Proposition 54K0967

Projet de loi modifiant la loi du 31 janvier 2003 sur la sortie progressive de l'énergie nucléaire à des fins de production industrielle d'électricité afin de garantir la sécurité d'approvisionnement sur le plan énergétique.

General information ¶

Submitted by

MR Swedish coalition

Submission date

March 17, 2015

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

electrical industry power plant energy supply nuclear energy nuclear policy nuclear safety decommissioning of power stations security of supply

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V ∉ Open Vld N-VA LDD MR PP VB

Voted to reject

Groen Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP DéFI PVDA | PTB

Party dissidents ¶

• Olivier Maingain (MR) voted to reject.

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Discussion ¶

June 17, 2015 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker.

So I will present you the report for the meetings of 24 and 25 March – so we have been working for a long time – and of 5, 6 and 12 May; we had thirteen actors or operators who were audited. I refer you to the report for the hearing of these people.

As for the procedural elements, you have seen a small overview here in the plenary session. by Mr. Nollet and Mr. Calvo, in particular, will allow me, for all the procedural elements that took place during this committee, to also refer to the written report, on pages 4 and 5.

As far as the procedure is concerned, I would like to say that the request of MM. Nollet and Calvo to receive the draft text concerning the agreement to be concluded between the Federal State and Electrabel was rejected in commission. The request of Mr. Following the hearing of Mr. Woitrin was also rejected in the committee. The request of Mr. Listen to Mr. Lamotte. Bens was also rejected in the committee.

I was forced to summarize 127 pages of this report. I would like to summarize your comments, and I apologize. The report is available in its entirety on the website for those who wish to read it.

I will begin with the introductory explanation of the Minister, which recalls the decisions taken by the Government Agreement, in particular No. 1, the extension of the units of Doel 1 and 2. It is also about encouraging effective competition conditions and encouraging Electrabel to examine investment opportunities; asking Elia to continue its efforts to develop interconnection capabilities; create an energy transition fund; transpose the ‘efficiency’ directive – we talked about at the beginning of the plenary session –; asking CREG for recommendations to avoid the commissioning of conventional production units; increase supply flexibility; invest in new capacities and develop an energy vision. This is a reminder.

The government’s intention is to provide our country with an affordable and sustainable energy mix. According to the government, nuclear energy has several advantages: it allows us to limit our dependence on imported gas and oil, it has stable production costs and it is indispensable for achieving the climate targets set for Belgium.

The Minister also talks about the second bill that we have already discussed.

Then we come to the opinion of the Council of State. The Minister explains the Government's responses to the State Council's remarks regarding the expiration of certain provisions of the Doel 1 authorization. I suggest you read the entire legal demonstration of the Minister directly in the report. Otherwise, we will spend there much more than at night.

In summary, the Government considers that the State Council incorrectly uses the notion of expiration or expiration. The Minister recalls that the legislature of 2013 expressly wanted that the conditions of authorisation related to technical operation or safety be ⁇ ined while the production of electricity would no longer be effective. The environmental purpose associated with the individual authorisation issued in 1974 is ⁇ ined indefinitely. The government recalls that parliamentary work within the framework of Tihange 1 has made it clear. Therefore, there is no obligation or need for further impact studies.

The Minister continues to comment on the State Council opinion on the annual fee to be paid by Electrabel in exchange for the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2. The draft law will be deposited in order for the legislator to determine before 15 November 2015 the modalities for calculating this annual collection.

Here is the summary of the report. Following are the comments of all members.

by Mr. Wollants, on behalf of the N-VA Group, who is present here and was present at all committee meetings, tells us that the following questions regarding supply security should be answered: how will we ensure that the last megawatt of power is available when they are needed, and how will we ⁇ this goal in consultation with neighboring countries?

The speaker believes that debates on these key issues have been lengthy and that supply problems have been present since 2007 in our country. The extension of the lifetime of Doel 1 and Doel 2 is part of the measures to be taken to ensure the security of supply. He says that hearing shows that the simple import of electricity coming from abroad has nothing of a sinecure.

Finally, he recalls that it is not enough to provide for interconnections. There must also be, at the other end of the cables, a power plant to actively power the network. In addition, he explains that it is obvious that, last winter, Belgium has passed through the needle chas. The economic cost of displacement is 100 million euros per hour. Prices also have their importance. And he recalls that if there will be 700 million euros of investment in the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2, those 700 million euros will be borne by the operator and not the consumer.

In conclusion, he says that it is the safety criteria that must be met and it will be the responsibility of the AFCN to give its green light.

On behalf of the PS group, I recall that the decision to extend Doel 1 and Doel 2 is primarily an ideological decision decided by the MR and the N-VA imposed on their partners in the government coalition. This decision will not improve supply security in the short and medium term. For next winter, the reopening of Doel 1 and the extension of Doel 2 are compromised. Legal uncertainty, security work and fuel management strongly undermine the government’s timetable.

I noted that at no time did the minister, the AFCN, Electrabel or Elia dare to commit to the fact that Doel 1 would be available next winter. In the medium term, I have indicated that this bill has the direct consequence of challenging the nuclear output of 2025. How can we imagine the closure of seven nuclear power plants between 2022 and 2025? The feasibility of the schedule seems to me difficult.

I have pledged that the exit schedule voted by Parliament in 2013 should not be changed and that alternatives should be developed now. I noted that the government did not demonstrate a political will to develop these alternatives, as illustrated by the abandonment of the tender launched by the previous government. With regard to the legal problem related to Doel 1 authorization, I regretted that the government refuses to follow the State Council opinion and the opinion distributed by the AFCN. I asked, on what legal analysis the Minister built his legal opinion. Was the legal analysis derived from the Energy Administration, its ministerial office or a private law firm? Regarding the agreement to be concluded with Electrabel, I regretted that no tags are contained in this bill.

With regard to nuclear security, I have expressed my group’s concerns in this regard and insisted that all the essential work for nuclear security should be carried out before the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2. I also insisted that a SALTO mission should be completed as soon as possible. Compared to the available staff, it is important to be vigilant because the age pyramid is reversed.

by Mr. The speaker took the speech on behalf of the group. He endorses the Minister’s approach and considers that the essential objective is to guarantee the security of supply. However, the project is only one element in the overall energy policy. The long-term goal is also to reduce Belgium’s energy dependence, the massive import of electricity from our neighboring countries being only a risk-free step-by-step and reminds that the black-out would cost 120 million euros per hour.

As regards the legal part of the file, the essential element lies in the preparatory work of the Act of 18 December 2013. The speaker is surprised by the turn of this discussion. At this point, the discussions on the extension of Tihange 1 did not raise so many questions. The solidity of the legal construction of the project cannot be questioned, according to Mr. by Friart. The Nuclear Energy Study Centre said that Doel 1 and Doel 2 did not pose problems in the field of nuclear safety. At the same time, nuclear energy is the least expensive option for consumers. We must also not forget the nuclear rent paid to the Treasury.

Ms. Dierick for CD&V recalls that in 2012, the government of the time approved a plan to guarantee the security of supply of our country and that this previous government had convinced the CD&V, since it voted and that it would not be necessary to extend Doel 1 and Doel 2. But Ms. Dierick says that we must dare to ask ourselves what has changed since 2013. Supply security has been systematically deteriorating. In terms of nuclear capacity, there is still great uncertainty about the micro-fissures detected in Doel 3 and Tihange 2. This represents an additional loss of 2,000 megawatts. Furthermore, the tender for a new state-of-the-art production capacity was suspended following the observations of the European Commission. All of these capacity losses have led the CD&V to support the extension of the Doel 1 and 2 lifetime, especially as the uncertainties for Tihange 2 and Doel 3 persist. Not deciding would be exposing yourself to shortages next winter. There is no alternative, according to Ms. Dierick. The import of an additional 1,000 megawatts at the northern border will only be possible from the end of 2016.

Accepting additional imports through Doel’s rescue line means giving up additional jobs. She talks about 200 employees of Doel 1 and Doel 2 who would lose their jobs. For Ms Dierick, affordability, sustainability and security of supply are the cornerstones of CD&V’s energy policy. The latter will accept the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2 only if the AFCN gives its green light.

for mr . Wilrycx, who spoke on behalf of the Open Vld, the many debates in Parliament on supply security and the decommissioning plan have sufficiently demonstrated the need for short-term action. The Open Vld considers the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2 a necessary evil. He also recommends showing some realism in this debate. It is not because Belgium would shut down its nuclear power plants that it could prevent the import of energy produced by other foreign nuclear power plants. With the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2, Wilrycx indicates that time is being purchased for the coming years in order to prepare for the vast energy mix. Therefore, Belgium must also cooperate intensively on building an Energy Union at European level. He draws attention to the storage of the energy he believes in. He thinks in this regard of the Tesla battery, the pilot project of Coo, the atoll in the North Sea. Storage is therefore crucial for the Open Vld. by mr. Wilrycx therefore welcomes the second bill that was discussed a while ago. He urges the Minister of Energy to work toward implementing an energy vision, as announced in the government agreement. He said that the Open Vld group will vote for the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2.

On behalf of Sp. Vande Lanotte believes that if we are, today, facing problems, it is not because of the law of 2003, but because the decisions that were to concretize this law have been systematically cancelled. He repeated it here. The bill under consideration also has the effect of repealing the decisions of 2013 voted by that parliament. by mr. Vande Lanotte predicts that some parties will try in 2025, with the same arguments, to extend the life of nuclear power plants again, and he rejects the argument that we passed through the needle hole last winter. During the peak day, Belgium only used 76% of its electricity generation capacity.

Then, he points out that, unlike other countries, nuclear production is not flexible in Belgium. It is constant and cannot be adjusted according to demand. The consequence is that nuclear energy brakes the development of renewable energies. The thesis developed by Elia during the hearings is correct: it will be difficult to meet the LOLE standard when the Doel 1 and Doel 2 power plants will close. However, this thesis is only valid if the Tihange 2 and Doel 3 power plants remain closed. Therefore, they actually propose to allow the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2 only on the condition that Tihange 2 and 3 remain closed. for Mr. Vande Lanotte, there are other alternatives, including the interconnection with the Netherlands, which would allow to import 1000 MW.

As regards the market price observations, due to insufficient internationalization, these prices are too high in Belgium, compared to those practiced in neighboring countries. This bill will only strengthen Electrabel’s monopoly. by Mr. Vande Lanotte does not share the Minister’s legal reasoning and recalls that the permits for industrial production of electricity that appear in Doel 1’s permits ended in February 2015. The operating authorisation is therefore expirated. It is true that in Europe, operating authorisations are for an indefinite duration but the Belgian Parliament has chosen to transform them into a fixed duration.

Finally, the AFCN must therefore provide for new production conditions, draw up a list of LTO works. Electrabel will have to comply with this. He says he does not understand the argument that 700 million euros of works would not change the physical situation of the site. He also said that Doel 1 will probably not be active for next winter.

by Mr. Nollet, for the Ecolo-Groen group, regarding the security of supply, believes that neither Elia nor the minister count on Doel 1 next winter. This is evident from an oral question submitted on 6 January 2015 and this seems logical in view of the statements of Mr. Property in the Echo, August 30, 2014, when he declared that work for Doel 1 and Doel 2 would take 2 to 3 years. Therefore, we do not see what prevents the minister from organizing a public consultation, nor why the minister persists in favouring a 10-year extension solution while Doel 1 will not be ready for next winter anyway and other available solutions exist.

by Mr. Nollet dismisses the urgency mentioned by the government and indicates that alternative solutions exist in the short term, including the BRABO project, which would increase the capacity of 1,000 megawatts and the reconversion of Doel 1 rescue lines, which would be easily convertible. This is a solution that was approved by Mr. Woitrin, the former director of CREG.

by Mr. Nollet has repeatedly requested that a commission be organized for a confrontation between Elia and Mr. by Woitrin. This was refused.

Regarding the legal dimension, Mr. Nollet believes that the main obstacle that threatens this case is that of the mandatory public consultation under international texts. It refers to the whole logic of a Ukrainian power plant. He considers that the minister leads the majority in the wall by neglecting the Espoo and Aarhus conventions, as well as Directive 2011/92/EU. by Mr. Nollet shares the observations of the State Council regarding the authorization of Doel 1. It considers that the project currently being discussed does not restore the provisions relating to electricity production in the Doel 1 operating authorisation. He stresses that the AFCN itself hesitated in the legal question raised by the State Council and considered it necessary to carry out an external legal analysis, which essentially confirms the point of view expressed by the State Council. He thus believes that this bill is not sufficient to revive Doel 1. He asks the Minister if he intends to submit an amendment.

According to M. Nollet, the management of this file shows a stubbornness on the part of the minister, all the more incomprehensible as the alternatives exist.

As regards the nuclear safety component, it requires a SALTO study prior to the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2. Ecolo-Groen therefore has serious concerns regarding nuclear safety and the Doel 1 and Doel 2 reactors.

On behalf of the CDH, Mr. De Lamotte believes that the necessary stability of the electric sector is compromised by the chaotic management of the minister. The cancellation of tenders launched by the previous government in relation to the commissioning of gas power plants is a bad signal. The speaker believes that the minister did not defend this case before the European Commission while the UK has gained a case over state aid. This renunciation in the procurement file is a good example of the government’s lack of energy vision. Both nuclear and renewable energy are must run. Therefore, TGV power plants need to be developed but nothing is on the horizon and no alternative is supported by this government.

by Mr. Lamotte is concerned that the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2 limits investments in favour of other energy sources. As regards the legal component, Doel 1 must be subject to a new authorisation and cross-border consultation. The bill does not include the essential elements of the agreement to be concluded, as was the case for the extension of Tihange 1. The Minister intends to extend Doel 1 and 2 before concluding the negotiation with the sector. This is a real gift to Electrabel. It also calls for a SALTO study to be conducted before the extension.

by Mr. Calvo, in the name of Ecolo-Groen, speaks of nuclear safety. In particular, it wants to have a list of planned LTO works and the planned timetable. He says the bill is dangerous. In terms of nuclear energy, absolute security does not exist. Statements available on the AFCN website show that the older power plants are, the more incidents are occurring. There is a link between the lifetime of nuclear power plants and the safety risk.

He believes that we are approaching the moment of truth regarding the credibility of the AFCN and he finds that the AFCN is in conflict with its own position and that it puts its credibility at risk on four points that you can read in the report. He then asks for clarifications on the negotiations and timing of the agreement to be concluded between Electrabel and the government. For this, Mr. Calvo regrets that no tags are included in the project to frame the negotiations.

In relation to the intervention of Ms. Dierick on the workers of Doel 1 and Doel 2, Mr. Dierick Calvo considers it to be displaced and is convinced that the post-nuclear era is favorable to job creation. He recalls that there are alternatives to the prolongation of nuclear power, in particular through a connection with the Netherlands.

by Mr. Calvo would also like to know where the search for a third-party investor is, as announced by the government, and whether the CD&V proposed timetable has been followed, namely to wait for the final decision on Tihange 2 and Doel 3 before extending Doel 1 and 2. He is also surprised that the government does not submit amendments after criticism from the State Council and the AFCN.

He concludes by speaking of the minister’s dogmatism that goes very far.

The Minister responds to all these interventions that have just been summarized. As regards the part of the decision on supply security, it considers that Elia’s estimate derives from legal obligations in relation to the calculation of the LOLE (loss of load expectation) standard. She believes that what emerges from Elia’s hearings shows the difficulty of our country’s short- and medium-term supply, especially with the uncertainties regarding Doel 3 and Tihange 2. The problem that arises is real, concrete, measurable. The Minister’s responsibility is to find solutions. The government does not neglect any tracks such as the expansion of capacity through interconnection with the Netherlands.

With regard to the variant of the BRABO project proposed by Mr. Woitrin, the minister submits an answer made by Elia and believes that the work will be long, since urban planning permits will be required. In terms of supply security, she says the answers are included in her second bill. As for the tender launched by the previous government, she says it did not offer long-term solutions, but only medium-term, from the point of view of supply security. It has been subject to a lot of criticism from the European Commission’s Competition DG, the CREG, the DG Energy and Elia. She believes that she should cancel this market.

With regard to the closure of thermal power plants, the CREG and the European Commission are developing recommendations on the capacity mechanism. Regarding the negotiation with Electrabel, the minister indicates that she does not want to mortgage her chances by revealing the state of progress of the discussions. Therefore, it does not respond to the demands for timing from parliamentarians.

The option of a third-party investor is still topical. I will answer the question, I suppose. On the question of qualified personnel, she says that this should not pose any difficulties. As regards nuclear safety, the Minister indicates that an official request has been made by the AFCN to the IAEA in order for a SALTO study to be carried out in an accelerated manner before 2016.

For the surplus, it considers that the various interventions relating to nuclear security issues are in fact foreign to this bill that deals with the supply security component. Regarding the legal aspect of the file, the minister specifies that she has drafted her own position, which has been developed within her cabinet and administration. She notes that there are two irreconcilable theses present and indicates that her legal thesis is not as isolated as the opposition claims, since in particular Electrabel lawyers share it.

I will not repeat the Minister’s legal demonstration. In summary, it states that the Belgian authorisation system is consistent with the European model, which consists in granting individual operating authorisations for an unlimited period, through ten-year security revisions.

The Minister recalls that the extension of Tihange 1 was not considered by the AFCN as a major change. Therefore, a public consultation is not necessary.

Of course, all colleagues replied, but each camped on his positions. I will therefore not repeat the replicas of the majority and the opposition; it would be completely useless.

Twelve amendments were submitted – you can read them in the report – and were rejected by the majority.

I thank you for your attention.

Madame Lalieux, I thank you for your report.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, Mrs. Minister, Dear colleagues, following the Conference of Presidents on Wednesday, May 20, it was unanimously decided to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Economy Committee in order to hear, on certain points, the Minister of Energy, Ms. Marghem.

At this meeting, which took place the next morning, on Thursday 21 May, the minister distributed a timeline tracing the various events related to the consideration of the bill. by Mr. Calvo presented an alternative time line.

Subsequently, the Minister reviewed the progress of the various stages of the draft law. After that, the minister recalled that the bill focused on the issue of security of supply and that it could not be ruled out that the AFCN, guardian of nuclear security, decides not to allow the resumption of the operation of reactors for the purpose of electricity production if the safety conditions were not met.

The same applies if the AFCN would decide that an environmental impact assessment or public consultation should be carried out as authorised by the RGPRI.

The Minister also noted that the external legal advice requested had only strengthened her in her choice.

In view of the various responses given by the Minister, some members found them insufficient. The Minister, on the other hand, considered that it had fully informed Parliament on formal issues and invited the members to continue the substantive discussions at the second reading of the draft, supported in this regard by several members of the committee.

We now come to the meeting of the Economic Commission on 26 May, which was organized at the request of MM. Calvo and Nollet – we will talk about this often – in order to proceed to a second reading of the bill. The general discussion began on the topic of nuclear security and the exposition of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Security and Home Affairs, Mr. by Jambon.

The Minister recalled that the agreement of the AFCN on the continuation of the operation of the power plants was still needed, even after the vote of the bill. The Minister also stressed that the AFCN was competent for the control of nuclear installations and not for the security of supply or electricity production. The Minister also returned to the IAEA SALTO mission, recalling that Doel 1 and Doel 2 had already been subjected to an in-depth review by the IAEA in 2010 during an OSART mission around which international experts had judged that the operational safety of Doel was good. He also recalled that safety and its continuous improvement are priorities for this nuclear power plant.

Members of the committee were then able to ask questions to the Minister. Some members asked him about the LTO operation for Doel 1 and Doel 2, to which the minister replied that the final report was expected by mid-June. He then confirmed that the LTO of Doel 1 and Doel 2 will be part of the government’s plan for energy supply security.

Regarding the applicable European directives, the Minister stressed that the AFCN had established an internal procedure in accordance with these European directives. The Minister was also asked about SALTO missions, which he replied that it was peer reviews carried out in addition to the controls imposed by law. The question of mr. Calvo and Nollet regarding the level of security that will be imposed for the extension of the life life of Doel 1 and 2, the Minister replied that the highest level of security would be required. Regarding LTO works, the minister replied that no concessions would be made. The work that the AFCN will consider indispensable before the restart of Doel 1 and 2 will actually have to be done before.

In response to questions regarding the notification made by Electrabel to the AFCN on 13 February 2015, the Minister replied that this was a notification concerning only the deactivation of Doel 1 in relation to the production of electricity for industrial purposes.

The question of mr. Calvo regarding the timing for the possible restart of Doel 3 and Tihange 2, the minister replied that the government had not imposed any timing on the AFCN. To various questions regarding the need for an environmental impact study and a public consultation, the Minister replied that no changes were made to the two power plants, joining up with the position of the Minister and recalling on this occasion that this was the position of the Government.

The discussions then continued on the issue of supply security with the Minister’s exposition. On 8 May 2015, the State Council adopted a resolution examining the application of the rules arising from the Espoo and Aarhus Conventions, as well as the Habitat Directive and the Dec. 13, 2011 Directive on the Environmental Impact Assessment of Certain Public and Private Projects.

The Minister has previously recalled that the State Council thesis was not that of the government, which considers, on the basis of the law of 18 December 2013 amending the law of 31 January 2003 and its preparatory work, that the provisions authorising the operation of Doel 1 remain applicable. The Minister then explained that only the economic permit to produce electricity was terminated on 15 February 2015. She pointed out that the bill could not be criticized in the light of the provisions on environmental assessment and public consultation.

In the legislative arsenal, the matter is, according to the Minister, mainly governed by the aforementioned 2011 Directive, the Espoo and Aarhus Conventions which it ensures its transposition, as well as by the Belgian law of 13 February 2006 on the assessment of the impacts of certain plans and programmes on the environment and on the participation of the public in the development of plans and programmes relating to the environment.

The Minister then discussed the history of the directive and explained its scope. In particular, it noted that the bill was not subject to environmental assessment and public consultation obligations.

The Minister then returned to the Habitat Directive, recalling its scope and its interpretation.

The discussion focused on the proposed alternative. Woitrin in a letter to the Minister. Ms Dierick, backed by other members, then said that Elia had considered Mr Dierick’s proposals. Woitrin and felt that they were not feasible.

Several colleagues reiterated the question of considering alternative solutions. The minister referred to the arguments of Ms. Dierick and other members, who had said a little earlier that supply security had deteriorated during previous legislatures and that therefore there was no solution without Doel 1 and 2, even if electricity was transported from the Netherlands. Calvo and Nollet.

Subsequently, the discussions turned to legal issues. Several members again questioned the Minister about the legal consequences arising from the State Council opinion. The minister then referred to the note drafted by her cabinet, which commented in particular on the opinion raised by several members of the commission.

Asked by Mr Lalieux about the 2011 directive and whether the Minister’s note considers that the bill does not constitute a bill within the meaning of Directive 2011/92 of the European Union, the Minister indicated the legal reasoning that was followed in the note in question, relating to the existence or not of a project within the meaning of that directive. It was confirmed that it was not a project and that, although it was to be considered that it would have been one, the minister considered that an environmental impact study and a public consultation were not required due to the exception in case of emergency.

by Mr. De Lamotte raised his question on the measures to be taken if the power plant operator decided not to undertake the promised work. The minister referred it to another bill indicating that it wants to address the upcoming winters in a new perspective characterized by a reformed energy policy. She also stated that at this point, the operator did not give any indication that it would not intend to resort to the necessary investments. The agreement should be concluded by 30 November next year.

Ms Jadin then mentioned the real risk of black-out and said the priority was to avoid it, recalling that an hour of black-out would represent a loss of €120 million per hour for the Belgian economy.

The debate ended with the discussion of the articles and amendments and, of course, the voting. Thus, the entire bill, as corrected legislatively by the services with the approval of the commission, was finally adopted by 10 votes to 4.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker of the Speaker of the Speaker, Mr. Speaker of the Speaker of the Speaker of Over the past eight years, the alarm has been ringing again and again. Since then, there has been a serious deficit.

The liberalization in 2003 did not give enough impetus to attract additional investments in our market. Rather, in fact, we have made sure that we have robbed power plants that were built long ago, gas plants, nuclear plants and some coal-fired power plants. When it was decided in 2003 to gradually quit nuclear power, there was absolutely no plan to replace that production capacity. One has decided to close, one has not decided to build. That is why today we are faced with those problems.

Based on this, one of the former directors of the CREG once said that it was advisable to buy candles; when we would need them, he did not know, but that we would need them, he could guarantee us. By the way, the name of that man has already fallen a few times, it was Mr. Woitrin.

At the same time, we note that our market has not provided stable prices. In 2008, we talked about prices of around and at 80 euros per megawatt hour. Today — effectively just today — we are talking about 44 euros. For the evening hours, it is slightly lower, between 30 and 33 euros. That is, we are in trouble, as in 2013 some 20,000 megawatts of gas power plants were closed in Europe. By 2017, this could reach 110,000 megawatts. That’s not surprising if we know that the production cost of a modern gas plant is close to 55 euros per megawatt, depending on the efficiency, the age of the plant and the like. In any case, the price is significantly higher than the market price.

This, of course, makes those who today have plans for a new STEG power plant think twice before they build it. There has been thought, because on Elia’s webstep we can very clearly see that a pack of gas plants were announced but never built. Together they are good for and at 3,200 megawatts, a volume that we can only dream of today.

At the end of 2013, we also conducted this debate and then we made the same conclusions. After all, it is on this basis that the previous government considered it necessary to keep the Tihange 1 power plant open longer. Based on a calculation, it was then said that it was important to extend the life of that plant. This was also supported by many Chamber Members in Parliament. Even then, there were doubts whether the extension of the life of Tihange 1 would be sufficient to guarantee the security of supply and to ensure that the light would remain on.

With these data in mind, we must today conclude that the situation of power plants such as Doel 3 and Tihange 2 is not so rosy. If a little more than 2,000 megawatts are taken from the calculation — power plants that can’t be counted on and which are not sure whether they will re-supply electricity in the short term or in general — then you know that there is a problem.

These problems are also addressed. A few weeks ago, the federation of network operators ENTSO-E drew the alarm bell. Each time she produces a beautiful report on what happens in summer and winter. By chance, we are just ahead of summer and she has presented her summer outlook. ENTSO-E has examined whether supply security problems are expected to occur in Europe this summer. In September, there is one country that comes into trouble. In all of Europe, one country is in trouble, especially Belgium. I think it is quite a punishment to dare to deny that there is a problem.

We must therefore intervene. Mrs Jadin — she is just entering — has just cited that the cost of economic damage after one hour of black-out is EUR 120 million. We can absolutely not do that...

I have the impression that Mr. Calvo is asking for the word.

Mr. Wollants, I can’t remember that at the committee meeting — Mr. Friart and Mrs. Lalieux presented the report in detail — someone said that our country was on the lookout in terms of energy policy and security of supply. I cannot imagine that. If I missed that, I would like you to correct me. If a colleague had said that it is fine in that area and that there has been good work done in the past few years, I would like to know the name of that colleague, because I would find that a strong statement.

At the committee meeting I said that last winter we were crushed through the eye of a needle, and I thought that Mr. Vande Lanotte contradicted me in that. He confirms that here now. That is why I take it here.

Ms. Lilian asks for the floor.

I was not yet fully pronounced.

Mr. Wollants, I tried to make a circumstantial report so that everyone remembers what was said.

In fact, Mr. Vande Lanotte said that only 76% of our energy production had been used on the day when there were difficulties this winter. But no one has questioned the difficulties regarding the security of supply. This must be respected. Respecting a debate is respecting the words that each one has spoken.

The opposition said that the solution you propose is not a good solution. We will explain it soon.

No one said that there was no problem in Belgium regarding the security of supply.

[...] about the second part of my presentation. What Mrs. Lalieux said was very complementary, for which I thank you.

However, I would like to ask you a third question, Mr. Wollants. If we are both of the opinion that supply security is critical to it, that we must keep this in mind, that we do not have the margins that a prosperous country like Belgium deserves, then I find it difficult to accept that you defend this policy and hold a fierce plea to develop the track of Goal 1 and 2.

That’s a track you’ve said in the media that it’s not certain that Goal 1 and 2 will work next winter. Then I don’t understand why you don’t say with us that there are other pistes and why those are not examined with equal assertivity. Why not do more about those thermal power plants, with more capacity than Goal 1 and 2 combined, which will close this year? Why not do more about this, if you consider that security of supply as important as we do?

We should take steps and not put our eggs in the basket of a very uncertain track. I quote you from The Standard of a couple of weeks ago.

Mr. Calvo, it is an en-en story.

I am just on my introduction. That is, there are still a few pages to follow and I’ll probably say a lot of things that you won’t like. I will also talk about those matters.

Fundamental issues can get a place in an introduction. Why, for the time being, is the only thing presented here today the life extension of Goal 1 and Goal 2? Are these other steps not taken?

Why can’t you convince Ms. Marghem that she should work much harder on those other points? You are usually very convincing.

I don’t know if you can consider our conversations as convincing, but well.

There are a lot of things going on. Simultaneously with what we are discussing now, we held a whole debate just an hour ago, then move on to the draft on demand management, an energy transition fund and energy efficiency. I can’t imagine you missed that debate.

These are also measures that we are taking. There will be other measures. I will soon list out the direction in which we should go with this, but I think everything has its place in a presentation. At that point, you will be able to get a lot of criticism.

The (...)

I have not heard your presentation yet. So I can’t estimate it, but I would like to ask you whether Goal 1 and 2 will work in the coming winter? You don’t have to give the answer right now, but I hope that the answer will find a place somewhere in your presentation.

Continue on, Mr Wollants.

I take back.

I think we must take our responsibility to get energy policy back on track. Part of that is indeed the responsibility to ensure that we look back at the nuclear departure. We will return to it conditionally. We know that this project is taking a very first step. Nuclear security is first of all. That is, the green light from the FANC is absolutely necessary before we can proceed. The FANC clearly has a duty to look at nuclear security, not supply security, because that is not its duty. It should be so, because it is absolutely not intended that these two things are to be contaminated or mixed together.

In the government agreement, we have indeed launched a lot of proposals in the area of security of supply. You are right to say, Mr Calvo. After all, we are exploring a capacity market with our neighbors in order to move forward and build that capacity in the longer term. We reevaluate the strategic reserve. How will we deal with this in the future? How should we adjust them? We are looking at emergency generators to bring them into the story. We look at how they can contribute to flexibility. This also applies to the emergency generators that the federal government itself controls. Initiatives need to be taken to keep the thermal power plants in service for longer. We need to look at demand management.

Therefore, initiatives should be taken to keep the thermal power plants active. Can you clarify this for me a little? We discussed this on Sunday in a television studio and you then removed our proposal on the subject, to give the regulator a place in that debate and in that decision-making, quite gratuitly as expropriation. What is your alternative to this problem?

We need to compare the operations of the power plants here with those abroad. There is no level playing field for gas power plants. This is one of the measures that we should consider.

What do I think should not be done? I have specifically reiterated your proposal. The regulator shall not prohibit the closure of the last power plant when the security of supply is compromised. If not, there is a rush to the exit and the last gas plant that wants to close is for the trouble. Who wants to build another plant in this country with such provisions? That entrepreneur must no longer close the plant that brings the company into difficulty. Nowadays you will find no one with such a business model that consists in that one can only produce at a given moment and bear the losses, without knowing whether one can keep the head above water. This is not a healthy way to enter the market. In this way, we cannot attract investors to install their power plants here. Investors who have plans to build a power plant will implement it in countries where the conditions are best. That will not be with us, I fear. I do not see that approach.

The link to the capacity market is there. If power plants can be compensated not only for the electricity they produce, but also for the stability they bring, then the business model of, for example, gas plants becomes much more interesting. We need to investigate this specifically in order to get results. I do not believe in a policy in which the government prohibits the shutdown of power plants, with which the shoe then ends. That seems to me, ⁇ in the long term, a pathway that makes it quite difficult to attract investors in this country that offer such capacity.

I come to my comments on the list.

We need to promote storage through concrete initiatives. Strengthening energy efficiency is an important prerequisite for this. Developing a long-term energy vision involves looking into the future for twenty to twenty-five years, finally stating what we want and ensuring that we find partners for our wishes, so that everyone has their place in a stable story.

