Proposition 52K2407

Projet de loi complétant, en ce qui concerne les voies de recours, la loi du ... visant à compléter les mesures de redressement applicables aux entreprises relevant du secteur bancaire et financier.

General information ¶

Submitted by

CD&V Leterme Ⅱ

Submission date

Feb. 5, 2010

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

bank investment company civil procedure financial institution credit institution nationalisation insurance company

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen CD&V Ecolo LE PS | SP Open Vld N-VA LDD MR

Voted to reject

Vooruit

Abstained from voting

FN VB

Party dissidents ¶

• Luc Sevenhans (VB) voted to adopt.
• Dirk Van der Maelen (Vooruit) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

March 24, 2010 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr Rik Daems, rapporteur, refers to his written report.

The general discussion is opened by Mr Luk Van Biesen. For a moment, Mr. Van Biesen, Mr. Mayeur wishes to intervene.

I would like to give you an oral report following the recent meeting of the committee.

There are three projects.

In fact, Bill 2408 is the next item on the agenda.

I consult the meeting. It is called for a joint treatment of bills 2406 and 2407 with bill 2408. Other members may have a different opinion on this.

If the House agrees, I would like to address these two agenda items together. Are everyone in agreement? (the approval of)

This was also the wish of the Finance Committee.

Mr Van Biesen, in that case I will give the floor to Mr Mayeur, who can report on what has happened in the committee in connection with the amendments referred to the committee today (2408/6).

Mr. Van Biesen can stay at the tribune, it will go very quickly. This score is not football, it is not a rugby score either: it is by ten votes against five that the Finance Committee agreed to amend the submitted project but that it also voted for the whole project as amended. The correction made restored the current text of the law instead of an earlier text in order to make the law consistent with existing legislative provisions. My oral report will be limited to this brief speech, Mr. Speaker.

Thank you very much, Mr Mayeur.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, colleagues, this bill provides for an arsenal of special safeguards aimed at protecting the financial markets and the real economy from contamination effects in the event of a crisis of the banking system. These are exceptional measures where the general interest prevails over the private interests of the shareholders. Indeed, the government cannot remain powerless when the ordinary corporate organs fail to take the necessary rescue measures.

With that draft, the government is implementing one of the recommendations of the special committee responsible for investigating the banking crisis. In fact, the special committee has concluded that the executive power does not have sufficient instruments to manage and manage a crisis of such size quickly and efficiently.

During such a crisis, the government must take into account the stability of the system as a whole and the general interest. The interests of the shareholders are subordinated to it. If the government intervenes by strengthening the capital base or by giving guarantees, it is primarily intended to maintain the financial system and to protect the savers. Not to save the shareholders as such.

Given the saga around Fortis, this bill is clearly in place. Similar initiatives are being taken in other countries. In Britain such a crisis law is already in force, so that in the event of a crisis it can be quickly worked to establish “good banks”, “bad banks” and “bridge banks.”If the institution fails to take the necessary measures itself and thus endangers the system, the government has the right to intervene. It is clear that this government intervention can only be done in very exceptional circumstances. It should also be proportionate to the objective, in particular to prevent the collapse of the financial system. This is ⁇ the case if there is a transfer of ownership in which rights are unilaterally deprived by the government. This means an expropriation or so-called nationalization.

Shareholders of an institution who, by taking excessive risks or mismanagement, endanger the entire financial system lose part of their rights. In any case, they are subordinate to other interests and that is no more than right. Of course, they are always entitled to compensation. However, the subsequent contestation of the transfer, as happened with Fortis, will no longer be possible.

This does not mean that the government can do anything. In any case, something must be done within the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights and there is a need for the intervention of the court.

The consequences for shareholders are clear. However, we must also look at the role played by the creditors. On the one hand, there are the deposit holders; their interests are protected precisely by this design. On the other hand, however, there are also the institutional investors or creditors. Banks have funded themselves for their speculative adventures mainly on the financial wholesale markets, interbank market, commercial papers, CDOs. As a result, the banks were able to raise their leverage and it is just that leverage that has put the entire sector at risk. The responsibility of the creditors is therefore equally or not greater than that of the directors and shareholders. It was precisely the institutional creditors who in the second week of the crisis massively withdrew their money from Fortis, forcing the government to intervene again. Debtors normally ask for a higher interest rate if they lend to an institution that is characterized by a high liking of leverage. However, if they assume that a system institution is always saved and that it is the shareholders who will have to bear the consequences, there is also a danger of moral hazard in their minds. It is unclear how this design deals with this form of moral hazard.

Let it also be clear that this draft has a curative character, it is a crisis law, intended to get the government to intervene if a crisis of the system threatens. In this context, one may wonder, by the way, how the government will determine exactly when there is a systemic crisis. Does every possible case of insolvency of a systemic bank immediately imply a systemic crisis? In other words, will the government intervene whenever a system bank is at risk?

More fundamental is the demand for preventive measures, measures that can prevent an upcoming banking crisis. I do not want to stay on this too long, because it is not here that we should discuss such measures. In general, however, it is often referred to changing certain accounting rules that should enable banks to set up financial buffers at good times. Such a rule exists in Spain and Canada. Moreover, it is no coincidence that Canada has suffered little from the banking crisis; there has been almost no real banking crisis there. It is only an example, but such measures should enable no or limited use of this crisis law in the future. Prevention is always better than cure.

As regards the supervision of the financial sector and financial services, this bill is strongly based on the recommendations of the Committee-Lamfalussy. This high committee last year proposed a new supervisory body to replace the current Committee on Financial Stability, which has failed. The Lamfalussy Committee stated in its report that “the CFS will need to be thoroughly reoriented in order to reach faster decisions. In particular, it would require more efficient consultation and less reluctance to share confidential information and a composition of the CFS that is more focused on systemic risks and which should therefore be significantly reduced to six members.”

The Lamfalussy Report made it clear that the new Committee on Systemic Risk should not be a paper tiger, but a tiger that can bite. Ultimately, in our view, the government has rightly opted for a step further and to reform prudential supervision in line with the so-called Twin Peaks model. In fact, the new Committee on Systemic Risk and Systemically Relevant Financial Institutions will only have a short life. It was the wish of the majority to come to an integrated prudential supervision as soon as possible. This means that both macroprudential and microprudential supervision will fall under the National Bank.

The design of the new Committee is largely based on the lines of the Lamfalussy Report. The Committee is not a paper tiger. It will be able to make decisions and collect confidential information. Decisions are taken by a majority, and in the case of equal votes, the vote of the President is decisive. There are close ties with the National Bank and the CBFA.

The Committee shall supervise the systemically relevant financial institutions. This is an exclusive competence. However, the current definition of systemic financial institutions is highly focused on the size of the institution, balance sheet and market share. It is clear that a financial institution can also be systemically relevant for other reasons. It is therefore recommended that the definition in the future be supplemented by previously qualitative factors.

The Twin Peaks model will be introduced from 2011. The Committee on Systemic Risk will therefore only function for a very short period of time. The Commission has chosen to maintain this intermediate phase. One could also have switched to the Twin Peaks model without an intermediate phase, in a relatively short term. Both scenarios have advantages and disadvantages. As the Committee de facto already exists and is preparing the transition to the Twin Peaks model, ⁇ keeping the intermediate step is the easiest solution. It is also the most secure, since we can now quickly have effective supervision.

By September 2010, the legal basis for establishing the Twin Peaks model will be a fact. Full prudential supervision will then be transferred to the National Bank. The CBFA remains responsible for the supervision of financial markets and consumer protection. Furthermore, its powers in this latter area are strengthened.

Will the new structure be able to prevent a new financial crisis? The conclusion is that the organisation of prudential supervision varies greatly from country to country, but that the crisis has nevertheless hit everywhere equally hard. The importance of this reorganization must therefore be relativized. Additional, more preventive measures are also needed.

Both the Governor of the National Bank, and the Chairman of the CBFA, are supporters of the Twin Peaks model, but admit that there are also disadvantages associated with this system.

There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Some countries already have a Twin Peaks model. The models still differ greatly from each other. The Australian variant is not the same as the Dutch variant. Can the Minister give us some explanation on this? Which variant is preferred?

In any case, it is important to emphasize that the introduction of prudential supervision of systemic risks is new for most countries. Belgium was actually the exception to the rule, since there was a Committee for Financial Stability here? The problem, however, is that the committee has not worked. The experience with that committee shows that the exchange of information from the system institutions, and from the CBFA to the National Bank, will need to be better organized.

One of the major difficulties associated with the monitoring of systemic risks is that certain activities which are equally beneficial and risk-free for individual banks can pose a threat to the system as a whole. How will the new surveillance system deal with this? The integration of micro- and macro-prudential supervision will not be obvious, and will also require the integration of staff with different competencies and expertise.

The integration of prudential supervision within the National Bank also implies the separation of other powers, such as consumer protection. In this context, it is not only financial institutions that can have a systemic character. Also, some financial products such as credit default swaps can have implications for the entire system. Who is responsible for regulating and supervising these types of financial products? The National Bank or the CBFA?

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, colleagues, as already stated, the supervision reform is a starting point, but ⁇ not an end. If we want to prevent crises in the future, additional measures will be needed. Collega Daems, on behalf of my group in the committee, has made a whole series of suggestions on this subject, which I will not repeat here. The adoption of these measures – I think, for example, the revision of the Basel rules, or the restructuring of the rating agencies – will, by the way, have to be coordinated at least at the international level.

The most important thing we can learn from the Minister is whether he is indeed willing to take further steps towards more preventive measures, and also to advocate them, in the international forums designated for this purpose.

Mr. Van de Velde asks for the word.

Mr. Speaker, I will ask my question when Mr. Van Biesen has finished.

The last point that I would like to touch at the end is that of the organic statute of the National Bank. The National Bank has an important supervisory role. This is a legitimate decision taken by a large majority in Parliament. It is also the desire that this statute will come into effect soon, and it is therefore logical that the government asks the Parliament for authorization to do so.

