Proposition 53K3068

Projet de loi relatif à l'introduction d'une gestion autonome pour l'organisation judiciaire.

General information ¶

Submitted by

PS | SP the Di Rupo government

Submission date

Oct. 14, 2013

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

judicial reform judicial power

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V Vooruit LE PS | SP Open Vld MR

Voted to reject

∉ N-VA

Abstained from voting

Groen Ecolo LDD VB

Party dissidents ¶

• Bernard Clerfayt (MR) voted to reject.
• Peter Luykx (CD&V) voted to reject.
• Olivier Maingain (MR) voted to reject.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

Dec. 12, 2013 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the committee we discussed very thoroughly the subject of the bill. I am sure that some colleagues will repeat one and another, which allows me to refer to the written report.

Mr. Landuyt, I will have to disappoint you. I had hoped that you would bring the written report here orally. My brief speech will be very punctual. Per ⁇ the other members will repeat the discussion.

Mrs. Minister, we have had to wait very long for the third loop of your reform, the management. If we look at your whole reform, we find that it is tied with heels and eyes. We had warned you of this during the discussion of the first two loopholes, which are actually combined into one loopholes. You necessarily wanted the first leak in Parliament to be approved in advance, without the Parliament being aware of the third leak, which is treated completely separately.

We had warned you about this. In the end, the third draft was discussed. No matter how important it is, because your reform falls or stands with this third loop, we are still disappointed with the whole. Our fear has become reality. It’s even worse, the gestured mouse is even much sharper than we thought.

I immediately come to the subject. We have two points of criticism.

First, the management of the courts is about the finances. What do you decide in your bill on finance? You say that what will happen with the finances will only be decided in the future.

In the future, there must be a new law that will regulate the finances, although the essence of the third part of the reform is still the management. So, at the moment, we do not actually decide anything. We decide to pour the third part, the finance, later into a law. When that law comes, we will have to resume that discussion, because today we will only vote on an empty box.

The draft also points out that a lot is delegated to the executive power. There are a lot of holes in it. All these gaps have yet to be filled. They are delegated to the executive power. Everything needs to be entered into one or more KBs. The State Council also had several comments and pointed out that a lot is being postponed. At this point, your design is still an empty box. In this framework law, only some details are regulated.

Furthermore, some additional structures or bodies are established here and there, such as a college of the headquarters, a college of the prosecutor’s office, support services for those colleges and a common support service. Furthermore, district management committees and an evaluation committee will be established. Some of these are effectively a good thing, but a few sentences from the bill reveal that there is no real decentralization in your bill. That decentralization and accountability, however, were just the intention of the third part of your management. Unfortunately, those are not in the design, although that was the intention.

Everyone knows examples of the problems that decentralization brings right now. I think of the example from the practice in Bruges, where there were problems. This week there was a problem with a court that no longer had heating.

Not only do we point out these problems; also the High Council for Justice has issued such an opinion, in which it states that there is no decentralization in your bill. Corps commanders will still be highly dependent on central authorities. There is no decentralization, as the corps commanders themselves have little responsibility with regard to personnel management, infrastructure and equipment. The only difference is that the central power is no longer entirely with you, but is redirected to decentralized colleges.

Furthermore, we see in your bill that the college will be able to destroy the management decisions of the local executive committee at any time. However, we assume that the management would be much better if it could be organized by the districts themselves, resulting in a real responsibility.

In that perspective, the current bill again gives a veto right to Brussels against decisions taken at a decentralized level. This is not real decentralization. Brussels does not want to let go of this power.

This is a missed opportunity for reform. The whole reform is a missed opportunity. I will not repeat my entire discourse, but I would point out the fact that in the first drafts there is no unitary court. All in all, we see this reform as a missed opportunity. The entire government-Di Rupo often leaves chances behind.

Mr. Speaker, I think that soon a bill will be adopted which constitutes the third loop of a reform that everyone hopes will benefit the user-friendliness, the accessibility, and above all the efficiency and the proper functioning of the Judiciary.

