wholemaster, but could sometimes cause stinking Flemish wounds. Therefore, we will not approve this draft.

Voorzitter: Jean-Pol Henry, first undervoorzitter. President: Jean-Pol Henry, First Vice-President

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, dear colleagues, I will build the intervention of the PSC on four points.

The first is to highlight the fundamental difference between the project we discussed about fifteen days ago, which focused on the refinancing of communities and the expansion of the tax competences of the regions, and the project we are discussing today.

This project contains two aspects that pose enormous problems to us because, on the one hand, we are truly entering confederalism and, on the other hand, when we speak of constitutional scruples, we must be aware of the importance, in a State, of the Constitution, of its respect and of the importance, for us who have sworn to respect the Constitution, not to have a light attitude towards this fundamental text.

I will conclude by analyzing what should be, in a country like Belgium, a project of state reform. It must ensure two elements: better governance and community tranquilization. I ask myself whether the current project goes well in the direction of these two fundamental elements.

The first project, which dealt with the refinancing of communities and the extension of the tax autonomy of regions, is an illustration of the technique of legislation, very peculiar to Belgium, which associates two very different objects according to a virtual balance between the two major communities of the country. Communities are responsible for matters whose importance at this beginning of the 21st century is crucial for the development of the whole society. I will name three: culture, humanitarian aid and education.

In the era of the knowledge society, it is evident in Europe that most countries must invest or reinvest massively in all forms of education and in research. This is the very essence of the future in Europe and no one disputes that the role of public authorities, tomorrow, will take more and more importance in this matter. It is therefore obvious that a certain number of additional public funds should be issued in favor of communities and I say well of communities – and not only in favor of the French Community – and that the transfer of funds in this matter is not at all the use of a consumer federalism but rather constitutes the strengthening of public funds in the field of education. by

The first object of this special law was in the right of an adequate management of the resources of the public authorities. It was a point at which everyone, regardless of the Community to which we belong, had to tend. To this fundamentally healthy project, we have added more tax autonomy for the regions. During this debate, we highlighted how tax autonomy carries a danger of detrimental competition, which Europe gives daily examples. That is why this autonomy must necessarily be framed. In this regard, the amendments we have submitted have enabled a framework that, if it is not perfect, limits the risks of this harmful competition. Thanks to the government’s joining to our definitions of taxable matters, tax competition is limited and it’s a good thing.

The second project we discuss today differs fundamentally from the first in two aspects.

First, it is an important change that, tomorrow, will lead everyone, wherever the state apparatus, whether the executive, legislative or judicial, to feel more belonging to a community or region than to the Belgian State. This changes the nature of the State, its components and its democratic expressions.

This project has serious constitutional problems. The Constitution is an essential social contract between the citizens and the state. Touching the Constitution calls for measures that remove the social contract and that reassure the inhabitants.

Let me start with the confederate character of the reform. In this regard, I am in the right thread of what Mr. Poncelet developed during the discussion of the first project. Belgium is a federal state, according to Article 1 of the Constitution. The PSC considers that the federal state is a conquest of our country. Like many Belgian citizens, we adhered to this type of state organization because it seemed to us to take into account, in a balanced way, the existence of communities and regions, while making the strengthening of the great principles of solidarity the very logic of what has been called union federalism. It must be noted that through this reform it is confederalism that imposes itself, since the transfer of powers no longer finds its foundation in the principle of subsidiarity but in that of attributing to the imperium of regions or communities which, however convenient or coherent they appear, realizes more the principle of symbolism than that of effectiveness.

Increasing the competence of federated entities to improve the management of the State, to make it more efficient, that is the logic of union federalism. Increasing the competence of entities in symbolic matters is the result of a purely confederate logic. In this project, the transfer to the regions of part of Agriculture, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation falls entirely within this logic.

At the level of agricultural policy, there are objective differences between the northern and southern agriculture of the country. Increased regionalization is therefore desirable. But when, as you propose in the draft, the federal deprives itself of the instruments that allow it to operate arbitrations, when no mechanism is provided that really allows the federal to make the synthesis, one no longer enters into a system of union federalism.

In this regard, it is also symptomatic to find that initially it was planned that the federal secretary of state, representing Belgium in the Council of Ministers, would have a federal administrative cell. On arrival, this cell disappeared for the benefit of regional officials made available. All this is likely to lead mainly to multiple abstentions from Belgium in the agricultural council and will not serve the interests of Belgian farmers, whether they are from the north or the south.

With regard to foreign trade, the competence of the regions was already full and complete. They could do whatever they wanted, but the federal had a parallel competence of promotion and coordination. This residual of federal powers is removed by the bill. It does not increase the competences of the regions but removes federal competences that could shadow the regions by allowing to promote the image of Belgium abroad. To counteract this downturn in terms of efficiency, an Agency for Foreign Trade is created by an interregional treaty that provides that each has the possibility to block each other’s initiatives, whether in terms of budget, staff or choice of missions. Paralysis is thus assured, certain inefficiency and the removal of the agency is already scheduled. This is in the middle of the subsidiarity principle. We are again in full confederalism.

Finally, I want to talk about development cooperation. The least that can be said is that things remain ⁇ vague. When we examine the article of the special law that deals with it, we realize that our legal creativity is fabulous since, by a special law, a special working group is created to result in measures, which are not said to be special, but which in any case seem curious and which can only be clarified through a next step of the reform of the State. We know, however, in what direction the evolution will go: it will be a downturn of the federal for the benefit of the communities on the international stage. This will be the first comparative federalism in Europe. Never has a federal state left development cooperation in the hands of federal entities for a simple reason of efficiency. On the one hand, cooperation, together with national defense, constitutes one of the two arms of a state’s foreign policy. On the other hand, in order to be effective, cooperation requires the aggregation of resources which are always largely insufficient. One may ask whether the current reform does not already prepare a further stage of the reform of our institutions that will be situated beyond confederalism. In any case, with regard to development cooperation, we are preparing to do the opposite of what we are going to do everywhere in Europe by bringing together these forces rather than dispersing them.

The confederate character of the reform still appears in other provisions such as the regionalization of the appointment and revocation of mayors and provincial governors while these are first and foremost officials in charge of implementing federal policies such as security policy or civil status policy.

From now on, the federal must rely on regional officials to implement policies. It is gradually denied the ability to have its own officials to carry out a number of its tasks.

In short, the confederate objective of the reform is not to improve the management of the state for the benefit of the citizens, but to reduce to the maximum the competences of the federal, even to seize what cannot belong in itself to each of the regions, for physical or historical reasons, and I specifically aim at the situation of church factories or cemeteries located on several regions at the same time.

The confederate objective of the reform has not escaped the actors of the different regionalized sectors. Whether agricultural organizations, ⁇ or NGOs, they all expressed their fears and opposition to the proposed reform and stressed that it would not result in an additional efficiency, on the contrary.

The crucial place that cooperation agreements and the association of regions and communities will take tomorrow in defining the competences to be transferred also reflects this confederate character.

From now on, the competence of the jurisdiction will increasingly escape the federal to belong to the federal entities. Is this evolution towards confederalism a good or a bad, because it must be acted, considered that it is now an evolution? Can we make a good? Confederalism in itself is not something abnormal. The EU is the very example of a confederate logic, but it is a logic where the transfer goes from federated entities to the federal for reasons of good governance.

I take the example of the Maastricht Treaty and the Economic and Monetary Union resulting in the euro: it is a confederate logic that played, but in the sense of a centralization towards Europe of a number of competencies. The process started from the idea of the traditional and historical competences of states: beat money, determine monetary policy. Economic policy could only be effectively carried out globally if these competences were transferred to the EU.

Difficult but evolving, this process of confederalism in the sense of a transfer to the Union is undoubtedly a long march that leads to a balanced distribution of powers and a better governance and which is also accommodated with everywhere backwards. The principle of subsidiarity, on the one hand, and the principle of effectiveness, on the other, can perfectly result in competences, now regarded as belonging to a federated entity or a confederate entity, going back to the central power and vice versa. Switzerland gives every day an example of a practice of this type of federalism.

But we are quite reserved with regard to what I will call one-way confederalism and cliquets. Our confederalism leads to transfers of powers that go, all, from the central state to the federated entities and, once the transfer has been carried out, the cliquet plays, that is, there is no way to go back, even if the evolution of society calls for these returns.

It is clear that this type of confederalism leads more or less rapidly to the disappearance or decrease of the central state. The complication of systems, the constant and necessary recourse to cooperation agreements as the only mode of management and therefore the necessary consensus between federated entities to advance in different matters, gradually makes management so difficult that the temptation of independence or separation often appears as the means of achieving good governance, both in the name of homogeneous blocks of skills and the will to be able to govern.

We are thus quickly sliding into a croupier central state, without skills and without efficiency, and we are at risk of what I will call “the dinosaur state.”

You know what happened to the dinosaurs: their head was so tiny compared to the whole body that the link between the head and the organs weakened to the point that the head no longer meant anything. This is what led to their disappearance; the whole was severely affected. by

We do not want to be the only ones to say that we are fighting for a federal state of unity. We are carrying out this evolution. It will have to provoke in each of the communities a number of reflections on the future of the entity that constitutes Belgium. Without wanting to play the Cassandre, we think that we are devoting a lot of energy in this determination to tend to confederalism but that will not lead to a better way of governing and a better relationship between the citizen and public authorities. We slide slowly towards what I call this “dinosaur” state; we sincerely regret it.

The second element of this project is, in our opinion, its unconstitutional character. The grievances we make concern both the regionalization of municipal and provincial laws and the Lombard Agreements. by

With regard to the regionalization of municipal and provincial laws, we highlight the serious criticism that has been formulated by the State Council, the response of the government and the consequences related to what we consider a serious infringement on the Belgian Constitution. I will not return to the demonstration of the State Council regarding the unconstitutionality of this text. This has been discussed in the committee for a long time. I would emphasize the inadequacy of the government’s response. The opinion of the assembled chambers of the State Council states that the regionalization of municipal and provincial laws, through a special law, disregards Article 162 of the Constitution, and more ⁇ its last paragraph, article which has not been submitted to revision by the preconstituent. In execution of a special law, the decree or order shall regulate the conditions and the manner in which several provinces or communes may agree or associate. If the regionalization of a part of the organic laws of the communes, in this case the intercommunal laws, could take place without revision of the Constitution, as the government claims, this paragraph of Article 162 of the Constitution would have no reason to be. by

However, the principle of the useful effect, which is essential at the level of legal interpretation, requires that any legal provision, and a fortiori constitutional, may be recognized as useful. The interpretation of the government is therefore contrary to this fundamental principle of the interpretation of laws, since what applies to intercommunal bodies whose transfer could not take place without a revision of the Constitution, applies obviously to the whole of the organic laws of the provinces and communes. This is the main argument invoked by the Council of State. To state that a special law is sufficient to regionalize the organic legislation relating to local authorities, it is therefore not sufficient to say that the intervention of the constituent was not necessary to allow the partial regionalizations of 1980, 1993 and 1997. The first argument invoked by the government, which is based on the jurisprudence of the Court of Arbitration and Article 19 of the Special Law of 8 August 1980, relates to so-called reserved matters, that is, the matters that the Constitution reserves to the law by referring to the exact scope of the term "law". The government deduces from this that the reserved materials can be transferred to the regions by a special law, without prior revision of the Constitution.

This is what he explains in his explanation of the reasons of the preliminary draft submitted to the State Council.

He is ultimately quite unconvinced of his argument, since he will, after the opinion of the State Council, limit its scope by amending Article 19 of the Special Act by specifying that this argument only applies to constitutional provisions which reserve matters to the law which are prior to 1 October 1980. I don’t see why this date is chosen when since 1970 skills transfers have been carried out.

The State Council rejects this argument and considers that, even if it were accurate, it would not change anything to the unconstitutionality of the project. Indeed, it does not respond to the main argument of the State Council, namely the last paragraph of Article 162 of the Constitution, which contradicts the government's thesis, in any case as regards the interpretation it gives. It is therefore in knowledge of the case that the Arbitration Court, in the ruling over which the government prevails, has limited its analysis and the constituent, according to this, has found it necessary to revise the Constitution to allow the special legislator to transfer the competence in matters of intercommunal to the regions.

The second argument of the government lies in a completely different logic, but weakens the first. I think it is relevant but not grounded. It takes note of the opinion of the State Council and the reference it contains to the preparatory work of the various revisions of the Constitution, but it is based on a fact after the opinion given by the State Council, namely the revision of Article 184 of the Constitution that took place at the end of March and, above all, on its preparatory work.

The argument is that, during the revision of Article 184 of the Constitution, the constituent would have confirmed the government’s thesis by considering a revision of the Constitution unnecessary to transfer to the regions the competence in the field of administrative police, while the matter was reserved by the Constitution to the law. Thus, the government agrees with the opinion of the State Council, but the interpretation I give is that in this line, our constituent assembly itself has disapproved of this principle, estimating that it can amend Article 184 of the Constitution on this basis.

I will not go into the technical details to say that the problem is not that and that Article 184 is not Article 162, that the preparatory work of Article 184 is not the preparatory work of Article 162 and above all, that in our constitutional system, under Article 195 of the Constitution, the constituent has no seizure and capacity to exercise his power except in relation to articles which are declared revisable and that he can not, implicitly, modify articles not subject to revision, because in that case, obviously, our constituent would pass purely and simply from Article 195 and would estimate that the role of the pre-constituent is simply an indicative role or inspires the logic that will be developed by the constituent. by

This is not the case. Our system is based on a clear logic. The Constitution is regarded as such an important text that one relies only on a certain sanction of the electoral body in relation to the acts or articles of which it has been decided that they are revisable. Otherwise, we could use Article 195 as a mere reference. It would not be necessary to pronounce the dissolution of the Chambers automatically since a number of articles to be revised have been stopped by the preconstituent. It is this relationship between preconstituent and constituent that limits the seizure and which, therefore, when an article has not been declared revisable by the preconstituent, does not allow the constituent of the following legislature to modify it or to do as if he modified it. by

Both the draft law on the regionalization of provincial and municipal laws and certain provisions of the Lombard Agreements constitute a violation of the Constitution. by

And I want to ask a question that might seem incongruous in an assembly like this: Is it serious to violate the Constitution? I’ve heard some ministers say that it was necessary to have a dynamic, evolving view of the Constitution, that it was not a Bible, but a mere legal text. I think, for my part, that violating the Constitution remains one of the most serious acts that can be committed by a legislator. This is ⁇ the responsibility of the constituent, which goes beyond the mandate given to him by the pre-constituent and by the elections. by

As soon as one enters into a logic that consists in saying that because of its dynamic character, the legislator could violate provisions of the Constitution, it violates the trust contract that exists between the citizen and the legislator. I did not refer in a plenary session as in a committee, citing all the great authors of the nineteenth century who have dealt with the Constitution, in our country as well as elsewhere. They all said that the Constitution was a sacred thing to which one approached only with extreme prudence and, in the logic of what the National Congress had decided, to which one touched only through special precautions, namely a declaration of revision, elections and a two-thirds majority to amend it. by

The evolutionary concept challenges the principle that every citizen of that country is bound by a social contract with the Constitution. You can say that the oaths do not matter. But finally, what is the constitutional oath that is pronounced by all officials, ministers, or by anyone – except parliament – who is placed with a particular charge in our state? It is the oath that calls for respect for the Constitution. What about us parliamentarians? The only oath we swear is to observe the Constitution.

Mr. Viseur, you may be surprised, but I agree with you. You are 100% right when you say that the Council of State rightly judged that the draft that is currently forthcoming is unconstitutional.

Well, we are the constituent and we have taken a oath that cannot be violated without a doubt. I thus assume that you will act consistently when voting on this draft and that you will not then vote the opposite of what you say now. The whole country is looking forward to it.

Last time we ⁇ that Mr. Poncelet broke the draft regarding the financial side of the case, but that the PSC turned its wheel several hours later and approved the amendment de facto. I would have liked to hear from you, Mr. Viseur, whether your party will act consistently this time and whether you will stick to your current position, in particular that the draft is unconstitutional and that the oath cannot be broken. Will you approve this bill?

Mr. Laeremans, you will allow me to clearly develop my thinking. I am pleased to see your group adhere to the idea that the Constitution is fundamental for everyone. But I say that when one touches a social contract, there must be a restoration of trust that binds both parties to the contract. Now, at this stage, we are in the presence of a serious act that has consequences on the trust the citizen has in the State.

Why did the Constitution appear? Because we lived in states where arbitrariness was associated with force. All constitutional measures have sought to protect the weak against the strong, the minority against the majority, to enter into what we call the rule of law, that is, a state where every citizen, whatever he is, sees his rights protected in relation to the power, whether it be public or of the majority. by

This is the basis of the social contract which will result in the emergence of courts that will control all or part of the constitutionality, namely the Arbitration Court. It is also the appearance on the administrative level of the State Council in its administrative section of which it is the essential role. At the heart of the problem we find the right of minorities. by

The right of minorities is ⁇ the most important advancement in 20th-century democracy. Several minorities in Europe have suffered and continue to suffer. Our European model tries to take protective measures against them. In Belgium, as in many other states, Spain, Northern Ireland, there are many minorities. It can sometimes be minorities based on the language. This is the case in Belgium: Francophones, Germanophones, Flamands in Brussels, Francophones in Flanders, Germanophones in Wallonia. Not all of these minorities enjoy the same protection. Some are well protected such as the French-speaking minority in Belgium or the Flemish minority in Brussels, others are less.

The reform we are considering must be an opportunity, in particular because of the constitutional prescription, for a re-examination of the protection of the different minorities in so far as any change in the balances can result in consequences for them. Considering that the regionalization of the municipal law and the organization of custody is a modification of the existing balances is obvious. Some people are in favor of this. by

Why should there be changes in this context? We find ourselves in the presence of harassment of which are victims the French-speaking people of the periphery, I will not enumerate them. In a state that wants to be balanced, it is indispensable that guarantees are granted and considered by the inhabitants as guarantees that protect them.

Mr. Viseur, it would be interesting to know which parties at the time developed, supported and defended the current arrangement for the peripheral municipalities. I know that your party was part of this.

What are the two guarantees defended by the government? The first is considered by the State Council as unnecessary or unconstitutional. It aims only to recall the principle of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution. It must be omitted because it does not contribute anything to the existing legal order.

According to the Council of State, if, on the other hand, this guarantee intends to impose an equal treatment on all municipalities even if they are in situations that, in view of the measure considered, are essentially different, then it deviates from Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution and is not acceptable. It should be recalled that these constitutional articles, as interpreted by the Arbitration Court, require the legislator to regulate equally equal situations and differently different situations.

However, in the current situation — the obligation for regional legislators to legislate in the same way for all municipalities in the region — the State Council locks us in a dilemma — inutility or unconstitutionality — and therefore this guarantee is no longer one.

The second guarantee, according to the Council of State, is implemented by a legal technique that is not recommended, namely to legislate in a special law by reference to the provisions of ordinary laws, in so far as this technique is, in fact, to allow the federal authority itself to determine by a ordinary law the extent of its competence or the limitations of the competence of the decretal legislator.

This guarantee poses a major constitutional problem since the special legislature is reserved the power to distribute the powers between federal and regional levels, which is the current situation, and that through this text, Article 39 of the Constitution would be violated.

Voorzitter: Paul Tant, second undervoorzitter. Chairman: Paul Tant, second vice president. These two great guarantees reveal weaknesses or uselessnesses such that they cannot be considered sufficient or ensuring the mission assigned to such shelters. For the PSC, a number of guarantees seem indispensable to us. The PSC has submitted a series of amendments – and will continue to do so – which ensure, within the framework of the regionalization of municipal and provincial laws, the dedication of a number of guarantees to the benefit of minorities, both of the Flemish minority in Brussels and of French-speaking inhabitants of facilitated municipalities.

In parallel with our amendments, what could be the guarantees that would prove useful and necessary so that each citizen develops in a situation where he believes to find sufficient protection against this disbalance that the project devotes? I will set out three specific priorities.

In recent years, we have experienced a political fact that was the clear translation of what was not wanted to protect these minorities from a number of harassment: the circular Peeters — Van den Brande — Martens. These three circular and the focus on the circular Peeters was, in this regard, interesting – they highlighted a harassment towards the inhabitants of the municipalities of the periphery and how, in disregard of legality, these circular, along with a series of other measures, had the essential purpose of discouraging individuals.

This was true with regard to the Peeters circular, including in tax matters for sending warnings-role extracts. This seriously complicates the situation of the residents. It is clear that from the moment when one commits to deepening and distributing greater powers to regions and communities, and in any case to regions, in this context, the political gesture that would constitute the removal and removal of circles such as these would indicate this willingness to give guarantees and to translate these guarantees into a determined behavior.

Second system of which we find a draft in the text, but which does not go to the end: in a number of subjects, the definition, in regard to the administrative section of the State Council, of the role that the general assembly could play. In this regard, I would like to make our position very clear. There has never been a question of saying that because a magistrat of the administrative or judicial order had obtained his diploma in Dutch or French and was therefore labelled in the linguistic framework as being Dutch or French-speaking, one was in the presence of a partial magistrat. All jurisprudence concerning the impartial magistrate in Europe is never based on the objective demonstration of partiality or impartiality. This is a difficult demonstration to do, which often turns out to be insulting and poses a number of problems. The Anglo-Saxon principle, applied more and more often at the level of the European Convention on Human Rights, requires that the judge is impartial, not because he is objectively impartial but because the justiciable has the subjective feeling that he is impartial. This is the rule that overcomes it in a whole range of areas. Take the example of the Court of Arbitration in Belgium. The judgments of the Court of Arbitration are not contested by anyone because this body is composed of magistrates half Dutch-speaking and half French-speaking. Therefore, her decisions are accepted by everyone, even if sometimes they are not pleasant, because she proceeds in this way. Another example: a magistrate who has ruled provisionally, in reference, in the judicial order and who therefore, by definition, is as impartial at the time when he decides provisionally as he will be when he decides in definitive, but he has made a decision in reference. This is true in the judicial order as it is also true at the level of the State Council in the administrative litigation.

I would like to say to Mr. It is of the utmost importance that the decisions made by the judges are accepted and that we have the necessary tags. Mr. Viseur, you are referring, in this regard, to the notion of probability and the appearance of impartiality. I would like to point out that, in the last two years, we have abandoned this path, in the sense that we must now establish the proof that there was something else under the appearance. You say that this theory is becoming increasingly widespread. This is no longer true, it is the opposite. For about two years, the complainant must provide the evidence of a certain partiality and the impartiality of the judge, whatever it is, is presupposed. I agree with the importance of this point but not to the extent of using the case-law of the European Convention. The difficulties we have especially known in this matter seem to push the balance in the other direction.

In our internal legal order – I take the example of the referred judge who ruled provisional – what I think is important is the reason that led us to integrate this aspect. We integrated it because we did not want to say at a single moment that this judge, who had ruled in the provisional, was not impartial. But in order to ensure optimal legal certainty, it was proposed to find a system in which it will not sit at the bottom. I have heard a number of criticisms about this proposal, which consisted in saying that the magistrates were despised because of their linguistic origin. This is not true at all. Your interpretation is also correct when you say that we are, on the contrary, in the idea that the strength of the rule of law and the strength of the role of the judiciary in the rule of law, including on the administrative level, is that it appears to be totally out of criticism. You can criticize jurisprudence. You have 24 hours to curse your judges, but in any case you do not criticize the legitimacy. And in my opinion, the creation of legitimate instances constitutes a great progress in a society. There is therefore nothing offensive to say that we have here a track that restores a balance.

Now we come to the last proposed path. I know that she sometimes presents reactions that have personally always surprised me. I want to talk about the reactions to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. It must be recalled how much – and we have every day the demonstration in Europe – the fact that the protection of minorities has not been considered as an essential principle of our right has constituted, in the past, a suffering for the countries of Europe and still today for some of them. All the efforts made since 1995 after the signing of this Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, for each of the countries to join it, for each of the European countries to make it an element of the legal corpus to which it is attached, shows how much it is an element that characterizes our European model.

Here is a list of all signatories. When one sees that among the signatories of 1997 and 1999 is a country like Bulgaria, which has a very significant Turkish minority, and which therefore must take into account a number of balances, one can say that one witnesses the demonstration of human and political progress.

When I see that the Czech Republic, which suffered...

Mr. Viseur, would you advocate that French speakers in Belgium should be treated in the same way as the Turks in Bulgaria?

I give examples of countries that have other disputes than the Belgian-Belgian disputes. I went to Bulgaria, I saw the monument that was built only with skulls of Bulgarians who were murdered by the Turks who said they were shaving everything. by

It is still true that European countries, which have experienced dramatic situations, have managed to overcome the tensions they knew. I will give you the name of the last signatory country; this should make us red. These countries were able to decide to end a dramatic situation. Nevertheless, the dramas they were experiencing were far greater than those we know, but they were aware of what this decision represented A country as civilized as ours should have no difficulty considering it an obvious element. He has already translated into his laws a number of elements that are found in the convention.

Again, in the Czech Republic, it is very different from ours. In 1938, she paid with her freedom the right to have a German minority. In Romania, you know how important the Hungarian minority is and there too, a litigation has developed. Let me finish with the last country that signed, on 11 May 2001, and immediately ratified for a date of entry into force on 1 September 2001, the Convention on the Protection of Minorities: it is Yugoslavia.

You can imagine what happened in Yugoslavia less than 5 years ago, you can imagine the suffering. I heard this morning on the radio the frightening number of missing persons whose trace has not been found: Serbs, Albanian speakers. This country comes out of a terrible confrontation that has threatened the balance of the Balkans and, just a year after being liberated from Milosevic, it signs this convention.

In terms of human rights, Belgium is one of the most developed countries. We have the will to live together, we have expressed it through a number of texts because we are a country of minorities. The founding fathers made Europe because everyone was a minority: the Germans because they had just lost the war, the French because they were in a difficult economic situation, the Italians because they were completely crushed by the situation known during the war and the 3 Benelux countries because they were obviously minority. These six countries said not only "never again war", but "let us make each of our minorities the very basis of what will be the balance of tomorrow."

When presenting this Framework Convention as an offence to Flanders, I find it absurd to feel offended by what is one of the legal elements at the very heart of our life in Europe, while countries as far away from our peace as Yugoslavia have signed it. And when one makes it an element of tension while it is an element of trust, I think one misses an opportunity. We miss an opportunity in a Europe where – Turkey being what it is and France having its particular problems – we are at the forefront of everything that is defence of human rights. We must enter into the logic of this convention.

I am willing to discuss anything. One speaks of a treaty that does not apply here, unless one compares situations that are incomparable. In this regard, I find it wretched what Mr. Viseur is doing here. Our situation is – fortunately but – not similar to that of Yugoslavia; our situation is not similar to that of Czechoslovakia or to that of a number of other countries. Therefore, it is ⁇ wretched to make a comedy here, as if it were all similar.

Mr. Viser, you also make a listing. We can do that too. That is not a single problem. This viewpoint, by the way, was already suggested before. Belgium has its own problems, but why does France, patrie des libertés, have so many problems with ratification? You are doing an intellectual comedy. I have very big problems with that part of your presentation, because if you do politics this way, you will have to do it with other discussors.

I agree with the previous speaker. I refer to the first rapporteur from then on, who clearly stated that no less than fifteen European countries have made reservations to the European Convention on Minorities. They have made it clear that they have no minorities or that they disagree with the definition of a minority.

Mr. Viseur, it is very gorgeous that you make a seemingly obvious comparison with Bulgaria and the terror that the Turks carried out there at the time. You also take the terror in Yugoslavia, as if it has something to do with what is happening here. You abuse the Convention on Minorities because it covers the indigenous population that is discriminated in a certain place and threatens to be minoritized or decimated. This is what this Convention on Minorities serves, and therefore not for arrogant insinuations such as the French speakers who have come to live in Flemish Brabant and who have said that the indigenous population must adapt to them. That is the abuse you are committing. It is very clear what it is about. Mr. Maingain said in the committee what he intends to ⁇ with the European Convention on Minorities: a return to the situation of 1830 in this country, a full bilingualism and full facilities throughout Flanders for all French speakers. This is what you want to ⁇ with the European Convention on Minorities, but you will always struggle with it, because in Flanders there is no majority to ever realize this.

Voorzitter: Jean-Pol Henry, first undervoorzitter. President: Jean-Pol Henry, First Vice-President

Mr. Viseur makes a fundamental mistake here by linking the position of the Flamings in Brussels to the position of the French speakers in the outskirts. Brussels was founded in the 10th century AD and has always been a Brabant city, not a Flemish city, because Flanders did not exist at that time, but a Brabant city. Until the late nineteenth century, Brussels remained the Brabant city. In the 16th century, by the way, thousands of Brussels travelled to the Netherlands, more specifically to the surrounding area of Amsterdam, where the Brabants was located at the base of the present modern Dutch.

Mr. Viseur, the French speakers in the outskirts are mainly French speakers who moved after 1963, at the time when the language boundary was fixed and that these migrants knew perfectly that they were moving from the bilingual Brussels to the monolingual Flanders. When you compare such situations with each other, you are intellectually unfair.

Mr. Tastenhoye, you want to finish.

What should be the principle? Anyone who moves from one country to another or from one language region to another language region must adapt to the local situation. And that is enough.

Everyone had the opportunity to speak out. Continue on, Mr Visitor.

I will answer these comments briefly. I am told that the situation is not comparable to that of Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia or even the Spanish Basque Country. I could mention other countries as wise as Belgium. Switzerland, for example, is a confederation that has for centuries included minorities and majorities. Minorities are well respected. Italy also has a German minority that is respected. As for Spain, let’s not talk about tourists staying in Ibiza or elsewhere. Of course, people who are permanently attached to the country must be protected. Mr. Tastenhoye, it is not wrong to say that there is a Flemish minority in Brussels. Nor can one claim that under the land law, Brussels will become a city with a flamish majority because it was founded in the 10th century by the Flemish populations. Europe is a good example of historical variations. Poland has signed the Convention. You know the situation in this country. In 1939, he was amputated from part of his territory. It has recovered part of German territory and includes Russian-speaking and German-speaking minorities. These are historical developments but this has not prevented this country from joining this convention. by

That being said, it is obvious that our country has minorities. However, some countries, which do not have minorities, have also signed the convention. It is obvious that respect for minorities is an essential element of building our democracy. There is nothing hostile to say that the Flemish in Brussels, the German-speaking in Wallonia and the French-speaking in the Brussels periphery can estimate that the signing of this convention can constitute an element of confidence in the State. Making this request a kind of French-speaking “Trojan horse” to try to conquer territories beyond the periphery is a fantasy that really does not correspond to our approach. by

Finally, I would like to summarize the position of the PSC.

1 of 1. There is a fundamental difference between the two projects. I explained it.

2nd In this project, some elements affect the confederate evolution. This is not our intention and we must take the consequences.

3 of 3. Constitutional problems arise and result in a loss of confidence of citizens, especially minorities, in the state and therefore in the majority. There are solutions to compensate for this situation.

The question is what this position results from. Giscard d’Estaing had one day answered by a “yes, but” to General de Gaulle who had replied to him dryly that one does not govern with “yes, but”. In the present state, it is obvious that the negative elements prevail over the positive elements. We have clearly explained what, in our opinion, are the additional confidence elements that we consider indispensable for a text such as this to be voted by the House.

It is now up to the government, well aware of our positions, to clarify the elements it puts forward to meet this concern which, in my view, is an essential concern in a logic of calm.

The construction of a State is constantly based on this sense of confidence that is important to develop. Everything that contributes to trust is not a defeat of one or a victory of one over the other. It is a victory of democracy and this victory, we have drawn the contours in which it could take place. It remains to be hoped that it will be understood in the head of government and that he will draw a number of consequences.

June 27, 2001 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, I urge not to begin the work in the absence of the Government.

June 27, 2001 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, you are not only physically present today, but you think you are also mentally present.

The federal agreement for the state reform is now called Lambermont, but everyone forgets that Lambermont is in the Dutch Lambermont, except for some colleagues. How could it be that the French-language version is spontaneously taken into the mouth by everyone? In the hemisphere, everyone speaks about Lambermont and no one thinks of saying Lambermont. The answer is that no one associates this agreement with Flanders.

The part on funding is an agreement of French speakers for French speakers, as our colleague Herman Van Rompuy said during the previous debate. Also in this chapter about the powers, however, and about Brussels, it’s about money, a lot of money, federal money, maximum fee for mini powers. This morning another special committee for the Revision of the Constitution met around the fund to channel, mobilize the resources for the international appearance of Brussels and also there it turned back to money, a lot of money, federal money for Wallonia with outstanding powers for Flanders.

In my speech, I would like to address in particular the agreements concerning Brussels. The Costa, the Conference for State Reform. This Costa was meant to signify the end of the community problems and to be a milestone in the state reform. However, it would also be different, unlike before. It would not be the government that would decide and the consultation would no longer take place at night and in distant castles. Well, all the decisions, the Saint-Elois Agreement, the Lambermont Agreement and the Lambermont-bis Agreement have been negotiated by the government during night marathon meetings.

The Costa itself has never worked and has never been a place of decisions. Moreover, every proposal and every suggestion with a view to genuine tax autonomy — for example the splitting of social security, of the health care, of the NMBS — was countered by Mr. Moureaux, who was shocked by the statements of Mr. De Gucht and Vankrunkelsven, who during the month of January 2000 ventilated their reactions and options in the press.

As a result, gas was taken back by the Flemish majority parties. The result is that of the essential Flemish demands, which were unanimously approved in the Flemish Parliament by all democratic parties, nothing can be found in the new agreements.

From the Costa I want to move to the Brussels Costa. The Brussels Costa originated, on the one hand, from the Brussels Government Agreement, which was also negotiated and signed by the CVP and which was an expression of the willingness of the Brussels majority partners to work on a refinement of the Brussels institutions. On the other hand, the Brussels Costa was an expression of the inability and/or reluctance of the federal violet-green majority to implement the necessary reforms of the Brussels institutions. The agenda of the Brussels Costa was therefore strictly limited to three regional subjects: the strengthening of the Dutch language group in the Brussels Capital Council, additional drawing rights on the Brussels Regional Budget for the years 2000 and 2001 to the benefit of the French and Flemish Community Commissions to cover clearly demonstrated needs in education and the avoidance of blocking the Brussels institutions by extremist groups.

However, this context was fundamentally modified by the Lambermont Agreement. The herein provided transfer of the entire municipal legislation to the Brussels Capital Region, without prior guarantees for the Brussels Flamings, threatened to seriously undermine the position of the Flemish Community in Brussels. Since the federal majority also once again gave up on this point, it was logical to extend the agenda of the Brussels Costa to the municipal level. The CVP has actively contributed to the establishment of a unanimous Flemish-Brussels front with the partners of VLD, People’s Union, SP and Agalev. This resulted in two resolutions and a motion approved by the Council of the Flemish Community Commission on 9 June 2000, 19 December 2000 and 16 February 2001, respectively. These texts, which were jointly prepared, signed and approved by the Brussels groups of CVP, VLD, Volksunion, SP and Agalev, contain a clear and concrete requirements package for the municipal level.

This package contained the following requirements: at least two Flemish creatures in each Brussels municipality, a guaranteed number of Flemish municipal councillors in each Brussels municipality and a double majority in each language group of the Brussels Capital Council for any changes to the revoked municipal law. The Brussels CVP group has always acted loyally, constructively and consistently in this regard, both with regard to the other Flemish partners and with regard to the French-speaking negotiating partners. The course of the negotiations in the Brussels Costa was quite chaotic with several false starts, numerous federal interventions and artificial grips.

The CVP delegation was also required to establish that there was constantly a parallel negotiation circuit that excluded the CVP and the PSC. This testified, to put it gently, not to a very loyal attitude towards the largest Flemish majority partner in the Brussels majority. The French-speaking negotiators have been able to successfully use this parallel circuit to persuade the other Flemish negotiators to break through the Flemish front on the municipal level. It has been chosen to serve the short-term interests of the purple-green federal government instead of the Flemish-Brussels requirements package that all Flemish parties had already described a few months earlier as essential and realistic.

The agreement that the Brussels parties VLD, VU, SP and Agalev eventually concluded can only be rejected by my group and this for three reasons.It is an imbalanced agreement that does not sufficiently take into account the essential interests of the Brussels Flamings and the capital role and the bilingual statute of Brussels. Because it is an agreement that has insufficient eye for the long-term interests of all Brusselsers, Flemish and French speakers, because it does not offer prospects for better and more coherent governance. Not least because it is an agreement that testifies to a lack of elementary political decency. I would like to remind you that there is no majority in Brussels for this agreement. Only 4 out of 11 members voted in Brussels for this agreement. The agreement for Brussels is perfidious and not even efficient. It means: more Flemish resources for less Flemish power.

The regionalization of the provincial and municipal law could have been one of the better decisions in the state reform of this government if one had respected the advice of the Council of State in the preliminary revision of Article 162 of the Constitution and if one had not neglected to efficiently settle the situation for Brussels. But the government did not do this.

Through the Brussels Agreements, the federal government, in other words the two major communities, loses impact on the administrative organization of Brussels. The agreement does not contain any guarantee for an equivalent participation of the Flamings in the board of directors in Brussels and that is a very serious mistake.

We believe that the two communities should remain involved in the administrative organization of their capital. Through the agreements, the tripartite of Brussels is strengthened. Due to the greater own taxation and the regionalization of the municipal law, Brussels is becoming more than ever a “région à part entière”. Again there is a thread that Flanders cuts through the alliance with Brussels. Prime Minister Dewael once vowed that there could not be a three-fold army formation.

The previous state reforms expressed a comparison of Belgium of communities and regions between which there was a political balance. The previous state reforms have achieved a balance between regions and communities. This agreement ends this political balance.

The agreement definitively departs from the Flemish aspiration to build a federal Belgium on the basis of communities and fully fits in the starting point of the French-speaking federalism on the basis of three regions. This is reflected in the rule that only the regions receive an exclusive, though very limited, tax autonomy and also that the regionalization of the municipal law on the regions takes place, also in Brussels. As a result of the tripartite, Flanders loses any participation in the administrative organization of its capital. This is a very serious institutional deficiency of this agreement, namely the definitive tripartiality of the country, in which French-speaking Brussels now decides about itself and in which on the federal level the minority ends up in a political majority of two against one.

The Brussels Agreements provide no added value in terms of better and more coherent governance. In the past and also now, we were and are in favor of the removal of the municipal and provincial law to the regions, but then in a correct way carried out for Brussels. That the overthrow of the municipal and provincial law, already inscribed in the SintMichielsakkoord, has so far left waiting for itself, has exactly to do with the fact that on the Flemish side the willingness to overthrow those laws was lacking without additional guarantees for the Brussels Flamings. This is happening now. This government arranges the lifting without guarantees for the Brussels Flamings. These conditions are known. They are listed in the various resolutions that all Brussels groups of the Flemish Democratic Parties have more than once unanimously approved. Can I remind you of these conditions? First, prior to each transfer of the Municipal Act for the Brussels Capital Region, guarantees must be registered for the presence of a minimum number of Flamings in each Brussels ship college and municipal council, in each section of each Brussels OCMW and in every section of any local public administration, such as the police councils. Secondly, the transfer of the municipal law to the Brussels Capital Region should provide that any aspect of this legislation can be subsequently amended only with the approval of a majority in each language group of the Brussels Capital Council. None of these conditions are met. What we say and demand is nothing more, but also nothing less, than what all democratic parties together in Brussels have unanimously demanded.

The agreement that was reached on Brussels is not a good agreement. The opinion of the State Council is destructive. The Constitution is violated. The principles of non-discrimination are violated. The agreement violates the principle of equality and the principle of proportionality. The Council also raises the question of whether certain arrangements can work. The State Council’s fundamental objections were wiped off the table by the government and by the majority in the Senate. The agreement and the provisions for Brussels must be rejected. This does not mean that this agreement does not contain any positive elements. A number of important elements that were acquired when the CVP was still participating in the talks were eventually preserved.

It is primarily the expansion of the Dutch language group of the Brussels Capital Council, but also the direct election of the Brussels members of the Flemish Parliament is a positive point that, by the way, implements an element of the resolution approved by the Flemish Parliament in 1999. These are solid provisions because they provide a better functioning formula for the Dutch-speaking language group in the Brussels Capital Council.

