Proposition 54K1727

Projet de loi relatif à des mesures complémentaires en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme.

General information ¶

Submitted by

MR Swedish coalition

Submission date

March 21, 2016

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

database search fight against crime criminal procedure terrorism arms trade

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen CD&V Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP DéFI ∉ Open Vld N-VA MR PP VB

Voted to reject

PVDA | PTB

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Discussion ¶

April 14, 2016 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, in agreement with our colleague, we refer to the written report. I have to inform you that the committee meeting has just taken place. The amendment was adopted unanimously minus one abstinence. The abstention was not about the amendment but about the article. The amendment concerned part of Article 13. The amendment was voted unanimously but the article was voted unanimously minus one vote. The entire text was unanimously voted.

and yes. It seems to me normal, Mr. Speaker, that the Parliament be well informed.

In November last year, the government announced eighteen new measures in addition to the twelve measures of January 2015. In total, 15 measures have already been implemented and the work will continue with the aim of strengthening the capacity and efficiency of our security and intelligence services.

On the proposal of the Prime Minister, a temporary Committee on Terrorism, which has just met, has been set up. It allows us to work faster on projects while discussing different pistes and various proposals related to the thematic of the fight against terrorism and radicalism.

The bill presented today constitutes a new counter-terrorism package, which concrete three important measures announced in November 2015 and which adds to the measures already adopted by the House.

The three aforementioned measures are the 24-hour search for terrorist offences, the extension of special search methods to strengthen the fight against the trafficking in weapons and the creation of a legal basis allowing the establishment of databases common to the various services involved in the fight against terrorism, a database that is part of the follow-up of the circular foreign fighters, which was adopted in August 2015.

The attacks of March 22 dramatically reminded us of the urgency to be able to equip our intelligence and security services with tools suitable for the fight against the jihadist threat.

Since its entry into office, this government, this majority, has sought to catch up with the lag accumulated in recent years in this matter. Terrorists are informed of our anti-terrorism procedural rules and they knew well that, until then, and with the exception of extremely specific cases provided by law (such as the flagrant crime), it was not possible to search their cache between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Of course, this situation had to cease.

By voting this bill, we are putting more pressure on terrorists. We couldn’t keep them sleeping peacefully. In addition to terrorist offences, 24-hour searches required by the services will also be applicable to cases of offenders’ associations or criminal organisations where serious indications suggest that firearms or explosives, nuclear, biological, chemical or any other harmful or dangerous substances could be discovered.

We know that arms trafficking is another major axle in the fight against terrorism. We had to make sure that our services could more easily intercept those and those who, by becoming guilty of arms trafficking, can help provide terrorists with the instruments that sow death and terror.

This will then be done with the second measure envisaged by the bill. This entails the extension of particular methods of investigation, including telephone intercepting, to violations of weapons law or standards relating to arms exports.

Here, it is important to emphasize that all the guarantees inherent to particular methods of investigation, namely the decision of the investigating judge, the criteria of necessity, serious indications, the finding that other means of investigation are not sufficient, will be applicable.

Since the first project, this majority ensures that the necessary balance between security and freedom is respected. It is a duty that we have assigned ourselves and this project, like the others, does not deviate from this fundamental rule. Naturally, we must not offer Daesh the sacrifice of our fundamental values on the altar of the terrorist threat; we can no longer afford not to respond to the call of services, field actors who need new tools in the face of a threat that is constantly changing. We must continue to raise our level of security.

The third part concerns the creation of a legal basis for establishing common databases. The exchange of information – it is known – is ⁇ one of the keys to the effectiveness of the action of the various police and intelligence services in the face of those who may represent the terrorist threat.

For example, today, the police do not have access to criminal data. It was a hole from which we had to get out. To this end, the project will enable the establishment of databases on individuals or groups, provided that at least two services, such as the State Security and the police, have such information as part of their work of prevention and monitoring of terrorism and extremism, where it could lead to terrorism.

The purpose of this measure is also to contribute to decision-making by administrative authorities, administrative police or judicial police. The latter measure will also increase the quality of the data processed and update it for the benefit of all actors justifying a right of access to this crucial information. It will also allow for faster and more appropriate action as signals from different services will clarify the reality of the threat. The joint management of such data will also participate in a necessary streamlining effort. This measure, however, will only be effective, as long as each actor assumes full responsibility.

If the judicial component continues to fall within the jurisdiction of the latter, local authorities can and must exploit all the tools at their disposal in order to assume their role in terms of administrative police, whether it is radiation, control of domicile, interaction with field actors, according to the existing modalities provided by the circular foreign fighters.

One of the objectives of this third component is to ensure the transmission and sharing of information. The creation of common databases will increase the possibilities of supplementing the information.

A series of royal arrests will later allow to define the terms of access but the government has wanted to be broad in its project. The Standing Commission of the local police, CTIF, Crisis Centre, General Directorate Consular Affairs, Office of Foreigners or the penitentiary administration should benefit from access to these databases. It will be the same for the mayors, the heads of bodies of local police or the houses of justice.

It will then be up to all these actors to bring back any relevant information that they would have knowledge of in their capacity as front-line actors. Various initiatives have already been taken in this direction and Françoise Schepmans has regularly had the opportunity to share with us in committee the various initiatives that could have been taken at the level of her municipality. We hope that all local authorities will follow this example.

Explained in this way, based on the debates that we may have had about the necessity of this third measure, I do not understand that there is still frilance in a number of political groups versus a measure that is a measure of common sense, a necessary measure. I explained it. Why, in the Socialist Party and in Ecolo, the path of abstinence has been chosen, when such a measure is called for by the services? I would like you to explain it to me because I cannot understand it. It is no longer time to abstain from a number of measures like this. Let me help you understand why there are still abstentions against so much common sense! Let them explain it to me because I don’t know.

Mr. Ducarme, I imagine that you, like me, followed the discussions in committee, when we met to discuss this bill. I will repeat all of our arguments in a moment. On the set of principles and the will that is behind that of the government in this bill, we follow you. Therefore, we voted in favour of the entire text. I would like to remind you of what happened in the committee a few weeks ago.

and no! It will be! It will be!

Let me finish. You accuse us of abstaining. It looks like an accusation.

I am not accusing. I say you abstain. Are you abstaining or not?