At the same time, the National Bank remains a publicly listed company with private shareholders. Just about this, Mr. Goyvaerts, I said here a year ago that this Parliament will have to discuss what we should do with the National Bank and the private shareholders.

It is very important that we find a long-term solution to the problem of the private shareholders of the National Bank. If you would like to know my personal suggestion, I say that it is actually not appropriate that there are private shareholders in the National Bank of Belgium.

Then, however, we must be able to find a clear solution on how to value them, and we must also avoid indirect elements affecting the listed share of the National Bank. You know that various investigations are going against the National Bank’s massive stock market manipulation by investor institutions and the like. I think we should also look at the correct valorisation there. This will ⁇ happen. We committed ourselves to this last year, and we are committed to it again today.

The fact that the National Bank will be given a new supervisory function raises questions about the stock exchange listing. Because today we decide on new powers for the National Bank, and of course this will have an impact on the profitability of this institution, and thus, in other words, also on the stock exchange listing.

Therefore, in the context of the implementation of the law, it seems important that the requested fundamental debate on the statute can be carried out in this parliament within a predictable time.

Mr. President, I would like to ask Mr. Van Biesen a brief question. I would like to ask that now, in order not to let it pass.

Members of Parliament may, of course, question each other, but your speech time is such as this.

Mr. Van Biesen, you have gone fairly smoothly over the intermediate phase of the Committee on Systemic Risk which is yet to join. You said there are advantages and disadvantages to both, you have not spoken about it. I would like you to comment on this.

What are now the disadvantages of the current constellation, where you are not working immediately with the Twin Peaks model, but where you are moving forward as you are currently doing?

Mr. Van de Velde, I have already said that the advantages and disadvantages of the system are very clear. If someone today would enter directly into the twinpeak model, then they are having a problem with the ability to actually do some things. There is the expertise and the staff. There are changes to things that need to be changed within certain companies. This is not possible in a very short period of time. Therefore, we have agreed on a period that runs up to 1 January 2011. I really do not understand why you are asking that question. It is clear, right? You also know, if such a system is introduced, that accompanying measures are needed. Therefore, the transitional phase is an accompanying measure, to get to the twinpeaks model.

Mr. Van Biesen, I do not understand why both the Minister and you at the committee meeting made it very clear that this transitional phase is not necessary. You know very well that this transitional phase is also not necessary. Now a chair dance is organized. For that chair dance now there is a legal basis.

Mr. Van de Velde, this is not about persons, but the minister will later respond to them.

Mr. Van Biesen, you have no answer!

The next speaker is Mr Goyvaerts.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Dear colleagues, allow me to use a moment of my speaking time to formulate a number of critical concerns within the framework of the bill amending the supervision of the financial sector and financial services and the organic statute of the National Bank.

Many will agree with me that the change in the supervision of the financial sector and financial services is not just a blunder.

For the Flemish Interest Faction, this is a very strange bill, though not because of what is in it, but especially because of what is not capable, and that is quite a bit.

In fact, the whole story of the Fortis Dossier has shown that government financial supervision of the banking and insurance sector was not properly organized and could therefore be much more efficient.

Since the outbreak of the banking crisis in September 2008, a lot has been talked about the reform of financial supervision and many reports have been written. Today, in the plenary session, we will discuss the Minister’s bill on the so-called twinpeaks model, whether or not with an intermediate variant structure.

Nevertheless, the reform of financial supervision apparently strikes the moods, both within the National Bank and within the CBFA, even if it is only because the National Bank takes over part of the powers of the CBFA. Three directors of the CBFA should be transferred to the National Bank. That appears to be a purely technical fact, had it not been a problem with the party-political composition of the management committee, but also a problem with language balance in the management committee.

Furthermore, the future governor of the National Bank, a certain Luc Coene, as the successor of Guy Quaden wants to work with a slendered board of directors. He is inspired by the Dutch model, where the Board of Directors of the National Bank consists of only four members.

Consequently, the question arises as to what the new structure of the National Bank will look like, knowing that there are currently eight directors at the National Bank and three more should be added. It is therefore really urged for a seat in the Board of Directors of the National Bank and its Regent Council, consisting of representatives of the trade unions, politicians and industrialists. Of course, the Flemish Belang is very curious about the slide on the double board of the political balances and representatives.

As regards the reform of the central supervision itself, the National Bank will take over a number of tasks from the CBFA. Consequently, the question arises of what the CBFA, which will meanwhile change its name, will still monitor, such as in relation to financial markets and the rules of conduct of financial institutions, for example for the protection of consumers.

Furthermore, the question arises who will be in charge of the reform of financial supervision, even if it is only because it is not clear where and how the boundary between the powers of one institution and the other is drawn. Consequently, the question arises of how those powers are defined and defined. We can reasonably assume that it cannot be intended for a bank or insurance company to be audited twice or in a fragmented manner. And then I haven’t mentioned the fact that a listed company such as the National Bank will soon have to control itself and fellow companies that are shareholders.

Furthermore, we note that the government, with this bill, in fact requires a blanco cheque from the Parliament, since in the bill of Minister Reynders, virtually all aspects of the transfer of the new powers to the National Bank, and the consequences thereof, will be regulated by royal decree. This is clearly a framework law.

A second element in the discussion of the government bill is the structure or organic status of the National Bank itself. On that organic status, the Parliament held a discussion of a draft law in the period from the end of February to the beginning of March 2009 and a discussion in the plenary session on 12 March 2009. Despite the presentations of colleagues Jan Jambon, Robert Van de Velde and myself at the time, which were very pertinent at the time, there was also someone from the majority who put forward very pertinent issues in the plenary discussion, referring to a number of suggestions and statements that colleague Luc Van Biesen put forward at that time.

Colleague Van Biesen, I don’t know if you remember what you said on March 12, 2009. I will repeat the quote before you disappear. Luc Van Biesen formulated it on March 12 as follows: “The organic statute of the National Bank is not regulated. You know that a number of other changes are urgent and that in the autumn we will still have a fundamental debate about the shareholder structure of the National Bank.” Between hooks, I don't know which autumn you mean, but that autumn is long over.

You also said, “Be honest with yourself. Do you think it is logical that the National Bank has 50% private shareholders? Do you think it is logical that the National Bank is listed on the stock exchange?” Dixit Luk Van Biesen. “We must dare to ask that question again,” you said, “in the Chamber and again dare to ask one another. Is it logical that 50% of the National Bank is in private hands? Is it logical that we do not discuss this? I invite all political groups to resume this debate in the autumn.”

I would like to point out, Mr. Van Biesen, that by now it is March 2010. You may hope to continue that fundamental debate, but it has been his words in the wind. All good intentions, colleague Van Biesen, only Minister Reynders on 10 March in the committee confirmed that this government has no intention of changing the statute of the private shareholders of the NBB during this term. All your legitimate concerns, all our legitimate concerns – but you are in the majority – are wiped off the table. The field of tension between government and private shareholders continues to exist and CD&V and Open VLD are in trouble. As is so often the case: if Didier Reynders doesn’t want it, it doesn’t come.

With the present draft law, private shareholders are involved in a story of altered responsibilities without being consulted. This must be experienced as a private shareholder of the National Bank. A listed company changes its structure, changes its responsibilities, changes its objectives, and one is not involved as a shareholder, let alone the private shareholders have been able to express their insights and their vision. Then I hear the minister say that the shareholders “no longer constitute an obstacle in the listed company”.

How would it happen, colleagues, that these shareholders do not offer any more in that listed company? In recent years, private shareholders at the National Bank have been outspoken in all possible areas and in all possible ways. With the present bill, you yourself acknowledge that due to the change of the statutes and the purpose of the company, the shareholders are no longer involved in any way.

Furthermore, it remains, in my opinion, a strange situation that a listed institution will exercise control over other listed companies. As a blow to the firepile, this comes with the recent investigation launched by the parquet on possible price manipulations of the shares of the National Bank. You cannot deny that all the trouble surrounding the National Bank is not purely on the grass? Then one would expect some flashing lights to burn at the CBFA, but nothing happens.

Who can benefit from this alleged price manipulation?

In the case of the National Bank, there are only two options: either the government itself has an advantage from it, or they are speculators. It is one of the two. Other possibilities do not, in my opinion, exist. One would then expect the CBFA to act on it, but the CBFA does not deal with “frustrated shareholders” as it calls it. That is how it goes.

I assume that the Prosecutor’s Office will do its job, but I can only state, Mr. Minister, that whatever you turn it or turn it, the credibility of the National Bank as a future supervisory authority has been undermined in advance.

All these elements are not accepted by our group and we will therefore not approve the bill.

Overall, we are very satisfied with the draft legislation. There is a broad consensus on the necessity and especially on the fulfillment. In fact, the Kingdom of Belgium is one of the precursors in issuing new legislation on the subject, because in other countries, where there is a lot of talk about new legislation, it is ⁇ little implemented. I think of the United States and France, which have held many major conferences, but very few declarations have turned into real reforms. Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, we are very pleased that we can already come here to defend a text on this subject.

There are three major bills and they are all in line with the special banking committee and the Lamfalussy report. The reforms are necessary to restore confidence within the financial sector; legislation is also important for society as a whole. I will comment on them all three.

The first draft is the crisis or recovery law. This is of course important because it temporarily removes the rights of the shareholders. The CBFA can already take important measures, but it always requires a recovery period. We now know how fast it can go if the crisis really expands. It is wise to be able to intervene quickly and that can be done by this legislation.

We regret that the newly established Committee on Systemic Risk, with the terrible abbreviation CSRSFI, is still included in the text. We were in favor of moving immediately to the twin peak model. I will come back to that later.

In the area of the crisis and recovery law, we have submitted an important amendment, the Vandenberghe amendment, which in special situations also gives the Board of Directors an authorization. It is, of course, easy to adopt legislation that provides that the government can intervene and at critical moments almost crash into the rights of the shareholders, but with this the board of directors is not yet covered in relation to the statutes of its company. I think it was a sensible amendment. It was approved in the committee. It is the mirror of the other parts of the law.