We had the debate not so long ago and so we all know that until now it was a little different every year. We have already learned that the only thing we can do to create stability is to develop and apply an energy vision.

Mr. Wollants, a substantive debate has been called for. We would be happy to accept this invitation.

Part of our criticism of the decision is that it makes a very strong advance on an energy vision. By cementing more than 50% of nuclear energy in the mix up to 2022 and actually shifting everything towards 2025 the energy future is very strongly determined. You may also be able to imagine something about it. After all, you are very strongly indicating what the energy mix will be until 2025.

You explain that the current government will work on an energy vision. Does that also mean for you that in terms of technology in that energy vision choices must be made, or do you believe that the law on the nuclear exit is sufficient? It is not quite clear to me at the moment what your position is in this regard.

Mr. Calvo, there are definitely choices to be made. However, if it is intended to close a number of power plants earlier in the light of the nuclear departure, despite the fact that all sorts of agreements have been reached, then that is a bad thing.

Why should we develop that vision now? We need to do that in the first place, because, when an investor wants to build a gas power plant today, the average run time for such an idea is seven years. That also means that we can’t make an energy vision, then wait seven years and see what happens before those power plants eventually come or not. I do not think that is the right approach. We know we will be in trouble in the coming winter.

When we look at the reports that Elia has made, for example following the capture of the strategic reserve, then we see, to begin with, the next three winters the necessary amount of strategic reserve growing year after year. I therefore fear that we cannot afford not to extend the opening time of Goal 1 and 2, and just let some work. Even when Goal 1 and Goal 2 remain open, we’re still talking about a three-fold winter, in 2017-2018, of a strategic reserve of more than 3 000 megawatts.

Mr. Wollants, let us clarify this energy vision completely.

I find it positive that for you an energy vision also means that technological choices must be made. You say that the calendar that is now being drawn up will not be revoked, because there will be a breach of contract. Does that mean for you that the government’s energy vision must explicitly include that there can be no more nuclear energy after 2025? After all, I assume that your energy vision extends beyond 2025, somewhere to 2030 or 2035. Are you committed to achieving the nuclear exit by 2025 within that broader energy vision?

Mr Calvo, the debate on the energy vision has yet to be carried out. You ask me what I want to discuss or not, but that is not the purpose of a debate about an energy vision.

You say you want to talk about an energy vision, but you immediately say which elements should not be included. Just like their prejudices.

I just ask you to keep certain things in that view.

My question is actually very simple. You announce an energy vision and you are a member of the largest party of the majority. Your program included the construction of new nuclear power plants and you submitted legislation to keep nuclear power plants open for 60 to 70 years. In that context, it is not strange that I ask whether or not a nuclear departure in 2025 will be explicitly included in that energy vision.

You say you have no problem making technological choices. Well, then it seems logical to me that the nuclear withdrawal in 2025 will be included in that vision. When you are struggling with a nuclear departure in 2025, I ask you to say that in so many words.

In a debate on the energy vision, all possible forms of technology are discussed. I have no problem with that. You are ?

I have no problem with a debate on an energy vision that discusses all possible issues. The question is if you have a problem with that.

Mr. Wollants, at a time when the law on nuclear departure is being debated for the 37th time, I think it is important that there is clarity about a concrete calendar. You do not want to give that clarity, of which act.

As a final measure, there is also the extension of the lifetime of the Goal 1 and Goal 2 power plants.

If one combines that whole package, I mean that we charge almost all the factors of our energy system. These factors are also absolutely necessary because we know that we will have absolutely no easy things in terms of energy supply in the next five years. I also heard here that no one really contradicts this.

This bill is not just about this winter, but also about the needs we will have over many winters. Next winter, there will be about 1,300 megawatt less available from the classic power plants, but even in the years that follow, that forecast will not really improve.

However, the prolongation of the life of nuclear power plants is sensitive, we know that. In this hemisphere are people who have approved previous extensions against their will, others did not believe that the nuclear exit was feasible. This, of course, leads to a lot of discussion on this topic, more than on other topics. Many hours of hearings and discussions have preceded this plenary session. That is also a trend break with the previous extension because then the opposition asked to hear five speakers and heard exactly zero.

This time – you can find that in the report – we heard 16 speakers. We have spent dozens of hours on this topic. I call this a thorough approach. Of course, not everyone agrees with what we should actually do or is not everyone happy with the forthcoming extension. The reasons for this are very diverse and sometimes ideological. The arguments are subsequently supported by a number of arguments, some of which should be placed in a certain perspective.

I will try to address some of these arguments to help advance the debate.

First, extending the power plants would be at the expense of renewable energy.

During the hearings, we heard the figures from the Federal Planning Bureau, which make it clear that there will be at least as much renewable energy as Goal 1 and 2 remain open as when they close. It is even true that the Federal Planning Bureau is even more optimistic than the renewable energy sector itself, when it comes to the percentage of green electricity that we will have.

Thus, the idea that nuclear power plants cause less renewable energy or that renewable energy needs to be stopped at the time the nuclear power plants are running is also questionable. In fact, the third energy package, imposed by Europe and translated into our own legislation, makes it very clear that renewable energy has always priority. Why then this fear?

Secondly, the €700 million to be invested will be removed from society; money that society would better invest in renewable energy.

First and foremost, that 700 million euros comes from the operator and not from the general resources. It is also not included in the electricity consumer’s bills. As with Tihange 1, there is also a fee to be paid by the operators. Even with the depreciation of the investment, it is even lower than the market price.

At the end of 2013, we held the same debate. Then Bruno Tuybens stood in this place who said that we would pay for our energy policy. I am a little more realistic than Mr. Tuybens, but I think there is a contribution that can be used to bring about an energy policy. One can discuss this compensation and I know that some people have a different opinion about it. Some parties speak of astronomical amounts, ⁇ with the intention of making the whole unprofitable. It could be. I think we should not have too much fear for those 700 million euros.

I have heard during committee meetings that the consumer who cuts 700 million euros.

If Electrabel should invest 700 million euros, do you assume that there is a kind of greenhouse in Paris where you get that 700 million euros and that you do not transfer that amount to the consumer? Do you think that’s not in the bill?

Mr. Calvo, for all clarity, you have talked to us several times about the fact that Electrabel with those depreciated centrales collects woeker profits, pockets full of money that it draws to Paris. Well, if that investment of 700 million euros happens, then there will indeed still be room for a reimbursement and they may have to torp a pocket less. That could be. Do you understand?

The debate is becoming more and more interesting.

Mr. Jambon, you know that we are an incredible fan of the content debate. To our great frustration is that the last weeks and months have been very difficult. In terms of nuclear security, it was better, I admit. I have said before that you were the light in darkness. If they had told me at the oath that I would ever say that again, I would not have believed it.

You talked about nuclear interest rates, about pockets full of money going to Paris...

You have always said that.

Okay, but you have used that argument to reflect your story that this will not be transferred to the consumer. This is how I could understand it. Then, of course, you also agree with us, if you take that assumption, that the nuclear interest rate should be raised. It is one or the other. Otherwise you will find those pockets full of money well, that can also be. However, if you take that assumption, you must also work with it.

Various things play in this story.

First, we have ⁇ been able to discuss the nuclear interest rate extensively in the previous legislature. We know that it is there. We both submitted bills to recover some of it. I kept it on a significant portion, you wanted an astronomical portion. Maybe more than a part.

Today we know that market prices have changed in the meantime and that the amount represented by nuclear interest has become more limited. However, we also know that there is still a margin between the actual production price and the sales price.

At that time you also read the Tihange Convention 1 and the associated draft law thoroughly. We, together with Mr. Wathelet, exceeded the prices of all that had to be charged. However, it has been established that there is a margin to be distributed.

I would like to remind Mr. Calvo believes that the price of electricity is determined by a stock exchange and that a company that produces it must do so in a profitable way. So if Electrabel decides to invest 700 million, it is because it can make it profitable and the price of electricity is at an acceptable level. Otherwise, she would not do it. One billion, for example, would not be profitable. Therefore, it should not be considered in the absolute, but in relation to the profitability that a power plant can have and with the stock exchange that sells electricity.

The key question is how the government will ensure that those 700 million won’t be transferred to the consumer as it removes all the safety nets in relation to the price of electricity.

Indeed, this government does not like too much the price blockage imposed by the previous government and is now challenging the safety net. He has renewed it, but he believes, in his government statement, that no later than 2016, there will be no longer a safety net that controls prices for consumers and for ⁇ . Will this government block electricity prices as the previous government did, so that consumers and ⁇ do not pay more for their electricity?

You did not agree anyway. You voted against, Mr Wollants. It is easy to say that this will not be passed on to the consumer, but with what mechanism? That is the question I ask you today.

For all clarity, we are talking here about the power plants Doel 1 and Doel 2, which are in the hands of Electrabel, Electrabel can sell that power. They are still in the story of the merit order, they are still in the story of the wholesale market. If Electrabel would suddenly raise prices, why would one buy electricity from Electrabel? Why should one do this? Is it compulsory? This is not mandatory.

Let us be serious. That does not mean that no other companies on the spot market that can buy energy, that market is not limited by Belgium; it is an international market.

The measurement of the safety net is postponed until the end of 2016, beginning of 2017, with an evaluation. Remember, I told you!

An evaluation is well planned. You properly know that it will take place before and after and that discussions are taking place on the fact that the price is so framed. This is also valid. We talked about it.

I would like to answer the Minister.

If my memory is good, and I think that is the case, in the government statement, it is stated that, anyway, the safety net cannot be extended for more than two years. This was repeated in the committee. You extended it until 2017. I will find these documents and ask you in the commission if you return to these statements.

Regarding the mechanism, the government agreement is indeed clear that it will suspend this legislature, and that it will be extended for a maximum of a limited period.

Did you just say it will be reviewed? It ends by definition. It will be evaluated, but the government agreement says you’ll stop it. You have just said the opposite. It is also not forbidden to change the government agreement, Mrs. Marghem. If you change the government agreement, that is not a problem.

Can I finish my reasoning?

The [...]

It is also so.

I have the extract under my eyes. I quote the government agreement: "The government takes note of the National Bank and CREG report on the safety net for energy prices. It will take the initiative to provisionally extend the current mechanism for one year. The mechanism shall be abandoned by 31 December 2017 at the latest.” “Until later!” This is the wording of the government agreement! It may be said that this is not the correct version, but this is the public version.

Mr. Nollet, I do not go into argutia like some, and I am able to acknowledge that my memory may be missing. You have heard that there was an assessment. At least let things be done in relation to the evaluation! You’ll remember that we’ve had a discussion about pre- and post-price control and all this isn’t anodin, but we’ll go back on commission.

This means that the lines of the government agreement can be moved. Contrary to what is written, we no longer want the mechanism to be abandoned by 31 December 2017.

I did not say that! The subject is closed!

Mr. Speaker, I demonstrated that I tried to work on the bottom and not add layers during commission hours. But you know how important the price is for the competitiveness of our ⁇ and for all households in terms of their purchasing power. You know how many parties that sat in the previous government worked on this price and how much, thanks to the binding measures taken not by the sector, because the sector had consented no effort, but by the government (price blocking and safety net) the price decreased for all. This was a fundamental policy of the previous government.

In the government agreement – this was repeated during the presentation of the Minister’s general policy note and during the budget debate – we said that the safety net was primary. Indeed, if today I hear that the government is already returning to its note, it is so much better for the consumer! I think the safety net is indispensable for tomorrow’s price control and for the government’s policy, especially around nuclear, not to be turned against consumers and our ⁇ . If today, I hear that the content of the government agreement concerning an end of the safety net by 31 December 2017 at the latest, what was written black on white, then so much better! In this case, I would like a firm and official statement from this government on the matter.

Thanks for this contribution.

One element that also plays in it is the following. When we have to make it with less nuclear power, we will have to use a number of other power plants. Some of those power plants do not operate today because they are too expensive, because the market price is too low to produce with those power plants. If we want to use these power plants, the market price will have to rise, which will also increase the price for families and ⁇ , even a bit more than if we continue to work with the power plants discussed in this debate.

Mr. Calvo, studies have already been published about this as well. We also know that when a number of nuclear power plants were shut down, the price has risen. There you only need to look at the boardboard of the CREG, which can be consulted online. You can see what has happened to the prices on our market since then. In principle, the prices will increase together as long as there is sufficient interconnection capacity, but that is not there today.

I actually started my accounting.

Mr. Wollants, you are starting to look a little bit like the minister now. You just say – this is how the whole debate began – that those 700 million euros will not be transferred to the consumer. Now you answer that question that in another scenario, prices would also rise. Did you say the same?

I say that when these power plants close, another, more expensive power station acts as a marginal power station, leading to a higher market price. I have said.

[...] I will tell you later.

Please explain it to me later, Mr. Vande Lanotte. I look forward to your college.

Colleagues, who 700 million euros the operator could also have invested in, for example, offshore windmills. That is an option. We need to know what we buy for it. According to CREG figures, 700 million euros correspond to 184 megawatts of offshore turbines, which provide slightly less than 10% of the energy of Goal 1 and 2. Even in their total lifetime, these turbines will only produce the same amount of electricity as Goal 1 and 2 in a two-year period. There is the difference and that also corresponds to the difference in cost price, which we must be very aware of.

The interconnection capacity is often cited as if it solves everything. We will immediately join the Woitrin Line as well. That statement has been pushed forward again and again, as if we would have more interconnection capacity that power plants no longer need. Yesterday we heard this statement again in the committee.

At the same time, one forgets to mention that one can put that cable, but that there is no guarantee that there will also be power on the other side. Elia also clearly pointed out this in his report on the strategic reserve. Last year, they said the interconnection capacity was limited to 3,500 megawatts, while at the same time, the underlying capacity at power plants was also around 3,500 megawatts. Now it is very different. The statement is that it is actually about 2,700 megawatts of power plants available. Even if the technical capacity increases to 4,500 megawatts, which is expected over the next few years, it is expected that only 2,700 megawatts can be imported. That is, it’s also a bit that ratio: extending the life of these power plants provides more security than increasing the interconnection capacity, the Woitrin track. Nevertheless, we will have to increase that interconnection capacity anyway, which I think is important.

It is therefore wise to continue to investigate all those paths further, even after this design has been approved. We will have to put all these things side by side.

The idea that the one who pays the most for electricity will get it, therefore, does not really matter. In many cases, for a very large part of the year, that’s true, but as soon as you get close to those 3,000 euros per megawatt hour, that story stops. At that point, the market stops playing and we get into the story of the strategic reserve that is activated, and all that current goes out the door at the same price. To argue that a higher amount will lead to that the electricity will still come to this country is not correct. That is not right.

We have a number of customers who offer in that market and they will accept any price that is asked, because they always need that power. Buy, no matter what If we then have electricity to come to us from the Netherlands via Germany via France, it is very unlikely that it will arrive in our country if there are shortages in northern France as well. We must be careful with that.

If we look at everything around the different advice we have received and to the environmental impact reports, then there have indeed been different opinions. Still, this design is the best thing that can happen today.

We have heard the various lectures facing each other and the line of the State Council has shifted through the process in tone. It is now very clear that the operating permit is still there and therefore there is no reason to apply for another one. That statement was already in the motivation of the draft. We also see that the ruling of the Dutch-speaking court of first instance in Brussels follows that line. In the meantime, it is clear that this is not a position or a decision, it is a judgment in first instance and on contradiction. I don’t know what that means, but that’s what is happening.

The [...]

It comes down to the fact that in the case in which Greenpeace was facing the Federal State and the FANC, Anouk Janssens acted, no unknown to our committee.

It is an interesting judgment, as the same legal issue that played in the draft was cited in that trial. For example, as regards operating permits, the court confirmed that they were terminated by neither the old law nor the law amended in 2013. According to the court, in the meantime, the moment has also reached when the deactivation of Goal 1 must take place, when the counselor of the FANC clarified that this reactor is still operating for the very simple reason that there are still fuel bars and that one cannot leave them uncontrolled.

In short, the judgment states, the operation of none of those reactors has ever been stopped and the permit for this purpose has been granted for an indefinite period, so there is no renewal of the permit.

As regards the conventions of Aarhus and Espoo, it is stated that the applicant, in this case Ms Janssens, who acted for Greenpeace, does not make it plausible that there is a direct effect of those conventions, which, however, places a number of matters in perspective.

Colleagues, when we talk about supply security, we know, and in the meantime it has also been confirmed by several colleagues from the opposition, that we are not good at it. Families and ⁇ today are concerned about the shutdown plan and the further development of our energy supply.

Mrs. Minister, you really have a lot of work on the shelf to draw this all right. Steps must be taken forward. The energy policy that our citizens have been entitled to for years must finally come. This design is only a small piece of it.

My group supports this draft. At the same time, we absolutely know that it cannot remain here and that there are still many other things to be done. Let us make progress in this Parliament as soon as possible. Let us make sure that those matters are discussed so that we can go on with all the elements I have just cited, because we will need all those elements to survive the coming winters.

As I have already said, those 866 megawatts of Goal 1 and 2 are important, but if at the same time more than 3 000 megawatts of strategic reserve must be held in order to survive, then we know that we must do other things too.

Reports such as that of ENTSO-E, which indicate that we are in the worst of all Europe, I really don’t want to see here anymore. That will not be easy, because repairing that will take many years and difficult political decisions. However, I think that this majority is willing to take those steps to finally be able to do what we must do, in particular: keep the light.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Minister, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, dear colleagues, before I begin my speech, I would really like to thank all the services who worked hard for us to have reports, and who have been by our side for many nights. I think of the interpreters. I would also like to thank, in a more personal way, my collaborator Frédérick Pirard for the excellent work he has provided and for accompanying me throughout this debate.

The Fukushima accident, the thousands of cracks discovered in the tanks of Tihange 2 and Doel 3, the sabotage of Doel 4. Nothing is done. Sixty hours of parliamentary debates that highlight that the extension of Doel 1 and 2 is ineffective for next winter and counterproductive in the medium term. Nothing is done. Three opinions from the State Council and even a fourth that we received yesterday in French, as well as an opinion from the AFCN: all assassins for a bill that is legally indefensible. Nothing is done.

Nothing is done, the ideologists of the ‘all-to-nuclear’ shake their heads down, no matter whether we go straight in front of an avalanche of legal disputes. It does not matter if it poses risks to nuclear security and supply security. It does not matter if there are credible alternatives. Nothing is done. Those who live in the dogma of nuclear power are imperturbable.

For the PS group, the path taken by the government is irresponsible. And we fear that citizens will pay the price from next winter. When the majority decided to return to the closure of Doel 1 and Doel 2, I had denounced a purely ideological decision. This is a purely ideological decision because it does not offer any solid solution to guarantee security of supply. Our electricity supply will not be secured for next winter and it is not the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2 that will allow us to avoid a new winter under tension.

Mr. Wollants, no stakeholder interrogated in our committee, neither Electrabel, neither Elia, neither the AFCN, neither the Deputy Prime Minister, nor the Minister have assured us that Doel 1 and Doel 2 will be active next winter.

The primary objective of this bill is to continue the work in relation to the government agreement but if we do not vote this bill, you are right, Mrs. Lalieux, we ⁇ do not risk extending Doel 1 or bringing Doel 2 back into operation.

It is better to ask for the word first. The word is yours, Mr. Wollants.

Mrs. Lalieux, for all clarity, I have said myself that it is not absolutely certain that Goal 1 or 2 will run next winter. In this regard, we say the same thing.

It is the first important step that we must take to enable them to rotate. The next step will indeed be the advice of the FANC and the necessary investments. Mr. Nollet will be able to confirm – we can trust him in that regard – that I have never said that I am 100% sure that Goal 1 and 2 will run in the coming winter.

I fully agree with Mr. Speaker’s thought. by Wollants.

We never gave the guarantee that Doel 1 and Doel 2 would work next winter. Our position has always been to say that the first step was this bill and that we would continue to work on other paths. But the government’s responsibility for energy supply is, of course, indispensable. This is not a new fact, Madame Lalieux. You know like me that since 2009, we know that we are at risk of facing an electricity supply problem.

Mrs Cassart, I spoke just recently – ⁇ you weren’t present at this meeting – to say that no one, either in the committee or in this assembly, ever questioned the fact that we are facing security and supply issues.

Furthermore, you must agree that we may not agree with your project and with the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2.

The whole scenario for next winter is based on this extension, otherwise we ⁇ ’t have discussed for sixty hours in the committee and then discussed the project in this assembly.

If the government and members of the majority wanted to be a little serious, they would recognize that opting for an extension of Doel 1 by hurting legal advice and not taking the time to arrange a consultation, all this so that we are facing problems this winter, endangers all energy actors as well as all the alternative solutions that have been on the table for months. That is what I blame this government for.

I recall that the previous government, with the exception of a majority party, thought correctly when it said that, in order to guarantee nuclear security, one could simply keep Tihange 1 and close Doel 1 and Doel 2. It did not take six months to reconsider this decision because, in accordance with the program of the MR and the N-VA, for the government, nuclear is the main solution to ensure the supply of tomorrow.

Mr. Speaker, I had the time to go and look for the texts that resume my exchanges with Mrs. Minister on the question of whether Doel 1 would be functional for next winter. I am referring to the report of 6 January last year which appears on the website of the Chamber. In response to a question I had asked her, the minister said the following: "What I believe is that Doel 1 will not be functional for next winter, but for the next." I decided to ask her again so that she can confirm what she said. In response to a new question dated March 3, the minister responded to me as follows: "I would like to confirm to the honourable member that Doel 1 was considered as an out-of-service unit for the winter period 2015-2016".

When on March 24th, we receive Elia in hearing – you haven’t made the report so far but I’m going to quote this excerpt –, with regard to the nuclear park, Elia says, I quote, “Elia is part of the principle that Doel 3 and Tihange 2 would be unavailable, as well as Doel 1.”

Here are three factual elements in the reports that are announced by the government and by Elia and that confirm us that Doel 1 will not be available. The President of the Commission is here to testify to this.

You can tell us everything you want now, but the facts are the ones I recalled and the reports are public.

I agree with my honorable colleague, Mr. by Nollet.

I will here recall three major elements to try to persuade Ms. Cassart and which allow to assert that the availability of Doel 1 and Doel 2 is compromised for next winter: the availability of fuel, the completion of the work necessary for nuclear security and the legal uncertainty created by this bill.

First of all, the problem of fuel ...

As for the fuel, it was specified by Mr. Van Troeye that the reservation had been made. The fuel is ready for this winter.

Mr. Friart, I was going to expand my speech on fuel. Maybe you could ask me later. Can I expand my arguments?

I will first tell you that the fuel is exhausted for the Doel 1 reactor since February 15th. You agree with me on this point. Electrabel ⁇ took options to get fuel. You see that I join you, Mr. Friart, but it is not acquired at this stage that this fuel will be available for 2015 and 2016. I would like to repeat the interventions of Mr. Nollet at all auditions or he finds the words of the CEO, he will. The latter actually told us that it was ordered. He told us that he would confirm his order when there was a government decision. But the CEO of Electrabel was careful to provide the slightest guarantee in this direction during the hearing in the Economy Commission.

The fuel problem will also arise, Mr. Friart, for Doel 2. It’s a bit forgotten in all our debates but Doel 2’s fuel will be exhausted in November. It is true that it has been talked about shutting down the Doel 2 reactor for a few weeks in the summer to save this fuel and allow it to operate beyond November. But this scenario has not yet been confirmed by Electrabel. This question also arises for this plant.

At this point, Mr. Friart, we still have no answer – unless you have received one from Electrabel, in which case I would like to hear you in this regard – to the question of whether this fuel will be present in Doel 1 and if there will be enough in Doel 2 or if, this summer, the latter will be stopped.

But, Mr. Friart, I will still reassure you: fuel is a secondary problem compared to the two other major issues I will address now, namely nuclear security and the legal uncertainty of the bill.

Dear colleagues, the extension of reactors beyond the 40-year duration involves large-scale youth and safety work. It is a matter of safety for power plant workers, for the population as a whole and for the environment. As we have seen during our committee discussions, the AFCN, but also the International Atomic Energy Agency recommend that a number of work be carried out before – I repeat: before – the extension of nuclear reactors or before the resumption of Doel 1. Obviously, given the late decision of the current government, this security work is still not carried out for Doel 1 and Doel 2.

I would like to reiterate here what I said in the committee: this work, deemed necessary following the post-Fukushima stress tests, was not carried out entirely for Doel 1 and Doel 2 for the simple and good reason that the previous government had decided to close these power plants in 2015. The AFCN therefore considered that it was not necessary to carry out these works.

For example, the installation of a more efficient filter system on Doel 1 and Doel 2 reactors has not yet been carried out. This system – I remind all my colleagues – allows, in the event of overpressure in the reactor building, to reduce the pressure in a controlled way in order to avoid an explosion like that of Fukushima. This is more than important work.

It is essential that all the essential safety work is carried out before the extension. Now, we have concerns about this, as we already see that security requirements are reduced in the face of government pressure. This is the case for the SALTO study, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, a study that should have been done by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This study allows international control of nuclear power plants in the extension phase. This control mission must be carried out before the extension, not after. This was done at Tihange 1.

We recently learned from your mouth, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, that this would not be the case for Doel 1 and Doel 2.

It is therefore a fundamental change in the policy of the successive Belgian governments not to do a SALTO study before an extension. This is a completely regrettable change in terms of security.

Statements by Mr. Goods – which has all my concern – which completely minimized the Fukushima accident by telling us that there were only two deaths, today do not guarantee that independence and that trust that AFCN must have in relation to parliamentarians and all citizens. The fact of denying that before any extension, we do not have a SALTO analysis proves that the government plays with the safety of citizens.

How long will these works take? Mr. Minister, you have not been able to answer. You do not know it yet, you do not have the list of tasks because it is not you who determines them, I give it to you. But even without a precise timetable, I think one can reasonably think that it will take many months. At the end of August, the director of the AFCN had said that the work could take up to three years. We were also told that the cost of these works was estimated at 700 million euros. Obviously, work on this scale takes some time. If the AFCN does not let itself be pressured, if it requires the essential work for security before extension, I believe it is a new element that tells us that the availability of Doel 1 and Doel 2 from next winter is more than compromised.

I have mentioned two of the three main reasons why Doel 1 and Doel 2 are unlikely to be available next December. I talked to you about the problem of fuel and the youth and security works, let’s come to the problem of legal security.

As soon as we read the first opinion of the State Council dated February 16, 2015, it became clear that the government bill could not remain in the state. From its first opinion, the State Council indicated that the provisions of the authorisation that allows the Doel 1 power plant to produce electricity have become out of force since 15 February 2015. This is in fact the strict application of the 2003 Act on the Exit of Nuclear Power as amended in 2013. Consequently, Doel 1 must be the subject of a new application for production authorisation or the bill must be amended to provide for a specific procedure for granting an authorisation or other appropriate specific scheme. It is written black on white in the opinion of the State Council. The government decided not to follow the paths proposed by the State Council and simply modified its bill by adding a small sentence.

During the hearings organized by our committee at the end of March, I asked the Director of the AFCN about the comments of the State Council. I asked him if the little phrase was enough. The CEO was unable to confirm whether the project was legally solid, but, under pressure from my colleagues and myself, he explained that the AFCN was going to conduct a legal analysis to see if the government’s project was holding the way.

A month later, at the beginning of May, we learned of this legal analysis, which is very severe with regard to the bill. The lawyers consulted by the AFCN clearly indicate that the bill needs to be amended. It needs to be amended to grant a new production permit to Doel. A change is also necessary to comply with international and European legislation, the Espoo and Aarhus Conventions, which require an environmental impact study with the organization of a public inquiry.

From that point on, the only responsible attitude was to amend the bill or to withdraw it. But, unfortunately, Minister Marghem and the government persisted. It was then the turn of the famous opinion of the law firm Janson to suggest improvements to the government text. And finally, on May 20th, a last nail is planted in the coffin of this bill: a second opinion of the State Council, entirely murderous, arrives in the hands of parliamentarians, after many peripeties.

This statement, which the minister had somewhat hidden for two weeks, is clear. The government bill is not valid from a legal point of view. Before extending nuclear reactors, the government is obliged to organize an environmental impact assessment and a public investigation. The State Council and the AFCN are categorical.

The government itself had doubts about its bill, since it tried, it has been repeated quite often in committees, to amend its bill itself by trying to play with retroactivity. This was a complete illusion, counterproductive at the legal level. Have you ever seen a Council of Ministers amending a project that it believes is legally sound or is trying to do so? If you were so convinced of the legal solidity of your bill, there would have been no attempt at government level to amend it.

I’m sorry to quote it again because he’s hospitalized: when the head of the AFCN talks about a somewhat bizarre legal acrobatic, it doesn’t help to guarantee the legal solidity of this bill.

All these elements indicate that many legal appeals will be brought against this bill. Mr. Wollants, you cited the judge who gave a judgment on Greenpeace’s appeal. It has not commented on EU internal directives. So what the State Council said about the entire problem of European directives, as well as the AFCN and all parliamentarians, is still complete. This judgment does not legally support the bill we are proposing today.

The legal procedures obviously risk delaying and hypothesizing the extension of these two nuclear reactors and their availability for next winter.

Before speaking of the legal opinion, I would like to read what Mr. Van Troeye said at his hearing: "As for the fuel needed for Doel 1, an option has been taken for delivery in the course of November. The option was made to be sure to be ready, if necessary, for next winter.”

There is one option, Mr. Frost.

Just an option, of course. That means that at any time, they can always pick up the option and buy the fuel, the fuel. This does not pose any problem.

As for the legal option, I would like to insist on the judgment of the Court of First Instance against Greenpeace, a judgment that joins the minister’s thesis. In that judgment, the court clearly distinguishes, on the one hand, the permit to operate and, on the other hand, the permit to produce electricity. All this corroborates the minister’s thesis, which had also been joined by the opinion of the Janson cabinet and the opinion of the Xirius cabinet. You also forget the third opinion of the State Council which also joins the minister's thesis, distinguishing between the authorization to exploit and the authorization to produce electricity. We need to complete the story and go to the end!

You make the interpretation you want. I think that since the beginning of the commission, we have never agreed, each with its own interpretation. I find, however, that the interpretation that the Minister has since the beginning has been corroborated many times afterwards and more and more often. This means that this thesis holds the way and, this, more and more.

This is the Coué method.

Mr. Friart, if you want us to tell you that there is a difference between the operating authorization and the production authorization, we will tell you and we will tell you. There was never a problem between us on this. There is indeed a difference.

What the State Council says, what the Federal Nuclear Control Agency says, what we say, and what is also said outside, is that in order to get a new electricity production authorization, you must go through an environmental impact study and public consultation. Do not try to say we think something else! There are two different dimensions in the authorization.

What the State Council says, including in its third version, is that the part related to electricity production is out of service. I know that one article talked about this a little differently. But return to the source documents, namely the opinions of the State Council. The first, already, speaks of expiration for electricity production. The second does. And the third on our amendments as well.

Did you always follow the opinions of the State Council when you were minister?

But of course not! I have already explained it.

The [...]

Mr Ducarme, Mr. Nollet has confessed. You have forgotten once. He has confessed.

But yes !

You should never hide.

We simply say that the opinion of the State Council has changed. Read it !

It is wrong, it has not evolved. On this point, the opinion of the State Council has not evolved.

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Explain to us! Cite us the excerpt where his opinion has evolved regarding the expiration of the electricity production permit. You might read this in a newspaper article, but that’s not correct. The opinion of the State Council has not evolved on this aspect.

I will not repeat what Mr. Nollet said it. Mr. Miller, you know I am very careful.

Do not swear to him!

I am not sorry, you have heard. I am in my party.

I will not take all the opinions of the State Council, Mrs. Cassart. One thing is clear. Mr. Wollants, the judgment does not rule on European directives. Also, everything that the State Council and the AFCN say in relation to European directives, to the Aarhus and Espoo Conventions is still valid. This means that an environmental impact assessment and a public consultation are needed. The State Council has said this four times. Maybe he should say it a fifth time? I don't know, but four times is already a lot! The AFCN said it only once, of course...