We abstained on a set of articles, for reasons that I will explain, as regards the feasibility of setting up databases. I will explain exactly why sooner.

But on all the measures that are taken in the bill, we are constructive, but we have great reservations on how the dynamic database will be set up.

Is there any explanation for the abstention?

You are starting to annoy me!

by Mr. Domeyer will come to explain. In terms of terrorism, we will have the opportunity to compare what some have done. by Mr. Dewael knows it better than anyone, when I was Minister of Justice, in terms of terrorism, we laid the foundation for everything that exists today: the first anti-terrorism laws, the OCCAM, security authorizations, the increase of State Security resources. Then you will go back with your lessons!

For the rest, we have a quality debate in the committee. We vote for the whole because we believe in it, and here is Mr. Ducarme, instead of saying so much better, and that we are all together to fight terrorism, comes to the fair and seek polemics. Mr. Duchamp, it makes no sense.

There is no desire for feast. There is no intention to attack you. I never attack anyone. You don’t bother me, Madame Onkelinx.

I would like to have a number of explanations and I hear that you are giving them in relation to a measure that, in our opinion, will be necessary for the fluidity we will bring to the exchange of information. It is well known that the exchange of information on this subject is a key element in identifying the threat of terrorism.

You will therefore give the Chamber clarifications as to the choice that has been yours on certain aspects to stay a little in reserve. This is said without controversy.

I wish very strongly, indeed, Mrs. Onkelinx, that we all be together, gathered around some steps to be taken. I think it’s time to finally get rid of old ideological reflexes.

Safety of airports.

We can renew the debate on airport security, and we will, of course, do so in the committee that gathers us so that we can learn from what needs to be improved to further raise our level of security.

I do not understand the reservations about anti-terrorism measures announced by this government, in particular the one related to databases. I do not understand, while we have organized long hearings and mobilized the terrorism commission for a long time on this aspect, namely the extension of the watch. The services are asking us to extend the surveillance to 48 hours, even though we had offered 72 hours by listening to a number of other echoes received by the majority. I do not understand that with regard to a tool as important as that, claimed by the services, a part of the opposition continues to barrage, and does not join a compromise to meet a necessity on this matter.

What you reproach us, Mr. Ducarme, is to do our job well. Sorry: the discussions in the committee were actually constructive, as were the exchanges during the hearings. It happens that I attended all auditions, from A to Z. You accuse us of asking questions. These are elements of practical implementation. Regarding the principle of creating a dynamic database, as I said earlier, we are convinced of the need for the tool.

Excuse us for having an opinion on how it is set up, to draw your attention to specific stops for the setup of the database. Stop blaming us for doing the job well. You demanded us a stretched hand majority/opposition at the beginning of this commission, and we said "chiche!". We do it, we submit texts and we are constructive. You are now pointing your finger at several parties: this is not worthy of the debates we have had in committee. As far as I am concerned, my text does not contain a single time the name of another party. These are discussions that go beyond the small political games. It’s a pity that we’ve pointed out parties. In addition, for once, and this is not always the case, we vote like you on the principles. I do not understand what you are looking for here. I find this deeply regrettable, and regrettable for the quality of the debate.

You have the right to have your opinion. I do not blame you for having your opinion. I wonder if you do not support the whole process. Beyond speeches, lessons, I developed the content of the measurement. Just point to me, as part of your intervention, as the PS, I imagine, will do, the elements of this important measure that you do not want to endorse.

There is no question of controversy. It is simply about everyone making their own choices. I do not ask you more. I don’t give you a lesson. I would just like you to justify these abstentions; as I call you, because the measure is always pending, to move you a little, at least to move the lines in relation to an equally important measure as the three we will vote today: the extension of the guard in sight. If you do not join the majority, I will allow myself, given the requests of the services, to give you a few lessons.

Mr. Ducarme, if you call that the version without polemics, then I am very curious how the version with polemics looks.

Mr. Vanden Burre rightly and with great conviction defended the work of various groups in the Committee on Combating Terrorism. This work lives on a tense foot with the speech of Mr. Ducarme.

Mr. Ducarme, in addition – this must be of my heart – I am surprised by your assertivity, especially today.

Today we have been able to take note of the total laxity of one of your ministers in the field of security. We have also been able to take note of the fact that a MR minister has systematically ignored signals to improve airport safety. We have seen a MR Prime Minister who has not answered the questions on this subject and who says here to the assembly that he wants clarity. A prime minister who says he wants clarity, that is the world on his head. Usually, a prime minister is prepared.

So, Mr. Ducarme, if you show only 10% of your assertivity, which you show to the opposition and the socialist members, to your own minister, then the situation in our country would look different. In that case, we might have another Minister of Mobility.

Mr. Calvo, we can return the ball and systematically return to the problem of airport security. It is clear that this issue will be discussed within the commission of inquiry, as the prime minister recalled. We support this approach because it is essential.

It is not about being assertive. Rather, it is simply about asking you the basis of the choice you are making in the name of certain reservations to measures that we consider essential. I’m not looking for controversy, I’m just asking you... (Brouhaha)

Listen, if you ask to justify some of your positions is polemic, then the debate becomes impossible. I ask you to explain, at least, why you intend to abstain from these measures that are going absolutely in the right direction. I do not understand why you abstained. I have probably been a bit distracted by the issue of the extension of the guard in sight. Given the requests from the services, and you indicated that you had participated in the hearings, I do not understand that we cannot agree on a minimum extension of the watch.

Mr. Ducarme, our fellow citizens expect us to debate the substance and not that we return the ball or give lessons.

First of all, we will abstain from some articles. I remind you that, for the overall text, we decided to follow the government’s project, because we join its objectives and intentions. Therefore, an abstention does not mean a blocking of the measure. We have very deep questions and relevant comments to be made that agree with the report of the Privacy Protection Commission.

Since some of our questions regarding some articles remained unanswered during committee debates, it seems to me healthy, responsible and constructive to abstain from these articles.

As for the guard, I have the impression that we did not attend the same hearings, Mr. Ducarme. Sincerely, your proposal to extend to 72 hours, over all the hearings, I must have only heard one or two people say “to the limit, if necessary.” All the other respondents, whether they were lawyers, lawyers generals or officials, opposed it. Not for an extension, but for 72 hours.