As for the draft law on legal remedies, I think it is also fair, because it goes very far, after all. The government enters into the rights of the shareholders Also the small and large shareholders have their rights, of course. The second bill does not lose sight of the rights of shareholders. It comes to what could be called a fair compensation. I think that is wise. The fair remuneration would be market related. I believe that the fee should be a fair reflection of the financial institution’s market value at the moment the bank intervened.

For example, if a bank has lost much of its value and is almost zero per share, then the shareholders can only be compensated for that small piece. Of course, one cannot say that shareholders should be remunerated for the full pound. They must be reimbursed according to the market value.

The third bill is the so-called twin peaks bill. This is also important. There will be a further section of consumer protection, although that is already mentioned here. I strongly believe in consumer protection. Consumer protection is currently very poorly developed. In full crisis, I met with all respect, seniors who asked if they were safe because they had invested in emerging markets. I said that I wasn’t quite sure if they were safe and that I needed to look at it.

I’ve met a lot of people at receptions who didn’t know what kind of financial products they were buying. So I think there is still a lot to be done and that the so-called self-regulation in the sector has absolutely not worked.

The interruption with the CSRSFI will help to prevent us from making a jump in the dark, but our group regrets that we could not go immediately to the end goal. It seems to me a waste of public funds, and also a waste of time, because we still need to work with that interim committee. I hope that nothing will happen in the coming months, because it would be quite dull to find that we are still working on intermediate committees, while a new crisis is already striking.

Greed is not for nothing one of the seven main sins. It is our expectation that a financial crisis will break out again. I see Flemish Interesting agreeing knicking. Hopefully we will be ready with the legislation. Hurry and hurry is rarely good, but in this I hope not to be too late, even though we are then among the first countries with a regulation. I would therefore like to call on the opposition to loyally cooperate in the adoption of this important and urgent legislation.

In my view, it is good to define the systemically relevant financial institutions. Somewhere a choice must be made. 150 billion euros seem very much for a consolidated financial statement. That is 10 percent of the credit in Belgium. But somewhere you have to make a choice so I think that’s not too bad.

Four major banking groups are being “guised”: KBC, Dexia, BNP Paribas and ING. It also includes Ethias, Axa, Fortis holding, Euroclear, Swift and Bank of New York Melon. Meanwhile, our CSRSFI may oppose certain strategic decisions of those banks. In my opinion, however, this is not waterproof. I had hoped that we could go immediately to the final goal.

I would like to defend the twin peak model as a whole. I would like to point out to my colleagues that I also made comments on this issue in the committee one and a half years ago. So I am very pleased that we are evolving to that twin peak model.

Consumer protection is needed, including insurance. Insurances are products for which both FOD Economie and FOD Finance are competent. Many financial products are sold as insurance products, while they are essentially investment instruments. If we design consumer protection only for the traditional financial products and not for insurance products, I think that protection shows very important gaps. This requires legislative work. I have read that there is a life insurance directive that temporarily stops everything. Our group will therefore ask Marianne Thyssen to discuss this in the European Parliament, so that we can adapt the Life Insurance Directive and protect consumers.

We must also see this in the context of what we have already approved. Corporate governance means a guarantee to the national banks and the system banks. The deposit protection is increased to 100 000 euros for individual savers. Nevertheless, I have a number of critical concerns, first of all as regards the financial testament. This is supported by both Mr. Van der Maelen and our group.

In the United Kingdom, there are also important votes to do so. It is clear that at the time of the Fortispericles no one knew exactly how the financial flows between the many companies were structured. I think it would be logical to keep a kind of log in case it happens again. I think it would be good to fine-tune the assets and liabilities of the banks in the various companies before another such crisis strikes.

In short, the financial testament is something important that is missing now, but that can ⁇ come in the future.

Second, I’m talking about the bonuses in the banking sector. We have already adopted important legislative work on this subject, under the leadership of the Minister of Justice. The result must definitely be seen. However, it concerns only the corporate law aspects of the remuneration of executives and the listed companies. That means that, for example, traders, who are not managerial, do not fall under this legislation, which is an important gap. I think we must definitely and definitely do something about it. I had always understood that the trader created the problem, though within a system with a high tolerance, which allowed it. I think we should definitely discuss the bonuses of traders in Parliament.

Many companies that may be important for the financial system are not listed on the stock exchange. I think we still have a lot of work to do with these unlisted companies, to ensure that the incentives are aligned and that traders are controlled. I myself worked in a trading room for a while, so I know how it comes to that. I want to do that outing here. It is simply a sector that needs to be monitored. I did not enjoy high bonuses because I was in a learning process, but it is very clear to me that such departments of big banks need to be ⁇ careful.

Third, I would like to say something more about the mandate of the bank executives appointed by the federal government. It is said that they are only minority shareholders and therefore cannot do much. I think they can do a lot, even though the companies are listed on the stock exchange. I think these bank managers have a social responsibility. For example, they need to pay attention to credit. I will give the example of BNP Paribas Fortis, where they have committed themselves, through a letter to the Prime Minister, to keep the lending in Belgium on the level. They have pledged to use every euro of deposits collected in Belgium as a credit. I think it is the task of the Parliament to check whether this is done effectively.

I have heard reports that it is so effective. This would be BNP Paribas. We need to look at it together.

The savings rate in Belgium is very high, up to 20%. This means that there are a lot of savings deposits at the banks. It is normal that there is a lot of lending to SMEs and families. In France, President Sarkozy has forced banks to increase lending to SMEs by 3% in 2010. We do not do this in our country. This requires efforts and is appropriate.

With regard to risk management and employee involvement, the following. We are receiving from the trade union requests to provide employees in those large financial institutions with more information on risk management. If they are wrong, they are a potential victim. In some banks, they are. The internal control bodies within the big banks should provide better information to the workers’ delegations.

CD&V will continue to hold the finger at the wrist by participating in the Succession Committee. On behalf of CD&V, Senator Hugo Vandenberghe is ⁇ active there. We will review all legislation in accordance with the recommendations in the comprehensive report of the Special Committee on Banks, including the report of 2009.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the PS Group is delighted to vote on these projects, in particular because the approach that presided over their creation is not uninteresting, since it has grouped, in a mixed working group, the government and the members of Parliament who had followed the commission charged with examining the various aspects of the financial crisis and its consequences at the national level.

This approach seems interesting. In fact, today, Belgium will have revised the control architecture of its financial system by bringing the macro- and microprudential guidelines closer to the National Bank and will be equipped with a law on the bank in crisis. In the coming weeks, a law on consumer protection with respect to financial products will be announced. Almost two years after the financial crisis, we are happy to see our country succeed in this area.

What choices were made? First, as regards the financial architecture, that of bringing the macro- and microprudential guidelines closer to the National Bank of Belgium. This was the option supported by the PS. Why Why ? Countries where this system was already in place did not necessarily perform better at the time of the crisis. While in the post-crisis period, it is important to draw lessons from this crisis and to ensure that, in the network now fitted within the European Central Bank, our country plays the active role that may be its own with the other national banks of the different countries of the euro area.

We thus acquire a stronger dimension to defend not only the European currency, the European states but also the European banks when they are caught in the turmoil. Germany, at the same time, made the same choices as us. We are in a dominant trend within Europe, which is positive and it is important to join in this current.

In view of the models established in our country (the National Bank of Belgium, the CBFA), the bill states that progressive work will be needed.

We will therefore go through an intermediate step: the Committee on Risk of Systemic Financial Institutions (CREFS). Very honestly, Mr. Minister, as I said in the committee, I repeat on behalf of our group that, in our opinion, it must be possible to move directly to the integrated model and the Twin Peaks model. If things are ready on time, we can save this waste of energy and time on the part of the teams of both the CBFA and the National Bank of Belgium.

We therefore advocate that things go as quickly as possible. So much better if we go beyond this intermediate stage; do not deprive ourselves of it. Of course, it is up to the government to appreciate it. You know our position.

The other major project discussed today is that of the bank in crisis. Saving the Bank: Should the Bank be Saved and Should the Bank be Saved Tomorrow? The answer to these two questions is obviously yes.

First, to save jobs in the banking and financial sectors. This is not negligible: many Belgians work in this service sector. But it is also all the money of the depositors, because almost all Belgians have a bank account and it remains essential to save the banking system that governs financial and economic relations in our country.

It is for these same two reasons that it will need to be done in the future, with crises returning at regular intervals, increasingly closer and closer. These are the two reasons that justify, for our group, to save the bank and to vote a law to save the bank in crisis.

But why ? Because, unfortunately, global finance has become a giant Ponzi pyramid. It’s not me who says it: it’s the thoughts of renowned analysts and economists. For them, the system today makes the last entries pay the remuneration of previous investors. In this financial system today ten times larger than the global GDP, it can no longer function but through the creation of bubbles, fraud and artificial enrichment.

This sentence is ⁇ serious. It will lead to the encounter of difficulties and financial crises that affect, beyond the financial system, the economic life of our countries. This is totally unworthy, it is rebellious, especially with regard to the workers of all our countries.

How should this intervention be carried out? We have envisaged that the state will intervene in two absolute ways: either the cession of assets or a recovery that assembles a form of nationalization. These two answers are obvious. State intervention is – and will be – indispensable. The state is the last guarantor of the banking system. It is also the intervention of states that has allowed the rescue of banks and, unfortunately – I would say – of the system itself since 2008.

The law therefore confirms the measures taken by the Belgian government, the role that the State has played in such a situation and prepares the future. We are better prepared to face the future and upcoming crises, in principle, at least.

However, an element in the law continues to pose a problem to me, even if our group will support the projects. This is almost ethical and moral: should shareholders be compensated when the bank is in crisis and that state intervention is necessary to avoid bankruptcy?

At one time, the shareholders gained a lot. Then, the crisis caused them significant losses. If you make the sum of what they gained and lost, ⁇ the operation will not necessarily have been dramatic, for some at least. On the other hand, for others, it is the savings of a lifetime that is sometimes engulfed in such an operation. They are the victims of those who have speculated. I would be tempted to say that one must be saved and let the other fall! But it is impossible to separate the good grain from the swallow in this bunch of shareholders!