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Miss Cassandra, you can see it here. We can make a trip with the Economy Committee. We'll see if there's any smoke coming out of Doel 1 and Doel 2. I guarantee you that there is no smoke out of Doel 1 since February 15, 2015. This means that the situation of Doel 1 and Doel 2 is not the same. This means that one reactor is closed while the other is open. This means that there is a different perception and opinion of the State Council.

In the commission, it was tried to say that Doel 1 was separate from Doel 2 and Tihange 1. Apparently, the information did not spread. That fucking! I can continue to try to develop my arguments, but I’ll end up getting tired. Also, let’s review the opinions of the State Council that mention exactly the same thing or let’s see the smoke, Mr. Chairman of the Economy Commission, who comes out of Doel 1 and Doel 2 or not! The AFCN’s conceptual note also specifies this.

Now, no one has dared to guarantee in commission that Doel 1 and even Doel 2 will be available next winter. Even the Elia transmission network manager does not rely on Doel 1 in its strategic reserve calculation to avoid supply security issues. He said it and repeated it at the meeting.

Yet for weeks we’ve heard the government and majority parties tell us that nuclear is the solution.

The government and the majority parties tell us it’s nuclear or chaos from next winter. by Mr. Wollants said it a little. For my part, I think with this government it will be nuclear and chaos. Dear colleagues, this government has blinded itself to thinking that two small nuclear reactors would be the solution to our supply problems for next winter.

The [...]

Just like Ms. Cassart and MR voted in 2013, my group advocates a gradual exit from nuclear power. It is a company choice that is based on at least two fundamental reasons: Fukushima and nuclear waste. The 2011 Fukushima accident demonstrated to the world that a large-scale nuclear accident is possible in one of the world’s most developed countries. Although the probability of a large-scale accident is low, zero risk does not exist. My group achieved the choice of zero risk in the field of nuclear power. The cracks discovered in the Tihange 2 and Doel 3 reactors remind us once again that nuclear risk is not an abstract matter. And I don’t think it is for our fellow citizens. These two reactors have been closed for more than a year because no one is currently able to claim that they meet all the safety standards.

With regard to nuclear waste, we must dare to tell the public that these waste produced today by our nuclear power plants will remain harmful to the environment for tens of thousands of years.

It is a heavy environmental debt that we leave to future generations.

The goal of the PS is to get out of nuclear power by 2025. Therefore, we cannot support this project, because it is contrary to this goal. The consequences of this law mean that our country will have to shut down seven nuclear reactors almost simultaneously, between the end of 2022 and 2025, instead of organizing a gradual withdrawal from nuclear power for ten years, as the previous government had programmed. This bill locks our country in a brutal and totally unrealistic exit schedule. By 2025, at least five reactors should be shut down at the same time.

Behind this text lies a great hypocrisy. The government claims to want the nuclear output by 2025, but changes the timetable to make it almost impossible. Mr. Minister, I regret to repeat the first thing you said to us, namely that you didn’t care much about the post-2019. I obviously believe that this government is engaging our society sustainably in nuclear power. To vote on this bill by declaring that we will quit nuclear power by 2025 is a deception towards the Belgian population.

In the policy pursued by this government, we see no action to make this exit from nuclear power effective. However, as we demonstrated in committee with our colleagues, another energy policy is possible. Action must be taken now to develop new solutions, including on the network by accelerating interconnections with the Netherlands. During the hearings, the representative of Elia told us that significant reserves would be available in the coming years. By the way, it would be much less expensive for consumers to take advantage of the surplus of electricity present in the Netherlands than to invest 700 million in two small nuclear power plants – totaling 700 MW – ⁇ aging.

Always in the short term, we call on the government to put in place a genuine demand management policy. This must be done within a broader framework than the strategic reserve. There is also a very significant potential in public or tertiary buildings that, through aggregators, can participate in a policy of erasing demand during consumption peaks.

We also expect determined policy actions to prevent conventional thermal power plants from closing when they are indispensable for this winter.

In your government agreement, you announced a capacity mechanism, but it is worth noting that no tangible measures have been presented.

To accompany the development of intermittent renewable energies, we need flexible gas power plants. I referred to Mr. Today, nuclear power prevents the development of renewable energy because there is no switch on our power plants to stop them when the renewable produces.

The government also decided to remove the tender for the construction of new gas power plants. There were, however, three investors willing to equip our country with production capacity within three to five years, in the medium term. Mr. Minister, you decided to remove this call for tender on the pretext that the European Commission had vetoed it. Nevertheless, the European Commission has never taken a formal decision to ask Belgium to cancel the tender. The European Commission has ⁇ issued criticisms, which are normal compared to a state aid mechanism. But it is you, Madame the Minister, who chose to cancel this bidding instead of entering into a negotiation with the European Commission. When we see that the European Commission has accepted that the UK offers a guaranteed price of 120 euros per megawatt for 35 years to EDF for the construction of a nuclear power plant, Mr. Wollants, it is obvious that Belgium could negotiate with the European Commission in order to organize this tender. This government did not want because it does not want alternatives today. The PS regrets that we do not grasp all these alternatives and that the only perspective of this government is nuclear.

Dear colleagues, I would like to talk about the working method of the Minister. I will not go back on all the debates regarding forgetting, lies, amateurism or how to treat Parliament or even institutions like the State Council. However, I will return to the trading strategy with Electrabel. When you trade with a giant like Electrabel, which has roughly a monopoly in Belgium, you have to prove a method to not shoot a ball in the foot from the beginning. Nevertheless, we have a bill on our table that extends Doel 1 and Doel 2 without even concluding the negotiations with Electrabel.

The negotiations are, however, on a fee that Electrabel must pay to the State in return for this extension. This is obviously putting Electrabel in a position of strength while it is known that the negotiation will have significant financial consequences for the state.

We regret that this bill does not contain any financial tags to frame this agreement. Parliament’s role is to control the government and not to sign a blank check.

Regarding the fee, it is inconceivable to negotiate one without knowing whether we will put the power plants back on the road. You have to look at things one by one. First, decide whether we will put Doel 1 and Doel 2 back on the road. Then, afterwards, depending on what the AFCN will say on the level of security – Mr. The Deputy Prime Minister had talked about it during his speeches – we will go to see Electrabel to negotiate a fee with them. We will not negotiate a fee without knowing whether the power plants will be put into operation. I think this is obvious and the Minister is well aware of it.

Mr. Friart, then you tell me that the minister is not negotiating with Electrabel. Are there any negotiations with Electrabel today regarding Doel 1 and Doel 2? Unfortunately, these plants will not be operational this winter. This is what you have just said, Mr. Freud. You are in the gas, Mr. Freeman. It’s not me that’s on the gas, it’s me. by Friart.

The [...]

Is that not the subject of the discussion?

This is not the subject of this bill. This will be the subject of the next bill. We will not talk today about negotiations with Electrabel.

Mr. Friart, you must at some point accept that this parliament, whether it be the majority or the opposition, controls at a minimum the government. This is our role. This is written in the Constitution. We also vote on the bills. You can still accept at some point that we are not fools and that, I hope, negotiations are ongoing with Electrabel. The CEO of Electrabel told us in the commission. The minister told us because she said she did not want to disclose the state of her negotiations with Electrabel so as not to get them overturned.

Mr Freeman, we are not innocent.

This will be the subject of a next bill.

I must do like the little monkeys: silence, nothing to see, and close my ears?

We will not put on the public square what is happening right now with Electrabel. This will be done soon after this has been decided. You know it very well. You’ve never negotiated, you’ve never discussed, but that’s how things happen.

I have never done anything in my life, sorry. I have never done that in my life. But, Mr. Friart, that we claim transparency, that we claim that there are labels in a bill as it was the case for Tihange 1, that we claim that we know where the government leads us in relation to a reopening of Doel 1 and Doel 2, do you not find this legitimate in relation to a parliament?

Do you not find this legitimate for our citizens? Do you think we should wait for everything to be signed and then say, “Oh, it’s a shame!”

Mr. Friart, I actually think that labels should have been fixed in this bill and you will not let me say anything else today in the plenary session.

Madame Lalieux, when I hear you talk about beacons, I remind you, however, that at the beginning of March, we audited sixteen or fourteen people – I don’t know more, Mr. Nollet – we never gave so much information – I will say it during my speech. You were present, not I, when we negotiated the continuity of Tihange 1.

Maybe go back to see what happened in the work for the extension of Tihange 1. You can blame us for certain things but ⁇ not the lack of transparency, when we see all the discussions in committees and the hearings we have conducted.

Mrs. Cassart, I think in the report, I tried to be totally objective and I thanked everyone for the depth of the debate. On the other hand, if you review the work on Tihange 1, you will see that in the bill, an amendment was filed by the government that placed all the tags. Do not say the opposite of the truth.

by [...]

Mr. Speaker, we will suspend the work to bring the bill and the report on the bill relating to the extension of Tihange 1 to Mrs. Cassart, so that she can read it with her head rested and confirm me that the tags were provided by the bill.

There were two ministers from the former government who were there. Were the signs planned following an amendment? (Yes) Mr. Wollants, you were in the committee; I ask you the same question.

It is true that this was part of that bill, but at the same time, in the present bill, it is already announced that there will be a bill in which the beacons will be removed.

The last time it went as follows: Mr. Wathelet went to negotiate, he submitted a bill containing those beacons and then signed. Now we get a bill for the extension with an explicit clause that it can only take place if an agreement is reached by a certain date and the announcement that a bill will come with the beacons.

Unlike last time, we will indeed have two bills now, versus one then, but those beacons will be there, because that is, of course, specifically recommended in the State Council opinion and also taken up in the response that the government has given to it. Those backs will be there. I understand that you like them very much and you will soon be able to consider them.

Mr. Wollants, when we vote a bill in favour of the prolongation of the nuclear power plant, because we need it for the security of supply next winter, and then we negotiate, because Mr. Wollants, who is a member of the Nuclear Power Plant, is a member of the Nuclear Power Plant. Friart tells us that the negotiations are not yet taking place, I think this is not an ad hoc negotiation method.

I also wonder, Mr Friart, why you did not accept the amendment that actually specified that before signing the Convention, it was necessary that in Article 3 it be indicated that Parliament validates the Convention prior to signature. What would have been impeccable to negotiate is that the badges appear in the bill that is now submitted to us. Even though, Mr. Friart, I never had to negotiate with Electrabel. I don’t have that chance or that misfortune. Mr. Nollet, you can forward the Tihange 1 report to Mrs. Cassart. In this way, you can change your intervention from now on.

I have tried to be concise and it seems to me to have been objective in my capacity as a rapporteur. Everyone should respect the word of the other. The committee debates were hectic, but this is not a reason to not respect parliamentarians.

After more than 60 hours of parliamentary debate, it is clear that the extension of Doel 1 and 2 does not bring any solution for next winter. This bill will also shut down our country in its nuclear dependence and delay the indispensable energy transition. The ideological policy of “all-to-nuclear” brings more insecurity at all levels and will be costly for the citizen. You doubt, we will not vote on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, like my colleague Mrs. Lalieux, I also wanted to thank the services for the long hours they spent in commission and the speed with which they provided us with the reports. It is essential to thank them today.

In 2003, Belgium decided to gradually abandon nuclear energy. However, as early as 2009, and I insist, a series of studies and reports pulled the alarm ring insisting on the risk incurred in the event of early shutdown of our reactors. Indeed, the closure of the gas power plants, combined with the intermittent character of some renewable energies, notably wind power, the whole aggravated by the recent shutdown of the nuclear reactors of Doel 3 and Tihange 2, came to strengthen reports insisting on the possibility of a black-out that led to the closure of three nuclear reactors (Doel 1, Doel 2, Tihange 1) by the horizon of 2015.

I will here cite the 2009 report of the Gemix group, a group of experts responsible for studying the ideal energy mix for Belgium in the medium and long term, or that of the International Energy Agency in 2011, not to mention the study of the SPF Economy 2013 on the supply prospects in the horizon of 2030. These documents went in the same direction: Belgium faces an increasing energy risk, accentuated by the rushing out of nuclear power.

The previous government, which had then, I would like to specify, the support of the PS, the sp.a and the CDH, therefore made in 2013 the decision to extend the life of the Tihange 1 reactor by ten years. We must all, without exception, show humility, because as the Prime Minister correctly recalled in the plenary session of May 28, last year, none of the previous governments have anticipated and solved this cruel problem, this dilemma between the law of 2003 and the energy supply situation of our country.

When the current federal government took office, it immediately measured the seriousness of the situation and engaged in this task. He intended to take emergency measures but also to equip our country with a strategy, a short- and medium-term energy vision in order, on the one hand, to guarantee the sovereignty and energy independence of our country and, on the other hand, to guarantee to our citizens and our companies an affordable energy with a high degree of security and security.

Madame Cassart, you will be pleased because I agree with you. Since the 2003 law, it has been effectively observed that the withdrawal from nuclear power has not been implemented by the various successive governments. Why Why ? We will probably not agree on the reason.

I listen to you!

We let the market go, thinking that the market would settle everything: “Let us trust the market.” And what did the market do? He did as he always did. He sought the most profitable path. This was not to favor gas power plants, especially in the current context, but it was necessarily to prefer nuclear power, because it is known that power plants have been amortized for a long time. As a liberal, you won’t accept it, but the real problem is the liberalization of the energy sector.

Really not ! You have your position.

This is why nuclear power has never been disposed of.

I listened to you. You have your position. We have our own. This poses no problem. In this Assembly, everyone has the right to speak.

Continue with your vision, Mrs. Cassart.

The (...)

I think what I say. Please rest assured, I am not Mrs. Marghem. Caroline Cassart is here. She takes the word and she has a position.

The [...]

Mr Nolan, I can reassure you. When I proposed the solution two per group, I knew very well that we would reach the number and we already had an agreement to audition for two days. I’ve always told you I’d do the transparency and some things so that the opposition also got the right information.

The [...]

You said at some point that I was the most sympathetic member of the majority. Such things will not be forgotten. We have seen some very positive things in the committee.

The [...]

On that shot, I wanted to show a bit of fair play if you wanted to audition on transparency, which we did. We played well. Over time, you may not always have been grateful in commission. For my part, I was very transparent and gave auditions.

The [...]

I think you interpreted it wrong. Transparency has always been important in this area.

Mrs. Cassart, I appreciated the construction of your argument on the occasion of the answer you gave me. It was well constructed, well argued.

I don’t want to discuss this with you for two hours because we’ll never come to an agreement. We do not think the same.

Allow me to ask you a question! Since 2003, which political family has participated, without interruption, in successive governments?

I said it from the beginning. We are showing some humility. I can repeat what I said a few moments ago: “We must all, without exception, show humility, because as the prime minister rightly recalled [...]”

I do not blame anyone else. I repeat that we all, without exception, must show humility.

I will return to the discussions that took place in the committee. Sometimes by ideology, sometimes by political calculation, an implacable finding was concealed during these debates. If we do not resume Doel 1, if we do not extend Doel 2, in the event of a harsh winter, we expose our hospitals, our retirement homes, our public services, our fellow citizens and our ⁇ to a high risk of black-out.

I must remind you that the Federal Bureau of the Plan estimated the hourly cost of a black-out to 120 million euros. This is what we want to avoid. In fact, the risk is real. This is the reason for the bill that is presented to us today.

Considering the urgency and the urgent need to vote on this bill, I would like to return to the allegations that embellished its legislative course in commission.

The government has been accused of opting for "all nuclear", of not having a prospective vision, of not having studied alternatives, of playing with the security of the citizen, of not discussing a convention that otherwise does not exist, of showing opacity and a lack of transparency. I really regret the positions adopted and the terms used.

We have been working on this issue for more than two months. The accusations we have made are serious. It is time to restore the truth.

The truth, what is it? On February 15, 2015, in accordance with the 2003 law, the Doel 1 plant was shut down. This is the reason why we have been involved in all the legal disputes that have occupied us for many hours in the commission.

We have a first opinion of the State Council of February 2015, confirmed, in a more elaborate and more explicit manner, by a second opinion of the State Council of May 2015 and even a third, obtained last week at the request of the opposition, in which, while retaining its line on the Conventions of Espoo and Aarhus, the State Council revises its position on the issue of the expiration of operating permits, now joining the position defended by the government.

I have the opinion of the State Council. Tell me where you see a difference.

I don’t have the comparison in front of the eyes, but, if you read it correctly ...

In the first notice of the State Council, it is written this: "In individual operating and industrial production permits, the provisions concerning the permission to produce electricity expire on 15 February. Changes to Doel 1’s deactivation date were not made before February 15, so the provisions regarding production permission became obsolete.”

The latest notice says exactly the same thing on page 18 of 24: "Therefore, it must be considered that the production authorisation has expired on 15 February 2015. In so far as the operating authorisation also contains provisions relating to the authorisation of production from the fission of nuclear fuel, these provisions terminated on 15 February 2015.”

Tell me what has changed! Both opinions say exactly the same thing.

and no. I will even repeat here the words of Secretary of State Melchior Wathelet, in the explanation of reasons regarding the possible discontinuation of Doel 1: "Only the provisions relating to the permission of industrial production of electricity from the fission of nuclear fuels terminate, while the other provisions remain fully applicable." The CQFD! Demonstration is finished.

This is what the government has been looking at and working on.

This is interesting because we are constantly quoting the excerpts of Mr. by Wathelet.

Is that bothering you?

not at all. You are mistaken in targeting. We were already in the opposition.

And your position has never changed. I confess to you, Mr. Nollet, I don’t think I can change you today.

I just wanted, to be correct, to go to the end of what Mr. Wathelet said it. He justified, in the summary of the statement of reasons for the law of 2013, that the bill aims to prevent any possible difficulties of interpretation because it is obvious – you have not read that passage – that the obligations of the nuclear operator with regard to nuclear reactors do not cease to exist when electricity production is discontinued. He also already made the difference between electricity production and exploitation. You do not quote that passage.

Now, it is fundamental because it justifies the position of the previous government that has evolved during the debate between the various readings within the federal government. Your party was represented; I suppose you have the document. There was a note to the Government, to the Council of Ministers, dated July 16, 2013, which the Minister did not cite in the preparatory work. We went to look for her. This letter, signed by Mr. Wathelet justifies the integration of amendments between the readings of this text by the fact that there are obligations related to the maintenance of operation.

Don’t say, today, that at the time it was introduced to allow an extension of electricity production, while, precisely, in the note to the government, the opposite is written. It is possible to reconstruct history on the basis of this famous text. We can give you the note. You have become accustomed to asking us for copies.

When you asked for them, we also gave them to you.

After a while, unfortunately.

The note to the government clearly explains why these changes were made.

I thank you, Mr. Nollet, for these clarifications but, I repeat, the government has chosen to maintain its line. We will continue. Simply because he does not share the legal point of view of the State Council, even though it has evolved in its third opinion.

Our position is consistent and we fully accept it. Proof of this is the analysis of two specialized offices. I will not mention any names here. We are not here to do advertising but we have the analysis of two firms that go in the same direction.

Madame Cassart, you know that it is following a note from a specialized cabinet, the Janson cabinet not to mention it – it is Ecolo who gave us the legal analysis since it did not exist according to the government’s words – which advocated retroactivity, that the government tested this retroactivity with the State Council. Do not say...

There were several legal opinions.

Madame Cassart, I will never interrupt you. I ask for the word; you interrupt me constantly. You are tired!

I just ask that you accept that we say the opposite of what you say. You say that there are two legal analyses that were impeccable and that did not question the government’s project. I say that following one of the two legal analyses, the government tested an amendment on retroactivity. So do not say that there was no problem in the legal analysis since there was an amendment followed by the Assassin’s Opinion, which you read like me, of the State Council.

There are two legal opinions.

Several legal opinions.

There are two opinions that go in your direction. The first opinion concludes that an amendment is needed. This is the part that was hidden in the Minister’s manuscript note. The copier-liper did not take up this part.

I have a second opinion in mind. It is in the annexes that the services have transmitted to us on page 343. What does he say? That the lawyer should not stand on the opinion of the State Council because that is not his role. He says, I quote, "It doesn't belong to Electrabel ..." - it's the lawyer of Electrabel who gave this opinion- ...

This annoys you!

Not at all! I am the one who cites it. You hide it, I quote it.

"It is not up to Electrabel, but to the legislator alone to decide on this issue." Do not say that this second opinion helps you because it says it does not pronounce itself!

The second does not serve, while the first considers that an amendment is needed. Then you say, "Victory, reviews are positive!"Where did you read this?

Mr Nollet, anyway...

I will answer you every time and explain why.

You have already done this in the commission.

Mr. Nollet, what can I say about the judgment made on 1 June by the Brussels Court of First Instance? Few observers have mentioned this judicial decision that, independently, validated the government’s position. You only know it too well! The endless debates that you imposed on us – and I tell you without any reproach, given the importance of the matter and given that democracy has its rights – actually had only one goal, namely the urgency to re-launch Doel 1 and 2 in order to avoid a black-out and guarantee supply security for next winter.

Madame Cassart-Mailleux, you are talking about next winter. Maybe you didn’t hear me, but I just quoted the minister and Elia who said that for next winter we could forget Doel 1. At least have the decency to recognize him for this plant! As for Doel 2, we will discuss it a little later when I speak at the tribune. After all, for Doel 1, the Mass is said!

We said in the committee that the first step was to vote on this bill, but we never gave any guarantee for the future. Anyway, if we do not vote on this text, it is certain, Mr. Nollet, that we will not extend Doel 1. We will first vote on this bill, in accordance with the government agreement.

This is interesting, because the government agreement does not say that. It states that you must have taken a legislative initiative so that the extension of the nuclear units of Doel 1 and 2 is effective until 31 March 2015 and 31 March 2016 respectively. However, you have not put this device in place in time. The problem we face today – and that’s why you’re trying to get the emergency without actually having it – is that you should have taken that initiative before February 15 last year. You are out of time! So don’t say that was planned in the government agreement.

The government is now in the position to vote on this bill. Because it is clear, Mr Nollet, that if this bill is not voted, it is certain that Doel 1 and Doel 2 will not be reopened. You have also accused us of adopting the “all-to-nuclear” position. But not . We have always assumed the fact that “all-to-nuclear” is not a credible option.

The government is focusing on the energy mix that the minister is currently working on. This is also included in the Government Agreement. In addition to the extension of the Doel 1 and Doel 2 reactors until 2025, it asks Elia to continue its efforts to develop interconnection capacity while adopting the bill that is also being considered today, and on the creation of an Energy Transition Fund to encourage research and development in innovative energy projects, including energy production and storage. The draft law also includes the transposition of the European Energy Efficiency Directive.

The Minister continues to reflect on the energy mix that it intends to build in consultation with the federal entities. I repeat, we know that the “all-to-nuclear” is not a solution and we will come to the committee to present this energy mix. We will come to the committee with proposals, but we are not going to discuss some things now, as we are not yet ready and we are continuing to work and analyze. But rest assured, we will come to present this energy mix in commission because that’s really the government’s desire.

We also want a subtle balance between the different energy sources that will ensure the sustainability of our energy supply, while fulfilling our ambitious commitments to combating greenhouse gas production and global warming. But as I said, patience. Patience is not one of my great virtues but here, I ask you to show a little patience and we will come into commission with these files.

Unfortunately, Doel 1 and Doel 2 are not available. This finding is relentless. It does not come from our imagination; as I have already mentioned, we rely on independent studies and reports.

I have a small question for you.

You just said that it was impossible to do without Doel 1 and Doel 2.

We are not sure. The first step is to vote the bill. Doel 1 and Doel 2 are used.

I knew that was your wish. Doel 1 and Doel 2 should be reopened. If ever the AFCN gives a red light, what do you do?

We have other paths, I will return to them. We have other additional pistes that are still under analysis.

At that time, they will not be additional, they will be alternative.

The primary goal is to vote on this bill, so that we can reopen Doel 1 and Doel 2 if the possibility arises. We will return to the energy mix. It’s not because we vote on this bill today that we’re not going to study additional pistes. I would like to talk about Mr. M. by Woitrin.

As I said, we have independent reports, the study of G-Mix, the expert group tasked with studying the ideal energy mix for Belgium in the medium and long term. A September 2009 report entitled "What is the ideal energy mix for Belgium in 2020 and 2030" explicitly concludes the need to extend the reactors of Doel 1 and Doel 2 and Tihange 1. I recall that when we extended Tihange 1, it did not cause so many problems. However, there was no such comprehensive report and there were no hearings. I wanted to emphasize it.

In a 2011 report, the International Energy Agency also urged Belgium to extend nuclear power for energy security reasons.

What to say about the alternatives mentioned by our now famous mr. by Woitrin?

The question was asked to Elijah. What did she answer? The Brabo track is not possible until winter 2015-2016. The Woitrin track is a very risky project that needs to be studied in detail. The Woitrin track is not scavenged from one side of the hand, it can be examined. But as the majority in the commission indicated and as the minister explained, it should not be that the Woitrin track brakes the adoption of this bill.

You say Mr. Woitrin’s track will be investigated. You know, the minister in the committee said that this path is not feasible.

I don't understand if you're talking too fast.

You just said, “We’re going to study the Woitrin track again.” You still remember that, during the discussions in the committee, the minister said that this was not feasible, that there were several things needed ...

Absolutely at all. A very risky project that needs to be studied in detail.

No, it was afterwards. But the minister started by saying that it was impossible, that they were telling nonsense.

Elia’s position during the hearings was such...

I will quote my notes. The minister said in a committee that this required a 220-volt radio station, insulators and a new pylon. Now you say that this track should be studied.

We have never left anything aside. We’ve always said that we’ll look at all the possible paths in addition to this bill.

No, that was not the case two weeks ago. The minister said it was impossible. And now we discover that it’s a problem of will: ‘I don’t want to do it’.

The image used by the minister was as follows: "It's like if we wanted to connect a 220-volt radio station to 380, it would explode." That was what she had said. And now we hear that it would be feasible and that we need to study...

Read Elia’s hearings in the committee. You refer to the Minister.

The minister said that the insulators should be replaced and that the installation of a new pylon would be necessary before the authorization is given, which is false.

I explained that this is a very complicated, very risky project.

You never talk about the scenario the minister described. She spoke of 220-volt radio stations connected to the 380-volt radio station.

This is stated in a very narrow context.

I think the path of mr. Dominique Woitrin is risky and needs to be studied in detail.

We have already discussed the Pist-Woitrin several times. We have received the proposal, we have received his letter, we have seen the response of Elijah.

A number of matters need to be further investigated. I think it is absolutely necessary that we do so so that it can be used as an additional track. Mr. Nollet, I think that is so. I think there is a lot of support to investigate all this. Let us just do that. For me, that is separate from the discussion about Goal 1 and 2, because it should be used as a backbone. As I just said, it’s not absolutely certain that Goal 1 and 2 will work next winter. That is indeed true.

If it is said here that we will investigate that, we will simply do so.

We will examine all pistes to ensure supply security for Belgian citizens. You hear, Mr. Nollet: all the tracks.

The [...]

We are not waiting. We first vote on this bill and, at the same time, we analyze all possible pistes.

I think it might have been useful to look at the pistes in a complementary way to move forward on several fronts. You express yourself that you have doubts about the resumption of the nuclear reactors of Doel 1 and Doel 2.

Today, we are wasting time.

not at all. We have additional pistes that we are now analyzing. The Minister will come to the committee with all these proposals. Give us time to work.

I suggest you work in parallel.

This is what we do.

As for the alternative proposals that may consist of bringing superpower generators, the companies that rent these engines do not wait and they rent these engines elsewhere. We may find ourselves without this track and we will complain later.

I think mr. Nollet asked for the word.

I would like to comment on Mr. President’s speech. by Wollants. I admire the fact that we will analyze the Woitrin track like everyone else. I agree, but I ask questions. Why did we lose two months before we analyzed it? I am asking this question to the Minister. We lost two months as we communicated this from the beginning of the work. Then, one dimension should be paid attention: the Woitrin track is not cumulative with Doel 1 operation. I wanted to explain it technically. It cannot be said that this is a complementary track. This is an alternative path.

and Supplementary!

In the case of Doel 1. Finally, the third element – and that seems to me the most important: as there is that heavy uncertainty about Doel 1 and as the minister said in January and March that Doel 1 would not be opened this year, I think it would have been better to do the opposite and look first at that track before doing the rest. Let me express this regret, to clarify that this is not a complementary but an alternative path. It has been said for a long time.

If there is a problem subsequently, then the two months lost will be heavy in the balance of responsibilities. C’est clair!

Mr. Nollet, on your three points we have already extended on point one and point two.

As for the third point, it is indeed true that all things cannot be realized simultaneously. However, the two pistes as equivalent proposals are also not correct.

In that sense, the certainty that, at the time that Goal 1 and Goal 2 are effectively running, its current effectively ends up on the grid is almost 100 % and it is certain that there is additional capacity. However, there is no certainty that there is also overflow of electricity. Therefore, it must be returned to the backward power plants. That means that in that case we end up again in the story of the 2,700 megawatts, which Elijah indicates.

That is where the problem arises. Therefore, the two pistes are not equal.

Mr. Wollants, how can you still say today that the production of nuclear electricity is a guaranteed production, with what we have experienced in recent months with Doel 3, Tihange 2, with Doel 4, with Tihange 1 which has also been closed for a few moments, with the situation on Doel 1 and Doel 2 and the legal and economic uncertainty? How can we now consider this energy to be the safest energy? Nuclear energy is currently the most intermittent energy in Belgium.

When compared to the volume concerned, it is now the most intermittent. On the contrary, in the Netherlands, and in the reports it is written, Elia said, there is already today an existing overcapacity. In addition, there will be another 3,000 megawatts next year. So stop telling us that this is uncertain.

The Netherlands is also an importing Member State.

This is the prime minister’s argument. I think we have solved that question. The Netherlands is not a net importer. They are largely exporters. When we need it...

They also import electricity.

Stop these arguments! Technically, they don’t hold the road. We could do this again, but we would lose a lot of time.

For all clarity, I just said that, at the time of Goal 1 and 2 running, the probability is quite high that we can use that electricity on the grid. If they turn, then we have that electricity.

When it comes to the availability of those power plants, the average availability of our nuclear power plants, we count – you know – at 7,750 hours per year. That is right, right? When it comes to availability, it is quite high. It’s a piece more than what the gas plants run and it’s already whole pieces more than at, for example, off shore wind or on shore wind.

If one now says that those nuclear power plants of us almost always stop, then one does the truth a bit of violence.

We exchanged our views. We will not continue the trade for a long time. But I can do it...

We know it! We know you, Mr Nollet!

I suggested not to do it.

It is very well so! From committee to committee, this did not bring much!

It is true that mr. Jambon could not attend all of our work.

From the point of view of electricity production, nuclear power is also a theory, just as import is a theory. In reality, we are no longer in a dreamed or ideal situation. The uncertainty is full and complete. The alternative exists here.

What should concern us in our research is the 13,700 MW we need at peak hours, in winter, between 17:00 and 20:00. We must rely on our capabilities. We must forget everything that is renewable because one day in January, after 16:00, there will be no wind, there will be no wind turbines. We also do not have to rely on imports because, on that day, neighboring countries will need all their electricity. Electricity should be produced as much as possible at home. This is a good reason to completely resume Doel 1 and Doel 2.

I am afraid that we will take a step back with the intervention of Mr. President. Friart, let us go twenty or thirty years back, at a time when the markets were not interconnected, where Belgium had to suffice for itself. Nuclear power dates from those years, okay, but we have evolved since then, Mr. Friart. There are even wind turbines that work in winter!

It is true that wind turbines were a great success in the Walloon Region!

Absolutely of course! With the help of Mr. Jean-Luc Crucke who installed wind turbines on the territory of his municipality, we can move forward. You are right to insist on this Walloon victory and the help of MR mayors who installed these wind turbines. They operate in winter, including in Leuze-en-Hainaut. That is the advantage.

Not after 5 p.m.

But yes !

Mr. Vande Lanotte, ⁇ in Ostende, there is no more wind after 17:00, but here we have! Isn’t it, Mr. Friart, there is wind in Wallonia even after 17:00? And even sometimes, the clarity there is enough to make some photovoltaic panels work. What I say is serious.