Ecolo-Groen has filed a text that goes further as it proposes to go up to 48 hours in the Constitution for all facts, under the control of an investigative judge after 24 hours. Do not accuse us of not wanting to move forward. It’s not because we don’t move forward exactly as you want that we don’t do anything. We are very constructive on this issue. Let’s read the PVs of the auditions.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to return to the bill that is being voted here today. Following a first package of anti-terrorism measures approved here in July 2015, there is a second bill, Terro II as it is now called. We had Terro I, now Terro II and I understood that there will be more.

The committee unanimously approved this bill, across party boundaries, majority and opposition. I would like to emphasize this because it is very important. We are affected by certain rights and freedoms. It is therefore very important that this room width is worn. This has also happened. We have just approved an amendment by Mr. Bonte from the opposition. I think this can emphasize the constructive course of the debates. It shows that we strive to ⁇ a certain goal together in this difficult period, with the serious facts that have happened to us. That is important.

We live in a rule of law. In a rule of law there are rules, it is not the Wild West. That means there are procedures, procedural rules, safeguards, right of defence, presumption of innocence, privacy. We know all of that. Just as every citizen must comply with these rules, our investigators, our security services, our Justice and our police must comply with them. However, the opposite is that criminals and terrorists do not comply with this at all. They do not take into account rules, they do not take into account procedures or hours. They are even less deterred by this. What can they care about the victim’s rights? What does it matter to the victim’s innocence? There is a very unequal struggle on the ground. Our police services and our justice offices adhere to the rules, the opponents do not. Today, however, they face ⁇ serious challenges. They must guarantee our security. They are going to fight those terrorists, those heavy criminals. If we can help them with some measures and for that we must limit some freedom, then that is only so. Then that is not a problem for us. Exceptional circumstances require exceptional measures. We approve these measures today.

What is it about? We all know the inviolability of our home. Between 9 o’clock in the evening and 5 o’clock in the morning, no one is allowed to enter you. It should not be simply anyway. With this design, nightly home search in Terro affairs will be possible. Ladies and gentlemen, that is very important. Why Why ? Criminals don’t follow the rules, but they know the rules.

We know from previous records that they also take rest between 21:00 and 05:00, set up their alarms and prepare armed at 04:45 until the researchers may arrive at 05:00. At 4:45 they arm themselves literally and figuratively. With the nightly home search, we offer our services additional opportunities to mine that too.

The expansion of the telephone. We are all attached to our privacy, but in the context of heavy arms trade, I think it is no more than normal that phone call can be extended. For us, it is not a problem that these freedoms are affected.

In addition, this bill also provides a legal framework for a dynamic database. This is also essential. The facts have shown that the flow of information and communication can and should be improved. This database will be a very important tool because the different services will be able to share important information with each other.

These three measures are very important. They offer our services more armrests to protect our society.

I would like to remind you that these are not the first measures to be taken. Something has already happened. There is still much to be done, there is still a lot of work on the shelves and there are still holes in our system to be filled, but a lot of measures have already been taken after Verviers. Sometimes you forget that.

I would like to take this opportunity to remind you. I think of the practical matters that have been arranged, such as the additional personnel that already exists, the Channel Plan of Minister Jambon, the database of jihadists that will be rolled out this month, the more targeted control of our land borders and software packages that catch a three-year technological lag.

There is also the Terro I legislation that we have already adopted in July, the withdrawal of the identity card is easier, moving abroad is criminal, there are more special investigation opportunities and more possibilities for withdrawal of nationality, freezing of national funds and I can continue for a moment.

Also in the field of justice we have modified the legislation and the procedures and there are even more in the context of the execution of penalties. These plans are ahead. Terro III and IV are located in the pipeline.

Our colleagues, this government and our Parliament have taken a lot of anti-terrorism measures since Verviers. Today we are taking another important step in this regard. I think it ⁇ won’t be the last step.

The current debate takes place in a difficult and unfortunate context for our democracy. The time is not for naivety and we must remain vigilant in the protection of public and individual freedoms.

In a committee, we had a high-quality debate during which all commissioners spoke in the sense of the general interest. Whoever says democracy, says free debate in committees and in parliament. Democracy is also a majority and an opposition, each with its responsibilities. Thus, the responsibility of the opposition is to democratically control the work of the majority.

These notions are indisputable and that is why I am sided, Mr. Ducarme, by your intervention recently. I, like many others, have lived through all the committee debates and I will not respond to what I consider a provocation.

I will not consider your proposal as a cloud of smoke spread preventively.

You can use big words, talk about "provocation" or "sidération" ...

“Provocation” is not a big word! You will hear my explanation, Mr. Ducarme, if you let me speak.

If I cannot question a number of reservations that you make about this project and which I do not endorse because I do not understand them, the democratic debate you are talking about cannot take place.

I simply ask the PS to explain to the House its reservations and the reason for its abstinence regarding a certain number of points.

The [...]

I am in the correction. If you want to keep an orderly, serene, correct debate, don’t waste your time interrupting your political opponents. We need to be united on these topics. This is the debate, Mr Frédéric. When one asks for the word to speak, this is called a parliamentary debate.

This is not about offending you, Mr. Demeyer.

This is an offence to intellectual honesty.

It is simply about having explanations within the framework of a proper debate. You indicated that you would develop your reluctance to some parts of the project. I listen to you very serenely.

Three topics are therefore on the agenda: the possibility for police services to conduct 24-hour searches, the expansion of telephone surveillance and the establishment of a legal basis for common databases dedicated to the fight against terrorism.

I will be brief on the first two points. On the one hand, my group supports the amendment expanding the possibilities of telephone listening and recording private communications or telecommunications as part of the new proposals. On the other hand, although we consider that the current law already allows the desired night searches, the Socialist group will support the extension of the possibilities of 24 h/24 search for terrorist offences covered by the Criminal Code and for offences of association of offenders or criminal organization, where there are serious indications of the presence of firearms or explosives.

On the other hand, the third part, concerning the creation of dynamic databases, seems to raise a few questions. In fact, filing is a very sensitive technique in the field of protection of privacy and individual freedoms. Therefore, we must proceed with caution and ensure that at least two conditions are met, as I have long explained in the committee.