This remains, however, because on various parts of the other points included in the Brussels Agreement we have devastating criticism.

More money for Brussels. Two billion francs of federal funds will go to Brussels. However, that is not the problem; the problem is that this money is distributed unbalanced. After all, in addition to the countless billions that are transferred to the French community through the Lambermont Agreement and which make it no longer necessary for the Brussels Capital Region to provide funds for the French language education, this agreement again transfers two billion federal funds to the Brussels Community Commission and the Brussels municipalities. Of those 2 billion, of which 1.2 billion comes from Flanders, 200 million de facto goes to the Flemish Community Commission.

Let it be clear to everyone that I have no objections to more funding for Brussels. On the contrary, but then this should serve as a lever for Brussels for a greater participation of the Flemish in governance; it should give Brussels the opportunity to make the Flemish feel more at home in their capital. These funds should serve as a lever for more bilingualism in hospitals, the service sector, the administrations. Now money is given without any condition. Political fragmentation in Brussels is encouraged instead of curtailed. It is intended to introduce a novelty in electoral legislation with regard to the apparentation system, in which it will be possible from now on to establish list connections between opponents. It is likely that the two cartels VLD-VU and SP-Agalev had to put their thumbs for the CVP in the last elections for the Brussels Capital Region. On the local level, the same phenomenon is usually observed: cartel lists do not get it from parties that remain themselves. In order to prevent this evil in the future, it is intended to incorporate the possibility of establishing list connections between parties that are actually opponents of each other.

One begins in Brussels, but ⁇ this purple-green majority will quickly extend this system to the Flemish Municipal Election Act which will result in the voter determining that with his vote candidates are elected on lists for which he has not expressed his preference in any way.

Does it show respect for the voter in this way to trick his or her vote for a list into a vote for a completely different list, with a completely different program? What is the benefit of such a system?

Due to the expansion of the Dutch-speaking language group in the Brussels Capital Council, the threshold for obtaining half of the seats is already so high that this association system does not provide any added value.

Third, the double majority disappears. In order to avoid blocking the Brussels institutions, the double majority in the Joint Community Commission and regulatory changes in the Brussels Capital Council will be definitively weakened. It is said that this is motivated by democracy motives. Well, instead of looking for specific and temporary solutions to specific and temporary problems, one has set up a completely new system. In this way, an important achievement of the Brussels Act is destroyed. Moreover, this undermines the parallelism existing between the guarantees that both language groups enjoy at Brussels level and at the federal level.

In the past, often only after some hesitation, the Flamings have entrusted powers to the Brussels Capital Region. Eventually, however, the bridge was crossed because the Brussels Flamings had sufficient guarantees at the regional level so that no policy could be conducted against them. This agreement puts these guarantees on the slope. The double majority disappears and takes place for approval with a third of a language group. This is an example of the new speech of this government. What do we read in the government statement? The fact that a majority in each language group is replaced by a third of the votes cast in each language group is called a refinement of the double majority. This is stated in the agreement. The refinement implies that the majority in each language group is reduced to a third.

I think that this purple-green majority should still be high that they should take into account the CVP in Brussels. The normal decision-making procedure is amended so that the CVP can also be put out of play. It is difficult to doubt that this provision will be a rule rather than an exception.

Fourth, additional Flemish sheep cost half a billion per head. According to Mr. Ducarme, according to the agreement, in the 19 Brussels municipalities a total of 2 Flemish crops will be added; one in Elsene and one in Watermaal-Bosvoorde.

Mr. Speaker, how much do you think this will cost?

One billion has been provided for the additional creatures, and there will be only two, so that is half a billion per head.

I did not follow your calculation.

Do you understand me now, Mr. Coveliers?

Thank you for your explanation, because now I understand you perfectly.

Mr Coveliers, I am going on.

If your party fellow, Mr. Van Rompuy, allows me to do so, I am a complete attention, as always.

Mr. Coveliers, the fact that this billion is for two Flemish sheep — thus half a billion per person — is not the biggest problem. However, I find strange the corrected reluctance of the French-speaking parties to ensure the bilingualism, which arises from the duality and from the capital functions, in the Brussels administration. Brussels is a capital area and thus the duality and bilinguality derive from it. I repeat, the corrected reluctance of the French speakers to acknowledge this is ⁇ strange, especially since the prosperity of Brussels is largely based on this capital function.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to strengthen the argument of my honored group member. Currently, colleague Jean-Jacques Viseur is absent—probably he is taking his turn in the walkways. For the continuation of the debate, I would like to recall the qualification he gave yesterday in the committee to the scheme of the guaranteed ships subject to payment to the relevant municipal administration. He called it "du brol", a real Brussels term. Mr De Gucht, however, was talking about a perfidious arrangement. For what remains to come, it is interesting to keep in mind the qualification of Mr. Viseur.

This is an interpretation that has its value.

Mr. Leterme, colleagues, I could go even further. If we apply the principle "one man, one vote" - which in this case is used by our French-speaking colleagues - in Brussels on the basis of the only measurable election outcome, namely the regional elections where the Dutch-speaking people win 14.1%, then this would produce for Brussels at this moment 3 Flemish mayors on the 19, and 21 Flemish creatures on the 141. But what are the facts? Now there are 12 shapes and 0 mayors on a potential of 170 college candidates. The city of Brussels, the capital, still has the bruist: the capital counts 1 Flemish ships per 10 colleagues; the possible added ships were refused there. That one Flemish ship has powers that do not exceed the several million Belgian francs, on a budget of 21 billion francs for the city of Brussels. These only Flemish ships in Brussels are not even competent for Dutch-speaking education and culture. The OCMW chairman and the 13 OCMW councillors are all French speakers. Recently, one Dutch-speaking OCMW board member was added, but at the moment this is still being discussed. The agreement on Brussels that was concluded here will not change these relations.

I have read an opinion article from Mr. Vanhengel, both in the Financial Economic Time and in the Standard, in which he writes "Flamings definitively anchored in Brussels". This article is about the fact that the Brussels Flamings get 17 seats. French speakers get 8 points. The difference is 9. It is a two-page article that only emphasizes that there are 17 mandates. In this article, there is no word about the loss of the double majority and that this agreement in no way reinforces the real power of the Dutch speakers in Brussels. It is only concerned with the fact that they get more mandates and that more mandates can be distributed.

It is also important that the agreement in no way ensures good governance in Brussels. No initiative is being developed to coordinate or rationalize the 19 Brussels baronies that are actually reinforced into 19 kingdoms. The system for the municipal level is completely insufficient. It is not waterproof and does not provide any added value in terms of better and more coherent governance, for example through a regional coordination of some aspects of municipal policy. The multitude of close-knit levels of competence may continue to compete and counteract each other. The Brussels should take it for granted.

Finally, I also note that the arrangement at the municipal level has been reduced in the most plain manner to a vulgar acquisition. It was apparently not enough that one paid this completely insufficient arrangement with 1 billion francs extra federal money for the French and Flemish community commissions. Another extra billion francs were thrown on the table to reward those municipal governments who show the kindness to elect a Dutch-speaking ship or OCMW chairman. In addition, this way creates a direct link between an individual mandate and federal funding. Well, this is not only legally challenging, but also contrary to the principle of equality. It is not only substantially challenging but also contrary to any principle of good governance and objective financing. It is also morally challenging because the agreement is a trade in people and mandates. Flames, as the negotiators of this agreement argue, should not bear local mandates because it makes sense in a bilingual capital area of a country in which they constitute the largest community. No, Flammers are allowed to hold those mandates because they pay cash for them. More money and more mandates. The Brussels should be satisfied.

I would like to ask a question to Mrs. Creyf.

The Flemish Party fully supports your position. What you said is correct. However, I find that the CVP does not always have the same discourse in the various assemblies, including in this Chamber and in the Brussels Capital Region. by

I give an example. Last Friday, the Flemish Bloc submitted a motion to the Flemish Community Commission which recalled two previous motions approved on 7 December 2000 and 8 February 2001 by the so-called democratic groups of VLD, CVP, SP, AGALEV and VU. The Flemish bloc has not approved these motions, not so much because we do not like them, but because, in our opinion, they did not go far enough. Last Friday, the motion of the Flemish Bloc recalls these two motions of 7 December 2000 and 8 February 2001, already approved by all Flemish democratic parties. The CDU voted against our motion! I do not understand this at all. by

Are you against Lambermont? Are you willing to go as far as to block Lombard or are you not worth it? I refer to the power of the CVP in the Brussels government. With your minister, you have a power tool. You can have your minister resign so that the Brussels institutions are lazy and the government has to find a way out, or you can order the minister to go on strike. The government must decide by consensus. If Mr. Chabert does not agree with the decisions, we must seek a solution. Mrs Creyf, what is your point of view? The CPP speaks a double language.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Tastenhoye, as regards Brussels, the Flemish Bloc and the CVP do not share the same position. I know that the Flemish Bloc wants to paralyze the Brussels institutions. You have never agreed to what has come out of the bus for Brussels in the past. The CVP does not want Brussels to be paralyzed and that Brussels cannot function. The only victims of the failure of Brussels are the Brusselsers. The CVP does not in any way share the position of Vlaams Blok on this subject.

This is the Federal Chamber. The CVP Chamber Group will assume its full responsibility. I repeat that after the approval of this law, the CVP will seek a case in this regard before the Arbitration Court. We know our responsibility. We will not escape her.

Mr. President, Mr. Minister, Dear colleagues and colleagues. The Belgian Constitution was frequently amended after the 1830 coup, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. To outline the reasons why we find the current draft of the Special Act, which is part of the logic of constitutional amendment, illegitimate, I would like to outline the broader historical background of the Belgian Constitution. After all, it is already wrong to start running with that legitimacy in the autumn of 1830, with the Belgian secession of the Netherlands. I would like here to examine the arguments invoked in the legitimation of the Belgian independence and to make a comparison with some other well-known historical cases of political separation, such as the Dutch secession from Spain in 1581 and the American secession from Great Britain in 1776.

What is in this comparison? It is evident that the Belgian independence was never justified or legitimized, even more, that the Belgian independence was never formally proclaimed. Both in the Dutch and American independence, one in 1581, the other in 1776, the state separation was a consequence of the right invoked by a people to remove the prince for breach of contract, more specifically the violation by the prince of his obligation to preserve and defend the freedoms and interests of the people. For the Dutch, it was also a mistake, since the prince, when he served as Duke of Brabant, had sworn a formal oath to respect the old freedoms, privileges and customs rights of the people, and had even explicitly declared his agreement with the right of the people to remove him if he would not fulfill that duty.

Both in 1581 and 1776 the state secession was preceded by a formal denial of the loyalty of the people to their prince and his government. That cancellation was legally justified by the Dutch and the Americans in the same document. During the Dutch secession this happened in the so-called Plakkaat of Verlatinghe, announced by the States-General of the United Netherlands in The Hague, on 26 July 1581. I quote: "It is commonly known that the prince is there for the sake of the subjects, without which he is not a prince," so the poster says literally. "When he violates the rights of the people," says the text, "he must therefore be regarded not as a prince, but as a tyrant. Then its subjects are free to no longer recognize him as a prince, especially after it has been agreed in the States of the country to abandon him and in his place to choose another sovereign to protect them." End of quote.

The American Declaration of Independence was announced by the Continental Congress on July 4, 1776. I quote the text: "We consider the following truths as self-evident: that governments derive their power from the approval of the rulers, and that when a form of government undermines the aforementioned goals, the people have the full right to change or dismiss that government and establish a new government." End of quote.

Even Anglo-Saxon historians today recognize the Dutch Plakkaat of Verlatinghe as the direct model for the American Declaration of Independence, as Stephen Lucas in his book "The Plakkaat of Verlatinghe, a neglected model for the American Declaration of Independence". The poster, however, goes back to a document from our regions, the so-called Happy Income, the authority granted by Duchess Johanna of Brabant to her people on 3 January 1356.

That Brabant constitution, to which each Duke of Brabant was subsequently obliged to swear a oath of allegiance, explicitly states that the people have the right of resistance if the Duke violates his obligations. The Brabanders were not the first to uphold this principle. The Flemish legal historian, Professor Raoul Van Caenegem, pointed out in his work "Medieval Flanders and the Seeds of Modern Democracy" that this principle was already invoked as a legal argument by Iwein, Count of Aalst, during a direct democratic people's assembly in Gent on 16 February 1128. Iwein led a protest movement against Count Willem of Flanders because it again introduced a tax that he had solemnly abolished shortly before. At a people’s assembly in Gent, at which Count Willem was present, Iwein told the Count that he had thus broken the mutual bond between himself and the people. No prince who had violated the law could rule lawfully further, according to Iwein. He therefore demanded that, if his accusation were found to be well-founded, the Count would resign and clean the seat for a ruler who would respect the law.

Iwein van Aalst took another step further in the direction of modern constitutionalism when he proposed to submit his accusation to a court that should be composed of "barons of both parties and our lords and all the responsible men from the clergy and the people" and must sit at Ieper, "which is located in the middle of our country, to thus quietly and after mature deliberation without deceit or bad faith to make the judgment." So it was judged whether or not the Count had broken the law. If that was the case, he would have to step up. When Count Willem did not accept that proposal, a popular uprising broke out. Shortly thereafter, the count died in the battle of Aalst and was replaced by Diederik of the Alsace, who recognized the rights of the people.

When then in 1789 the Brabant Revolution breaks out and the United Belgian Provinces separate themselves from Austria, they also do so on the basis of the argument that the prince had violated his solemn promises. The Manifesto of the Brabant People, proclaimed in Hoogstraten on 24 October 1789, declared the Duke of Brabant, Emperor Joseph II of Austria, due to the scandal of falling from the throne.

Mr. President, Mrs. Colen, I find your speech very interesting. Is it possible to get a summary? I think we will be able to use them many times.

You will receive a summary tomorrow. Please let Ms. Colen speak further.

Mr Tavernier, I can add that the speaker who comes after Ms Colen will summarize her speech and explain his vision on it.

Mr. Speaker, with my presentation, I would like, by means of a historical sketch and by reporting what precedes the Belgian independence and the Belgian Constitution, that the Belgian Constitution has never been legitimated and that that Constitution has no legitimacy according to modern constitutional and folk law concepts. The background of all that modern constitutionalism is usually laid by the population to the American secession of Great Britain. However, it has its origins in the Dutch model, which itself is based on historical facts from Flanders that are also documented. In particular, it is the "Plakkaat of Verlatinghe" and the Happy Income. These are elements that are taught in the history lessons but that gain increasing importance in the modern view of constitutionalism by historians.

If you allow me to continue my argument, you will see where I will eventually come. During the Brabant Revolution, Emperor Joseph II of Austria was declared to have fallen from the throne. There was used exactly the same argument that the General States had also invoked in 1581 against the then Duke of Brabant, King Philip II of Spain. Both Philip II and Joseph II had sworn the oath of allegiance to the Happy Income. In that sense, the Brabant Revolution was in line with the old Dutch freedom tradition and seamlessly closed it to the past of our people. It was, as one would, a conservative revolution, intended to safeguard the old rights and based on an existing rule of law and accepted by the people for centuries.

Given this national prehistory, it is all the more striking that the Belgian Revolution of 1830 did not produce a legitimacy document, although if one had wanted to look for it, the source of inspiration was nevertheless before the rape, in particular the Happy Income. Professor Michel Magits of the VUB demonstrated in his work "The Right of Self-Determination during the Belgian Revolution - an examination of the attitude of the Belgian constituent in 1830-1831" - that the Belgian revolutionaries deliberately failed to theoretically justify their separation from Northern Netherlands. More even, the suggestion of one person to draw up such a manifesto was, according to the then historian Huyttens in his 1844 book "Discussions du Congrès National de Belgique" received by the members of the Belgian National Congress on "hilarity and laughter". Mr. Smets, I think the situation at this moment is very recognizable with you. The argument that I put forward to say that in Belgium there has never been an effort to find a legal legitimation and support for the Belgian independence is received here by you on hilarity and laughter, just as in the National Congress at that time even the idea of providing a legal support for a declaration of independence was received on hilarity and laughter. They found it not necessary.

According to the Liège lawyer Joseph Lebeau, one of the leaders of the revolutionaries, a manifesto was unnecessary since the affairs in the world were not decided by law but by violence. “The bajonets have spoken,” said Lebeau. “Violence has destroyed what violence had imposed. Europe already knows it, a manifesto is not needed.” The Belgian revolutionaries worked through the way of the facts enforced with the weapons rather than by resorting to legal arguments. Charles Rogier, another prominent revolutionary and also a Liechtenstein but Frenchman of birth, found a theoretical substrate of Belgian independence "useless". Therefore, the failure to draw up a legitimation manifesto appears to have been a conscious choice for which two statements can be invoked.

First, it was not the intention of the Belgian revolutionaries to restore the principle of the right of self-determination of the Southern Netherlands or, as you would like, the Belgian people as expressed in the Happy Income in honor. This right was not recognized. One knew, as Lebeau explicitly stated, only "the language of violence." It is no coincidence that that same Lebeau as Minister of Justice in 1834 deliberately released the army on the possessions of political opponents of the Belgian regime because, according to him, “the looting of homes of Orangists, though regrettable, is a terrible necessity to suppress the enemies of public order.” From its inception, Belgium has not embedded itself in the original Brabant tradition that the state is at the service of the citizen — which therefore has an active right of resistance if the government intervenes against the interests of the people — but in the totalitarian philosophy of the French Revolution in which the citizen is at the service of the state.

The latter is per definition considered to represent the general interests of the people, which excludes any right of opposition. Belgium therefore became in 1830 a unitary, centralized state whose nature went straight against its own Southern Dutch legal customs and political traditions so far. The revolution of 1830 is therefore absolutely incomparable with that of 1789. Belgium, which was formed in 1830, was in no way like the United Belgian States, which were formed in 1789 and which were violently destroyed by the French the following year.

Second, the Belgian revolution was not the work of men who wanted to replace a foreign, in this case Hollands, government with their own Southern Netherlands or Belgian government, but of characters who wanted to replace one foreign government with another, equally foreign government. In fact, in the first instance, they sought an annexation of our regions by France. They wanted another strange rule in place of the first. The Belgian Revolution was indeed primarily the work of French agents-provocators. According to the then Austrian ambassador, Count Von Mier, they were hooligans paid by French secret agents. Of course, there were also real freedom-loving Southern Dutch people involved, such as the Bruggeling Louis De Potter and the Brusselsman Adolphe Bartels. They were in fact republicans in the liberal and federalist Dutch tradition, but were abused as useful idiots by the pro-French party and immediately after the revolution put aside. The tragedy of The Potter is evident from the fact that in 1839 he will write with insistence that Belgium and the Netherlands should be reunited in a federal connection. I quote: “We must be reunited with or without the house of NassauOranje. I do not care.”

Let me stop for a moment on the important question when Belgium formally became independent. The history of the Belgian revolution was described with true monastic patience to the details by the historian, the Benedictine Father doctor Arnoldus Smits in his four-dimensional work: "1830, cracking in the Netherlands". The hesitation of King Willem I, the betrayal of Crown Prince Willem, who hoped to become King of an independent Belgium, and the military incompetence of Prince Frederik, resulted in pro-French gangs, originating either directly from Paris and Northern France, or from Liège and Henegouwen, taking over power in Brussels and then throughout Flanders. They established in September 1830 in Brussels a true horror wave, as described in various reports of the British consul Cartwright. A month later, "Belgian armies" consisting of French and Luigian gangs with appropriate names such as Têtes de Mort, would subdue the Flemish provinces. Even the so-called Belgian general Grégoire, a Frenchman from Roubaix, admitted that it wasn’t about soldiers, but used the word “robber” himself. Since the new Belgian powers sought the annexation of their land to France, a legal legitimation of Belgian independence remained entirely out of place. This idea led to the new rulers to hilarity and ridicule. 180 years later, this is still the case.

It is even difficult for historians to establish when the Belgian independence was formally proclaimed. It happened that on October 4, 1830, when the Provisional Bewind published a proclamation of which the first article ⁇ and I quote: "The Belgian provinces, with force separated from Holland, will begin to form an independent state." The document only states that Belgium has been separated by force from the Netherlands, but leaves the possibility of independence open in the future way.

Apparently this was not a fact yet. Did they want them? Did it happen on 16 October when the Dutch Crown Prince Willem from Antwerp proclaimed Belgian independence and appointed himself as head of the new state? That announcement, in which the prince, as the head of the Dutch army, ordered the Dutch troops to withdraw over the great rivers and ordered the civil authorities in the south to cooperate in the elections for the National Congress, which had been announced by the provisional regime in Brussels, led to chaos in the southern provinces. After several so-called disobedient army units, in Breda, Maastricht, Luxembourg, Sluis-Oudenburg and the citadel of Antwerp and in Liefkenshoek and Lillo, the Dutch troops in fact withdrew everywhere, after which the French and Luikese gangs could fill the power vacuum.

Did the Declaration of Independence happen somehow mysteriously between 12 and 16 November? On 12 November, Count de Celles submitted to the National Congress a proposal for a decree to officially proclaim Belgian independence, but on 16 November he suddenly declared that — and I quote — "...the Belgian independence is a fact. The Provisional Bewind has proclaimed them.” End of quote. During the discussion on the draft decree, numerous congressmen stated that such a debate was a waste of time. Typering is the contribution of congressman Tiecken de Terhove, and I quote him: "Let that discussion about a declaration of independence be ignored. I repeat, gentlemen, I do not understand the importance of attaching such a statement. I really don’t see it.” It is therefore not surprising that the Belgian national holiday does not coincide with a proclamation of Belgian independence, because except in the future manner on 4 October, such a proclamation formally never occurred. Unless the proclamation of the Prince of Orange on 16 October 1830 would be considered legal.

Do you want to take the leap to the future or to the present? Everyone has their own vision of history and can write history. Just do it.

Until the end of 1830, a majority of the National Congress remained of the opinion that the country should be annexed to France. Rogier was sent to Paris by the provisional regime with the question whether France was willing to support the Belgians if the National Congress formally requested annexation by France. The French hesitated because they feared a war with England if they accepted the Belgian offer. Then Alexandre Gendebien threatened that the Belgians would proclaim the annexation anyway on 30 September.

In the end, however, the Belgian revolutionaries did not decide the fate of the country themselves. The European powers insisted on Belgium the status of an independent kingdom, accompanied by a mandatory neutrality, aimed at keeping the country out of the French waters. The trick of the National Congress on 3 February 1831 to obtain an indirect annexation by France by proclaiming king the sixteen-year-old Duke Louis de Nemours, the second son of the French king, angered the Englishmen. Through Lord Ponsonby, brother-in-law of British Prime Minister Lord Grey, London attempted a pro-orangist coup at the end of March, to which the National Association of Gendebien responded with an elevated wave of terror in April and May 1831.

Eventually, the Belgians had to agree to the kingdom of the English candidate, Prince Leopold von Sachsen-Coburg, the mother-in-law of British Queen Victoria. Thus, Belgium became independent, although no one wanted a new state — neither the orangutans who wanted to stay with the Netherlands, nor the moderate revolutionaries like De Potter who wanted to maintain a confederate or federal bond with the North, nor the radical revolutionaries who wanted to join France. As a national holiday, the country was given July 21, a date that has nothing to do with the history of the birth of Belgium itself, but the day when King Leopold swore in 1831.

A legal legitimacy for the new state was never given. He was not there either. The Belgians had not really had to complain under King William's rule because the royal merchant as he was called, pursued a policy in which the south was clearly favored over the north. Major ministries such as Home Affairs, Water State, Colonies, Religious Affairs and Education were in the hands of Southern Catholics.

Even after the breakup, the south with Leopold I got a Protestant prince. The new Belgian Constitution, according to the analysis given by Professor Karel Rimanque in his book "The Constitution: Explained, Woven and Weighted", was largely a copy of Dutch with the exception of the listing of a series of freedoms to which no real importance was attached as the Flemings could experience in the coming decades. The old right of abandonment, the right of a people whose interests were violated to separate in whole or in part, was never formally recognized after 1789; neither in the Dutch Constitution of Willem I nor in the Belgian. Both the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Belgium were unitary, centralized states according to the French statist model. But even in the series of constitutional amendments since 1970 that have made unitary Belgium a kind of quasi-federal state sui generis, the right of secession has been absent. Neither did any of the princes after 1789 swear the oath of allegiance to the happy income.

If we analyze the Belgian Constitution of 1831, as well as those of the successive constitutional amendments of which the Lambermont Agreement is a new step, and allow ourselves to be guided by today in the West generally accepted legal and international legal principles and in particular by the understanding of the right of self-determination of peoples as developed in recent years, we can only conclude that Belgium is also on that level an illegitimate state. The power of the State is laid in the Constitution to the central government of Belgium which is divided into three bodies: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. These bodies should at least theoretically be independent of each other. This triangulation is in fact a reaction to the absolutism of the ancient regime when legislative, executive and judicial power were united in one person or in one state body. A condition which was assumed to lead to confusion of interests and lack of independence. In addition to the three organs, there is a somewhat separate institution, the King, which unites certain functions of the three organs.

In addition to the central government, there are the so-called subordinate governments: the municipalities and provinces. They will only be empowered to the extent that they are granted by the Belgian central government. That is the opposite of the state in a real federal state, such as in Switzerland, where Article 3 of their federal constitution states, I quote: “The cantons are sovereign in so far as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution. They exercise all rights not entrusted to the Confederation.” In Belgium it is the opposite.

In principle, the Belgian municipalities regulate the matters of municipal interest and the provinces the matters of provincial interest. The central government oversees these lower administrations and appoints mayors in municipalities and governors in provinces. Thus, a hierarchy of governments is set up: below the municipalities, then the provinces and finally the central Belgian State. The center and source of political power is clearly the central regime.

Lambermont shifts the control over the municipalities from the federal to the regional level, but essentially does not change the fact that the so-called Belgian federalism is not true federalism from the ground up. When was and is a law valid? If it has been voted by Parliament in accordance with a certain procedure, usually by a majority against opposition. Why can Parliament pass laws that bind millions of people? The Belgian Constitution allows it. Why can the executive power take administrative measures against the inhabitants and the territory of the State of Belgium? Why can it prosecute, arrest, imprison and punish people for crimes? Why are judgments and rulings enforceable in Belgium against the citizens? Because they are pronounced by the organs of the judiciary, which may do so because it has been authorized to do so by the Constitution. Why are decisions of municipal and provincial councils, ship colleges and permanent delegations valid in Belgium and why can they be enforced? Because the central government has given them those powers and because municipalities and provinces were established by the Constitution.

As is apparent from the foregoing, not only the bodies themselves find their justification in the Belgian Constitution, but also all acts ever made by these bodies: judgments, judgments, resolutions, resolutions, laws, decrees, ordinances, royal and ministerial ordinances, arrests, searches and so on. In short, the Belgian Constitution is the unmoving driver of the entire Belgian state machine. But the question in this regard is: where does that Belgian Constitution find its justification? Officially, a Constitution finds its justification in the will of the people. It is the elect of the people who made this Constitution and it is here in Belgium that the shoe kneels. At the time of its founding, there were two peoples on the territory of the Belgian state: a fragment of the Dutch people, who spoke Dutch dialects and in the Belgian provinces were the majority, and a fragment of the French people, speaking French dialects. In accordance with international law, two or more peoples may establish a multi-peoples state only if they all consent to it in full freedom and knowledge.

The people who made the first and most important version of the Belgian Constitution, and thus the framework of the Belgian state, in fact consisted exclusively of representatives of French speakers. The Flemish were not represented. Nothing shows from the Belgian Constitution that the Flemish people agreed to their separation from the Netherlands. Nothing shows that they agreed to the establishment of a Belgian state. On the contrary, the Flemish cities of Antwerp, Gent, Mechelen, Dendermonde and Sint-Niklaas formally spoke out between 8 and 10 September 1830 against a separation, even against a mere administrative separation from the Netherlands. The province of Oost-Vlaanderen stated that it would like to remain with the Netherlands in the event of separation. On October 23, Antwerp reiterated the request to King William to continue to treat the city as part of the North. Afraid of an Orangist election victory, the Belgian National Congress, which was set up in October 1830 for a period of six months, committed a coup of state on 12 April 1831 and postponed the elections indefinitely. The power came into the hands of an unelected and self-appointed Association Nationale who established a terrorist regime. The British representative in Brussels, Lord Ponsonby, had already ⁇ to his government on 19 February 1831 that the National Congress — in his words — was "hostile to the majority of the people".

The Belgian Constitution, which is at the same time the founding act of the Belgian State, therefore lacks a very important chapter which, in principle, according to the universal law of the peoples, must be present in all the founding acts of multi-peoples states, namely that all the peoples that make up the multi-peoples state or their representatives have decided in full freedom and with knowledge of matters on the establishment of the state in question. As there were in fact only French speakers in the National Congress, the Belgian Constitution pretended that there was only one people in Belgium: the French, who were called the Belgian people to distinguish them from the French in France. The Belgian Constitution thus pretended that Belgium was not a multi-ethnic state. Since the founders of the Belgian State pretended that Belgium was not a multi-people state, the Belgian Constitution does not specify what political powers the constituing peoples transfer to the central Belgian government. In short, it is stated that by law all powers are transferred to the central government. Article 25 of the Constitution reads, “All power comes from the nation.” All political power therefore comes from the nation, which is the Belgian nation. Nation is here synonymous with central government, as it is suspected to embody that nation.

This formally confirms what was announced above, namely that the central Belgian government is given literally all powers, while the municipalities and provinces only have powers to the extent they are assigned by the central government. There are no peoples in the cultural anthropological sense. This short but extremely important article 25 undermines the entire Belgian state structure and is, by the way, an additional reason why the Belgian State should be regarded as contrary to international law. The central government in a multi-ethnic state can only have limited powers, powers conferred upon it by the constituing peoples. But the fullness of authority, the famous right of self-determination of peoples, remains always with the people in question. With this laconic phrase in the first version of the Belgian Constitution, the self-determination right of the Flemish people was effectively abolished by the Belgian-French central government. Article 25 still applies to this day. However, in the new Constitution of 1994, it conforms to Article 33 and Lambermont does not change anything.

Something similar can be said about Article 23. The Constitution states: “The use of the languages spoken in Belgium is free. It can only be regulated by law and only for acts of public authority and for courts.” The use of languages in Belgium is free under the original Constitution. This sentence gave the impression that Dutch was also permitted. However, the ink of the Constitution had not yet dried up, or on 19 September 1831 a law was already passed stipulating that only French was the official language in all of Belgium. This constitutional provision was in fact a reaction to the humiliation policy of Willem I, who had stipulated in accordance with the law that in the Dutch regions only Dutch would be the official language. Implicitly, this provision also resulted in the abolition of the language limit established by the Dutch king. It would take a century and a half before it was reintroduced. Article 23 is contrary to international law. Indeed, it follows from the right of the peoples to self-determination that a people is also master of the language or languages which are more or less public in their territory. A public language can in principle be only its own language. Other languages in the territory may also be semi-public, but only with the unilateral consent of the people to whom the territory belongs.

In Belgium, however, it was the French who, through Article 23 and its implementing laws, granted themselves the right to use French in Flanders and even impose it as the only public language, all this without the consent of the Flemish people. Like Article 25, Article 23, now Article 30 is in the 1994 Constitution, still in the Belgian Constitution, which makes it at least theoretically impossible for the Flemish institutions to conduct a language policy regarding private relations.

The Belgian Constitution of 1831 – in particular Articles 23 and 25 – contain a framework programme for the termination of the Dutch nation in the Flemish provinces. Through French as the only public language and through the central government which they completely controlled, the French and their cousins granted themselves the right to use French everywhere in Flanders, to suppress Dutch, to exclude the Flanders from the main administrative functions, to rule themselves in Flanders and to colonize and exploit the Southern Netherlands people and territory. That would happen in the decades after.

The Belgian State can only be seen in one way, as an assault by the French on the Dutch people, in which the people's territory of the Southern Netherlands was attached to French territory and the right of self-determination of the Southern Dutch people was simply abolished.

Some people will ask why we need to go back to the past. Do the Flemish have access to the Belgian Parliament today, and have they fixed that fuzzy situation, which existed at first? The latter is not true. Especially in the 1970s of the 20th century the Belgian Constitution was rewritten as a grendel constitution, making the Flemish majority permanently inactive. This was done by the introduction of a whole range of institutions in favor of the Belgian-French minority. I think of parity in the Council of Ministers, the system of double and special majorities in Parliament for Community-sensitive matters, the alarm procedure, and so on. These are all techniques that give the Belgian French a veto in the central government. The point, however, is that the Belgian Constitution had that grinding character from the outset. In fact, it was drafted in 1831 in such a way that the Flemish could never change it without the consent of the Belgian French, even after the Flemish in later times, in application of democratic principles, would become a majority in the Belgian Parliament. The fourth paragraph of Article 131 of the Constitution of 1994 states that amendments, amendments or additions to the Constitution are only possible by a two-thirds majority. I quote the article: "In this case, the Houses may not debate if not at least two-thirds of the members of which each Chamber consists are present and a change is only adopted if it has obtained at least two-thirds of the votes" A two-thirds majority the Flemish in Belgium have never had and will never have, even in ideal circumstances. In other words, within the Belgian legal logic, the Flemish have never been able to use their majority to regain their right to self-determination, and they will never be able to.

Under the pressure of the Flemish movement, on the condition of paying high prices, the Flemish have been able to obtain one and the other – here and there a language law or a state reform – but so far they have never succeeded in overturning the injustice of 1831 as a whole. The restoration of injustice can only consist in the restoration of the full right of self-determination of the Flemish people over their entire territory.

The structurally unfair and unbalanced power relations between the French and the Southern Netherlands, as already embodied in the first Constitution of 1831, continue to exist today.

The arsenal of laws on the use of languages and on state reforms is ultimately considered nothing but some exceptional laws on Articles 23 and 25, which themselves are still massively and unshortly anchored in the Belgian Constitution.

Could it have been otherwise? Could the establishment of the Belgian State have taken place legally? That would have been possible if the Southern Netherlands had separated themselves in full freedom and with knowledge of the affairs of the Northern Netherlands, if the subject of the separation had been the subject of a broad social debate, and if it had been approved as such by a free Southern Netherlands people's assembly. If it had happened that way, of course, the separation itself would never have taken place. What interest did the Southern Dutch have in separating themselves from the North? Which people will voluntarily choose to see their situation deteriorate? After the coup, his condition deteriorated: abolition of his language and education, abolition of his self-government, economic and social decline, poverty, alienation, illnesses and famine; here are the fruits of Belgium for Flanders.

The unlawful nature of the Belgian revolution for the Flanders could even have been later regulated if the Belgian French had at any point in the Belgian history come to repentance; if, for example, they had said: “We have in 1830 unilaterally and without your consent deprived you of your right to self-determination, but come, sandy, we give you back the right to self-determination over the entire then-national territory, and we agree that our French fellow-peoples in Flanders only have minority rights to the extent that you voluntarily agree.” Something like that could have been said. If this had happened, maybe something else could have been done from that Belgian State, but it never happened.

It is a strange spectacle to see how the Flemish served the right to rule themselves and the right to speak their own language on their own people’s territory and still have to buy from strangers, through money, territory and power positions. However, according to universal international law, these rights are free of charge, are merely parts of the well-known right of self-determination of peoples, and come freely and naturally to all peoples of the earth. It is tragic, and at the same time comic, that the French revolutionaries of 1830 quickly incorporated the two aforementioned articles 23 and 25 into the Belgian Constitution, while removing the negative effects of Flanders would require effort, labor and sacrifices for thousands over a period of many decades. Even now, almost two centuries later, the harmful effects of these products have not yet been neutralized.

It was immediately proven that the two centuries of Flemish national struggle was in fact a struggle against something that was nothing more than an illusion invoked by the French, against a piece of paper that for the brave Flemish took the form of an irrevocable fortress. Immediately it was also shown that the radical direction within the Flemish-national movement was at the right end. It did not accept the validity of the Belgian State and the Constitution. For this reason, it refused any cooperation with the bodies of the Belgian State. An illegal government should not be negotiated.

It was also demonstrated that the moderate stance was wrong, for it hoped to reform the Belgian State in a sense more favorable to the Flemish by entering into the logic of the Belgian state machine. By submitting to the Belgian state rules, they were stuck in the Belgian mud, resulting in a cynical and degrading power game that has been ongoing for many decades and in which the Flemish have to redeem themselves as slaves from their French masters, while the latter are enjoying raising the price ever higher.

The conclusion of all this is that the Belgian State has no legal and democratic basis under international law. After all, what is the democratic relevance of a state and a constitution that has been created with the participation of less than 1% of the total population?

For the Flemish, the vast majority of voters and participants in the National Congress cannot even be considered Flemish. Since the Flemish people have not given their consent in any way and that error has not been corrected at any time in Belgian history, the Belgian multi-people state has become invalid and the Belgian Constitution is therefore void. This means that all consequences of this Constitution are void. All Belgian institutions are void. The legislative power, the judiciary, the executive power, including the Royal House. The same applies to all the acts taken by these powers which we have seen justify in the Constitution itself. All judgments given by Belgian courts, all laws passed by the Belgian Parliament, all acts of the Belgian administrative bodies. Strictly speaking, there has never been a Belgian state. This is actually a universal rule of law in Western legal systems. If a legal act, whether it be an agreement or the establishment of a company or an association, is void, in principle, not only the act itself is void but also all its effects. Now, to invalidate everything, however, is neither possible nor desirable. Let us be pragmatic. In private law, the jurisprudence has developed a theory by which the acts of companies or associations whose subsequent establishment appears to be void or the effects of agreements which have become void are not all void, but only selectively.

This theory can be applied by analogy. Only the acts carried out within the Belgian framework that affect the rights of the Flemish, Whaling and German-speaking people as a people could be considered void. If one thinks this way, one sees that this applies, among other things, to the following arrangements: the separation of the South from the Northern Netherlands; the attachment to the Belgian State; the language boundary of 1962; the language system in general; the expansion of Brussels as a separate region; the money flows and, more generally speaking, all the unlawful and unbalanced privileges that the Belgian French have granted themselves both in Flanders and at the Belgian level. The annulment therefore of the annexation of the Southern Netherlands to Belgium and the French Empire will be the last act of Flemish nationalism in Belgium, its first act in the new Flanders, and in this act it will immediately find its completion. Is this a misguided thought? The Firemen ⁇ ’t be the first to do this. In the early 1990s, the peoples of the Baltic Sea, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania not only declared their independence but also annulled their membership of the Russian Empire several decades earlier. However, meetings of the Baltic peoples in the early 1940s formally approved this accession. However, Baltic nationalists declared this invalid, as the deputies were Russian-manipulated puppies. In other words, there was no connection to another foreign state in full freedom and knowledge. Compared to the Baltic example, the Flemish dossier is even stronger. The annexation of the Southern Netherlands to Belgium took place without any formal approval from any Southern Netherlands National Assembly. It was an attachment, of course.

I decide . How will we see the foundation of Belgium and its consequences in the future? Do we consider it a project in which the Flemings are more or less embroiled by free will, but which they later realize was a mistake? Or should the Belgian era be seen briefly as the last foreign occupation of Flanders? Given the facts of my argument, I think that only the latter view can be restrained. This is not a purely academic matter. The last point is the advantage that only...

If you are not interested, you can always go out. Do not stay here. Either you sit down, or you go out.

Mr. Speaker, I will decide. In this way, members may be able to listen to the following speech with more interest.

I repeat that the discussion on this matter is not a purely academic issue. The advantage of the latter position is that a number of unfair Belgian arrangements that the Flemish parties can play even after the end of Belgium such as the establishment of the language boundary and the expansion of Brussels as a separate quasi-government can be re-questioned in a manner that is correct in international law. Finally, the latter position can also be admitted for reasons of mental hygiene. As for people, it is unhealthy for peoples to live in lies. Belgium has been a lie since its inception and remains so to this day. Therefore, the Flemish Bloc rejects the Lambermont agreements. They further build on a constitutional system that is essentially illegitimate in itself because it lacks any legal basis and is fundamentally contrary to international law.

A little discipline, a little discipline. You sit down or you leave the room.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleagues, the way this government is conducting the debate on the community issue that Lambermont should be is signing her to the feet.