This was also a success on your part. If you want, we can start talking about wind turbines and photovoltaics. Don’t forget that I was a member of the Wallon Parliament when you were a minister. I can say that at the time, the balance sheet was not great.

Mrs. Cassart, I ask you to think about the translators. When two people are shouting, it is difficult for them to translate. Keep calm and it will get better.

Why do you think I have such words? Try not to get away from the debate. The intervention of Mr. Freud makes us retreat. I therefore propose to continue our debate.

I would like to make a small clarification. When you look at the puppy, Mr. Nollet created in Wallonia with his 50 passes to the Ministry of Energy, I think I can say that he is quite badly placed to come to give lessons here. Considering the price of energy in Wallonia after its passage, one is right to think that it still has a lot to learn before coming to give lessons to the Chamber!

Mr. Friart, it must be acknowledged that some of your interventions in commission went a little counter-current. Indeed, all the other colleagues members of your government have told us – the report actually believes – that a European energy policy should be developed. And for your part, as was the case in the commission, you declare here that you believe only in nuclear power and only in nuclear power produced in Belgium.

It seems to me, Mr. Friart, that in terms of energy, one cannot live on an island. Interconnections are needed.

Elia told us that the Netherlands will have a surplus. They produce more than their domestic demand. It is a border country with Belgium. The cost of importing energy produced in this country will be much lower. We have recently had a discussion about the consumer price and the safety net. What is the benefit of investing at least 700 million in aging power plants? Mr. Freeman, at least try to be honest in this matter!

I expected the Wallon argument to fall earlier!

It’s not because you’ve always done this in commission that you have to do it. I would like to explain what has been discussed in the parliament. You were there!

It is paradoxical to see today in interviews that we did not do enough under the previous government in Wallonia for renewable, while when the MR sat, and he is still, in the opposition in Wallonia, he said that we were doing too much!

You are handling the file wrongly, it is different! We never said you were doing too much.

No, I own the articles and I can put them out one after another! We have talked about it enough! Now we need to know! In the middle, there is what Mr. Crucke made on its municipal territory, it installs wind turbines that work beyond 17:00 when there is wind!

I would like to remind Ms. Lalieux and Mr. Today, we are talking about 700 megawatts. We are talking about Doel 1 and Doel 2. They are indispensable for security of supply, but in the coming weeks, in commission, we will talk about an energy pact, an energy mix with other sources of electricity production. But one thing at a time! Today it is Doel 1 and Doel 2.

Mr. Nollet, we said that in the Walloon Region, this case was poorly managed and not that you did too much. I will not tell you the history on voltaic panels, on the wind catastrophe, on many other materials. The primary need of the citizen is the security of energy supply.

In order to reach this security of energy supply, it is clear that the Minister will come into commission with additional measures. This is not an alternative, we will do more. We will not put this bill at risk because it is indispensable for us.

Safety, for us, is an absolute track. The Interior Minister was very clear. We will bow to the decisions of the AFCN, an independent institution responsible for nuclear security. This institution has a staff, it has engineers, it is envious to us pat all Europe. The position of the Minister of the Interior was very clear on the subject. If the AFCN gives its green light on the extension of Doel 2 and the resumption of Doel 1, so much better! If the AFCN conditions this green light, then we will be uncontractable on the work to be done. If the AFCN considers that the danger is too great, we will not take the risk of putting the population at risk. It comes from the source, that is obvious. The Minister explained this in the committee and I wish today that this be taken back into the report.

If nuclear security is this government’s priority and not rush over supply security, why does this government change its shoulder gun from SALTO and international experts’s check before the extension? So you agree with us, you will not re-open the power plants until there is an expertise.

What happened to Tihange 1?

Mrs. Cassart, you should read your files again, I told you before.

No, not at all.

There was SALTO before the extension of Tihange 1. Bells were included in the law and relative. I no longer know how to say it. I do not speak Dutch well enough to say it in this language.

Today, the government changes its shoulder rifle and shows precipitation for next winter.

Statements by Mr. Goods do not reassure us. Indeed, by minimizing the Fukushima accident to this point, it has caused a total break of confidence and has lost all credibility.

Quality in this institution. This is a whole, Madame Lalieux.

I’m talking about a breakdown of trust and a loss of credibility towards their own institution. I apologize to all the employees of the NFC.

After such statements, international expertise is indispensable, as we did for Tihange 1. Read the reports!

When it comes to Tihange 1, I am the most neutral observer.

I was not in the majority. You came to say that for Tihange 1, the SALTO did not take place before the extension. It is false. Pre-SALTO was made in August 2012 and SALTO in January 2015, before the 40th anniversary. It is not innocent. This is not something that environmentalists have asked for. The fact that a SALTO must be carried out before the extension is a request from the International Atomic Energy Agency. This is not really the study service of Greenpeace or Ecolo-Groen. This is one of the examples where we see that this majority plays with nuclear security, that you do not comply with the directives...

The [...]

Let me speak mr. Calvo, Mrs Cassart

For me, this is one of the examples where we find that you do not follow the international guidelines, the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I repeat, this is not our request. I can provide you with the requests of the Agency. Normally, a pre-SALTO is performed two years before and a SALTO two years before the start of the LTO. It is still important. And you just said that was not the case with Tihange 1. This was the case with Tihange 1. This is a strong demand from the IAEA.

I said that the SALTO was made in 2015. I did not lie; it is the truth.

Ms. Lalieux tells me that a pre-SALTO has been performed before. I just told you that a SALTO was made in 2015. I said nothing else.

(i) I have submitted my comments on security issues. We simply ask the MR in particular, and the government in general, not to mislead the facts. It is a fact! When it happened, don’t say it didn’t happen. We know that we do not agree on the bottom. But at some point, Mrs. Cassart, Mr. Friart, when things have been done, we have the documents in the committee and you have access to the report, I simply ask that we do not cut the truth once again here in the plenary session.

I just told the tribune that the SALTO was done in 2015!

Mr. Calvo, it makes no sense to work that way. I would like the word to be asked, and this also applies to you, Mrs. Cassart-Mailleux. We must be able to follow the debate in a decent way.

Mr. Minister of the Interior, I believe that your position has always been very clear about the attitude that the AFCN will take and about nuclear security.

Yes, the AFCN is an independent institution, I repeat, which will decide in terms of nuclear security. Let us stop scaring. We have a quality institution and we will not take any risks!

No, there is no ideal world in terms of nuclear security. Definitely not ! But we must constantly strive towards this ideal. This reporting, the studies that the AFCN advises ideally to carry out before the relief will be carried out as soon as possible. It is possible that this work will take place after the resumption of Doel 1 and the extension of Doel 2, but it is up to the AFCN, independent and impartial, to decide in this direction.

It will be briefly recalled – you will not agree, Madame Lalieux – that the SALTO program of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for example, if it should ideally take place before the extension (like any optional control) or the reboot of the reactors has no legal value. This is a peer review, a comparison with good practices in nuclear safety. A visit by the International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled for February 2016.

To complement my remarks on this point, I will add that Tihange 1 – you will not agree – was the subject of a SALTO visit only in 2015, while it had been extended since 2013.

I also wanted to address the subject of the convention. The Minister had already indicated in her presentation the reasons why she would soon return to Parliament to submit to us later the final terms and amounts for the conclusion by the Government of the agreement planned with Electrabel, as was the case for Tihange 1. Meanwhile, it is quite easy for the opposition to talk about a convention that does not exist. “As long as there is no agreement on everything, there is no agreement on nothing,” the minister repeated often. This is a real trial of intent.

The Prime Minister himself spoke about this in a plenary session. "The government wants to avoid a significant financial risk on the shoulders of the state." But, at the same time, as in any negotiation of the rest, each party comes to the other with its demands and claims.

It may seem logical that a private operator, before making investments, seeks stability and legal certainty. The agreement will therefore be the result of a subtle balance. Making predictions, asking for exclusives while negotiations continue, at this stage, is not of great interest. The Minister has repeated it: she will return with this matter to Parliament.

I will conclude by returning to the incidents that embellished the work in committee during the review of the bill we are discussing today. These debates, even though the strikes to the minister did not always honor their author, even though the arguments were not always high-level,... Some MPs repeated the same questions, the same debate to make a little longer. This is the game of the opposition.

I think I’ve been a bit upset by my colleagues Nollet and Calvo and I apologize. Imagine you had a president or a majority chairwoman who voted by a majority to end the general discussion. Imagine the position that would have been yours in this case.

I think that by reasonable management of the debate, I allowed colleagues to speak, but I deprived Mr. Nollet and Calvo from an exceptional position that is to be cut off in a general discussion. In fact, I was proposed to vote the end of the general discussion. I refused to do so, as a good Democrat, but unfortunately for their media position, because that has made them a little bitter.

All members of the committee and in the end all the members of the committee were finally able to formulate an opinion in full transparency. This is the positive side of this debate, Mr. Nollet.

We have, dear colleagues, organized for this bill two whole days of hearings during which the opposition and the majority were able to listen, exchange, ask questions to more than fifteen speakers chosen by each other. This was not the case for Tihange 1. We heard the Minister of the Interior, responsible for nuclear safety, for several hours during the second reading of the draft. This was not the case for Tihange 1.

Ms. Milquet did not come to the committee to discuss the matter.

How many alternatives to the renewal of Tihange 1 were studied through written reports? None of . We have ⁇ 300 pages attached to the report of the two readings. How many annexes to the 2013 Tihange Law report? None of . It is therefore false to say that the majority would have lacked transparency in this matter. We spent about 50 hours in the committee, including the two above-mentioned hearings days.

The conclusion, Mr. Speaker, dear colleagues, from this litany of examples, which I say, of facts, is that this majority has given the opposition the opportunity for a great debate on the nuclear and energy future of our country. We have demonstrated our commitment to transparency.

More than ever, I would like us to keep those figures from the Federal Plan Office as to the cost of an hour of black-out. It has had to be repeated dozens of times, but it’s still a long time for the people to know that we’re finding solutions.

For this majority, for this government, it’s a risk that we don’t want to run and we refuse to let our fellow citizens run. The vote on this bill is just the beginning. We still have a lot of work to do. This government will be responsible.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker. That is why we are debating today. As a good housekeeper, we must take our responsibilities today and enable our energy supply to be secured for the coming winters.

Our security of supply is at stake, this winter, the coming winters, and according to Elijah, even this summer. So we now need to cut down the knots to guarantee our supply security and ensure that the light continues to burn in the short term.

Today there is a draft law that allows the extension of the life life of Goal 1 and Goal 2. This is a first step, but not the last. With the approval of the present bill, we will make it legally possible to extend the life of both reactors. After that, however, an agreement with the operator on the financial aspects and last but not least the green light from the FANC is needed before the power plants can restart.

Our security of supply is at stake. Unfortunately, this is not the first time. I would like to go back in time. This is not the first time we have this debate. To be honest, I have a little déjà-vuge feeling.

In 2013, Parliament approved a similar bill, namely the extension of the life of Tihange 1 by ten years. Together with the then majority parties, CD&V was also convinced that by taking measures within the framework of the Wathelet Plan, Goal 1 and Goal 2 could be closed. We will now return to that decision.

We must have the courage to ask ourselves, colleagues, what has happened since then, so we still have to decide to keep Goals 1 and 2 open for longer. With the extension of the life of Tihange 1, the problematic situation of the security of our energy supply was already clear. Well, since then, the situation has not improved, on the contrary. Several power plants have announced that they will close this year. The shutdown of more than 1,300 megawatts of capacity was not planned in 2013. Last year, two power plants were already placed out of the market and included in the strategic reserve. This is in addition to the classic power plants that were put out of service in 2013.

We lack new investments that can also contribute to our security of supply. The tender for the new gas plant, which was envisaged in the Wathelet plan, is not feasible under pressure from Europe. In addition to the closure of the various gas power plants, there was also the unavailability of the Tihange 3 and Tihange 2. This, of course, was not expected in 2013.

We still don’t know whether these power plants will be restarted and, if that happens, when it will actually happen. Can’t we wait until we have clarity about Goal 3 and Tihange 2? CD&V, too, would have preferred to have had clarity about these cracks now, or even yesterday, but it is not so. Delaying the decision indefinitely would be irresponsible.

It’s very easy to criticize energy policy, but let’s be honest. It is very difficult to formulate a sound policy as long as there is uncertainty about as much as 2,000 megawatts. The date when we get clarity about Goal 3 and Tihange 2 is always pushing. According to the FANC, the analysis process may take several months. The uncertainty remains, but even here nuclear security is at the forefront, let that be clear. For this reason, it is not necessary to simply decide to restart. For the sake of economic rights, it is also not merely possible to decide on a definitive termination. The fate of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 requires a very accurate weighing of a group of experts. We leave it entirely in the hands of the fans.

In addition to our gas power plants and our nuclear power, of course, we also have renewable energy that can contribute to our supply. We can only welcome that there has been an increase in renewable energy in recent years. For now, however, it does not yet substantially contribute to our supply security in the winter.

In addition, we can still import electricity, but also there we encounter technical limitations. In addition, we must keep in mind that several power plants are also closing in France and the Netherlands, which in the event of a real cold wave threatens to threaten sharp competition between Belgium and France for the reserves currently available in the Netherlands.

Colleagues, as stipulated in the Government Agreement, the extension of life life is not a blind, solitary measure, but a measure linked to several pistes that were taken into account and in which, in the context of supply security, it was determined that it would not be a sensible decision to close Goal 1 and Goal 2. It was necessary to take into account the fact that the nuclear reactors Doel 3 and Tihange 2 could potentially shut down. Possible additional planned interconnection capacity had to be taken into account. It was necessary to take into account the possibility of integrating foreign capacity into the Belgian network and of course also the evolution of the Belgian production capacity.

Mrs. Dierick, I have not interfered with the crack reactors.

I remain confident that you have made an incredible twist compared to previous positions in the committee, but I will not come back to that in detail now.

What I find strange in your presentation is that you seem very satisfied with the way things are rolling out now. You say that the government agreement contains many alternatives, that it is being worked out and that this is part of it. Well, that contrasts with your critical attitude — not just yours by the way — for example Sunday in the television studios and in your recently published press release. If you were talking about improvisation and mistakes made by the minister, what were you talking about? After all, you seem to be very satisfied at this time with what is happening, with how things are addressed, but that is in sharp contrast to your previous statements. What is it about?

Mr. Calvo, I have indeed been critical and have repeatedly said, both in a television debate and in the committee, that we think that the debate has not gone as quietly as possible and that we regret it. We also felt that there could have been faster transparency. The government has not always chosen the easiest way. For us, however, it is the result that counts.

With regard to this bill, all opinions were made available to the committees. All the elements are now on the table and we can discuss the content.

There have been mistakes in this file.

It did not happen in a serene way, but could have happened differently.

Mrs. Marghem, have you heard Mrs. Dierick?

To this day, you maintain with regard to this Parliament that in this case nothing really went wrong, that everything went smoothly, that things should not have gone differently, as Ms. Dierick says.

This is not how it works, of course. You can speak to the Minister, but it must be done through the President. You can ask a question to the minister, but no one has to feel forced here to speak right when. Now you have the word.

There is, of course, no coercion in your Parliament.

Mrs Marghem, I find it remarkable, however, that members of the Parliament of the majority here in the speech panel say that it should have been different in this case.

I said, “Mrs. Dierick said that mistakes were made.” You corrected me: you said that it should have been different in the file, that some things should have come on the table faster. I confront the Minister with that judgment. Why do I do it? I still find it strange that after all that we have experienced, the Minister of Energy still has not said at any time that one could indeed have addressed it in a different way. She did not do that in any way.

Mrs. Dierick, I agree with what you said there. I also find it courageous that you say that as a member of Parliament of the majority. I can only state that the Minister of Energy – this is also annoying for future files – has not given that opinion at all. She thinks that it has gone perfectly, that things should not have gone differently than they have gone. This is not a pleasant decision, not even for you as a member of the majority.

Based on what do you think she will do better next time? What elements do you have right now to be able to know that Mrs. Marghem will do better next time?

I have indeed said that everything has not been done in the most serene way, but I have also added very clearly that in the end the result counts. As members of the committee, we have received all the advice. We have even received an opinion on a government amendment that has not been submitted and is therefore actually non-existent. This has never happened before in my political career. All the documents you requested, you have also received.

Now let’s talk about the content. It is the result that counts. All elements are there. We are no longer playing procedural games, we will be talking about the content of the file.

With all respect but information to Parliament is a matter of substance for me. This is not a procedural given, for me it is a substantive given. I agree with you that it could have happened in a different way.

I can only conclude that the Minister has not yet made that conviction. That makes me worried. Her performance this afternoon strengthens me in the belief that there is a problem and that the problem will not thus be limited to Goal 1 and 2. It has in no way used the space, which has been there for hours, to admit to Parliament and the general public that certain things should have been addressed in a different way. I have not seen it yet. I think you should regret this even more explicitly, because I think that otherwise we will not move forward. Mrs. Marghem has not yet understood it.

Mr Calvo, I have said several times that all the elements are now on the table and that I really want to continue with the content of the dossier. I don’t want to always look back at the past. Let us look to the future, because there is still a lot of work on the shelf.

Colleagues, if I overlook all the conditions in the government agreement, I can only conclude that all those conditions have been taken into account. The projects of Elia to strengthen the interconnection, we have heard in the committee detailed explanations. In the coming years, we will be able to import more from the Netherlands, England and Germany. With CD&V we were the first to look at the integration of the Dutch power plant in Maasbracht in the Belgian network, but that proved in practice not feasible for the coming winters.

As the Government Agreement stipulates, and given all that is now on the table, it is not a wise decision to conclude Goal 1 and Goal 2. We cannot agree with a possible scenario where both Goal 1, Goal 2 and Goal 3 and Tihange 2 would not be available in the coming winters. Therefore, as a good homeowner, we must make it legally possible to keep Goal 1 and Goal 2 open longer, power plants that can additionally provide our energy for the coming winters, provided that they of course meet the strict conditions for a safe operation.

In addition to additional employment, the extension will also provide additional income. Certainly, the amount of this is still uncertain, but it is certain that when both power plants are closed, the nuclear interest rate is zero euros. With the annual fee the Energy Transition Fund is established and thus the future is prepared.

The question we should dare to ask is whether there are short-term alternatives. A possible alternative, which has been cited several times in the discussions, would be to import 1 000 megawatt extra from the Netherlands by next winter, the so-called piste-Woitrin, using an emergency power supply from Doel 1 as interconnection. For us, every reasonable alternative can and must be examined. Based on the information of Elia that we have today, which has even been put on paper twice, I can only conclude that that alternative is not feasible for the coming winter and above all that it poses a potential risk to nuclear security. Without going into technical details, that proposal seems to be a risky concept at the moment. I agree, of course, to further investigate this, which commitment has already been made in the committee. But even when it comes to an alternative emergency solution, we should not allow ourselves to risk nuclear security.

The government agreement still contains measures that need to be further developed, such as the study of a capacity mechanism. For us, any additional measures that contribute to our security of supply can be examined as long as they are done in a safe way and at an acceptable cost substantially contribute to our security of supply.

Mr President, I am going around.

We all face a huge challenge here. None of us wants to see that our country has to deal with a black-out. That would be a disgrace to our country, to our economy and to us politicians. We need to take action in the short term.

CD&V does not want to put their heads in the sand and hide behind procedural debates. The bill is not the favourite approach for us. However, as a good homeowner, we want to take our responsibility and take all measures that can contribute to our supply security in the short term.

We are consistently implementing the government agreement. The proposal is a first step towards a legal framework. After that, an agreement with the operator and a green light from the FANC will be required before the power plants can restart.

Strict conditions for nuclear safety continue to be a top priority, including in the case of emergency solutions.

Mrs. Dierick, you have drawn the timing well.

First is the principled choice. Then the translation follows through the convention. Only after the translation of the convention and the legal green light for the convention is the life extension definitive.

I return to the beginning of your presentation, in which you point out that the future of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 and 2 000 megawatts are important.

I would like to ask you a very concrete question. If between now and the legal translation of the Convention there is news about Goal 3 and Tihange 2 and those two plants restart, will you approve the legal anchoring of the Convention? At that moment, the picture looks completely different.

Mr. Calvo, I do not have a glass ball. So I can hardly answer your question.

Mrs Dierick, you don’t have a glass ball, but you have a belief. My question is what your belief is in this regard.

You have just described yourself – do not apologize to me for interrupting you – how these two things relate. You have pointed out that 2 000 megawatts are not insignificant for the supply of energy and for the clarity thereof.

If that clarity comes and that would mean that the power plants are restarted, between now and that moment you can perfectly decide not to do it and therefore not to give green light to the convention.

That was also your position at the time. Do you maintain that position? Yes or No?

Colleague Calvo, I have indeed always said that it was very important that we quickly obtain clarity about Doel 3 and Tihange 2. I would have preferred that clarity. Then we might not have to vote on this bill, but that clarity is not there and we can no longer postpone the decision we are taking here, because otherwise we will ⁇ not succeed.

That the FANC would make a decision before the convention is concluded would be peculiar, as the results are expected at the earliest in November. I think there should be a bit more clarity about the convention. If I read the bill correctly, the convention must be signed by the end of November. Therefore, it seems to me unreasonable that the two would cross each other. If Doel 3 and Tihange 2 would open anyway, then that is obviously good for our supply security. However, I think the chances are small that both agreements will cross each other.

You did not answer the question.

This is a hypothetical question.

Is this a hypothetical question? I will later examine what hypothetically correct means, but you agree with me – you have said it yourself – that these two things are related? You have reinforced that point in your last statement. So my question is, do you still have the same belief as at the time in the committee that there can be no question of extending both Goal 1 and Goal 2 and reopening Goal 3 and Tihange 2?

No, I just said that I would like to have obtained clarity before we approved this bill, but that clarity is not there now. However, we cannot postpone this decision on Goal 1 and Goal 2 indefinitely until we have certainty, because then Goal 1 and Goal 2 will ⁇ not open this winter. Then it will be much too late.

The longer this procedure and all this discussion last, the less certainty there will be that Goal 1 and Goal 2 will be open this winter. Since we still have no clarity about Doel 3 and Tihange 2, we must take our responsibility and now cut the buttons.

... to be in the position where you now say you want to give at least in principle green light to complete the negotiations and then take the next steps, but what is wrong with the idea in line with your previous positions? You can give a green light in principle, but Mr. Wollants also assumed that some things are not definitive and still need to be legally anchored. Before that second step has been taken, nothing has happened for Goal 1 and Goal 2.

Why can’t you just say that those two things are linked together and that if there is prior clarity, Goal 1 and Goal 2 don’t open and you don’t approve the legal translation of that convention? Is that the position you have defended before? Why would you not do that today?

There is no further negotiation with the operator on Goal 1 and Goal 2. One cannot ask to invest 700 million, but where everything goes wrong when the two crack reactors open and all preparations have to stop?

My vision is very clear and I have explained it several times. We have different opinions about this and we can discuss it for a long time, but the point is that we must decide now. We will approve this bill because we cannot postpone it indefinitely.

It is one or the other: either this is the final decision, or there are still steps to be taken. It was just said that two very important steps still need to be taken, the FANC and the legal translation of the convention.

Nothing is definitive, so it was. You still have all the space, and I ask you about it, to see between now and the legal translation of the convention what happens with Doel 3 and Tihange 2. You have that space entirely. My question is, then, why would you not use that space, if you previously had so much talk about it? Moreover, no euro will be invested, no investment in renewal will be made until green light has been given here for the legal translation of the Convention. They will not do that. It would be a shame to start investing before a green light is given by Parliament. Nothing will have changed when you vote on it. My question then is: if you approve that and at that point it is already decided to extend Goal 3 and Tihange 2, will you accept it or not?

After looking at the term ‘hypothetic’, colleague Calvo will in any case be convinced that it is a hypothetical question.

The attitude we take today is well known to you. If Doel 3 and Tihange 2 would still get green light from the FANC and we could still continue with it, then we will look at it at that moment, given all the circumstances of the energy market at that moment. We will then not only look at Goal 1 and Goal 2, but also all the other options. It is too early to make definitive decisions.

Mr. Speaker, I have searched for the word ‘hypothetically’ in the meantime: based on an idea that has yet to be proven to be correct. I did my research work.

Ladies and gentlemen, what does your argument mean? If Goal 3 and Tihange 2 re-open, is it possible for you that the life of Goal 1 and 2 will not be extended?

With your research work, you have given yourself the definition of your hypothetical question.

Again and for the last time I repeat that my answer does not mean that. We keep the options open and will look at the situation at the time it is required, not before and therefore not now.

It is important that Mr. Verherstraeten, the group leader of one of the majority parties, says that the options are kept open. For me, this means that it’s possible that you won’t go further if Goal 3 and Tihange 2 reopen. This means keeping all options open. If you say that option does not exist, you are not keeping all options open.

I note – which is important for the continuation of the work – that all options remain open. I hope Paris will listen. All options are open for the CD&V, so also the option – unless you disagree with me – that, if Doel 3 and Tihange 2 are reopened, not the final step is taken to extend the life of Doel 1 and 2 by ten years.

I will finish, I was almost at the end.

We support the draft law on a possible extension of the lifetime of Goal 1 and 2 of course. It is important for us to do so that in the short term the light continues to burn. We will ⁇ do that.

In the long term, however, we need a strong energy policy. We expect you to have a long-term energy vision. For this, an energy pact is crucial. That should be a pact between governments, producers, suppliers, network operators, families, civil society and ⁇ . This should be the starting point for a new energy policy. Everyone needs to support that consensus, a consensus that involves choices for our production, networks and energy needs.

Mrs. Minister, CD&V will be your ally in taking measures for our supply security. Be aware, however, that we also consider that there is no more time to lose and that we expect you to also accurately implement all other measures of the Government Agreement.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Minister, Mr. Minister, colleagues, this bill is an important measure by the Government to guarantee supply security, both in the short and long term. This bill is also inseparably linked to the bill that we discussed subsequently.

The importance of supply security should ⁇ not be underestimated and should ensure the necessary stability in our energy landscape. There is a need for security for both families and ⁇ .

With regard to the future, the government is clear: the energy mix must remain affordable and sustainable. The transition to more varied provisions requires transitional measures. It is precisely in this perspective, however, where we must also show the necessary pragmatism, that the current measures must be considered.

This measure gives us several years to work on the urgent reforms in our energy policy. The future of our energy supplies must also be embedded in a European Energy Union. This energy framework must become even more uniform, even more integrated and even more European. In a world that is becoming less stable, Europe must be able to meet its own energy needs, ⁇ given, for example, Russia’s geopolitical attitude, which also impacts our energy policy.

Good interconnectivity with overseas and sufficient import capacity are important and essential elements of this European Energy Union.

It has been discussed several times, but the interconnection has been discussed at various times during the discussion of Goal 1 and Goal 2. It was more concrete about the hypothesis surrounding the Brabo project. We must be realistic in this regard with regard to supply security in the coming winter.

Brabo 1 is scheduled for mid-2016. Elia was very clear on the subject, I quote: “A proposed solution, namely the use of an emergency line as an alternative to Elia’s technical solution for 2016 for the arrival of the converted line in Doel’s high-voltage station, is a risky project that needs to be studied in detail. This solution, in any case, ignores the fact that an essential, precondition today has not been fulfilled. In fact, a new transformator must be placed in Doel which, according to the information available to Elia, is required for nuclear safety as long as there are fossil fuels present in the docks of the power plant. The adoption of the transformator from 380 to 150 kilovolt is also not possible before the coming winter.” Elia was therefore very clear: the interconnection is possible, but will ⁇ not be able to be used before this winter.

Another very important aspect in this matter is the safety of the power plants.

I agree with the position adopted by the ministers Jambon and Marghem in the committee, namely that the safety of power plants has absolute priority. In the end, it will be the FANC that sets the necessary conditions for this.

Also in the many hearings that we have spent on the bill, as many as 16, with speakers freely chosen by both majority and opposition, it has proven that security is essential. An important explanation in this regard came from the SCK, yet the leading knowledge center on nuclear safety, which has demonstrated that the term lifetime must be interpreted in an economic context and not in a technical context, which is still an important indication in the context of safety. The SCK has given us numerous examples of nuclear power plants that have remained open for more than 40 years.

The current bill cannot be separated from the bill we have just discussed. For the government and our group, these two form one whole. Whereas the target 1 and 2 scheme focuses on supply security for the coming winter and the coming years, the other draft shows a target that goes further into the future, focusing on a more solid energy mix, sufficient investments and research. We will have to constantly think about new solutions such as renewable energy but also storage, batteries or other possibilities, such as the atoll in the sea. I also expect that Minister Marghem will engage in maximum consultation with the regional ministers of energy.

Our group will support this bill, but is aware that several steps still need to be taken. In particular, we look forward to the negotiations that will be initiated with the owner of Goal 1 and 2 and the nuclear interest that will result from it.

In short, with the keeping open of Goal 1 and Goal 2 we pursue the same goal as two years ago with the keeping open of Tihange 1, to which the previous government decided: in the short term the security of supply is guaranteed and we buy time and release resources to shape the long-awaited transformation in energy policy.

Ladies and gentlemen, I will try to be brief.

First, I would like to express my disappointment over the draft law.

There has been a lot of talk, sixty hours, but we have sometimes had very little time to discuss the essence by the way we treat. There is a lot to be discussed about all kinds of incidents. We can say, however, that this bill has not always been discussed serenely, as colleague Dierick has already said; let us say that it is reasonably misrepresented. This is not the fault of the opposition.

Mr. Minister Jambon, it is obviously not your responsibility either. You answered correctly, in all openness. I also want to thank you for that.

I disagree with your decision to keep Mr. Bens at the head of the FANC, but that’s something different, that’s everyone’s thought. I am afraid that you have thus held a lame duck at the head of such an important institution. Humanly speaking, I even understand that you wanted to do that, but I don’t think it’s the right decision. I think the director of the FANC is no longer able to do that properly. We differ in opinions, but in the right way.

Furthermore, we have seen many fictional manoeuvres, half truths, whole distortions, the cinema of today was also not really highly recommended. It has become more a soap than a big debate. I find that disappointing.

It was also remarkable that the majority at once remained silent. The majority members, of course, have expressed their strong support to the Minister at certain times. My experience is that one must then ask themselves who you support and who doesn’t. The silence of the majority was sometimes embarrassing, and I can understand that, out of honest shame, they have stopped from time to time.

Then I come to the real content and that is, contrary to what is said, not the security of supply. It may be in the title, but it is not.

On the contrary, I am firmly convinced that supply security has become more uncertain due to the bill. By necessarily wanting to press it now, without, for example, environmental impact reports, it raises many questions, creates uncertainty and at the same time pushes, especially with other investors, every opportunity to invest very much into the background. The surrealistic attempts of the minister in the newspaper related to Turkish steam boats or Kenyan emergency generators make this painfully clear.

This law does not bring us a step closer to supply security and I do not have the impression that there is even something to do. I explain what I mean.

If one, like Ms. Dierick, says that it is absolutely necessary to have it before winter 2015-2016, what is it about? That is important. If it is for the next winter, we can afford to first launch an environmental impact report and remove uncertainty. If it is for winter 2016-2017, it is said here that there is a procedure for an environmental impact report and that then it can be decided for that winter. We are talking about the winter 2015-2016, because then we need it. What are we talking about? Not about goal 1 and 2. For the winter 2015-2016 Elia provides half, which is 400 megawatts, in all scenarios.

So the question is whether we can find those 400 megawatts somewhere. I think we can. I’m not talking about the solution-Watrin yet, but let’s look at what other countries are doing in this situation.

First, the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has just experienced the same, with nuclear power plants crashing and the fear of a black-out. The first action point proposed there was to use all emergency generators as soon as there was a shortage.