On the one hand, the effectiveness of the project and, on the other hand, the existence of clear labels regarding the functioning of the new system and its future developments. So what do we see? In terms of efficiency, first of all, the project brings together a very wide range of actors in the data collection, so wide that the mass of the data collected may make unreadable, for the competent authorities, some of the relevant items collected.

Without betraying the monitoring work of the P and R Committees, we have already raised the fact that file management in its current form presents difficulties. And we noted that it fit well into the government’s intentions to improve the situation. However, we wonder if it ⁇ ’t be more relevant and priority to make existing tools work efficiently, rather than adding an additional layer of database.

Then I come to the tags to ask about the future functioning and development of this dynamic database. Four reasons make the system potentially imperfect in our eyes and already lead us to ring the alarm. Who will be the operational manager? Who will be the subject of a file? Who Eats the Databases? How to get out of the database? Here are the four questions!

First, the operational manager of the databases, current and future, is not identified. It seems that in the first place it will be the Ocam. Nothing in the project allows to say whether any databases created in the future will be managed by other operators or not and who they will be. It is critical to us that at least one senior judge or a senior police officer be responsible for such sensitive tools, which does not take away anything from the ability of the government and ministers in charge to pilot the operations. But this reason is one of the reasons why, together with the State Council, we are questioning the relevance of using the Law on Police Function as a legal vehicle for the creation of these databases. This does not mean that we are against its creation.

Second, who will be the subject of the file? The concepts are also uncertain. Extremism that can lead to terrorism, we are told, is an entirely new formula that leaves room for broad interpretations.

The concept is not defined anywhere. We are pleased that our amendment has been received. And we thank the majority for this, including CD&V, but not only. This amendment refers to Article 139, § 2 of the Criminal Code, although we are not the only ones who have mentioned this possibility.

This article explicitly excludes organisations whose real object is exclusively of political, trade union, philanthropic, philosophical or religious order. This is a tag but a minimum tag and we would have preferred the use of a slightly clearer and slightly more accurate definition.

This is also the case with the definition of the need to know, need to know, of an institution empowered for strategic, tactical or operational purposes. We are asking questions. What is a strategic, tactical or operational end? The project is silent in this regard. I would like to clarify the concept.

Third, the question of which authorities and institutions will power the databases is crucial. The government has chosen from a very wide list. I have indicated the risk of this choice for effectiveness but the list is left open and it could be changed, not by a debate in parliament as we have for the first list, but through a simple royal decree. The amendments should also come to Parliament. They may be subject to professional secrecy. We do not know what will be done tomorrow. Will the users of this delegation tomorrow forever be animated with as noble intentions as the ministers of today?

Fourth, monitoring, in particular in terms of data retention time, is problematic. They can remain, colleagues, up to six decades in the files. Sixty years! It’s the same thing, but “six decades” is better said! So let’s be serious! Control of the possibilities of exit from the file is fundamental. When can we go out? That is, when a person who is arrested is no longer arrested. That is, when one decides – and it is happy – to communicate information to other foreign services as part of a good European or global police.

The bill does not provide for any guarantee or condition in this regard. We do not oppose the idea, we simply ask for some guarantees. We think this is the role of the opposition and, in fact, of every Democrat.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, I could have developed, but this was done in committee and this is recorded in the minutes. I could have explained very long the arguments raised in the committee that justified our abstention on the specific points I have just addressed. We call on you to keep our interventions in mind because they are important on a democratic level. I would like to emphasize that the ministers seemed to us attentive and receptive in the committee; proof of this is the amendment recently adopted with the support of the majority.

There were comments and abstentions. However, and only that matters, in view of the general balance of the text and the general interest in the moments we are going through, the Socialist Party has approved the overall text in commission. This will be the position of the Socialist Group in the plenary session.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, Colleagues, Mrs. Onkelinx has recalled: our fight against terrorism has indeed been going on for several years, now for fifteen years. I suppose it is our struggle. It is a painful determination and a terrible, undeniable reality that the plea has long not been won.

You will agree with me that the fight against terrorism should not be conducted only through repression. I heard a colleague in French say that we should not be naive. Justice and intelligence and security services need all possible and necessary means to protect our country, our citizens, our fundamental rights and freedoms.

In the past, we have not stood still. As early as 2003, we introduced the crime of terrorism as a criminal offence in our Criminal Code and even criminalized the recruitment and incitement to terrorism. For us, as members of the Justice Committee, this seemed even a little overwhelmed, but today the reality teaches us that it was indeed not a minute too late to criminalize those acts as well. Recently, in 2015, entering and leaving the territory for the purpose of committing terrorist crimes was also criminalized. This was one of the twelve measures announced by the government following the prevented attacks of Verviers, all of which were carried out one by one unshorted. So, I repeat, we did not stand still; we worked hard.

We must continue to invest in people and resources, in our security services. There is no point in attacking those who are daily in the weather for our freedoms and our security. We need to strengthen their functioning.

It is in that sense that today three of the measures announced by the government on 19 November 2015 will be approved by the House. If I can read the discussions in the committee, I assume that those measures will be approved almost unanimously. This only underlines that it is indeed our common struggle that we must fight against terrorism.

I have already quoted it in the committee and I would like to repeat it: I can only agree with the words the prime minister has uttered here in the middle of the round, namely that it is the duty of all Democrats to fight fanatism and terrorism resolutely and relentlessly. We must fight the enemies of freedom, with respect for the rule of law and for our fundamental values. That is our duty, Democrats. We will do that too.

In other words, we must not give up our freedoms and fundamental rights, enshrined in the Constitution. We must defend and respect them: the freedom of the person, the inviolability of the home, the right to respect for one’s private life.

These rights and freedoms, however, are not absolute, and in the fight against terrorism and in the defense of our Constitutions we must weigh a lot. We need to do that well thoughtfully. If our fundamental rights and freedoms are affected, this must be done in a clear and proportionate manner.

The measures presented today can pass that test for our group. It is good that they have been submitted to the Privacy Committee and to the Council of State. It is also good that, to the extent possible, the comments that have been made have been taken into account.

I would like to briefly refer to the house searches and night arrests. It would have been easy to take a general measure. There is, however, a well-considered and well-defined decision to use such a heavy, profound measure only in the fight against terrorism and heavy banditism. That is proportionate, well thought out and well defined. Therefore, we will also approve that measure.