For us, this management structure, as it is outlined here, is only a first step in further self-reliance, a transitional framework as it were. A definitive model must then be drawn out. At the moment it is said that the corresponding funds will also be allocated step by step. Work will be done on management contracts and policy plans to eventually bring the operation and decision-making powers closer to the workplace in order to work more efficiently.

We are pleased, Mrs. Minister, that the measurement of workload has been incorporated as a principle in this bill. There has also been a further refinement of the story concerning the management committee. Changing the disciplinary arrangement is also important.

We are also pleased, Mrs. Minister, that the management contract will be submitted to Parliament on our request. In this way, a piece of tradition in management contracts, further decentralization and more autonomy can be developed.

This general framework is a beginning, but ⁇ not the end. It remains a focus for us. The concrete implementation, the concrete operation and especially the framework conditions, necessary to ⁇ this, must be followed. These are the training and management tools that are assumed and expected within the structures of Justice. Additional capabilities will also be needed, including at the infrastructure level, to ensure proper functioning.

Finally, Mrs. Minister, there is a need for a good dialogue with all the staff involved, from high to low. I don’t like to use the term “high to low” because everyone needs to be involved. After all, each function is important in this whole in order to allow the further development to run together. I mean the judicial staff, the judiciary and all those needed to provide that support.

Mr. Speaker, in view of Mr. Landuyt’s extensive report and in view of the consideration that good wine does not need a crown, I conclude that the framework is closed today. It is now up to the magistrates and judicial staff to fulfill that framework, which allows them to ⁇ a more efficient functioning of Justice in an independent manner and in a way for which they will have to be accountable.

Mr. Speaker, dear colleagues, I do not drink much wine but I think I can distinguish between a bad table wine and a good Bordeaux, Mrs. Van Cauter. The wine that has been served to us in recent times in the Justice Committee on this subject, and on others unfortunately, deserves to be discussed longer and this despite the extremely interesting and comprehensive report of colleague Landuyt.

More seriously, Mr. Speaker, it is indeed the third aspect of the Justice Reform that is submitted to us and discussed today, after the judicial districts and the mobility of magistrates. Like others, I am deeply regretful that we have worked this way, with three separate packages and different moments. The result is a lack of a comprehensive and coherent vision. Furthermore, the field actors did not have a voice in the chapter despite our requests to receive and audition them. This is becoming a regular refrain in the Justice Commission, I am no longer surprised by anything, especially since the last few hours.

Forgetting the work, consulting little, advancing fast and far to correct later becomes a typical working method of the Minister of Justice!

I must admit that I understood, with surprise, that the majority was not always behind the Minister of Justice. I mean as proof a series of amendments submitted by the MR to the text discussed today, withdrawn a little later. These amendments, however, were interesting and would have won our membership. We took them back and then removed them in the meantime. He even left the room at some times. To sum up, a messy work and little cohesion from the majority behind its minister.

In terms of management autonomy, Ecolo-Groen is fundamentally in favor of greater autonomy in the management of courts and courts.

Congratulations to the Minister. Unfortunately, the project presented to us today does not really meet our expectations in this regard.

I will outline three main elements. But, above all, I would like to go a little back on the position that we have been advocating for a while, ⁇ in the discussions in the Atomium group. We wanted to seek the best level of autonomous management in order to make the internal functioning of the courts more efficient and allow the magistrates to focus on the important tasks that belong to them with regard to the subject. To do this, autonomous budgets must allow the body to operate safely within a defined envelope. Our message was also to say that we wanted the necessary resources to be allocated to these entities and to be distributed fairly and objectively, always to ensure a quality justice service.

The Atomium Group discussed the basic principle that lies in a more autonomous management of the judiciary based on the principles called integral management, as they are implemented in other federal public services and which, applied to the judicial landscape, consist of establishing an autonomous management at the level of the headquarters and the public prosecutor’s office. This autonomous management concerns only the management of resources and not the organisation of judicial tasks. This empowerment is based on a decentralization of the competences and management of the SPF Justice, with the objective being a general model applicable to most situations.