If one considers that state intervention is done on the edge of bankruptcy to avoid it, one is in a quasi-bankruptcy situation where the value of the share, if one had allowed the price to continue to collapse, would probably have been zero, or even close to zero, which would represent a complete loss for shareholders.

In the committee, the Minister’s response was relevant. The value of the bank’s assets is not necessarily the value of its shares, including when the price of its shares falls. If we had to sell the bank, it is true that the shareholders would probably have received something from the realisation of the assets. This must of course be taken into account.

Nevertheless, it is difficult for me to accept and imagine compensation for the repair of a damage that would have been committed as a result of state intervention to avoid bankruptcy. There is something illogical here, since the State has not committed a fault but intervenes, on the contrary, to palliate the possible faults - and even some - of the bank managers.

The bill stipulates that the judiciary, when proceedings are in progress, will have to take into account the state of the bank at the time the events occurred. This is probably sufficient safeguard for the State so that it is not forced to repair with amounts that are not fair in proportion to what happened at the time of its intervention. We hope that this guarantee will properly save the intervention of the state and will not penalize it a second time.

Why should all this be done? The intervention of macro and microprudential controllers is obviously important in trying to grasp the crisis and the future. If it is necessary to preserve the independence of the European Central Bank – this is an important debate – maybe European states should not forbid themselves from giving some political indications in the management of the economy and therefore in the regulation of finance.

I will talk about some elements that constitute our priorities or the points that we think we need to discuss and ⁇ take action.

The size of the banks will need to be limited to reduce the moral gap. This question arises today when banks are probably even bigger than before the crisis and where the moral gap is ⁇ even bigger than before the crisis. In fact, who will let down a bank as important as BNP Paribas Fortis, to name one? It is almost impossible now. Therefore, its leaders can eventually afford some adventures since there is a big insurer behind, namely the States.

The question may therefore arise of the separation of banking activities and the treatment, in particular tax, differentiated according to the activity of the bank, whether it is a deposit and credit bank, on the one hand, or an investment bank, on the other. Probably the equity of banks, especially those engaged in risky activities, should be increased.

I also believe that we must resolutely move towards taxation, taxation of financial transactions, taxation of investment “banks” and additional taxation on the profits of banks. This is the only way to impose regulation in this sector. State intervention is needed on the means that these banks or these pseudo-banks develop. Taxation should bring everyone together, even those who generally consider that taxation should not interfere too much in political action. Here, on the contrary, I think this is the only way to act effectively against the financial excesses practiced in this sector.

At the Financial Crisis Committee, a lot was talked about dynamic provisioning, making comparisons with what had happened in other states that had applied an anti-cyclical policy. In addition to the use that is made of these means, it has been seen that, in some states, especially Spain, the situation has probably been less catastrophic, even though it has experienced the problem of loans in the real estate sector (which falls within the use of these funds). This different management from the provisioning of banks is probably a way to act preventively.

Furthermore, I will refer to the protection of consumers saving on financial products, with control of the marketing of certain products, the traceability of financial products and the prohibition of certain types of transactions.

We are therefore looking forward to announcing this bill, probably even before the summer holidays. This is fundamental for the PS: there is a need for protection of savings consumers alongside measures taken in favor of banks and in favor of the financial system and its control. Consumers must be protected from errors that we have experienced, ⁇ in 2008, and that will return, as the system has unfortunately not yet been reformed.

Finally, there is another thing that we have not talked about in the financial crisis commission or during the review of these bills. States must also be protected. The states saved the banks and the system, the system that attacks the states today. This is obviously unacceptable! This is rebellious cynicism.

If this continues, the peoples will not long accept that the financial systems continue to undermine the economy, the jobs, the way of life. If the system does not want to hear what is happening today in the streets of Athens or maybe what will happen tomorrow in the streets of Rome, Madrid or Brussels, it is necessary that the states take their responsibilities and impose on the system, which is rotten, to be reformed, to be regulated.

Spekulation against states must be prohibited. It seems that even the European Commission, though very open to the system, is of this opinion. I would like to quote the words of Mr. Barroso: “The Commission will closely examine the possibility of prohibiting purely speculative transactions on CDS connected to sovereign debt”, namely state debt. It is not enough to examine the world and interpret it; it is also necessary to transform it, said a nineteenth-century economist philosopher with whom I am quite in agreement. Mr. Barroso, examine, interpret the situation, but then change it! It is fundamental!

Risk coverage for debt repayment defaults is probably legitimate in the economy and intrinsically related to the foundation of the financial system. We have moved from this risk coverage to a company’s repayment defaults – today from a state, which is absurd! It is pure speculation against the state. This is unacceptable! This needs to be reformed and ban rating agencies from rating states. If they do, they must be punished. Such measures are indispensable to protect the sovereignty of those who, ultimately, are the last saviors of the system. They are somehow firefighters. When the house burns, it is the state that intervenes, including in the most liberalized economies, such as the United States. We believe that we must continue on this path, putting good order to intervene before the fire begins. The system must be controlled, regulated and reformed.

In order to do this, we will need to take initiatives, probably within the framework of the European Presidency, which is up to us soon. Of course, I’m not emitting a kind of “psychoanalytic transfer.” The fact that we are in the presidency of Europe will not solve everything. You can’t solve everything in six months, but it’s an opportunity to push impulses. Since our country has suffered a lot from the financial crisis and we have almost lost our main banks, we have a legitimacy to talk about this issue at European level. I hope that the Belgian government will deal with this.

Mr. Mayeur, I have listened to you very carefully in the beginning and the end, between which I have been away for a moment. There is one thing that is very striking to me. You strongly call for immediate action. You are a little the knight on the white horse who immediately comes in storms and things will change. All very beautiful. However, I ask you the following question. Why is it then that you with the PS opt for the interim step with the Committee for the Systemic Risks while all Flemish parties are not in favor of the draft law but in favor of quick action. Nevertheless, you have decided that it was better to choose the intermediate step. I wonder what is not arranged for you? Do you miss something? Are some mandates not arranged or something in this style? Tell us because...

I read De Tijd; you don’t need to recite it to me! We did not ask for a mandate and, in the long run, we lose one – the presidency of the National Bank.

In the design of the project oriented towards the integrated model and the Twin Peaks, we heard what people from the National Bank of Belgium and the CBFA told us. An intermediate step seemed necessary. They have put forward several functional arguments in this regard. We answered them positively. These are important bodies, composed of qualified teams, which must be able to work together.

Today, we are told that it is possible to go faster. We are taking, because I said we should go as quickly as possible. This is the opinion of the PS, who considers that it is necessary to opt directly for the integrated model. If things can be done quickly – I said in my speech – we are contractors. Thus, we will make the economy of a systemic risk committee as an intermediary. But if this does not happen as quickly as planned, the opinion will take a month delay. I have proposed in the committee that the deadline be extended until the end of the year, since the model will enter into force at the beginning of next year. Some responded that this was not the right measure.

Let’s admit that difficulties arise – for reasons of political crisis, for example... We must not revive the present situation, or the void. Therefore, an intermediate step is necessary before reaching the definitive model. It is realism, purely and simply. I would like to reiterate that the PS has not asked for a mandate. Everything in the press is not true. It may be a pity, but it is so!

Mr. Speaker, I was just going to say that I was going to continue where Mr. Mayeur had ended, but since it was about a specific case, I will return to his comparison with the burning house.

I think this is the best metaphor to describe what we are doing. Colleagues, we are making the reverse movement in this country today. There are some arguments in favour, but it remains a reverse movement. Instead of starting with prevention so that no new infernos - it was not just a fire, but a real inferno - could emerge, we are debating two bills that should indicate how to extinguish fires and infernos. And then goes the debate about a third bill that should serve as a smoke detector if banks threaten to go out of the curve, and so it begins to crumble in one of the rooms of the house.

The draft law nrs. 2406 and 2407 deal with the emergency measures. The King here, against the trend of today’s newspapers in, gets very extensive powers and becomes the largest dispatcher. In consultation with the CBFA and the National Bank, he may decide whether, and in what manner, the arrangement of a procedure should be made to take hold of, temporarily take over, or transfer a bank. So far, the Bill No. and 2406.

Proposal for Law No. 2407 then specifies how the interests of the shareholders, those who hold the assets, can be protected throughout that operation.

By resolving this matter, we can intervene better and faster in the future if it burns effectively, without having to argue about who in what way where to extinguish first.

This is in itself a positive development, but the Minister has in the committee at the explanation already admitted that in future crises it could still be challenged before courts by dissatisfied shareholders or owners of the transferred funds of the house.

The further settlement of those emergency measures is therefore not yet as stern as we think. There are a number of important questions that have not yet been answered. In the committee, Mr. Mayeur expressed some of the concerns that I myself share.

What happens if compensation is paid to shareholders? Who will be responsible for the payment of this compensation? Who is responsible at such a time? Are they the drivers? Or is it the state that has taken the urgent measure? This is not yet clear and has not yet been arranged.

Whatever it turns or turns, shareholders hope for profit. They think a lot about their wallets. But if it eventually goes into the fog and the house burns, it will not be the biggest concern for them who blows the fire, but how their interests are freed as much as possible.

The perverse to the system is the following. If the government intervenes in order to safeguard the public interest, their interests will immediately be safeguarded. If the government does not intervene, their interest will irrevocably disappear. If we intervene, they can again stand on their own interests and request that attention be given to their own interests. This is a perverse effect. Those who want to imagine it very negatively could say that it could mean a “run on the government.” Just think of the many discussions we have had about the value of Fortis at the time of salvation. This is very paradoxical, and there is hardly any answer to it.

The shareholders whose shares are transferred may request a revision of their remuneration at the court. It is therefore actually acknowledging that judicial proceedings will be effective. Therefore, we should not make illusions that these lawsuits would disappear. They will continue to exist.