There is no need to argue that the phone call is a very profound and extensive measure for the privacy of all those involved.

Since that measure is well-defined and is used only in the case of arms trade, and in a subsidiary manner, which I think is important, we will also approve the relevant provisions.

Finally – several colleagues have already cited this – a very old one is being addressed, which our group has repeatedly called for. It creates a legal basis for sharing information and personal data, not with anyone, but with those who have the legal right and duty to protect our security. We are pleased that this legal basis is now under vote. I cannot emphasize enough the importance of that measure, for various reasons.

First, if our rules, such as our fundamental rights and freedoms and our rights of defence, are not respected, then the terrorists will be out faster than we will have seized them. Therefore, a legal basis is needed. Not only our Belgian government says that, but it is also said on the European and international level. We must therefore respect those rules, no matter how good-intentioned and legitimate the struggle is.

Second, it is important that channels are created. Those involved should know who to whom to report and with whom to share what information. If this information is shared, it must also be validated so that one can assume that the information in a database is correct. If the information is no longer up-to-date, it should be removed. Internal and external control mechanisms should monitor the correctness and orderliness of the flow, as well as respect for, inter alia, the right to the protection of privacy.

All these reasons together lead us to one decision: we will approve the present draft in full conviction and in the hope that one will work with it on the ground. It makes no sense to approve measures on paper; they must also be applied on the ground. Thus, we give the resources to those who are daily in the wake of our security, our rights and our freedoms.

I hope that we will soon receive maximum support for the measures presented today by the Minister of Justice for approval to Parliament.

I would like to briefly emphasize the importance of this bill. Of course, our group will support this bill. We will support our Minister in this. The most important thing is that we want to approve all of this.

I am very pleased with the words of Mr. Demeyer at the end of his presentation. He talked about the balance that is contained in this bill and the importance of certain measures. It adorns the opposition and especially the PS to agree with it, in all intellectual honesty.

For the rest, I will not repeat the various measures again because my colleagues have already done this. We must take these measures now. We will never know if they could have prevented the horrible events of March 22. These are all measures that we must take for our people and our police officers. If we do not take these measures, it might be criminal.

In the Terro committee there was good cooperation. I hope this continues like this. We will also agree to an amendment by Mr. Bonte as it is a further perfection of what is proposed here. I think it is going the right way and therefore my group will of course approve these measures.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, colleagues, we all share a large piece of frustration after March 22, after Charlie Hebdo, after Verviers, after the Thalys Incident, and so on. I think we are all suffering in a painful way to what terrorists are capable of.

At the same time, as representatives of this assembly, we must dare to see the relativity of what laws can do. The previous speaker, Ms. Van Cauter, has referred to criminalizing forcing people to leave. My experience on this subject teaches that with laws, unfortunately, one cannot stop people. This illustrates the frustration that we think we share in this area. Unfortunately, such a horribly complex problem cannot be solved by laws alone.

However, I give you a surplus of right, Mrs. Van Cauter, if you say that it is our duty to provide the security services with the best possible tools, capabilities and means to act vigorously. I say this even though I belong to those who are convinced that one can ⁇ and definitely control radicalism not only with repressive measures.

Therefore, we must effectively seek efficiency. For this we need legislation.

This brings me to the design that is presented. Colleagues and gentlemen ministers, I think that the SPAA supports the bill with full conviction, because it contributes to what we also advocate: more efficiency and more impact for our security services. We also included certain elements from the draft law in bills, which we withdrew. For example, I think of important elements such as nightly home searches and phone calls. The legal basis for databases is not too early. Meanwhile, everyone has learned through the media that today there is still some chaos in the area of information exchange between databases. So I find it ⁇ good that a legal basis for this is now being created.

I am grateful to the colleagues for subsequently going into the committee on a bill we had submitted and now then in the form of an amendment sought to get added to this bill, with which we tried to make the difficult bridge between the judicial investigation and the information that comes there and the local police services that have the task of closely monitoring people. I think that this bridge is important and that you can also work on it locally. This could strengthen police and administrative services in their difficult challenge of closely monitoring those FTF’s, or “visible and clampy” as described in the press release of the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs. Therefore, I hope that this will make those local police services a little better armed, where they today often have to work blindly. I am grateful to my colleagues that this has also received full support in the committee.

In conclusion, I would like to address in particular the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Justice. We have already talked about the hard work of the past thirteen years. A new design is announced: Terror 2 or Terror 3. A commission of inquiry will soon be established that should carefully examine what can be better and which apparently should also look for responsible.

However, I think that we all must also realize that there is a lot of executive work on the table. Executive tasks that deal with dysfunctions, that deal with difficulties in the flow of information, that deal with a shortage of capacity in certain cases, that deal with many things.

It is my feeling – I address the ministers – that every time the country is involved in a major incident, the willingness to resolve some issues and break some taboo is great. My frustration is also that that willingness quickly disappears again and we remain with the same difficulties. This should not be the case this time, colleagues, members of the government.

This is in line with the Prime Minister’s call. We must try to remove the existing taboo, especially in the workplace, across the majority and opposition. We can ⁇ efficiency. At the same time, the airport files and the issue of the safety passes were discussed. There is work to do.

I read in the newspaper that Minister Homans pointed out yesterday in the Flemish Parliament that in the capital a number of municipalities do not carefully carry out their circulation letter, which is crucial in the succession of the FTF’ers. I press myself well. I think she is right that we can be stronger and better at this point.

I would like to point out the problem of population registers, the basis of security policy. A number of mayors say clearly and clearly that they will not get it in order. That is a disregard of legislation, circular letters, directives. Fund of Security Policy.

I would like to point out that there is indeed a very unequal police capacity between different police zones. I can point out that we can actually ⁇ efficiency by scaling up the police work. I like to refer to Brussels, but I also look to Flanders. I also look at my area. My governor also launched the message that we should go to larger police zones. I hope we get rid of the taboo too.

In some matters, after the attacks in Brussels and Maalbeek, we cannot lose a second of time.

You do not get it explained to me, gentlemen ministers, that a police zone like mine or a zone in Brussels, which must oversee dozens of FTF’s, does not get direct access to, for example, the camera network of the MIVB. You cannot consult them online, but you must follow them. There are cameras at every metro station, but you can’t use them. That is no longer normal.