We obviously support the principle of this management of decentralization as it can effectively solve a number of sometimes deplorable situations in the courts. We talked a long time about it. One of them is the heating disruption in Charleroi.

We also wanted this reorganization to be based on the assessment of the workload, of which we have talked long. We also wanted that this autonomy be the subject of three-year management plans, which constitute the duration of a “legislature” for the management body and the head of the body.

As for the manager, we wanted him to be someone from the judicial world with a manager profile.

If the head of the body does not have management skills or knowledge, he could be assisted by a manager better trained in management methods and dedicated solely to this task. The manager would be more present in the major districts.

Finally, our message also signaled that we would not want this method to result in an evaporation of political responsibility: the minister must continue to respond for the proper functioning of Justice. A public service managed as a commercial product, without political responsibility, would be worse than its privatization. This reorganization must be based on the assessment of the workload. I repeat that, if not intelligently designed, it would become a funest technocratic tool. I insist on this, because the measurement of the workload is still in progress. That is why the Minister has advanced in all the components at its disposal.

Another important element that we have defended in the debates, and still today, is that the operation of closed envelopes requires special attention. Indeed, it is unthinkable that an inquiry judge must abandon an inquiry by exhausting the budget.

If I recall all these remarks, which we have made for many months, it is that they remain relevant, while the text that is submitted to us and that Parliament must approve does not go in this direction.

I would like to emphasize three elements. First, our will – defended today as well as in the two previous projects in recent months – to evolve towards participatory management. This is the point of the amendment we have submitted.

The objective of this model of participatory management is to make the maximum participation, through the general assembly, of the magistrates who work with the head of body. The involvement of the assisting magistrates of the chief of the corps in a decision concerning the mobility of a magistrate, for example, has the advantage of guaranteeing their adherence to that decision and, thus, avoiding as far as possible the risks of a disciplinary decision – we have raised it – disguised through a temporary appointment or delegation order.

The debate on this subject has been long. This element does not correspond with the vision of the minister who continually responded to me that she wanted to take responsibilities, decide. I believe that the idea of participatory management does not exclude responsibility, on the contrary.

The idea of a participatory management is really to move forward with the support of the base, with a broad support, with an uncontested legitimacy since discussed and supported by all, rather than working as you do with binding guidelines, which could sometimes be misperceived, or even misinterpreted.

I regret that the project is not moving in this direction. Ecolo-Groen is not alone in defending this idea of participatory management. Many field actors, who practice justice on a daily basis, would like to give additional powers to the various general assemblies, which are important places of debate and reflection. Integrating them into decisions would sometimes just allow to make decisions fit the best possible to the reality of one and the other.

The second element I would like to address is the risk of evaporating the political responsibility of the minister. We discussed this in the committee a long time. Many field actors, again, are concerned about this project discussed today because the risk is high of an evaporation of the minister’s responsibility.

The Minister will actually negotiate with the three new structures, which we have recently cited: the College of Courts and Tribunals, the College of Public Prosecution, the Board of Directors of the Court of Cassation. She will discuss with these three new structures management contracts and the granting of a envelope. After that, the colleges will have to distribute these envelopes between the different judicial entities.

It would obviously not be necessary that by this method, at some point, the minister says (re-take a current example): "Do you no longer have heating in Charleroi? The problem is that you have mismanaged your envelope. I am not responsible for this situation.”

Today and tomorrow, after the adoption of this project, it is fundamental that one can keep in mind and that the reality is that the minister remains the guarantor of the proper functioning of justice, also in its daily management. In order for this to work, it is therefore necessary that the envelopes accompanying the management contracts debated within the colleges are consistent and effectively enable daily management and the proper functioning of justice.