We should not let them come from Kenya. Do we have 400 megawatt capacity for emergency generators? Yes, and even significantly more. Large companies, not to mention Colruyt, have even attributed us with the mention that it would be a good measure if all wholesale homes, all people and all agencies that work with deep freezers and who have emergency generators, which would effectively deploy. After all, in terms of investments, that is zero, because those installations are there and they serve for exceptional circumstances. We will have to provide a fee for the fuel that they would not otherwise use, but that is not a big cost and you know that too. In any case, it would ensure that we should not overdimensional our production equipment and use only emergency procedures. It is necessary to check whether the ground pipeline is connected, but I assume that it is possible to check that in three months and build a ground pipeline if necessary.

The emergency generators can easily accommodate the 400 megawatts that are being talked about for this winter. And why does it not happen? For practical reasons; because it means that Elia, Infrax and Eandis should talk about it and organize it. That is not a reason to stop us, right? There is, therefore, a solution beyond the already mentioned.

What does Germany do in such a situation? Germany, at that time, ensures that much less is demanded: demand management. In the plan that Elia predicted for us, it is about 100 to maybe 300 megawatts. That is nothing, dear friends!

The people of Solvay have come to us and have begged us for a more active government action. How does Solvay do that in Germany? It is for them a source of income if they at the time when there is a peak is their production which can move in time and get a small fee for it. They win twice: first, because the electricity they receive later is paid less expensive, and second, because they get a fee. The CEO of Solvay has come to ask us to use this also in our country.

Has this been done in the last six or eight months? and no. We’ve been working on Goal 1 all the time. Are there emergency generators? and no. In short, one has missed opportunities to easily compensate through emergency generators and through demand management that 400 megawatts.

It all had to happen through the extension of Goal 1 and 2, which is otherwise uncertain. One has chosen an uncertain track rather than a certain track. It is said that Goal 1 and Goal 2 are the most secure tracks. No, that is a less secure track than extensive use of emergency generators and extensive stimulation of demand management. Opportunities were missed!

Therefore, I say that this law does not bring us closer to supply security. By focusing on Goal 1 and Goal 2, others have missed opportunities that provide more certainty.

Again, Elia does not take into account the capacity of Doel 1 for next winter. If one wants to extend Goal 1 and 2 because one likes it or because one principally likes it better, à la bonheur, then yet one has no reason to say now that this must be done before this winter. Then there is no reason not to wait until you have certainty about Tihange 2 and Doel 3.

You know that Mr. Bens said, among other things, that the chances are real that both will not start again until November. You’ll read it in Le Soir, I hope. That was the most remarkable article about the envelopes. Mr. Bens said: “C’est réaliste qu’on démarre au mois de novembre.”

We do not turn on emergency generators, there is no demand management, we try not to get through the winter in other ways, it must necessarily be before the winter. That raises questions. I have not even talked about the option-Woitrin.

Furthermore, I can say that there is another possibility, namely the entire system of subsidizing gas capacity. A lot of questions can be asked about it and I myself am not fantasticly enthusiastic about it, but it is still remarkable. The State Council has criticized the bill, but the response is no way and the government goes on because the government thinks differently about it.

However, when the European Commission asks questions, we agree and stop doing it. Could we have discussed this with the European Commission? No, that did not happen. Suppose we’d succeeded, then we ⁇ ’t have to extend the opening time of Goal 1 and Goal 2 and that would have been bad! Even if the European Commission had asked a hundred questions, why was it not discussed? When it is not about questions, but about criticism, then the government says foert and does not attract that criticism. Energy generated by gas is thus treated differently than nuclear energy and that is a very strange finding, unless that finding brings us to the essence.

After all, what will happen? The majority will approve the bill to keep Goal 1 and Goal 2 open longer. Although the members who have heard the experts in the hearings and who have read what Mr. Bens writes, know what time it is, in November – oh wonder – the cracking power plants will reopen. It is written in the stars. In the statements on this subject, it dropped away. We asked a question about the expert who criticized the report, but the FANC man who was in the committee just laughed away. In fact, we know about enough.

What will be the result? At the end of this year, the opening period of the entire nuclear production facility has been extended until 2022-2025. That is the only thing that will happen and that is also the only goal. It must be so. If the goal was supply security, then there were and are other possibilities. If the goal is to preserve nuclear energy, there is only one possibility: under the guise of security of supply to argue that the opening time of nuclear power plants should be extended.

At the end of 2015, we will eventually arrive in a situation where at times of high consumption, i.e. when demand is highest, one producer and one mode of production will still provide sixty percent of production, including imports. and 60 percent!

We are talking about market action. There is no market if sixty percent is supplied by one producer, that is simply not a market. Moreover, that sixty percent cannot be excluded. Our system of nuclear reactors implies that they must be running continuously. It is not like in France and Germany. In Germany, production can be reduced. We cannot do that.

Therefore, there is one form of production that will be continuously operating when renewed. There will be a dominance of power in the market, even in difficult times. We have seen the slides of Elia, which indicate that during the summer the nuclear capacity is sufficient for the full hundred percent of the demand.

What will then have to be done? However, it can be decided to allow the renewable energy power plants to run. However, its production will have to be carried out or another solution will have to be found. The renewable power plants can be shut down, while the nuclear power plants cannot be shut down. With those more than 7,000 megawatts, nuclear power plants will be monopolistic during the summer. And then you are talking about the market operation? With the present design, the majority reduces the market effect.

I have been asked who will pay those 700 million euros and how it will go.

When 700 million euros are invested, that amount will be reflected in the price one wants to charge, which is logical. Also, electricity will only be able to be sold if there is no other cheaper electricity on the network. In the other case, that electricity will not be able to be sold, assuming that there is sufficient other supply and therefore other competitors will be able to effectively enter the market.

When those nuclear power plants run all year round and push away all other power plants, how will the other power plants then offer their electricity in a competitive way? If our interconnectivity, as it is today, represents no more than 25 to 30%, how can an effective market effect be achieved?

This is just the difference now. That Goal 1 and 2 will not be renewed is the first hypothesis. The second hypothesis is that during the first winter that is coming later, the winter of 2015-2016, through the emergency generators and through demand management at a high level, as in other countries, we ensure that everything is compensated and that we begin interconnection as soon as possible. In that hypothesis, there is an alternative that is cheaper.

Why is the chance that it is cheaper? That possibility is great, because through the interconnection with Germany and the Netherlands, cheaper, competitive electricity also enters the country today.

It is not a coincidence that the price in Belgium has become higher in recent months than in other countries, while that was not the case in the past, because the competition is disappearing. With this design, the competition will be further eliminated, as the possibility of rapid interconnection is excluded. Not only will this result in fewer incomes from abroad, but there will also be no new investment in the future. Once Doel 1 and 2 are extended and Tihange 2 and Doel 3 are reopened, there will be no new investment in Belgium. Do not believe that. You will therefore be dependent on a player for the prize.

A liberalized market, I don’t have to tell the liberals, almost without imports and exports, where one player accounts for 60% of the production, what does that mean? That means that the price will rise, as it is already doing. If one does not make that 700 million euros, one can connect to cheaper electricity from abroad with a simple investment of 10 to 20 million euros.

This extension is not about security.

When it comes to supply security, you have alternatives. You should not go back to Mr. Woitrin. You should go back to what is introduced in the UK as the first measure and what is requested in Germany by the big companies and also with us. It should not be a problem for a center-right government to introduce the same measure as the Cameron government does in Britain and what a company like Solvay will ask.

However, this is not done. The extension of Goal 1 will simply mean that we will only have nuclear energy in the future. History repeats itself. In 1986-1987 we had the same discussion here. Then we had subsidies for the construction of windmills. There was scientific research and subsidization. Belgium, along with the Netherlands, was quite far away at that time. We had, among other things, a company in Vilvoorde that produced windmills. The center-right government then decided not to do so anymore because it had no future. It was decided to invest in the nuclear industry in Kalkar. That was the future. What happened to it?

I refer to Denmark. Today, in one of the few countries where wage costs are higher than in Belgium – there are not many, but they are there – more than ten thousand people work in the construction of windmills, in which the government has continued to invest. In Belgium there are zero people working in its construction. and zero. We have invested our money in that nuclear industry, in Kalkar, several billion.

What happened to Kalkar? A Dutch businessman bought it for two to three million euros to make it an amusement park. It is now a fun park. There is a beautiful attraction made there, one can climb in the cooling tower. That is where our money goes. We are going to do the same here. We continue to invest in outdated technology. We put money in MYRRHA. The previous government has said that we were going to try it for one time but that there had to be private partners involved because otherwise we would stop. No, we are going on. We keep putting our money in there.

We will see in a few years that, first of all, the prices are higher as it has been in the past. We will find that employment in the new sectors is in other countries and not in our country. That is what we are talking about today.

Don’t say it’s about supply security. There are alternatives. It is about choosing to go exclusively to nuclear. That is a wrong choice.

“The closure of Doel 1 and Doel 2 and the deployment of new production units, gas plants and offshore wind farms will foster competition in the production market, which will reduce energy costs. The impact of closing Doel 1 and 2 cannot be underestimated. The legislator will send a strong signal and make known, in addition, the alternatives he wants, and this in very difficult times. “If Doel 1 and 2 were not closed, the credibility of nuclear departure would be compromised.” This is an excerpt of what was said here, on this tribune, on November 28, 2013, by the majority of the time. The majority, however, were part of it. You, as a member of the Parliament at the time, have supported this proposal.

That’s what the government says, but the members say the same. I will briefly quote a short excerpt. “Investors are also receiving a clear signal. The problem is not the lack of alternative energies, but the lack of stability with regard to legislation.” We are at the end of 2013 and Mr. Clarinval who, at the time, thought he might be becoming the next energy minister, but here, the story is made so that it’s not him, said this: “The economic actors involved will really know under what conditions they can work and invest for the next 10 years. The Belgian state will benefit from a clear and stable, legally sound framework that has been negotiated with the stakeholders.” Now that no longer matters. You broke this contract, that commitment made at the time in relation to Doel 1 and Doel 2. These words no longer count today.

So you came back before us with another project, with a project that contradicts what was, at the time, your own statement, the statement of your group, your political family and the majority. This is a dangerous and expensive project. It is also a fragile project, brilliant and in spite of common sense. This has been well understood in all the debates, including today. No, I did not quote the N-VA because, in fact, the speech was different. They were not in the majority. I have nothing to say at this stage. I will address Mr. Jambon soon when I will talk about aspects related to security. The consistency of your partner here was to be emphasized. That is what I did.

This is a project in spite of common sense. We have seen this during the discussions. This project does not solve the risk of black-out this winter. Even worse, it is a project that locks Belgium in the choice of the past. But most importantly, this is an unnecessary project because there are alternatives. Since the start of the work, two months ago, environmentalists have proposed it. At that time, we were almost in the desert and you did not listen. But today, or rather on Monday, June 15, 2015, there was a turning point. I read the article in the newspaper Le Soir. Your spokesman replied that additional pistes were actually being studied. I read here: "The idea of taking advantage of the surplus production capacity of our batav neighbors did not fall into the ear of a deaf. At least, our work will not have been in vain."I continue: "Elia would have ended up finding another solution." by Mr. From Lamotte he tried to bring Elijah into commission. One interlocutor speaks of a secure track that reaches the same result as the Woitrin track, i.e. 1 000 MW.

But, and that’s the only problem with this contribution – and I wanted to congratulate you, Mrs. Minister, for changing your point of view on this – this solution should be officially presented in the coming days. And the journalist says: “Surely after the vote of the nuclear bill.” honestly ! Why to wait?

These tracks are worked, it is your spokesperson who says it, it is your cabinet who says it. I suppose that is correct, contrary to what Mr. could say. Duchess in the Commission. These tracks are being worked out. Why did you not present them to us? We never said that the Woitrin track was the only track. In addition, we have presented others. But today we can see that a almost similar track, also working with the interconnection to the Netherlands, our neighbors, would allow us to import 1,000 megawatts.

Why deprive yourself of it? Faced with a project that costs 700 million euros, this alternative is at the market price. Why deprive yourself of it? Why keep it hidden until after the vote? Per ⁇ because we could fear at that time that within the majority of other screams than those we have already heard would still be heard? Or maybe .

But at the point where you were, Mrs. Minister, what else was the risk? Why hide this too, when it is only positive? Imagine, you could have, as a minister, said: “I have a solution: 1,000 megawatts coming from the Netherlands. We just tested and the interconnection is possible. This is not exactly what Mr. Woitrin, but there is a way.” Why do you deprive yourself of this? Honestly, I do not understand it.

During the 60 hours of debate we have had in the committee, you have never mentioned this. You always postponed this for later. And then we realize that in fact, there is something. You knew it existed. I suppose this was not hidden from you, contrary to the Greenpeace decision mentioned earlier. You knew, however, that it was working.

Why refuse to explain simply, concretely, those paths that exist? Because you have made an ideological choice, a political choice, and that you are stuck by those elements while there are alternatives. But you say, "No, I have given myself a goal, which is to extend the nuclear and to please Electrabel and EDF; I must absolutely go to the end; and the end justifies the means."

I will not return here, the report is quite comprehensive, on all the events that embellished our work in commission, but the end justified the means. Even within the majority, your partners say it in more or less flattered words. I will repeat the words of Mr. Wollants, who is not there – he is ⁇ supporting himself. But things are relatively clear.

“The route could have been more elegant.” It’s crazy, but it’s clear. For the CD&V, Mrs Dierick, I didn’t understand you. You make an official statement from the party on the day Parliament meets to discuss the subject, talking about improvisations. It is in your statement. by Mr. Wollants is able to answer questions. You make a statement on your initiative. Your point, speaking of the minister and her method of work, is very clear: “It’s improvisation. This cannot happen again!”

Since then, we have nevertheless repeatedly had the reproduction of incidents, crackdowns and once again in the plenary session. These words are more or less fuzzy, because they come from the majority, but the signal was clear. The prime minister, as well as his party chairman, also spoke in the debate to clarify these points.

I would like to take note of Mr Dierick’s remarks. There, you justified your shift from the extension of Doel 1 and 2 by the fact that in the short term, there is no alternative to Doel 1 and Doel 2 (page 21 of the report), but today the minister tells you that there is an alternative, which Elia confirms. This alternative brings 1,000 megawatts, that’s not quite Mr. Trump’s track. It’s like the trail of Mr. Woitrin. Woitrin, and it’s possible for next winter. But you will only be told after you have voted the extension text for Doel 1 and Doel 2. The justification for your vote or your a priori favor is no longer valid: there is an alternative to Doel 1 and Doel 2! It is presented today in the press and in a few days the minister wanted to present it publicly. The reason for your vote is no longer valid: an alternative exists.

The same applies to the statements made by the Minister in the framework of the work, in the written justification on the text that was transmitted to us at the very beginning of the work and which accompanies the draft law, the statement of reasons says this:

"Why do we want to extend Doel 1 and Doel 2? Because the integration of foreign capabilities into the Belgian network is not possible in the short term."

This is what you said, Mr. Minister. "The integration of foreign capabilities into the Belgian network is not possible in the short term!" We also learn that not only do you work there, but that in addition, this integration is possible. This text is no longer needed. You make the demonstration yourself. During the discussions, however, it was not possible to discuss this. Maybe today, a miracle will happen. Who knows! I don’t believe it too much, but let the minister have the opportunity to explain itself soon.

During the discussions in the committee, you have not ceased to show bad faith. You have hidden documents. You have manipulated the truth. As today, you sat on the three opinions of the State Council. You rejected the contradictory debate on alternatives. They lied to Parliament. You escaped your responsibilities by still hiding behind the Federal Nuclear Control Agency. You have refused to enter in the law a minimum of tags for trading with Electrabel. Even though mr. The president of the commission could not take the photo, you rejected your 2013 and 2003 commitments. You have decided to be impavid!

Do you know what this term means?

The [...]

Mr. Piedboeuf, why is it impolite to say that the minister is impavid? I have here the excerpt from Le Vif magazine, on page 41: "Marie-Christine Marghem does not see where the problem is. "I have decided to be impavid, and that those who don't know what it means go see in the dictionary."

I read the article as it is and the quote is from the Minister. If you have a problem, I can lend you my copy.

For 60 hours, we have tried to dismantle point by point your legal reasoning.

We brought a lot of documents, still just recently. I will always remember this episode related to the arrest of '74 that you didn't have. It was Electrabel who had it. We had to address the Monitor, but in this case, it was Electrabel. Within a few minutes, we were able to provide you with a copy of that document.

We made proposals, we submitted amendments. You, on your side, have remained blocked, beaten, beaten, impavid. This is the word you use for yourself. You have remained in this choice of the past, you have forced the vote and you will bring the text to the plenary, but you know, this text is not solid, it is not mature. As Mr. Wollants said in his interview, it is very risky. And you know. The best proof of your awareness of the weakness of your text is your amendment, the amendment that the government sent to the State Council.

In the committee, a lot was talked about the State Council itself. I would like to speak here of the amendment and the justification that you yourself have drawn up to explain the reason for being of this amendment. In its opinion, the Legislative Section of the State Council considers that the Doel 1 nuclear power plant was deactivated on 15 February 2015, so that it can no longer produce electricity and that the permits issued for this nuclear power plant also end on 15 February 2015 and could not be revived. The Council of State shall consider the possibility of a specific authorisation procedure or another specific arrangement. In order to avoid any risk to supply security and to respond to the opinion of the State Council, the bill is amended."

That means that you are aware of the problem and that you are aware that things need to be changed. You are writing it yourself. This is not a text of the Council of State, it is not a text of the AFCN. This is the text of justification for your own amendment.

I will cut off the four times of your reasoning. First time: you recognize that there is a problem, an impasse and that the text does not hold the road. Second time: you are looking for a solution, you are submitting an amendment. Third time: this solution track is rejected by the State Council. Fourth time: since the proposal is rejected, it is that the problem no longer exists.

Of course, this is not the way. The track is rejected, but the problem remains.

As I said to Mrs. Cassart, who left us recently, the issue is not about operating authorization. Of course, such an authorisation is necessary. We must be able to manage the waste, the safety of the site. No one thought the opposite. But you’ve clung up, for weeks and weeks, pretending that the opposition had not understood, that the operating authorisation is general. This is not true, the opposition knew it from the outset.

What is meant here – the State Council says it and repeats it, I have just quoted it – is the fact that the provisions concerning the permit for electricity production ceased to apply on 15 February 2015. In its analysis of Amendment No. 16 – I believe this is your amendment – the State Council stipulates that the operator must, in any case, apply for a new production authorisation – therefore it is not an operation – in application of Article 4, § 1 of the Act of 29 April 1999. The problem is therefore that there is no longer any authorisation to produce electricity. The Federal Agency for Nuclear Control also said. Let me remind you of the conclusion of his legal analysis. This is stated in paragraph 8 of the document contained in the annexes to our work. The Federal Agency’s Legal Opinion states: “Opinion 57093/3 of the Legislative Section of the State Council on the expiration of the Doel 1 authorization should be followed, given the wording of Article 4, § 2 of the Law of 31 January 2003. The Doel 1 license dated 24 January 1974 is effectively expired. This is what the Federal Nuclear Agency says. But, for your part, you’d rather stay on your position pretending that we didn’t understand anything and that we’re talking about operating authorization. But no, we are all talking about electricity production authorization.

We know very well—per ⁇ that’s why you refuse to see things in front of you or to recognize the situation—that, as there is no more electricity production authorization, a new authorization is needed. This requires an environmental impact assessment and public consultation for a few months.

I can’t hide that I myself was surprised. The Council of the European Parliament has adopted amendment no. 18. The State Council said that even for four months, an environmental impact assessment and a public consultation is needed. The State Council goes further in its third opinion, I quote: “To admit the contrary, even by relying on reasons of security of supply, would be to empty the substance of this conventional provision.” This is what you do, you rely on supply security reasons, but even that does not allow you to extend for four months without going through an environmental impact study and public consultation.

Mrs. Minister, you can repeat your legal reasoning, but it clashes with the Aarhus Convention, it clashes with the Espoo Convention, it clashes with the legal opinion of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, it clashes with the first opinion of the State Council, it clashes with the second opinion of the State Council, it clashes with the third opinion of the State Council. You don’t like it when I make this list and I can understand it but that’s the reality. From a legal point of view, you are responsible for this. This makes your situation ⁇ delicate. You acknowledge this in the search for a solution through the amendment. You also tried to drown the fish with this difference between exploitation and production. You write yourself at times that there is no longer a production permit. The logical conclusion is that if there is no longer a production authorisation, it necessarily requires an environmental impact assessment.

Just recently we used a new piece, an element that happened to us afterwards, as part of the work: the note to the government of 2013 is explicit about the government’s intention. Not the part you regularly retrieve, but the full note that justifies why you really need to maintain an operating authorisation and distinguish it from the production authorisation. There, you are legally in an impasse because your text does not change Article 4 of the 1999 Electricity Market Organisation Act. Your text does not amend Article 16 of the Act of 1994 on the protection of populations from ionizing radiation.

These two articles contain a passage that is unambiguous, but that you do not modify. Article 4 § 1 of the Act of 1999 states: “The establishment of electricity production installations, the revision, the renewal are subject to the prior granting of an individual authorisation issued by the Minister, with the exception of installations for industrial production of electricity from the fission of nuclear fuels which can no longer be the subject of authorisations.” These articles, article 4 of the law of 1999 and article 16 of the law of 1994, you do not modify them. They continue to exist and state that there is no longer a possible permit for the production of nuclear electricity. You are in the legal impasse. We don’t discover it today — it’s been a while ago — but this element should lead you to reflect. In your rush, in your legal crafting, you did not bother to change these two articles. I repeat, you are in the impasse.

I now come to the role of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, which is your responsibility, Mr. Minister Jambon. Thank you for being attentive to our work since this afternoon. I regret, of course, that we have not been able to empty the debate on Mr. Properties that have decredited the institution. The facts are there - I think especially about the medical situation. We respect this, of course, as we have said again at the Conference of Presidents. We will have the opportunity to come back.

In the meantime, since I know that our work is being followed and that it will be read, I would like to send four very clear warnings, to you as Minister of Custody, but also to the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control, thus to Mr. Trump. to his colleagues and their eventual successors.

The first warning is to inform the Federal Nuclear Control Agency that there is no question of going backwards. What is written by her must be applied.

The Federal Agency, I just quoted it, considers that the authorisation has expired: the legal opinion is clear to it. I will quote an extract from the second legal note, which you immediately printed, Madam the Minister. "It belongs to the competent administrative authorities ... "- here the AFCN -, " ... after receipt of the reactivation project submitted by the operator, to exercise their discretion and to decide whether such studies are necessary in view of the criteria." If I agree with you, it is up to the Federal Agency to decide whether or not it is necessary to organize an environmental impact assessment. You say that the Federal Agency will have to verify, within its powers, whether an environmental impact assessment is required. I assume that you do not question this statement that you have held in committee and that is in your written note, submitted to committee.

But the federal agency has already taken a position on the matter since it has said legally that it has become obsolete. It is your legal note that I cite here, not Mr. by Jambon. In the report of our work – I thank again the rapporteurs and the services, as my colleague just stated – the issue of the authorisation regime will, in any case, of course, be included in the dossier in the consideration of the three green lights (legislative, technical, administrative) necessary for the restart. The first warning is important. The Federal Agency will have to remember what it wrote in this point 8 in its conclusion, namely that the permit dated 24 January 1974 is effectively expired. And we expect it clearly at the turn on this question, that it be mr. Property or the management board or others tomorrow. The facts are clear: it was written at the time. And now you say it’s up to the agency to decide if it needs one. The agency has already taken a position.

Second warning to the AFCN: there can be no question of breaking requirements under the pretext of urgency. The federal agency’s job – the minister has repeated to his wishes – is not to ensure the security of supplies, nor to ensure the security of Electrabel’s portfolio.

Their job is simply to ensure safety. Yes, we have fears. I can support them. Why does the Agency allow itself to say that the only assumption it agrees to work on is to work over ten years? Why does the Authority, which does not have to worry about profitability, say that a short-term extension – from one to three years – is not to be considered? It is not his job. It just needs to see if the project that is handed over to it meets all the requirements in terms of safety and security. It is not up to her to decide whether it is for three years, five years or ten years.

The second element that makes us fear that the federal agency is breaking its requirements is obviously everything concerning the SALTO and the inspection role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Mr. Wollants, I don’t know if you remember your first speech, during the first debate of the first day. You were the first to speak, since the N-VA is the largest group in parliament. This is written in the report of the first day, for your first speech: "Mr. Wollants emphasized that the intervention of Mr. Bens demonstrates the importance of the exchange of experiences at the international level, of which peer review is an element to get a clear view of nuclear security."

At that time, you did not know that there was a problem with SALTO. Of course, it was in tempore non suspect. You said in the committee that it was necessary to peer review before giving a clear view. Today we do the opposite. As we realized that there might be an agenda problem with the IAEA, we delayed events and decided to do the opposite. But what you said at the time is in the report and is now contradicted by the proposed schedule.

I am addressing the Federal Agency, because it is probably too late for the vote that will take place here. What the federal agency itself wrote in the documents, including in 2014, is very clear as to the fact that the SALTO must happen before the decision of the boost.

On April 18, 2014, in a statement, the Federal Agency specified this: “SALTO missions are organized in two stages. A first preparatory mission, called pre-SALTO, is first carried out in nuclear power plants considering a LTO and a second mission called SALTO is then carried out in the installations whose life of operation will be extended. “Go,” and not “was extended.” This is the position of the Agency, but it was before the government put pressure and say to the Agency: “Stop laughing here. Now let’s pass things.”

What makes me fear the worst is what the minister clearly said in the committee, that the scope of the mission would be reduced, limited to a week, while this type of inspection usually lasts much longer and is done much more in depth. He also specified that the mission could only be accomplished in January 2017.

As you are still present...

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I please please. In the meantime, I will move on to the items intended for mr. and Jambon.

I think we are going faster. Jambon with Mrs Marghem.

I recalled the Federal Agency’s statements, I would like to recall those of Electrabel. In a document filed in 2012, Electrabel said this: "The goal for us is to demonstrate that pre-conditioning, aging management, as well as skills, knowledge and behavior management will have reached a sufficient level to start the life extension period."

Electrabel said in 2012 that it was necessary to do this SALTO mission in advance in order to be able to properly justify the start of the new period. It started for Doel 1 on February 15 and will start for Doel 2 on December 15.

The Federal Agency reiterated in its recommendations: “The Safety Authority recommends the arrival of a SALTO mission for additional external assessment by the end of 2014.” If there is consistency in the Federal Agency’s proposal and if it doesn’t put itself under the pressure of the government’s desired schedule, there’s no choice but to do the mission before deciding to extend.

We say to the Federal Agency: do not accept, do not crack the security, do not agree to work at a discount, as proposed by the minister, with a lighter mission, with a schedule that does not respect what you yourself requested. Demand that this mission take place before the power plants are extended!

Recently, the Agency has lost a lot of credit, and if it had to renounce its own timing and requirements of the time, it would have finally lost any credit in the matter. This also applies to the requirement level, at which level we will check whether Doel 1 and 2 can continue to produce electricity. "The level required in 2015 should be the level of the most recent power plants," as stated in the AFCN's strategic note in 2009.

In 2009, we have the advantage that the Agency writes a note without knowing what it will be and having the time since the first extensions are for 2015. The agency stated at the time: “The level that will be requested will be that of the newest power plants.” This is not the same as it was in 1970 or 1975. The level of requirement must be that of the 2009 strategic note. This is our third warning to the Federal Agency.

The fourth is about the work that must be done before, in particular those related to ageing must be done before you can make the decision. Electrabel also said in 2012: “For aging-related operations, we will do them between 2012 and 2014, so that everything related to aging is done before the extension period.”

Now the government wants to act differently. But the Federal Agency, in its strategic note, clearly explains that for the aging aspect, any adjustments to the facilities must be made before the plants reach their 40 years of operation. This means that all this makes it impossible to extend Doel 1 and Doel 2 until next winter.

If the Federal Agency does not lower its level of requirement and if it respects what it said in its strategic note, it is mathematically and logically impossible to restart the power plants but we fear that the Federal Agency will escape its responsibilities and its mission and prefers to submit to the dictates of the government in terms of timing, while its mission to it is not to ensure the rapid implementation of measures but simply that security and security are full and complete.

There are alternatives. The first alternative is to prevent operators, mainly Electrabel, as it is still the main operator in this matter, from closing the thermal plants. You are deploying such energy – I’m talking to your colleague, she’s not there, but you’re passing it on to her – and the government, in order to extend the lifespan of Doel 1 and Doel 2. Now, if you took 10% of that energy to quickly let Electrabel know that these thermal plants should not be closed, you would already have a solution for next year: 1,000 MW are available.

The second step, you found it yourself. It connects with the Netherlands. Of course, this trail is real. The third track consists of demand management, storage. There are other pistes. We are not going to look at them all in depth.

But instead of making that choice of alternatives, you have decided to extend uncertainty because, let’s be clear, extending nuclear is extending uncertainty, except for one actor, Electrabel! Electrabel will have the butter, that is, Doel 1 and Doel 2 extended, not a year, two or three, but ten years! Electrabel will have the money of the butter, a decrease in the nuclear contribution, namely the 700 million euros, and the smile of the minister, the lack of reaction in relation to the closure of thermal power plants. In addition, Electrabel will have an all-risk assurance, namely the clause that they will introduce into the agreement that, if ever the text does not reach the end of its course, as it will be far from being completed after the plenary vote, Electrabel will be reimbursed for its investments. Electrabel will therefore have the butter, the money of the butter, the smile of the minister and the insurance all risks. Honestly my hat. Electrabel must do nothing, not even give its consent to the publication of the agreement. It is never seen! In exchange for what? of nothing ! There is no production guarantee because Electrabel may decide not to produce: "Everything is done, we do not produce, even if we have the green light." There is also no reduction in the amount of the citizen’s invoice or third-party investor guarantee. Remember that at the beginning of the work, the minister said: “I’m excited to have another investor next to Electrabel.” Worse, Electrabel can say it’s not his problem.

My gsm number is known, they just have to call me.

Mr. Minister, you are going to make the move. Butter, money butter, smiles and insurance all risk, it’s strong in the face of the lack of commitment on the other side.

We are on the eve of voting this text in the plenary session, but you know it as well as I do, it is far away, it is far from being completed.

Mr. Wollants, you recognized this in the interview you gave the day before the previous plenary session that was aborted: "It is the first step of a long journey."

We are still far from the end of the tunnel, especially the government. We have not said our last word. Citizens, associations, the European Union, the Commission have not said their last word.

Don’t assume, however, that by voting on this proposal in the plenary, you will be able to resolve the matter. The life of the Doel 2 plant is still far from being extended and, most importantly, the Doel 1 plant is still far from being restarted. The appeals are underway. We are also looking forward to Mr. of goods. Not to mention the convention that we will have to talk about. There is the Federal Nuclear Control Agency on which I have made my comments. There is the test on microcracks and, in general, all the other tests in progress. The risk is very important in this regard. (The Minister enters the Chamber)

Mr Minister, you are doing well. I was talking to mr. He said: “It’s not about extending at all costs without nuclear security measures being taken. The security measures will be taken long and broadly."Today it is seen that nothing is wrong, that you are forcing the Federal Agency and that you are bypassing the speeches that were held at the time in so-called "strategic notes".

You have made the ideological choice and the choice of a methodological brick-up that leads us into a triple impasse: a legal impasse, an economic impasse and an energy impasse. The end justifies the means. You have decided to put the gain of Electrabel before the safety of citizens. It is not our choice. You are playing with fire. If there is a problem this winter, you will be the only one to be responsible for it. You will be reminded that since February we presented you with alternatives and that you would then have had time to launch an environmental impact study. In February, you would have had time to set up the public consultation. You no longer have time.

The text may still be voted on, but it is far from over. This closes a chapter, but the story is not over. We have not said our last word on this matter, far from there. Be assured of it!

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. and Mr. Ministers, dear colleagues, tonight, I want to take the bill as it is presented to us by the government in a different direction than the one that has been put forward since the beginning of the debate and to try to have a different approach, as was the case at multiple times in committees.