The Lambermont Agreement, as it currently presents, is simply a financial rescue for French-speaking education. It is ⁇ not the case that both communities go well together, something that Mr. Viseur would like to make us believe. Mr. Smets, I hope you pass on my message to Mr. Viseur. Wallonia gets a bunch of money. Flanders as well. So far his reasoning is correct. The problem, however, is that Flanders have been filling the federal greenhouse from which that money comes for decades. We can only thank you for allowing us to enjoy a little bit of our own money.

Mr. Viser, let us also take advantage of a little of our own money. Thanks in advance.

I repeat my speech. The Lambermont Agreement is a financial bailout for French-speaking education.

This and nothing else is the foundation of the discussion that is being held today. If there were no survival problems for French-speaking education today, then there would be no discussion today about whether or not to approve a so-called Lambermont Agreement, for the very simple reason that there would never or never be an agreement to be discussed. Let us, Flamingen, in the assessment of the agreement above all not forget that this is the absolute and only starting point of Lambermont. French-speaking Belgium has no interest in starting a discussion with Flanders on further regionalization of this Belgian state, I insist, no interest. She does not do this. Their

Every French speaker in this country who wants to see it differently is immediately put to death and accused of being a traitor to the people, precisely because in every French-speaking politician there is the life fear that any evolution in the powers of the provinces in this country would have catastrophic consequences for the Wallish state household. The financial dependence of the South on the North is so great and so decisive that every community conversation drowns in it, in short, money is the alpha and the omega of every conversation between Flanders and Wallonia. This has been the case for the last few decades, but the tragic thing is that nothing indicates that this will ever change in the short or even half-term. Their

First, all possible studies indicate that the annual cash flows from Flanders to Wallonia are increasing. At the same time, the core of the discussion is not whether it is about 250, 300 or 400 or even more billions, the core of the discussion is whether that Flemish and, meanwhile, more than unbeatable generosity also brings ground to the Wallish dike. Solidarity is a beautiful word, but ultimately requires results, otherwise it becomes useless, it excites more and more resistance and raises the idea of profit. The politically conscious Flaming has already overcome that cap for a long time. The ordinary Flaming sees it in the meantime also already days in the East, but not through a awareness campaign in the Flemish media that in recent years deliberately and therefore disinformationfully silences about this, in the firm conviction that a correct presentation of the facts would direct the Flemish voter even more expressly to the Flemish Bloc.

To say it with a boutade, Wallonia may be very grateful to the Flemish Bloc at the moment, but Bredero was, of course, a wise man. There must be no doubt that in the event of a further decline in economic growth, the average Flaming will sometimes ask questions very quickly and intrusively about that boundless deflation of his wealth and, moreover, and above all, that he will ask himself loudly what has happened to those thousands of billions of Flemish money in all those past years. The pot only goes to water until it breaks.

In addition, the political world in Flanders has the fatal tendency to underestimate its voters. The ever-increasing success of the Flemish Block is already a sufficiently eloquent proof of this. The fact that the same political parties are, in addition, hard teachers and apparently do not want to learn from their mistakes, proves the convulsive attachment to the cordon sanitary, of which even the ordinary in the man in the street sees the useless, and even counterproductive.

After all, these political parties are not a demonstration of courage. In those parties, everyone, meanwhile, realizes that the Flemish Block with that cordon sanitary only has to put its basket under the ripe apple tree to harvest. Today, however, there is a primary lack of the honest courage to reject the cordon. It is so. We cannot be blamed for silencing our reasoning. Political courage will, however, be more than necessary for the Flemish politicians who will later give their approval to this Lambermont Disadvantage Agreement. It does not require political courage, like the party neighbor, to press the green button. It takes courage to confront the voters with this anti-Flemish decision.

Mr. Verhofstadt and the VLD have held firm Flemish positions for twelve long years of opposition. For the opposition, this remains non-binding. Nevertheless, there was a general feeling that the former Party for Flanders had thrown off its old anti-Flanders clothes. When a significant part of the People’s Union under the leadership of its former president, Mr. Gabriel, joined the ranks of the new VLD, this was obviously a confirmation of that growing presumption.

Mr. Verhofstadt was clear in his civil manifests. He is at least as clear as the Prime Minister. His civic manifests are, in fact, an absolute crackdown, ⁇ well during an opposition course but of no count if one is prime minister. That honesty honors our Prime Minister. It is already clear that his voters will undoubtedly appreciate that too. His imminent success will not only be supported by his efficient foreign policy and security policy, not only by his innovative drug policy or by his revolutionary gay marriages and euthanasia positions, but also by his Flemish firmness. I wish this Guy Verhofstadt much courage in the upcoming elections. I dare now assume that the Flemish voter will once again not have understood it.

Mr. Verhofstadt proves a bad service to himself, his party, Flanders and eventually even Belgium. His Flemish image—if he ever had it—is definitively lost. From the charm offensive of his new VLD with which he got Mr. Gabriel and his followers over the bridge, nothing remains. The VLD has proven that it does not have any Flemish reflex. As the largest Flemish party of the government coalition, it has taken on a crushing responsibility, which will be remembered for many years. He has lost his Flemish credibility, and that is the worst thing that can happen to a politician: to lose his credibility.

Flanders is becoming increasingly rigid in a financial slide against the Belgian state and against Wallonia and Brussels. The splitting of social security, or at least a part of it, was one of the mandatory demands of the Flemish Parliament, a unanimous requirement which, therefore, was also supported by the VLD — then still in the opposition. The studies of the inexplicable differences between Flanders and Wallonia remain equally inexplicably unfinished. Therefore, there can be no question of retraining the diverted situation. Therefore, there is no alternative but to divide the social security system so that in this country there is finally a question of its own financial responsibility. Mr. Verhofstadt had an excellent opportunity to bring Wallonia to the negotiating table on this subject because the French language education is in an acute financial need. The regionalization of education brings daily the school example of how both parts of the country address an identical problem. Flanders has saved and rationalized and kept the standards. Wallonia, with the most expensive education per student in all of Europe, is constantly asking for money while the quality of education remains beyond everything. The infrastructure is, in many cases, of an overwhelming quality that has long been considered impossible in Flanders. Like many other sectors, education in Wallonia is once again a dump for job seekers. The more souls, the more joy. Mr. Verhofstadt, despite all the bravery on this in his civil manifests, has not even made an attempt to get Flanders out of the financial malls of social security. This Lambermont agreement gives Wallonia the opportunity to simply reject any discussion about further regionalization for several years. It cannot be that Verhofstadt does not know and realize this. Otherwise, he may come to explain where, when and how he will consult with Wallonia on a division of the social security and especially how, where and when he will obtain that division. As long as Wallonia has no project to get out of its financially difficult situation, as long as all the given Flemish money is thrown away money. All those thousands of billions in Wallonia, in fact, do not contribute to financial self-sufficiency. The last quarter of a century is a solid proof of this. Financial dependency, on the contrary, is growing day by day, as demonstrated by today’s Lambermont agreement. The problem is simply structural. Thus, Mr. Verhofstadt does not do any service to Belgium as it does not need to argue that Flanders can not conduct its own social policy in this way, in particular because hundreds of billions of dollars flow to Wallonia annually. Population ageing is coming, and the mountain of debt still stands there in all its glory. So it is clear that the slightest delay in economic growth almost immediately brings us back into trouble. The delay is already fully underway.

Now coming up with the abolition of the viewing and listening fee is almost the most ridiculous thing one could think of to put pressure on the Flemish parties to get the Lambermont Agreement through, before Mr. Verhofstadt becomes Emperor of Europe for six months.

By the way, the common man in the street has been wondering for a while how it is that he first had to save and deliver years to meet the Maastricht standard and to prevent the biggest debt mountain of the European Union from growing even bigger and that suddenly, with the arrival of this brown government, Mr. Verhofstadt, like Moses, has stood up to pour out the promises – for so far they are only promises – as heavenly manna over the astonished heads of his citizens. It has been said earlier: this government continues to underestimate the voters. Political credibility is something different from selling a smooth advertising slogan. Or does the VLD again believe in opinion polls?

The least that can be said about this Lambermont agreement is that it does not offer any future prospects for Flanders. Flanders was melted out, is now melted out and will later be further melted out. Flanders is the milk cow and Lambermont does not change that, quite the opposite.

Social security was not divided, nor is it divided. The Lambermont Agreement did not mention this. This despite the fact that a quasi-unanimity of the Flemish Parliament had set the at least partial split of social security as a basic requirement in new community negotiations. In addition, this requirement was by far the most necessary and urgent requirement of the Flemish parties because Flanders thus each year loses indisputably many billions with which it could develop a dynamic policy itself. Now she cannot even develop her own policy on that unitary matter. The regionalization of social security had to be a basic condition before the Flemish parties sat at the table with the money-needing French-speaking parties. How do the Flemish yes voters dare to wage a good agreement if the most important and most urgent requirement has not even been the subject of discussion? How can one of the Flemish government parties in its electoral propaganda still dare to have its own Flemish, social security, if one possesses at least some intellectual honesty. What is the value of a resolution in the Flemish Parliament, which was served with so much bullying in the media? What is discussed in the various party offices if the federal parliamentarians do exactly the opposite of what their Flemish colleagues have demanded in an official resolution?

Fiscal autonomy was also one of those demands of the Flemish Parliament. First, the size of the figures is so small and so far in time that Flanders can hardly work on their own fiscal policy for a period of many years. Flanders are also wasting a lot of time here. Furthermore, Wallonia is in control of the situation and can intervene if it considers that its interests are being violated. Their

One must be from another planet to not understand what this will lead to. Of course, the interests of Wallonia will be compromised, because taxation is a ⁇ important tool for conducting a socio-economic and therefore political policy. It is therefore obvious that when the rich Flanders offer tax advantages, in whatever form, to their citizens and the less rich or less economical Wallonia does not or does not find it appropriate, it will immediately discover in it a subordination of its citizens. From a clear political perspective, any discussion, any fiscal favorable measure that Flanders put forward with respect to the Flanders, will be immediately followed by a pressure of the Wallonian citizens on their government to get what the Flanders get. This is the evidence itself. It is equally obvious that the Wallonian government parties will immediately oppose the proposed fiscal measures, as this will be perceived as a threat to their own budget and political policy. Their

In short, as long as one neighbor can interfere in the other neighbor’s wallet, this must inevitably lead to a long procession of problems, protests, threats and everything that will confuse an efficient fiscal policy. The term "fiscal autonomy" is therefore, softly expressed, misplaced. Own social security and own taxation, the two most special leverages for conducting a own Flemish policy, remain dead letter in this Lambermont agreement. This is a very bad deal for Flanders.

The Flemish parties that approve this agreement take a heavy responsibility on themselves, because they mortgage the future of their Flanders and their voters, especially now that Wallonia is thrown into the womb, which allows it to turn back to the aspirations of Flanders for years. The same line, the line of the bribe money, is drawn around Brussels. Flanders pay hard Flemish money to obtain shipping offices in Brussels. The shamefulness of such a dress is crushing. This is just bribery.

There is more. The fact that one dares to imagine such a cow trade is a disgrace to the Flemish parties for Flanders as a whole. Any politician who respects himself and his voters should feel insulted by such a proposal. This would mean that political Flanders no longer represent anything in their own capital and they only listen to Flanders when a bunch of money comes on the table. This is just a flat insult.

Furthermore, although this is a totally subordinate order, this ship office does not constitute anything in its content and the Flemish ships may soon be authorized for street lighting during the day. The Flemish parties should therefore simply reject this proposal out of self-respect. The same applies to the increasing number of seats for the Flamings in the Brussels Council. Here too, nothing fundamentally changes the power position, or rather the powerlessness, of Flanders. For this reason, this proposal is to be reduced to a round of postal packaging. This is politically reduced to its most cynical form. Their

The politician orders for himself a number of low-paying posts without benefiting the general interest, without the paying citizen having any interest in them. This should apparently be the level at which community discussions are still being conducted today. This is probably what this brown government calls good and efficient governance. This is politics from the lowest slope. If the Flemish parties approve this agreement, they will write history. This Lambermont Agreement will then be the exponent of the beginningslessness, weakness and mediocrity of political Flanders at the beginning of this twenty-first century.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, after prior historical and ideological considerations, it is time again for a green vision on the Lambermont Agreements.

Panta rhei kai ouden menei — everything changes, nothing remains the same — the Greek philosopher Heraclitus once said. Indeed, since then, a lot has changed in the world, but also in Belgium. Since 1993, Belgium has been a federal state and its federalism is a dynamic construction, subject to an evolutionary process.

Also with this special law, the three elements of this phase of the state reform, namely the transfer of powers, the refinancing of the Communities and the expansion of the tax powers of the Regions and the arrangement for Brussels, constitute a reasonable and balanced whole and a further and meaningful step in the reform of this nation.

The draft includes a global political agreement on the transfer of an important package of powers from the federal level to the Communities and Countries, which in itself constitutes a further development of the previous unfinished phase in the state reform.

In this sense, the two special laws, the Finance Act and the Competence Act, must be read together and sounded together: tax aspects are linked to delegated powers. But it is also about a better and democratic governance of Belgium and Flanders. Each community has long waited for it, and it is of interest that it has resources to finance the matters that were handed over to it more than twenty years ago, such as culture, education, education, education, welfare, media, and so on.

The draft proposal provides for such a step-by-step and structural refinancing that will provide communities with more than 100 billion new resources by 2012 to enable them to plan long-term and provide people in both communities with better quality of life.

The Flemish Community also needs resources to exercise its powers in a decent and efficient manner. The introduction of a new financing mechanism is therefore a logical and necessary consequence. The approval of the Lambermont agreements will give Flanders additional budgetary space. A tax reduction is one thing, but equally there must be enough money to improve the quality of life of the Flemish population. The Flemish purple-green government must not hide behind economic bulletins and worry only about tax reductions, but also has the political and moral duty to worry about the socially weaker.

Belgium will soon take the lead in a social Europe during its presidency. Well, then Flanders as a prosperous region cannot be left behind and must respond to the most urgent needs to build Flanders into a caring region. With the budgetary space that is released, one can offer the six percent poor in Flanders a quality life prospect. The long waiting lists in childcare can be put to an end, thus affordable and more accessible childcare. Better care for people with disabilities, efficient special youth care, a better combination of work and family, anticipate the aging that comes upon us.

Mrs Talhaoui, I would like to point out that the Prime Minister of the Flemish Government, where your party is part of the majority, last week explicitly indicated the destination of the Lambermont dividend. It would be quite unambiguously going to tax reduction. The rush of the green Geysels, Dua and Vogels, who have protested and warned of unfulfilled needs — although due to wrong policy choices one and a half years are valid — has led to a harsh condemnation by the liberals. Do you not think that you lack a little "weight" to push through those needs when you see how the Flemish prime minister-president reacted? You actually make the Flames know that Lambermont will lead to additional efforts on those different domains. No, that will not happen. The Prime Minister has stated what the money will be used for. What you said sounds good, but apparently it is of too little weight in the Flemish government.

I was just going to say that this is also something our ministers asked for at a press conference last week. Mr. Dewael did the same thing. Questions are free. I think this issue will be debated in the Flemish government. We will wait for the result. Importantly, with the Lambermont funds in Flanders, a lot can be achieved. Their

(Interrupted by Mr Joos Wauters.

With the Socialists. They were always there.

Josh, let them listen.

Mr. Leterme, Mr. Van Rompuy, I also wanted to say what can still happen in Flanders provided that transfer of those funds. Of course, there must also be attention to the environment, to the reduction of ecological debt, to the health of the people and to a healthy agricultural policy. That alone would cost about 60 billion francs. I also understand that this will need to be strongly negotiated. There is also an urgent need for funding for education. We always blame the Francophones that they only need money for education. I think that Minister Vanderpoorten will soon be able to use that money best for the commitments she has made with the educational trade unions.

Last but not least, I think that the Flemish government - now I am Antwerp - should also be more attentive to the major cities, especially than possibly to Antwerp. The latter is currently in an acute financial downturn, leaving no room for an innovative and structural policy. In short, thanks to Lambermont, a socially moved and green Flanders seems much closer. Their

There is also an increase in the tax liability of the regions. We find that positive. This is an important step towards a greater tax competence of the regions, a complaint expressed by the various parties on both sides of the language border. Regions will also be given greater policy responsibility in terms of personal tax. What was not achieved during the Saint Michel Agreement was the implementation of the revocation of the organic laws of municipalities and provinces. This is done in the special law. Everyone will be able to bear that this upheaval from the Flemish perspective is an important step forward. Their

With regard to Brussels, a multiple solution was sought through a smoother cooperation of the Brussels institutions, by providing the Dutch speakers in Brussels with a better working comfort within the Brussels Capital Council and by avoiding a blocking of the Brussels institutions which incorporates a necessary measure of self-protection of democracy. Agreements on Brussels are never easy. The compromises resulting from this are very complex and a piece of high-tech legal cutting-edge technology. I remember that the Brussels loop was the most difficult chapter of the constitutional law course and that examination questions about our capital were the nightmare of every student in law. The Brussels Agreement is currently a reasonable and balanced whole in which, not insignificantly, Brusselsers have made a large contribution. The principles of the Brussels Government Agreement were translated into the Lombardy Agreement. The political position of the Brussels Flamings is significantly improved; there is a guaranteed representation and ⁇ more could have been expected, but given the Brussels given, the French-speaking aspirations also had to be taken into account. Their

The pacification between the two communities results in a system in which minorities in the capital are extra protected. An absolute application of the principle of equality in the Brussels Region would therefore constitute new discriminations. The criticism that some have expressed in connection with this Lombard Agreement, especially since it would be a rejectionable ransom of one billion a year, even citing the comparison with Judas and his 30 silver coins, can best be relativized. Sometimes you need to look further than your nose is long. Rejecting the reform because a little extra money goes to Brussels is irresponsible in the light of the metropolitan problem of this city. Brussels City and its municipalities need money to make certain neighborhoods and neighborhoods habitable, to do urban renewal and to increase social dynamics.

Another point of reform in the draft special law concerns the agricultural policy.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Talhaoui, you link the metropolitan problem of Brussels to the funds associated with owning. As far as I know, the two are completely disconnected. That Brussels needs a little more money, we can understand somewhat. I think of the social needs and the like, but here the money will only go to those municipalities that have Flemish ships. It is not because of having or not having a Flemish ship that your social costs increase, I thought. That is where the criticism goes. I have no criticism of the fact that money goes to Brussels to address the social needs of the city. A municipality that takes a Flemish ship receives a kind of premium and the municipalities that do not do so do not get it. That is what it is about. The question is whether something like this can be done. One links the funding of a municipality to the composition of the college, even retroactively, after the college has been composed. It is about that.

Mr. Pieters, I have said that it is a global agreement and that compromises about Brussels are very difficult compromises anyway.

You imagine it as if the needs of Brussels should still be met. That is one thing. Another issue is whether one should link that to having or not having Flamings in college.

These funds are also welcome in these municipalities, I think.

Following the dioxin crisis of 1999, agricultural policy also had to be shifted. The transfer of agriculture to the regions ensures that, from now on, the European level and the regional level become the main actors in this theme and that the regions must assume their full responsibility, taking into account environmental conditions and health conditions. It is important to establish that Public Health remains federal in order to still maintain some control over food safety. Finally, I want to talk about development cooperation. The draft special law provides the possibility of transferring certain parts of Development Cooperation to the sub-regions in the future. As a group, we have shown several times that we do not want to work in this area in a hurry and that time could be the best advisor in this matter too. By the way, nothing prevents communities and regions from worrying hic et nunc to work with the world’s poorest countries and structurally cooperate with them. Furthermore, we must not forget that the revolutionary reform of the Administration of Development Cooperation – the former ABOS – has not yet been given the opportunity to function and prove itself. I speak here as someone who is familiar with international law and international relations, where one primarily works with the concept of the nation state. I have often wondered whether developing countries, or rather our bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements with them, will not compromise quality.

I think they will benefit more from an increase in the budget for development cooperation. If the reform comes with additional money from the communities, this is well taken. Therefore, I hope that the expert working group, which will curve on the transfer of powers, will also take into account the aforementioned concerns.

I will try not to polemize over the rewrite of the provisions on development cooperation. However, you said that you are a lawyer, and I know that you are an eminent lawyer. Let me explain the legal meaning of the provision on development cooperation. In my opinion, there is absolutely nothing else in it, except the announcement that there will be a sub-work group and that nothing will be transferred. In your opinion, the competence is already transferred under the special law on the components of development cooperation related to the competences of the regions and communities. I would like to know how your group interprets this, because they have been the most on the brake in this matter, they say to me. What is stated in the Special Law?

Mr. Pieters, we have focused our attention primarily on the working group that will focus on the problem in 2002. This may lead to very wise decisions. At least that is how we understood it.

We are talking about a text of a special law. In your presentation you quote yourself about the overthrow of development cooperation. Therefore, it is not difficult for me to explain what remains of this in the legal field. After all, it is just your faction that has stood on the brake all the time in this regard and has insisted on a very complicated formula. Consequently, I no longer know whether the competence is directly transferred under the Special Act on the components of development cooperation related to the competences of the regions and communities. Or will the parts be designated by the subwork group? Or will there be a second phase—albeit known to Agalev—in which a new special law must come? You have cut the subject; therefore you must know what is in it.

Mr. Peters, in the texts is stated what is in the texts.

Dear Speaker, Mr. Minister, Colleagues, the Agalev-Ecolo Group will support this draft with a positive vote because of its balanced nature.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, if soon this draft of special law preserving the transfer of various powers to the Regions and Communities will be approved by this purple-green majority, though after purchasing the necessary two-thirds majority, the necessary champagne bottles will undoubtedly be cut off in various places in this country. At first, this will undoubtedly happen in the midst of the government, where the leader of this purple-green cabinet, Mr. Guy Verhofstadt, will triumphantly knock himself on the chest and say that he has yet again solved it and that all this was only possible thanks to the fact that he had prepared for the establishment of a period of community pacification in this country.

The sending by the Council of Europe, and this at the request of the French speakers, of a Swiss to report on a possible violation of the human rights of the French speakers in the outskirts is undoubtedly a school example and a consequence of that community pacification. But it will not only be celebrated within the government, it will be celebrated especially in the south of this country. After all, Wallonia can - once again - rejoice over the many billions of Flemish money that are coming and which should allow the French Community to be saved from bankruptcy. The digestion can thus continue uninterrupted without really having much opposite to what Flanders was the requesting party. Clearly, this state reform was another missed opportunity. It would be an absolute world strangeness to assume that this state reform is not the last and that it can be talked about again within a relatively short period of time.

Let this be clear. Wallonia has bitten its necessary cents and for them this will be enough.

Several Wallonian tenors have pointed out that we should not count on many rounds of state reform in the near future.

It is clear that Flanders has once again led themselves to the slaughterhouse. This agreement is a major breakdown of words compared to the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament adopted by a large majority. What is left of the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament? What are they worth? What is the meaning of a resolution if one has to determine how smoothly it is pushed aside and so quickly erased from the memory of the leaders of certain parties? What does the Flemish Parliament’s resolution on the creation of more coherent powers packages suggest when analysing Lambermont’s results? The answer is “nothing.” It is useful to refresh the memory.

The resolution of the Flemish Parliament, which did not go far enough for the Flemish Bloc, stated, among other things, that the Flemish Parliament is of the opinion, I quote: "...that a more quality and efficient governance requires that some uncertainties or inefficient allocation of powers be eliminated. The Flemish Parliament considers the establishment of more coherent powers packages as a priority objective of the next — thus this — state reform. This implies in particular that the organization of local and provincial administrations becomes a competence of the counties and the Brussels Capital Region as provided for in the Saint Michel Agreement. At the same time, a separate specific arrangement for Brussels should guarantee the position of the Brussels Flamings in the Brussels institutions. A full federalization of science and technology policy must be carried out both in powers and in resources. This implies the abolition of the space policy, the scientific programmes and the impulse programmes as well as the activities and resources that fall within the competence of the counties. The full competence in foreign trade should be conferred on the provinces. Thus, the export promotion policy should become the exclusive competence of the counties. This implies the abolition of the Belgian Service for Foreign Trade. With regard to the National Delcreder Service and the Committee for Export Financial Assistance, the counties should acquire an autonomous decision-making power for the files of the companies of their own counties. Loans from state to state must be decided by the counties. Competence in telecommunications should be transferred to the counties and the Brussels Capital Region, thereby giving them competence for the general principles, the infrastructure, the terminal equipment, the organization of the networks and the service. The railway infrastructure and its regional operation should be transferred to the provinces as well as the entire regulation on inland navigation. Flanders is now already competent to conduct a statistical policy, provided that the rules of secrecy are respected. The Statistical Services of the Land are responsible for the quantitative policy information of their governments in partnership with the NIS and the Institute for National Accounts.

Since development cooperation relates to areas primarily dependent on the provinces, development cooperation and corresponding resources should be allocated to the provinces within the existing framework of the foreign policy of that country. They are responsible for the conception and implementation of this policy. It is important that Flanders acquire more powers to promote economic growth through greater business dynamics and to counter market failures. A complete removal of agriculture and horticulture and the fishing authority to the provinces should be implemented. This implies the full implementation of European policies, including quota management, scientific research, product control and sanitary and phytosanitary powers. Their

Tenth, the standardisation, implementation and financing powers relating to the whole health and family policy should be fully transferred to the Land, including health insurance and family allowances. In addition, residents of the Brussels Capital Region should be given the freedom to choose to join the system of the Flanders state or the French-speaking state, which each includes a system for both income and expenditure. Their

The resolution of the Flemish Parliament further stated that by a more coherent distribution of powers the Flemish government should be better able to conduct an active employment policy on its own. This implies, among other things, cooperation agreements with the federal government, which should give the counties and the Brussels Capital Region greater opportunities to use the unemployment benefits as an activating labour market instrument. The application of unemployment benefits for work experience projects should fall within the exclusive competence of the counties and the Brussels Capital Region. Their

For Flemish jurisdictions, Flemish social agreements must be concluded which are ratified by the Flemish Government. Social agreements concerning both Flanders' and federal powers must also be ratified by Flanders in respect of its powers. For the other matters of crucial importance for the development of the economy and employment in Flanders, a global agreement between the social partners at the Flemish level should be worked out if this would prove impossible at the federal level. Their

This is, colleagues, the resolution of the Flemish Parliament on the creation of more coherent powers packages in the next state reform, which was supported by the overwhelming majority of that Parliament. If one weighs this resolution against what is contained in this present bill, then one can only be disappointed. It is clear that Flanders is suffering another defeat here, just as we are now accustomed to other and former state reforms. Especially with regard to social security in general and the removal of health benefits and family allowances in particular, which was an express wish of the Flemish Parliament, it is a missed historical opportunity. Their

It is clear that this theme has always been a taboo for French speakers in the past, and it is certain that it will obviously remain the same in the future. All that the Flamings can do in the framework of social security is to pay and further ask as few questions as possible about the spending of these resources.

Wallonia, however, allows us to transfer roughly 120 billion francs annually through this social security to Wallonia. Together with the consequences of the Finance Act, the taxes and interest charges, this amounts to more than 300 billion francs or 55,000 francs per Flaming. As maintenance for a partner with whom we actually never wanted to be married, but who was imposed on us as if through marriage, that can count. Instead of respect and gratitude within the framework of the so-called solidarity between communities, the Flammers are given to process one humiliation after another. The Flamings are held hostage in all files by a French-speaking minority. The will of the Whales is still law in this country.

Why do we want to divide social security? First, because solidarity in this country has made place for profit-making. Money flows from Flanders to Wallonia and Brussels will ⁇ not dry up in the coming decades, contrary to what one might think given the faster ageing of Flanders compared to Wallonia, which will increase social security spending in Flanders faster. Only if the employment rate in Wallonia and Brussels can be raised to the level of Flanders, the transfers would begin to shrink. This is shown by a KBC study that was proposed a few months ago. The decisions were as follows. In 1999, financial transfers from Flanders to Wallonia and Brussels amounted to just under 200 billion francs. In recent years, transfers grew less rapidly because the Flemish share of social security expenditure has increased as a result of the faster ageing. In the coming decades, the population in Flanders will age faster than in Wallonia and Brussels. This is evident from the demographic data of the National Institute of Statistics. The KBC economists therefore wondered whether transfers from Flanders to Wallonia and Brussels will shrink. Simulations show that transfers due to the faster ageing of Flanders only temporarily decrease. According to the forecasts, they will rise again from 2010. According to the KBC study, transfers in 2010 fell to 172.4 billion francs. After that, they will again rise to 180 billion francs in 2020 and 210 billion francs in 2030. I know it may still be far away, but those numbers speak to the imagination.

Wallonia sees the received transfers decline in 2010 to about 174 billion francs, but in 2020 they will rise again to 175 billion francs and in 2030 to 203 billion francs. Brussels sees the transfers sink from 26 billion in 1999 to 8 billion in 2010 and 4.4 billion in 2020. By 2030 they will again increase to 7.2 billion francs. The KBC economists therefore conclude that the demographic evolution in the coming decades does not lead to a shrinking of transfers. Only if Wallonia and Brussels were able to realize an economic recovery movement between 2000 and 2030 and reach the same high employment rate as Flanders, the transfers could decrease.

In the next 30 years, 216,000 and 57,000 full-time jobs will be created in Wallonia and Brussels, respectively. The domestic regional product in Wallonia and Brussels is expected to grow 0.5 percent faster each year than in Flanders. However, I have little confidence in this necessary reversal, ⁇ in terms of raising the employment rate. I would like to refer to an article today, Wednesday 27 June, in "The Standard" entitled "Flame works harder, Whales sleep longer". That was long considered a cliché but it is now official as it is confirmed in an official time-spending survey by the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and the National Institute for Statistics. As part of the Belgian Time Budget Survey, 8,382 Belgians aged 12 to 95 kept a diary for several days. They recorded every ten minutes of what they were doing. This, of course, was not easy for the Whales who were asleep. The fieldwork for this was carried out by the NIS and the analysis took place together with the VUB. This is the first time since 1966 that such research has been conducted. Since then, the data has largely remained the same. The results remind a little of the time study that Professor Ignace Glorieux of the VUB recently published about the new man or rather the lack of it. Interesting to the latest study is that data are not only available for Flanders but also for Wallonia and Brussels. Then, of course, the usual community clichés emerge. It will not be a surprise that we all spend most of our time sleeping and resting. This is about 38% of the available time. On average, people spend 60 hours a week or more than 8 hours a day in bed. The researchers note that the image of the hard-working Flaming is once again confirmed in this time-spending study. The total workload of the Flamings is now 37 hours and 27 minutes, in Brussels 34 hours and 42 minutes and in Wallonia 34 hours and 48 minutes. Based on this study, I cannot believe that the employment rate in the south of this country will be sharply increased in the coming years. As far as sleep is concerned, I would like to nuance this. When it comes to money in this country, after all, the Whales are increasingly alert. It is clear that this regime will do its utmost to maintain these transfers. They do not argue for nothing that a possible split of the social security will irrevocably lead to the disintegration of this country. Now that the French-speaking people are holding their coins, nothing will motivate them to talk about a division of social security in general and the abolition of the powers of health care and family allowances in particular. Moreover, there is even no willingness of this government to create clarity about the transfers. They are constantly on the brake. The various Jadot reports that have to analyze the consumption differences between the north and south of this country are therefore a laugh and serve more to cover and hide the core of the matter. It is also repeatedly argued that the division of social security would break the solidarity. The Flemish Bloc is ⁇ not opposed to solidarity that arises after mutual consultation from community to community and on the condition that the habit of being helped is not degenerated into convenience and profit, as we too often can see on the French-speaking side.

Social security in the south of this country is increasingly regarded as a hangmat instead of a safety net. The ethnic communities in this country do not only speak another language. They also differ greatly in life vision and mentality, so an adapted health care policy on this highly personal subject is obvious.

For example, flames prefer to choose cheap first-line healthcare through the primary physician, while French speakers prefer the most expensive second or third-line specialist. French-speaking medical faculties teach their students that they must always try out the last snaps, both in the diagnosis and in the therapy. That this behavior phenomenally increases costs is apparently side-effective. The reimbursement by RIZIV, mostly from Flemish taxes, is also referred to here as solidarity.

We, as the Flemish Bloc, as a social and as a people’s party, support the principle of solidarity. Therefore, we are in favor of a well-developed and well-functioning social security system that ensures that members of our national communities can live a dignified life, even and especially when they are in a socio-economically difficult period. A people must therefore be able to regulate their own health policy according to their own insights and set certain priorities on condition that they pay for them. Responsibility is called that.

The division also means that the counties become accountable for their own income and expenditure and thus are obliged to put the threshold to the bottom and also to think when making basic expenditure. However, I can imagine that we would rather not see this happen in our southern neighbors.

Furthermore, a social security of its own does not preclude that peoples can also be solidary with other peoples, less prosperous or temporarily in need, but only on the condition that this is done on a voluntary basis, that this solidarity is negotiated directly from nation to nation, that it has a transparent character and that it effectively benefits a people in need. This is largely the case in Belgium, where the cash flows from Flanders to Wallonia have an automatic character, not the case. Money flows are not negotiated from nation to nation and they are completely opaque. Moreover, the troubled economic situation in Wallonia is mainly due to poor policy. However, the guaranteed flow of billions does not feel the need for structural reforms, on the contrary. Why should we make an effort if, from Flanders, we constantly adjust the deficits without making much heightening on them? Therefore, everything is done to perpetuate this unlawful theft of wealth.

The present draft law does not respond to the call for homogeneous powers packages. However, having its own social security would also give Flanders the opportunity to emphasize its own policy flaws in social security and to counter the fragmentation of powers.

Our plea for the division of social security in general and health care and child allowance in particular is motivated by a concern for the effectiveness of policies. For example, it is illogical that Flanders are competent for the old age policy, but not for the pensions. And what about a Flemish family policy, while child allowances remain a federal jurisdiction? Similarly, the Flemish government is competent for part of the health policy, while the actual health insurance remains unitary. Their

Also with regard to the problem of employment, the resolution of the Flemish Parliament is not met. There is no word about it, despite the fact that it is increasingly shown that a federal employment policy is not good. This has already been shown abundantly during this legislature. I refer, for example, to the start-up job plan that was introduced and that actually responded to the needs in the south of this country, but that did not provide a clear response to the needs of the Flemish labour market. The situation on the labour market in Flanders is completely different from the situation in Wallonia and therefore also requires other solutions. The result of a federal-imposed employment policy is a curvature of employment plans that are completely opaque and lack their efficiency altogether. A sound employment policy should be conducted at the regional level so as to be able to respond flexibly to changes in the labour market and to take the most account of the regional socio-economic realities.

It is well known that the complete transfer of powers to these regions in this matter may be the only solution within the framework of efficient governance. Furthermore, this would immediately provide a solution to the ethics of the European Commission, which says that the policy in this area of the different administrations should be better coordinated. Again, it must be said that in this draft on this topic even the discussions have not yet been cut.

I wish Mr. Somers also welcome in this hemisphere and at the same time also a good night.

So the Whales continue to graze in the pots of social security. The Flames pay while the Whales digest. This is how it happens in this country. Such a way of making decisions is the result of the introduction of federalism. That was the main strategic option to sustain the power of the Wallish minority. Their

Although federalism was presented as a Flemish victory, in reality it is a successful Belgian-Wales attempt to channel and neutralize Flemish power and Flemish autonomy. In 1940, the French-speaking people received parity in the Belgian government. In addition, there came the two-thirds and double majorities and other alarm call procedures. These typically Belgian constructions gave the Wallish minority an unlikely position of power and blocking from which it could and can deter any further Flemish struggle for autonomy.

The situation could and can only be changed if the Flammers are willing to make concessions. This is indeed the core of the successive state reforms in this country. Flemish concessions in exchange for Belgian divisions of competence, which would also benefit Wallonia. Everything has to be bought with a lot of money. The price we paid was always very high and the Flemish parties also bear a great responsibility for this. The result of the process of state reforms in this country is that Belgium has six governments with 58 ministers and secretaries of state and in total there are more than 500 parliamentarians, not to mention the new phenomenon of special envoys that is emerging recently.

Federalism was once seen by the broad Flemish movement as an attempt to realize the Flemish aspirations without completely breaking with Belgium or even as a step in the right direction, as an intermediate stage towards complete independence. This, however, was counted without the Belgian recovery of the federalist idea. The federalism as it exists today is not genuine federalism, but a label that has been attached to the Belgian structures as they have emerged in the last thirty years.

Flanders is not a fully autonomous state. She is financially as well as dependent on the Belgian-French-speaking mother-in-law. Furthermore, the French speakers continue to seize a large part of the Flemish prosperity through a theft institutionalized by the state reforms. It is clear that only the Flemish independence can answer the false federalism that is the Belgian construction. Only then will we be able to ensure that we can decide on our cents, only then will we be able to realize an independent and social Flanders where Flemish prosperity remains in Flemish hands.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, today we are discussing the draft special law concerning the transfer of various powers to the Regions and the Communities.

This draft forms the second loop of state reform as this purple-green government has completed its project for community pacification. We speak of the second loop because in this hemisphere a few weeks ago the draft special law on the refinancing of the Communities and the expansion of the fiscal powers of the Regions was discussed and approved.

The present special law, which regulates, among other things, the repeal of the municipal and provincial law, had its origins in the St. Michel Agreement of 1993. Later on the title of history and therefore for the report, I must point out to my colleagues that since the first state reform in 1970, the number of state reforms has not stopped. The fifth reform is currently underway. Every so many years, something had to be reformed and thrown into agreements. All accords were given beautiful names of halls, castles and saints such as Egmont in 1977 — the so-called third phase — Saint-Michiels in 1993 and Saint-Elooi in 1999, Hermes in 2000 and currently Lambermont in all its versions and forms.

In the preparation of my speech, I just accidentally took the collection of work by Guy Verhofstadt, that is to say, his three well-known civil manifests. As some of our colleagues know, the collected work has been on sale for a few months at a price price in the well-known second-hand bookstore. At the time, these civil manifests were for some of you, I refer to the colleagues of the liberal group, compulsory reading.

This has been said hundreds of times.

Mr. Coveliers, to my great surprise there is in that second civil manifesto a very strange chapter with the clear title "Thinking on Flanders". This is not a philosophical or poetic approach. This is a political analysis and a related position.

As an introduction, I would like to give the best during this discussion a few statements of the author, then VLD chairman and now prime minister. Not that what follows can take away our full approval, but it undoubtedly contains some very strange statements that are worth reminding in the context of this general discussion.

The first passage begins as follows, I quote: "Belgium is on dying after death. This is the result of the dozens of community and institutional compromises and political bargains that have been concluded since 1970. Especially the reforms of 1988 and 1980 made our country unmanageable. Since then, the citizen is lost in an institutionally non-disconnecting cloth.

With the word "spacing" the author unambiguously refers to the number of institutions such as Communities, Community Commissions and with the blow on the firepile the surreal united meeting of the Joint Community Commission in Brussels.

The passage goes on as follows, I quote: "The bureaucratic paperwork and the regulatory drift increased visibly, and in any case the administration of our institutions" — and that was what it originally was to do — "was not brought closer to the citizen. Undoubtedly, there are several reasons for the failure of the state reform, but the main reason must ⁇ be sought in the original principles of 1970. The state that was then created, in which three Communities — the Flemish, French-speaking and German-speaking Community — three districts of Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia and the four language areas, the Dutch-speaking, French-speaking, German-speaking and bilingual area were created, has proved to be an unsustainable construction, not to mention the facility communities, the problems in Komen, Voeren and mention only.

“Nowhere in the world exists a federal state in which, as in Belgium, the territories of the territories or of the subregions overlap. The reform of our institutions must be changed radically and addressed completely differently. Instead of constantly thinking about new compromises, following the formation of some government in which we build on the flawed institutions with which we have been planted since 1970, there must be an entirely new state reform. Instead of further dividing powers, institutions and administrative authorities from above, the two great Communities must sit down at the table and consider what they want to do with each other and how. End of the Pass.

The author, then VLD chairman and now prime minister, went even further in his political analysis and expressed in his referral work his concern when there would be no radical approach. He even dared to propose the alternative to the disintegration of the country.

“It is sufficient that one irresponsible Wallonian politician or one Brussels national minister once again exceeds his ‘institutional atomic bomb’, thus once again threatening to make autonomous decisions among French speakers that are contrary to the law, so that in Flanders a majority is found to give up the Belgian state definitively.”