The Minister could answer that if judicial entities consider themselves injured, an appeal is possible. This leads me to mention my third element, namely the many interference of the executive. The appeal is possible before the Minister. We find ourselves thus facing the snake who bites its tail since it is the minister who has the last word regarding a decision that she has made being all at the top of the chain. If judicial entities consider themselves injured, it is the Minister who will have the last word. This makes it clear to many observers that this is not really about autonomous courts and courts.

The [...]

You are disturbing me, Madame Van Cauter. I will conclude soon, but since you have not intervened, I am intervening for you.

To return to the subject that concerns us, we are faced with a risk of evaporation of political power, which is worrying. Paradoxically to what one might believe, there is a large interference of the executive in particular in terms of the terms of election of members of the colleges of the headquarters and of the public prosecution which are within the competence of the minister, the terms relating to the functioning and organization of the support services of these colleges, the definition of common matters to be jointly managed by the colleges and how to manage them, the appeal of a board of directors against the decision of the college that would manifestly jeopardize the administration of justice of a judicial entity, the minister deciding on the distribution of the resources of this appeal.

Among the interference of the executive, I also point out that it is up to the Ministers of Justice and Budget to cancel the directives of the colleges that would be contrary to the law. You’ll tell me that’s important, and that’s true. However, it is clear, through these different examples – many observers and field actors share this view – that just like This is not a Magritte pipe, this is not a management autonomy that is granted to the judiciary.

For all these reasons, the Ecolo-Groen group will not support your text.

By voting on this bill, we conclude the reform of the judicial landscape. Indeed, after the changes made to the territorial structure, the distribution of courts, we are facing the third pan of the reform that concerns management.

The PS group welcomes the overall reform of the structure of our justice, which dates globally from its creation when our regions were annexed to the French Republic in 1795. We also welcome the improvements that the landscape reform and the judicial organization can bring for the justiciable. Better management is also a more efficient, faster justice that will allow, we hope, to avoid exceeding the reasonable deadline, unnecessary judicial costs, underemployment within the prosecutor’s office or headquarters, thanks to a better distribution of work and full cadres.

Nevertheless, if the judicial circles had requested a reform in this sense before they could best manage the available means according to their needs, if it is necessary to ensure that the judicial world is accountable for the public money used, it is obvious, Madame the Minister, that we will be attentive to the question of the financing of this justice and that we will ensure, both for the prosecutor’s office and for the seat, that they have available the necessary and indispensable means to enable justice to be performed in an effective and humane way.

We do not want, like the magistrates, that they become responsible for the structural lack of means and that closed envelopes prevent them from conducting the necessary investigations or searches at charge or at discharge to ensure the innocence or guilt, the violation or respect for the rights of both.

It is important to ensure that justice, which will operate in a new setting, on a new territory and through self-management, can also continue to modernize itself. I think in particular of computerization, the modernization of the places of justice which are often in a deteriorating state, but also of the assessment of the workload and the possible changes in the remuneration.

It will be necessary to ensure that experts can continue to collaborate in the search for the judicial truth, the fair compensation of a victim and I go.

It will also be necessary to ensure the scope and measurement of the workload of the members of the administrative staff who often make up the cost of budgetary or personnel constraints while they are essential for the proper administration of justice. The raising of accountability and empowerment of both the resources and staff of the judiciary should not be a reason for policymakers to lose interest in the proper functioning of the judiciary and its proper financing. My group will pay attention to it and on that condition we will vote in favour of this text.

This is the second part of a colossal reform, the reform of the judicial landscape, which we vote today. This part transfers to the courts and prosecutors the management of their functioning. This reform was expected and even desired by the judiciary. No longer have to go through the SPF Justice to buy its operating equipment is to gain, surely, in efficiency and speed.

It is therefore with benevolence that the magistrates were waiting for this project that will generate a great responsibility in their chief. Critical opinions from the Supreme Council of Justice, the Permanent Conference of Chiefs of Corps and, recently, the Professional Union of Magistrates demonstrate the extent of their disappointment and anxiety over what will be voted today. This does not fully meet their expectations.