I come directly to the heart of the question. While your government is constantly repeating that it wants to attract investors in Belgium, its energy policy does not guarantee in any way stability in the field of energy supply and prices, which is however indispensable to attract and retain investors in our country. Ensuring the competitiveness of companies by guaranteeing fair electricity prices is essential. However, this bill does not ⁇ any of the two aforementioned objectives. It also does not guarantee a reasonable price for the individual.

I therefore call on the majority to take this case and analyze this bill so that we can finally seriously address the problem of security of supply at a reasonable price and reject the text as it has been drawn up.

There is an important question to be asked to this government. Why didn’t you consider solutions to ensure short-term supply security, namely for next winter? Indeed, Doel 1 and Doel 2 will probably not work next winter; everyone has agreed here and you have recognized it yourself.

We have just learned that Elia has installed a fourth phase transformator at the Zandvliet station. Elia’s spokeswoman confirms that a phase-dephasing transformator is comparable to a tap. It allows to regulate the flow of the current and better manage the flow. In Zandvliet, a second transformer can offer additional possibilities as early as the winter. This is a different alternative to the one mentioned with the Woitrin track.

How did she come? Simply take her phone, contact Elia’s spokeswoman and examine the files. Remember that, according to some experts, our new capacity of interconnection, outside the track mentioned by Mr. Woitrin, would rise to an additional 700 MW thanks to the installation of this series dephase transformator as a result of another existing device. Doel 1 and Doel 2 represent 866 MW. We are at comparable heights.

This installation would be temporary in order to improve import capacity for next winter. But, following the implementation of the Brabo project – which will significantly increase our interconnection with the Netherlands in the course of 2016 – this post will be put in parallel with the other three dephase transformers. It would seem that this installation in series is uncommon. It is true. But why did we not hear Elijah speak about this technique in commission? What does the majority fear? A good news in terms of interconnection, probably...

This other path that should be addressed to guarantee the security of supply in the short term, is obviously, as we mentioned in the commission, the rental of large gas or diesel power plants. It seems that Elia has already defined places where to connect these mega-containers. We learned that on April 30th, the company Aggreko, whose name has been repeatedly cited in commission and in session and which leases electrogen groups, was received in your office, Mrs. Minister, as well as the companies Siemens and General Electric. Why did you not follow these meetings? Remember that industrial groups such as ArcelorMittal will not wait for you to decide before renting these groups for their own consumption and thus protecting themselves from degradation next winter.

Installation of such units is quite feasible in the short term. In the meantime, you are wasting time. You use your time defending the nuclear power from every crin. There are other pistes. This question requires a clear answer from the majority. Governance is predicting. However, your bill provides absolutely nothing to guarantee the security of supply for next winter. In a month, we will be on vacation. Winter will be at our doors, and no concrete measures will be taken.

We need to be proactive in this matter. We need to react and not wait until November to evaluate whether these paths are ripe. Remember that all these solutions are credible alternatives. Some elements will help us to make a feedback from the discussions to highlight this legal expertise that you demand, Mrs. Minister. Remember the Royal Decrees of Authorization for Doel 1 and 2 that we have claimed, first in writing, and then, repeatedly. Know, Mrs. Minister, who defines you as a lawyer, that you stated that parliamentarians should go to get them themselves at Electrabel because you didn’t have them ... Admit that it’s stunning.

The commission also witnessed the disclosure of the existence of a legal advice from a law firm requested by your office, while for two weeks, you denied in commission to the Chamber, having requested such an opinion. Parliamentarians were also entitled to a further lie, since you tried to make them believe that this opinion was requested by your administration, but not by you.

The little stories of this debate do not stop there: you then claimed to hold this opinion for several months while it was only from the beginning of May, and then claim that the content of this opinion, you had it in mind for several months before even receiving it. So we had the opportunity to discover your divinatory talent.

Why did you want to hide this opinion? For he expressly stresses that the current bill does not guarantee the legal certainty necessary for the extension of Doel 1. In this regard, I would like to mention the opinions given by the State Council, which will one day have to decide with the Constitutional Court. But when we hear you, for the judges of the State Council or the magistrates of the State Council, it is the second session assured. You have removed them, you do not listen to them. Or maybe you are stubborn to repeat your legal analysis that we have called a banal against and against everyone, including that of the AFCN. Eventually, it may be this bill or the administrative acts that will result from it: we will have to wait for the second session to know.

As the State Council recalls, nuclear power plants are built to produce electricity on an industrial scale, and once this activity disappears, on the grounds that it is prohibited by law from a certain date, they actually no longer have a function. Mr. Friart, even if there is fuel, as you said, but rather fuel waiting, a nuclear power plant is not a fuel museum.

The State Council is very clear: "The prohibition to produce electricity, provided for in article 4, § 1 of the January 2003 law, has the effect that the authorisation of production has become expired." Furthermore, the State Council considers that, “to the extent that the operating authorisation also contains provisions relating to the authorisation of industrial production of electricity from the fission of nuclear fuel, these terminated on 15 February 2015, as follows from Article 4, § 2 of the Law of 2003”.

This is also the text of the AFCN’s conceptual note. If this is not the case, all the data is not stored. With regard to the reopening of Doel 1, the State Council confirms that the provisions of the Espoo Conventions, the Aarhus Conventions, the Habitat Directive and the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive must be complied with. This is stated in the 16th amendment we have submitted.

It appears that the Royal Decree of 11 October 2000, which effectively governs the procedure for the authorisation of production, does not contain provisions which meet the obligations of consultation and assessment of the effects on the environment provided for by conventions and directives.

As we have repeatedly pointed out, article 6 of the Royal Decree of 20 July 2001 on the general regulations for the protection of the population, workers and the environment from the dangers of ionizing radiation, which governs the procedure for the authorisation of operations, contains, on the other hand, requirements for consultation and assessment of environmental impacts, which can in principle be interpreted as complying with these conventions and directives in order to meet the aforementioned obligations.

Both the production authorisation and operating authorisation procedures must be complied with in order to meet the obligations for consultation and environmental impact assessment. With regard to our amendment No 16, the State Council believes that after the deactivation of Doel 1, making the application mandatory and obtaining a new permit would allow compliance with the rules of international and European law applicable to the reopening of Doel 1.

The State Council clearly states that it does not matter whether these obligations have a direct effect or not, contrary to what the minister has stated in a committee. When you sign this type of agreement, Mr. Minister, you commit the Belgian State. You must comply with international conventions. There are rulings of the Court of Cassation that actually say that when treated with direct effect, it is superior to the Constitution.

When international law is treated with direct effect, Belgian law prevails. You cannot escape the opinion of international conventions.

The State Council also considers that the obligations regarding consultation and environmental impact assessment provided for in the two Conventions, Espoo and Aarhus, must also be complied with for the legislature’s proposed decision to extend the lifetime of the two nuclear power plants concerned, at least if this extension is not accompanied by the renewal of one or more of the required authorisations.

As a reminder, Mr. Bens, director of the AFCN, said, regarding this bill, that it was a somewhat bizarre legal acrobatic. I wish him a quick recovery but it is a pity that we were not able to question him at this time, but we will return to it. The disclosure of the draft amendment on Doel 1 retroactivity, which the government itself has submitted to the State Council, proves, however, that even the government is convinced that this bill does not stand the way and that it has thus tried to find a solution through this legal fiction, as the State Council says. This amendment has been removed. But the Minister says that the State Council opinion is one opinion among others. So you have recalled the students of the first bachelor sitting in the Council of State but you respect the legal opinion of Electrabel whose impartiality no one doubts!

Another extremely important issue that concerns us is the rupture between government and nuclear security. Mr. Minister of the Interior, you have stated and confirmed that the SALTO study will not take place before the beginning of 2016, and therefore potentially after the restart of Doel 1 and the extension of Doel 2. This is a breakthrough in the management of nuclear safety. While, as part of the extension of the operating life of Tihange 1, the AFCN requested the IAEA to organize in 2012 a pre-SALTO mission, this will not be the case here. Even though the AFCN and Electrabel recognize, in several documents published in tempore non suspecto, the need for such control before the extension of the lifetime.

For the CDH, it is essential that the IAEA, which is an internationally recognised authority, carries out this control before Doel 1 restarts and Doel 2 extends, and not only the AFCN.

The government cannot compromise on nuclear security. Furthermore, we still do not know the list of investments needed before Doel 1 and 2 restart and after it, nor the amounts of these investments. I would like to ask Mr. good about this.

On the other hand, what we now know is the history of the small envelopes of the director of the AFCN. What credibility can still be given to this situation after these statements? He confessed in an interview that he was even offered it, and so we question his independence. Is this irreproachable? Shouldn’t we have the certainty that the guarantor of the safety of our power plants proves an unfailing integrity? by Mr. Bens is the nuclear gendarme and we expect the gendarme to be integrated.

You have been declaring for weeks that it is necessary to extend these two reactors by ten years to ensure the security of supply for next winter. The reboot of Doel 1 is indeed compromised. The government has also refused, through you both here present, to claim that Doel 1 and Doel 2 will produce electricity next winter, stating that the AFCN must still give its green light. This seems obvious to us, but it is not enough. The AFCN control must be validated by the IAEA and this cannot take place until next winter.

What will the government do if it cannot reopen these two reactors? At present, there is no answer to this question and the alternatives we have sought and which I mentioned at the beginning of my speech have not been able to be discussed in a circumstantial manner with the experts in the committee.

So you present to us today a policy of “everything to nuclear”. The majority again refused to hear Elia yesterday in the Economy Committee to effectively examine these alternatives. Therefore, we are witnessing a detriction of the progress made during the previous legislatures to develop the energy mix. Thus, the bidding on gas power plants that would have yielded 800 megawatts was swept from a reverse of the hand through the removal by a royal decree. Your renunciation in the tender file is a good example of your lack of energy view, Mrs. Minister.

While you simply receive a preliminary notice from the European administration, you surrender, you are not proactive, you do not contact and you abandon this bidding, unlike the UK which has managed to obtain the approval of all European Commissioners for the implementation of a much more expensive support mechanism than the bidding mechanism.

It should be stressed that this tender, let us recall it, had been approved in the Council of Ministers during the previous legislature, of which you were part, in kern by Minister Reynders at the time Deputy Prime Minister. But why justify this position of Mrs. Marghem on the tender? This was approved in the previous parliamentary term. Was he afraid to make other decisions? Was he already opposed to this mechanism? Or is the decision, today, to move straight toward nuclear policy?

As you know, both nuclear and renewable energy are must run. Therefore, more flexible production tools such as TGV power plants must also be developed, in addition to the development of renewable energies. But today, we do not see how you will proceed.

Finally, regarding Electrabel, given the total legal uncertainty that reigns on the extension of Doel 1, will Electrabel agree to extend Doel 1 and invest considerable amounts for youth work? The rejuvenation work of this reactor is based on this legally fragile bill that risks an attack either on the State Council for a number of administrative acts or before the Constitutional Court. Will Electrabel agree to extend only Doel 2? The question has never been asked and remains unanswered.

Furthermore, with regard to a number of questions, is it acceptable, within the framework of the mechanism, that a separate fee be instituted while the fee relates in both cases to the 10-year extension of a nuclear reactor? I mean Doel 1, Doel 2 and Tihange 1. Is it not contrary to the principles of equality to impose two different mechanisms while Tihange 1 belongs to two operators (Electrabel and EDF) and Doel 1 and 2 belong only to Electrabel? Do you not fear an EDF appeal if that operator feels hurt and believes that the Doel 1 and 2 mechanism is more advantageous for the operator than the Tihange 1 mechanism? There is no answer to these questions either.

Regarding the compensation mechanism, what you are accused of is to go on your knees to negotiate this fee with Electrabel once you are legally bound by the bill that has been approved by your majority. Mr. Minister, we should not submit this bill before we have an agreement with Electrabel. Now you will go to see them by telling them that there will be no more nuclear contribution to be made in view of the CREG study and that you need them since your entire energy policy is based on nuclear and that, legally, you can implore them to extend these two reactors for ten years.

Faced with this legal uncertainty, Electrabel has two possibilities: either it will not commit to extending these two reactors, or it will require guarantees in compensation for the legal uncertainty that threatens this extension.

Mrs. Minister, you have still not answered the question of how you would proceed, in order to extend Doel 1 and 2 until the end of next winter as planned in the bill. If there is no agreement with Electrabel, what will be the solution? Are we going to a recruitment? There are no answers to these questions, and therefore no clear answers from the government! In the absence of clear responses from the government and a rush of your majority to guarantee supply security, it will clearly be threatened this winter.

Mr. Minister, nuclear security, legal security, security of supply, the three feet of a triptyque indispensable to function, your bill does not meet these three criteria. (The applause)

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Minister, I speak with all the reservation of the one who has admired the work of his colleagues who, being members of the committee, what I am not, have conducted a high-quality legal and political debate. I come to bring a voice that will probably not have the same value as those that have followed this debate since the start of the work in the committee, but I admit that I have been very intrigued by the legal debate.

I had a doubt because even though the consultation of the Janson cabinet is in its editorial somewhat confused, it insinuated doubt. It must be said that when reading the last opinion of the State Council, which felt compelled to make a legal pedagogy that seemed to escape many, it must be acknowledged that the issue is now well defined on the legal level. In summary, the government believed to escape the direct effects of the Conventions of Espoo and Aarhus, saying: "You do not understand anything. There is the operating authorization and the production authorization. And the authorization of production, it, is not subject to these international conventions."There, the State Council places its finger on a legal reasoning. We will see if it is validated by the Constitutional Court. We will return to this procedure before the Constitutional Court.

What does the State Council say? It must be acknowledged that the obligations arising from both conventions – I am not talking about the Habitat Directives – are not worded in the same terms. But the State Council says, at least in a clear way – others before me have recalled it here – that “the extension of the lifetime of a nuclear power plant must be considered as a significant change of an activity within the meaning of the Espoo Convention and must also be considered as an update of the conditions covered by the Aarhus Convention.”

More specifically, for the Espoo Convention, there is a opinion of the European Economic and Social Council which gives the interpretation and the State Council cites this opinion of the Economic and Social Council. It is very clear that the extension of the lifetime of a nuclear power plant is considered by the Parties to the Convention as such a significant change in an activity and must therefore be assimilated to the application of Article 1 § 5 of the Convention. The legal framework has been tightened. The legal accuracy is provided by the opinion of the State Council.

Per ⁇ you expect that the interpretation of the Constitutional Court is not as strict as that of the State Council.

In my opinion, what you expect even more is that the procedural deadlines before the Constitutional Court, a fortiori if the Constitutional Court was to ask a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union – which would then ⁇ give you a deadline of a few years, say five years – would allow you to spend the winter. This is the case to say. I think that should be your calculation. I will listen to you with interest.

I believe that basically, unless you risk having a suspension of the law – but it is true that this risk is minimal before the Constitutional Court – you say to yourself that even if the obligations arising from international conventions impose, we will only know that after a long procedure and that in the meantime, you yourself or a successor will surely return with a correctional text. I take the prognosis with certainty. We will not end this legislature without you returning with such a text. But as I say, you save time to spend the winter by evacuating a legal problem that you know will be heavy of consequences if, at the end of the procedure, the Constitutional Court would have to annul a number of provisions of the law.

In short, you make the calculation like bad debtors who know that the cost of the court for creditors is such and that the duration of the procedure is such that one can remain in bad faith on the legal level because one does not expose itself too much in view of the time limits in matters of justice.

I believe that this is ultimately the secret calculation of the government that it is said that if the legal threat should be made more precise, it would return with another text of law before the State Council.

Beyond this legal debate, the outcome of which will not be decided here as we are not responsible for it, I would like to give very quickly but essentially the position of the FDF regarding the supply and security of energy supply, which is a substantial debate.

Let us be honest! You have inherited it, like others from your predecessors, and you have been confronted like them with many unknowns, constraints, or even lack of political will to really approach this debate, as other states have done. For example, Germany dared, with a much clearer political will than ours, to face this debate.

I recall that already in 2003, when the first law was adopted for the exit from nuclear power, the responsibility of the State Secretary for Energy of the time, Olivier Deleuze, who had planned the exit from nuclear power but did not provide for alternative sources of energy, was challenged – ⁇ partially rightly.

This is a discussion we have had regularly. With each amendment to the original 2003 law, the question was asked where we were going in the long run, in what timeframe and according to what political will.

It must be acknowledged that this is the real substantive debate. But you are different too. And we do not yet see very clearly. Indeed, the government agreement includes quite ambiguous, or even dangerous, passages. I quote: "The government is committed to guaranteeing the security of energy supply, affordability and sustainability of energy in the short and long term so that it can ensure the output of nuclear power of the current generation" - I say right of the current generation - "reactors in 2025". This suggests that ⁇ , the construction of the new generation, the so-called generation IV, whose concept is still in the research phase and whose prototypes are probably not expected before 2030, you could rely on another energy production from nuclear fission based on a new generation.

( ... ) : [...]

Mr. Speaker, I understood that the N-VA was in favor of the appointment of another president. I understood that you were successful in the exercise of your duties.

In my opinion, you too.

As I said, I am too modest to allow myself to believe that I have the favors of the NV-A.

Do not be desperate.

Never do that, I reassure you.

Let us first listen to Mr. by Van Hees.

I was saying that there is more than a doubt about your willingness to finally quit nuclear energy. However, the Federal Office of the Plan, in its excellent October 2014 report entitled "The energy landscape in Belgium. Perspectives and Challenges for 2050", clearly outlines what direction we must take in terms of energy production and security of supply. He reminds us that Belgium’s energy dependence is expected to increase by 9% between 2010 and 2050, although at first it will decrease slightly to grow sharply in 2030 and stabilize in 2050. While the level of net import of electricity is relatively low in 2010, it is gaining in importance, according to the Federal Bureau, in 2020 due to the planned release at the time of this report of nuclear power, on the one hand, and the integration of many variable renewable energy sources in the future electricity system, on the other.

The Office of the Plan estimates that €10 billion more will need to be spent in real terms on imports of fossil fuels in 2050 compared to the 2010 bill. It also notes that by 2050, an average annual additional production capacity of approximately 1250 MW will be expected. During the critical period 2020-2025, during which most of the nuclear power plant is expected to be dismantled, a production potential of no less than 5,000 MW will disappear. In monetary terms, these investments to be made by 2050 represent a total of €62 billion – the first half being injected before 2030 and the other half between 2030 and 2050.

Therefore, you will see the importance of defining the inter-federal energy pact to which you referred in your political orientation note, in order, you said, to “enable the socio-economic and environmental transformations that are necessary for a period of twenty to twenty-five years at least.” It will be up to you to reconcile the needs of our three regions. I must acknowledge that Wallonia is accusing of a weakening in terms of the potential for the development of renewable energies which, in addition to being intermittent in nature, have been the subject of political and legal uncertainty in recent years, as well as poor public management, which is not the best prognosis and, above all, does not give citizens confidence.

Another study by CRISP, led by Fabienne Collard, thus reveals the certain potential of biomass and cogeneration in terms of wind and solar power. I regret, for my part, the lack of predictability of the Walloon authorities in terms of the exploitation of the Walloon geothermal potential. I also recently heard the exhibition of an eminent specialist from the University of Mons – whose very large expertise is known, as well as that of the University of Liège in this field – on the knowledge of seismic mapping of the Walloon basin. Investments are not negligible. Of course, this does not offer a very large autonomy of production. But this is not to be overlooked in the search for a balance for the energy mix. I would not be too much to call on the competent authorities not to forget this dimension of energy production.

What is the future of this energy mix? Your government does not intend to oppose the energies of each other. In doing so, you seem to be closer to the position of France, which, by the Law on Energy Transition Programming for Green Growth adopted in July 2014, wants to reduce nuclear power to 50% of total energy production – with the closure of twenty reactors out of fifty-eight – and bring renewable energy to 40% by 2025.

In summary, France and other states make the choice to partially withdraw from nuclear power while still preserving an important, even preponderant, place. This is not our choice and in this we join the study of CRISP, which I cited. I will not draw all the conclusions.

Undoubtedly, combined-cycle thermal power plants, called steam gas turbine plants, powered by natural gas, which are known for their benefits in reducing CO2 emissions, should be developed. Let us not forget the storage of electricity within the pumping turbine plants, which also allows to balance the production of electricity and in particular to supplement the production from renewable when the weather conditions are not optimal or in case of peak energy consumption.

The Federal Plan Office says that the electric landscape will experience a profound mud until 2050. If we take the option, which we consider necessary for reasons of safety and protection of public health, of ending nuclear production, of abandoning coal, that gas decline before recording a dramatic progression, and finally that renewable energy sources really take their boom, then, by 2050, two forms of energy will be inevitable: renewable energy sources, which alone account for 54% of net production, and natural gas, which would provide 45% of this production. This is the direction the Federal Bureau of the Plan recommends to us. I would not be able to get into that logic.

The prospects for the evolution of production costs for fuel-free pipelines are clearly downward. Fuel pipelines have the advantage of offering electricity production that can be perfectly modulable and centralized, which gives them a certain advantage over fuel-free pipelines, with the undoubted exception of geothermal.

That is why, Mrs. Minister, I believe that we should have the political courage and a clear vision for the coming years. It is now that the decisive choices for the energy mix are being played. Political courage to dare to get out of nuclear in a definitive and clearly affirmed way after 2025, and a vision, that of implementing a sustainable energy mix, similar to that carried out in Germany: immediate shutdown of eight nuclear reactors, accelerated closure of the remaining nine reactors, in order to completely get out of nuclear in 2022. What Germany has planned, we can do, too, by the end of 2025: replacement of gas or coal installations to fill the renewable supply, revision of the support mechanisms for renewable energies, moderate exemption scheme of contribution to the development of renewable energy for large enterprises in order to improve their competitiveness.

This is the path that Germany has shown us and which we must inspire.

These are the reflections that I wanted to bring to your knowledge in order to broaden the debate on an essential issue that, without doubt, determines the future prosperity of our economies and our country.

The AFCN has approved the resumption of Doel 1 and Doel 2. The report signed by Mr. Goods: "It goes, you can resume activities, the risk is limited to two deaths. There will be a maximum of one drowned and one drowned from a crane. There will be no greater risk than that.”

The words of mr. They are ambivalent, but they are also ambivalent. On the one hand, there are the words of a fundamentalist of nuclear power, who expresses himself very clearly and very cruelly. On the other hand, it is someone who is not afraid to say things as he thinks them. He says it in terms of nuclear fundamentalism but he also says it when he talks about government or Electrabel.

When he talks about the government, he says that “the bill is a bizarre legal acrobatic.” Speaking of Electrabel, he says that "before Electrabel, it was a box of engineers where technology prevailed: we built beautiful power plants that worked well." We feel the nuclear fundamentalist. “The most important thing is to make money.” And I will not raise the questions of the envelope because I still risk angering my colleagues of the MR!

We have a problem of losing credibility of this federal agency that has decision-making power while the International Atomic Energy Agency will probably do these Salto tests. Despite what the Interior Minister, who has just left, said in committee, "no concession on nuclear security," we will not wait for the Salto tests to take place before re-launching Doel 1 and Doel 2. How can one reconcile the fact of not wanting a concession and, at the same time, without it before restarting the power plants, and thus content with the Federal Agency?

The Nuclear Exit Act dates from 2003. And since then, six governments have succeeded with Verhofstadt, Leterme, Van Rompuy, Di Rupo, Michel. But no government has done anything. They felt that this was not their job and that the market would settle everything. But the market has not resolved anything.

It was said that thanks to liberalization, it would come by itself, as by miracle. No to No! The miracle of liberalisation has not been accomplished. What we have seen is that by leaving the market to do, instead of reviving renewable energy, a series of gas power plants have been shut down. Obviously, today, Electrabel can, along with the government, say that we are obliged to keep the nuclear power plants to avoid shortages. Somewhere, this is a shortage that arranges Electrabel well. We know that nuclear power plants are completely amortized and that this brings maximum money to Electrabel.

Doel 1 and 2 are actually little, they are two small power plants. It would be enough to maintain or restart the Esch-sur-Alzette power plant in Luxembourg or that of Drogenbos that we want to close to have the equivalent of Doel 1 and 2. If we look a little backwards, 5,000 MW of additional capacity could have been obtained from all the power plants that private producers had committed to create. Doel 1 and 2 represent 800 MW, which is little.

It is clear that this renewal of nuclear power is not aimed at addressing the shortage. If we really wanted to deal with the shortage, there would be many other solutions. It was enough not to allow all these power plants to be shut down or to maintain those that were planned. But obviously, the aim of Electrabel is to maintain nuclear power.

The problem is that nuclear power is not a factory of biscuits, toys or beer. This is not the production of Saint-Feuillien, Mr. Friart, although there are tanks too, but it is still a little more dangerous than the production of Saint-Feuillien.

In this regard, we have nuclear power plants that are very old. 40 years is too old for a nuclear power plant. Per ⁇ the government wants to extend the age of power plants to 67 years, but there is an obvious danger! Greenpeace warns against the fact that the perimeter of the Doel power plant is inhabited by one and a half million people, a rather impressive configuration. I can recall the words of former director of AFCN, Willy De Roovere, who said in 2012, at the time of his departure: "If I see the risks today, I would have preferred to have other sources of energy." There are risks that, in bad times, can lead to disasters.

Beyond the cost of human danger, danger to the environment, danger to life, there is an economic consideration that, in my opinion, is less important, but let us talk about the economic challenge also in the event of a nuclear disaster. A single nuclear fire would cost 23 billion euros compared to the cost of a black-out mentioned recently by Ms. Cassart. It is not much. It should be noted that Electrabel is only insured at the amount of 1.2 billion euros. Compared to those 23 billion, that is little. If we had a Fukushima-style catastrophe in Doel, it would be between €742 and €1,412 billion. This would mean neither more nor less than the economic bankruptcy of our country.

I’m not going to go back in detail on the saga of what was called the ‘Marghemgate’.

You will have at least had the opportunity to have your name associated with a substantive.

The State Council Opinion of 8 May 2015 evokes a legal fiction, states that an impact study is necessary. Let us not forget the State Council opinion of June 2015, the saga of the so-called legal opinion of your firm, Mrs. Marghem, but which was in reality that of a private law firm. My colleagues have spoken enough about these points.

What is hidden behind this? That is what interests me. Does what is hidden behind it appear to be a caveat? Madame Marghem, I will take your defense. We can’t really talk about coughing. If it’s coughing, I think it’s organized coughing. I simply believe that the real energy minister in Belgium is not Marie-Christine Marghem, it is Electrabel. I have already had the opportunity to tell you. It is also Electrabel that has high-level representatives in your office. It is seen that rarely or never has a government so clearly chosen the camp of Electrabel.

On the one hand, this government makes extraordinary gifts to Electrabel. There were already the tax gifts Electrabel benefited from. Now there are those gifts in terms of ⁇ ining nuclear energy with power plants completely amortized. On the other hand, we hear the government’s project of ⁇ increasing energy VAT, bringing it back from 6 to 21%. He also planned to remove the safety net. He submitted the intercommunal energy to the ISOC. For consumers and citizens, this is a whole series of additional taxes and price increases.

Why shut down gas power plants and not nuclear power plants? Because the power plants are completely amortized.

Finally, the PTB has an alternative that is to oppose the limits of this market. We are witnessing the failure of the nuclear exit because we have left the power to private operators. I therefore think that the state must take over the energy sector with a future energy plan in which the state takes the keys to sustainable development. Where can we find a model like this? Madame Marghem, travel a little. Look at our German neighbors. Go to Munich and see how it goes. You often cite the German model in social matters, when it comes to breaking wages. You could talk about the German energy model. Munich has received international awards as it is one of the world’s top cities in terms of green energy. Who produces green energy? They are not private operators. In Germany, private operators, multinational companies account for 6.5% of the green economy. These are public enterprises, municipal enterprises. Munich’s mayor, a social-democrat, explains that it is not in the interest of multinationals to produce green energy and that he had to make public energy. I could quote you the case of Copenhagen, with wind turbines that are mainly managed by public companies or cooperatives.

These are successes in terms of nuclear exit and green energy. Why Why ? Because it is public companies that are maneuvering. We are not talking about nationalization but communalization because it is public enterprises, municipal enterprises that are maneuvering. If we really want to have an energy future, as the majority of the population wants today, we must follow this path. This is both an energy issue because we know that there are risks for the coming winter and the following winters, with or without Doel 1 and Doel 2. This is also an environmental issue because we know the dangers since Fukushima. Finally, it’s a democratic issue because I don’t think it’s the multinational companies that have to decide the energy fate of our country.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Minister, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, first of all, let me regret that the debate on the energy future of Belgium has been the theater, in recent weeks, of a skillfully orchestrated strategy to sow panic among the population. All the techniques have been used to spread fear and disinformation for the sole purpose of shutting down power plants.

First of all, the choice of the words was not innocent, since the inclusions that were observed were transformed, and you will grasp the nuance of them, into cracks. Wim De Clercq, chief nuclear officer of Electrabel, however, confirmed in his hearing in committee of the House on 25 February 2015 that it is a detection of defects due to hydrogen in the tanks.

These defects are hydrogen inclusions that formed during the casting and forging phase of the tank at the grain level in the material.

I see that it makes some members of the opposition laugh.

The [...]

I am part of the opposition, but for my part I am objective and I try to find a way to be interesting enough for the majority of our population.

The [...]

I am not in the majority. I have nothing to do with the latter. If you allow me, I will explain what my position is.

Mr. Calvo, I listened to you, as I listened to each of the speakers, and I did not react.

Mr. Speaker, I will continue. A bill was submitted to distribute iodine capsules across the entire territory, as if the imminence of a cataclysm required immediate and drastic solutions. Moreover, the issue of waste is systematically returned to the forefront, as if nuclear power would result in its spread throughout the territory. Even the nuclear bomb was, without surprise, invited in the arguments. The emergency plans are, on the other hand, more based on Chernobyl but on Fukushima, while the geographical and geological position of our power plants is not the same as that of the power plant in Japan.

You have understood, dear colleagues, not only does the People’s Party regret this diabolization of nuclear power and the alarmist remarks that are held, but it is also in favor of the extension of the power plants.

No one is perfect! Only fools don’t change their mind.

At the moment, we simply can’t go without these power plants. Nuclear energy is, first of all, cheaper, much less than gas. In times of crisis, and while we all hope for a return to growth, we must ensure that companies pay as cheaply as possible for their energy consumption. The same applies to the economy and the economy of our country. Electrabel CEO Philippe Van Troeye has warned that without an agreement and in the absence of stability, there will be no investment from his company, with the consequence possible the loss of 5,000 jobs.

Then, alternative energies are not yet delivering the expected results. Even if we need to continue in the research, we cannot, at the moment, bet exclusively on them. Wind turbines have a load rate – i.e. the ratio between actual output and maximum efficiency – that is between 17 and 25%. The intermittence of wind turbines thus requires the resumption or creation of thermal power plants that are large emitters of CO2. Land wind turbines are unpopular and are the subject of many appeals from citizens who can’t tolerate their landscape being ruined. A recent German study has found that wind turbines are bad for health. Finally, this technique is expensive and will have an impact on citizens’ bills. Alternative energy sources are not yet sufficiently developed.

Nevertheless, we call for a broader debate and consideration of research on coal gas or shale gas. We know that this has allowed the United States to recover.

We must at all costs keep our energy destiny in our hands. Nuclear energy has always been one of our assets. It should be appreciated rather than demonized. Our independence has no price, especially in relation to Russia at a time when the geopolitical context could have disastrous consequences. So we must rely on ourselves and not on our partners, however reliable they may be. In case of disaster, other countries will be in the same situation as us and will not be able to help us much. Most significantly, the Netherlands on which we rely has also become energy importers.

Energy demand will increase in the coming years. Therefore, we cannot be mistaken and, without acting in rush, we also cannot drag. The question of the energy future of our country and therefore of nuclear power is so crucial that we call for more serenity. The weapons passes and invectives we have witnessed are not part of the debate. We have heard in the committee some parliamentarians treat the minister as a liar. How should we today qualify those same elected members who, in order to spread fear and overwhelm the citizens, turn inclusions into cracks?

We have also witnessed the bad faith of those who have attacked all the way, multiplying the arguments to curb the nuclear relief, because when it is not about cracks, it is legal or psychological arguments that have been used.