It is therefore clear to us that the government and the majority must look for a way in which the managers themselves are held accountable.

In my opinion, it is absolutely undesirable – I think everyone agrees on this – that the one who saves in order to safeguard a common interest should also be the one who must pay the compensation to shareholders, simply because he has risen for the rights of society.

The draft law nrs. 2406 and 2407 therefore remain with symptom control, without any guarantee of the possibility that those who have set the house on fire by their careless behavior – the tenants, if I can say so, in this case the bank managers, and also the tenants, the shareholders, who have exercised or had exercised insufficient supervision – will be brought to their responsibility afterwards. Thus, there remains an opening to allow society, and also the State, which is already tormenting a decent state debt, to re-create for the pieces made by the bank executives and the shareholders.

These two bills remain for us a first positive attempt to do symptom control. However, these uncertainties should be resolved as soon as possible. However, this does not succeed sufficiently if the fire insurance, in this case the bank contribution, and the gap prevention are not at all in order. We had a very good discussion about bank contributions at the time of the budget. The size of the bank or the proportion of the risk taken is in no way consistent with the contribution to be made.

Prevention is the whole loop that I will return to later on, namely the reduction of risk and the effective intervention on a number of mechanisms that exist today.

Some colleagues have referred in the committee – not only Mr Van der Maelen of sp.a, but also Mr Bogaert of CD&V, to a bill on the bank testament. That actually involves a settlement scenario at the time it failed for one particular bank. Our group has also already submitted a bill that makes a clear distinction between investment banks and savings banks. I think both pistes are valuable, and now actually should have been included in the bill.

However, our proposal also has a very important aspect of prevention. If, as Mr. Mayeur just said, crises are inevitable, I do not want to concede to the fact that it is also inevitable that the government and the state will bear the consequences of such crises. If one divides banking activities, it ensures that a crisis that may arise within an investment bank no longer has consequences for savings and for the rest of society. I therefore regret that the government has not worked on either proposal, including a proposal from a majority party. This is also a criticism raised by Mr. Bogert in the committee.

As was the case at the discussion in the special banking committee, it was very clear that there is still a consensus on who are the real triggers of the problem, and where the possible solutions lie – and I have noted this in the debate, insofar as it has already been conducted –: addressing the triggers, in the sense of the rating agencies, increasing the equity, adjusting the accounting rules, and so on, and addressing the risk behavior.

The minister has also answered in committee that the texts are evolutionary, among other things relating to the discussion about the moral hazard, only is my question: what is evolutionary? When is later? Is it later in the sense that we must experience another crisis, learn from it, and then adjust the legislation? Or are we already going to incalculate a number of things whose problems we already see clearly, and which are recognized across the majority and opposition, but which are not in the law?

I advise not to wait for the next bad experience, because we simply cannot afford it in a year when our public debt is likely to be above 100% of GDP.

Evolution is also the most neutral, objective word to the third bill no. 2408 on the reform of the supervision. In a first phase, a Committee on Systemic Risk and Systemically Relevant Financial Institutions (CSRSFI) will be established. In a second phase there will be an integration of those powers with a prudential macro and micro supervision at the National Bank of Belgium, while the CBFA must exercise behavioral supervision, check information and protect the consumer.

It may be surprising, but I share the question of colleague Van de Velde why that intermediate step is there. Both Mr. Mayeur and the minister have said in the committee that they would actually want to skip that intermediate step. It has now been confirmed here. It is a very concrete proposal. We have just received an amendment from the majority, for which a committee has also been convened. I wonder why such an amendment of the majority can not come yet. If it were not for political-strategic reasons, and if there is still agreement in the majority, there is no reason why the majority would not submit an amendment to move directly to the twin peak model instead of ⁇ ining the intermediate step. Either you agree and there is no objection. That twinpeak model should also be launched and all its modalities should also be developed. Either you are now going to set up a dragon of a construction that may work for a few months and is surreal. You agree that it is surreal. Therefore, I expect today or tomorrow an amendment of the majority – you are able to write that quickly and deposit it on our banks – which proposes to move to the twinpeaks model. Then there is nothing else behind and there are no political-strategic games involved. I want to believe you, but then give something on which I can base my faith, dear colleagues. If that doesn’t happen, I can only conclude that The Time may have pressed on a painful wound.

Whatever they are, even the bill itself will not solve all the problems. It is not because one redistributes supervision into a twinpeak model that it will go better afterwards. Countries where macroprudential and microprudential supervision were in the same institution have not necessarily been better able to cope with the crisis. With the state of affairs at the CBFA today, I also doubt whether the supervision will become more effective in the future and the consumer protection, on which many words have already been spent, will improve.

Much more important is what options and decisions we will eventually make. The redistribution between both bodies shows a clear compensation for the loss that the CBFA has suffered. I know people are trying to refute this with hand and tooth, but I have not heard any clear argument yet. The CBFA has lost the prudential supervision and is given something else, consumer protection, a gap that has existed so far. In the banking committee, where I was present at least, when we talked about the role of the CBFA, there really arose about opposition and majority questions about the way of acting or the passivity of the CBFA during the crisis. It makes no sense to be aware of where it’s going if you don’t intervene. This is what we saw during the banking crisis. Implicitly, the bill recognizes that criticism by carrying out a reshuffle in that supervision. It is only a pity that those who remained in default at the time of the crisis itself are now not only allowed to sit but also received a reward of comfort in the form of consumer protection.

I also have a few questions about this. Who will handle the complaints and how will this be done? What about the know-how that the Economic Inspectorate already had? We heard the people of the Economic Inspectorate at the initiative of the Greens in a hearing of the special banking committee. They said they knew what was happening, that they wanted to intervene and that they had know-how and experience. They asked to give them the resources. Instead of addressing that question and actually honouring their know-how, it is now said that it will be given to the CBFA, the CBFA which has so far been in very close contact with the institutions that it will have to control in that area, while it has no experience with it. I think this is a strange choice.

The question of how the consumer will be specifically protected will also be filled in later. I refer to the discussion on consumer credit in the Committee on Business. Apparently, the supervision of consumer credit, advertising, and so on will also go to the CBFA. So there is a recovery operation ongoing around the CBFA. With regard to consumer protection, I would like to give Mr. Bogaert, who has since left, the absolute right, there is a shortage. I have repeatedly complained about this in the plenary session and in the committee. There is abuse of the MiFID rules that one simply bypasses, there is abuse of toxic products whose prospectuses — read the leaflets of the products one buys in the hope of becoming financially better — are not yet understood by anyone.

It would be interesting if the CBFA for which we have now chosen is given the power to intervene with regard to those toxic products and to be able to ban them, for example, at the moment when a leaflet says that this is mess. Today, the reality is that banks and financial companies are allowed to market rubbish products if they put it in the leaflet but say that it is rubbish. It is permissible to put deadly products on the market. If it were about medications, it would be unheard of. Because the consumer is insufficiently informed and even bank directors and CEOs themselves have no insight into the hundreds of pages of the leaflets of the toxic products, these products should continue to exist joyfully. This is the world on his head. I call on the government to say about those toxic products that if it is messy, these products will not come to our market.

You must explicitly give that authority to the CBFA, otherwise you leave the consumer to the merchants of products whose banks themselves say they do not know what they have bought, that they know that it is mess but that they are promised that it will make a lot of money. What is not understood in the sector itself, it is allowed to enter the market. I find that unimaginable. If you really want to do consumer protection, those are the areas where you can mean something. I look forward to the proposal that will come, but there has been a clear reshuffle, with protection of those who remained in default during the crisis itself.

There are also some gaps. Not only delay measures, but gaps. There are no measures to put a pole and perk on speculation. In addition to imposing fines, it should also be easier to determine liability, for example by setting a liability compensation against speculators at the time the damage is suffered. Currently, short selling is still partially banned in our country, but more is needed. One of the two supervisors you specified here in this model could include that task. For example, it could require large shareholders such as insurance companies or pension funds that often have large packages in their hands not to borrow their shares or to develop conditions that stipulate that those large packages of shares that can exert influence are not borrowed to speculators. For example, pension funds used by workers and companies in our country cannot be used against our country in the speculative model that Mr. Mayeur just referred to. In doing so, speculators use the money of those people to destroy the country where they live, with disastrous consequences for those individual citizens. This is done today with our pension funds and that are gaps in the legislation.

In addition, there must be a pillar and a pin to the disproportion that arises between own and foreign assets in the banks, the so-called leverage phenomenon or leverage. This is also one of the main causes of the crisis. We have seen in Spain that something already existed before the crisis. I wonder why not even our country can establish that the equity of the banks is raised. It is also a proposal that the Greens formulated at the beginning of the crisis.

The leverage effects make it possible for some banks to note a ratio of 1 to 40. In contrast to 40 euros borrowed by such banks, they only have 1 euro in cash. With that amount they speculate. Until today, there are still banks that use such a ratio. You can put a maximum, for example, a maximum leverage of 10. Then you will see the risk decrease a lot.

The committee has also said a lot about the rating agencies, which, unfortunately, are only American. They have not sufficiently assessed the risks of certain products. We have noticed that this has led to negative effects within our banks, because there was no longer any internal control.

It is very clear that those offices themselves were too close and are with the banks for whom they must evaluate the products. The ratings – should this be surprising? They were not always objective. Far from even. This needs to be thoroughly reformed. It might be an idea to set up in Europe a counterpart of the U.S. rating agencies and to hammer on it as European president. In the meantime, it might also be good to follow the ratings very closely from the twin peak model, to ask the banks how they rating their own products and to ensure that the internal control this time happens.

Despite the gigantic crisis we have experienced, we see that the resistance of the banks is still very large. They quickly moved back to business as usual. The bonuses, which are a symptom of an advancing, sick system, have hardly or actually never gone away. The same applies to credit rating agencies and high-risk products. Therefore, a word about this would not have been wrong in the present legislation.