Like these instances, I consider that the means are not given to the judicial entities to reach this autonomous management. Thus, the draft provides that the federated entities will establish every three years a management plan sent to the colleges, composed of magistrates either from the public prosecution or courts and courts, who, themselves, will establish a management contract that they will negotiate with the Minister of Justice.

Autonomy is in a cascade. Federal entities do not negotiate their own budgets. Furthermore, as indicated by the Permanent Conference of Chiefs of Bodies of the Court of Cassation, in order to ensure a real autonomy, it would have been necessary that the credits necessary for the performance of these constitutional tasks were allocated to the judiciary by the legislative power on the basis of criteria which put in question only the good administration of justice.

In the proposed system, where the magistrates are responsible for the general operating resources allocated to them, while the budget allocated to the judiciary has been inadequate for years, the latter should not be held responsible for the lack of resources available to them.

To this problem of real autonomy comes an addition to an interference of the executive power in the functioning of the judiciary. For all these reasons, I have drafted amendments which, unfortunately, could not find a majority. However, I remain convinced that these amendments were relevant and would have improved this project.

These amendments provided, first, that the Minister of Justice no longer has the power to ask a college to issue binding directives to the judicial authorities. A directive, of course, but not binding.

Second, I had established the Court of Auditors, an independent body, as an appeal body in case of conflict between the various actors of the project, in place of the Minister of Justice who is often, then, judge and party. Thus, for example, it is the appeal body when a judicial entity finds that a decision of the college concerning the allocation of resources endangers the administration of justice.

In this case, the Minister is a judge and a party since she is a party involved in the contract of management of the colleges.

Third, the draft provides for a representative of the Minister of Justice and a representative of the Minister of Budget to participate in the meetings with a consultative voice. These representatives have a right to appeal against the decisions of the College which they consider to be contrary to the law or to the management contract with the Minister to which they belong. Again, although I understand that it is difficult for the executive to not have a right of view on the use of allocated budgets, I consider that this is an interference of the executive power in the judiciary. I proposed as a solution that these representatives should not be part of the college but be notified by minutes of decisions taken with possible appeal before the Court of Auditors.

Finally, the project provides that the appropriations for the management contract are registered in the administrative budget of the SPF Justice. These credits are distributed by the colleges for their functioning and for that of the federated entities. I proposed, in order to ensure a certain serenity in the granting or not of sufficient appropriations to each judicial entity, that there be a debate in Parliament on their management plan. For this purpose, these plans would have been attached to the SPF Justice budget. I am pleased to see that I was partially followed by the Minister, who submitted an amendment providing that three months after the conclusion of the management plans, management contracts and management plans will be submitted to the House of Representatives.

I will conclude with an intervention on a last issue. Currently, the College of Courts and Tribunals consists of ten magistrates who represent quite well all judicial entities. However, one may wonder whether it would not be reasonable to increase this number to fourteen by incorporating an additional representative for the four specialized courts, namely the Labour Court, the Commercial Court, the Peace Judge and the Police Judge. Thus, linguistic parity could also be respected for these specialized courts. I leave this to the appreciation of the Minister. This should be possible since the entry into force of this text is scheduled for 1 April 2014.

These fundamental texts will live their lives and they will undoubtedly, in the examination of daily life, be the subject of modifications and improvements. I dare hope that the reflections we have had in the framework of this project will come to improve it over time.

Because it is a fundamental project and an important reform for the modification and modernization of our judicial system, my group will vote on this project.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Marghem, who was not there recently, referred to the many interesting amendments she submitted in a committee, in particular on the binding directives on the participatory management aspect and on the involvement of the Parliament.

As far as the Parliament is concerned, the Minister’s amendment goes a bit in this direction. However, I would like to say to Mrs. Marghem and her group that we are not “one foot inside and one foot out.” If amendments are made, we have to go to the end and accept them. If we remove them, then we do not regret having to remove them. This is a bit limiting!