The same goes for Securail. In every major train station in our country there is camera surveillance. It is monitored in Brussels. Local police officers cannot do this. This is no longer normal when, rightly, one expects the local police zones to follow closely and closely.

Mr. Minister of Internal Affairs, I am pleased to see that you are investing resources in the expansion of the ANPR camera network. I think that is good. You know that I also work in the police area for which I am responsible in this regard. You know that there is a support platform in the Rand around Brussels to further roll out this network.

Colleagues, it is not normal that the FTF registration plates today are not in all police zones in the system. We have seen how mobile they are, we have seen that the FTF’s who commit attacks have links with different police zones, with Verviers, with Brussels, with Vilvoorde, with elsewhere. It is not normal that those number plates are not in the system of the network that exists today.

Colleagues, I can continue for a while, for example, on the single-band problem. There is still a lot of efficiency to be achieved. However, we will not regulate this here as a legislator. I think I hold a rightful plea for the strengthening of the executive power, with a government commissioner, to quickly address all those practical issues and remove the small and large taboo in the workplace. I think we should discuss this. Certainly the government should do that.

I want to point you to history, colleagues. At the time of the dioxin crisis, when the chickens had been out of the ranks for a long time, it was still useful to appoint a government commissioner to simplify procedures, strengthen controls and expand supervision. What can happen in a food crisis should ⁇ be possible in a terrorist crisis as we are experiencing here.

I therefore advise not to wait with these practical matters until all the trees are equally thick, until the Terro Commission has made its analysis or until the investigation committee has made its analysis. We all benefit from giving the government more power to tackle them quickly and efficiently in all those practical issues that are still effectively discussed today, which are known and over which there is no discussion. At that point, you will also be able to count on our party to support that.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, first of all, I would like to emphasize the importance of the current discussion and debates around the fight against terrorism and the necessary strengthening of the royal functions of our federal state, in which successive governments have not ceased to disinvest over the last ten years.

The debate we have here is therefore crucial in general, given that security is a common good that must be guaranteed for all our fellow citizens, and more ⁇ following the terrible attacks of March 22, which are still very present in the minds of all Belgians. A rapid, serious, thorough and proportionate political response was therefore necessary, in particular in the context of the work of the Terrorism Commission.

However, speed and precipitation should not be confused. In this regard, I would like to remind you that we regret not being able to organize hearings as part of the analysis of this text. We could have done it quickly, shortened during the Easter holidays, but it was refused despite our request.

That being said, my Ecolo-Groen group intends to participate in this debate in a constructive way, while keeping a critical look, as we have always done. Yes, problems need to be solved, but it is equally important to meet precise criteria for the adoption of a new regulation. I use this to recall the criteria that we use as environmentalists as a priority in the texts discussed in connection with the fight against terrorism.

First, it is necessary to determine whether legislation is really necessary and to examine whether the existing regulation is not sufficient to address the challenges that arise. Second, evaluate whether the possible new legislation leads to greater efficiency and efficiency. Real progress must be recorded in these areas for any new measure adopted. Thirdly, the balance between the objective of regulation, in this case the effective fight against terrorism, and respect for fundamental rights, is, in our view, primary. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that a number of relevant questions have been raised by the Privacy Protection Commission as part of the review of this text. In addition, he gave a negative opinion on six points.

The main questions are about the need to create a new database rather than develop more ahead of existing tools.

I will now enter into the more detailed analysis of the measures contained in the bill. As regards searches, the bill provides for a sixth exception to night searches. This exception applies, on the one hand, to all offences related to terrorism and, on the other hand, to those dealing with criminal organizations and associations of offenders. In this second case, the explicit condition of an acute danger is added, namely the existence of indications that the persons concerned will oppose the search using specified means (firearms, explosives, etc.).

This condition, however, is not imposed in the case of terrorist offences which can therefore include, for example, the dissemination of tracts. In such cases, a night search may also be allowed even if the person concerned is not armed at all. This is our main concern regarding this first measure of the bill. Why does this explicit condition not also apply to this category of terrorist-related offences?

In its opinion, the Council of State further emphasized that, in such cases, it must be necessary to provide additional procedural or material justification. It refers in this regard to the French regulation. For the government, therefore, no special motivation is required and the mere finding of a possible terrorist offence is sufficient to motivate a night search. This is a regret on our part and we would have wished that such motivation was requested.

For the rest, we support this measure on principle, but we demand that the regulation in this area be drafted with the necessary care and prudence.

On the level of strengthening the means to fight against the trafficking in weapons, Ecolo-Groen welcomes the attention that the government pays, finally, to this problem that we have put forward with force since the attacks on Charlie Hebdo. We therefore support this measure without reservation.

With regard to the provisions on databases, we believe that the establishment of a dynamic database is absolutely necessary in the fight against terrorism. However, we have significant reservations about the practical way in which the government wants to implement such a system.

First, the proposed regulation speaks of creating “one or more databases”. This leads us to question the actual scope of the provisions of the bill. Does the establishment of several additional dynamic databases not make the situation even more complex?

Do we intend to connect all these databases to each other and, if so, do we have the assurance that such a system will work, when it is currently failing? Will existing databases be integrated into the new terrorism database(s) and then deleted as such?

The explanation of the reasons for the bill further specifies that “a common management of personal data and information should be considered, provided that at least two services are to cooperate in the prevention and monitoring of these phenomena.”

There are many such collaborations. For example, between the State Security and the SGRS, between the local police and the federal police, between the local police and the State Security, etc. So will a dynamic database be created for each collaboration? In other words, how many new databases will it be and how will they articulate in relation to each other?

In our view, the new system will have no added value on the ground if it does not provide a clear answer to these questions. The government’s position is not reassuring on this point. Indeed, the argument is as follows: "The choice of the legal integration of common databases referred to in the Law on the Police Function is based on the fact that the police will be able to ensure the technical support of the databases, the police having in fact the technical capacity."

This point of view, in our view, strongly contrasts with the content of reports of the Committee P, for example, overwhelming in terms of the technical capacity of the police to manage databases. From this perspective, the government’s argument is far from softening our fears.

To conclude on this chapter on databases, we find that the database aims to counter the phenomena of terrorism and extremism that can lead to terrorism. In doing so, how will the data relating to terrorist offences be matched with those relating to conventional offences?