There is also the fact that the Belgian government itself provides for a tax deduction for companies investing in pension funds for the construction of the second pillar for their employees and for pension savings, the third pillar, for individual citizens. Such pension funds are very large players in the financial markets and they have a significant impact on them. It would therefore be useful to impose on those funds certain criteria regarding sustainability and decency, ethical character, for example. These funds have long been required to invest in companies. Thus, they cannot even be used against the retirement savers. For example, they may be required to invest part of their funds in sectors of the social economy or of a green economy, a sustainable economy, which pursues ethical criteria. This is the subject of a bill that we have submitted a while ago. It is not a matter of time, it is a matter of priorities.

We note that it is also not a priority that the banks in which we have forced representatives, after we have saved them by providing their state aid, are still active in tax havens. The role of our representatives here is still ⁇ obscure. It would have been ⁇ interesting, in the context of this bill, to clarify the role of those directors and to define the criteria that we use and will use for banks being rescued. These include criteria for the transactions of such banks in tax havens.

Finally, I repeat the question of the separation between deposit banks and commercial banks, between savings banks and investment banks. The abolition of this separation has saved us a lot of misery. Nevertheless, when they are introduced, it is the best preventive measure to ensure that the State and society do not respond to the harmful consequences of a fire.

I therefore urge the government to consider the opportunity of this very quickly and to come up with a proposal on the subject, because unfortunately it did not do so within the framework of the present bill.

Colleagues, our group has drawn up a 21-point plan at the end of October 2008, when the financial crisis was raging in all its intensity. We have used this plan during all the discussions in the special banking committee, where many of those points have been taken over. They agreed on many of those points.

The 21 point plan consisted of three basic elements. First and foremost, the risk must be properly identified, secondly, the risk must be reduced and, thirdly, the consumer must be protected.

The government has succeeded in starting with a fourth point: it has primarily sought an answer to the question of how it can ensure that, if it fails and a crisis arises, it can settle the transfer as soon as possible and as a government eventually charge the crisis.

How do we ensure that we can arrange that transfer as soon as possible and that the government can eventually declare the crisis? We assumed that we should avoid the crisis. The only way that we can prevent, for our country and even internationally, the occurrence of crises, to which Mr. Mayeur just referred, is to work on those three first points, and not on a number of aspects that should actually settle the matter afterwards.

With less we cannot be satisfied, given what we have experienced so far. However, I note that, in this regard, the ambition of the government is still far from clear. This clear question, which was asked by the Special Banking Commission, has not yet been answered.

You can protect the consumer as much as you want. If you do not remove the toxic products from the market, if you do not improve the equity of the banks, if you do not deal with the rating agencies and if you do not split those banking activities, you will continue to have crises. I must note that there is still no willingness in the majority or within the government to prevent these crises effectively, and that I find very regrettable.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker. On the extension of the recovery measures for banks in trouble, I can be brief. We think that is a good measure and a good bill. We will also support it, as we did in the committee.

It is clear that this is a difficult pathway, in particular the balance of the public interest against the interests of the shareholders. However, I think it is well-regulated in the current bills. The greatest interest of shareholders is, of course, that the company, of which they are shareholders, continues to exist. This is the best guarantee for shareholders. In this regard, we support the government’s proposals.

However, the third draft on the supervision of the financial sector is another pair of sleeves. I would like to deepen a few points on this. I will begin with the interim solution with the committee with that impossible abbreviation. If we can believe The Time today – and who are we not to do so – even in this dossier, the community ghost and the ghost of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde is shown to come around the corner.

We have heard the National Bank and the CBFA say it can be realized without such an intermediate step. We have heard most parties here today in this hemisphere and also in the committee say that it can be realized without intermittent steps. Suddenly, this intermediate step appears to be necessary.

In short, this great reform is being pushed forward by the government, like all other major reforms, the pensions, the state reform, the budget and more. Also this reform, the supervision of the financial sector, must therefore deviate and is postponed indefinitely for us.

Mr. Minister, you should tell your colleagues at Ecofin that you have been forced to postpone such important legislation as the supervision of the financial sector because of the split of a electoral district. Ms. Almaci just spoke about surrealism, I would rather call it a typical Belgian phenomenon, but I think these are two identical things.

A second element in relation to the third bill, is that what we vote here today is not a draft law. This is not a law for which we know what we vote. This is a framework law, a framework law, which outlines a general window and gives you, Mr. Minister, a mandate to go your way within this framework.

The essence of this law will be recorded by you in KB. The correct distribution of powers between the two bodies, the course of the arbitration when there are conflicts, and which will be frequent, will be fixed later by KB.

So my question is very simple. When will you get the KB? When can we know the content of it here in Parliament and evaluate the case? I think this will be much more important than the bill that is presented here.

A third element, Mr. Minister, is the question to which I have never received an answer, despite my repeated questions. What is the intellectual basis for choosing the twinpeaks model? I’m not saying you don’t know it, I just asked you the question and there was no answer to it. That is what I say. Why have we never heard from your mouth what are the advantages of a twinpeaks model and the advantages of a single institution that would take on the two tasks?

There has been a number of references to the report of the Special Banking Commission, including Lamfalussy’s report. Let us be very clear in this. The Special Banking Commission did not comment on this and left the various possibilities open, because we wanted to close and did not want to conduct that debate. Lamfalussy also opens it. Lamfalussy says in his report that should be able to start from scratch, one supervisory authority would be better

Why do you opt for that twinpeaks model, and not for the unit model? In a unity model, it is clear, because then you do not have the discussion of powers, and there is no need for arbitration between the different institutions. It would make the matter more transparent and simpler, I think, but it will probably be accompanied by a lot less political appointments, and the division between PS and MR would be much more difficult. Therefore, I repeat my question, Mr. Minister: What is the intellectual basis of this choice?

My next point – and a number of colleagues before me have already cited it – is about the statute of the National Bank. The National Bank will be given a lot of new powers with this bill. Curiously again, in the long sequence of harassment by private shareholders, with this fundamental addition of powers to the National Bank, 50 percent of shareholders were not taken into account. However, they are definitely and definitely involved party. The model installed here means that a listed company will exercise control over listed companies. I think the story of the judge and the party here is not far apart. If the National Bank, in the event of a crisis of one of these banks, would be caught on the fact that it has done a poor control, then the National Bank can be held accountable for this, because then it has not done its job well, and then the rates of the National Bank will be under pressure at that time, and then the shareholders will pay for a responsibility that they have never asked for, and in which they were never known to assume this responsibility.

Mr. Minister, I must admit that you have been very clear about this in the committee. You have made it clear: there will be no changes to the statute during this legislature, and there is nothing in the interest of private shareholders during this legislature. You have been very clear about this, and I do not know whether Mr. Van Biesen and Mr. Bogaert, who also made a call, have understood what you said about it. They have repeated this call here today with a little naivety that adorns them somewhere, but you have been very clear in it: they can both continue to knock on their cheek. You have decided that the shareholders will remain in the cold, you will take away the chances at the National Bank, and VLD and CD&V will be allowed to swallow.

Therefore, we submit an amendment, but I leave it to Mr. Van de Velde who took that initiative.

My last point is about credit rating agencies. This should not be arranged directly at the Belgian level, but I will use the opportunity to say something about this. One can put as many weapons in place at the national level as one wishes, but if one does not control the rating agencies at the international level, they are all just drops on a hot plate. I think the European level is most suitable for the control of credit rating agencies.

The role that the rating agencies played in the crisis, which hopefully lies behind us, has come out of the paint too little so that the alertness for it is currently absent. When you have the presidency of Ecofin and Europe within a few months, it seems to me the ideal time to take the lead to install the control of the rating agencies and at least think about European licenses and a European audit body.

Mr. Speaker, my group will submit the draft law no. 2406 and no. 2407 of support. However, we do not support the way you organize the supervision of the financial sector.

This is a very important law that will not have a majority in Flanders. If we vote a majority against the opposition here, as it was in the committee, then the Fleming should know that here an important law on the control of the banks, in a vital sector in this country, is not carried by a majority in Flanders. I wish the colleagues of Open Vld and CD&V good luck with this.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker. This financial crisis, which has affected the whole world, and not only the Belgian economy, will mark these few years. It is the consequence of taking control of our economy by increasingly financial logics, which have been denounced for years by regulatory economists, such as the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics, Joseph Stiglitz, or the author of Derivatives of Financial Capitalism, the economist Michel Aglietta. They support various measures, such as the fight against tax havens, of which I often speak to you; against tax evasion and tax dumping, which Belgium practices at its time; for the self-strengthening of banks, subject to a bill we have recently filed; and for the forecasting of bank accounting standards.

There are even repentants who denounce this situation, such as the former director of Crédit Lyonnais, Jean Peyrelevade, author of an excellent little book entitled Le Capitalisme total. He denounces with simple and very just words the fact that the economy has "financialized" and that the purpose of profit for profit, without employment, whether at the expense of the economy, the environment or the social, has taken over. These regulatory economists did not think so well because speculation has led us into the financial crisis we know, and today it attacks even states, which can only worry us.

To cure the crisis, we must know the roots of evil and deal with them by imposing profound reforms on the banking and financial system. We must use the crisis to ⁇ these reforms. These are known, they have been cited by some colleagues, including Ms. Almaci. It is about the separation of banking professions: the profession of collecting savings and lending to individuals and small ⁇ is to be separated from that of business banks, those who take risks and speculate. It is the determination of bonds in terms of own funds, to control what is called the leverage, which suffered Fortis Banque, in the absence of liquidity following unconscious investments.

It is the reform of rating agencies or at least the creation of a public rating agency that would have no interest in the financial system, which would be above the blade. This is an irreproachable attitude that is to be expected from banks in terms of remuneration to traders or in terms of presence in tax havens.

I believe that all measures that are taken and will be taken in financial matters and reporting to banks should be inspired by these principles. We talked, Mr. Minister, about the contribution of banks to the state budget, namely these famous 500 million euros. It should be proportionate to the level of risk, to the limit to discourage risk and to protect banks that are reasonable in their risk behavior and choices.

It is also the introduction of taxes on stock market operations or on speculation both to discourage it and to enable to find additional resources to the budget of the state that needs it.