Colleagues, as you can see — I hope the ears of the liberal colleagues have not flapped too much — there are many elements in the texts just quoted that can be useful in the context of the discussion on this bill. In any case, there are a lot of statements that sound like music in our ears. However, we note that the then VLD chairman and current prime minister have undergone a complete change of form over the last two years, because I do not have the impression that his then political analysis is reflected in the present draft. This, of course, should not surprise us of the VLD from after 13 June, because it is of course not the first time that it dares to violate its program points and political statements or just dares to do the opposite. There are already enough examples of this in this legislature, not to mention the easing of the nationality legislation as the most flagrant fact. To say it with the words of Camille Huysmans: becoming a minister, that is something that can happen to anyone, but the minister remains of his conviction, that is a little harder.

I will return to the present draft, more specifically to the direct impact of some of Lambermont’s provisions on the situation in Brussels. It is about the overthrow of the organic municipal law and the municipal election law, which have catastrophic consequences for the Brussels Flamings and which causes the Brussels Flamings to be held hostage by the French speakers. The fate of the Brussels Flamings has always been linked to the fate of the French speakers throughout Belgium. I refer here to the parity in the federal government and the alarm call procedures. As regards the organic municipal law, it can be amended by simple majority. On the legislative level, Brussels French speakers can adjust this law at their own discretion, without taking into account the Brussels-Flemish interests or sensitivities. The impact on the Brussels flames cannot be underestimated. Their

First, the Brussels Flamings can further extend the language legislation at their own discretion, by allowing them to transfer powers from the municipalities to the region. For the Brussels local authorities, the language use in administrative matters requires bilinguality of officials. For the centralised and decentralised services of the Brussels Region, on the other hand, the bilinguality of the service, as well as the uniformity of the staff members, applies. This leads in practice de facto to the French-speaking unitary. In concrete terms, this means, therefore, that with the transfer of the powers of the municipalities to the region, with the officials involved, the way is opened for the unitary of these officials and, consequently, for the definitive undermining of bilingualism in and of Brussels. Their

Secondly, the Brussels French speakers can change the municipal boundaries, allowing the current negligible Flemish guarantees that currently exist, to be further reduced. Their

Thirdly, if there is work done on the direct election of the mayors, then the Brussels Flamings can completely forget to ever see a Flemish mayor coming to power in Brussels.

Fourth, the Flemish municipal councillors in Brussels are completely unlawful as their guardianship in Brussels and consequently in French-speaking hands. The practical experience in the field will demonstrate that this results in complete lawlessness. I refer to the problems already arising in the custody of the Brussels French-speaking authorities regarding the application of the language legislation and the fact that it is systematically refused to answer the questions of the Flemish municipal councillors.

Another important element is that the fundamental bilinguality of this country is permanently abandoned by the excessive assignment of powers to Brussels. This will also lead to excessive concentration of power. For example, the Brussels Capital Region has already closed large amounts of money to the 19 supreme baronies, creating a continuous mixture. In practice it comes down to the fact that the same persons both in the region and in the municipalities make the beautiful weather. In addition, the heads of municipalities are expressly present in the Capital Council. In fact, it follows that, if Brussels becomes competent over the municipal law, it is immediately a judge and a party without any control of the federal government or its capital.

As the full guardianship will now be exercised by Brussels, there is no higher authority where disadvantages regarding the non-application of the language laws can be discussed. This will undoubtedly have an impact on the recruitment policy in Brussels. I think of the hospitals and emergency services, the fire department, the Society for Intercommunal Transport and the OCMWs. In other words, the total freezing gets a free job. Consequently, I dare to argue that Brussels as a third region is a bad thing for Flanders, that Brussels as a third region is a bad thing for the Brussels Flanders and that Brussels as a third region is a bad thing for Brussels itself. Mrs. Coen, I will explain myself more closely.

Mr. Goyvaerts, are you Brussels?

And yet, yes.

This is the typical attitude of the Lambermont parties. Only the Brussels would be mandated to talk about Brussels. Remember that Brussels is our capital. You struggle as Ecolo-Agalev parliamentary member with all the small and large incidents around the world. You know all the development problems in each village from your head, but when it comes to your own capital, we must be silent. I live only 15 kilometers from Brussels, but I have to be silent about it. That is a misconception that prevents us from being solidary with people from our own capital. This is very extensive. That was the mistake of the mini-Costa.

(Incomprehensible discussion between Mrs. Marie-Thérèse Coenen and Mr. Bart Laeremans)

I continue my speech.

As the full guardianship from now on will be carried out by Brussels, there is no longer any higher government where disadvantages regarding the non-application of the language laws can be discussed. As I have already said, Brussels as a third region is a bad thing for Flanders, for the Brussels Flamings and for Brussels itself. I explain myself more closely.

At the start of the Brussels Region, it was said that the Brussels model was based on the cooperation between the two language communities. Brussels should and should be governed on the basis of equality by French speakers and Dutch speakers. Brussels would be the perfect example of how different language communities manage to manage the capital of a federal country. There has even been a Brussels minister, Jos Chabert, who managed to sell the Brussels model in Jerusalem and Sarajevo as the solution to their social problem.

In 1997, there was the incident in which Vic Anciaux resigned as Secretary of State, causing the Brussels model to break apart like a soap bubble. Although the Brussels Act stipulates that the position of the Secretary of State must be re-employed within three months, this has not happened at the time.

With the transformation of Brussels into a full-fledged third region, with the same powers as Flanders and Wallonia, regional federalism has entered the state-owned household of this country. This is contrary to the kind of federalism that both Flanders and Wallonia have in mind. In Flanders, one opted for a federalism based on the two cultural communities, while the French speakers preferred a federalism based on cooperating regions.

The result of this whole construction around Brussels as a third region is that it has become a state, a city district at the same level as Flanders. Flanders no longer have any control over Brussels. Brussels is thus territorial and administrative completely separated from Flanders, although it is entirely within Flanders. Brussels will be established as an independent federal state entirely alongside – and therefore also against – Flanders.

It is therefore absurd to assert that the capital of the state of Flanders has the same institutional status as the state itself. Understand who can understand. The strange thing about this Belgian context is that the more independent Flanders become, the more independent Brussels becomes. In other words, as Flanders gain more independence, Brussels loses more and more, until Flanders definitively loses Brussels.

As Flemish nationalists, we cannot endorse this logic. Since a solution for Brussels within the Belgian federalism is no longer possible, there remains only one possibility to retain Brussels: in particular the choice for an independent Flanders.

As previously stated, in the current Brussels, the Brussels Flamings are left to their fate. The French-speaking politicians, those of the PRL-FDF at the head, consider the district structures as their own territory where the Flamings are only temporarily tolerated. Not only are they politically temporarily tolerated, the French-speaking politicians also abuse their structures to make it as difficult as possible for the Flaming people by regarding them as second-class citizens. There are numerous examples in everyday practice. I refer to the revengeful way in which the language legislation is laid on the lookout.

In the Brussels Capital Council, the current band adopts Flemish-hostile resolutions that with district powers as such have no outstanding. The Brussels Region, and more specifically the Cocof, has become the base of French-speaking Brussels politics from which the attacks on the Flemish character of the belt around Brussels are increased in all intensity. I refer here to the Advisory Council, which was established under the impetus of the PRL-FDF, in which Brussels French-speaking council members and French-speaking municipal council members are brought together out of the belt to develop strategies aimed at challenging the uniform Dutch-speaking character of the belt in practice. All this happens in a framework in which we can rightly ask ourselves what interests the Flemish-Brussels excellences defend. One will feel left to his fate for less.

To conclude this analysis, briefly a little about the inhabitability of Brussels as "Une région apart entière". It would be naive to think that Brussels as a region can handle its tasks. Particularly the financial support of Brussels is far too small to meet its tasks. This is to solve only the metropolitan and socio-economic challenges facing Brussels. With this agreement, the government will add additional powers in agriculture and foreign trade. This is completely absurd. All municipalities in Brussels are losing. They are rattled by a region that is losing itself and consequently takes the money from the federal government to be able to fulfill its capital functions. For those capital functions, what I would call, a capital dividend is granted.

In 1998, this amounted to 13.3 billion francs. This amounted to 17 to 18 billion francs. In the context of Lambermont, there is a good deal being done on top of that, because the agreement of yesterday night has once again demonstrated that lubricating money on the beard of the PSC and the entire cow trade of money - it is currently about 3 billion francs extra from the federal pot - apparently the only way to solve a political problem. Their

From my previous analysis, only one decision can be made. Brussels as a third region is a disaster and therefore not viable. Then we have not yet talked about what will happen to the Brussels Flames when the Brussels Parliament will also introduce the foreign voting right. Finally, there is another important issue that is not mentioned in this agreement, in particular the necessary division of the administrative and judicial district of Brussels-HalleVilvoorde. Their

Due to the non-splitting, the French-speaking expansion policy in the border around Brussels will expand more and more so that at the 2003 elections 3 Flemish Chamber Seats will be compromised. The current situation is a flagrant violation of the principle of equality. French-speaking parties may appear in Flemish-Brabant, but Flemish lists are not possible in Waals-Brabant. According to Professor Senelle, an expert on the subject, however, the division of the administrative and judicial district can be carried out in a simple way. The division can be carried out by means of a common law in the federal Parliament. Both in the House and in the Senate, the Flammers are in the majority. The split of the electoral district gives Flemish-Brabant the opportunity to expand into an administrative unit that is on a line with the other Flemish provinces. The division of the judicial district would allow Flemish-Brabant to gain greater legal autonomy and eliminate the shameful backwardness of the Brussels courts. As a conclusion of my argument in the general discussion of the special law on the transfer of various powers to the regions and communities, I dare to say that this part of the Lambermont Agreement is also an insult to Flanders. No one proud nation in the world will eat such a thing!

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I begin my speech much earlier than Mr. Colen started his speech. I begin with Confucius, not by chance, I will explain later why. (An incomprehensible comment from Mr. Hugo Coveliers.) Indeed, my speech is multicultural, Mr. Coveliers. The wise Confucius said that a man in his life — I apologize for discriminating against women — must accomplish three things. He must give birth to a son, plant a tree, and write a book. I have already succeeded in one case. I hope to succeed in the second case tonight. The third will be for later. However, about this evening, I might write a book later.

I maintain the seriousness of the speech. I myself add two things to what a man as a human should do in his life. He would have to arrange a large feast — I suppose you have no objection — and accompany a man in mortal distress.

These are two things to which I myself add, from my own philosophical considerations. Am I a Confucianist or a Confusionist, as you might, Mr. Coveliers? I consider myself a confucianist, with my own addition. As a human being, I therefore hold a round number of five life purposes, a round number of life-leading principles, but as Flaming today I climb the speech line clearly and manifestly as Flaming – I add one thing to that and that remains for me fundamental and that is that I want to destroy, Mr. Coveliers, everything that threatens our people. And then I speak for the whole world for each of the peoples present and for each of the people who belong to the people as a nationalist. I hope that every person belonging to every nation will also reason like this. Their

I go back to Confucius, why? To extend the debate? No, Confucius in his time revived politics, colleagues, He revived the breath of a crushed state apparatus. The State was prophylactically and curatively upgraded by a solid political state and public apparatus. It was a strong state structure – and not a totalitarian structure to which we today may threaten to slide down. It was mainly a simple structure with clear guidelines.

I challenge you to explain what you have now decided or will decide with Lambermont, in addition to the teachings of Confucius. I challenge you to put the public apparatus that was developed for an empire that at that time was already larger than what is now called the Belgian Empire beside the turmoil, the chaos and the unfathomable mass of laws that you today – I really think no more today and maybe no more tomorrow – will try to vote in this Chamber.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Schoofs, you must not unlock our home strategy by suggesting that there can be a vote already tomorrow. Who says it will happen tomorrow? Leave that in the middle, my colleague, please!

Colleague Annemans, I suspect that from now on I will talk longer than 12 minutes and then we are tomorrow, of course. I do not disclose any strategy, not even that we would vote on this matter on 5 July.

Please take your time, I have the whole night.

I am constantly being interrupted. I am not even halfway.

I am against the confusionists, Mr. Coveliers, and that is a clear fingerprint in your direction. I say it clearly and for the last time. The difference between the old and the new China and Belgium – and there I end my Confucian theory – may have been fundamental, but has eventually shrunk to a provisional difference. On the one hand, there will never be a Confucius who will save Belgium. I look forward to this, and you, apparently, also, colleague Coveliers, although you have already joined another party.

The following is essential: China was then and is now a multicultural society held together by a communist dictatorship. In recent history, there are still such examples, in which the communist dictatorship had to succeed. In Belgium, this may not be the case if we want to remain intellectually honest. However, I doubt whether this will remain so. This brings me to the comparison between China and Belgium. Belgium currently lives only of dogmas and muilkorf laws and Lambermont fits exactly in that picture. It started with Egmont and it may not end with Lambermont. There may be several phases to follow, for which Lambermont model stands. I refer to the arrangement for Brussels that is significant. (Interrupted by Mr Hugo Coveliers.

I would like to tell the VLD group that the real Chinese can be silent and smile.

Thank you for your intellectually honest comment. It might be meant as a joke, but you are absolutely right. The VLD faction must be silent, because it is bound to the Okazans of its party and they must now swallow. Mr. Coveliers, we have known for a long time that you should swallow now. As a colleague politician and as a political competitor, I hope that you will not get stuck in it, but it is quite possible that your party will do so in the next elections. However, I do not have a glass ball, I am not Madame Blanche, I only warn you, not as a Vlaams Blokker but as a colleague politician.

Lambermont stands as a model for the undemocratic and dictatorial Belgium that is increasingly rising and is increasingly in the hills. The arrangement for Brussels is significant. In the media dispute council of the Flemish Radio and Television was held today a plea against the Flemish Bloc. We had filed a complaint because we were not invited to give our view of the recent Sauwens rail in the Seventh Day program. The plea clearly stated that the Flemish Bloc does not conform to a multicultural society and its ideas. Therefore, a public broadcaster stated today that freedom of expression only reaches where the taboo of multicultural society begins. That is the comparison between the old China and this so-called new Belgium: the laws of the muilkorf, the dogmas, those things that one cannot tell, and that even a public broadcaster can afford to not have to tell.

Colleagues, you can now laugh at the comparisons I make. The voters believe me. You can readily reflect that as dogmatic behavior, but it is not. The Flemish-Nationalist Party in particular is gemuilkorfed here. The only real opponent of Lambermont is gemuilkorfed here. We can speak, but for Flanders, the reality is so serious that only one party goes straight against Lambermont. Another party bites her teeth and breaks it. Mr. Coveliers, Lambermont has, by the way, managed to definitively refer the party to which you formerly belonged to the annals, possibly from September 2001. The People’s Union has cut its teeth on Lambermont. The People's Union, of which you formerly passionately advocated the program, has been referred to the annals of history by Lambermont. I’m not saying that this was the scenario that was supposed to lead to the death of the People’s Union, but it was in any case the ultimate death stroke. This was confirmed in the votes on the first league in which the party voted completely divided. Only one of her representatives is present here now, Mr. Pieters. He has always sought to follow the most straight line in this debate. Yet a small plum for that.

Now I come to the CVP. The CVP is for Flanders the obstacle in the Lambermont Agreement. In Brussels, Minister Chabert remains in office. The great advocate of the Flemish cause in Brussels, at least she has always raised herself, was colleague Grauwels. She has connected. I strongly ask the CVP whether it is well aware of what it is doing, especially in the part of Brussels. Just at the moment when both the media and the political opponents raise a sanitary cordon against the Flemish Bloc — which is clearly reflected in the Lambermont Agreement as well as in the fact that we were not allowed to participate in the Costa and its preparation — the media and politics are conducting a doctrine in the face of the CVP. This still seems not to be realized. The CVP still wants to pursue, bind, and surrender when it comes to it, instead of holding the leg stiff for once. That is the tragedy of the CVP. I want to warn them about that. We could have stood here today as Flemish allies. They also let themselves be guided by the idiotic, mad and absurd cordon sanitaire that generates very many votes in elections. It seems a paradox that you, on the one hand, allow the other parties to prevent you from getting stuck in a cordon sanitary. You may already have seen what you can deliver. On the other hand, however, you continue to hold on to that one post in Brussels for Chabert that is o so important for the party. You continue to cultivate internal division without making real decisions. I am really curious about what will happen in September. I hope from the bottom of my heart that there can arise a Flemish and conservative think tank, warrior of every cordon sanitaire, who dares to compromise with any party in Flanders. You will then know which party you should choose in Flanders. You will then know which party you could and should have chosen here in this hemisphere as an ally. But no, now you are self-satisfied with the doctrine that is being carried out against your party. Do not make illusions, I also speak behind the scenes with politicians of other parties, of the VLD and the SP — not of Agalev, but I am not awake at all because this is a waste of time. Some of them are very happy that the CVP has finally been driven out of the power scenes.

Mr. Coveliers, I try not to convert you. I don’t need to do that, because you have been converted once in your life and then there is a good chance that you can be converted again.

But that is what I wanted to make the CVP clear once and for all.

I would like to make it clear to the CVP once and for all that sticking to Chabert’s post will bring you much less benefits than a steady attitude in a party policy of Flanders that is increasingly shifting to the center-left. But what do you do? You are buriing the battle beard. You know what happened to the Indians who buried the battle beard.

The future of the party, ⁇ with a different name than the CVP — a brand name that apparently has passed away — will in any case lead to the label that is hanged on a slated, curtained reserve in the Flemish party-political landscape where one can admire the last generation of CVP members, who then got a different label hung up.

Brussels is the last battlefield of Flanders, respected CVP members. This is the last battlefield where Flanders now suffer the definitive defeat with the Lambermont Agreement. The position in which one wants to maneuver the Flemish Bloc in Brussels by playing with seats and controlling election results, by correcting election results—which is even worse is a democracy, in this case that name unworthy—will be the victim of not only the Flemish Bloc, but also the CVP in the future. Do not forget that. I remind those who expressed the opinion – that is a free opinion that is respected – that the CVP must be driven out of power once and for all. Do not think that you can convince the log brothers, the little cenacles who swing the plate here in this country.

The Lambermont Agreement may mean the end of the VU, but it will primarily trigger the so-called change of the CVP to something else, ⁇ to two or three other things. It means at least the end of the existence of a party that has been known for decades. That end is announced today — read the newspapers — and the internal disputes become more and more clear at this politically important moment. At this time, at midnight — it has become June 28, 2001 — you might be able to claim, but you sit there with a few on the banks and you do not react fundamentally, you do not react sufficiently.

Mr. Speaker, I do not want to interrupt Mr. Schoofs’s interesting presentation, but ⁇ there are news from the backdrop of this Parliament. Per ⁇ Mr. Leterme can say something more about this. (Different conversations — hilarity)

Mr. Speaker, I have a question. I would like to answer them. The question was whether there was any news from the coulisses. The state of affairs is evident that the Flemish parties meet with the Prime Minister and the French speakers at the seat of the PS. The French speakers would have an agreement on the definition of a minority within the framework of the ratification of the Convention on Minorities. However, the Flemish parties do not yet agree with this definition. Until then a short report on the engine, maybe in an hour more news.

You are better informed than me.

Mr. Speaker, that was the only thing I wanted to report, namely that there was a comment from the tribune. I apologize for disturbing your head à tête with Mrs. De Permentier. I would have liked to participate in that. I will now proceed with my speech.

The last struggles, colleagues from the People’s Union, have ringed in the Lambermont demonstration. It is exaggerated to argue that this would have been the case with the CVP, but I see a difference between the combative CVP, who took part in the Lambermont demonstration on 6 May, and the position it has taken very recently in the Brussels dossier. Now the CVP becomes completely unreliable. Would it be too much demanded to address a call to the CVP to get Minister Chabert to resign his ministerial office? I think yes. All hope on that point is, at least for my sake, lost.

The definitive and irreversible catastrophe for the Brussels Flamings is threatening. Nevertheless, there is hope for Flanders, because — and it has already been expressed by several of my colleagues — the end of Belgium may have begun. A small comparison with the SintMichel Agreement may be in place. That agreement aimed to make Belgium a looser link, not only between two, but even between three regions. Finally, a full-fledged Brussels region was established.

There is a parallel line to be discovered between the election victories of the Flemish Bloc and the cordon sanitaire, but also between the state reforms and the progress of the Flemish Bloc.

The Flemish Block can be isolated. One can isolate or isolate that engine of Flemish independence that we have become because the VLD but also the Volksunion have lost their credibility in that area. The Flemish movement gradually belongs entirely to the Flemish Bloc. Lambermont will confirm this. The next elections will confirm this once again. The isolation of the Flemish Bloc on the one hand and the state reforms on the other, indeed, follow the same line but one loses the long-term from the eye. The hetze against the Flemish Bloc is counterproductive and also the hetze against Flanders is counterproductive. Today, everything that is Flemish or is called Flemish, on the French-speaking side, is equated with the Flemish Bloc. This evolution is not worrying for Flanders and the Flemish Bloc but for all those who want to protect their beloved Belgium.

We see this every day in the media. VTM follows the VLD, the VRT follows Agalev and SP, and the Flemish Bloc is held behind by the State Security. This was recently reinforced by the pericles around the Sint-Maartens Fund where the younger core of the Flemish Movement — all eighties —, the spine of the Flemish Bloc as it was called, was caught on a high feast of nostalgia and desires for a period in which I had not even been born. Most of them are indeed bald-headed, so skinheads, so Nazis, so to be followed by the Belgian regime. Their

I would like to draw that analogue line between, on the one hand, the successive state reforms, the successive ways in which Belgium tries to strengthen itself, and, on the other hand, the way in which the Flemish Bloc is sought to diabolize and demonize. That heat has recently reached a rare peak. In this speech, this should be said once again. Unfortunately, the occupation level in the Room is not really encouraging. It could have been less, but it should have been more.

It must be pointed out that the insults, the suspicions, the insinuations and the intellectual terror against everything that is Flemish-minded and Flemish-nationalist, are shaking and punching. I remind you, colleagues, that in recent months the terms grain beverage, fascist and slurry of VLD’s De Gucht and Dewael have created a climate in which bread robbery, physical terror, discrimination and blackmail have become legitimate means in the struggle against the Flemish Bloc.

This struggle of all against one and of one against all has never hurt the Flemish Bloc electoral, but on the contrary. Of course, it is the intention of the Lambermontists, of the opponents, to scare the voters with undemocratic means if necessary and to permanently raise the threshold for new members and mandators and militants. Of course that must be the intention, but be assured or worry, we Flemish Bokkers do not let us be intimidated or deterred by the harassment or deterrence of the political establishment that everyone wants to hunt Lambermont through the throat. Our determined attitude, our unanimity and our rocky belief in our own future are a solid response to the destabilization attempts made by the gang of five against us.

Colleagues, we will indeed face a court ruling in the trial against the Flemish National Party that is the Flemish Bloc, against VZW indeed, but everyone knows that it is the party as such that is fishing. The best signal and the only thing we will send to our members, our voters and our sympathizers is that we will continue to work in any way and in any form. The public opinion has no message. The Flemish Bloc is and remains a political party that will and will continue to weigh on the climate of political terror in Flanders and also simply on the political agenda in Flanders. Our independence campaign simply continues after the verdict, as well as our anti-drug actions and our protest against Lambermont, even if it is voted at any time. After all, the weak spot in Lambermont is Brussels, the so-called Third Region, formed by the SintMichielsakkoorden, a body of Belgium with a huge waterhead. By Lambermont, Brussels would, so to speak, be cut from the party-political fabric that is present in Flanders. The ever-strengthening Flemish Bloc needs to be cut on a scale, but this measurement suit that one tries to make is still a little too crushing.

Colleagues, the collar around the enormous waterhead Brussels is a little too knolling and gets a slightly too solid node. This measurement suit with so many unnecessary fringes continues to knell. To argue that the measurement approach is finally right now and to argue that this is the end of all state reforms and the end of the community-based cushion in Belgium is wrong.

The measurement continues to knell. Eventually, the largest leaf of fabric, usually the pants are made of, will crack. Belgium will tear its pants to Lambermont, colleagues, let that be said today. Their

I would have liked to make another comparison, interesting for the VLD colleagues still present here: Lambermont becomes the Blue Sky for Belgium! Are you surprised that I call Lambermont this way? Well, I bring the mustard for a moment to Minister Daems who at the time announced his Blue-Sky plan for Sabena. No one in the Cabinet of Minister Daems has apparently had the evil courage or the instinct to open an English dictionary and look at what blue sky actually means in English. I challenge you all to check this out. It will be immediately apparent that Minister Daems is visionary in what he means with Blue Sky, if I explain to you what blue sky means in English. Per ⁇ Minister Daems had a bright blue sky in mind for Sabena, he may have seen the planes already take off. There has never been one survivor of those planes, which is also good news. He saw the planes already take off to that beautiful blue sky, but what does blue sky really mean in English? That means, find it, a useless endeavor, a meaningless thing, a triviality. That’s blue sky and eventually Sabena also got its Blue Sky. Blue sky is the triviality, the total disappearance. This is the blue sky of Minister Daems. What a beautiful thing, what a fun thing to use other languages or to pretend to be able to use other languages. Now, the Blue Sky closes above Sabena and I wish for Belgium of course also the very best of all blue skies. That wish could indeed be fulfilled, colleagues. I am strengthened in the belief that it will also run that speed from Lambermont. The witness of this may be that the independence campaign that our party is currently conducting within the framework of Lambermont — Lambermont comes at that point very close to the Flemish Bloc — runs like a train. I don’t want you to remember that the launch shot was given exactly on 1 May 2001 in Mechelen. Nearly a week later, a Flemish Bloc delegation of more than 1,000 people, ⁇ even 2,000, took part in the anti-Lambermont demonstration in Gent: a pluralist demonstration of Flemish nationalists in one of our major Flemish cities. The hundreds of white caps and the thousands of self-lips delivered a clear message. We not only reject Lambermont, we also do not believe that new Belgian state reforms can still be useful. Therefore, the only correct solution is for us: Flanders independent! No navel-staring Flanders, no Flanders that lock themselves and isolate themselves, but a Flanders that lies in and is embedded, historically and culturally, in Europe.

Therefore, it is a pity that one does not wonder what the new Belgium could mean for, or what nefaste influence it could exert on Europe, whatever concept one finds on it.

Anyway — nobody can deny it and sometimes one must regrettably confess it — Flanders is in the heart of Europe and Brussels is in the heart of Flanders. Also in the frame sheet of the Flemish Bloc is written black on white that Flanders for us is in the heart of Europe. It is not a coincidence that, just as the Belgian Presidency of the European Union is approaching, the opportunity for Mr. Verhofstadt to pursue the Lambermont Agreement through the Chamber and Senate and for us, Flemish nationalists with a broad view of Europe and the world, to make a few critical comments.

What kind of Europe do we want? How much Europe do we want? What role can Europe play in the world? Although you may not care, colleagues, these questions were addressed at the colloquium that we organized last Sunday in Knokke.

I am one of those whales who sleep little. For me the night is still young.

Mr. Speaker, you may take the necessary resources to keep you from sleeping.

I can assure you that we will use the construction of the cordon sanitaire against Belgium. We will mobilize the voters and we will increase our voter corps and incite against the Lambermont Agreement and against Belgium; by the way, both are synonyms.

Both the lawyer and the Democrat in me are “debuted” by the provisions of the Lambermont Agreement. Without hesitation and with the greatest pretence, the government puts aside the opinion of the State Council. The absence of the Prime Minister during this debate is also marked.

Who ever said that the most important country is the interior? This apparently does not apply to Verhofstadt for whom Congo is apparently more important than Belgium. However, the Committee on Foreign Relations has already ended; I wonder where the Prime Minister is. Of course, he cannot split himself into two, but today I would have expected him at this plenary session, once the Foreign Affairs Committee had ended.

I now come to my decision.

The best comparison that the Lambermont Agreement can withstand is that of a cork on the bottle Belgium in which all already much too long yeast. On the Flemish side, something is bruising and bubbling. I am convinced that Flanders will become a state. There have been enough predecessors, and there will be enough followers who will reinforce, carry out, and turn that idea into action.

We just take up what is currently living in Flanders. This is also the idea of independence. What the government of Dewael does and thinks may not matter to us. I refer to Dewael, whose Verherstraeten later said that he did not steal his surname, but his first name apparently does. His first name is Patrick, and for nationalists — I think of the Irish — that means something. The real Patrick in Ireland drove the snakes out of the country while Patrick Dewael is in a party with a prime minister who chooses snakes as an ally. For Flanders and the Flanders, if he had executed the resolutions, Patrick Dewael could have become the hero of our people, as Saint Patrick was for the Irish, but Dewael, on the contrary, has profiled himself as an amateur psychologist of the seventh node hole who wishes to practice the study of the body steel of his political opponents. Their

Therefore, we should not count on Dewael. Flanders should not count on Dewael and Flanders should not count on Dewael. On the Flemish Block only Flanders and the Flamings will be able to count. Therefore, I conclude my argument, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, with the following words: "Please not another Belgian state reform like Lambermont, but finally a Flemish state formation."

Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out an incident.

The Minister is present in the hall.

(Incomprehensible speech by Mr. Bart Laeremans)

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Colleagues, I will try to show briefly that this Lambermont Agreement is not a good thing for Flanders. Then I press myself weak. With my loud voice, it’s hard to do anything else.

I go back a moment in time, to 3 March 1999, when the Flemish Parliament approved by a large majority 5 resolutions for a coming state reform. You may notice that it is strange that we, who did not approve these resolutions in the Flemish Parliament, are now using them to criticize this wretched Lambermont Agreement. The Flemish Bloc also acknowledges that the institutional framework in which Flanders are located has been thoroughly considered at that time.

The resolutions of the Flemish Parliament were not the result of several nights of brainstorming, but of in-depth work. This was the merit of the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament. As for the substantive side of the case, the Flemish Bloc agreed with some of its elements; with some partially, and with some absolutely not. We were and still do not agree with the principle. They remained trapped in a federal logic within which no solution is possible. Our principles are fundamentally different. Consequently, the continued acceptance of respect for the federal framework is rejected.

Of course, we would agree to a full federalization, including scientific and technological policies, foreign trade, telecommunications, development cooperation, agriculture, marine fishing and horticulture. These instruments should ⁇ be part of our competence in order to ⁇ better and more coherent governance. Now, however, they determine the power relationships in this country.

This is one of the reasons why our party abstained from voting on the resolutions in the Flemish Parliament: it is clear that the value of the texts and their statute threatened to become non-binding. We strongly wonder what was the commitment of the political parties that signed these resolutions. Was it a conditio sine qua non, which had to be realized before one would join a next federal government? I think that question has been answered by now.

Mr. Speaker, I return to the essence of the five resolutions, which do not indeed constitute a radical programme. Meanwhile, we know that it has become entirely non-binding and we can ask questions about its value. The Flemish Parliament approved a minimum program, but the advantage was that for the first time a Flemish consensus text was offered, which was even approved by the VLD and Volksunion.

Mr. Speaker, the Flemish Parliament formulated a number of general principles and objectives: the organisation of a more quality and efficient governance and a better decision-making; a good governance that is only possible with coherent packages of powers, which are an important tool for establishing such governance, coupled with extensive financial and fiscal autonomy.

Flanders should be competent over local and provincial governments, health and family policy, social policy, science and technology policy and foreign trade. Flanders should also be given competence in telecommunications so that the counties become competent for the general principles: the liberalization of the market, the infrastructure, the terminal equipment, the organization of the networks and services, as well as the railway infrastructure – which I will return to later – and its regional exploitation should be transferred to the counties. The full regulation on inland navigation, statistics, development cooperation, agriculture, horticulture and fisheries.

Third, in the application of the principle of subsidiarity, the powers should be situated as close as possible to the population.

Fourth, and this is very important. The federal state model should be based on a fundamental duality based on two counties with Brussels with a specific status and the German-speaking Community.

Fifth, the cooperation between public authorities should be further expanded and promoted. The competence of the counties to regulate their own institutions should be expanded.

The full jurisdiction concerning the current regional tax, the tax on the reversal, the eurovignette, the full registration duties, the gift rights, must be transferred to the provinces. The tax autonomy of the counties should be strengthened, in the first place, by the full transfer of competence in the field of personal tax. For its operationalization in Brussels, a specific arrangement should be developed. Their

Brussels cannot become a full-fledged third region. The fundamental duality of Belgium must be confirmed. No transfer of the municipalities and provincial law to Brussels. Only federal supervision of Brussels guarantees Flemish participation in the structure and management of the suburb of Flanders. No connection of the French speakers in the outskirts of the Flamings in Brussels. The border is a homogeneous Dutch-speaking area and Brussels is a bilingual capital.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Mr. Colleagues, frankly, if I look at these five resolutions, I must, in the light of what this draft special law relating to the transfer of various powers to the regions and the communities intends to realize, even if Flemish Blokker exhibits a slight form of admiration. In the light of what is on the table today, these resolutions get almost the allures of a maximalist program. These resolutions, however, mostly show that the majority in Flanders wants a better and effective self-government through more autonomy. In addition, in recent years, various study services and printing groups have continued to criticize the money flow to Wallonia and the Brussels Region, which amounts to approximately 330 billion francs per year, according to a VEV study by De Boeck and Van Gompel from 1996.

In terms of social security, it is between 115 and 118 billion francs. In terms of federal taxes, it is about 27 billion francs. As for the grants through the funding law, it is about 42 billion francs. As for the payment of interest charges on the state debt, it is about 143 billion francs.

In total, that is 330 billion francs or 55,000 francs per Flaming that is raised as maintenance money. Anyone who still had some hope that the flow of money from Flanders to Wallonia would end will be deceived. There is no end to the flow of money. There is even no work done on a transparent solidarity scheme. Moreover, transfers to the south are increasing. Even a transfer of parts of social security to the communities is not the case. Mutatis mutandis therefore also not of a own Flemish social policy. In the Senate Committee, Mr. Moureaux made very clear that there would be no state reform if one word was spoken about social security. That taboo remains. Flanders are responsible for health prevention but do not have their own financial resources to conduct a health policy. Flanders are responsible for family policy but the only leverage, family allowances, remains in federal hands so that Flanders cannot take initiatives to address, among other things, denatality and ageing.

As a member of the Committee on Infrastructure and Public Enterprises, I have paid special attention to the achievements in telecommunications and railway infrastructure. The Flemish Parliament was very clear in this regard. The railway infrastructure and its regional operation should be transferred to the provinces. However, I note that the NMBS remains firmly in federal hands. This is detrimental to the mobility fees and to Flanders, which has long been a requesting party for a number of urgent investments. An extended, modern, comfortable and reliable passenger transport could be a full-fledged and environmentally-friendly alternative to the straightening of roads and the chronic lack of parking for the growing fleet. Especially the freight transport requires additional efforts. The ports of Zeebrugge and Gent have been in need of a modern railway shutdown for years. Especially for Zeebrugge where modern container terminals remain empty because the loading boxes cannot be on and off on time, this is a compelling requirement. Antwerp is also a demanding party. An additional railway tunnel under the Schelde, a second railway shutdown that unlocks the northern side of the port, the reactivation of the IJzeren Rijn are the most noticeable aspirations on the Flemish wish list. Depending on the variants chosen for these beautiful dreams, the cost plate is 400 to 600 billion francs. That money is not there. It is clear that the traditional parties, all the Lambermont parties, have chosen not to make Flanders competent for the problem and to ensure that Flanders are not competent to put wish lists on the table. The railway is and remains a federal matter. The Belgian railway policy is awarded by the Federal Minister of Transport and the Board of Directors of the NMBS.

Lambermont will therefore not change the stepmotherly treatment of Flanders. It is and still remains the PS who behind the scenes has the ropes firmly in hands and it is in that perspective that the Flemish Parliament comes to the conclusion that one cannot talk about the mobility events without being competent about the rail. The Flemish Parliament could therefore not otherwise demand what was granted to the regions, namely full authority in these regions. As regards the Flemish Bloc, this can only be done in a fully independent Flemish state and in anticipation thereof only provided that a regionalization of the NMBS itself. Only in this way can Flanders record its own investments in the light of known needs and justified aspirations. Their

As we already know, Lambermont does not speak of even a partial regionalization of the railway. If I was talking about the transfers then it is unimaginable what is happening in this area. It is the Financial Economic Time that perfectly expressed it on 31 March 2001 and I quote; "Flanders will have the right, if it so desires, to contribute to the costs of railway investments, with the consequence that in practice the balance of the community is broken, because there are no Wallish spending against it. In the meantime, it was already decided to invest almost 150 billion francs in the Brussels railroad, but without any involvement. Flanders are allowed to build tunnels, but the railway remains under the supervision of the NMBS, in which everything is paritary divided. Their

Wallonia does not want and cannot finance its railway investments on its own. It has managed to secure the existing cash flow to the Wallish Railway for the next twelve years. In addition to these transfers, Flanders can now also fund a part of its own railway investments, without having to say anything to the NMBS, according to the Financial Economic Time of 31 March. You may be surprised, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Colleagues, but I also cite José Happart who in Le Soir of 23 February clearly says that the economic leverage that Wallonia needs to stand on its own should be financed by Flanders, that is, as long as the Flanders are willing to pay for it. The railway dossier should be examined in the light of this objective. Their

I would add that the railway dossier must, of course, be viewed in the light of Lambermont, for that is why even a partial regionalization of the railway cannot and cannot be discussed. That is the only reason! If we examine the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament on this special law, we can only conclude that there is no step in the right direction. This is not even a procession of Echternach, where one is eventually still moving forward, these are steps back, these are steps backwards. For example, Lambermont took steps that are fundamentally contrary to the principles formulated by the Flemish Parliament. The ruling parties throw their promises overboard and sin against a basic principle of democracy. This is an inappropriate policy and voter fraud. Their

First, it contradicts the duality of Belgium. The Brussels Region is treated on the same basis as Flanders and Wallonia, against the express wish of the Flemish Parliament. Their

The federalism with three has become an acquired right. In the Flemish Parliament, however, it was pledged across the party boundaries for a state structure based on the two major communities. Instead of that transition to duality, we are now receiving an irreversible evolution to trinity which brings with it a double minorization of the Flame.

In Belgium, the Flemish majority position is reduced to a ratio of one to two. In Brussels, the Flamings are becoming increasingly dependent on the goodwill of the French speakers. The Lambermont parties let Brussels and thus the Brussels Flamings finally release.

Fiscal autonomy is very limited and, in addition, especially complicated. The district taxes already defined as such in the Special Financing Act are transferred, which, however, is no more than logical. There is no real tax autonomy, in which a state is held accountable not only for its spending but also for its income. It is not with the possibility of increasing or reducing the tax on gambling that one can send the policy to the income side. The time when the VLD demanded that all personal tax should go to the states and also the corporate tax should be transferred is far behind us. However, these are the two leverbars for carrying out its own fiscal policy. The refinancing of the communities where more Flemish billions go to French-speaking education is in place. The company tax, on the other hand, remains entirely Belgian.

A very important point in the agreement is the abolition of organic legislation on municipalities and provinces. Here too, the classic mechanism that plays in every state reform appears again. The Flames must permanently pay a price for something that should have been conditioned for a long time. The federalization of the municipal and provincial law was already promised at the time of the Saint Michel Agreement. Those who thought that Flanders would be able to end the decades-long abuse of the facilities in Flanders with the repeal of the municipal law are deceived. This makes it ⁇ serious. The French have some guarantees. There is no violation of the 1988 Peace Act. The direct election of the creepy and OCMW councillors in the six district municipalities continues to exist. The undeniable presumption of language knowledge remains. The facilities cannot be touched. The Deputy Governor remains. I can give many more examples. There are additional guarantees for French speakers. The municipal boundaries of the facility municipalities must not be touched. Future federations of municipalities in Flanders are therefore excluded. The disciplinary procedure for mayors and shapes, which is written on the basis of the mayors of the six facility municipalities around Brussels, is set up in such a way that the Flemish government has little or no bracelet.

The implementation of the so-called Hermes Agreement is the next point. The Conference on State Reform would settle this forever. We note that the appearance has not even stopped. It quickly turned out that it was merely occupational therapy. The Conference for State Reform remained what it was. They switched to nightly meetings in the coulisses of the Wetstraat, which, by the way, continues today.