The proposal could have improved in some respects. We could have supported many amendments by Ms. Marghem and Mr. The CDH as well. In the end, you could have found a majority, or even an alternative majority, to support you. At some point, you have to be able to accept it.

It is true that, if we want a majority on amendments, we begin by discussing them by a majority to see if an agreement comes out or not. This is still the best way to move them forward, as we sometimes ⁇ in other cases. Sometimes we succeed! It is not? They really need to be discussed between us. This is much safer!

I come to the second case that, after the reorganization of the judicial landscape and the mobility of the members of the judiciary, brings us to the heart of the reform or what should be the heart of the reform. In fact, you have often asked us about the need to increase the scale of judicial districts to enable optimization of management resources. A greater accountability justified a better decentralization but a decentralization on a slightly wider scale than our 21 judicial districts were so far.

As I have had the opportunity to say in the committee, objectively, we are a bit disappointed by the content of the text that provides for the judicial organization, inasmuch as we wonder whether we really need to touch the territorial aspects to get to what you are proposing today. What are you proposing us? It is a kind of framework law in which many powers to be transferred to the bodies that are being created are not determined. Royal decrees will be needed to implement these transfers of powers. Today, the legislator we are still does not know what the objective parameters are, the criteria that will be selected so that, in the different new districts, the financial resources are made available and most importantly distributed.

We somewhat feel like we are facing an empty shell or a white-seing attributed to the government or the Minister of Justice. In my opinion, it would have been easier to give us the opportunity to better specify the competences that the new bodies responsible for this management would have to manage.

This is my first observation.

A second observation.

I must acknowledge that in the committee, you responded quite precisely to the difficulty encountered by the judiciary in relation to a possible fear of interference by the executive in the tasks of the judiciary, in particular in a form of harmonization of the jurisprudence. I therefore invite you to repeat it, if necessary, on the occasion of this plenary session: it is obviously not a matter of seeing the executive interfere in the constitutional tasks of our jurisdictions.

However, there are still difficulties. I hope that the practice will allow them to settle and that a jurisprudence may be established. Indeed, when conflicts will arise between the various judicial districts – it is inevitable – in the distribution of the financial manna at the level of the colleges, organized at a higher level than the judicial districts, in the arbitration, who will have the last word?

According to the proposed texts, it will be the Minister of Justice. This involves certain risks and makes me say that you take back with one hand what you give from the other.

We should not come to the conclusion that, if the financial means made available to justice continued to shrink tomorrow, it would no longer be the fault of politics, but of those who, within the judicial world, would be charged with organizing this decentralization and this better management. In some way, they would therefore only have to deal with themselves if the financial means did not follow: it would be a fundamental mistake and an evaporation of the responsibilities of politics, as Ms. Boulet said. I hope we do not get to this case.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Minister, you have decided to leave your name in the history of justice by a trilogy, like the good novelists or the good filmmakers. I searched for what might fit in the trilogy you presented to us by reforming the judiciary.

There are obviously trilogies known but not corresponding to the subject you are dealing with today: Les Bronzés, Les Ripoux, La Trilogie marseillaise with Fresnay, Pagnol: "You break my heart." This replica, the judicial world could give you it. Then, already more precise, The Truth If I Lie, with Richard Anconina, it should like you; The Dollar Trilogy, For a handful of dollars, it is the little you leave to the world of justice; A few more dollars, the second, and it ends with The Good, the Brut and the Stupid. Find your role.

A Night in Hell with Georges Clooney. Night in Hell No. 1; Night in Hell No. 2: The Price of Blood; Night in Hell No. 3: The Daughter of the Burrower. I believe that indeed the world of justice recognizes quite well the fate that is reserved for him in this trilogy.

Let us treat this text with a little bit of humor because unfortunately, the subject is serious and the reform you propose to make the parliament accomplish will leave deep traces in the judiciary world, except to hope that from the next government, another minister will return all this to the profession and change those reforms of which I did not realize that they received today a massive support from the majority, everyone telling you that you will be judged on the budgets.