As part of the Commission for the Monitoring of the Banking and Financial Crisis, we recently received representatives of banks and insurance companies who had to be assisted by the State in order not to sink with the crisis. The latter found themselves in this situation due to unconscious risk-taking, massive investments in dangerous products that they did not know, with most of these products based in the United States. These banks and insurance companies sought quick profits regardless of the means used and the risks taken, including being present in tax havens or participating in questionable or even illegal assemblies.

These hearings of representatives of Dexia, KBC, BNP Paribas Fortis and Ethias were ⁇ enlightening about their state of mind a few months after the crisis. We were able to question them about the changes introduced since the crisis, about the evolution of practices, about the policy of risk management and remuneration of traders and executives of these banks, about the policy of corporate loans, because they are expected to support the real economy. I will not talk about the Decto case that resulted in a positive decision yesterday in court for the continuation of activities, which I look forward to. This goes against the opinion and resistance of two banks, one of which is supported by the state. They were also asked about the evolution of their staff.

In some, we felt a re-founded modesty, a real humility, a willingness to do better, to no longer make mistakes and to focus on known markets and trades. Others, on the other hand, have already found all their arrogance: "Let us do, we know our profession" and I have even heard: "You know, we didn't get so bad!". They had to explain to them all the consequences of the crisis on our economy and on the state budget, those 20 billion euros of deficit to be filled by 2015, and the importance of public aid granted to banks. I would like to point out Mr. Bonnafé that he spoke on behalf of BNP Paribas Fortis and not on behalf of BNP Paribas. BNP Paribas, on the other hand, may have done well and made a good deal by buying our bank.

Beyond these small differences, all these representatives, in more or less measured terms, have complained about the constraints that are now imposed on them, either by the European Commission, within the framework of the Basel III standards, or even more or less precise standards announced by States. If they are too constrained, if they are not let go of the bridle, and if they are not allowed to manage, themselves, the risks, they threaten the worst of the recessions and announce the end of growth, that of their profits and their ability to sustain the economy.

I was surprised and shocked by this attitude, especially since these are banks that have been largely assisted by the state – the others have not been heard – and have, within them, administrators who represent us. We expect them, even more than others, to be irreproachable in all matters. Political leaders will need to show courage and perseverance to impose these reform measures that are equally urgent and indispensable and that we are looking forward to. Furthermore, zero risk does not exist, it requires a "fire service" performing even though I said it wasn't enough. Tomorrow, we will vote on the new "fire services" of the Belgian state in financial matters. Will they be more efficient than existing devices? We hope for it, but especially hope we do not have to use it in the future!

Here are four small comments regarding the texts that will be voted.

1 of 1. Thanks to the first text, we will be able, if necessary, to intervene faster and cleaner in the event of problems in a bank. Certainly, the saga around state intervention in the Fortis case could only lead to this kind of change. This logic can be supported.

2 of 2. CBFA’s past skills are transferred to BNB as part of the Twin Peaks model. Hopefully BNB will be more efficient than CBFA in the Fortis case, as everyone knows it was informed, including liquidity and risk-taking issues! It is not enough to transfer skills and personnel. We still need to have the will and the means to exercise them as best as possible! These decisions are largely referred to arrests. The role of Parliament will therefore not be to vote or amend these texts, but to continue to question the Minister of Finance about the developments in the matter. We will take care of it!

3 of 3. However, the device remains blurred around this intermediate period. The analysis of the texts has made this problem appear, several times, in the Finance Committee. I still have some difficulties in understanding the usefulness of this measure. The majority proposes to empower the government to organize the transfer in question. This undoubtedly poses a problem of democratic control and it can cast suspicion on the system. In any case, if there is a transfer of skills, as much as it is as fast and as clear as possible and this does not matter our opinion on the new device.

4 of 4. We remain on our hunger when it comes to consumer protection. Beyond the consequences on the economy, on the revenue of the state, beyond the need to mobilize enormous funds for the rescue of banks, many people, many institutions have been victims of the financial crisis because they have been advised to invest in certain products. I discussed this with the Secretary of State in charge of the Social Economy. Funds such as the Social and Solidarity Economy Fund have misled KBC’s advice to invest in CDO products, in which we have lost a lot of money.

We have submitted an amendment that we are submitting. He simply proposes to associate with the CBFA, which will have this product control mission tomorrow, the services of the Economic Inspection, of which it is the profession. They are already engaged in this type of activity and are accustomed to dealing with citizens who question them. It seemed to us that this collaboration could be positive and prevent future savers from still being victims of random investments.

Another text will be announced in a few weeks. We will judge by piece. In this matter, as in many others, one of yours is better than two you will have it!

I reserve my conclusion for Mr. by Major. Unfortunately, he is no longer there. I listened and generally appreciated his speech. I hope his colleague Thiébaut will report to him.

However, some of his interventions are problematic to me. Maybe I misunderstood it, but I had the impression that he presented the next crises as inevitable and inevitable. He said, “When it is necessary to intervene again, we must be ready.” I conclude with this: what should be implemented in Belgium under the Belgian Presidency, as much as possible at the international level, are fundamental reforms to combat these speculative behaviors and choices. On the one hand, they have led the world into an unprecedented financial crisis, but on the other hand, on a daily basis and long before this crisis, they have generated very serious economic, social and environmental consequences.

Politics, public power, therefore, must regain control in this matter and take advantage of the crisis to bring these fundamental reforms; I have already said. The texts we will adopt tomorrow are not these fundamental reforms, they only respond to a part of the problem, they have a certain capacity to intervene in the event of a problem. It would be to work well in advance. This is what we expect.

Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the two or three projects that are submitted to the debate of our Assembly – they are two and a half – must be considered as supplementing the one we voted here a few weeks ago, the corporate government, and anticipating in some way the fourth, the one relating to consumer protection.

They should be viewed as a single mechanism in response to the recommendations of the Special Committee and the Lamfalussy Report: establishing a new control architecture and empowering the State to initiate a procedure leading up to the transfer of any elements of the bank’s assets.

Both projects add to the one we voted on governance and anticipate the one on consumer protection. They start from the finding that banking failures are likely to destabilize the financial system as a whole, a fairly puddic justification when it is known that the ILO has estimated the effects of the crisis to 20 million jobs sacrificed, that 53 million individuals on our planet have remained poor because of this crisis. It should also be recalled that, in its report published at the end of 2008, the IMF recommends that Belgium strengthen its legal framework to define future conditions for intervention with financial institutions and to be able to mobilize financial resources in the event of a market crisis.

Among the provisions that are proposed to us is the possibility reserved to the Government to terminate any act of disposal in favor of the State of any other Belgian or foreign person, of public or private law, in particular any act of cession of sale or contribution relating to assets or liabilities or to several branches of activity. In fact, we are establishing a capacity to expropriate assets and liabilities from several branches of business of securities and shares of credit institutions. But who says expropriation, also says, constitutionally, just and prior compensation of holders of groups of shares that participate in the management of the enterprise but also of the multiple small holders holding investments of good family father.

The bill, as submitted to us, provides an answer to how the compensation of shareholders will be assured, taking into account the situation of the company where the intervention of the public power has taken place, as well as the rank and quality of its creditors. If it is capable of ending the legal battles triggered by taking control of banking institutions, we must hope that it will never be implemented. Even though, we know, we were deprived of it at the time when decisions had to be made and that, in the face of these mega-banking institutions, we will still have to think tomorrow about the shareholding plan between the reference shareholders who assume a responsibility and the small holders of investments of good family father.

The second project, on the other hand, includes several significant parts. First, the disappearance of the Financial Stability Committee and then, the transfer to the National Bank, the powers related to the exercise of systemic control and prudential control.

This transitional phase is accompanied by the creation of the Committee on Risk and Systemic Financial Institutions. It confers to the reformed CBFA the control to ensure compliance with the rules of conduct of financial institutions with new accents that could be extended to other intermediaries than financial intermediaries. The King is empowered to take measures to promote the protection of consumers.

As for the financial architecture, I recall that the special committee had not decided within it on the model to be adopted. When drafting the report, we talked about three assumptions, indicating that it would be up to our Assembly to choose. We were bound by a deadline – the report was to be submitted within four months – and we did not have enough information to make an informed choice, even though we already had indications on the solution to be implemented.

The hearings and the report of the colleagues of experts on the findings we had made showed that while the roles of CBFA and BNB were well established, the first as a microprudential supervisor and the second as a macroprudential supervisory body, the action status of the Financial Stability Committee created by the 2002 Act did not allow it to fulfill its union role in an optimal manner because, the report said, “it constituted only a forum for the exchange of information about formal authorities.” In doing so, the special commission observed the failure of this arrangement.

The new drawn architecture, according to the Twin Peaks model, ⁇ brings more clarity. However, it will be necessary to provide the actors of this model with the means to exercise effective mesoprudential control: these are the Commission Recommendations 38 and 39. As some of my colleagues have said, the question arises of the need to go through the intermediate stage. Does the time that has passed and the need to move forward still justify the passage through this intermediate stage? I add that by its integration into the European banking system, the National Bank is de facto the most capable of fulfilling the new tasks entrusted to it. It must be hoped that it will not have to implement them but if it should do it, that it can do it in the best way possible.

We must also ensure, in addition to the competence, that our institutions are equipped with the human and regulatory capacity to carry out the strategic control of banks and insurance companies of a systemic nature. This implies that they have a regulatory authority to approve or reject what these institutions are implementing, possible strategic plans and tactical actions they are carrying out, on the basis of a permanent dialogue respecting the strengthened principles of confidentiality.

This goes, as the special committee envisages, through the introduction of legislation reinforcing the role of the responsible body. This is the subject of our discussions. It would also be necessary to ensure the recruitment of market intelligence teams, experienced financial analysts capable of monitoring and implementing, on the test, the strategic choices of financial institutions. This, of course, involves additional human and financial resources.