We believe that at the present time, citizens expect courageous choices that engage the country for the coming decades. Only at this stage does nuclear power provide us with the necessary energy, environmental and economic guarantees.

We therefore call for further investments and are delighted that these €100 million are announced for the device that revolves around Doel 1 and Doel 2. Therefore, we will need to take care of our power plants so that they live as long as possible, and I recall this as a conclusion, we call for the resumption of research so that our country remains, or re-stays at the forefront of the energy sector.

Mijnheer de voorzitter, beste Parlementsleden, enkele maanden geleden heb ik de Latin formula ad augusta per angusta geciteerd tijdens mijn eerste betoog in de commission in verband met de mission die mij werd toegekend. The formula hereinert terecht aan de moeilijkheden die moeten worden overwonnen vooraleer men something can verwezenlijken.

If the formula is old, its statement is more relevant than ever. This troubled path that leads me today before you to vote on a text that is essential for our fellow citizens and our companies is there to prove it to us. I do not want, however, to see in the polemics that have arisen in this case only the entirely legitimate expression of the questions of our fellow citizens just repeated by the national representation.

Let me be well understood. Supply security cannot under any circumstances be done at the expense of the safety of the production units and the safety of the citizen in respect of which there is no matter to be negotiated.

There is no matter to deal with the security of supply itself. It has been recalled by many speakers that our country, which a few years ago still ⁇ a comfortable situation in terms of electricity supply and which therefore was an energy exporter, is now unfortunately for its needs, and sometimes on the brink of rupture, an energy importer of which it has a great need.

This security of supply must be ensured and there are things to say and questions to ask about it. What are we talking about? I will not recall what I said recently when reading the essential lines of the government agreement. I would simply say that at the installation of this government in October 2014, this government was faced with a very short-term power shortage situation. So, within the framework of supply security, which had to be provided in the very short term, there was a debate at the government level. It was decided to extend the nuclear units of Doel 1 and 2 with the agreement of the AFCN and the operator, in compliance with the principle of nuclear safety which cannot be done at the expense of the willingness to supply Belgium with electricity.

The duration of operation of these reactors shall not exceed 2025. Second, the decision of the Council of Ministers of 18 December 2014 which, in eight points, began to implement, alongside this very short-term solution, medium- and long-term solutions. I’ll take them back because I’ve only mentioned three out of eight.

The first is the extension of the nuclear units of Doel 1 and 2 which we are talking about in the project currently under discussion. The second is to ensure that conditions of effective competition in energy production are encouraged on the Belgian territory and, in this context, to encourage the operator to examine third-party investment possibilities in the possession and standardization of Doel 1 and 2 units. Centralized production, in our territory, is the safest means, the first we must implement to ensure our security of supply and our energy sovereignty. The third step is to ask Elia to continue its efforts to develop the interconnection capacity in accordance with the current planning. I will talk about it a little further in my presentation.

The fourth step is to create an energy transition fund. We talked about it recently during the debate in the first project we talked about recently. The fifth measure is also in this project because it is about transposing the provisions of the Energy Efficiency Directive which falls within the competence of the federal in terms of demand management. We cannot say too much that energy erasure is a future path to secure our electricity supply. The creation of a fund is long-term as it is to use the money from old means of production, i.e. in particular the production of electricity by nuclear power plants to promote the production of energy in an innovative way and the storage of electricity.

The sixth measure is to request recommendations, in particular to the CREG, in order to avoid the decommissioning of conventional production units, such as gas and cogeneration, which are not yet at the end of their life, and in particular to ensure the profitability of these installations.

The pre-last measure is to look at how to increase supply flexibility, including by considering ways of investing in new capacity.

The last step is to ask the Minister of Energy to continue its work to develop an energy vision and write an energy pact. I will also touch a word.

What is our current situation compared to this specification of general charges for the legislature and especially for today and the coming months, as I just pinched it, in the Government Agreement of 18 December 2014? With the 750 megawatts of the existing strategic reserve last winter (first measure), I was forced, following Elia’s probabilistic analysis, confirmed by the determinist analysis of the DG Energy, to launch a tender to obtain 2,700 additional megawatts in order to reach a total power of 3,500 megawatts.

The results of this bidding are now known and I can tell you that we finally received a regular bid for only 800 megawatts. Fortunately, this amount has just added another, since two weeks ago it was announced the return to the market of a major power plant in Drogenbos with a capacity of 500 megawatts.

However, a quick calculation shows us that we are far from the 3,500 megawatts mentioned, since a rapid addition shows us that 750 megawatts for the strategic reserve of last winter plus 800 conquered within the framework of the strategic reserve for next winter plus 500 of this Drogenbos power plant that returns to the market are never more than 2,050 megawatts, to which it is worth adding 341 other megawatts from gas power plants returning to the market and that, already a few weeks ago. These are the power plants of Herdersbrug, Awiers 4, Beers, Thuron, Volta and Buda. In our small household account, we are now at 2,391 megawatts, which is 1,100 less than expected.

Here, ladies and gentlemen, is the harsh reality of the numbers that we must face for next winter.

Mr. Minister, in the committee, during the work, you announce, given the search for 2,700 megawatts, a contribution between 1,200 and 2,000 megawatts. Does that mean that, since the work of the committee, some candidates have withdrawn from this tender, while they had submitted their candidacy? In fact, today you say that 800 megawatts have been conquered.

The assessment took into account, on the one hand, the last winter’s strategic reserve. There were also, at the time I was answering you, all the offers that had been made and that had not yet been analyzed by the DG Energy. These offers have been analyzed since then and those that have been declared acceptable are now the number I have given you. To be very precise, today I give you the final number.

Some have mentioned alternative pathways such as the one relating to increased possibilities of imports but unfortunately impossible to realize within the scheduled time, and especially so risky in terms of realization that they have been classified as dangerous by the GRD Elia, which refuses to implement them and thus engaged its responsibility, while, at the same time, the operator of the Doel 1 plant exposed that they were not compliant with the operational safety conditions imposed by the AFCN.

To those who, as a commission, found it useful to make easy parallels with the technical inspection of vehicles, I will simply advise to examine more before the recipes they offer before presenting them as solutions, when in fact they are pass-through towers. How else to describe the fact of wanting to use continuously and under a voltage of 380,000 volts an emergency line that is only there to be used only at certain times and whose potential power is 150,000 volts? Just by looking at the photos of this rescue line, everyone will understand that this is a troubleshooting tool, which can be used for very short periods of time and when absolutely necessary. In addition, it is absolutely essential for the safety of the nuclear reactors installed at Doel, from Doel 1 to Doel 4, passing through 2 and 3.

How else can it be described as putting simply aside the conditions imposed on the operation by the AFCN which, for the sake of redundancy, provide for the presence of the two rescue lines?

However, as the Prime Minister has well recalled at the plenary session, we are open to complementary pathways for the extension of Doel 1 and 2. As you repeat it to me, I am obliged to tell you that you are manipulating the truth, for I have never said anything else. I’ve never talked about an alternative track – “rather than” – but an additional track: “besides.” So, in addition to the extension of Doel 1 and 2, next to the power to be obtained by the development of their capacity, namely 866 MW for next winter.

In this regard, I met with my Dutch counterpart, Mr. Camp, on the sidelines of the Pentalateral Forum that took place in Luxembourg on June 8. In this regard, I continued the contacts that the Prime Minister had taken on this subject in Riga with his Dutch counterpart, Mr. by Rutte. This interview followed many other contacts with my counterpart and was the occasion for the signing of a joint policy declaration, which focused on a four-year programme and aimed at amplifying actions related to market integration, supply security, flexibility and governance between our two countries. The objectives of these actions are, of course, to maximize the fluidity of cross-border trade and, by the resulting increase in supply, to exert a downward pressure on prices. This approach is part of the energy diplomacy that I have been advocating since I took office, ⁇ through the Belgian Presidency of the Benelux, which has made interconnections and the capacity to exchange and bring the markets closer to priority issues.

I came back to the extract, page 34, § 2 of the report where you explained the situation at the time. He stated that the tender had been launched. I quote: “The calls for tenders for the establishment of this strategic reserve are gradually increasing, and we are currently at a capacity of 1 200 to 2 000 MW in addition to the 750 MW already planned in the previous estimates and regardless of a capacity of 341 MW.”

Contrary to what you just said, the 750 MW were not included in the 1200-2000 MW. So we went from a situation where we analyzed between 1200 and 2000 MW to a situation where we analyzed more than 800 MW. There is a fundamental difference here.

Mr. Nollet, I understand your excitement. We will ⁇ have the opportunity to see all this at megawatt near commission later, since I don’t have the numbers here. At that time, as the report very well states, the offers were returning and the analysis of the offers had not yet been done. In fact, I may have been a bit generous because I am a volunteer. Faced with the situation of electricity shortage that I just recalled, on the advice of Elia and based on his analyses that we have long talked about during our work, I was forced to inflate the strategic reserve and launch this bidding at the height you know.

Offers were returned, they were analyzed and only regular offers were accepted. I do not have this document here, but we will have the opportunity to discuss it later in the committee if you wish.

I just wanted to point out, Mrs. Minister, that compared to what you said, the 750 MW were not included in this amount at the time.

I agree with. I don’t make it a disease. That doesn’t change, since from 1200 to 2000 megawatts, offers came in, and it turned out that regular offers were declared regular only for 800 megawatts. That is all.

I do not understand this crap.

There’s no crap, you see crap everywhere.

The differences in megawatts are not innocent, they are important throughout this discussion. The colleagues who have talked about supply security will undoubtedly support that.

If you say that only the regular offers are accepted, what distinction is made? What is accepted and what is not accepted?

There are prices for megawatts. I don’t know the amounts by heart, so I can’t answer you right away, draw the conclusions you want. I repeat that if you want to go deeper into this point, here are the very accurate figures updated today, sure, that make up the megawatts we are assured of having in strategic reserve for next winter.

I am prepared to discuss this in detail with you. What do you want me to say more? It is 23:49. I would like to continue my speech because I still have all the legal development to do to respond to what you have just said and so if you want well, if you agree, if you still want, we will do in commission all the details of this and we will see in what, according to what criteria, the offers have been declared regular in this context. I thank you.

These are, I think, normal questions when there are sudden megawatts disappearing from the mix.

Mrs. Minister, there is something I just want to ask you to also give you the opportunity to do the rest of your presentation. For me, a difference of hundreds of megawatts is not insignificant in this discussion. However, it would just be interesting if you could briefly communicate in writing tomorrow how much megawatt the strategic reserve eventually amounts, what is and what is not contracted. If we receive that in writing before the final vote, we will not have to come back to it tomorrow. How big is the difference, how many megawatts? It is 400 and 1 200 MW.

I do not know at what time we will finish. There are still the replies. Tomorrow I have a lot to do. I give you quite accurate numbers, which can be verified. If you want me to give you it in writing, I’ll do it. But a discussion about the conditions for the regularity of the offers, the number and identity of the companies that had made the offer, the analysis made by the DG Energy of the regular offers or not, I’m sorry, but this is typically the order of a debate that we should have had in a commission. I would like to continue, Mr. Speaker.

As for my Dutch colleague, we have asked our respective Energy administrations to step up their cooperation in close consultation with both domestic and external producers to explore all possibilities for increasing our production capacity as soon as possible. A working group was formed in March and a first meeting took place in April. This group brings together both Energy administrations and network managers in the two countries, Elia and TenneT. The next meeting of this working group is scheduled for June 30.

On the other hand, let’s recall that Elia has, through three major workshops, undertaken to develop to the maximum our interconnection capabilities which, it should be recalled, make our country, and by far, the most interconnected in Europe. Brabo, Nemo and Alegro are the cornerstones of a vast project that will connect us more closely to the east, north and west to the networks of our neighbors.

In 2016, unfortunately, as some have claimed, Brabo will provide us with an additional 1,000 MW of import capacity from the Netherlands. That is, if the electricity is there from the Netherlands, we have the ability to receive it. As previously explained by Mr. Wollants in the debate you’ve had with him, it’s never certain or guaranteed on invoice. And it is very clear that the Netherlands must at that time have this capacity to send through the wires. Therefore, this is not to be compared with centralized production in our territory.

This Brabo project envisages in its subsequent phases a new two-wheel line of 380,000 volts between Zandvliet, Lillo and Liefkenshoek. It will be Brabo 2, which will extend Brabo 3, in 2019, until the Mercator station.

Nemo, in 2020, will provide us with the same possibility from the UK, thanks to a high-voltage continuous current connection between Gezelle Station and Richborough Station. This project is carried out by Elia and its English counterpart NGET.

Alegro, which is the abbreviation of Aachen Liège Electric Grid Overlay, the result of a collaboration between Elia and the German GRT Amprion, will connect us to the German network in 2019 also through a high-voltage continuous current connection of 1,000 MW.

However, we should not dream. Indeed, if the Netherlands is exporting today, according to the forecasts, this feature will decrescendo in the future and is expected to end in 2025. As for Germany, it is sometimes exporting, sometimes importing, according to the weather conditions which prevail and affect a country with very different means of production than ours.

So it is now that we must prepare for those years that will see our nuclear units disappear, knowing that this government is within the framework of the 2003 law that provides for the disappearance of our nuclear units and the total withdrawal from nuclear power by 2025. Thus, beyond the actions appropriate to boost our production fleet, we need to develop those related to demand management, whose share in the strategic reserve is already substantial as it accounts for almost 40% of the new tender.

We are also deeply concerned about energy efficiency, which is already included in the second project we have just discussed, and which is one of the most promising pathways in terms of decreasing demand. Thus the only relamping or relighting, if you prefer, is likely to decrease very significantly the share of lighting in overall consumption. There will be concrete proposals on this subject.

I now address the legal reasoning of the law that has occupied us for a while. In this context, I will not overly support the legal reasoning of the law that is currently being debated and which is the choice of the government. I will rather stay on the analysis of the last decision of the State Council which I find extremely interesting.

In fact, I thank you for submitting amendments that allow me today to see, in the slightest details, the reasoning of the State Council in relation to the whole legislation that interests us.

The State Council begins its reasoning (for the French version, for our ease, page 15/24) with point 5 and says that Article 4 of the law of 29 April 1999 relating to the organisation of the electricity market has established an obligation of authorisation for the establishment of new installations for the production of electricity. Continuing his reasoning, he concluded: "Doel 1 and Doel 2 being existing installations, they were not covered by this new authorisation obligation and no production authorisation should therefore be requested."

This is where we begin to diverge and the State Council is looking for solutions to get thick. Since the 2003 law and the 2013 law, which is the only exception so far to the release of the nuclear calendar – and we are preparing to make it a second – never all the legislation concerning the production of electricity and the associated authorizations since the liberalization of the energy market occurred in 1996 and which produced the Electricity Act of 1999 of which I just talked, which provides that for capacities above 25 MW, a permit is required to produce electricity, while the power plants existed, has not imposed a permit to comply with this new law. This is the first part of measures.

The other aspect of measurement is the environmental aspect, which is recalled in the laws of 2003 and 2013 which are the basis of our reflection and the one on which we are making the changes allowing the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2. The 1994 Act is the successor to the 1958 Act and the 1963 Act that protect citizens and workers from ionizing radiation. It was on the basis of these laws and the Regent’s Decree of 1948 that individual operating authorisations were granted, in this case to Doel 1 and Doel 2. The timeless nature of these authorizations is recalled both by the 2003 Nuclear Exit Act and by the 2013 Tihange 1 Extension Act.

I will continue. This will take some time. You will have the opportunity to contact me later if you wish. I have not interrupted you at all. This requires some concentration, especially at this time. So I would like to continue.

The State Council indicates that the Ministerial Decree of 18 February 2008 issued a production permit to SA Electrabel for the transformation of the existing electricity production facility, unit 1 of the Doel nuclear power plant. This was to allow Doel to produce an additional 40 MW for the Doel 1 unit. The fundamental question was whether, in the case of a capacity greater than 25 MW, such an authorisation should be granted or not. For this authorization was connected to a power plant which had not been the subject, for the whole of its capacity, since its existence, and at the time when the law of 1999 comes into force, of an authorisation to produce electricity. Since the Electricity Act transposed Directive 96 on the liberalization of the energy market, in this country, no nuclear power plant has ever been subject to a permit to produce electricity up to its capacity - the State Council has found it - for the total production capacity of all nuclear reactors in that country.

Now I return to the reasoning.

Mr. Calvo, the Minister has explicitly requested that its reasoning be completed. You will then have the opportunity to respond.

I have to go to the end of my reasoning. You will see that the Council of State and the legislator are not so far from each other. Having resolved the problem of the absence of permission to produce electricity for the nuclear power plants of that country, in accordance with the law of 1999, by extending this ministerial decree to the State Council and by the figure of the switch, as I have already explained many times. As with Tihange 1, the extension law of Doel 1 and 2 has the virtue of constituting a switch that, at a given point, allows the power plant to produce electricity beyond the age of forty, which is the central point of reflection of the State Council decision and all this legislation since 2003.

I am referring to the 2003 law.

The [...]

I would like to continue my reasoning. I have the word.

The Act of 31 January 2003 on the Progressive Exclusion of Nuclear Energy states in Articles 3 and 4: "No new nuclear power plant intended for the industrial production of electricity from the fission of nuclear fuels may be created or put into service. For all existing power plants, nuclear power plants intended for the production of electricity from nuclear fuel fission shall be disabled for forty years after the date of their commencement and shall no longer be able to produce electricity from that moment on. All individual operating and production permits from fission, issued for an unlimited period by the King, under the laws of 1958 and 1963 and the Environmental Laws of 1994 and 2001 (i.e. the major environmental axes that form the basis of the construction of our nuclear power plants; therefore we are never talking about the electricity law, but only that environmental basis) end forty years after the date of the industrial commissioning of the relevant production facility.

This means that, while the 1999 law regulates permits to produce electricity, we do not mention at all, in the 2003 Act of Nuclear Exit, what bases the existence of our nuclear power plants in terms of permission to produce electricity. It is simply said that this permit will be stopped at 40 years, but the entire legal regime of our power plants is an environmental regime that goes back, as I said, to the decree of the regent.

In doing so, when the 2013 law comes into force – the State Council continues its reasoning on page 1724 – the 18 December 2013 law on the extension of Tihange 1 adapted the output schedule to allow, for reasons of security of supply, the maintenance in operation of the Tihange 1 nuclear power plant for another ten years, without, however, affecting the ultimate purpose of the law of 31 January 2003, namely the deactivation, closure and dismantling of the power plants.

All the reasoning revolves around this aspect. Greenpeace has the same argument. In fact, what motivated Greenpeace to bring a lawsuit before the Brussels Court of First Instance sitting in reference? I do not know why they have chosen the referred and why they have requested compliance with the international conventions of Aarhus and Espoo which have no direct effect in Belgian law, as the State Council says, and therefore do not allow the Belgian judges to request the application of subjective rights before a Belgian court on the basis of these international conventions.

They chose the formula of the referred and they introduced their action not the day after the vote of the law of 2013, when they should have reacted immediately, since in 2013 we are preparing to extend a power plant that is 38 years old at the time and that one day will be 40 years old, and which therefore, in the spirit of Greenpeace, can no longer continue to live because it has ended its life and must stop. This is the logic of the 40s: at 40 years old, life is over for power plants. But they do it precisely, and it is also extremely logical, the year of the 40th anniversary of Tihange 1, that is, in 2015, since this plant reaches the 40th anniversary on 1 October 2015. They demand that the international conventions Aarhus and Espoo be respected and that an impact study be made for this plant, which will reach its 40 years, as well as a public consultation, possibly cross-border because the range of action in case of a problem is quite wide.

The Court of First Instance of Brussels sitting in reference starts Greenpeace and makes a reasoning – always the same reasoning since we are all faced with the same texts – where it finds that there are 2 parts of measures in our Belgian law. There is the 'electricity permit' section that has not been required for our nuclear power plants and therefore there is a legal vacuum, or a legal non-vacuum according to the State Council that tries to draw from a 2008 ministerial decree aimed at increasing the capacity of Doel 1 that there are actually permits that are given under the law 'electricity' to nuclear power plants in this country. But in reality, there are very few.

Not all power plants are affected by the permits in question. So, they try to infer that there is a link between the legislative component of electricity permit and the environmental component. And we say that in reality, when permission was granted for 40 megawatts more, it is because there was an increase in power. But we have never been concerned about the full power of these power plants!

From the moment Doel 1 reaches the famous age of 40 on 15 February 2015, it meets the conditions, according to some, to be the subject of an impact study and a public consultation, possibly cross-border. This is their logic and they develop it. The Council of State does the same throughout its arrest.

In fact, in the paragraphs preceding the point I have just addressed, the State Council says: “By adopting the law of 18 December 2013, the legislator wanted to avoid that the provisions of the law of 31 January 2003 on nuclear departure be interpreted in the sense that when the power plants are deactivated, the conditions of authorisation relating to the technical operation or to nuclear safety also become invalid.”

So the State Council, which had considered, in its first and second opinions, that all permits, including environmental, relating to the nuclear power plants we are talking about, were due, begins to say that ⁇ , environmental permits are no longer equally due and are not even at all due, since they exist, they continue to exist and they have been granted for an indefinite period, which is perfectly logical, since this is written in length and width in the law of nuclear exit of 31 January 2003.

The [...]

Mr. Speaker, if you allow me, I would like to continue my reasoning.

You will have plenty of opportunities.

There is therefore a weighing of the interests of the State Council which, in a sub-page note, which you see appearing on pages 17, 18 and following, will seek in the preparatory work of the laws of 2003 and 2013 what is the intention of the legislator. What was the intention of the legislator regarding the nuclear power plants of this country? The deduction of the State Council consists in saying that, when they reach 40 years old, their life is over and, that if their life is over and that one wishes to extend them – this is the logic of the State Council – a new authorization is needed.

This is not the logic of the Belgian legislator, since he extended Tihange 1. He knew very well that Tihange 1, through this extension, would pass the course of his 40s. Tihange 1 was obviously going to be in this situation at 40 years old, also highlighted by Greenpeace in the case before the court of first instance in Brussels, and would therefore suffer from a possible criticism in this matter.

The fact that Doel 1 reached the age of 40 on 15 February 2015 and the fact that Doel 2 will reach the age of 40 on 1 December 2015 does not strictly change anything to this logic. In fact, the State Council says this and it is quite extraordinary: "Our opinion had observed, page 19/24, in a notice given five working days, that it had not been possible to verify whether and to what extent comparable legal objections could also be raised against a pure and simple extension of a deactivation date that is still in the future."

This deactivation date, which is still located in the future, is Doel 2, on December 1, 2015. Indeed, the State Council follows its logic and goes to the end. It is always this logic of the 40 years that comes back and that is the pivot of the State Council’s reflection.

I now come to point 10, § 2, and sub-page note 16 of the State Council. Taking the analysis of the law of 31 January 2003, the State Council said: "In order to ensure the security of supply, Doel 1 can again produce electricity and this, from the entry into force of the amending law but only until 15 February 2025, which is the new date at which Doel 1 must be disabled."

In a sub-page note, he adds: “As the production authorization for Doel 1 has expired, a new individual authorization must therefore be requested and obtained on the basis of the Act of 29 April 1999 and the Royal Decree of 11 October 2000. It follows, however, from Article 4 § 1 of the Law of 29 April 1999 that installations intended for the industrial production of electricity from the fission of nuclear fuels for which the deactivation date has been reached can no longer be subject to authorisation.

The State Council says so. Doel 1 arrived for forty years, it would be necessary in my logic - since I consider that it is the Electricity Act that is the basis for a new individual authorization - that Doel 1 have a new individual authorization. However, Article 4 of the Act of 29 April 1999 states that power plants that arrived at the deactivation date can no longer be subject to authorizations. Therefore, the State Council said, due to the lack of adaptation of the date fixed in the law of 31 January 2003, such an authorisation cannot therefore be issued.

I would like to think, but I am surprised. The State Council takes an intellectual path that is to say that it considers that 40 years is the age beyond which, if one wishes to pursue in the concrete case of Doel 1, an individual authorisation is required on the basis of the Electricity Act; but unfortunately, Article 4 of the 1999 Act prevents me from doing so and unless amending the Law of 31 January 2003, such an authorization cannot be issued. There, I ask myself what the exact logic of the State Council with regard to this legislative set is.

I continue my reasoning. We also have point 11 § 2 that says this: Regarding Doel 2, the State Council says ignoring if there are objections of the same style to be formulated in relation to the deactivation date that will come in a few months, and therefore, it would like to know how to solve this difficulty.

The State Council concludes its reasoning with a quite extraordinary sibylline phrase that solves absolutely nothing: "The power plants concerned (Doel 1 and 2) are built to produce electricity and they do so on an industrial scale and once this activity disappears, on the grounds that it is forbidden by law at a certain date, they actually no longer function."

I have always said, the government has always said, and repeats, and it is also written long and broadly in the law of 2013, and it was also mr. Deleuze, who had already talked about it in the work of the law of 2003, that the prohibition of electricity production, the inability to produce electricity from now on, must be understood in the purely economic sense, that is, as I have already had the opportunity to explain here in the plenary session, the possibility of injecting electricity into the grid and withdrawing income from injecting electricity into the grid.

This means, therefore, that if electricity could be stored, Electrabel, at the Doel 1 level, could now put that electricity, for example, in batteries and send those batteries elsewhere to sell them, because in doing so, the electricity would not have been injected into the network and Electrabel would have responded to the prohibition of injecting electricity into the network and therefore to the purely economic prohibition of permission to produce electricity.

Do you know that all this is recorded?

I know very well. I continue to. As for points 15 and 16, I know that all of this is not pleasing to you, but what do you want me to say to you?

I am obliged to read what is written. You have held us for hours with your legal reasoning, I have the right to hold you as long with the legal reasoning. With regard to points 15 and 16 on pages 22 and 24, your amendment aims to insert in article 4 § 1 in draft law of 31 January 2013 a sentence stipulating that Doel 1 must be subject to a new operating authorization.

Point 16, the general review, according to the State Council, showed that the operating authorisation for Doel 1 has not fully expired. So, the State Council finally realized that the operation for Doel 1 has not fully expired. This is only the case for the provisions relating to "the permission for industrial production of electricity from the fission of nuclear fuel which would possibly be included therein".

This means that permission to produce electricity, says the State Council, would eventually be included in permissions that have not been declared expirable, which are environmental permissions. Therefore, in itself, there is no need to make the new application for operating authorisation for Doel 1 mandatory. This is what the State Council says in all letters. Thus, the State Council, as it stops, becomes more and more comprehensive of the government’s thesis and progressively advances towards it.

I now come to pages 23 and 24 concerning the Aarhus and Espoo Conventions.

The State Council says it is not its responsibility to validate the exemption from obligation of international law contained in these conventions. As already stated, the obligations of consulting and assessing the environmental impacts arising from the Espoo and Aarhus Conventions also apply, in any case, in the case of a mere extension of the life of the Doel 2 nuclear power plant for which the legislator himself would provide that no authorisation for operation or production is required. It is awesome! So the State Council says that even if the legislator said that no operating or production authorisation is required for Doel 2 and if the legislator wants to extend this plant beyond forty years, knowing that it is the magical age, the Espoo and Aarhus conventions must be applied. This is the thesis of the State Council.

What else does the State Council say? I come to the end of his reasoning. It’s not my fault, it’s 24 pages. The State Council says that effectively, in its view, the Aarhus and Espoo conventions must be respected in any case, and it leaves all doors open. Thus, depending on the time, a new authorisation is needed for Doel 1 whose electricity permit expired on 15 February 20015, but he also says that it might also be necessary a new authorization for Doel 2, which will be forty years on 1 December 2015, without deciding on the subject. If the legislator intends to extend these plants, whether or not an authorisation is required, the Aarhus and Espoo conventions must therefore be respected.

This is the quintessence of the State Council's thesis since the publication of its decision on retroactivity. I read at the end – this is extraordinary – in the 20th amendment you submitted: “The 20th amendment aims to insert, in the law of 31 January 2003, an article 3/1 which stipulates that the AFCN must set the conditions relating to safety and safety and can only agree to the extension of the duration of operation of Doel 1 after the completion of an environmental impact assessment procedure authorizing cross-border participation of the public.”

He continues: “Like Amendment No. 16, this amendment also aims to ensure that Doel 1 can be reactivated only after completion of an environmental impact assessment procedure allowing cross-border public participation. Contrary to Amendment No. 16, which aims to subject the extension of the life of the Doel 1 nuclear power plant to the request for a new authorization, this amendment seems to want to intervene at a later stage of the procedure," the State Council said. The State Council says at the end very openly and that is, I believe, the most interesting conclusion for us: "It is primary that the observance of the obligations of international law and European law is guaranteed, the modalities defined in this regard have a secondary interest."

Then he talks about the justiciables. I do not see why the State Council speaks of the justiciables, since it says above that the Aarhus and Espoo conventions have no direct effect in Belgian law and that it considers that it can nevertheless control the application of these conventions, whether or not they have a direct effect, while saying that they do not have.

It is necessary to ensure that the legal entities and the regulator are clearly aware of which procedure to be followed and how it stands in relation to other authorisation obligations. The amendment should be amended accordingly. This means, of course, that the State Council is willing to admit that compliance with the Aarhus and Espoo Conventions takes place where it is provided in our Belgian law, and I have told you dozens of times, that is, when the AFCN, which follows the reasoning of the General Regulation for the Protection against Ionizing Radiation (RGPRI), and which in Article 12 makes the distinction between works of great importance, of medium importance or of small importance, which, when it comes to works of great importance, does not have the possibility to choose whether or not to make an impact study and a public consultation, and must do it (application of international conventions), which, when it comes to works of medium importance, as was the case for Tihange 1, has the possibility to choose and here will have the possibility to choose whether there is a place for an incident study and public consultation.

I will conclude by speaking of the State Council opinions on the extension of Tihange 1. I consulted them and checked if it was the same people who had given the opinions. Remember, in the government’s plans regarding supply security, it was discussed to extend together Tihange 1, Doel 1 and Doel 2.

The previous government wanted to show that really, by extending only Tihange 1, and not Doel 1 and Doel 2, there would be enough electricity with other complementary, and not alternative measures, with the tender for gas power plants for example, to ensure supply security as part of its policy. It was also a way of showing that we were in the exceptional logic of an extension, in the will to continue the exit from nuclear power and to stop the power plants from the age of 40 years.

So I looked at who had given these opinions to the State Council. These are the same people: Mr. Jo Baert, Mr. Tim Corthaut and another person whose name I will recover, who rendered twice four pages of very concise opinions on the extension of the Tihange 1 nuclear power plant, which in 2015, like Doel 1 and Doel 2, reaches the age of 40 years.

In these extremely succinct State Council opinions, it is simply stated that the preliminary bill submitted for opinion aims to make two amendments to the law of 31 January 2003 on the gradual withdrawal from nuclear power. On the one hand, the deactivation timetable of existing nuclear power plants is reformulated so that specific shutdown dates are stopped for each nuclear power plant instead of applying the rule used to date of the deactivation 40 years after industrial commissioning. This legislative intervention is necessary to grant, by way of derogation from the existing 40-year principle for the Tihange 1 plant, an extension of the operation until 1 October 2025.

On the other hand, there was a delegation to the King that allowed to take other necessary measures of scheduling in order to provide for the extension of other power plants if there were problems with supply security. The previous government said this: we repeal Article 9, which therefore removes the delegation to the King, allowing to take the necessary measures in the event of a threat to the security of electricity supply.

And the State Council to continue unanimously: “Since the legislator is empowered, if necessary, to provide timing measures to deal with the security of supply,” what we are doing, “there is no legal objection to the modification of this draft.”

There is no legal objection to the extension of Tihange 1. We are not explained that there is a problem with a pivot date of 40 years. There is no indication that a new authorisation will be required. We are not talking about the Conventions of Aarhus and Espoo. We are not talking about anything at all.