Current investigations indicate that persons suspected of terrorism whose names are mentioned in the investigations are sometimes not known for terrorist offences, but for acts of big banditism.

Therefore, it will inevitably be necessary to overlap the data relating to the different offences in order to detect any potential danger. In conclusion, my Ecolo-Groen group understands and shares the objectives of the bill under consideration as well as the principles underlying these objectives. For this reason, in the committee and during the plenary vote, we will support this text in its entirety. This did not prevent us from abstaining, to remain consistent with what I have just explained, on the articles organizing concrete databases.

For this reason, ladies and gentlemen ministers, our support is not a blank check because we have expressed serious reservations about the feasibility of measures related to databases, which we will therefore follow with the utmost care. We also invite you, with the utmost insistence, to follow and respect the many relevant comments made in the opinions of the State Council and the Commission for the Protection of Privacy.

I will speak from my bank because I will be brief. Our group welcomes these bills and legislative proposals that will be submitted to our vote in a few moments. This is the first time that the terrorism committee carries out a concrete legislative work that results.

These three measures are part of the measures announced by the government following the Paris attacks; some of them, such as the issue of the dynamic database, were already announced a year ago by the Minister of Justice. We welcome these measures. This will help to fight terrorism more effectively. This was expected by the security services. It seems to us that they are proportionate and that they respect our values, such as privacy protection, proportionality and procedural guarantees through an investigative judge.

As much as we did not discuss 24-hour searches in terrorism - we knew that there were already exceptions to the ban on night searches in drug trafficking - so we did not discuss the issue of telephone interceptions related to gun trafficking, as much, it is true, on the issue of databases, we read carefully the opinion of the State Council and the Privacy Commission. We had also questioned the government on the issue of the thousand sheets of databases because we know how central this issue of data exchange is. We have not yet succeeded in sufficiently exchanging relevant data, nor in ensuring that such data, once transmitted into the databases, can be analyzed and proactive action in the fight against terrorism. It is really central.

We had some confusion about this proposal for a new database. We listened to the arguments of the government and noted in particular that this was the result of a long work of all the security services, of all the experts brought to process sensitive data in Belgium in the field of combating terrorism and major crime. We were told that this was the best option. We are not technically competent enough to say the opposite. So we joined together. We did not abstain, but the question remains. It will be necessary to check whether this device is really the most suitable.

We wanted to be accountable and demonstrate that we would like to support the efforts made, but we will need to check in the future whether, in terms of information exchange, the device in place is suitable. It will not make the economy of knowing what we do to interconnect all the databases. We know, and this has been addressed in the monitoring committees of the P and R committees, that they are numerous and spread across a whole range of police and intelligence services.

It is necessary to ensure that the relevant information can be used by all those who need it.

We welcome the amendment submitted by Mr. It allows local police and mayors to have access to some important information for the fight against terrorism, in which they also have a role to play.

Our party will support all the proposals that are on the table today and we hope that in the future we can continue to move forward in the fight against terrorism.

Mr. Speaker, I can reassure you. It is not my intention to break down the bill. On the contrary, the proposals made in it are realistic and correct and should have been put into practice for a long time. Night searches, the extension of interim detention, the extension of telephone calls, a legal basis for the databases in our country and a better coordination in this matter seem to me to be evident.

As often happens in politics, the design is a typical example of firewall policy. The committee, led by colleague Koen Metsu, was established after the attacks in Paris and for four months, up to the attacks in Brussels, led a – let me euphemistically express it – sleeping existence. There were a lot of hearings, with all that came to be seen, to ultimately hide that there was no consensus, not only in the majority, but also beyond, because we needed a two-thirds majority in order to eventually pour these proposals into a bill and get approved here.

As is often the case in politics, there was also a new cause needed. The attacks in Paris were not enough. The attacks in Brussels were necessary before the committee in rapid pace finally concluded that it was really necessary to put the proposals into practice. If the Brussels attacks had not occurred, then colleague Metsu might still be looking for a two-thirds majority to implement the proposals.

We will therefore approve the proposals, because we have been thinking for a long time that they are correct and right, and that they were better put into practice in the past.

Does that mean that all the problems are now solved? Will the terrorists respect our country in the future because of these proposals? I don’t think, but on the contrary.

This is all but the patriot act for which Bart De Wever, the chairman of Mr. Metsu, advocated some time ago. He wanted a Flemish patriot act, well, this text, this bill is not even a faint decoction of the American patriot act.

Do we need special investigation methods that allow terrorists, alleged terrorists, potential terrorists and terrorists established to have committed terrorist acts, to be questioned through these methods? Yes, we need that.

Do we need an extension of the mandate and powers of the investigative judges to do what needs to be done when it comes to terrorism? Yes, we need that.

Is there a need for a ban on terrorist, jihadist and salafist symbols? Such a ban is needed.

Should some salafist, wahabist and jihadist mosques and premises in this country be closed? Yes, they must be closed.

Should we ensure that Salafist and Islamic extremist literature is banned and that there is an index of relevance for this type of literature? Yes, we must do that.

And so I can continue for a while.

In difficult times, as is the case now, we must – and I have heard this several times in the committee – not too much and not too often appeal to some democratic rights for people who have a lack of democracy. The terrorist threat that we are currently facing in this country and elsewhere in Europe lacks democracy, wants to destroy democracy, wants to destroy our society and the values and standards for which it stands.

In the end, we must not be more holy than the Pope wants and dare, we must dare to go to the bone, we must make exceptional measures, special legislation and a Belgian patriot act actually possible to put a pillar and a punch on terrorism. And not just terrorism. Following the discussion on the establishment of the Investigative Committee, I will take a closer look at this.

Terrorism is only one of the many facets of Islamic radicalism in this country. The policy of torture in the past against Salafism, against Wahabism, against Islamic extremism, has for decades laid the ground for the terrorism that we finally experienced in our country a few weeks ago. Therefore, we must also dare to act strongly and repeatedly against it. But well, with the bill, we cut a few branches of the tree and that is better than nothing. However, we do not touch the tree itself and ⁇ not the roots. All beginnings are difficult. We will be gentle and therefore we will at least approve the bill.