But budgets are already absent today. The world of justice suffers from budgetary restrictions imposed on it by the current government majority and which have as consequences that the work of the prosecutor’s office is slowed in several judicial districts, that instructor magistrates can no longer diligent a number of investigations, can no longer issue rogatory commissions because they will not be executed due to lack of means. In short, the great misery of justice is a real concern in our country.

One cannot always say that one wants to restore the authority of the state and make the law respected when one does not give the judicial authority the means of the politics which one pretends to want it to assume!

In short, this reform allows the executive power to transfer its weaknesses and gaps to the judicial power.

You also summarize in the introductory exposition of the 2014 budget, Mrs. Minister, your reform as “allowing the judiciary, on the basis of an obligation of results, to become itself responsible for the management of its budget and its personnel.”

The Commission for Democracy through Law, known as the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, in an important report on the independence of the judiciary and the judiciary, published in March 2010, recalls this obligation for every rule of law that respects itself: “In order to preserve the independence of the judiciary in the short and long term, it is essential to provide it with sufficient resources so that courts and judges are able to comply with the standards set out in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in national constitutions and to fulfill their tasks with the integrity and effectiveness required for the public to have confidence in justice and the rule of law.”

As very usefully and very pertinently suggested and underlined by the Chairperson of the Professional Union of the Magistrates in her white paper published in the newspaper Le Soir on 3 December last: "When one knows that no budget increase is planned, one understands that this bill will allow the political power to discharge the responsibility for the lack of resources put at the disposal of justice."

You anticipate that the funds will be negotiated in the management contracts at the level of the colleges and fixed in the management plans between the judicial entities. In the management plans, these personnel resources shall be fixed on the basis of the results of a uniform and regular measurement of the workload.

Thus, not only will the magistrates very quickly face the lack of means to enable them to carry out their tasks while being held responsible for this lack of means, but in addition, you impose on them a private logic used in this project. This logic could push them to process their files in rush, to judge without going into details in order to improve their productive results and gain more personnel resources. This is a distraction from the work of justice.

Furthermore, your project allows the executive power a real interference in the management of the courts and prosecutors. It is you who will conclude the management contracts with the colleges, courts and courts on one side, prosecutors on the other, and the board of directors of the Court of Cassation, who will assign them envelopes. You will also have discretionary power over these budget amounts.

But in addition, delegates from the Ministers of Justice and Budget will sit with a consultative voice within these bodies. Curious companionship between representatives of the executive power and the judicial power!

They may appeal to those ministers against the decisions made by the magistrates. Similarly, it is also the executive who will decide in case of disagreement between a college and a court or prosecutor. This is ⁇ the most serious obstacle to the independence of the judiciary, since you claim, in addition, to make it responsible in terms of management.

The Order of French and German-speaking bars summarizes this situation well: "In the future, colleges, courts and prosecutors will bear all responsibility for the deficits of funds without having to take on them and this, while even the central authority, the minister and its administration will always have the last word, since it will have the control of management contracts and the envelopes granted as well as the power to cancel decisions." That is, the perversity of the system that you set up and that the State Council had not failed to raise in its opinion when he said: "Couple decisions can also be cancelled because they are contrary to management contracts that are precisely concluded with the Minister."

Marghem’s amendments that were not even supported in the committee could easily have received the approval of the majority. I am still trying to understand, today, why these amendments have not been accepted by the whole majority. It is really a failure of the latter to give a real autonomy to the judiciary while she calls it out of her wishes. Indeed, the Court of Auditors would have been fully empowered to have appeals against any management decision of a college or a board of directors.

The Professional Union of Magistrates has not failed to point out that, in the end, this law looks like a almost empty shell, except that you have managed the turn of force to bring the responsibility for the insufficiency of budgetary resources on the shoulders of the magistrates themselves.