We are told that there is no legal objection to the amendment in the draft, although therefore the opinion of the Electricity and Gas Regulatory Commission (CREG) is no longer required to take such measures. Evacuation of the cage. There is no reason to think that under these conditions no necessary measure could be taken in a relatively short time. The law can very well, quickly, rearrange the timing of nuclear departure, without any objections and without compromising the international obligations contained in the Aarhus and Espoo Conventions.

This is the synoptic and historical framework of how the State Council, the same persons, analyze the whole legislation in this matter. Indeed, we have an approximation of the sensitivities of analysis between the government’s logic regarding the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2 and the logic of the State Council. But the State Council is absolutely unclear on whether, yes or not, a new authorization is needed for Doel 1 and maybe later a new for Doel 2, and on what law this authorization should be based. He ended up somehow saying, “Today I decide, I want international conventions to be applied, and it doesn’t matter how you do it. If you do so through the AFCN and RGPRI, it’s also good, as long as you comply with these conventions.”

I am impressed by the Minister. I do not know if we should ask the Deputy Prime Minister to make a summary to tell us if he understood, what he understood, and if the whole government supports the legal demonstration of the minister.

I finally held that the State Council is to the right what a military fanfare is to music.

Let me tell you that we will need to read your argument very carefully and thoroughly. I don’t know if you still had to pay a legal consultation to produce us this argument. In any case, you deduce from the reading of the State Council’s opinion things that it has never said. You are mixing...

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Wait, don’t tell me it’s the state council that mixes! You are not going to do his trial more than you should. I would like to hear that one can advocate a different opinion on the legal level and I am cautious in this regard. But from saying that you convinced us about the argument of the State Council, there is a margin!

I am willing to discuss the interpretation of certain provisions of the Aarhus and Espoo Conventions to see whether the extension of a nuclear power plant falls within their application criteria. This will probably be the debate before the Constitutional Court. I would like to say, on this issue, that there is no 100% legal certainty. Therefore to say that the State Council holds a completely inconsistent reasoning, no! It gives an interpretation of international conventions that it supports, I recalled recently, on an opinion given by a specialized committee of the European Union, responsible for interpreting the conventions. Therefore, it is not based on criteria that it would have invented by itself. That you question, in certain aspects, the opinion of the Council of State, either, but not to the point of denaturing it and making it appear inconsistent in all points and in all things.

I recently told the tribune very precisely what there was matter to be discussed legally. As you know, there is no certainty. Read the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the application of the two conventions, you will see that it tends rather to a broad interpretation. You defend a restrictive interpretation with your metaphorical image that the law would only be a switch that would temporarily stop an activity and that, in short, it can be restarted. No, the will of the legislator was clear, even with the 2013 amendment, to end the activity and not to suspend it. Your metaphoric image has no legal meaning. It’s pleasant to hear because you’re trying to convince with a simple image, and maybe that’s the only thing you get to understand from your demonstration. Basically, the legal analysis requires a little more respect for the opinion of the State Council.

I greatly appreciate the elaborate manner in which, usually, Mr. Maingain proceeds with the analysis of texts. Indeed, we agree on the point of discussion that is likely to be discussed before the Constitutional Court and which concerns the application of international conventions, and to what extent.

Because when it comes to authorization to produce electricity, things are all but clear. And you know well, in the extension law of Tihange 1, a paragraph 2 was expressly added to article 4, which states that environmental permits remain as they were originally, i.e. indefinitely, as long as the law of 15 April 1994 and its enforcement orders are not modified, while only the permission to produce electricity, which must be considered in the purely economic sense, is part of the mechanism established by the law of 2003, against which, by exception, Tihange 1 is extended under the law of 2013. So we go through the deadline organized by the 2003 law of end of electricity production, to say that we will extend Tihange 1. It is considered that this aspect is quite exceptional by saying that we will keep the same regime for all other power plants.

Here, we are doing exactly the same thing, we are taking exactly the same legal reasoning. In 2013, we have not been to the end of the logic, we have not joined the two major legal regimes that apply, and to what extent (which will have to be discussed in the courts), to our nuclear power plants. Indeed, as the State Council now notes, no authorization to produce electricity was imposed on our plants by the law of 1999, knowing that at that time, these plants were already established, already existed, had individual environmental authorizations of which we talked, and they never regulated their production capacity by incorporating them into the law of 1999 to compel them to have this authorization to produce electricity.

We could have done it, but we have not done it and we have never changed this regime. I think this is the second important aspect that we will have to look at someday.

At least one thing I understood today.

I understand why mr. Bens spoke of legal acrobatics. Mrs. Marghem gave us a beautiful demonstration.

by mr. He talked about improvisation.

In a much more serious way. Mr. Minister, at the beginning of your reasoning, you say that the 2008 decree granting the authorisation to produce 40 additional megawatts was not necessary and that, in addition, it was the only exception in this matter. Did I hear correctly?

Listen, don’t go into the details yet. Try to see the bottom of the problem. There were other permits. I know; we have said it in the committee. I do not know them by heart. It is not the only one, but it is the only one mentioned in the ruling. This is a couple of megawatts. This is not the full capacity of nuclear power plants. You know properly! These are occasional permissions in 2004, I think, and in 2008 and maybe another one later (there are two or three). But in this case, the State Council only takes up that and I have parted in the State Council’s opinion to speak to you. That is all.

What I am trying to explain to you is that since the law of 29 April 1999, the legal situation has changed.

Any further increase, extension or resumption of capacity requires passing through an authorisation. I explain to myself. Initially, with the Act of 1958, the authorization had an indefinite duration. This was the starting point in 1958. But the law of 1994 repealed the law of 1958. In 1999, an authorization obligation was introduced. Everything that has happened since 1999 has required the adoption of an electricity production permit.

I would like to mention the arrested in this case. 8 January 2002 concerning Tihange 2; 13 November 2007 concerning Tihange 3; 1 March 2004 concerning Doel 2; 17 August 2007 concerning Doel 4; and 18 February 2008 concerning Doel 1, this is the last authorisation to date.

Systematically, since article 4 of the 1999 law, as soon as there is a change in the situation, a new authorization is requested. Regardless of the government, regardless of the competent minister, he has always asked for permission in this matter. And it was granted with the necessary steps, the CREG, etc.

How can you say today – Mr. Jambon, I suppose that this is not an individual position, even if it is a ministerial decree, that it is really the government position that is presented to us – that what was done in 2002 is wiped out, just like what was done in 2004, in 2007 and in 2008; you create a new right under which one must no longer seek permission when it has been done, five times, by different ministers, by different governments and that this is recalled by the State Council. I do not understand! You say that the law of 1958 must be taken into account, but the latter was repealed by article 66 of the law of 1994. In 1999, the government and parliament introduced a new procedure. Everything that has been done since then must be done in compliance with the new procedure. This has been the case five times. But today, you decide to change the jurisprudence and no longer proceed in this way. It is hallucinating!

Mr. Nollet, I can understand that we do not agree. This has been the case from the beginning. I am not embarrassed about that.

The law is not desperate. Nor is it an exact science. It is a reflection that is in motion and that is based on the analysis of texts.

If you look at article 4 of the Act of 29 April 1999, you will find that this article begins precisely with the following sentence: "Except for the installations for the industrial production of electricity from the fission of nuclear fuels that can no longer be the subject of authorisation in accordance with articles 3 and 4 of the Law of 31 January 2003 on the progressive withdrawal of nuclear energy, the establishment of new installations for the production of electricity, the revision, renewal, waiver, transfer and any other modification of an individual authorisation issued on the basis of this Act is subject to the prior granting of an individual authorisation issued by the Minister."

Let me finish with the explanation of this article.

Why, then, if I listen to what you say, there is no renewal for power plants that have reached the age of forty that should be allowed under this law? Nuclear power plants produce much more MW than the ministerial ordinances you have spoken of, which only modify the power generated by nuclear power plants. Never, in our law, it has been imposed, and there is no question, for our nuclear power plants, of a particular authorisation that would be deduced from this law for the total capacity they produce. You can turn the problem in all directions. That does not exist.

The Law of 29 April 1999 states this. She says: "Except for the nuclear power plants that can no longer, etc." This shows well that we are in a quite exceptional regime where the legislator has not been to the end of logic. This is why the State Council, in its first opinion, says that a completely special authorisation regime would be needed. Remember, that’s what he says in his first opinion.

I am very pleased to acknowledge this, as I stated at the beginning of the work, I am not a lawyer. Nevertheless, there are prominent people here in the assembly, including one who is behind me and who is ⁇ attentive to our debates.

Mr. Minister, you say that you do not need to go seeking permission under the 1999 law. For the production of nuclear electricity, one should not go seeking a new permit since one had it previously.

This is not the case in Article 4. This article says that "we can no longer" give permission for the production of nuclear electricity. It’s not the same thing as “you don’t have to.” I read with you this article 4: "Except for installations for industrial production of electricity from the fission of nuclear fuel which can no longer be subject to authorization."

Nuclear power is no longer allowed. Why Why ? Because the majority of the time decided to quit nuclear power. No more permission can be granted. That’s what the law says, and you don’t change it. You are therefore in any way in the legal impasse from this single article.

You can no longer give permission. You say here: “It shouldn’t, the 2008 decree wasn’t necessary, we shouldn’t.” But you can no longer from article 4, § 1, which is subsequent.

This is the same reasoning concerning the Aarhus Convention and the Espoo Convention. You say that in 2013 the State Council did not use this in its opinion. It is true.

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No, it is not strange. He can go by things, as was the case at his first opinion. Do you know why? You are asking for the urgency. You don’t have time to analyze everything in five days.

It is incredible! In an emergency, he is able to remember...

You didn’t let me cut your word, but I let you speak.

I have the pleasure of cutting your speech with your permission, Mr Nollet.

I simply say that the State Council issued two opinions during the review of the law of 2013 and that it had the time to review, since it delivered them in thirty days. I have the utmost respect for everyone who tries to think about a situation and find solutions. But in twice thirty days, it comes out to us twice four pages without ever mentioning the conventions of Aarhus and Espoo. Contrary to what you claim, in five days, he gives us 40 pages telling us about the conventions of Aarhus and Espoo. It is extraordinary!

In any case, this law will be attacked obviously as is the law of Tihange 1 for the same reasons that we have exposed recently, each in our own way and it will be discussed before ad hoc courts of the application or not of these international texts. This is the essence of the case. We don’t have to worry about this, because we obviously won’t get out of the contradiction with an agreement. We continue to disagree on how things should be arranged intellectually and all this is not a problem.

Law is not an exact science. It is not a natural science either. It is an intellectual construction that is based on a set of rules. Everyone has the opportunity – and even better in this assembly – to make their own analysis. The government has done its analysis that it supports, that it defends and that founds the law that is today in debate before you.

Please do not confuse legal security fears with nuclear security fears. You can’t make a slide, which you do too often, with these two themes that strictly have nothing to do with each other.

Absolute legal certainty is ultimately something quite conceptual. It is obvious that judicial discussions will take place; we know it. Therefore, we defend as far as we can the legal certainty, and you can see that some opinions are irreconcilable. That said, it is not the security or legal uncertainty you lend to this text that will provide the technical facilities of Doel 1 and Doel 2 with the nuclear security they need.

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But yes ! There is a systematic shift between these concepts. And you are introducing to the minds of the public fears that mix the legal aspects of a text, which you obviously want to cut into pieces and that is for you a sum of inconsistencies, with nuclear security, of which my colleague here is responsible through the AFCN. Anyway, this nuclear security constitutes the real background of the matter with security of supply. This is what we need to discuss.

Everyone can have their point of view, of course. I’m in science, and I’m very happy. Nevertheless, I will not let you say that the State Council gave you the right when it indicates that you are wrong. You do not have the right to speak in your name.

Mr. Nollet, I do not have the right to say what I think, but you do? It is unlikely! Are you more equal to me?

And I apologize for it.

I repeat my reasoning.

If the State Council, in 2013, does not expand the dimensions of Aarhus and Espoo to such a point but does so in 2015, it is also because, in the meantime, there has been a decision you know, related to a Ukrainian case. This was finally settled in 2014. It must be that at the time when the State Council gives its opinion in 2013, it is not aware of what has been decided by the implementation of the Espoo Convention and which was recalled during the hearings by Ms. Anouk Janssens. This is a new fact and the State Council takes into account the possible evolution of this case-law and the applications that have been linked to this evolution of the case-law. This is one of the reasons why the State Council is more specific in its subsequent opinions. The point.

The rest is from 2013. Today, the Council of State is more precise. He is not in contradiction and he does not say that there is any contradiction to his three recent opinions. We cannot follow you on that side.

Mr. Speaker, I will wait for the end of the Minister’s reasoning but, on this legal aspect, I wanted to intervene immediately, before she can develop all her reasoning to be able to counter the elements relating to the State Council.

However, it is necessary to have a bit of intellectual honesty with regard to what the State Council itself says. First, he explains why in 2013, he did not refer to international conventions in his opinion of the time. He simply indicates that the time limit granted to him did not necessarily allow him to raise all the legal objections he could have raised with regard to a draft law.

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Read the bottom of page 11, point 23, infrapageal note. The State Council is aware that this observation concerning the applicability of the obligations of consultation and environmental impact assessment imposed by international law with regard to the extension of the lifetime of certain nuclear power plants could in principle already have been formulated in opinion 57093.3 which it gave on the preliminary draft law. This may be explained by the fact that the examination by the Legislative Section is an open examination in which it cannot be guaranteed that the opinion addresses all possible objections that a given text may raise and that subsequently, on the occasion of new requests for opinions on adaptations to that text, other views cannot be expressed, in particular when such initial opinion is requested within a very short period of time.

He adds: "Out of the way, this is also the case for the two opinions that the State Council gave at the time on the preliminary draft, which became the law of 18 December 2013 (...)" and so on. He himself thus makes it clear why this happened to him under his nose – apologize for this somewhat trivial expression – in 2013.

The time limit has not allowed him to raise all the legal objections. It can be regretted. It could be said that this may relativize the scope of the State Council opinions but, in this case, it has made sense to go further.

Why Why ? Because he knows that a jurisprudence has developed. By the way, this jurisprudence served in a completely different case. Read the excellent decision of the Brussels Court of First Instance of 30 July 2014 in the appeal against the Wathelet Plan. This is a direct application of the Arrhusian Convention. One of the arguments used to annul the Wathelet Plan resolutions is the Aarhus Convention. The direct effect, the absence of. It is worth it.

So the State Council, who knows the jurisprudence, knows that today, a jurisprudence begins to develop around these international obligations, of which he himself says that one can discuss indefinitely whether there are direct effects or not – there are direct effects because these provisions of international conventions have been invoked directly by the justiciables before the courts and that the courts have made right to their direct applicability.

And the State Council says that in 2013, it went aside because the deadline did not allow it to pay attention to it and above all, let’s be careful, because at the time, these international conventions were not applied as it is today through jurisprudence. Therefore, do not make the intent trial of a contradiction of the State Council. and no. The State Council itself justifies and explains.

Second, the issue of licensing. Recognize that the starting point of your reasoning was to say that you distinguish between operating authorization and production authorization. It is not subject to international obligations. This was the starting point of your reasoning, it was even the starting point of the Janson note. According to the State Council, it does not matter whether you make the distinction or not, and it can be done, by the way, the 2013 law has accentuated the distinction, but despite this distinction, even the production authorization is subject to the obligations arising from international conventions.

So it is not because it is not an authorization of environmental administrative police that it is subject to or not to the Aarhus and Espoo conventions; it is because the nature of what the legislator intends to do, enters the legal framework of the application of these two conventions. The reasoning of the State Council is of a clear clarity.

As I said earlier, there will be a debate before the courts to find out what should be understood by certain terms of the two international conventions. After that, let me still think that the State Council reasoning has an appearance of stronger coherence than yours.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to say to Mr. Maingain that he might have had to participate more in our debates because it might have helped to avoid long legal demonstrations at least inconsistent. Maybe another reading would have been possible. Per ⁇ Mrs. Minister would have been more convinced by your demonstration because apparently, the demonstrations of the lawyers are not enough and I admit that your demonstration was clear and might have made more sense with Mrs. Minister.

I would also like to address the Minister. You talked about Amendment No. 20 by saying that there was a need to amend the amendment accordingly but you forget to read the small note 25. Why should the amendment be revised? Because precisely, if you give the AFCN the power to decide whether or not to carry out an environmental impact study or a public inquiry, you remove the legislative power of its prerogatives.

Thro ⁇ our debate, and this is also evident from the report that I have strived to write with objectivity, we have confused legal security, security of which we have talked much more with the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Internal Affairs – who has had much clearer, direct and transparent answers – and security of supply. We have not mixed these three levels. Legal certainty has been demanded for many years because it can also be said that all governments have had difficulties with regard to legal certainty in the electricity sector.

But you cannot say that legal security is not damaged by your project. The demonstration has just been done. All opinions agree and are murderous, except in fact your demonstration which was at least disassembled here in the plenary session.

Please return to an objective reading of our discussions. Do not confuse security and security. In addition, we are talking about security with the Minister of the Interior who has not yet responded to all of our interventions. You talked about supply security at the beginning of your intervention and we did not react to this practice. Instead, you said at the beginning of your speech that Doel 1 and Doel 2 were very short-term supply security. We demonstrated for 60 hours that, obviously, Doel 1 and 2 will not offer very short-term supply security.

For half an hour, you were bluffing. When we push the analysis further, no one is fooled. One element attracted my attention: you have been long reading a whole number of paragraphs of the State Council opinion. When paragraphs do not fit you - you can read the text of your speech - you skip them. You do not use them as the State Council tells you. So this is a legal pirouette in your oratory art. You have attempted, in this exhibition, to discredit the opinion of the State Council to make a opinion which, in your opinion, is delirious. The legal vision of the State Council is based on legal texts. When you observe the amendment 16 that is being proposed to you, it actually allowed you to respect the State Council’s opinion and you do not want to seize it.

To resume your text, your stubbornness to push the switch to turn off the light prevents you from correctly reading this State Council opinion.

Second, as regards the Espoo Conventions and the Habitat and EIE Directives, these are international texts. You must respect them. You represent the Belgian State in this debate. The Belgian State has ratified these texts. They impose themselves on us. This is the whole issue of legal certainty that we wanted to address throughout these discussions, both in the committee and in the plenary session.

Read what is written and not what you want to read. It is completely different. You have misinterpreted the texts. You are wrong.

We have a very rich debate.

Finally, a small point, but very important, as this is the central point that has been discussed in the committee. In this regard, I would like to refer to my remarks in the committee. by mr. Maingain cites a key decision concerning the flight plan of Mr. by Wathelet.

We have studied the criteria for applying or not international conventions with our colleagues in committee. Mr Maingain, of course, I do not blame you for not coming. You have nothing else to do than be present in all the committees. It would have been interesting, however, that you were present because we developed the policy criterion. When a law drafts a policy and when that law is not a concrete project, as is the case in this case according to the government (since the project discussed today drafts a policy on security of supply and various measures for that security of supply), there is no application of international conventions and there is no public consultation or environmental impact study.

This is the reasoning that has been developed.

I conclude my speech so that I can give the floor. Jambon, who waited very patiently for me to finish. It is not because we believe that this law constitutes a policy that should not be the subject of public consultation or environmental impact study that the safety and safety of the people will not be fully guaranteed. We all agree. Mrs Lilian has made it clear.

I reiterate that Doel 1 and 2 plants will not be extended if the AFCN, which is the guard dog for nuclear security, declares that it is impossible for them to resume operations and that it therefore does not give its green light.

The extension of Doel 1 and 2, and I repeat again, is by no means an end in itself. There is absolutely nothing ideological in this regard. We want to be pragmatic in ensuring our country’s security. Furthermore, the out-of-nuclear law for 2025 is fully complied with as this extension extends until that date.

Through its decision of 18 December 2014, concretized by this bill, the government intends to take medium- and long-term measures that express its will to lay the foundations for a real energy transition policy for our country alongside this extension, aiming further to build an attractive and productive market for investors. The focus is on energy efficiency and demand management, as well as on preparing for the future through the creation of a fund to finance research and development in production and storage. The latter is crucial for balancing the intermittent nature of renewable energy.

In fact, it will not have escaped anyone that both the solar, by the succession of days, nights and clouds, and the wind power subject to the caprices of the wind, present an irregular production profile that generates an increased need for tools of flexibility in the transport and distribution networks. The development of these storage means, including Coo 1, Coo 2 and Plate Size are perfect examples, therefore constitutes the indispensable support for renewable energies, whose durability and consistency they guarantee. As I said, we cannot ensure the security of our country’s supply in the medium and long term without an ambitious energy vision. I call on the Regions to seize this unique opportunity we have to work together to defend the interests of our fellow citizens and our ⁇ through measures that make our energy more sustainable and affordable. I refer here to the energy vision that the Federal has developed and is sharing with the Regions and which will be expressed in concrete actions through the Inter-Federal Energy Pact.

Dear colleagues, beyond the often binding doctrinal positions that I see expressed here and there in one or another of our interventions, we do not lack themes on which we should debate so that we can agree on major projects, essential to the development of our country and guaranteeing its security of supply.

Thus, by agreeing on the essential, each of us will be faithful to the mandates we have received from voters.

This was the first half of the government’s speech. Now comes the second half of the government speech, but I can tell you that it will be a little shorter.

I will limit myself to matters that have been noted and which may have already been dealt with in the committee, but of which it is important that they are repeated for a moment, or that have not yet been dealt with.

It has been said here several times, but I want to repeat again that the government’s position on security is very clear. With the hope of the adoption of the present bill tomorrow, phase 1 of the reboot of Goal 1 and Goal 2 has started. Phase 2 will be the analysis of the FANC and its advice on the restart and the investments that need to be made before we can restart. The Government shall uninterruptedly implement the advice of the FANC in all its modalities. We will not make any concessions in this regard. If investments are required according to the FANC, they will be made before Goal 1 and Goal 2 are put back in operation.

This brings me seamlessly to the problem of SALTO.

Let’s be very clear: if the IAEA now had the time and space, a SALTO analysis could now take place. However, there is an agenda issue. The FANC is not obliged to carry out the SALTO analysis. The FANC applies the guidelines and, in addition, a SALTO analysis will take place. We will have it implemented as soon as possible, as soon as it fits its agenda, by the responsible international body. However, as it is not a legal obligation, this is not necessary before a possible restart.

Much has been said here, but the FANC is under the control of that same body, which must also be responsible for the SALTO analysis. The FANC shall be regularly audited by that body. The FANC is repeatedly receiving a positive audit, and I think this is a sufficient guarantee to trust and trust the analysis of the FANC. This analysis will clarify whether or not we can re-open Goal 1 and extend the life of Goal 2.

I would also like to return to the question of Mr Bens.

Mr Bens is not the FANC and the FANC is not Mr Bens. Mr Bens is the director of the FANC. He is the first in command, but he is of course part of a management committee. There is also a Board of Directors and a Scientific Committee. To say that a ruling made by Mr. Bens to the left or right, of which I have given you my appreciation, puts the whole functioning of the FANC on loose screws, is an analysis that I absolutely do not share. The FANC is much more than just Mr. Bens. I can inform you – you may already know it – that Mr. Bens will appear before the subcommittee on 8 July after his sick leave due to a heart disease.

I have a final note – it is brief, I admit it – for Mr. Nollet.

On the tribune you have repeatedly said that the government is putting pressure on the FANC. I do not accept that. I have said several times that there is no pressure from the government on the FANC. If you say that the FANC is being pressured by the government, you must also be able to prove that, otherwise you must not make such statements here on the tribune.

I repeat once again that the government does not put pressure on the FANC in any way. The FANC has the autonomy to subsequently come up with advice on life extension and reboot. We will follow that advice without putting pressure on the FANC in any way.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, where I consider that at least you put the AFCN under pressure, it is precisely on the SALTO. If I review the Federal Agency’s guidelines as well as the documents it has published, it recommends the arrival of a SALTO mission for additional external evaluation regarding pre-conditional elements and aging-related elements by the end of 2014. It recommends that this be done before the LTO expires, before February 2015 for Doel 1 and before December 2015 for Doel 2. These are the recommendations of the AFCN.

This was repeated in the statement of 18 April 2014 published on the website of the Federal Agency. It is clearly stated that applications related to SALTO and pre-SALTO are needed for those considering an LTO and not for those who have already gone beyond. These are currently the documents published by the Federal Agency. Now, you say in committee and I repeat your words in the report: "This is not possible. A SALTO mission will be performed after, i.e. in January 2017 for the full mission and in February 2016 for the pre-SALTO mission, i.e. after the LTO. This mission will have a limited scope.

What is it, other than to say to the Federal Agency: you have your guidelines, but I find that this is not possible, no matter what, we will pass through?

If we limit ourselves to what the Federal Agency has published on its website in tempore non suspecto, we must do so before making the decision. This is where there is incoherence and therefore pressure. You say, it needs to be, then it will be in 2017. But the agency has always written that it was before. Even Electrabel said it was before. I have the document here.

The documents do not prove anything about the government’s pressure on the AFCN. This agency is an autonomous body. We ask them to produce a security notice for the restart of Doel 1 and 2 and it is the AFCN that must then assess whether they have the means to give a opinion or not.

So far, they say they can do it without the jump. But we will make the SALTO as soon as possible, when the international instance agrees.

Mr. Minister, where do they say they can do without the SALTO? Indeed, I could read on the website of the Federal Agency that it is necessary to appeal to SALTO, in advance, while, on your part, you say that we can avoid it.

We’ll see what the AFC will say. I always said that I would follow his opinion and that I had no intention of putting pressure on him.

But the opinion exists.

I am used to doing what I say.

of course ! What you say is true.

We will therefore invite the AFCN to give an opinion. It will be up to him to assess whether he has all the elements to do so. This is his responsibility, his duty.

You are right to emphasize this point. I have no concern with this. But the Federal Agency issued an opinion which was published on April 18, 2014. It appears on his website. He recommends this pre-SALTO mission to those who are considering an LTO and not to those who have already completed one. The opinion exists. It was published on the website of the Federal Agency on 18 April 2014.

Mr. Nollet, this is why this SALTO mission has already been planned. It will take place as soon as possible. It is now up to the AFCN to decide whether or not it can give an opinion. I think this is a fairly clear position.

I hear what you say. I think the responsibility is of the AFCN. That is why, in my speech, I wanted to warn her. We know very well what is the intention, the will, the calendar of the government. But I wanted to let the Federal Agency know that it should not give in to these requests and that it must respect what it had written, for the last time, on April 18, 2014.

Mr. Nollet, this is a normal position and I can understand, but I cannot accept your statements that we are increasing the pressure on the AFCN to do something that it does not want. I do not accept this position. We do not do it, we are happy to follow the way the AFCN works.

So why in the commission, which I thank you again because you were not obliged to, did you say that the mission will be limited and will take place later? Now, when you come to the committee, you know that the Federal Agency recommends that it take place before.

But no, I do not know!

This is on the site!

These are probably the intentions that the AFCN has published. I do not know at the moment whether the AFCN needs this SALTO to give an opinion or not.

This is stated in the strategic note of the Federal Agency. This is a public document. This is not something that is invented.

It is up to them to make this estimate when we ask them for an opinion.

I can enter into your reasoning, but if they say to do so later, you must admit that the AFCN has changed position, while there is no external objective reason for doing so except to meet the needs of the calendar. But we will come back to it because it will have to explain itself in relation to this.

I do not accept your statements that the government is putting pressure on it because it is not at all the truth.

In this case, it will be necessary that she gives the reason for her change of position, while no external element justifies it, because her communication date in tempore non suspecto of 18 April 2014 if it is your intervention to advocate 2017.

You will have the opportunity to question the officials of the AFCN on July 8th.

I took note of the date and thank you.

Without pressuring anyone in the scenario that is drawn here, Mr. Minister, you speak that the AFCN will do it independently, I hear you, and I want to believe you. But from the moment when the SALTO will be done after, what will the AFCN do if after the SALTO, it is necessary to stop a reactor, after it has eventually made the decision to reopen the reactor, but that the SALTO tells her after it is necessary to stop the reactor? What will be the credibility of the institution? Can the NFC take that risk? Shouldn’t we anticipate the SALTO and wait for it to actually be delivered? We are putting the chariot before the bulls. What else will be the credibility of the institution if after the SALTO, it is told that the reactor must be stopped? That is the question.

I think we are at the end of the session. Everybody will still be able to speak. I would still like to raise up at this stage all the work that has been done in a few months by our minister, I speak here on behalf of the majority, to identify, to raise up all the problem of energy in our country, and God knows if this problem is important, and also to already begin to bring elements of response. This is witnessed by the bills we have already worked on in the committee, including the transposition of the European Energy Supply Directive, the recent Bill on Fluxys, the creation of the Energy Fund, and now the extension of Doel 1 and Doel 2 which are known to be important for ensuring electricity supply for this winter.

Regarding legal interpretation, which has occupied a large part of our debates, the majority confides in the reading given by the minister.

It should also be emphasized that this law is only a step. We are aware of the Minister’s will to develop an energy plan using all possibilities and all complementary paths. We can be sure that all this will take place in the coming weeks or months to diversify as much as possible the electricity supply of our country, the population and also the industry – this is important to emphasize.

In the meantime, I wanted to thank Mr. The Deputy Prime Minister who attended these meetings gave us his light and showed us the attention he – like the government – pays to nuclear security. He also did well to insist on the independence of the AFCN which sometimes seemed to be questioned in these debates.

We work in teams, in shifts.

I would like to take the opportunity to say a few things, also following the presentation of both ministers.

I have never had the opportunity to thank my colleagues and the services, so I would like to expressly do so. However, I think that what we are experiencing today does not immediately form a beautiful page in Belgian energy history.

Mrs. Minister, if you say that you are registering in the law of 2003, I clearly disagree with that. What we are threatening to face here today or tomorrow is the first stage of the burial of the 2003 law. In my opinion, we are actually ending the law on nuclear discontinuation right now. For the second time after Fukushima, the Belgian Parliament threatens to decide to extend the life of an old nuclear reactor by ten years. So, if you say that you fully adhere to the law of 2003 and that you subscribe to that philosophy, then I totally disagree with that. What prevails here today actually means that what remains of the first phase of the initial law is again abandoned. Completely in line with the boycott and sabotage of the Pioneer Act in 2003 to step-by-step withdrawal. Completely in line with the boycott and sabotage of almost all political parties in this country when it comes to nuclear withdrawal.

The result is, if this law is passed tomorrow and the next stages are rolled out, that you choose to sustain a double monopoly, a monopoly of one player and a monopoly of a technology, until 2025 and evolve into a legislation that would close roughly all nuclear capacity in two years. I think that is not a rational, pragmatic choice, but a dogmatic and ideological choice.

From the rational, phased law of 2003 nothing remains today. This majority calls for a theoretical law on nuclear shutdown. That is the future of boycotting, sabotaging and that is very far from what was decided in 2003. Do not repeat that you are registered in the law of 2003. The opposite is true.

Finally, the legal framework.

I am convinced that this story is not over. I have just heard you say, with the necessary temperament, and even almost joyfulness, that there will be a procedure at the Constitutional Court. I think this is a very irresponsible attitude. It is my conviction that this was perfectly avoidable. I would like to remind you that the first opinion of the State Council dates from February 18 this year. You could already have organized a public survey and an environmental impact report. You should not have said here today that you knew there was a procedure before the Constitutional Court. You have once again chosen a stubborn, dogmatic position.

If you wanted to extend the life of the power plants, you could have done it in a different way since February, since the bill was submitted here. It is almost to our rage and anger that we have had to determine how you have had to handle such an important file.

I am closing.

I have already said: it is definitely not done. Mrs Dierick, Doel 3 and Tihange 2 will know their seizure in the coming months. This will, of course, have an impact on the next stages of this bill. There will be a convention. There may be legal procedures. Our faction will use all the energy they have, and that is pretty much what and indeed includes renewable energy, to prevent this from happening. In 2003 this country was a pioneer with courage, but today, after Fukushima and for the second time – I repeat it, the first time with Tihange 1 under the previous legislature – this parliament, with Goal 1 and Goal 2, calls for the extension of the life of a 1975 reactor.

There is very little future in these power plants. As Greens, we love the future and we will not help approve this bill tomorrow.