Can I ask for a little more attention – and I will ⁇ turn to the Flemish nationalists at the N-VA – for article 8 of this bill? The definition of extremism is “racist, xenophobic, anarchist” – and then it comes – “nationalist, authoritarian or totalitarian conceptions or intentions, whether of a political, ideological, confessional or philosophical nature, which, in theory or in practice, are contrary to the principles of democracy or human rights, to the proper functioning of democratic institutions or other foundations of the rule of law”.

I know, it has been somewhat corrected with Article 139. I will not quote that. If one abuses the article, then, of course, on the basis of the concept of nationalism, it could also be applied to a number of parties and organizations, Mr. Minister of Internal Affairs, which should not at any time be identified by that legislation as such. My party has been on the list of state-threatening organizations long enough to at least be vigilant when I read such passages in a bill. It surprises me somewhat that the N-VA eventually abandoned the term nationalist in an article that ultimately defines extremism. Did we also have socialism, Islam, and I know a lot which other ideology should not be mentioned? I leave the question and the answer open.

In any case, the word nationalism does not, in my opinion, fit into the line of indications within the framework of a definition of the word extremism. But also in this regard I would like to spread the mantle of love, because I think it is indeed necessary that the proposed articles be put into practice. I only hope that through Article 8, paragraph C, the draft law will never be abused to affect Flemish national groups or parties. I don’t think that can or should not be the intention. At least let the warning be noted. Should that ever be the case, I will not fail to refer to my concerns, which I have expressed here with these.

On 22 March, our country and its democratic values have been touched in the heart. Such violations of our freedoms, such acts of violence and hatred are intolerable. The day after these horrific attacks, it was time for national unity and gathering, tribute and support to the victims and their families.

Then, quickly, the reality of parliamentary work grabbed us to learn from the events and take new measures in the fight against terrorism. Thus, a week after the attacks, the counter-terrorism commission passed this bill, the first bill filed since it came into force last November. We needed a strong gesture. I now dare hope that the pace of the committee’s work will remain as sustained for the other subjects it will be brought to, and that the constructive legislative proposals of the opposition can now be analyzed without having to wait for the submission of bills on the same subjects.

To return to this bill, I will not surprise you by saying that my group will support it, given the legislative shortcomings observed in the field, but also the overall positive opinions of the Privacy Protection Commission and the State Council.

The extension of the possibility of carrying out searches between 9 a.m. and 5 a.m. to terrorist offences and criminals and criminal organisations with prohibited weapons was indeed a necessity. The investigations into the attacks in Paris and Brussels have shown that. This possibility, of course, already existed, but there was some legal confusion that had to be lifted in order to limit disputes on the ground. As for expanding the use of telephone listening for the fight against arms trafficking and terrorism, my party has always supported this idea.

My colleague Olivier Maingain and I had indeed submitted in November a proposal to amend the Law on the Code of Criminal Instruction in this sense. I regret, however, that the government has not gone further. In fact, the gun law also has gaps that terrorists take advantage of.

As we explained in our bill, we consider it useful to extend to new terrorist offences the sentences making applications for permits for possession of firearms inadmissible, to clarify the procedure for the transfer of firearms imported to Belgium, in order to improve their best traceability, to allow the prosecutor’s office, whenever it justifies it, to verify compliance with the conditions necessary to keep its permission and permission for possession of a firearm.

We also proposed to establish a mechanism of parliamentary control, which the bill responds to, without however specifying that this control must result in a report at least annually, which we regret.

As for the creation of a common database, we fully understand its usefulness. It is urgently necessary to optimise the collection, exchange, processing, management and updating of personal data and information crucial to the fight against terrorism.

We are also pleased to find that the project is more ambitious than the circulary on the exchange of information and the follow-up of foreign terrorist fighters whose shortcomings my colleague, Olivier Maingain, had highlighted.

Finally, we welcome the guarantees provided by the project: the opinion of the Committee R and the Body of Control of Police Information as preliminary to the development of the rules relating to the recording of data, the three-year official review of data, the conditional archiving of data, the appointment of a security and privacy protection adviser or – and this is really primary – the exchange of data with foreign services.

Therefore, we will, of course, support the whole of this project, while drawing attention to two points. First, the problems with the management of databases that already exist in the field of terrorism will need to be solved. Second, sufficient financial, human and administrative resources will need to be provided to support all of our police and intelligence services.

Without these means, you will adopt the best measures in the world, but they will never be fully effective in the face of this plague that is terrorism.

Mr. Speaker, I will not be long since I have already been able to develop in committee the criticisms regarding this project. It is true that I was satisfied to see one of my criticisms relating to the absence of reference to Article 139, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code.

However, this is not enough to make this project acceptable. First, because there is, in general, a leak forward legislative from this government. Thus, instead of analyzing the dysfunctions of a system, we introduce new laws without questioning the points to be settled. It is like putting the chariot before the bulls.

It is also observed that the government, instead of taking targeted and effective measures against terrorism, takes general measures (population census, general surveillance, etc.). However, this poses problems on the democratic level but also in terms of effectiveness in the fight against terrorism.

I will soon review the three points relating to this project. First, as regards the extension of the special measures relating to the trafficking in weapons, in addition to the general objection I have just made, we have little to say, given that this is the general framework for the fight against the trafficking in weapons, that it is well defined and that the law provides for appealing to an investigative judge.

On the other hand, with regard to the second point relating to the possibilities of searching and deprivation of liberty at night, problems actually arise. These are serious acts that infringe upon the person and his freedoms. Furthermore, it must be noted that it is already possible, within the framework of existing legislation, to conduct such searches at night if it is truly necessary.

Therefore, I do not see what this second point can actually bring to the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, the derivatives associated with this for the whole population seem clear to me.

As for the third aspect, databases, the problem is similar. It is first observed that instead of evaluating all the dysfunctions that already exist and that Committee P has identified, one layer is given. Then, we find very vague and highly dubious definitions referring to terrorism or extremism that can lead to terrorism. These points have been criticized by the Privacy Protection Commission.

Once again, the government takes general measures rather than targeted measures, which will undermine the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism and respect for certain democratic rights.

The PTB does not consider it necessary to remain passive in the face of terrorism. That is why we have introduced proposals for resolutions and laws containing very precise provisions. In any case, we feel that the government is doing the wrong way in its way of addressing this phenomenon.

Ordemotry