We believe that the financing of courts should not be based on discretionary decisions by public bodies, but on objective and transparent criteria that guarantee its stability and sustain its work in the long term.

The Advisory Council of European Judges, in its opinion on the financing and management of the courts, recalls that it is necessary to ensure that neither the executive nor the legislative power can exert any pressure on the judiciary when setting its budget.

One of the possible forms of this active involvement of the judiciary in the preparation of the budget would be to entrust the independent body responsible for the management of the judiciary, in the countries where that body exists, with a coordinating role in the preparation of the financial requests of the courts and to make it the direct interlocutor of Parliament for the assessment of the needs of the courts. Thus, we would work, as with the Supreme Council of Justice, with grants granted directly to the judiciary through this representative body.

You did not choose that path. You have chosen the path of political irresponsibility versus the independence of the judiciary. We cannot, therefore, endorse this choice and resolutely and resolutely, we will vote against this bill with the hope that your trilogy will be erased as soon as the current government majority withdraws.

Mr. Speaker, first of all, I would like to thank the rapporteur for his excellent, clear and brief report, which provides a good summary of all the work we have done.

Today we complete two years of intense and at times intense debates in Parliament on two bills that shape one of the most profound reforms and changes in our justice system since 1830. A debate that has been raging for years is closing. The majority can be proud that they have been able to complete this work in this short legislature.

I would therefore like to thank everyone in this Parliament, in the government and in the judiciary who has collaborated and written on the bill. Some colleagues will ⁇ have read the contribution of a professor from the University of Luik, who states that excellent legal work is delivered. We must therefore be proud of that.

The bill strengthens the separation of powers and organises the administration at the level to which it belongs. I disagree with the colleagues who say that the interference is being reinforced by the executive. On the contrary, today all frameworks in the judiciary and all budgetary resources are determined by the executive in Brussels, by the federal government and the Federal Public Service.

We give that management in the future to the level where it belongs, namely to the magistrates themselves. Of course, the finances will be audited by the Court of Audits. Of course, the management contracts and management plans are sent to Parliament, so that an open parliamentary debate can be held on the priorities of the various judicial districts and jurisdictions. Per ⁇ one of the most profound changes will be that it is necessary to clearly outline how the shortcomings will be addressed and how the priorities of Justice will be addressed.

It is a profound reform that will be implemented gradually so that the magistrates can take all the time to install the management courses and skills needed.

In preparation for the closing of the parliamentary debate, I looked at the parliamentary acts of two years ago.

I looked at the policy note from two years ago, which shows exactly what this government’s ambitions were in terms of judicial reform. He said: “I want to talk about the reform of the judiciary. The government agreement is clear and ambitious. The essence is now to work on a redistribution of the judicial districts, for which the government agreement provides that it will be reduced by at least half. The development of the system of management agreements, of a single organization for the management of the courts by jurisdiction, is linked to this. And this includes a disciplinary right for magistrates, a creation of management teams per jurisdiction, which are responsible for the management of the courts and are recruited at the same level as the magistrates.”

I read further in the same policy note.

“We will try to create a unified organization for the management of district or district courts, respecting the independence of the judiciary, taking into account the specifics of labour courts, trade courts, peace courts and police courts. This single structure will be responsible for the management of budgets, personnel and material resources, as well as for the horizontal mobility of personnel and for better valuation of expertise.”

Thus, the policy note continues with the conclusion of the management contracts and management plans.

If we can quote today from that policy note of 10 January 2012, then this loop has been fully implemented, in full respect of the government agreement but above all also with the closing of the debates that have been ongoing for years.

I also have an appeal to the judiciary today. This opportunity to have greater autonomy and greater accountability can only make Justice more efficient and better organized, with a clear civil debate per district and per jurisdiction, and here in Parliament about the priorities and how we can improve Justice. If the confidence in the judiciary is at 61 % today, I am confident that with these bills and this reform of the judiciary we will ensure that this confidence will surely be strengthened in the future.