It was switched to night meetings in the coulisses of the Wetstraat which, by the way, continues to this day. On 5 April last year, with some pride, it was possible to announce to the outside world that there was an agreement on the issue of agriculture and foreign trade. Pricing and income policy remains a federal matter. The Belgian Intervention and Restitution Office remains federal. The text is formulated in such a way that the powers of the Agency can be expanded quietly. Therefore, there is no question of the complete overthrow of these powers. There are so many exceptions that one can rather assume that agriculture is transferred except agriculture, completely contrary to the resolution adopted by the Flemish Parliament on creating more coherent powers packages in the next state reform. Their

The same goes for foreign trade. Several issues remain federal, such as state-to-state loans and guarantees against certain risks related to export, import and investment. The BDBH is supposed to be abolished, but a federal agency will be replaced. How can it be otherwise: it is composed in its Belgian. There is parity between the regions as the three regions each designate four representatives. This also applies to the federal government. Therefore, one completely ignores the fact that Flanders account for over 75% of exports.

I could still talk about development cooperation, but that has been discussed extensively. Also the inclusion of a special working group in the special law was already discussed in a number of interventions, I suspect also with Mr. Pieters. A special working group will be established to examine which parts of development cooperation may ever — who knows — be transferred to the communities and regions, which from January 2004 and of course limited to those parts relating to the competences of the communities and regions. This is Kafka. In fact, it comes down to the fact that when it comes to development cooperation, nothing and therefore nothing is overlooked. This has already been said several times tonight.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, these are just some of the concerns that have convinced me that this Lambermont Agreement is a blow to Flanders. After reading the texts, after listening to the colleagues and after reading some still critical journalists, our group can only reject this agreement. We must not forget that this agreement is only one out of a whole series of state reforms that have made this country an institutional threat. Lambermont, in the first place, does not take into account the five resolutions of the Flemish Parliament. Just as the state reforms of 1980, 1988 and 1993 already did, Lambermont is building on the disastrous ground plan drawn in 1970. That basic plan provided for the establishment of the three regions, the introduction of the alarm bell procedure, the reinforced special majority and so on.

The Chronicle of the Lambermont Accords is the Chronicle of an announced defeat.

Therefore, it is clear that only the Flemish independence offers a response to the false federalism that is the Belgian construction.

My party strives for a peaceful and democratically legitimate dissolution of the Belgian Fake Federation. The fluvel separation from Czechoslovakia in 1992 shows that such a disintegration can happen in a quick and efficient way. It is this democratic and nonviolent way of separation that my party has in mind, that I have in mind and that must and will be realized. A Lambermont agreement will ultimately not be able to stop this. I am convinced of this.

That Belgium will disappear has become a certainty for many people. The question is only how and when this process will take place. Even the supporters of an independent Flanders usually underestimate the power position that Flanders have when the political will is present to reach a Flemish independence. Flanders should not be compared with the Basque Country or Ireland. Flanders should not reflect on Padamia, which does not have officially recognized structures and where the struggle for independence threatens to be stuck in colorful manifestations.

Flanders is demographically the most important and economically the most prosperous of the two major entities in this country. The Flemish people must prepare themselves, including those who are not principled for Flemish independence and who want to give Belgium an all-last chance, and must make a list of what will be possible in Flanders without Belgium: a healthy economic policy, wage cost cuts, a Flemish social security, police reforms, judicial reform, correct application of the language legislation in Brussels, no interference of the French Community in Flemish-Brabant, a Flemish diplomacy, and so on. That must now be the goal.

It is clear that Flemish independence is necessary to secure the prosperity of the Flemish people. It is clear that independence can be achieved in a peaceful and democratically legitimate way. Another question remains to be answered: when? I quote the Gentese professor Jaap Kruithof: "The independence of Flanders is no longer to be stopped. It is an irreversible process. It may not be quick, but in the foreseeable time we are living in an independent state.”

In Czechoslovakia, until the summer of 1992, a new federal or confederate model was considered. It was only after the elections of June 1992 that the contradictions were no longer reconcilable. Within six months the divorce was completed. Also in Flanders, the minds are ready for the abolition of the union. The concept of separatism may have a too negative connotation for some, the degree of independence that many Flanders want to give, in practice corresponds to the split of Belgium. I quote the words of Mark Grammens: "We are now at the stage of degeneration and the great uncertainty that is characteristic of every fin de règne, but just at this stage that one incident is not far away that is immediately necessary to enter a new path."

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I conclude with a quote from Peter De Rover, Chairman of the Consultation Centre of Flemish Associations.

The entire Lambermont round was set up to provide the French speakers with new resources. They are the requesting party and the discrepancy in the agreement must be eliminated in favor of the Flamings. The price paid by Flanders is already far too high. It would testify to unprecedented cynicism to push this even further. The government would do better to put the current Lambermont version aside and go into the justified Flemish aspirations. Adopting a fundamental reform through bricolage and changing majorities is unworthy of a mature democracy. Their

Any previous state reform could rely on sufficiently large political support in both parts of the country. With this Lambermont agreement, however, the state threatens to be reformed with completely unbalanced proportions: almost unanimity on the French-speaking side, and against the opposition of about half of the Flemish parliamentarians. Do we get in 2001 the image of Belgium as a country where the French speakers determine which direction we go and obtain the necessary majority thanks to the cooperation of the least necessary Flamands the service? Hence, there is the ultimate call of the OVV to all Flemish parliamentarians to discard the incorrect arguments and to assess the Lambermont Agreement and the associated agreements on the basis of their intrinsic content. It is clear to everyone that Lambermont in general and the Brussels chapter in particular, for Flanders, are not virtuous and should be rejected.

Mr. Speaker, I have noticed that it is on the side of the majority on 28 June and on the side of the opposition on 27 June.

We will take initiatives in this direction.

Mr. Speaker, we heard at that time in our classical education of Mr. De Croo that he once in his youth changed the date and that he was then pointed out by the then President, one of your respectable predecessors, that one cannot change that date simply. This can only be done if a new session is announced. We are now in the session of June 27. I would ask if you ask the minister to correct it not on the side of the opposition, but on the side of the majority.

Everyone can have their own interpretation.

It is only if the session is suspended or the session is interrupted and a new one is announced that that date may change.

Mr. Speaker, please clarify for a moment what you mean by taking initiatives towards the opposition. Everything happens here this night. I would like to know what you mean by initiatives.

I don’t pay attention to the calendar. You must not misinterpret me.

Political business is a hallucinating business in Belgium. Here we are supposed to conduct a political debate in the Parliament, the Chamber of People’s Representatives, where 150 people represent the people and the various opinions on, for example, the community problem. However, this debate is in fact entirely superfluous because at this moment the decisions are being made at — you never guess — the PS headquarters.

In Belgium, of course, it can be expected that this will take place at the PS headquarters. We are beyond the democratic police. Two and a half millennia ago in the Greek police was still really discussed between the different directions. At the beginning of the 21st century, this is no longer the case.

To clearly show how hallucinating it really is, I read the Belgian Bulletin for 22.25 am: "While in the House the debate on the competence loop of the Lambermont agreement continues, the representatives of the French-speaking majority parties and the PSC have been sitting together around the table since 19.30 at the PS party headquarters. Deputy Prime Ministers Laurette Onkelinx (PS), Isabelle Durant (Ecolo), Louis Michel (PRL-FDF) and the party chairs Elio Di Rupo (PS), Daniël Ducarme (PRL) and Jacques Baudouin (Ecolo) will participate in the meeting. Gérard Deprez (MCC), PSC chairman Joëlle Milquet and PSC member Jean-Jacques Viseur are also sitting around the table. The majority is still trying to persuade the PSC to allow the approval of Lambermont’s second leak. What attitude the PSC will eventually take is still unclear. Tomorrow, Thursday afternoon, the vote will take place.”

Then we put on a good hour. While we are here in the House of Representatives, the political emanation of what is living in this country, conducting a large social debate about the future of this false federation writes Belga, I quote: "La réunion entre les représentants des partis francophones de la majorité et le PSC était toujours en cours". We are still in the headquarters of the PS to decide what we should think here. We are debating here, but in fact that is all speaking for the often. It will be published in the PS office. “La discussion porte sur la signature et la ratification par la Belgique de la convention-cadre du Conseil de l’Europe sur la protection des minorités et plus spécialement sur la définition de cette notion de minorité”. Behind our backs, this is being blown up while we should be carrying out the big political debate here.

Gelukkig is er Belga zodat wij kunnen vernemen, I quote: "The French speakers would have agreed on a formula that would still pose problems to the Flemish majority parties that meet at 23:30 with the prime minister to discuss the issue." Meanwhile, other political figures have joined the meeting that is still held at the PS, namely J.P. Poncelet and Olivier Maingain.

For Ecolo, Marcel Cheron and Jean-Marc Nollet also participate in this meeting."

The important political debate is still being held here and we could have heard half an hour ago from Belga that the meeting between the French-speaking members of the majority and the PSC is still ongoing around midnight. The discussion revolves around the signing and ratification of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. The message ends with the words and I quote: "In the Chamber the general discussion is still underway." How ridiculous can we be? One is more willing to decide, at the headquarters of the Socialist Party, but Belga writes that the debate in the House is still ongoing. It is ridiculous, but this is Belgian. In Parliament, people’s representatives are allowed to calmly do their thing, they are, after all, well paid for it, and in the meantime we will decide on the Keizerslaan.

I am referring to the situation in Brussels that I am concerned about. I grew up here and I have a lot of friends here. I am deeply concerned, especially because what is being blamed now in Brussels is worse than what has ever been seen in this country. There is in that Brussels Third Region all the one and the other happening, but what is now bullied is still quite rough. I will give a few examples: one will be able to combine lists within the same language group for the election of the Brussels Capital Council. That list connection aims to stop the Flemish Block as much as possible in its yet impressive rise. After all, we are already the largest party in Brussels and therefore there is almost a panic fear for that progress. Through this system, one wants to enter the number of remaining votes as much as possible and keep the number of seats that the Flemish Bloc can obtain as low as possible. It is a trick, not really democratic and voter fraud. This has already been done in 1999 and will be overcome in the next elections.

Abolition of the double majority. If there is no majority on both sides – read on the Flemish side – then a term of thirty days will be invoked after which there is absolutely no need for a majority on both sides – read on the Flemish side. It will no longer be necessary for the Flemish in Brussels to agree at least half to press things that — one may suspect — violently counter Flemish interests. It will be possible to hold a second vote after a month where the percentage of one third is sufficient.

This is already much worse. This is truly undemocratic. Democracy means that the majority decides. In this case, you no longer need a majority in the Flamings and you will always find some collaborators, genre Vic Anciaux happier. Or genre Mr. Chabert, isn’t it, Mr. Leterme? One will always find those Quislings who with great pleasure serve the French speakers on their tips and provide that third, 33% of the Flemish votes, necessary to take measures that will possibly and possibly be anti-Flemish. Their

Another strong measure of how one cares about democracy is the way one will choose the Brussels government. If no absolute majority is found in the capital council for a Flaming, a new election will be held after a period of thirty days, in which a candidate must obtain the majority within the extended community commission. There is another trick in the making: one is going to introduce five additional Flamings, not based on what the Flamings in Brussels have chosen from their political considerations, but based on the election results for the Flemish Parliament. It has nothing to do with the capital council. The good Belgians, who are all that, speak against it, because one has wanted a separate third Brussels region, but now, only and only because there is that annoying Flemish Bloc, one goes from the Flemish Parliament into that separate Brussels Parliament to import Flemings to prevent the Flemish Bloc in Brussels from hitting a majority. The share of the Flemish Block Votes must be diluted, at any cost, in a ⁇ undemocratic manner. Here are many lawyers who now all look to the ceiling, but this is completely undemocratic and one can absolutely not place this on any legal basis.

I now come to the trick used to dilute the share of the Flemish Bloc in the VGC: unelected candidates are designated based on what happens in the Flemish Parliament. The elections take place simultaneously and so one will be based on it, in the hope that Flanders do not choose more and more for the Flemish Bloc, I assume. We are already the third party and I don’t think we will go back in the next election, on the contrary. So, for the time being, one hopes to organize the contribution from the Flemish Parliament in such a way that one or, in their eyes in the best case, no Flemish Blocker will be used. Their

In addition to all the tricks that are used and which are an affliction of democracy and of every sense of law, another trick is applied which consists in that the designation of the five Flamings may take place on the basis of linking lists of which the Flemish Bloc is exceeded in number, in order so, rather than the Flemish Bloc, to be able to propose a candidate. The system is ⁇ transparent and undemocratic, but that doesn’t affect the majority majority Democrats. They do not even respond because what the Flemish Bloc says is not important. As long as they can put the law into their hands, everything will be fine.

Anyway, such a system will take revenge at some point. Such things cannot be done unpunished.

I now come to the enormous achievements – I point out that my word use is intended sarcastically – in the Brussels municipalities. For several decades, we have witnessed that the Flamings have completely fallen into the oppression there, and also that the Brussels municipalities, through those formidable French-speaking politicians, are governed in a rather inefficient way. I step into an open door when I say that it is local baronies that are initially characterized by administrative inefficiency.

Brussels is a separate case. Over the course of the last century, Brussels underwent enormous changes. In the beginning it was nothing more than a small provincial town, surrounded by a number of independent municipalities. For the sake of urbanization, Brussels and eighteen surrounding municipalities grew together into a medium-sized European city that once had more than 1 million inhabitants. Indeed, Brussels once approached 1.1 million inhabitants, but was subsequently confronted with an immense city flight. I can continue for a long time on the causes of this flight – anyone who walks around in Brussels can, by the way, set up a bump about it – even if that is not immediately the topic of discussion tonight. Crime, vandalism, traffic chaos, a ⁇ unfriendly climate with regard to Flamingen and the like caused the number of inhabitants in Brussels to decline to 945,000 people.

Through their merger, the central municipality of Brussels and the eighteen other municipalities underwent an urbanization which allowed them to face the problems of each major city. Even the city of Mechelen, with mayor Somers, is still the victim of the social problems of the cities.

This is not really the subject of this debate, Mr. Somers, but I assume that we may have a debate about it in the coming years. I really hope that your conversations with the youth — I will remain polite and ⁇ not racist — have really impressed. Most likely you have made a great impression on those reigns and you will now be delivered from all problems.

Good governance, including in Brussels, presupposes that one has an administrative entity that efficiently meets the needs and needs of the population. In Brussels, it can be seen that this is not the case in practice. The structures available in Brussels — and that is an important element in the discussion — no longer coincide with the scale in which those problems arise. Mr. Somers can still talk quietly with his own criminals, but it seems to me almost impossible to talk to all criminal youths as mayor of Brussels. It would have a life task. I assume that one can do that in Mechelen with a few hundred still, but in Brussels not at all. First and foremost, the structures are not adapted to Brussels and Lambermont is not going to change that at all. The baronies remain, with the approval of the people of this hemisphere, who have so many times defeated these baronies. We all know that this has never been done in the PRL and the FDF, but the CVP, the Flemish Bloc and also the VLD have done it. Lambermont has no message at this moment and the problem that was born out of those 19 baronies is not addressed. This structural deficiency remains.

There is a fragmentation of municipal policy. In a metropolitan area like Brussels, one cannot work with 19 different municipalities. They are, as is known, guided by the local power potentials, each of whom gives its own fulfillment to the policy. How will he run his municipality? This can be completed in 19 different ways.

The presence of powers at the local level, which would be much better exercised at the capital level, and the continued existence of those 19 baronies will ensure that the administration in Brussels remains quite uncoordinated, not to say in some points even chaotic. One side aspect, which has already been addressed by many parties, is the overcrowding of political personnel. Brussels has, as I said, another small 950,000 officially registered citizens, not counting the illegal.

Officially there are 950,000 people registered in Brussels, possibly there are many tens of thousands of illegals. Brussels has more delegates than Antwerp. This is normal because Brussels is twice as big. In Brussels there are 1,135 mandataris and in Antwerp there are 324. This means that in Brussels there is one mandatar per 473 voters, and in Antwerp there is one mandatar per 1000. It’s nice to drive democracy and representation far through, but it’s a little of the good too much. This problem has already been addressed by several parties in the past, but here nothing is being done. There is even a creation at the top: a number of parliamentarians will be created. This is proposed as a great victory for the Flamings: "You get a pack of parliamentarians, is that not fun?" According to the results of 1999, there will be two Flemish Blocks, and that is nice for the Flemish Blocks. But what does Brussels have to do with the fact that there are a few more parliamentarians? What does the Flammers in Brussels have to do with the addition of parliamentarians, when at the same time they lose their power, especially the power they used to have? Previously, 50% of parliamentarians had to agree to approve certain matters, while now that is still 33%. This is the Flemish defeat in Brussels. That they get a few seats, of course, has no importance. Whether there are 20 flames, or 25, or 30 does not matter. The only thing that matters is the political power that these people have in the Capital Council; and it is now reduced from 50% to 33%. I said it later: one always finds a few quislings who want to join with PRL-FDF and PS.

I return to the level of the municipalities. The local power potentials, the Brussels barons, occasionally give in. There is a need for a level of governance above the municipal. Therefore, a number of informal consultation structures have been established, such as the Conference of Mayors, the merger of a number of police corps and the meetings of the municipal secretaries and of the OCMWs. However, these are still informal consultative bodies, which are not legally regulated bodies, which have no decision-making power and which, according to the Flemish Bloc, are absolutely insufficient.

The municipal legislation is also unadapted according to the Flemish Block. If the structures of Brussels were closed, an effort could have been made here too. Over the course of the last century Brussels has grown into a large city, but the administrative organization has not grown with it.

Brussels is still governed by a municipal legislation that is suitable for a city like Mechelen or Vilvoorde, but which is completely unsuitable for a city like Brussels, ⁇ in the early 21st century. In order to manage such a city properly, it is absolutely necessary to be able to work at different levels. Certain policy matters should be organized centrally. Other aspects must, of course, remain at the local level. This need is felt because we are at the beginning of the third millennium, society becomes more complex and more technical, the citizen becomes more demanding and that there must be created a level that answers these social questions.

President: Fred Erdman, oldest member in years President: Fred Erdman, doyen d'âge Another problem is the financial capacity. First, we are with an exodus and with an impoverishment of the city, but also with the financial problem of the 19 barons. It is well known that some municipalities have absolutely insufficient financial support to properly fulfill all their social or social duties. These municipalities are not financially viable. Look at the shark. I would not want to fill the pit of the OCMW of Schaarbeek. This results in a reduction of the service. Eventually, in some of those poor municipalities, one comes to some kind of basic service. People who have difficulty, the so-called social cases, can no longer go to court in some municipalities or you must enjoy special statutes that are positively discriminated such as an asylum seeker. This will make it easier to access this service. I talked about Schaarbeek, but one can also name Sint-Joost or Sint-Gillis. This means that also here a structural change in the organization of Brussels was needed to provide a solution to these problems. This Lambermont Agreement will only cost the Brusselsers money, money to long-paid parliamentarians who, if I can believe some of my colleagues in the capital council, do not have much more to do than in a narrow provincial council. It is a sad conclusion that there is actually nothing, but then absolutely nothing corrected. Regarding the community imbalance, the Flemish Bloc believes that the Brussels municipalities are historically Flemish municipalities and that the capital area is also geographically Flemish. The agglomeration is located entirely in Flanders, not even bordering on Wallonia. These are also elements that should be taken into account in political discussions. Even if one wipes out the history and geographical location of the table, it remains true that Brussels is the capital of Flanders. Even if one does not accept that, one must accept — even a FDF’er — that Brussels the capital is the country formed by Flanders and Wallonia. For all these reasons, the Flemish Blok believes that the Flamings in Brussels have the right to participate fully in the power in the 19 municipalities. This is not a question of historical justice. This can also be supported by a number of international law agreements. Their

What is the situation at this moment? It is conscious, but one must repeat it, that the power participation of the Brussels Flamings on the municipal level is completely insufficient. The political representation of Dutch speakers in Brussels is poor at the local level and is divided at the level of the capital council. The Flemish parties in this majority fail. I do not know whether AGALEV could ever be called a Flemish party. The SP has in the past known Flemish upflakes and delivered large Flemish supervisors. I fear that the last time the SP has profiled itself Flemish the period of the Red Lions has been in the region around Brussels. However, it is a long time ago, about 30 years ago, that the socialists still had the courage to stand up for their Flemish people.

President: Jean-Pol Henry, Prime Minister and Vice-President. President: Jean-Pol Henry, First Vice-President The current statute of Brussels is that of a region à part entière. Since 1988, Belgium has been a federal state. Some powers were transferred to the regions, other powers were assigned to the communities. Strangely enough, this was not enough and it made Brussels a separate region. Brussels had its own institutions. The Flemish Bloc has always been against this. It is a mistake of jewelry among the Flemish parties that have approved the creation of a third region. It was a compromise between the demands of the French speakers and those of the Dutch speakers. That Brussels was recognized as a full-fledged state alongside Flanders and Wallonia I experience – and many with me I suspect – as a great victory for the French-speaking politicians. The State of Brussels has its own legislative power and may issue ordinances whose legal force, though not entirely, is almost equivalent to that of the other states.

Brussels region à part entière, where, of course – and that is important – a lot of ministerial posts, parliamentary seats, cabinet staff and all sorts of power and influence were to be distributed. So that was a bad thing. The summit of that restructuring in Brussels is the Capital Council, a parliament consisting of 75 members, but to which one would now, as later already said, add a number of Flemish and French speakers from the Brussels outskirts and even from the Flemish Parliament would designate another five. It is of an unprecedented cynicism, because one actually only aims to limit as much as possible the increasing influence of the Flemish Bloc in the Flemish Community Commission. Their

The Community Committees and the Joint Community Committees are creations about which one has spoken quite euphorically, also in the CVP and about which also a certain Mr. Chabert still speaks very euphorically. It is very easy to understand why, but we have a lot of questions about it. We fear that – not only because the Flemish Bloc and its elected members, the twenty municipal councillors and the four Brussels people’s representatives of the Flemish Bloc all say that, but because the Flemish in Brussels feel all this painfully – this leads to what I said at the beginning of my discussion, an ever stronger city flight. Their

This will probably make the lady of Ecolo a pleasure. There is a very strong city flight, which is proportionally much larger than the city flight with the French speakers, because they also fly from Brussels. One does not like to live in a neighborhood that has become a ghetto, an Arab or Muslim ghetto. One does not like to have their children in a ghetto school, surrounded by children who sometimes do not even understand the language of the class they are sitting in. French speakers also fly, but proportionally they are more Flaming than French speakers. Their

On the other hand, we see that the balance of power that one claims to pursue in Brussels, and that one also tries to pursue with Lambermont, is not only endangered and endangered by the flight of those Flamings, but of course also by the continued wave of naturalization. In Brussels it was naturalized that it was no longer beautiful and you can take this literally and figuratively. Everyone knows what is wrong with naturalizations. There are naturalized people whose neighbor I ⁇ ’t want to be and I’m not scared of rap. The opposite may also be true, but I think I still have more rights than the kind of individuals who are naturalized and have a lot on their nursery. Their

There is therefore naturalization against the stars and that wave of naturalization – it is in Brussels many tens of thousands – will in turn lead, like the city flight, to an evolution in the relations between Flemish and French speakers. Their

The Brussels Dutch speakers are ⁇ difficult at the moment. They will find it even more difficult in the next two to three decades. Neither Lambermont nor the Flemish parties that will approve Lambermont have given only one answer. They have made sure that some of their friends can become people’s representatives or ministers in a very smooth way. We will now also take care of some additional Flemish creatures. For the ordinary Flemish citizen, however, all this has no importance. It brings him nothing. On the contrary, the 50% rule has even been discarded. One falls back to a third of the Flemish votes if the French speakers in Brussels want to push something through.

The situation is serious and will get worse. No one is drawn to it and no one is listening to it, but that decline will result in an institutional crisis. It will be a concern for the French speakers, but someday it will have to be the concern of the Flemish parties. The Whales now think they are so clever with all these reforms. However, they are accelerating the dissolution process of Belgium. The disgrace and arrogance with which they have treated the Flammers for years, they will get like a bumerang in their faces. The language legislation in Brussels is also a crucial issue. We live in the 21st century. It should nevertheless be impossible to be discriminated in the capital of this bilingual country because of its language. Especially thanks to the left corner, but now also thanks to the white knight of the VLD, Mr. Verwilghen, all possible discriminations are addressed. This is usually done on the instigation of the Greens. All possible discrimination must be eliminated from the world, starting with Belgium. However, the kind of linguistic discrimination confirmed by numerous reports and the numerous testimonies from the sectors is not a problem in Brussels. This will not be corrected.

In a shameless manner, the language legislation – a legislation drawn up not by the Flemish Bloc but by the traditional parties – has been continuously stepping in for various sectors for many years. This will remain so. Nor will the new political culture and the urge of this majority to eliminate all discrimination remedy this. Their

Let me now talk about the language legislation at the municipal level. I am talking about the municipalities and the OCMWs. The language legislation is governed by the laws of 1966. These laws put the principle of general bilinguality of services at the forefront. This, therefore, applies not only to the external services, which is quite logical, but also to the internal services. If you want to get angry about this in Brussels, then you will not be the first. However, this is also important. With regard to the internal services, the Brussels local officials should be able to prove their knowledge of the second language by passing an exam at the Permanent Recruitment Secretariat. Of course, we agree with that principle. Both Dutch-speaking and French-speaking persons must be able to go to public services in their mother tongue in Brussels. This principle must be ⁇ ined and strictly applied. The principle has existed since 1966, but it has not been applied for a long time. I will never forget that the very Flemish-minded Mr. Weckx — at the time a statue in Brussels — and the much stronger Flemish-minded Mr. Victor Anciaux came a year or ten years ago with interpreters for the Turks and Moroccans in the hospitals of Brussels. If one then said that all this was very human-loving and asked why this could not be for the Flammers, then that was twisted. It was then said that the Flemish Bloc ⁇ would not want the Flemish to be placed on the same level as the Turks and Moroccans. Speaking of racism. It was a joke of Mr. Weckx that actually turned out wrong. Their

Let me now return to the current situation. In some hospitals and at some OCMW services we still do not have the right to a Dutch-speaking treatment.

We also have no interpreters, such as sick Turks and Moroccans. The problems remain for the Flamings in Brussels for a third of the work volume.

As regards public relations, the legislation provides that one quarter of the relations are reserved for each language group, so that the remaining 50% can be completed by the local authorities at their own discretion. That means that a quarter of the jobs are for Dutch speakers. Anyone who knows a little about the situation in Brussels can easily understand it. We consider that this scheme – the linguistic free filling of 50% of jobs – should also continue to exist on condition that these people have demonstrated a certain professional competence through objective exams and meet a number of requirements that can be tested, for example, at the exams of the Permanent Recruitment Secretariat. It is obvious that the language requirements in both language groups must be identical. There should be no differences.

The heavy discussion that has been raining for years between the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking politicians is about the question of what relations with local governments exactly fall under the language legislation. According to the French-speaking politicians, the language law applies only to permanently appointed staff members. So what do they do? They bypass the language law by appointing as many people as possible in other statutes and by hiring as many French-speaking staff as possible at the local level. This, of course, results in undermining the bilinguality of the service. The Flamings, and ⁇ the Flemish Bloc, on the other hand, believe that not the statute, but the function must determine whether the language legislation is applicable. Any employee employed by a local government – in a permanently appointed statute, as an internship or contractual, as a substitute for a career break, etc. – should be subject to language legislation and should have passed a language exam before being recruited. In Brussels it works the opposite. A full number of French-speaking staff are appointed. They do this against the legal regulations and then promise afterwards, to give the Flemish coalition partners a little bit that they will pass exams, but those are continuously postponed. The Flammers are constantly deceived there, but they are happy with it because they are in the majority. This is the case with the VLD now and that was the case with the CVP in the previous legislature, no, Mr. Leterme. You are personally completely innocent, but you are now the chamber group chairman of the CVP, a not insignificant position in this country. As a CVP’er you are a bit co-responsible because you have that all the years to the crazy, sweat. You have swallowed every escape, every fake manoeuvre, every temptation of the French speakers. Now Mr. Courtois and Mr. Somers swallow that. It seems to be a legality that, if one is in a Belgian government, one can swallow quite a bit like Flaming. I swallow until closer order water and no humiliations.

We do not want to thwart the same regulation of that language legislation, but it must only be applied and enforced. There is also a problem because it cannot be forced. The French speakers keep their leg stiff, and even today, although the situation has lasted for many years, they have failed to impose even a little respect on the French speakers for those laws of 1966. The Flemish Bloc advocates respect for the two language groups and that must be due to the entire bilinguality of the services. We are in favor of ⁇ ining the scheme, as explained earlier, but it must, of course, be fully applied. Their

This was the leak on the language use in the 19 municipalities. There are, of course, also rules for the Brussels regional institutions. Therefore, this language use has been regulated by Articles 32 to 37 of the Law of 16 June 1989. It states that the services of the capital council and of the Joint Community Commission are equated with the central services of the Act of 1966, which are competent for the whole country. Since this legislation is tailor-made for conditions across Belgium, it is obvious that it cannot be adapted to the situation in Brussels. The provisions prioritise the bilinguality of the service, but they want to realize that through the unanimity of public officials. Practice has shown that this leads to absurd situations, to poor service to the citizen and to a whole range of dysfunctions.

As an example, we can talk about the difficulties of the fire department. The firefighters in Brussels are quite a soup for me. This has also lasted for years. The quarrels between the Flamings and the French speakers are legion. It is still unable to resolve this. They don’t even work with percentages, but with pieces of percentage to find a solution.

For example, service 100 should be bilingual on the phone, but one wants to do this by not requiring bilinguality from the staff members. Knowledge of the second language is not required. In order to be in order with the language legislation and to give the citizens in Brussels the privilege of being assisted in their own language, one must place two officials at each lock and every phone: one Flaming and one French-speaking. This is, of course, absurd and even money-sweeping. Both the fire department and the service 100 sometimes need to intervene very quickly, which in certain situations can cause fear for the safety of civilians in need.

We are in favor of a change in the language legislation for these regional services by taking over the regulation on municipal services. Therefore, one should move from monotony to bilinguality of officials. In this way, the citizens, both the French speakers and the Flamings, can be assisted optimally.

If this regulation is amended, there will, of course, also be a change to the distribution of relations between the language groups. The current system should establish language frameworks that are essentially based on the workload as a decisive criterion for the distribution of relations between the language groups. In 1989, an agreement was concluded that is still more or less valid to divide government relations at the regional level according to the rule of 1/3 Dutch speakers and 2/3 French speakers. This distribution key was immediately challenged by the PRL-FDF and is still challenged and legally challenged.

This has resulted for the firefighters in the destruction of the language framework by the Council of State. This was not drafted according to the provisions of the language legislation, but only according to a simple political agreement. A procedure has also taken place against the language framework of the Ministry of the Capital Region and one can say that the political agreement from the beginning was unsustainable.

As Vlaams Blok, we believe that a political agreement on the distribution of posts and the requirement of competence for those who fill the frameworks is not necessarily contradictory, since the work volume on Dutch-speaking affairs in Brussels is much lower. Approximately 15% of Flemish people have an identity card drawn up in Dutch although at least as many people speak their Brussels Vloms at home, but are officially registered as French-speaking. This is the result of the fringing process that has been ongoing for many decades.

The Flemish Bloc chooses to introduce for the regional services the arrangement of the municipal services, thereby abolishing the language frameworks and thereby providing a quarter of the relations for each language group and completing the others through a political agreement. As previously stated, however, we are in favour of the complete abolition of any assignment of a public relationship on linguistic grounds and that only competence would ultimately apply as a recruitment criterion. Competence should be a primary requirement for designating and appointing someone. This skill includes being able to deal with the two language communities in this country.

There could be a good relationship between Brussels Flamings and Brussels French speakers, provided that the agreements are effectively fulfilled. The regulation of 1966 was a good regulation, which, however, is laid on the French-speaking side. One must therefore effectively comply with the agreements and loyally take into account the rights and aspirations of the two communities, and of course of the Brussels Flamings. The problem is that the will for understanding in some of the French-speaking politicians – I don’t shave them all over the same chest – is not present at all and ⁇ not in Brussels.

This resulted in the denial of a number of basic rights, language rights, to the Brussels Flamings, by the pertinent refusal to comply with the language laws of 1966. This is in itself by refusing to follow the jurisprudence on the matter, although it has already taken some form. These are things that are promoted year after year. From a French-speaking angle, in order to keep Belgium alive, one should be loyal to the Belgian laws. Apparently, one has entered a sort of kamikaze process by which one now wants to enter everything, to ultimately establish that the dream has disintegrated.

The unlawful state of language thus leads to states as they are known in the OCMW Hospitals of Brussels. One must imagine that: as a Flaming, seriously sick or injured, one must express himself in French to say what happened to you. It testifies to a form of racism that would otherwise be fought immediately with fire and sword, but with which one appears to have no problems in this country. I have never a green ear fulminate against such discrimination. They fulminate against all discrimination that can be found around and around the globe and if they could, then they would explore the Milky Way a bit more, looking for discrimination. But here, these discriminations just under their nose, that can’t care them ass. Therefore, there is genuine unwillingness and hypocrisy. We find that the communication between the doctor and nursing or paramedical staff, on the one hand, and the patient, on the other hand, is so important that one should not accept such disadvantages. Whatever disposition one may be, one should not accept it. In the current circumstances, as long as the bilinguality of the staff is not a fact, we want a doubling of the bicommunitary sector that must be continued if the language wasteland states continue to last. French speakers need to feel if they don’t want to listen. The French speakers know very well that we have money, that we have a lot of money. They know it too well, because they are trying to seize more and more of it. However, this could also be used in reverse by the Flemish, at least if there was political will within the Flemish majority parties. As is well known, we must nowadays look quite far for Flemings in majority parties that are radically standing up for Flemish interests, also and especially in Brussels.

Mr. De Man, you are speaking for an hour and 11 minutes now. Normally, the time in the general discussion is limited to 30 minutes. I’ll let you go on, but may have to cut in your colleagues’ speech time.

I was so driven, you see. I will finish. You are especially kind to point out to me the limitation of the speech time. It is the drive that leads a man so far. I was talking about language legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I take back the thread of my speech. I talked about language legislation and the conclusion that this — and ⁇ no one of the majority will contradict me — is not spoken of in a community debate under a purple-green government. That is another aspect that is very important for us, but not at all for the purple-green coalition.

Finally, I would like to address the problems in education. Although there is much to say about this very complex problem, especially for Brussels, I will limit myself to the following. We agree that, in Brussels education in particular, an extra effort is being made to teach our students French, which is happening, and that is good too. However, we believe that an effort can also be made with regard to the Dutch-speaking education in the French-speaking schools, which is of such a low level that those who graduate there are as true language disabled as soon as they appear on the professional market. Per ⁇ this is so desired by the French speakers; they do nothing about it anyway. Again this time, I can only warn of the boomerang effect; someday it may fall into their faces.

Brussels as a third region is a ⁇ bad thing for Flanders, for the Flanders in Brussels and even for Brussels itself. With regard to the problems addressed, the government has either done nothing or made things worse. In this context, I refer again to the arrangements in the Capital Council and to the scandalous practices at the local level where one must purchase as ships nota bene, where therefore a price is attached to a Flemish ship office. What are they doing in heaven?

The purple-green government has failed heavily, both in terms of the Lombard Agreements and in terms of the Lambermont Agreements, and like the other members of my group, I can absolutely not appreciate this.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Colleagues, I think that in the meantime everyone knows that the Lambermont Agreements or the draft special law relating to the transfer of various powers to the regions and communities, as expressed in our political jargon, are also well debated in this Parliament. A debate is one thing, but whether one really understands what is being discussed here today is another question. I have been able to hear in the walkways that most of my colleagues from the various parties hardly realize what exactly is capable of. Maybe they don’t want to know. That is even more important. They do not want to know. Anyone who knows the plotting of this Parliament can see to the representatives of the various parties in this hall what is going on. It seems to me that there is always a fairly significant number of French speakers present here. That is the best barometer to show what it is about.

It is a very simple question of a lot of fresh Flemish money, colleagues. That is the essence of the agreement. Therefore, many colleagues would rather not know the agreement. In order to conceal or obscure some of the worst things, one has put it together in a large bag with, of course, some good things. It would be intellectually unfair to claim that there is nothing good in all this agreement. That is not correct, but that is of course the classic trick of the foor to be able to hit the agreement through the throat of the colleagues. One can imagine it as beautifully as one wants, it continues to turn around the same Flemish money. We give something or we buy something from the Whales. This is the way it has been working since the creation of this “community state”, a state that would only exist temporarily and which has been surviving itself for 170 years.

The agreement — if one can call it an agreement — is a milestone in the Belgian negotiation policy. It is one of the greatest achievements of this agreement that it is Belgian. It is what Mr. Verhofstadt, though in his opposition period, would call an exponent of the Belgian disease. Since I have been part of this Chamber for several years, I have still experienced the VLD when it belonged to the opposition. It has happened a few times that when I heard another attack of the VLD on the regime, I thought that party actually had some good ideas. My colleagues, I have gone astray. After two years of purple-green government, I realize that with this VLD it has not become much better than with the previous regime parties.

This government, which is one of its great achievements, has created many expectations among the citizens from the very beginning. In the beginning, there was a certain atmosphere among the people. They thought everything would be different now. Everyone was a little bit tired of CVP and I also thought it would be different with the VLD. Worse could not be in that period, but I have not yet seen much that could confirm my previous opinion.

I suppose it will be better for some, but for whom? A number of people from the VLD have been able to strengthen their position by joining the government, this is a fact. The wet dream of Mr. Verhofstadt has become a reality: he has become prime minister, but of a country he in the past, with the regularity of the clock, though verbally, broke the ground. However, there is still no argument to argue that the change of power at the summit has already made the citizen slightly better; I will return to that later. The prime minister’s party once addressed the Belgian problem. All community problems were solved in the shortest possible time. Now we know how to do this with the VLD: quickly and efficiently. This is widely known and it has already been made ridiculous enough, they, by the way, regularly do it themselves.

What I am interested in is how this purple-green government comes to an agreement. I understand that we live in a democracy, and, colleagues, I must confess that I am also a Democrat; I know that this is sometimes questioned. However, one should look at what is all called a democracy: the Democratic Republic of the Congo is also a democracy. “C’est moi le président,” so it goes, and yet it is also a democracy. It depends on what one understands by democracy, but in a well-functioning democracy I am definitely a Democrat. As a Democrat, I would like to participate in a democratic operation.

In an agreement, one must give and take a little. I fully agree with this. Of course, giving always happens on one side, and taking also: Flanders gives and Wallonia takes. This is a cow trade that has existed for 170 years and will continue with this new government. In other words, the agreement is made as it has been doing here for a long time: how much will it cost and how much can it cost? By "cost" I mean what it can cost Flanders and the taxpayer, not what it can cost the VLD. It was soon clear that Flanders had to pay a heavy price for the purple-green adventure. From the beginning, the Flemish liberals have been guilty that no unanimous Flemish position was possible in the negotiations with the French speakers. It is becoming increasingly clear that the French speakers are the dominant factor in this government. However, this is not enough, because today they will also demand the agreement of the PSC, I suppose. We now have the support of almost every French speaker for the agreement. This is a clear parameter for the fact that this agreement is mainly defended by French speakers.

It is clear that the future of this government is in the hands of the PSC. We can say that. The PSC has ended up in its old role, that mini-party that has been ruling the country for 70 years, now even from the opposition. The Flemish liberals, I find it difficult to use this name, would rather change their name back. I suggest that the PVV be used again. Pest for Flanders. Mr. Somers, you know, in our good old time of the People’s Union, we called the liberals the plague for Flanders. They can call back this name calmly. This is not a federal government, but rather a hidden Wallish government. This government is fully dominated by the Wallish Corner, mainly by the PS and PRL. Minister Verhofstadt can travel around the world. I think he planned to visit another democracy, the Congolese democracy, within two days. To learn something, or something. He is in office the leader of this government, but this agreement once again shows that the cards are distributed outside the Parliament. That is clear. The dream of Verhofstadt has a price and that price is called Lambermont.

The weakness of this agreement is clearly made clear in a beautiful way, today again by the PSC. The majority is so tight that one is easily blackmailed. The PSC can of course, through its comfortable position, joyfully drive the price up. I suspect that the price has reached a serious height, because the tension is becoming increasingly strong. There are already some prices. I think of the price of Mr. Poncelet. 600,000 francs a month, that’s nothing. I can hardly believe the prime minister’s bet on that. This is an important achievement for Wallonia. Wallonia was saved.

The price for this agreement is not a problem for the VLD because it does not come out of their pocket. Being in power must be the end and the end sanctifies the means.

The way this agreement has been reached is a staple of farm fraud. Fraud is fraud, even if it is of purple-green origin.

Where does this so-called agreement originate? On 3 March 1999, a few weeks before the elections, the Flemish Parliament approved 5 resolutions concerning the further state reform. In the meantime, one and the other changed. He became a forest guard. (Interrupted by Mr. Bart Somers)

The basic idea of this agreement is always the same with the 15 speakers. That the stricter forest guard has become you can approve, Mr. Somers because you specialize in it.

A broad consensus had to be reached on these resolutions. In Belgium and, unfortunately, also in Flanders, this means that every agreement becomes a minimum agreement, an agreement that can be broken through for everyone and, consequently, means hardly anything. Even that agreement was still too strong. March 1999 was before the elections. In the election campaign that preceded June 1999, the current majority parties made another step up. In an election period, everyone washes a little whiter than white. At the moment when the VLD fell out of the electoral bus thanks to the dioxin spikes and a little manipulation as the winner, the sale of the resolutions began already after a few hours. They had to move as smoothly as possible. They had to get into the government. The purpose justifies the means. It had nothing to do with who offered the most but who offered the least. Even this minimum program was too much for the Waal brothers. Unfortunately, promises made before the elections can simply be wiped out in politics. There are no standards in politics. Decent behavior and politics are things that clearly do not go together. And then complain that the citizen did not understand the signal!

The traditional parties hope that they will always be able to swallow their election promises unpunished. It is time that they begin to realize that all that conkelfoes give the Flemish Bloc more and more wind in the sails. The parties that approve the Lambermont agreement breach promises to their voters and become guilty of fraud. This foolish Lambermont agreement contradicts the 5 conscious resolutions on fundamental points and even the electoral propaganda and programs of certain parties.

Furthermore, this agreement degrades the Flemish Parliament into a worthless appendix of the federal government. That was for most observers in the stars written with the appointment of Mr. Dewael. This wonderboy ensured that the Flemish government has always managed to give the federal government the necessary push at the right moments. I remember that Mr. Dewael initially refused to call himself Prime Minister. He did not do this out of humility. Anyone who knows Mr. Dewael knows that he does not suffer from humility at all. That’s not necessary, he’s a very skilled man who doesn’t have to be modest.

I would also not dare to accuse him of false humility. That would offend him, which I do not want. Of course, he had another problem. On the title of Flemish prime minister, there was another smell. The former prime minister dared quite often to make comments and make punitive statements which were not always accepted with gratitude by our Wallon brothers. Everybody still knows the image – allegedly it was the stamped card – of a prime minister who dropped his dog on a Wallish cock. This statue has continued to hang at the Whales and Mr. Dewael has wanted to distance himself from that statue. Unfortunately, one could not immediately invent another title and so he eventually became only prime minister. He gave a different fulfillment to the job. One of his first steps was to make consultations or make a friendship visit with his Wallish colleague and I think the Walls are now convinced that a Flemish prime minister is completely harmless. No one will hear of it anymore, one can comfortably take a drink with it, but he will ⁇ not bother and ⁇ never embarrass this Chamber. I see Mr. Dewael never sending his dog on a few Wallish chickens, for example. Per ⁇ he will go behind the valley chickens. (Laughter) Colleagues, after the previous elections, the Flamings were in a strong position. I remember an interview with Mr. Anciaux, though a politician of unmistakable origin, in which he stated to the Gazet of Antwerp, the right-wing newspaper of Linkeroever, on 5 May: "The French Community is dying financially. It cannot prepare the 2001 budget. The French Community does not have to get in trouble, but it will have to get over the bridge. For Flanders, patience is the strongest weapon. We are financially in a situation that allows us to wait.” What we had to wait for was not quite clear to me, but I was able to establish that the Whales had understood one thing well, namely that we had money and time. So it has taken two years before they could get that money, but when I see the nervousness here, I think the moment is near that one will get our money or that we will be able to transfer the money.

So we had a good starting position, which indeed offered a lot of advantages. We were once again in a position where the French speakers were urgently embarrassed for money. However, if we satisfy that financial need of our Wallish brothers, then we are out of circulation for a while again and we will have to wait for another acute outburst of financial distress at the Whales, and that can take several months or years. Per ⁇ the next agreement will have to wait until the next government is formed, or maybe only until next week. I don’t know, but at least we gave a chance out of our hands.

The Whales are only interested in Flanders if there is money out of it. This is called solidarity, although I prefer to speak of milking.

The Flemish start-up proposals were also not blown out by great ambition. If one wants to negotiate, one does not begin with a minimum proposal or with a proposal that already automatically contains a compromise. In exchange for the implementation of the French-speaking demand for more money, even the minimum program was not immediately put on the table. However, this program had already been approved in the past. Community love still means additional Flemish money for Wallonia.

I have already stated that the Flemish Parliament in March 1999 put the points on the i. The two-part Belgian was therefore to consist of the counties of Flanders and Wallonia, with a specific status for Brussels. The Flemish Parliament considered it necessary to give priority to the construction of these two provinces in the further state reform. In their own electoral programs, the VLD and the People’s Union went even further. In 1999, the VLD called that in 1999 that the party stands for the simplification of the federal state development, consisting of the Flemish and French Commonwealth with in addition the Brussels Capital Region and the German Commonwealth, which will receive a statuut sui generis. In my opinion, Brussels is treated in the Lambermont Agreement in the same way as Flanders and Wallonia. Brussels will be given equal tax autonomy and will also be fully competent in the newly overhauled matters.

Before the election, all Flemish parties assured themselves that Brussels would be competent for the municipal law only after a proper solution would be found for the position of the Flemish in Brussels, also and especially in the local governments. In the Flemish Government Agreement, we read among other things that the guaranteed representation and also effective and balanced policy participation of both groups at all policy levels in the first half of the legislature would get a definitive solution. Practice has taught us that it is somewhat different. In the Lambermont Agreement, there is no mention of this. The position of the Brussels Flames is completely forgotten. In the meantime, the jurisdiction goes to the Brussels Region. The Flemish government agreement is thus undoubtedly thrown into the rubbish.

Education is also an important aspect in this issue. Education will now be financed with subsidies from the large Belgian pot, which the Wals know very well that it is being filled again and again by the Flamings. In addition, the basic amount of this funding is distributed according to the number of pupils. The French speakers are very nice in that calculation, as we have been able to establish several times. French speakers also gain better financial treatment for free schools in the French community. It is a fixed duty of 1000 francs instead of the registration fees of 1.1% for the contribution of school buildings into a patrimonial Non-Profit Association. This is the classic backdoor that is now created. This is a federal-funded tax benefit that primarily benefits the schools in the French community. I find that strange. This is obviously so because most Flemish schools have long been in a VZW structure. In addition, they request an exemption for these VZWs from the annual tax of 0.17%. Both small measures soon cost Flanders 1.1 billion francs. Even the long-awaited financial autonomy does not actually come. We even go backwards. The only exception is the viewing and listening fee. There has already been a lot to do around there. Flanders does not yet have it under its jurisdiction but has already abolished it at least three times or at least informed the public about it. This is the Communication Government. She even has millions of tax money left for it, to the great joy of a certain advertising agency that supports this government in all areas as much as possible. Even the color of the prime minister’s dozen is determined by this advertising agency.

Especially the viewing and listening money is a beautiful story in itself. When this was first announced by Minister Stevaert, a lot of people thought that this was finally abolished. The abolition of a tax is a fun measure and people have been waiting for a while to reduce the fiscal pressure. There is, of course, a big difference between propaganda, government announcements and empty promises. This government is very well aware that it is difficult for the people to distinguish between them. Per ⁇ that is right because among the purple-greens, the distinction between propaganda, government announcements and empty promises is difficult to distinguish. On the Flemish level, Minister Stevaert is by far the most beautiful in this area. He can say it so well and a lot of voters have believed him. I recently read that a lot of people have no longer paid the watch and listening fee. I hope that they will also intervene if these people are later fined. Otherwise, they can pay it out of their own pocket. It is necessary to stop proclaiming such things if they do not stand. In addition to this promised tax abolition, there is actually nothing changing. However, the VLD demanded in an earlier life that even the personal tax should go entirely to the communities. I will try to continue here without the VLD. It will not be so easy.

I have read that a community should at least have its own taxation. In practice, it is possible less than 25%. This is another missed opportunity for Flanders, thanks to the same VLD. Wallonia, of course, is once again in financial need but the VLD was ready to do anything to help the French speakers. However, they are not satisfied again because now some political power and language relationships in Belgium have begun to be understood. I will give a few examples here. The Convention on National Minorities is used to enforce additional rights and facilities for French speakers living in Flanders. This has nothing to do with the goal of this treaty, which was created to reduce tensions between the classical national minorities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But yes, the ends also sanctify the means. I think the French speakers in this country are more than sufficiently protected by alarm procedures and special majorities.

Furthermore, the statements of the last days of some French speakers testify to a humiliating suspicion towards the Flemish political leaders, who are almost depicted as disgusting oppressors who cheat the legitimate claims of French speakers. The VLD continues to accept all this. For them, apparently, no humiliation is too much.

It is clear that the French-speaking politicians feel that they are at the winning hand. The questions in this government are quite silly. They also undermine the Flemish legal system and in particular the Council of State. Thus, they demand that the Flemish peripheral municipalities fall under a bilingual chamber of the Raad van State and not under a Dutch-speaking chamber, which, according to them, would not judge objectively. With such suspicions of partiality, the authority of law is undermined by politicians. They also criticize political parties, which claim the same from other political parties.

Furthermore, the Lambermont Agreement already provides for a new concession to the mayors of the peripheral municipalities. If they are disciplinary sanctioned because they do not comply with Flemish decrees, decisions and language rules, they may, during the course of the procedure, have to submit a preliminary question to the Council of State, i.e. the unanimous chamber. The Joint Assembly of the State Council or the Arbitration Court, the bilingual colleges, should judge the constitutionality of these rules. The answer to this question, folded by a bilingual room, is binding for the single room. Furthermore, an important condition for obtaining the suspension of such a decision fails. For example, the French speakers in the outskirts, unlike the other countrymen seeking the suspension of a government decision, must not demonstrate a difficult to repair serious injury, the main obstacle to being admitted to a suspension procedure. After the Lambermont agreement itself, with its poor price-quality ratio and the poor arrangement for Brussels, the Flamings are further disguised. The Flemish majority parties are there and look at it.

What personally also disturbs me about the Lambermont Agreement is that the transfer from Flanders to Wallonia is increasing once again. The minimalist calculation of this transfer is 200 billion francs per year. If one could use a part of it, a number of problems could be solved. I see Mr. Van Campenhout sitting. Some of the money could be used in Antwerp by the financial service or customs. They have long complained about a deficit of several hundred million francs. Imagine the transfer to Wallonia of 200 billion francs. This is a minimalist estimate. I want to keep the threshold as low as possible to keep it as credible as possible.

If you look at the problems – which, by the way, would be solved when the VLD came to power – there is still a great opportunity for the VLD to solve a number of issues. You have the money to raise, but you have to do something for it.

Another example is the problem of the merchant ship, namely a lack of money. This has also recently appeared in the news.

Due to the drainage of Flemish money to Wallonia, there has been no money for this distressing sector for years. In 1991, the then government believed to have found a solution by placing the fleet in Luxembourg, a matter to shift through a number of problems. That painful measure gained a permanent character and led to the gradual reduction of ship ownership and the associated exploitation in Belgium. Despite the favourable regime our shippers currently enjoy in Luxembourg, they are fully aware that a first-class national register would offer more future prospects. However, when they call the government, they always get the answer that there is no money.

That this is not a priority for the government is plausible. After all, when we say maritime, we mean ports and ports located in Flanders, which is ⁇ not a priority. This is more clear with the Lambermont Agreement. If the Whales need money, they will get it immediately, whether it is 1, 2 or 3 billion. But some measures, which Antwerp has so long needed and which would cost only a few hundred million, are pushed over the long run or spread over 10 to 12 years. Some of them are even transferred to the next government, when ⁇ the CVP, which will then be a new party — they are re-sourcing — again becomes part of the government.

I will give a number of other examples to show that the system now ⁇ ined in Belgium must lead to serious problems, also for the rich Flanders. Let’s look at the military purchases. I think here specifically of the files of the A3XX and the A400, in which Flanders is once again injured in comparison with Wallonia, even worse even now that the VLD is a member of the government coalition, although it has always claimed to come out with it. Even in the Airbus file, the government has invented a nice trick. It was a regional jurisdiction, but since Flanders did and Wallonia did not have the necessary money, it was decided to put it back under the federal jurisdiction. And suddenly the government was able to trick six billion from its high hat, all to save a distressing Wallish industry. It is very beautiful and very praiseworthy of the government that it is so concerned about the Wallish industry, but that does not mean that the Flemish industry must always be used to help another industry. It happens too often that before the government the Wallish industry comes first. As our Flemish industry crumbles, the chairman of the Flemish Liberals argues for more rights for homosexuals. This can really count as a priority!

Similarly, the government acts in the NMBS file.

In this regard, Flanders is also scandalously damaged. One example is the TGV file. In that case alone, Flanders is rolled for about 65 billion Belgian francs. This is a sum that needs to be considered. No one is awake from it. No one in this government has any feelings of shame. They just go his walk. The smoke curtain that this purple-green PSCregering creates should ensure that this government stands. The differences between the parties are so great that it will become more and more difficult. The last hours have shown this; the nervousness in this Parliament is greater than ever. If the Lambermont agreement is not approved, it could lead to a government crisis.

Especially for the VLD it is to be hoped that their voters will not understand this agreement. This was also the intention. This agreement has been made so complex that it is difficult to defend this agreement. The Lambermont Agreement should be an example of the new political culture. I’ve been in this Parliament for four years now and I’ve never seen such a crowd. If this is the new system, I would rather have the old system. We almost get homewashed to the time of the CVP. It is a pity that I have to say this.

I have troubled myself with the effort to break out the agreement entirely. In the coming days we will have the opportunity to thoroughly explore this again. We will rub everything under your nose again. This is a bad agreement. The only constant is the fact that Flemish money goes to Wallonia. We will resist it and you will find us on your way in the coming days.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, the advantage of being another speaker is that almost everything has already been said. In fact, I could have referred to the previous speakers from my group. These prevailing powers are so detrimental to Flanders that we must exhaust the only means that remains to us, namely the right of speech.

Colleagues, the attitude of the PSC during the discussion of the Finance Act and now also the Competence Act speaks book parts. The two loops are tailor-made cut from the French speakers who, by the way, in blocks, without any exception, approved the financing law. This is in sharp contrast to the little interest they showed during the discussions. However, they showed even more solidarity when it came to the penny.

Again, the PSC may impose additional requirements in the interests of the French speakers. Why would they not do it? The French bloc already has its battle at home, because the financial gap is as good as inside. If we make the comparison between the cash flows that the French-speaking people realized and the transfer of powers, then this transfer has remained quite limited. And yet there is one special conclusion that we as Flames can make, namely that we are strong in packing air. The overthrow of agriculture is a clear example of this. This is presented as a counterweight to the financing scheme while the French speakers themselves were the requesting party for that overhaul.

Also as regards the regionalization of the Municipal Law, there was a previous agreement that is now sold as a kind of war buffet and there are a few more examples to be given. While the French-speaking bloc may rightly be happy with what they have received, on the Flemish side we must note that the Flemish majority has filled the shopping cart with old products after they have passed the cash.

This state reform, like all the previous ones, is detrimental to Flanders. It has become a synthesis of night hunting and unimaginable compromises. Another finding is that these Lambermont Agreements lead to a federalism with three. The strengthening of the Regions contradicts the position of the Flemish Parliament. A state reform based on two large communities must be given shape, but now the Flemish Community is becoming increasingly dependent on the French-speaking minority. The Flemish Brussels is also left behind by the Flemish parties who will provide their support here.

In the discussion of the present draft comes a quote from former senator Lode Claes. “The Flames didn’t know they could win and they didn’t know they would lose.” This ruling does not strike Lambermont, but goes back thirty years and strikes the federalization of Belgium. The Flemish demands for autonomy were then neutralized by the federalist load and for thirty years it has been possible to neutralize the Flemish power. The only difference is that we now realize that we could have won, but again some consciously make the same mistakes and they know in advance that they are going to lose.

I have already said that Belgium’s fundamental duality is abandoned by the excessive assignment of powers to Brussels. This also leads to excessive concentration of power. The Brussels Capital Region frequently transfers money to the 19 baronies, resulting in a continuous mixture.

They are the same figures that make the beautiful weather in regions and municipalities. In addition, they are the heads of the municipalities and are explicitly present in the capital council. Roger Van Houtte stated very correctly in the Gazet of Antwerp: "If they become competent over the municipal law, they are immediately a judge and a party." Such a sensitive matter, which in Brussels also has everything to do with compliance with language laws, must of course be guarded by the two communities. As the full guardianship will now be exercised by Brussels, disagreements concerning the non-application of the language laws can no longer be discussed in the Chamber or Senate. This will also be felt in the recruitment policy in Brussels: hospitals, fire, MIVB, OCMW, emergency services. In other words, the total friction here gets the free flow. Their

For Brussels, the Lambermont Agreement means that, like in Flanders and Wallonia, a simple majority in Parliament can amend the municipal law. Concretely, this means that the French speakers can change the municipal law as they wish. The Brussels Flamings become the hostages of the French speakers by the overthrow of the municipal and provincial law. This leaves a foundation of any previous state reform. The Flemish majority in the Belgian board was abandoned in favor of the equivalent of the Flemish in the Brussels board. According to the principles of the Flemish Parliament from 1999, before the repeal of the municipal and provincial law, a arrangement must first be made to ensure the position of the Brussels Flamings in the Brussels institutions. That has not happened and therefore the Flemish Blok believes that the guardianship over the 19 Brussels municipalities would have better remained federal. Only in this way can the Flemish majority retain participation in the structure and management of its own capital and exercise control over the protection of the Flemish minority in Brussels and the application of the language laws. Now all power is in French-speaking hands: the French-speaking majority in the Brussels Capital Council. The so-called safeguards for the Brussels flames are not enforceable and are long not applied everywhere. The request of all Flemish parties to ensure a guaranteed Flemish presence in municipal councils, ship colleges and OCMWs was not answered, on the contrary. In addition, when the Brussels Parliament will also introduce the foreign voting right, this will lead to the total marginalization of the Brussels Flamings. Their

President: Fred Erdman, the oldest member in years. President: Fred Erdman, doyen d'âge It is not correct that for the French speakers in the facility municipalities nothing has changed. The French speakers could impose additional safeguards. There is a special monitoring system for French-speaking mayors. If they are disciplinary sanctioned by the Flemish government, they can appeal to the bilingual chambers of the Council of State or the Arbitration Court. In addition, the direct election of the mayors will ensure that the mayors of the peripheral municipalities automatically enjoy the undeniable presumption of knowledge of the Dutch language, which is not the case now. Their

Furthermore, the Flemish Parliament cannot change the municipal boundaries or merge municipalities in the six peripheral municipalities. Neither can these municipalities be included in the federations of municipalities against their will.

Finally, the special law stipulates that not the Flemish government, but the Council of State decides on disputes concerning local elections.

It is striking to the chest that the Brussels Flamings are linked to the French speakers in the edge. After all, one should not lose sight of the fact that the border is located in a homogeneous Dutch-speaking area and that Brussels is officially a bilingual city. This connection undermines the foundation of all previous state reforms and thus the so-called pacification. The Brussels Flamings can only be linked to all French speakers in Belgium in order to maintain the parity, which in itself was already a concession of the Flamings in 1970.

The necessary division of the administrative and judicial district Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde is not mentioned in the agreement. Due to the non-splitting of the electoral district and the judicial district Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde, the refraction of the ommeland will not be stopped On the contrary, in 2003 the influx of French-speaking voters, including new Belgians, three Flemish chamber seats in danger. However, Flanders already has the necessary instruments: the two splits can be carried out through a common law approved in the Federal Parliament. Both in the House and Senate, the Flammers are in the majority. In addition to the obvious benefits, the split of the electoral district would also give us the opportunity to expand Flemish-Brabant into an administrative unit that can function in line with the other Flemish provinces.

The split of the judicial district would allow Flemish-Brabant to gain greater legal autonomy and would eliminate the shameful backwardness of the Brussels courts for a large part. This could also put an end to the violations of language use in court proceedings.

Another fundamental threat to the Brussels Flames is the will of the Donnéa to make Brussels the European capital.

In general, we note that different criteria are used in the different domains, tailor-made to the French speakers. As regards grants, the number of students is used as the norm, which is not to be checked. In the field of agriculture and foreign trade, other distribution keys are used, each time in favor of the French speakers.

Furthermore, the so-called fiscal autonomy currently reaches only 20%, despite the Flemish Parliament in 1999 still proposed 50%. It is not until 2004 that the targeted 25% will be reached.

The transfers are being silenced, let alone the overthrow of even parts of health care. In Flemish government circles, one claims that this is for later, but one does not realize sufficiently that the French speakers will wait a long time before initiating a next round of state reform. Their salvation is assured for years and they have no need for further negotiations.

In full-fledged federal states such as Switzerland and the United States, tax autonomy is about 50%. The Lambermont Agreement only guarantees an autonomy of 26% in 2004.

Regarding the removal of a series of taxes to the regions, the following observations can be made. Their

First, this overhaul should be a zero operation for the federal government. Secondly, communities and regions should not receive less income. The question arises whether these two conditions can be realised in parallel. Assuming that a district suffers loss after the override, then the federal government adjusts the difference. Will the compensation be calculated on the basis of a localization of the proceeds of the reimbursed district taxes or on the basis of the localization on the basis of a personal tax? Moreover, it would be a mistake to see this operation as a step forward in fiscal autonomy. In practice, it is nothing more than a flow system based on the principle of localization. This, in itself, is not a step forward in tax autonomy. The so-called tax autonomy remains federal. The new Finance Act stipulates that if Flanders makes a decree within the framework of fiscal autonomy, the decree must be submitted to the federal government, the other regions and the Court of Auditors. Flanders remain tied to hands and feet here. Of course, there is no question of autonomy. It remains a grant system, entirely dependent on the federal government. Furthermore, the existing grant remains calculated on the basis of the number of students. Belgium continues to pay this additional subsidy to Wallonia through the education funding. The decrease due to the progressive link to the personal tax occurs but very gradually.

I would like to conclude with a summary. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that Brussels is a third region and leaves the fundamental duality of Belgium. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that Flemish participation in Brussels disappears due to the overthrow of the municipal and provincial law to Brussels. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the Brussels Flamings are linked to the French speakers in the edge. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that there is no guaranteed and enforceable Flemish presence in the Brussels municipal councils, ship colleges, OCMWs, police councils and all regional institutions in Brussels. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that there is no double majority in regimental matters. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that there are no guarantees for the strict application of the language legislation at all levels in Brussels. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the Flemish government has no jurisdiction over the French-speaking mayors in the border. The Lambermontakkoord ensures that there is no control over the irrefutable presumption of knowledge of Dutch among the mayors in the district if the direct elections of the mayors are introduced.

The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the Flemish government does not have the power to change the municipal boundaries of the peripheral municipalities or to regroup the municipalities into municipal federations, although they belong to the homogeneous Dutch language area. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the Flemish government does not get full authority in the margins in case of dispute in local elections, the Council of State does. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the direct election of OCMW councillors and creatures in facility municipalities is not punished. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the administrative and judicial district Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde is not divided, threatening three Flemish chamber seats. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that consumption deregulation is not stopped, thus permanently freeing resources for French-speaking money wolves. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that existing and additional grants are not distributed on the basis of personal tax. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that Flemish education, due to the adverse distribution key of the pupil count, gets many billions of francs too little, and thus pays to Wallonia. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that there are no guarantees because the tax transfers to the regions are in fact zero operations. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the standards, based on economic yield and labor-intensive engagement of the population, are not applied; I give the example of the Flemish share in Belgian exports of 76.28%, which we find nowhere in the comparison.

President: Jean-Pol Henry, Prime Minister and Vice-President. President: Jean-Pol Henry, First Vice-President The Lambermont Agreement ensures that relations with Europe on agriculture do not go to the states, but to the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Lambermont Agreement provides for the creation of a federal foreign trade agency to pay for the regime’s sweets. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the federalization of development cooperation still hangs in an unclear fog curtain. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the federalization of the National Lottery does not take place on the basis of personal tax, thus at the detriment of the Flamings. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the federalization of the drawing rights for employment programmes does not take place on the basis of personal tax, thus at the detriment of the Flamings. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that nothing comes from health care, child allowances, the regionalization of personal taxation and corporate taxation. The Lambermont Agreement ensures that the cash flows of Flanders and Wallonia continue to exist. The Lambermont agreement ensures that 50% tax autonomy remains a distant dream. In short, the Lambermont Agreement ensures that the five resolutions of the Flemish Parliament of 3 March 1999 are not even partially implemented. Thank you, Flemish majority.

I agree with my predecessor. I am the 18th speaker in the row. Then, of course, it is normal that one falls in part in repetition. I step into an open door when I say that, on the one hand, new and profound steps are needed in the Flemish state reform. They are an urgent and compelling necessity. On the other hand, it is a very complex and technical dossier, which is not wanted by anyone. To explain to the general public, to the man and woman in the street, that we are all getting better from less or no Belgium and more Flanders, that is a difficult task. This is not sinecure. Their

Constitutional law specialist and professor emeritus Senelle – professor Senelle is ⁇ not still senile – set things up in the fall of 2000 in an article in the Financial Economic Time. I quote: "History teaches that the unitary Belgium has failed to conduct a policy that was acceptable for all areas and the two language communities." Through previous state reforms since 1970, Flanders received their own powers, economics, employment, education and training, environment, housing, family policy, mobility and urban policy, but not their own taxation to support the policy.

I’ll save you another repetition of the numbers. Only with its own income can Flanders conduct its own policy. Whether what we do ourselves is also better, will have to be shown. In the current federal context and constellation, Flanders is castrated. I mean, I am actually castrated. The Belgian federalism means that Flanders can still count, but can no longer multiply. Accept, on the economic level, much is shifting, colleague Pieters has that this afternoon also mentioned, to the European level, but microeconomically it remains vital to be able to carry out its own efficient regional policy.

Flanders is not Wallonia. Imposing identical social and economic policies and identical taxation in both areas is decadent. It leads to inefficiency, waste, meaningless compensation and waffle iron. Belgium prevents Flanders from disposing of its own well-being, prosperity and destiny, and can therefore disappear as quickly as possible, yesterday.

Flanders should become an independent state within the Europe of the Peoples with Brussels as its capital.

The famous resolutions of the Flemish Parliament, carefully prepared and ⁇ not radical – at best a kind of mini-program – showed that a democratic majority in Flanders wanted a better and more effective self-government through more autonomy. The resolutions do not speak about transfers.

Our well-known Flaming in the Michel-Government, Verhofstadt, manages to glue the nervous and obsessed People’s Union through the trail box of the Costa, the Saint-Elois Agreement and the Hermes Agreement. From the policy declaration of October 2000 it is strikingly clear how great the gap is, how deep the gap is between the Flemish resolutions and the promises of Verhofstadt. However, the resolutions were approved by his VLD. Moreover, at that moment, the VLD did not even find them going far enough.

Meanwhile, we are a few pages further in the Verhofstadt-feuilleton. And we end up with his new Community Agreement, Lambermont, Marathon Agreement, St. Hedwig Agreement, just mention it. What remains in this agreement of the resolutions is more than poverty to say nonexistent. We have heard our Flemish excellences, our ministers of the government parties. Their major discourse revolves around “later”. Then further steps will be taken towards greater autonomy or the French-speaking ministers should not interfere with Flanders. and later.

A Flemish proverb says that a donkey does not stumble on the same stone twice, unless, as the saying goes, it is a stone seed. Experience shows that French speakers only want to negotiate when they are in an acute need of money. The French Community is on the black seed and has been looking for additional funds for its education for a while. In Flanders, teachers come on the streets for a linear salary increase of 3% but they catch bone. In that same Flanders, please explain that their Wallish colleagues earn an average of 100,000 francs per year more. You are stone or you are not.

There is more. The agreement sets out steps that are fundamentally contrary to the principles as formulated by the Flemish Parliament. The ruling parties overwhelm their promises and sin as self-proclaimed superdemocrats against a basic principle of democracy itself. This is nothing more or nothing less than disrespectful governance and voter fraud.

If we want to believe Prime Minister Verhofstadt, Lambermont is a historic agreement. Historically, however, it has more than one meaning. In my opinion, Verhofstadt means historically "known" from history.

The Prime Minister himself repeatedly said that he would create a new community climate, a climate in which one would no longer seek confrontation, but dialogue. In that climate, much could be done and, according to the Prime Minister, the community problems would be solved once and for all. So go away with a Luc Van den Brande, who had broken the case for seven years and who had achieved nothing with his destructive attitude. Long live Guy Verhofstadt, who on the subject of state reform would press the gas pedal in order to bring communities and regions in the pace of independent peoples.

It was nevertheless the great and, in the meantime, very justified reproach, also from our side, that the CVP then spoke out of two mouths and had a januskop, in which Van den Brande was allowed to play in the institutional sandbox until the great boss, JeanLuc Dehaene, floated at the end of the play time. That talk of two mouths would now be over. From now on, one mouth is spoken, both at the Flemish and federal level. There is only one problem: it is the mouth of Louis Michel.

The resolutions of the Flemish Parliament were referred to the garbage basket by the Flemish Lambermont parties with a rarely seen cynicism. They are at most still good to help bring a sanitary need to a good end. It was a sign on the wall that all French-speaking majority parties painted the agreement heaven in praise and especially the French-speaking achievements. The comments of the State Council were laughed away as if they were dealing with a gang of kindergartens who had heard the clock sound, but the valve could not hang. Today it is still uncertain – ⁇ in the meantime – whether this government in the House will ⁇ a two-thirds majority and no one can tell us what concessions Verhofstadt is doing to get the PSC over the bridge to approve those agreements.

The agreements on financing communities, yet so important for French-speaking education, are already in the pocket. It would be even better for the House and Senate to approve the refinancing, but the delegation of powers is not affected by Parliament. Let the Flemish Lambermont parties think about it. Nothing from the promised new approach has been achieved. With the so-called community-to-community dialogue, called the Costa, one has not even stopped the appearance that one wanted otherwise. The Costa has proved nothing more than an annoying occupation therapy. As quickly as in previous occasions, one has switched to night marathon meetings where the real decisions were made.

The Conference for the State Reform has thus only served as a lubricant to enable the Volksunion to join the Flemish government, to enable purple-green there too and to keep the symmetry between the federal and Flemish levels in terms of government composition cool. It is incomprehensible that the Co-Chair of the Conference on State Reform can be satisfied with the outcome that is expected today. At the beginning of the Conference for the State Reform, he made still rumbling statements. Did he forget that he then resigned against the secret agreement in which Guy Verhofstadt promised to the French speakers 2.4 billion francs for their education at the time of government formation? The prime minister lied so much that he believed himself. Did he forget that he then pleaded for the abolition of health care and child allowances? Has he finally forgotten how he advocated for extensive tax autonomy? Apparently he has indeed forgotten that.

Prime Minister Verhofstadt has labeled the Lambermont Agreement, the jurisdictional part of which is now in question, as historical. He is right: the agreement is historic. It is a historical mistake that, by the way, will not solve the problems but only increase the frustrations. Here again played the classic Belgian mechanism. The ⁇ limited autonomy that Flanders have acquired in the past has always been paid very expensive. The classical Belgian federalism always came down to the granting to Flanders and Wallonia of a number of powers in exchange for the strengthening of the political and financial power position of the French speakers in this country. In this regard, Mr. Verhofstadt did not make any changes.

At the start of the Conference on State Reform, we, too, also in the Flemish Parliament, have always warned of an agreement by which, at the request of the French speakers, a refinancing of communities would be reached on the basis of consumer deregulation. In exchange, it was granted only a very limited tax autonomy and a very limited transfer of powers. Unfortunately we got right. The so-called tax autonomy is an empty box, it is a Pandora box. It is a kind of poisonous gift. The regional taxes already defined as such in the Special Financing Act are transferred, but that is no more than logical. There is no real tax autonomy, in which a state is held accountable not only for its spending but also for its income.

It is not with the possibility of increasing or reducing the tax on gambling, for example, that one can send a policy to the income side. Of course, that was not the intention either. The time when the VLD demanded that all personal tax should go to the provinces and also the corporate tax should be transferred – the leverage for conducting its own fiscal policy – has long been behind. The refinancing of the communities — read more Flemish billions for French-speaking education — is therefore within. Also acquired is federalism with three. More than ever, the position of the regions is being strengthened and the communities must dig the bottom. This is also fundamentally contrary to the principles of the Flemish Parliament, which advocated a state structure based on two large communities across party boundaries. Instead of the transition to duality, we are now receiving the irreversible evolution to trinity. This leads to a double minorization of the Flammers. Within Belgium, the Flemish majority position is reduced to a position of one against two. Within Brussels, the Flamings are becoming increasingly dependent on the good will of the French speakers. The Lambermont parties leave Brussels and thus the Brussels Flamings definitively free. Despite the fierce pleasures of late Frans Van Der Elst, a part of the People’s Union is also moving forward in this nefaste scenario.

In the first part of the draft, the so-called Hermes Agreement on Agriculture and Foreign Trade is implemented. As far as agriculture policy is concerned, the case is by no means becoming more transparent, ⁇ not in terms of representation at European level. Pricing and income policy remains a federal matter. The BIRB remains federal. The text is formulated in such a way that the powers of the Agency can be quietly extended. A scenario similar to that of the BDBH is so obvious. Therefore, there is no question of the complete overthrow of these powers. There are so many exceptions that it can rather be said that the agricultural policy is transferred to the exclusion of agriculture. I think Mr. Mortelmans has already put it in about those words. Also in terms of foreign trade, there is no complete upheaval. State-to-state loans and guarantees for export, import and investment risks remain federal. Although the BDBH will be abolished, it will be replaced by a federal agency that is composed in a classic Belgian way. The three regions each designate four representatives, and the federal government does the same. There is, therefore, parity between the regions in which, for the good course of affairs, one ignores the fact that Flanders accounts for more than 75% of Belgian exports. Furthermore, the allocation of resources, both in agriculture and foreign trade, has also been cut to French-speaking size. The personal tax, otherwise disguised by the French speakers as a criterion for the allocation of the resources for education, is now eagerly used because this criterion is most advantageous for them in these sectors. In the allocation of resources accompanied by the transfer of powers, the criteria most imposing on Wallonia are applied without shame. Speaking of sizes and weights.

I need to talk a little less loud. I do not want to awaken certain colleagues in the banks.

The article on development cooperation that was already said this afternoon - is undoubtedly the giller of the design. A lot can be experienced in this kingdom, but it has probably never been seen that in a special law which regulates the powers of the communities and regions, it is stated that a special working group will be established to examine which parts of development cooperation may, ⁇ , someday, who knows, be transferred to the communities and regions, and that from 1 January 2004 and of course limited to those parts relating to the powers of the communities and regions. This means in human language that nothing is overlooked in terms of development cooperation.

Then comes the main dish: the abolition of the organic legislation on municipalities and provinces. Here too we see again the classic mechanism that plays out in every state reform. The Flames must permanently pay a price for something that should have been conditioned for a long time. The abolition of the municipal and provincial law was already conditioned by the SintMichiels Agreement. Today, Flanders must once again raise billions for French-speaking education in order to obtain what had long been obtained. However, those who assumed that Flanders would be able to put an end to the abuses of the facilities in Flanders that have been made for decades, have already been deceived. It is even a lie to claim that the French speakers in the outskirts and in Voeren retain the existing guarantees. On the contrary, there are guarantees. Not only remains the whole monster of the 1988 pacification law standing. This means that the direct election of the Creators and OCMW Councillors in the six remains.

This means that the contradictio in terminis, which is called the undeniable presumption of linguistic knowledge, is also preserved. This means that the facilities cannot be touched. Thus, the six may not be included in the future in the federations of municipalities that Flanders would possibly want to establish. Furthermore, the competence regarding the disciplinary procedure relating to mayors and shapens is set up in such a way that the Flemish government has little or no armshake to be the mayors of the six. These are mayors who, by the way, wanted to organize a national council on the repeal of the organic municipal law to Flanders completely illegally. As an example of improved community climate, this can count.

The Flemish Lambermont parties fully determine the future of the competent Flemish government regarding the facility municipalities. There will therefore in the future be two types of Flemish municipalities, namely those municipalities that are governed according to the Flemish decrees and those municipalities where the French speakers may continue to bear their arrogance. This can also be counted as a stable of negotiating tactics.

Finally, there is Brussels. We were told that in terms of guarantees there remained a status quo between the guarantees of the French speakers in the outskirts and those of the Brussels Flamings. One has committed an unforgivable mistake by linking the fate of the French speakers to the fate of the Brussels Flamings. This link, which was rejected by everyone on the Flemish side, is the so-called status quo. This is a pertinent lie.

Perfide and efficiently, Karel De Gucht called the Lombard Agreement. Perfide, according to Van Daele, still means “faithless, false, treacherous.” Whether it will be effective remains to be seen. Perpetual is it in any case. Political scientist Wilfried De Wachter said in the Financial-Economic Time about the agreement: "And then there is the unimaginable insult to the Flemish in what should be the capital of a bilingual country with Dutch as the most spoken language: the purchase of Flemish creatures and the release of the double majority, the only blocking system that the Flemish have there."

The Brussels Flames are therefore not moving forward in terms of political power. They are going backwards in exchange for additional mandates. The number of parliamentarians is raised to 89, which is slowly reaching the peak of ridicule. What, however, can not only be called perverse, but even perverse, is the so-called ABS system, which serves to safeguard democracy and avoid blocking the institutions. I didn’t know that Vic Anciaux was an anti-democrat.

This is a real constitutional coup d’état, with the aim of falsifying the election results. Constitutional creativity has no boundaries. This introduces a novelty, in particular the apparenting within one electoral circle between different parties.

The VGC is supplemented with five members for the Brussels Capital Council, not on the basis of an election result for this Council — that is not at all necessary, that is the new political culture, but according to the election results for the Flemish Council.

With the French speakers, we do not find this back. This only applies to the flames. We need to find the logic between these two data. To safeguard the question of democracy, we propose for five additional members to be appointed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. For the 17 additional seats, the Flamings in the Brussels institutions give up the guarantee of the double majority. One goes even to the point that the Flemish ministers can be appointed by a minority of the Flemish language group. In the future, therefore, a Brussels government is possible that does not enjoy the support of the majority of the Dutch language group. In addition, a Flemish minister can be expelled de laan by the same minority. This has never been seen. This is not just about the Flemish Bloc because the CVP could also be the victim of such regulation in the future.

If things are extrapolated, the Flemish Bloc would go from 4 out of 11 seats in the VGC to 6 out of 22 seats. This is not Dutch or Chinese mathematics, this is just Brussels mathematics. For a handful of mandates more, the Flamings renounce their political power. The democratic content of this constitutional coup is so great that the Council of State has literally labeled this arrangement as undemocratic because at least 4 points are contrary to the Constitution. Also that advice was radically ignored as if the Council of State was a collection of refined communicators. We will in any case challenge these provisions before the Arbitration Court.

At the local level, the humiliation is the greatest. If a Flaming has already hit the municipal council and if he is found sufficiently good to sign the proposal act, he may, against payment, become ships. If necessary, he shall be empowered to study the pairing behavior of the bear. This most widely announced state reform has been wrapped up like a pudding. The starting point was the refinancing of the Communities. The French speakers in Brussels get a lot of Flemish billions again and that was the only thing they had to do. It is unlikely that the French speakers were not only the requesting party for the revision of the Finance Act but that they, as the requesting party, also set the agenda of the negotiations. The Flammers can with their desires and demands, carried by the majority of Parliament, get into the trees. Mr. Moureaux has made it very clear that there would be no state reform if even a single word was spoken about social security because that taboo remains, of course.

This taboo remains, of course. Indeed, the Flemish people have the privilege to cover up the 120 billion dollars each year to Wallonia through social security. They have the privilege to cough through social security, the financing law, the taxes and the repayment of interests more than 300 billion alimony payments, that is, 55,000 francs per Flaming per year, and they have the privilege to be solidary, not with people, but with structures and policy makers who themselves have never wanted to take responsibility for their actions and have always shifted the invoice to the Belgian treasury, to Flanders, that is, to Flanders.

During the First World War, the Flamingos were given the command "silence and fight"; today they are given the command "silence and pay". That is ultimately the only meaning of this state reform. That is, therefore, clearly the only meaning of Belgian federalism, that one great peasant fraud has proved, that it is only aimed at neutralizing the power of the number of the Flamings. Since 1970, the Flamings were stolen their majority - who finally began to play with Leuven Vlaams. Federalism has ultimately led to a permanent hold-up and to the creation of structures that should enable the French-speaking minority to consolidate its privileged position on the political and financial levels and to make the majority a minority.

That kind of federalism is doomed to fail, and the state reform that we are discussing now will not stop the process of dissolution of the State, because it is the result of deception and lies. Today, in a cynical way, one man, Guy Verhofstadt, has thrown all principles overboard for the first ministry and how he shamelessly offers the Flemish interest on the altar of the Belgian-French-speaking interests, at the same time forgetting his worthy statements in his so-called civil manifests.

We no longer believe in this kind of federalism. In fact, we never believed in it. Moreover, it makes no sense to want to maintain a marriage in which both partners are in a permanent state of paranoia and cheat each other. Rather than wanting to maintain such a marriage at all costs and instead of working out a new state reform, the government would rather put the divorce act on paper.

We also want another conversation, but then not more about the future of the country, but about its past, a conversation about the separation of structures that will happen – state reform or not – anyway.

I would like to greet the courageous interpreters. by

I would not yet measure how much the Vlaams Blok despise all those and all those who think differently than him. I didn’t know yet that for the Vlaams Blok – I quote Alexandra Colen here – “Belgium is an illegitimate state.” “The Belgian State has no legal and democratic basis.” “The Belgian Constitution is null.” “The Belgian institutions are null.” Why then – I speak personally – keep as Vice-President Mr. Van den Eynde? What a cancer for Flanders and Belgium that this party supported by more than 600,000 voters as of June 13, 1999!

Last night too, some Volksunie rebels sought to rival the Vlaams Blok by the violence of their critics towards French speakers and the PSC in particular. As if the PSC was now responsible for the divisions of the Volksunie and its explosion. by

Whenever nationalist groups collapse, it is a wonderful gift for democracy. Today’s difficulties come mainly from the fact that Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt initially put too much on a nationalist party to build a harmonious agreement between regions and communities, on the one hand, and the federal state, on the other. Instead of simply aiming for a good balance between a frameworked tax autonomy and a refinancing of education, the prime minister let himself be driven by the Volksunie in an institutional adventure. Thus, in order to take away the qualified majorities, it was necessary to satisfy the excessive appetites of the representatives of the Volksunie and to suffer their blackmail for too long. by

It is essentially for this reason that the rainbow majority has been condemned to include in its projects the regionalization of agriculture, foreign trade and development cooperation. How could these chantage masters be satisfied with this? The Bourgeois-Pieters et Compagnie tandem added additional requirements: the regionalization of provincial and municipal law. For them, it was the time or never to definitively dedicate the primacy of the right of land over the right of the people.

The PSC has never hidden that linking the two projects could pose a problem. Firstly because the constitutional base is delicate but also because the regionalization of the municipal and provincial law insecures minorities and all those who live in communes with specific linguistic status. by

To quote Mr. Jean-Jacques Viseur, who expressed himself this morning, “the risk is great to break the confidence of citizens in the state.” This is why, whether for the outskirts of Brussels or the Fourons, the PSC calls for measures and elements of trust, in a willingness to help all Belgians, regardless of their language, to live together. Community and linguistic peace is at this price.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin my speech with a question to Mr. Smets. I hope he won’t leave the room immediately and give me an answer. He says he wants reassuring measures for the benefit of the minorities, in particular the French speakers in the outskirts and in Voeren and the like. As always, the real debate and the real political negotiations were not held in our hemisphere, but outside.

You wish me good night, Mr Smets, but at four o'clock we heard the news of a unanimous French-speaking front that the ball has now been placed in the government camp. Well, Mr. Smets, can you explain this? What concrete concessions would you be satisfied with? Your response could enrich and clarify the debate.

One thing is clear: Mr. Smets could just count on the applause that Mr. Viseur this afternoon failed for his destructive analysis of the Lambermont and Lombard agreements. Indeed, the majority banks applauded Mr Smets quite massively. There has been a reversal in favour of the PSC. We are curious about what. We have many questions about this, but I will talk about them in the last part of my presentation on the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities.

Dear colleagues, the height around the Lambermont Agreement can be compared to that around the Egmont Pact in the mid-seventies. Some will wonder how I can know that, since I was not politically active at the time. It was the beginning of my political insights. All that Egmontpact has, by the way, caused a true trauma in many Flemish families, especially in Flemish-Brabant. Collega Coveliers can testify that the pact also caused an immense crackdown in the VU. A comparison with the Egmont Pact is therefore imperative.

When one makes the comparison, the strange role of the media, which apparently abolished critical journalism, is very clear. In the Egmont period, ⁇ the editor-in-chief of almost all Flemish newspapers were sharp-minded persons and independent spirits for which politicians still feared. They were not afraid to pull back the Flemish map and put the Flemish interest first. Today, our written media is primarily interested in exposure and play. Thus above the title of The Last News of Today — my speech I had already written before I met that newspaper — stand naked males and females, to tell you to what level we have been reduced.

One newspaper acquired a pulp gazette, the other became a beate solenlikker of purple green. The only medium that makes an exception to this is the Financial Economic Time, which often consistently publishes Flemish and clear political analyses and indeed has an independent political editorial.

(Interrupted by Mr Hugo Coveliers)

Mr. Coveliers, Mr. Tastenhoye was a strongly Flemish-minded journalist, but he chose a different path, as it occasionally happens in life.

(Interrupted by Mr Hugo Coveliers)

Mr. Coveliers, if we start this way, it will soon be done.

The Gazet of Antwerp was also a beautiful example of how in this purple-green era the media beat the final debate on the Lambermont agreement. Only two large photos were published, namely, on page 2 a charm photo of our good Antwerp ships Kathy Lindekens who with bare arms embraced a black cat, circled with flowers, branches and leaves, and on page 4 a charm photo of Joëlle Milquet with bare legs and toes. That was about all that The Gazet of Antwerp had to offer in connection with the Lambermont Agreement.

So I can understand that Mr. Tastenhoye chose the House of Representatives before he went crazy.

That confirms indeed my statement that certain newspapers have chosen exposure and play.

Whatever it is, the Financial Economic Time is a proverbial exception because of the publication of often consistent and clear Flemish political analyses and because of its actually independent editorial. It is, by the way, the only newspaper that has informed readers in a consistent, correct and intellectually responsible manner about the Lambermont Agreement.

I do not say that with pleasure, because the editorial is not one of our friends. After all, the newspaper also publishes with the regularity of a clock reports about the Flemish Bloc that are not correct and when it comes to the struggle against the Flemish Bloc she cheers with the wolves in the forest. Since last year, there are no free tribunes from us. Nevertheless, I must objectively admit that the newspaper, unlike all other Flemish newspapers, properly reports about the Lambermont agreement. On one thing all the media — both the audiovisual and the daily newspapers — agree, in particular that the Flemish Bloc is the worst enemy. The struggle against the Flemish Bloc is the highest priority and can – even must – be carried out with all means. Therefore, no more free tribunes of Flemish Bloc members of parliament should appear. The last one in The Standard was from my hand and then it was over. Interviews are also not reduced. You may have already noticed that an interview with one of our members, even at the regional level, simply can no longer be done due to the tightening of the media-cordon.

For these reasons, television journals claim that the Flemish Bloc has less success according to polls, while the opposite is true.

We have just experienced it. Therefore, it should be avoided at all costs that the Flemish Bloc can still participate in television debates and we are constantly excluded from TerZake and the Seventh Day, especially when it comes to community debates. Coveliers, these are the figures. In advance of the municipal council elections, we received 0.4% of the political attention in TerZake. The VLD also had only 9%. You are still not in the upper box of TerZake. The SP had in the 20% and the CVP even got 30% of the transmission time, but we only 0.4%. It is therefore objectively, black on white can be proven that we have been working out completely since the municipal council elections or before. We are also not allowed to participate in community debates. During this entire legislature, the Flemish Bloc has not yet been allowed to participate in a community debate once in the Seventh Day. Colleague Annemans may contradict me. I may be wrong. Maybe it was once. I think it never happened. We have never been allowed to participate in a community debate, precisely that matter in which we are the main party that is engaged in it and the voter has addressed it.

You went to the Seventh Day for homosexuals.

Not for or against homosexuals, but against homosexual marriage. In community affairs, we have not received a vote in the debate since the elections. The reason is very clear. One wants to create an atmosphere from which the people must deduce that the Flemish Bloc on the community level has no expertise in the home, can not talk and therefore is completely useless because it can not generate community pressure. In short, at the community level, the Flemish Block simply does not exist. This is the image that the Flemish Bloc wants to convey.

Sometimes there is a radio interview. The strange thing happened after Lambermont on May 30. A radio interview was taken from Gerolf Annemans. When I understood it correctly, he asked if it made sense. He was surprised that he was asked for a radio interview. The journalist made clear that they were not so strict with the cordon sanitaire, but the radio interview was eventually erased. It was not broadcast.

If wrong images are accidentally shot, for example, when group chairman Annemans delivers a blanco cheque to Ms. Onkelinx, then there is the man with the scissor, who cuts away everything that he considers not politically correct. He cuts away everything where the Flemish Bloc appears differently than he wants it to occur. Thanks to our much narrower television team, who sat in the right place at the right time, all of Flanders through our Broadcast by Third Parties, which will soon be abolished for certain reasons, witnessed how ugly and dictatorial the man with the scarf — the upper-log brother of the VRT — can behave. He really stood very intrusively squeezing with his fingers as a symbol of the scarf. In a very aggressive and dictatorial way, he made it clear that his men ⁇ should not be allowed to film. Not a few VRT employees, behind the scenes of course, were ⁇ enthusiastic about how we had revealed this impeccable behavior. What should never have been seen is finally revealed through the VRT itself, as long as the Transmissions by Third Parties may still exist.

Until now, it has always been denied that the Flemish Bloc was discriminated against. The VRT has repeatedly argued that journalistic criteria were used.

Again and again, the VRT argued that one used journalistic criteria and that one was looking for someone who could make a relevant contribution to a debate or had taken a striking initiative. When even that could no longer convince, the truth was put on his head even further. A few weeks ago, VRT director Bert De Graeve dared openly declare in the competent committee of the Flemish Parliament that the Flemish Block is not so much concerned because it always sends the same people to the VRT for the Seventh Day and that could become too boring. Less-known members of parliament would also not be allowed to participate in television debates, which is why the Flemish Bloc is so little addressed. This was, of course, a huge drug deal. For someone who is at the head of a government agency and who earns a multiplier of a parliamentary bet annually, such a lie in a normal country stante pede would yield a C4.

Only a few days ago, the VRT again changed the gun from shoulder to shoulder and openly admitted that the Flemish Bloc is being deliberately discriminated against. The VRT has openly stated before the Disputes Council for Radio and Television in its defence that it rejects our thought stream. One of her arguments is our open rejection of the multicultural society. Another evidence that in this country government agencies such as the VRT, along with the persecution center of Father Leman, are deployed against everything and everyone who does not share with the true doctrine of salvation. This is a clear indication that this country is sliding into a dictatorship.

Imagine a government agency literally saying that it rejects our thought stream. However, it went even further. I have just heard from the conclusions of this defence letter why so few Flemish-Blockers are invited to debates: if the Flemish Bloc is soon condemned, they would also be condemned for cooperation with a criminal organization. This is used as an argument, even for any ruling, to exclude the Flemish Bloc from all debates for months now — from before the municipal council elections. This is really the worst thing you can imagine: preventive censorship. This is only possible in a dictatorial country. They manipulate the Centre for Equal Opportunities and they abuse the media. They even telephoned directly from the Prime Minister’s cabinet to the media when a certain broadcast was misplaced. We also have our sources in the media. They use the media, but of course also the courts and the Security of the State – that debate we have had a while ago – to systematically prosecute and shadow Flemish Blocker. This is truly a dictatorship. This is a piece of totalitarianism.

In fact, it is unimaginable: the whole Brussels Agreement revolves around the Flemish Bloc. The main goal of the French speakers has been achieved: prevent the largest Flemish party in Brussels from coming to power and at the same time break the Flemish blockade force in Brussels. The party directly involved has no patience at all and has no right to protest anywhere. The municipality should not know what is happening in Brussels and how democracy is violated in the capital.

We have been naive, my colleagues. When the extremely negative opinion of the State Council became known, we were in a triumphal vote. After all, we had thought that every self-respecting journalist would draw his own conclusions and make a crushing analysis of the Lambermont agreement. Indeed, the State Council itself has unambiguously stated that the draft special law was not only unconstitutional, but also contrary to our democratic principles.

However, it is also intended to correct the election results with this bill – as stated in the opinion of the State Council – and therefore to falsify them. The design of this Brussels Agreement or of this Lombard lock of the Lambermont Agreement is the falsification of the election results. Our hope was futile. Once again, with a few exceptions – I think of the very respectable Roger Van Houtte of the Gazet of Antwerp – all this was swept by the politically correct press. What else should we have expected? How would journalists, who themselves step the feet of democracy, now accuse the government of doing the same? They have been conducting an exclusion strategy against the Flemish Bloc for years. They have neglected 600,000 voters for years. How would such people suddenly begin to accuse the undemocratic behavior of the government?

The manipulations are not limited to the Flemish Block. I am pleased that this time some members of the CVP are present. The log and the veterans of May '68 are the boss in the media. They feel so powerful that they think they can afford everything. The worship of purple green and the hatred of the Christian civilization is so immense in some editions that the CVP also shares the strikes. The large press conference of the CVP, for which almost the entire chamber faction had to commission, received in the former Christian newspaper with the AVV-VVK logo barely two columns of 7 centimeters high. For decades, the CVP has managed to bring public opinion into its hands with its newspaper empire. But today that party on the left feels how terrible such a thing can be, how terrible such a thing can turn. You will now get a trousers from the same leaves. I have no pleasure because your generation was no longer guilty of those manipulations or that CVPimperium. Now you can see how those media form an anti-CVPimperium.

Mr. Speaker, very briefly, I want to correct a historical error, a mistake in the argument of Mr. Laeremans. Last Friday there was an effective press conference of my group on my initiative. But it wasn’t that the colleagues had to commission. My group members were full of enthusiasm. They were immediately challenged at my invitation and immediately attended the press conference. Furthermore, Mr. Verherstraeten and the ladies Creyf and D'Hondt can testify that this has happened with unlimited enthusiasm.

Mr. Leterme, I am pleased that you correct me in this regard. Of course I did not know what was happening in the coulisses, partly because you, unfortunately, received so little attention. The strike of the newspapers was still ongoing, but there were still the Belga reports, on which one could rely. It was also possible to interview the leader of the CVP group later on the day. On page 3 of that newspaper there is an enormously large article about Fons Borginon, and only a very small article about the CVP. Really, I was ashamed in your place.

Mr. Laeremans, my group is suffering from my legendary modesty and flight from the media.

Indeed indeed . Nevertheless, your decision on the appointment of the CVP members may have been a poetic exaggeration from your side, but I had noticed that very many members of the CVP Chamber were present. Therefore, I found it worthwhile to emphasize the meaning of such an important moment that is simply wiped under the mat and wiped under the mat. Their

I note that you do not criticize me about the fact that the CVP is ultimately also a victim of a media cordon at this time and that you also realize this.

More and more we need to find that one wants to give the impression that there is no opposition in this country at all. Something new has been found. In increasing debates, the opposition is created or encouraged within the majority and even within the same party. Whether it’s about drugs, homeless homes, Prince Laurent or the shortage of financial resources for the municipalities – Tobback in Leuven – again and again the opposition is kept out of the spotlight as much as possible. On television and in the newspapers we get debates presented between members of the majority. However, one case is hopeful. Studies show that less than a quarter of the Flaming people still have confidence in what the journalists are telling them. Apparently, the critical attitude of the Flamings is not so dramatic yet.

I have already talked about the VRT. However, I cannot ignore TV-Brussels. After all, there is no better propagandist of the multicultural doctrine of salvation than this channel. That goes even so far that this heavily subsidized broadcaster is still barely interested in the fate of the Brussels Flamings and therefore does not bring any critical reporting about Lambermont. When I called TV Brussels at the end of April at the establishment of the Lombardy Agreement to point them to the seriousness of the Lombardy Agreement and the very nefaste and far-reaching consequences for the Brussels Flamings, I got a super light weight from a journalist on the line. With hands and feet I have tried to explain what the nefarious consequences of this Brussels agreement were for the Flamings in Brussels and that the double majority would be abandoned in Brussels. I was told by the staff that such a thing was actually just a detail and that it was impossible to pay attention to it in the broadcasts. I heard this as a member of parliament from a witch, a journalist who did not understand what was happening about her own capital. A journalist from a political editorial, note bene. It is really hallucinating. It is not only an opposition to the Flemish interests, it is in many cases also your purest incompetence.

This is all the more dramatic because the essence of the Lambermont Agreement, its political significance, has nothing to do with Agriculture or Foreign Trade. These agreements already existed before. It also has nothing to do with the implementation of municipal legislation. This agreement dates back to 1993, just eight years ago! The essence of Lambermont lies beyond the concentration of the gigantic money flow to Wallonia in the consecration of Brussels to a full-fledged region, in the absolute triune of Belgium which is sealed with this text and in which Brussels becomes completely autonomous from its subordinate governments, from its municipalities. In this way, in the future, Flanders will have nothing to say about their own capital and will lose any control over Brussels and have nothing to do with their own capital. Understand who can!

Colleagues, this draft special law has already been widely discussed during the debate on the financing component. I will not repeat what I said then. I would like to enter on a free tribune in the FET of Guy Vanhengel, VLD minister in Brussels, in which he raised an unlikely, almost song-like praise on the Lambermont and the Lombard agreement. Their

Since we do not have the opportunity to respond via tribunes, I do it here. Guy Vanhengel – colleague Creyf has already quoted him – begins to distort the historical facts by stating that the Flamings have been constantly demanding that there should be a guaranteed representation in the Region since 1989 and that there will finally be a response to that. In addition, according to Mr Vanhengel, a number of Flemish aspirations have been formulated in recent months. What will suddenly fall out of the air? Among other things, the guaranteed representation at the municipal level.

The truth, colleagues, is exactly the opposite. The requirement for a guaranteed representation at the regional level was far from as priority and far from as old as the requirement for a guaranteed representation at the municipal level, because the Flemish presence in the Region was already assured, more specifically at the executive level, where the leaves are distributed. Everyone knows that; there is there a Chabert, a Guy Vanhengel, in the place of Mrs. Neyts, who has now come in the place of Chevalier. We have there a Mr. Delathouwer, a former Chamber member, who is now called in Brussels the red potato and thus continues the honor of Bob Cools and the reputation of Bob Cools from Antwerp in Brussels. The Flemish presence on the municipal level, on the other hand, has not been guaranteed in any way until now.

Are you called the black potato?

So far, this word has not been used for us.

Are you just black?

The red potato is an expression on his Antwerp. Collega Erdman may not contradict me, because he is much better introduced in all this Antwerp environment, but the red patatje was actually a co-name.

The Flemish presence at the municipal level has not been guaranteed in any way until now, neither in the municipal councils, nor in the ship colleges, nor in the OCMWs. Therefore, the French speakers with the greatest ease follow the language laws in so many Brussels municipalities and continue to succeed in treating and bullying the ever smaller group of Flamings outside. This has to do with both the locks and the hospitals, for which no closing arrangement has yet been found. I recently interviewed the Minister on this subject and came back very dissatisfied with it. To date, there is no legal guarantee to uphold the Flemish rights.

The Flemish demands were very concrete. Not only the Flemish Bloc and the Flemish Movement had put them on the agenda, but, as a result, also the Flemish parliamentarians, the new Flemish government and ⁇ also the VLD. In its election congresses of 26 April 1998 — they have taken a very long advance to the elections of 1999 — this party was obvious and I quote it from the VLD election program: "The nineteen municipal councils of the Brussels Capital Region consist of ministers 20% Flemish councillors". So I’m not talking about the regional representation, but the municipal councils must consist of at least 20% of Flemish councillors, the VLD said. “The ship colleges have at least two Flemish creatures with effective general powers and the language frameworks of the Brussels administration must always provide for a minimum of 33% of Dutch speakers.”

Nothing, colleagues, zero come zero of all this was realized. There will be no guaranteed number of municipal councillors, no 20%, no 10%, no 5%, 0% where no Flamings have been elected in the municipal council. You all know the cause. This is due, among other things, to the undemocratic system and to the highly associal anti-Flemish social pressure placed on the Flemish inhabitants of Brussels. It was almost a criminal act in the 1960s and 1970s to pretend to be Flaming.

As a result, many Flammers felt compelled to send their children to French schools and to pretend to be a Francophone; this is the truth of the Francophone and what happened in Brussels. This situation is now not being repaired, because there is no guaranteed representation in the municipal councils where there are no Flamings, such as in Ukkel. A fortiori there will also be no minimum number of OCMW council members, since one is related to the other and the OCMW election is a derivative of the municipal council election. The two required creatures were not obtained; even of that one Flemish ship we are not sure. Only the chance that a Flemish ship will arrive increases a little, especially when a Flaming belongs to the majority. If there were any Flemish ships there, it is not guaranteed in any way that he will actually be able to dispose of powers and financial resources. This was, however, another demand of the VLD election congress of 1998.

This agreement is thus light years away from what the VLD had promised its voters. Concretely this means: no financial resources. This has already been well illustrated by Mrs. Creyf. After all, she has said that Bruno Delille can hardly manage a few million in a city with a budget of 21 billion francs. It’s about the crumbs that fall from the table; he’s the Flemish the service and the fetish of the ship’s college with which laughter is made. After all, he has no authority and sits there as predicted as ships of shrines and church courts. It exists in Flanders. There are in Flanders municipalities where for all kinds of reasons certain creatures are pushed aside; among others near Lier this is the case, somewhere in the Rupel region. That man is in the ship college, but he gets the sermons as authority. Such a man then appears on television and declares that he can crawl from his shell of ships three times a year and organize the feast. This is happening and it will happen in Brussels.

Now I will talk about the second case proposed by Mr. Van Hengel traffic. Lists of management ambitions will ensure that they prepare solid Flemish candidates in eligible places. The opposite is true, colleagues. The dominant French-speaking parties in Brussels — the French-speaking parties in Brussels are dominant — will of course ensure that they are not contradicted in the colleges. Consequently, the Flemish will push the service forward. These are persons with a Dutch-speaking identity card, but who, as is more common in Brussels, only represent the Franco-speaking interests. It is even possible that a number of French speakers kick it into Flemish creatures. The guarantee that this agreement leads to a better Flemish representation at the municipal level is therefore completely absent. I will only take the example of Molenbeek, where, on behalf of the CVP, a person of immigrant origin has been elected as a member of the municipal council. I may be mistaken, but I have understood that this person hardly speaks Dutch. It could then be represented as Flemish ships. He will not soon contradict the members of Ecolo and PS, who are now in power there.

I come to a third misrepresentation of things. Mr. Van Hengel says that the six Brussels police zones are generally seen as a prelude to future municipal mergers. This too is completely taken from the air and therefore a pure invention of the minister. I confronted Minister Van den Bossche with this statement and he immediately classified it as the most individual expression of the most individual emotion, if I am not mistaken, a statement of Willem Kloos; this he remembered from his lessons Dutch in poetry.

I would like to pay tribute to Minister Van den Bossche. He was the only one who wanted to seriously debate with the opposition. He gave clarification where clarification was needed. According to Minister Van den Bossche, there is no question of a merger of the Brussels municipalities. Anarchy and anarchy still exist. The nineteen baronies remain the center of the real power in Brussels.

Finally, Mr Vanhengel makes the sum of all the additional mandates created in the Brussels Parliament for the Flemish and French speakers. The number is impressive: 109 parliamentarians and ministers, for a city with less than one million inhabitants. The term "decadence" is especially good and euphemistic for this. Much worse is that Guy Vanhengel shows that the mandates are equal, and that they strengthen the Flemish power in Brussels. This is of course not the case. The five built co-opters are not in the Brussels Capital Council. The six members of the Flemish Parliament are also not present. Furthermore, the Flemish blocking power is removed to compensate for this inflation by mandates, the only power that the Flemish parliamentarians actually have. I think this goes very far. The essence of the 1988 Brussels Agreements was that the Flemings could block a decision in an emergency. They were able to stop the French-speaking pletwalks. Exactly that power of the Flemish Brussels parliamentarians, the only power they had, is now equated with the ground.

The Flammers now receive additional mandates in exchange for giving up power. A gross betrayal of the Flemish interests is impossible. At the end of his speech, Mr. Vanhengel comes with his real drivers for the pines. I quote him: "Thanks to Lambermont we get enough political responsibility at the level to organize an active political and community life in all municipalities and districts of our capital." There is there to be done, colleagues: presence in the Brussels neighborhoods, at the expense of the taxpayers, participation in pencil rides and cheese nights, barbecues and bird picks competitions, against a hefty paid fee. For this, there must be so many members of parliament now, not to organize power in the Brussels bodies. Certainly not to mean anything in the municipal governments.

Mr. Vanhengel is proud that he can now give all his good friends in the VLD a full-fledged parliamentary seat, with all the plush that comes with it. In Brussels, by the way, the plush is even richer than here in the Chamber. However, the small Flemish Brussels is not getting better. It is scary and terrible that Vanhengel suggests that ordinary municipal councillors do not have the level to represent the Flamings in Brussels at municipal parties and neighborhood parties. Such statements say a lot about the level of Vanhengel.

I repeat what Mr. Vanhengel says: "Through the Lambermont Agreement we now get enough political responsibility at the level to organize an active political and community life in all municipalities and districts of our capital."

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Laeremans, I find it completely irregular that people are taken hostage at four o’clock in the morning in order to fight with someone from another party in Brussels, who is not here and whom you dispute that he has a level. I tell you, if you have half the level of Mr. Vanhengel, then you should be happy to praise yourself.

Mr. Coveliers, Mr. Vanhengel makes a call to the House members and the Senators to approve this Lambermont Agreement on behalf of the Brussels Flamings and he betrays the Brussels Flamings. We — and ⁇ I as a member of Parliament for Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde who is not attached to a ministerial office and is not heard from any party that he must say the opposite of what he has stated in the previous legislature — have the right and the duty to oppose this and to accuse the treason to the Brussels Flamings and to the small Brussels Flemish man and the municipal councillors.

Mr. Laeremans, the Flemish Bloc has spoken for more than 8 hours. That is more than 30 minutes per member. I would like to ask you to finish.

Mr. Speaker, I will conclude. I promised you that.

Colleagues, I was going to talk about the means by which everything is purchased. I would like clarity. I will limit my speech. I had written several things down, because in this government with the liberals everything is about money. In fact, the liberals are so unprincipled that they are convinced that everyone is for sale and that every human being is willing to exchange his soul and his opinions for some silver coins. We have also seen that it is being purchased. A European Fund for the International Role of Brussels is being set up and reports from Belga now show that it is indeed agreed to add 500 million francs each year. By 2009, we are talking about an additional 6 to 7 billion francs per year. I would like to have an explanation from the Minister. I want clarity.

I will leave the minority treaty aside for the time being. We will discuss this later in the discussion of the articles.

My last word in this uncomplicated dossier is addressed to the People’s Union. The strange attitude of the VU has made sense for one reason. The devastating and devastating fraternal struggle finally brought attention to Lambermont and the dramatic consequences finally came to the media. Without the escapades of the People’s Union and without the soap on the Barricade Square, the public debate about the Lambermont agreements would have been limited to the fables of cabouter Stevaert and his viewing and listening money. The merits of the People’s Union. Furthermore, the share of that party has been catastrophic, because it once again makes it possible that in exchange for a few pruts powers the road to more Flemish autonomy has been blocked for decades and the gigantic cash flow to Wallonia has been ⁇ ined. This stands straight on all VU programs and on all VU promises to its voters. In this context, it is ⁇ unpleasant that Fons Borginon came last weekend to tell Walter Zinzen that the opposition of his party counterparts was motivated by their consideration to break the purple green project of Verhofstadt and Dewael. Borginon turns things around. The people of his party who support Lambermont do this not for the sake of Lambermont himself, but exclusively for the purple-green project. They want to keep Bert Anciaux in his seat and keep the Dewael government and the Verhofstadt government in the seat. There is no other explanation for the behavior of the supporters, since Lambermont does not bring any concrete Flemish progress and finally liberates us from Brussels.

Today we are a quarter of a century later after the disastrous Egmont Pact. It has turned out that the choice of the Flemish Bloc to start sailing on its own was correct, because since then the People’s Union has no longer played any role of significance. That party has only served for the honor and glory of a limited club of coryfeees, the Schiltzen, the Sauwensen and the Anciaux family. A Flemish progress has no longer brought the People's Union after its fruitful years of the 1960s and 70s, unless one would like to label the three-part formation of the 1988 and the cementing of the facilities as a Flemish progress. However, this party, especially in the last 10 years, has contributed to a significant degree to the debilitation of Flemish politics. Certainly under Bert Anciaux, the People’s Union has evolved from radical to ridiculous, from blasphemy to profit party. For this reason, the People's Union was not established in the 1950s. I can know it, because several generations of my family stood at the cradle of the party, worked for it and slaughtered themselves. This party was not created to support the Belgian regime and to repeatedly postpone and extend the death penalty of Belgium. This, by the way, explains the current departure and the fragmentation of the People’s Union. A party without profile and without goals cannot continue to engage people. A Flemish nationalist party has only life chances and is only credible if it demands full autonomy for our people and demands its own voice in Europe. Unfortunately to those who envy it is that only the Flemish Block.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, this debate has something unimportant.

Everyone agrees on that.

The debate has something irrelevant, not so much because we are debating until the early hours — in itself it is a very honourable thing that a Parliament, if necessary, wants to debate a whole night on a topic of vital importance — but because the decisions are taken elsewhere. You know this, Mr. Coveliers, you were there tonight. The French speakers gathered in the headquarters of the PS in the Keizerslaan. The Dutch speakers were together with a few top ministers and Prime Minister Verhofstadt. The two camps were in constant consultation with each other. According to the latest Belga report, the parties split around 2.30 am and a pre-agreement was reached. This pre-agreement will be consecrated this morning at 9 a.m. in the nuclear cabinet. At 9.30 a.m., a meeting between the Prime Minister and Ms. Milquet is already scheduled to make the final arrangements to get the PSC over the line. I repeat that decisions are made elsewhere. In this half-course, we can have some forests to keep the appearance high.

Mr. Speaker, the eyes of Mr. Erdman and Mr. Coveliers read that they do not know which agreement will be discussed in the nuclear cabinet.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, yesterday morning in the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution was debated on the famous Brussels Fund. It was claimed that it was not certain that there would be millions more. Vande Lanotte was very vague about this.

Minister Vande Lanotte said very vaguely that it would be checked annually whether there would indeed be additional funds going to Brussels. Well, Mr. Coveliers, I read in a Belga report last night that there is indeed an agreement behind the scenes to release 500 million extra annually. “Diverse sources confirm the existence of a political agreement, but not on paper, which would increase the contribution to the Brussels Region by 500 million annually until 2003. Vande Lanotte, however, left in the House" — which was in the constitutional committee — "understand that any increase will have to be discussed. Vande Lanotte said 3 billion would be allocated to the region in the coming years. That money is put into a fund. However, given the increase, the amount would be 4 billion in 2003. There was indeed a political agreement for an increase of 500 million francs annually, Brussels budget minister Guy Vanhengel said on Wednesday. The cabinet of Brussels Prime Minister François-Xavier de Donnéa also confirmed the existence of an oral agreement for the increase. There was a silent agreement...”

Mr. Tastenhoye, your party fellow Laeremans held here a whole tirade about Vanhengel who knows nothing, who was even a traitor and so on. The same traitor now introduces you as proof of an agreement that does not exist. I realize that you are not a lawyer; you hear that right away. However, you don’t need to be a lawyer to know that an agreement that isn’t on paper only exists in the minds of a few. Why do you say there is an agreement? You’re driving someone to the scene that you’ve broken down before. If you choose sources, you should stay behind them and not attack the source once and then use them later as evidence.

Mr. Coveliers, we use the sources of Belga.

Where are we going now? After that, I heard from Mr. Laeremans how bad the press was and how dependent. Now you use them as an argument. You must learn to choose in life.

Mr. Speaker, the leader of the VLD group apparently suggests that we do not take the source that is Guy Vanhengel seriously.

I did not say that. I gave the advice to choose. You attack a person you use as a source, better not. You should not blow warm and cold the other time.

Mr. Speaker, even if we follow the leader of the VLD faction and not take Guy Vanhengel seriously, the testimony of Mr. de Donnéa remains. This gives me — I have already raised it in the committee this afternoon — a very high Saint-Eloois feeling. Also in the period of the Saint-Elois Accord, the French speakers proclaimed that there was an appointment, while the Dutch speakers denied it. But afterwards — I have now predicted something similar in the committee — it turned out that there were indeed agreements and that the French-speaking people had not been mistaken, unlike the Flamingos who claimed that no agreements had been made. The fund is characterized by a very high Saint-Eloois content in which I have the impression that I unfortunately spoke prophetically when I let Mr. Viseur note that he was not yet aware of any agreement, but that it would come without doubt. I already tell you that Annemans can predict you on the basis of what he establishes here, that an additional 500 million will be allocated to Brussels annually. It has already been calculated in the background by journalists, among others, that by the end of the legislature-Verhofstadt the thing will have cost 4 billion on an annual basis.

Again, I follow the suggestion of Mr. Coveliers and do not take Mr. Guy Vanhengel au sérieux, but Mr. de Donnéa I take very seriously.

Mr. Speaker, allow me to refer to another source from the Belga report: "There was a silent agreement between Prime Minister Verhofstadt and the Donnéa, formers of the federal and Brussels governments, respectively," — which dates back two years ago in 1999 — "a negotiator at the Brussels government formation. It is a verbal agreement and its implementation would depend on the good will of the federal government.”

So what Mr. Annemans has just said here is correct. When two years ago it was agreed that the French speakers would receive their money, 2.4 billion francs, for their needy education, there was indeed an oral agreement that the Brussels region would receive 500 million francs more annually. Prime Minister Verhofstadt, who did not like his first lie — although we should not use the word lie in this assembly and I can better keep it with falsehood — has answered here a few weeks ago, namely on 7 June, to a question from Mr Annemans concerning the famous Framework Convention of the Council of Europe on National Minorities: “I see no connection between the dossier on which Mr Annemans speaks and the adoption of the special laws. I have never linked the two files in the past. The case on the protection of national minorities is now not on the table with the federal government.” However, we read in the press that there would be a link between the framework agreement and Lambermont’s approval to pawn the PSC and the FDF.

Chairman: Herman De Croo, Chairman President: Herman De Croo, President. Prime Minister Verhofstadt has strongly denied that there was a link between these two files. What are the parallel discussions going on tonight, at the moment we are holding a false debate here? Well, precisely about the bond between the Framework Treaty on National Minorities and the approval of the Lambermont Agreement by the PSC and the FDF. When the negotiators came out tonight at 2.30 a.m., PS chairman Elio di Rupo told the press: "We have worked well. We were in constant contact with our Flemish colleagues. We have come up with something that should be acceptable for both the French speakers and the Flemish. We continue to be mobilized. Everyone is looking for the most appropriate terms.” This is the report from Belgium. The Belga report also leaves other protagonists to speak, including FDF chairman Olivier Maingain who was registered to participate in the debate tonight but who has been discharged because of course he had to be elsewhere where the real decisions are made. What is Mr Maingain’s comment on last night’s agreement? It is very disturbing because Mr. Maingain spoke of “a reasonable solution”. Ladies and gentlemen, and especially the Flemish, I do not have to tell you, but if Mr. Maingain is satisfied, and if he speaks of a reasonable solution, then the Flemish proverb "farmer pay attention to your eggs" applies. Ladies and gentlemen, I fear that with the ratification of that Framework Convention on National Minorities, the door will be opened, not only for the further refraction of Flemish-Brabant, but also, and ⁇ even worse, for the granting of all kinds of cultural rights to French speakers, wherever they may live in Flanders. Their

Thus, all the hard-fought language laws of the past decades are immediately put on the slope. One must well realize that when one comes to touch these very fragile balances, one is undermining the foundations of this state. We are indeed convinced that, in an attempt to set up all kinds of constructions and to forge all kinds of things together, one is indeed working to put the balances of this country on a slope. In itself, we cannot care much about it, even the opposite: the more this country is crumbling together, and the more the two communities of this country become separated from each other, the closer the division of the country comes and the closer the independence of Flanders comes. And then, of course, there is the case of Brussels. I do not want to repeat what my colleagues have already made very detailed on Brussels. This Lambermont Agreement further cuts the bond between Brussels and Flanders. Brussels slips through between the fingers of the Flamings. This will have very serious consequences for the survival of this country. I would like to devote a few theoretical considerations to what this could lead to in the future. Without pondering here that these would be ready-made views of the Flemish Bloc, you can rather consider it as a finger exercise on scenarios that may occur in the future. In the past, some in the Flemish movement argued that proclaiming the Flemish independence was an undesirable option, with dreams that Flanders would lose Brussels as a result. Therefore, the Flemish movement for a long time opted to bring the Flemish struggle for independence closer through all sorts of complicated Belgian federal or confederate formulas, which, by the way, did not satisfy any of them. The forward-looking part of the Flemish movement has now, following the Flemish Bloc by the way, already returned to this strategic choice for some time and now chooses Flemish independence unwaveringly. It is a sober conclusion that within the Belgian federalism Flanders is losing its capital Brussels. Consequently, the loss of Brussels can no longer be an argument against Flemish independence. In the realization of the independence of Flanders, Brussels has two options, which can be complementary.

A first scenario is that Flanders can immediately harden their claims to Brussels in the face of any Brussels separatist aspirations and in the face of the international community. We can argue that the right of self-determination is reserved to peoples and that the multicultural city of Brussels is not a people. Within Belgium, Brussels has the status of a capital region. Brussels is part of Flanders. There are strong international law arguments for this position, namely the geographical location of Brussels in Flanders, the capital role of Brussels for Flanders, the historical linguistic, ethnic and cultural connections, the socio-economic interconnection, and so on. This requirement can also be made acceptable to the international community by providing the French-speaking Brussels people with the necessary safeguards for the preservation of their linguistic and cultural identity. It is, in any case, the position that the Flemish negotiators should take as a starting point.

In a second scenario, it is assumed that the Brusselsers will indeed have the opportunity to make a strategic choice about their own future. From a national court perspective, this is not obvious. However, there is a high chance that the Belgian federation will disintegrate along the regional borders. Certainly the French-speaking majority in the Brussels Capital Region will manifest itself as a separate entity. At that point, the Brusselsers will at least have to make a strategic choice about their own future.

What are the different possibilities for Brussels at the moment when Belgium breaks up? We are of course convinced that this is going to happen, although I cannot predict when. It will happen in any case. Theoretically, the dissolution of Belgium leaves numerous possibilities and variants open. It is important to check the relationship between Flanders and Brussels. A further distinction should be made between the short-term, in which a significant proportion of the French-speaking Brussels may be emotionally anti-Flemish, and the long-term, in which financial and socio-economic arguments will play a more important role.

The first scenario is the combination Wallo-Brux, the axis Brussels-Wallonia which is sometimes also called smallBelgium or trunk-Belgium. Wallonia and Brussels would then form a new state that may or may not appeal to be the continuation of Belgium. The influence of Flanders in Brussels would then be reduced to a minimum. French-speaking Brussels and Wallonia have a common language, the same political parties, the same press, and so on. However, there is little need to argue that this State will have a very difficult socio-economic situation and, in addition, there is no land connection between Brussels and Wallonia. There is no territorial connection.

The second scenario is the accession to France. You know that in Wallonia there is a Wallon, rattachist movement active. It has not so much influence yet, but it can grow. During this debate, we have already pointed out Robert Collignon, a PS-corrifee who is the chairman of the Waals Parliament, who in Rijsel proclaimed his belief in front of France. The annexation of Wallonia and Brussels to France is not obvious. We must ask ourselves whether France is a requesting party for this. Moreover, such a scenario is unthinkable without the consent of the other European great powers, mainly Germany and Britain, which would not like France to push back to Brussels. For Brussels, this would also mean a degradation from a national capital to a city of a level similar to Strasbourg. The annexation of Brussels to France would, of course, mean that the Flemish influence in Brussels would be greatly reduced. Here we must make the same note as in the first scenario, namely that between Brussels and Wallonia, if they wish to join France together, there is no territorial connection.

A third scenario is that Brussels would become an independent city state, a kind of European district like Washington D.C. Economically, Brussels cannot survive on its own, but ⁇ the European Union could be found willing to make financial efforts in favour of its capital. In this scenario, Flanders, of course, as a member state of the European Union, decides how far this European currency crane should be opened for Brussels. Furthermore, the European Union, which breaks a lance for the rights of minorities everywhere in the world, cannot afford that the rights of the Flemish minority would be affected in its capital. This scenario in itself is not dramatic for the Flamings in Brussels. It is a scenario that we should not simply throw away but that we should think about well.

The next scenario is a confederation between Brussels and Flanders. In this scenario, two or more independent states form a confederation. However, one must first be independent in order to form a confederation. This would then mean that one leaves an independent Brussels and an independent Flanders which then both decide as sovereign states to manage a number of matters jointly.

The next scenario is a federation between Brussels and Flanders. In that case, the current institutional situation will be more or less consistent, but without Wallonia. This is based on Waals separatism. Both Flanders and Brussels retain their own institutions with their own legislation in this scenario. On top of that, there would be a federal level. Externally, Brussels and Flanders would act jointly at the international level.

Mr. Tastenoye makes some very strange statements about Brussels and the methods to regain Brussels. He lists a number of scenarios he would like to follow. In what scenario does the strategy of starvation, the cordon, the stimulus wire around Brussels fit?

Mr. Leterme, I have never mentioned this in those words. What I have said about this is, but I will come to it later, that we must ensure at the time that Flanders becomes independent, that Brussels must be put in every possible way so that it will seek joining Flanders on a voluntary basis. Their

What I said about a scenario of starvation is the following. I did not mean the word hunger literally. You know that as well as I. It was in the figurative sense. What else has been said and written about this, I am not responsible for it, for it is a journalist of De Morgen responsible who has completely pulled my words out of its context and even manipulated them. I now ask you to listen to my speech. Then you will hear that there is no talk of what you are coming to say next.

Another scenario is that Brussels would be the capital of Flanders, with guarantees for the French speakers. In this case, Brussels is part of Flanders and the city retains its bilingual status. Brussels French speakers receive from Flanders the constitutional guarantee that they will be considered as full-fledged Flanders citizens in an independent Flanders and at the same time can maintain their linguistic and cultural uniqueness within the borders of Brussels. In this scenario, the French speakers also retain their own institutions in Brussels, such as the Cocof for example. They will also be responsible for their own education.

This scenario is my personal preference. This means that Brussels French speakers will be Flemish citizens, but with all the rights in the linguistic, cultural and educational fields that they currently have. There will be no obstacle to them in this regard and their guarantees will be included in a Flemish Constitution. I am even prepared to add another provision, in particular that nothing can be changed to the Constitution unless the French speakers of Brussels themselves agree to it. I do not think that greater guarantees can be given. This is, in my opinion, the ideal scenario we should pursue.

The following scenario is a variant: Brussels would then be the capital of Flanders and of Europe, with guarantees for the French speakers. This scenario differs from the previous one, in the sense that the European Union is therefore involved in the management of Brussels. As such, this could be an additional guarantee for the French-speaking residents. I have no objection to the involvement of the European Union in the administration of Brussels. Their

Therefore, the modalities of these can be discussed.

A final scenario is Brussels as a Flemish city. In that case, Flanders would simply annex Brussels and consider it a Flemish city. French speakers would not have their own institutions. They could at most enjoy extensive facilities. Such a scenario is not desirable, because it has little sense with the current demographic situation in Brussels and with the cultural, linguistic and educational rights that we really want to give the French speakers in Brussels.

For the Brussels and Flanders, it would be most interesting if Brussels remain the capital of Flanders, with guarantees for the French speakers. However, this is a thinking exercise and should not be considered as the official position of the Flemish Bloc. In the autumn we will also hold a congress on Flemish independence and the position of Brussels in this regard. The ideas I have put forward must yet mature. The discussion on this issue is still ongoing in our party. We believe that a strategy of independence with the preservation of Brussels can only succeed if it addresses some of the fundamental concerns of the Brussels French speakers on the cultural and linguistic level. Concretely, this could mean that the current Brussels Capital Region will be transformed into an independent Flanders into a city district. The Brussels French speakers then retain their own institutions. These guarantees would be included for them in a Flemish constitution.

Within Belgium, the relationship between Flanders and its capital is now very problematic. Not only do we find that Brussels is both demographic, legal, territorial and institutional far alienated from Flanders. In addition, a significant part of the Brussels establishment is opposed to Flanders. It is then about French speakers, but more and more also about the Flemish establishment. In the rest of Flanders and even within the Flemish Movement, on the other hand, more and more votes go up to release Brussels. With the dissolution of the Belgian Federation there are therefore various scenarios and combinations possible. Between "Brussel Flaams" and "Flanders loses Brussels" there is a very wide range of possibilities. In order to keep Brussels as much as possible for Flanders, Flanders must not turn away from Brussels. There is a need for a seduction strategy and an investment strategy.

I return to the actuality. I would like to address the CVP about its attitude towards Brussels and towards the entire Lambermont Agreement. On the eve, Mrs. Creyf presented a very good analysis of the adverse and harmful nature of the Lombard Agreement for Brussels. We can fully support this analysis.

We can fully support this analysis. The gentlemen Laeremans and De Man have presented similar analyses here. Mr. Leterme, I would like to know now what you are going to do tactically and strategically with your so-called atomic bomb which you have in Brussels in the person of Mr. Jos Chabert who must have been a minister for about 30 years. In this context, I would like to refer to Mrs Grouwels who, on 11 June, when the debate on the Lombard Agreement was concluded in the Flemish Community Commission, referred to the resolutions already adopted there in relation to the Lambermont Agreement. Those resolutions demanded the necessary guarantees for the Flamingos in Brussels with regard to their representation at all levels. These guarantees were endorsed by both the CVP and other so-called democratic parties. Mr Grouwels also made an analysis of the Lombardy Agreement during the same session. She said it barely got two out of ten. She referred, among other things, to the major disadvantages of dropping the double majority on regional and bicommunity matters and the questionable spending of billions that go mainly to French-speaking institutions. She said this was unacceptable for the CVP. The Lombard agreement was a fiasco. Last Friday, June 22, a meeting of the Flemish Community Commission was held. In the end, the masks of the CVP fell off. What happened there? During that meeting, the Flemish Bloc submitted a motion in which the previous motions were simply taken back, motions that were then approved by the CVP, the VLD, the People’s Union, the SP and Agalev. On 22 June, the CVP wiped out the motion of the Flemish Bloc containing two previous motions that it had approved. With that motion of the Flemish Bloc, our party wanted to finally turn the beautiful words of the CVP into actions. However, the CVP managed to vote against the motion of the Flemish Bloc and thus to swallow all its previous beautiful statements in a shameful way. We must therefore conclude that the CVP is still the regime-friendly party that it has always been.

I hear Stefaan De Clerck, chairman of the CVP, like to say that he is working on a re-profiling of his party. All the summing that comes from his beekeepers, of which, by the way, we have not seen much honey, has not yet led to "concrete completions" of all those woolish words that Mr. De Clerck commonly uses. Here, together with his party, he now has the chance to finally throw the wheel and become the Flemish People’s Party that the CVP was before to a certain extent. Unfortunately, the party has become a Belgian regime party. The CVP will now have the opportunity to react and to profile itself as a party that stands up for the interests of Flanders and in particular for the interests of the Brussels Flanders. Their

I see Mr. Leterme running out. He will probably not have much to answer to the questions I have asked here. It is not important. It is only about the interests of Flanders and the Brussels Flanders, Mr. Leterme. You do not find it difficult to answer that.

I’m going to finish here because my time is wasted. Therefore, we should not expect much from the CVP. This is an opportunity to put the government in difficulty. The CVP can do two things. Or she can withdraw Minister Chabert from the Brussels government and with her three parliamentarians in the Brussels Gewestraad go into the opposition. Then the opposition will be formed by four Flemish Blocker and three CVP’s, so together seven, against a majority that then still consists of four members. I do not need to tell you that it is impossible to govern Brussels in this way. Brussels is currently in a government crisis. This crisis will be reflected on the national majority. Prime Minister Verhofstadt will be in serious trouble. It is always the task of an opposition party to bring the majority into serious trouble. Their

A second scenario could be that the CVP orders its minister to go on strike and to stop taking collegial decisions in the Brussels Council of Ministers. As you know, in a Council of Ministers decisions must always be taken unanimously. If the CVP Minister now decides to go on strike, to stop making decisions and to refuse to approve the cooperation agreements resulting from the Lambermont Agreement and the Lombarda Annex, the federal government will also be in serious trouble.

Colleagues, I don’t think the CVP is willing to go so far. We have heard Herman Van Rompuy here in the last few weeks. What was the purpose of Mr Van Rompuy? If I listened carefully, he wants Prime Minister Verhofstadt to agree not to deal with the Lambermont Agreement and the Lombard Agreement for the big holiday, but to postpone the whole matter until after the European Presidency of the Belgian government. He wants to re-examine the whole matter in the spring of next year. The CVP even demonstrated its willingness to then sit around the table with the majority to work out a new community agreement.

Herman Van Rompuy’s real goal was to postpone the case and to resume it after the presidency of the European Union. So it has never been the intention of the CVP with the Lombard Agreement and the Lambermont Agreement to get this government on its knees. I can only guess why. The Flemish Bloc would not prefer that with this Lombardy Agreement and this Lambermont Agreement we get this government on our knees. We are not afraid of elections. We can come tomorrow, we are ready. Who is afraid of elections? Mr. Leterme, that is your party. I think you do not dare to go to elections right now. Your party is currently in pocket and ashes, which Mr. Coveliers will probably confirm with joy. The [...]

I can understand this, but unfortunately for you, Mr. Coveliers, this is not the case.

Finally, colleagues, the CVP will make no effort to bring this government into serious difficulties with the Lambermont Agreement and the Lombard Annex. The CVP will provide some weather here for the appearance, but when the Lambermont agreement will be approved tomorrow or overmorrow, the CVP will say, “Wow, we’re out of it, it’s behind. Give us just now the necessary time to reassemble this crab basket, so that in two years hopefully we will be able to go to the elections in a decent way.” We, Mr. Leterme, will continue to play our full role as an opposition party, because we are not afraid of elections, on the contrary.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to speak on the rules of procedure.

Mr. Leterme, remember that at half seven the croissants are ready.

I like croissants.

Since last night, we have been facing an existential problem. When I look in this direction, it’s June 28; when I look behind me, to my charming colleagues, it’s June 27. According to the jurisprudence of this Chamber, this is quite important. When it is displayed on June 28, this is the work of the government, more specifically of Mr. Reynders. Mr. Reynders, in spite of our protest, made 28 from 27 just after twelve hours.

I will give you an example. When I was a young chamber member and Achiel Van Acker was chamber chairman, the meeting continued until after midnight. This is not new, for younger colleagues. I also got up from the last bench, where I was sitting, and changed the calendar in my innocence. I was terribly stunned by the President. I won’t mimic his Brugs accent, but he said, “Keep away, the day is not done yet.” So it is still June 27. Moreover, the clock stays still until the end.

Mr. Speaker, I assume that you will soon call Minister Reynders to order in the style of Achille Van Acker? I would also like to know from you how long the “27 June” still runs? Before the debate is over, or until the agenda is exhausted?

Until the debate is over. Until the voting procedure is completed. If the clock remains still, June 27 may even last until June 30.

Mr. Speaker, does this mean that activities, for example, scheduled for 28 June, cannot take place as long as we continue our activities here?

We have to wait for that. I cannot be in two places at the same time.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to move forward on the next morning, the 28th of June according to the calendar. At 9:30 a.m., not only will Ms. Milquet be expected to attend the Prime Minister, who himself will hold a meeting of the nuclear cabinet at 9 a.m. on the subject he wants to discuss with Ms. Milquet, but at that time also the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution is expected to meet, under the chairmanship of Mr. Giet. In that committee we must address the famous bill on the Brussels Fund.

Mr. Speaker, this proposal was discussed yesterday in the committee, and it is expected to be further discussed at 9:30. However, this cannot happen simultaneously with this plenary session.

Mr. Annemans, when the agenda was set for this week, this was not foreseeable. In addition, I saw that the time was decided by voting yesterday.

Do we have to be reasonable? The plenary session of June 27 cannot continue while the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution meets on June 28?

Mr Annemans, at 9.25 am I will make a decision on this matter.

Mr. Speaker, I have seen that on PSC banks it is still June 27 and on PS banks it is already June 28. I already started to fear that the PS was ahead in its time. I had no explanation for that. Your explanation reassured me.

In short, it is better for everyone that Mrs. Milquet is on time.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Minister, dear colleagues, when we left our families on 27 June, we could suspect that this case would take a long time. We know the mentality of some colleagues here. I will, by the way, come back to that later. However, the staff members who came here yesterday in the hope of being able to perform their job during the day hours did not know that it would take so long. I would therefore like to apologize to these staff members on behalf of my group and on behalf of the majority groups.

I regret that they have to experience this. In this age of social achievements, they are, supposedly for the sake of democracy, forced to work all night. Hundreds of people must hear here, for eight hours, talks about the thirteenth century; they must hear here about Confucius; they must hear here the program of the VLD — which I, by the way, know much better than the speakers —; they must hear here again irrational arguments. I find this annoying.

Mr Annemans, the staff has also been able to hear your arguments, and they will be able to judge how you fill the concept of democracy. I find it shameful that these people have to work all night and that they hardly have a chance to tell their family because you want to proclaim a lot of nonsense here for eight hours.

Mr. Speaker, I ask for the word because of a personal fact, so that it would be noted in the reports. I have been named here by name, so I have this right.

No one is obliged to continue this Chamber Session.

That has only been done by one man and his supporter, Guy Verhofstadt, who obliges the House to vote on this Lambermont agreement today Thursday, along with Mr. Coveliers, group chairman of the majority party. They have obliged us to remain, even though before the beginning of this debate, I have asked and proposed two, three, four times to speak in a reasonable way about a reasonable handling of this agenda.

Mr. Coveliers, I do not accept that you accuse me of things that you caused and not me.

Who does not want to hear, must feel. This has always been so and it will always be so.

Mr. Speaker, I will continue to use this proverb in the coming hours, but I think the staff can judge it on their own. I do not allow myself to be dictated by Mr. Annemans, nor through intermediaries. I would like to make it clear that I find this embarrassing. I would still accept it if one had brought an interesting language during those eight hours, but I have heard the interview with Vanhengel cited seven times, I have heard in the committee twenty times a particular pamphlet – which would have been written by journalists of The Financial-Economic Time – cited. I hear here a hundred times the VLD attacks, which does not bother me, but even after one time it is understood.

Well, that is, in my opinion, the reason why you are considered an undemocratic party. Because you abuse democratic rights.

Mr. Laeremans, do I notice any emotion? You know, colleagues Blokers, that the truth hurts.

I actually look in the mirror every morning and then I think how hard we give up when we have to listen to a number of things again and again. I was here all night and I, like the staff, could listen to everything. I have had to establish — and this will be read in the annals — that you talked here about a contract breach by a monarch in the 13th century. I’ve heard someone here speech about a builder of a Chinese restaurant Confucius. I had to listen to all that. And then you will tell me that this is a democratic response to the treatment of a draft on the state reform in Belgium. I tell you that abusing is the abuse of democracy and that unfortunately democracy is such a valuable system that it allows non-democrats to do so and that one must ask questions about it. (Interruption) You just have to say that. You spoke for eight hours without saying a word about the design.

Mr. Coveliers accuses us here of an antidemocratic mentality. The Flemish Bloc proves once again how undemocratic you are. If Mr. Coveliers cannot tolerate that we fill the great political debate in our own way, then I ask him how he sees it? Who determines how we express our opinions? Who will do that, Mr. Coveliers? In what democratic way will you organize that, so that the Flemish Bloc sells the language that you like? Are you going to regulate that?

Mr. President, Mr. De Man, you usually ask questions that you do not expect an answer. Now I want to answer. You fill it in as you want it, and you did. Once you have done that, it is my right to make a judgment about the way you fill it out. I now use that democratic right to say that you fill it in a way that is completely unacceptable, because you abuse, in the hope of achieving success through the violence of time. Now you see that it does not work.

Mr Coveliers, when we submit 1302 amendments, we are antidemocratic. That is your logic!

Colleague De Man, I have not spoken about the papers you submitted as amendments, but I have only spoken about the eight hours you filled here. It is my full right to say that what you have told about Confucius, about the 13th, 17th, and 18th centuries, has nothing to do with the design we are talking about now. That is my good right. This is an abuse of democracy, and I will continue to do so.

The incident is closed. The incident is closed.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Minister, colleagues, I would like to be consistent and not to repeat this text. We have been doing this in the committee for a very long time. I simply note that these texts are based on a vision of the way this country could exist. This approach, of course, differs fundamentally from others who have a separatist view on it. Everyone should have a separatist view. I only think that emotionally charged concepts, such as traitors and the like, can work in both directions and that they are therefore neutral and worthless in this debate.

We, Flemish Liberals and Democrats, assume that we have made a commitment, unfortunately to those who envy it, to form this government for a period of four years and with this government to govern this country well. These agreements, as, by the way, was very clearly highlighted during the committee debates, are a step in the framework of state reform. In the committee I have already repeated and I continue to repeat that a federalist state structure is a dynamic structure, which needs to be regularly reviewed and regularly reviewed to see to what extent adjustments need to be made. That is our view on these agreements. Whatever it turns or turns.

It has already been long and broadly explained what the benefits of these agreements are and why these agreements have been reached, why a number of conditions have been conditioned. I do not come back to that, for I do not want to again compel all the people who are present here and who are therefore forced to work here all night, to listen to it. I refer to all that has been said in the committee.

In this regard, after all that has been said in the committee, I refer to the text in the memorandum of explanation, the excellent report of the Senate Committee and the excellent report of the Chamber Committee. I will, together with my colleagues in my group and in the majority, approve this text on Thursday 28 June with great conviction.

Mr Leterme has the word. May I be a little evangelical, because it says that the last will be the first. There is also a Latin saying, in cauda venenum. Many words can be used, of course. Mr. De Man, the Latinists sometimes say "in caudam venenum", with an accusative of movement, if you understand me.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Minister, colleagues, at this dawn, seven hours after the last speech of my eminent colleague Simonne Creyf, this is the third plea of the CVP. The first took place this morning, June 27.

and yes.

On the first morning of June 27, colleague Verherstraeten delivered his plea. I will not go into detail on the content of our criticism of the present draft mandate, because in the explanation of our amendments — but twenty — we will still have a great opportunity to do so.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Leterme, there have been very good, excellent amendments submitted by your group.

You say that with few amendments you can also propose good changes?

We will take them to the discussion and, if necessary, also support, other than, for example, the fate that Mr. Dewael has been harmed, who has pledged for Mr. Leterme’s amendments, but must see that his own party in the Chamber wipes its feet on that.

I have received amendments signed by Mr. Leterme and Mrs. Moerman, but that is something else.

Mr. Speaker, I will return to this dossier later. I will not talk about our substantial criticism of the draft mandate, which was well expressed by our colleagues Verherstraeten and Creyf and will also be discussed during the article-by-article discussion and the explanation of our amendments, which already predict a very good receptivity. I would like to summarize some facts, but before I get to that, I would like to ask the Minister a question.

In a normal parliamentary debate on a draft based on the government, a number of statements and criticisms are addressed, but after that one still expects a response from the government. I would like to ask if the Minister who has been present here for the last two hours intends to answer later. If yes, I will ask a few substantive questions. If you do not want to answer and refer to the article-by-article discussion, then I will temporarily omit those substantive questions.

Mr. Speaker, I listened attentively to all the demonstrations, although not all of them were equally intriguing and the content was not so much addressed. The agreement is that, since we have guaranteed continuity with various members of the government, only at the end of the whole of the comments will be answered.

After my presentation, will you not answer?

and no.

When will the government then respond to the arguments of my colleagues and of myself?

Mr. Leterme, we will answer at the end of the debate.

After the article discussion? In that case, I will limit my argument to a sketch of the actual course of the debate.

The Government is considered to be one and indivisible. Sorry, but I would like someone from the government to answer at some point during the general discussion.

Mr. Speaker, I dedicate the first part of my presentation to the actual summary of the developments in this file during the last 24 hours. Later, I will address a few concrete questions.

Yesterday I was the first to say very explicitly that this parliamentary debate is a virtual debate. In fact, what is happening here in this legal country is in the margin of what is happening in the actual country. In the fresh newspapers of this morning, June 28, which colleague Brepoels from Limburg brought with him, you can read that, by the way.

I want to emphasize that this is a virtual debate. The re-evaluation of Parliament - which has been talked about with so many words in all sorts of committees about the new political culture, and about which all sorts of great-spoken statements have been made - that re-evaluation is still very far away. Some groups have not even spoken so far. For example, the SP group, which at its 1 May meetings has yet to swing with the need to approve the Lambermont Agreement in order to be able to abolish the viewing and listening fees, now seems to find the debate not important enough to say even one word during the plenary discussion of this draft special law on the powers.

The real debate does not take place in this House. At this time, in the Chamber, in the legal country, the second morning of June 27 begins. In the actual country, however, for the outsiders, it is slightly after 6 o'clock in the morning of 28 June. In that actual country, the debate is still going on. The ministers of institutional reforms, Mr. Michel and Vande Lanotte, are not here in the hemisphere. They are outside the Chamber and try to reach an agreement on their canapés via their GSMs. I cannot give a better illustration of the fact that the real debate is being carried out elsewhere.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, Mrs. Minister, the Acts of the Chamber are often used as a legal source for scientific studies, for theses and the like. In the event that in fifty years a student of one or another university, in the landscape then recognised after the Bologna Agreements, finds it in his head to discuss the history of the formation of the Lambermont Agreements and their approval in this Parliament, I do not want that person to rely solely on the Acts of the Chamber so far. So far a lot has been said here. Most of those things were interesting, including the things quoted by the Flemish Bloc colleagues, but the actual debate will not be reflected in the Acts. I want to fill that gap here. Therefore, I will now summarize what has taken place in the actual world, outside this hemisphere, in the meantime.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker. Belga has been quoted here. It is best to praise for his careful work. I am quoting the Belga report of 27 June, at 9 p.m. The title reads: “Kernkabinet — Aelvoet: ‘No extra money for Brussels’.” It goes on: “‘The approval of the PSC’s demand to extract more money for the Brussels Region, cannot be the case.’ This was stated by Agalev Minister Magda Aelvoet at the opening of the nuclear cabinet on Wednesday morning. The adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, on the other hand, appears to be debatable.”

The Belga report continues: "Like in the House, the approval of the competence loop of the Lambermont Agreement is being discussed in the nuclear cabinet. On Wednesday morning, Deputy Prime Minister Onkelinx said: “Sensitive progress has already been made, but more is needed to win the PSC for the Lambermont agreement.” She referred to the adoption of the Minorities Convention that should protect all minorities in Belgium. According to Ms. Aelvoet, it is necessary to look at exactly what this transfer of powers is about, how minorities are defined."

The message then quotes Ms. Aelvoet: “We will only approve a charter if the Belgian system stays up.”

The same message also contains some comments from the ministers Louis Michel and Isabelle Durant, but these are not essential for the chronology of the facts.

So yesterday morning there was already the intention to meet the demands of the French-speaking Christian Democrats. First, additional money for Brussels and second, the signing of the Convention for the Protection of Minorities.

At 11.04 a.m. on Wednesday morning, Belga ⁇ what had happened at the beginning of the plenary session. "The House agreed on Wednesday at the beginning of the plenary debate to the urgent consideration of the bill establishing a fund stopping 3.082 billion francs for the Brussels Region." “This is a proposal from the majority group leaders, who thus want to end the PSC in exchange for support to the Lambermont Agreement.” The French-speaking Christian Democrats also ask for a concession for the situation of the French-speaking people in the Flemish Rand." At 9.24 hours, therefore, the work began outside this hemisphere. Ms. Aelvoet said there could be no way to approve the PSC demand – to get more money for the Brussels Region. However, the ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of Minorities seemed debatable. At 11.04 a.m., the bill was taken into consideration for a highly urgent treatment. According to this bill, a little more than 3 billion francs will be put into a fund. There is also some objectivity and continuity in allocating additional resources to Brussels to function as the capital.

At 13.32 o’clock, the PSC asked for “additional trust elements”. "PSC Chamber member Jean-Jacques Viseur asked the government to come on trips with 'some elements of confidence to ensure that Lambermont is not tortured'."

“Pearls-Green already filed a bill that partially took over a proposal from PSC Friction Leader Poncelet. This creates a fund for the Brussels Region and will be funded with 3.082 billion francs this year. However, the PSC wants more and especially urges additional guarantees for the French speakers in the Flemish edge. In this context, the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has been signed. The majority is currently trying to adjust a handle there.

As regards the jurisdiction loop itself, the PSC has fundamental objections. This is important to weigh the attitude of the PSC in the coming hours. Chamber member Viseur spoke about a constitutional problem — the abolition of the municipal and provincial law does not happen through a constitutional amendment — and pointed out the fact that the draft is based on a confederate logic.” He said: “It does not lead to better governance or a better relationship between citizens and government.” For the historians within 50 years, that was Wednesday 27 June at 13.32 a.m. Meanwhile, I am throwing a Belga report to which Mr Annemans has even made allusions and which reports on a debate in the Flemish Parliament. This debate is important because it is a first step towards the PSC. The colleagues will remember that a few days ago, in the context of all kinds of merchandise, cow trade and merchant art, at some point from the majority a signal was sent to the PSC to indicate that it agreed to honor the commitment, already made intra-Community, to reduce the VAT rate for new construction and renovation works on school buildings from 21% to 6%. This was a draft law that was discussed last week in the House Committee on Finance. It was previously considered and immediately treated for the first time. It immediately came to resistance from our side. I think, by the way, the resistance came only from the CVP. I don’t think other groups have commented on this. We then noted that it was not possible to reduce the VAT rate — even for school buildings — from 21% to 6%. Last time it happened on a Wednesday night. Remember the last time the PSC had to make a curve. One can not just because that night one unilaterally agreed as a member state of the European Union to lower the VAT rate? The Minister of Finance then said that he would seek the advice of the European Commission and that we should not worry. He would soon become chairman of the Ecofin Council. In that position, he would get it in order. We then warned that this was contrary to the applicable directives and that therefore it could not. Last week Thursday, when faced with the fact that one must unilaterally lower the VAT rate from 21% to 6%, it turned out that even a concerted reduction was impossible. Suddenly, the PSC submitted amendments to the original bill on VAT reduction. These amendments were intended to replace both the title of the bill and its full content. This would be replaced by a very peculiar arrangement in which so-called asset-based VZWs — at some point there were even non-profit asset associations, a new legal entity — who manage buildings, own or have rights to grant an exemption or a sharp reduction in the applicable registration and succession rights. That was the scope of Mr. Poncelet’s amendments, embedded in a “spiritual” concession to the PSC to get them over the bridge.

It is a pity that colleagues Moerman and Tavernier are not present. I suppose it’s not from a feeling of shame for what happened last week. They probably lie in bed and will join us later. Last week, Thursday 21 June 2001, when we pointed out that this would be a detrimental change for Flanders, a detrimental reduction of the registration and succession rights, we were bluntly laughed at by Mr. Tavernier and the VLD representative in the Committee for Finance, Mrs. Moerman, who had "confirmed" the two texts as Mr. Poncelet stated. Thus, it was amendments by Mr. Poncelet signed by Mrs. Moerman and Mr. Tavernier. I then insisted that the unilateral arrangement, which was imposed by the PSC and signed by members of the majority, would be detrimental to Flanders. However, this was removed. We then had to resort to a procedural trick, namely asking for a second reading. It is complex. It is six in the second morning of June 27th.

Mr. Leterme, I give you a advice. Don’t talk too long, for the longer you talk, the less democratic you will be in Mr. Coveliers’ eyes. In this regard, Mr. Coveliers is a good pupil of Mr. Schiltz. Mr Schiltz has stated that someone who does not approve the Lambermont Agreement is someone who is undemocratic because he does not accept the consensus model in which Belgium evolves towards a joyful and new future.

The reasoning of Mr. Coveliers is indeed the reasoning of a disciple-wizard who, of course, goes beyond his teacher. He was raised by Mr. Schiltz.

Mr. Leterme will make a decision.

Mr. Annemans, in our group there is a different assessment of the species weight of Mr. Coveliers’ statements. You would react less emotionally if you put yourself on the same line of the generally assumed species weight in Flanders and the value of Mr. Coveliers’ statement.

I return to the amendments-Poncelet, Tavernier and company. As for Mr. Tavernier and company, it is forgiven them. It turned out that they did not understand what it was about. However, this was only apparent after a second reading. The second reading gave us the opportunity to reiterate that the concession of the PSC was detrimental to Flanders. The colleagues, however, persisted in the anger and they were at that moment also assisted by the Minister of Finance who stated that our explanation was not picked up and that there was no community disruption. We have also used the procedural printing of the adoption of the report to avoid it being scheduled very quickly, namely today, 28 June 2001. In the end there came a reaction from the Flemish Parliament, from the Prime Minister-President of the Flemish government, I parafrase: what Mrs. Moerman, VLDkamerlid and member of the Committee for Finance — she was not alone, by the way — and Green Chamber member Mr. Tavernier had promised, what they had signed with, what they have approved with the grey laugh, is detrimental to Flanders. If this cannot be corrected, we will, if necessary, resort to the procedural conflict of interests in order to have it corrected. Yesterday afternoon, June 27, 2001, Prime Minister Patrick Dewael of the VLD of the Flemish Parliament issued an order to approve the amendment of Mr. Leterme, otherwise the interests of Flanders will not be well served.

Why am I speaking about this? This argument is not motivated by a misplaced arrogance because we have succeeded in exposing a weak spot, but to warn of the march and the possible promises and promises made. Even when you denigrately accuse the opposition of not knowing anything about it, I want to warn you. You used this method last week and now on Monday and you were called to order by fellow party members, including the Prime Minister-President of the Flemish Government.

So far the chronology of what took place today, June 27, in this country. This is contrary to what has happened here. At 9.24 a.m. there were the statements of Mrs. Aelvoet. At about 11 a.m., the problem of the PSC was discussed. A little after 13 o’clock, Mr. Viseur stated that additional elements had to be discussed. Then came the communique of 16.08 hours in which Prime Minister Dewael points out the flater that needs to be corrected.

At approximately the same time — 16, 17 hours — Hugo Coveliers, the leader of the VLD, made a statement in the electronic media. In The Morning of This Morning it is read that Mr. Coveliers was honored to shoot the ball in open goal. He stated that for his group the door was open to the problem of the signing and ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. They wanted to deal with the PSC. However, the nuance was made that this should not mean that there would be a change in the status of the French-speaking minority in the outskirts around Brussels. In other words, the ratification could have no impact on the fundamental balance in this country. At no time should the French-speaking minority in the Brussels outskirts be regarded as a national minority which would question or jeopardize the Belgian system.

I quickly overlook the statements of the Flemish-Brabant Governor, Lodewijk De Witte, who may have declared in ordered assignment, I quote: "... that French-speaking mandators in the facility municipalities, after the regionalization of the municipal and provincial law, retain sufficient safeguards against discriminatory treatment. These guarantees in the Peace Act, for example in the field of language knowledge for mayors and creators, remain in force and can only be modified by the federal government. In addition, Lambermont is adding new safeguards.” This Belga message from 16.15 am goes on, I quote: "Among the French-speaking mayors lives the fear that the Flemish government will abuse its new authority to appoint and sanction mayors in respect of those who oppose, for example, the circular Peeters. Municipalities are autonomous administrations that have the right to disagree with the Flemish government and to challenge the interpretation it gives to a law. Insubordinations and disciplinary sanctions can only be discussed if one does not want to conform to the final judgments of courts. The Lambermont Agreement also establishes a special procedure in the State Council and the Arbitration Court for mayors against whom a disciplinary sanction has been imposed for non-compliance with a law, decree, order, regulation or administrative act. These statements of the Flemish-Brabant Governor are important.

I would like to extend the vote process because of some Flemish ministers. Right and wrong, they say that Lambermont’s money would really be useful. Ms. Dua hopes that, in connection with the problem of closing the ISVAG oven, she can extract 1 billion francs from the Lambermont Agreements. This is how he wants to resolve that file. All arguments are apparently good to get some people to vote on things that are against the Flemish interest. Their

While all these little facts are taking place, of course, a number of things are taking place in this actual country. This evening, before this morning, it came at 22.25 am. As the debate on the competence loop of the Lambermont Agreement continues in the House, the representatives of the French-speaking majority parties and the PSC have been sitting since 19.30. at the party headquarters of the PS together around the table. Deputy Prime Ministers Laurette Onkelinx, Isabelle Durant, Louis Michel, the party chairs Elio Di Rupo, Daniel Ducarme and Jacques Baudouin will participate in the meeting. Gerard Deprez is also part of the party, along with Ms. Milquet and PSC Chamber member Viseur. The majority is still trying to persuade the PSC to allow the approval of Lambermont’s second loop. What attitude the PSC will eventually take is still unclear. Meanwhile, the chamber debate risks to last very long. Very long speeches are being held and there are in principle still a lot of amendments that can be explained in five minutes.”

Meanwhile, we are still on June 27 and it is already 0.31 u. We read: “The meeting between the representatives of the French-speaking majority and the PSC was still ongoing around midnight on Wednesday evening. The discussion revolves around the signing and ratification of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, more specifically around the definition of the concept of minority." “The French speakers would have reached an agreement on a possible definition. However, it could not count on the consent of the Flemish parties. These parties are together with Prime Minister Verhofstadt in a meeting on this topic. Meanwhile, a number of other French-speaking politicians have been dismissed to the Keizerslaan. They are PSC leader Jean-Pol Poncelet and FDF chairman Olivier Maingain. For Ecolo, Marcel Cheron and Jean-Marc Nollet also sat around the table. In the Chamber the general discussion is still ongoing."The following is important for the further course of this debate. “The majority, in any case, wants to go to the end and does not want to be blamed by the opposition for not being able to speak during the debate. Most members of the Chamber consider a session until Thursday morning.” "The vote would take place between four and six o'clock in the afternoon." It is good that we can learn through Belga reports what the intentions of the majority are. Their

A little later, at 3.46 a.m., a new Belgian report arrived. The listing may be monotonous, but this is what actually happened. This is apparently something completely different from what happened here in the hemisphere. “The representatives of the French-speaking majority parties and those of the PSC are in the night of Wednesday on Thursday around 2.30 am. They separated. All stakeholders stated that significant progress has been made, but that should be expected now. The ball is now in the camp of the federal government, said PRL chairman Daniel Ducarme. PSC chairman Joëlle Milquet referred to the meeting of the nuclear cabinet on Thursday morning. The discussion centred mainly around two points. On the one hand, the financing of the fund established to fulfill the international capital function of the Brussels Region. That fund, where no additional money could go, according to Mrs. Aelvoet’s statement, and where no other money was provided, would go. The Council of Europe signed and ratified the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. With regard to this last point, a definition of the concept of minorities is sought." “According to Milquet, this is a constructive and positive discussion, but at the same time she referred to the nuclear cabinet meeting Thursday morning.” “We worked well. We were in constant contact with our Flemish colleagues. Their

We have reached an agreement that should be acceptable for both the French speakers and the Flemish. We continue to be mobilized. Everyone is looking for the most appropriate terms.

It also refers to the statements of Mr Daniel Ducarme and also of Mr Olivier Maingain. I do not remember that, as it may be important for the review of any agreements or agreements in the continuation of the debates. The gentlemen Maingain and Clerfayt intend to support the design. FDF chairman Olivier Maingain spoke of "a reasonable solution". If Mr. Maingain uses such words, the Flammers fit their counts best.

The announcement concludes with the announcement that the nuclear cabinet will meet Thursday morning from 9 a.m. At 9:30 p.m. Mr. Verhofstadt has a meeting with PSC chairwoman Joëlle Milquet. Their

I have given that somewhat annoying list to give the truth its right. I want to show that the debate held here was rejected by the majority and the government. In fact, one had to visit the darkness beside this hemisphere in order to find a two-thirds majority through GSM and other contacts for the vote of this draft authority. This, of course, contradicts the statements of the Prime Minister. As his statements progressed, it was increasingly late in the night. Mr. Verhofstadt has repeatedly stated that a global agreement has been reached around a new community equation. Now we find that, in the hollow of the night, until the last hours before the vote, and where one must even manipulate the calendar to ensure that we experience a second morning after the evening of 27 June, in spite of the statements of the prime minister, apparently there was no global agreement, though not to the extent that a two-thirds majority could be gathered around.

Colleagues, the colleagues Verherstraeten and Simonne Creyf have already indicated that this agreement does not take away our approval, not only the funding draft but also the draft special law on the transfer of powers. Of course, one is related to the other. It’s not just about excessive transfers. Moreover — and we let that be observed more and more — last week the Minister of Budget himself admitted that Lambermont had invested a little too much in the resources available at the federal level for him. Their

The Deputy Prime Minister has said that the gold hamster, who is housed in the local area next to his office and who is allegedly living a good life there and is the symbol of his budgetary policy, prays every day that the Lambertmont Agreement will not be approved.

That is the ex-absurd proof of the resources available at the federal level that this is a ⁇ expensive agreement, although it allows the Regions to organize large expenditure flows in terms of primary expenditure, insofar as they would agree on where exactly these expenditure should go, or to have less income. However, it is clear that this Lambermont agreement is a very expensive agreement, even to the extent that it would not be approved for the Minister of Budget. After all, I dare to assume that, as in other files and other statements, he thinks through his gold hamster. That golden hamster is nothing but an alter ego that our budget minister is engaging in.

The first point of criticism, of course, is the excessive transfers and the fact that there is no fiscal autonomy.

Second, the fact that too few powers are transferred, maxi-money against mini-powers. Two weeks ago, we already formulated this criticism.

Third, and colleague Creyf has already extended on this, the fact that — and I quote Karel De Gucht — that a perfidious arrangement has been made for Brussels, which does not solve the basic problems of Brussels.

Therefore, we will vote against this bill, unless, of course, our amendments are widely accepted, which will have to be shown in the debates that will follow.

I conclude with the following conclusion. The great lesson from this story, from what happened here yesterday and tonight and also two weeks ago in and outside this hemisphere, is that today we once again experience the bankruptcy of what in the meantime can be called the method-Verhofstadt. Their

A lot can be said about the former prime ministers. Those prime ministers, however, had the format to ensure that, when a draft constitutional revision or special law was submitted and discussed and submitted for voting, that there was a coherent majority to approve it and that believed in the objectives of that state reform. Contrary to that method, we note that the current prime minister goes so-called from global agreement to global agreement, speaks about the total exclusion of any connection of one bill or proposal with the other, in fact at a hottest pace, the proposals must shake out of the handle by putting the people of the PSC in an emergency on the agenda and that until this time we must establish that there is marshalled until the last moment, the merchant art to the detriment of Flanders must be used to finally come to a vote with heels and eyes where of course, as in the special Finance Act, the scoreboard will again be 59-0 on the French side and a squeezed majority on the Flanders side to choose this anti-Flanders design well.

I have commented on the comments made several times. My successors have done so too. I have the impression that, since I left here about eight hours ago and after hearing what Mr. Leterme said, it has been repeated continuously during those eight hours what was said then. I refer to the statements I gave at that time.