Beyond this, the establishment of a culture of dialogue between banks and system insurance companies, where the independence of the supervisory bodies should be perceived as an asset and the outward vision of a controller as a contribution, appears necessary. The appetite for risk is such that, in determining and choosing strategic directions, it is necessary to empower those who exercise them. And in this regard in particular have informed opinions within these institutions, audit committees, and value internal audits.

That is why the CDH will approve these bills. You will allow me to remind you that we are in the middle of the wave, that there is still an important road to go. I had spoken, during my speech at this same tribune, during the deposition of the report of the special commission, of the danger of collective forgetfulness, of falling asleep. Human beings are made so. Even though we may not all be aware of it anymore, we have passed near the absolute abyss. The entire global economic system, based on the market and giving the financial sector an excessive role, has failed to collapse. These lessons should not be forgotten. On the contrary, we must persist in the willingness to change the rules, to strengthen supervision and thus to fight greed.

The systemic convulsions of the financial system, due to deregulation, do not belong only to the past. There are already new imbalances at global level. Speculation is still present. Some would like to start again like yesterday, while we were all convinced, a year ago, that finance should be at the service of the economy and not the opposite.

It is not enough to lay down rules, as Dominique Strauss-Kahn recently recalled in Brussels. It is also and above all necessary to organize the supervision. Logically, this means “a super vision.” Joseph Stiglitz said, “Every game has its rules and its referees. The economic game is no exception. One of the crucial roles of the state is to write the rules and provide arbitrators. Rules are the laws that govern the market economy, the arbitrators who understand, the supervisory authorities and the judges who help to enforce and interpret the laws. In America, too many rules have been established by or for financial professionals and arbitrators have proved biased. Therefore, we cannot be surprised by the imbalances of the results.

Therefore, we cannot allow it to happen, as would be desired by the supporters of liberalism, whether it be neo-, crypto- or reformed.

There is also a need to combat greed in this area. And the only barrier against it remains the democratic process. The history we have lived through could give the feeling that the events as a whole are explained by a kind of almost Shakespearean gear in which the greed of one and the panic of the other would have intertwined, causing the card castle of our illusions to collapse for the benefit of a few powerful.

As Jacques Attali says, “as long as the analysis and action against the crisis remains founded, for the right, on the simple regret of having transgressed the principles of liberalism, for the left, on the nostalgic return to the State of Providence, nothing serious can be undertaken to overcome it.” It raises us and raises us the question of the usefulness of these markets. Certainly, they are essential instruments – and they remain, let us not be mistaken – to the progress of our economies, since they allow to transfer, against remuneration, an interest or a dividend, the savings of those who are able to make it to those who can use it. But it is also necessary that these institutions cease, through nonsensical policies, to participate in activities that they do not understand while the regulators let them do.

In the face of the greed that lies in every intersection of the world economic system – thus, in those areas of unlawfulness that are tax havens – in sophisticated vehicles of which one asks who holds the capacity to drive and which resort to means devoid of any ethics, we are in a state of legitimate defence. The market has changed our ways of thinking and distorted our values. The culture propagated by the dominant economy is often of convenience, seeking to make believing that the state is a disability and that it is appropriate that it does not care about the economy and the great global balances. We can see where this has led.

The mistake that also awaits us is the opposite, namely, not to let do, but to want to regulate everything, to regulate everything, to catalog everything. This applies to the economic system as well as to the justice system. One cannot without consequence overload the files of the judges of instruction, because then justice is exercised only for simple and close cases. This always produces impunity for complex situations, in this case organized crime. The same is true in the economy. The diagnosis of what did not work should lead us to bring the remedy where the activities have failed and have not been properly organized. It is at the heart of the problem that the iron must be carried.

Above all, we should not freely multiply regulations where things are going well and would still go well. Thus, if the regulators have only one thing to do, would it not be appropriate for them to ensure that they restore the control they exercise in particular on the use of several financial stakeholders to leverage effects, to strengthen the information in particular by the creation of a CDS clearing chamber, by putting our economies safe from predators and speculators of all hair.

The financial devastation that has been inflicted on the economy and the resulting budget deficits will obviously only be taken into account. It would be a fundamental mistake for our parliament to believe that it is the others, at higher levels, who would have all the decision-making power. Not only does the awareness of our fellow citizens of the known situation and the remedies to do so require a better orientation of the allocation of human resources within our economies in relation to finance, given the excessive externality of the failures of market fanaticism, but it also leads us to respect the essential, that is, trust, a better balance between the individual and the collective, between economic activities and non-economic activities, between the role of the market and that of the state.

This involves, in all institutions, at any level, both the European and international institutions of which we are part, that a certain action is continued, whether with respect to rating agencies, the problem of equity, the redistribution of banking activities in Europe or the taxation of financial products on an international scale. And the list is still long!

Certainly, we have made a big step and we will make another soon. The time is not for falling asleep but above all for a democratic awakening centered on human value. One step has been made, but the road is still long.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, I would like, like some of my predecessors, to congratulate the Minister for having been able to present to us, within fifteen months after the onset of the crisis, a mechanism ⁇ much more effective than the previous one in regards to the control of financial institutions and the measures that may be taken to avoid systemic disruptions within the financial sector.

Bank failures, such as those at the heart of the financial and banking crisis in late 2008, are likely to destabilize the financial system as a whole and disrupt the overall functioning of the economy. These disruptive effects affect both shareholders, savers and creditors, whether they are individuals or companies, whose value or the return of assets may be compromised with, as a result, a decrease in their assets and consequently in their purchasing power and investment capacity.

Furthermore, the scarcity of liquidity leads to that of credits, it is the famous credit crunch, with as a consequence an increase in the cost of financing companies and a slowdown in economic growth, without even mentioning the direct budgetary cost related to possible public interventions. All of these elements lead, at a macroeconomic level, to a weakening of the economy and to a spiral of declining of the economy.

At the beginning of these findings, the government has already responded urgently with various targeted measures of support of the economy that our assembly had the opportunity to vote at the end of 2008 and in 2009 and which have brought the fruits we know.

Today, we are discussing two important bills. On the one hand, a project expanding the powers of public authorities to react when an institution in the banking and financial sector encounters difficulties such as its financial position would be severely threatened to the point of affecting national and international financial stability. On the other hand, we are also discussing today a bill introducing a new system of supervision of the financial sector.

In situations of 2008-type banking crisis, whose sudden and unpredictable nature is now evident, it was appropriate to strengthen the capacity of the authorities to intervene quickly. These exceptional emergency measures consist of the possibility for the State to initiate a procedure which may lead to the transfer of assets of the institution concerned against compensation granted to the owner of the assets thus transferred.

The project also aims to strengthen the protection of holders of securities deposited with financial institutions. As the Minister of Finance rightly pointed out in his reasoning, it was imperative, within the strict limits required by the general interest, to adopt measures to preserve citizens, as well as ⁇ , from the adverse consequences of the financial crisis, the provisions founded on them as well as their proportionality in its extent and force.

As regards the related project, it complements, as regards the means of appeal, the project of recovery by organising a specific judicial procedure for the protection of the patrimonial interests of the owners of the assets or securities whose transfer the King would have ordered. Law of 26 July 1962 concerning the procedure of extreme urgency in matters of expropriation for reasons of public utility.

I now come to the project on the supervision of the financial sector. The main objective of the project is to revise the control architecture of the financial sector by establishing without delay a Committee on Risk and Systemic Financial Institutions.

Its primary mission will be to contribute to the preservation of the stability of the financial system, while receiving exclusive decision-making power with regard to the supervision of systemic financial institutions, in this case, the prudential supervision aimed at ensuring the solidity of such systemic institutions, such as large banks and large insurance companies.

The committee is also given a new competence, in particular to monitor and evaluate strategic developments and the risk profile of such institutions. This is a phase that is only transient and that we can hope to be as short as possible. This will be followed, as soon as possible, by an integration into the National Bank’s branch of the CBFA’s competences in matters of prudential control according to the so-called Twin Peaks model. I obviously share the opinion of those who have asked here to make this transitional phase as short as possible. It seems to me that the Minister also expressed such an intention regarding this project at the committee meeting.

At the end of this transitional development, the National Bank will ensure, in a cross-sectional manner, the systemic and prudential control of the actors of the financial sector. It will therefore exercise supervisory control over credit institutions, insurance undertakings and reinsurance undertakings, investment undertakings having the status of a publicly traded company, clearing bodies, liquidation bodies and bodies assimilated to such bodies, as well as payment institutions and professional pension institutions.

As a reminder, the Lamfalussy report had, since June 2009, made recommendations on this subject. The experts proposed to significantly strengthen the cooperation model between BNB and CBFA, before considering a more fundamental reform of the control architecture of financial institutions. The government’s general policy statement was in the right line of these recommendations. Moreover, the latest developments in several countries, especially in the euro area countries, show a growing convergence in the convergence of the microprudential and macroprudential control components.

Finally, the future division of powers between the National Bank and the new CBFA will join the recent proposals for regulations adopted by the European Commission with a view to establishing European Supervisory Authorities. As for the new CBFA, it will exercise on financial institutions, in a cross-sectional manner, the control aimed primarily at monitoring the compliance of the rules of conduct by these institutions. Furthermore, it will continue to ensure market surveillance and control of investment agencies. The CBFA will see a strengthening of its competences in consumer protection.

Its Board of Directors will have the power to adopt regulations in this area of consumer protection. A legal basis is also created allowing the establishment of a new department that will be responsible for relations with savers and will ensure the information and protection of the interests of consumers of financial products.

It also provides for the possibility for the King to adopt specific rules concerning the content and manner of presentation of promotional communications and other documents and notices relating to an account opened with a financial institution, to the offer of investment instruments such as in the context of a campaign conducted in the media for investment instruments with a unit nominal value of at least EUR 50 000. The CBFA will also be charged, as part of its mission, to monitor compliance with these rules.

During the committee discussions, the Minister of Finance announced the upcoming arrival of a third package of measures related in particular to consumer protection. We look forward to it because in recent years, the quality of the services offered by banks to their clients has clearly deteriorated. The advice they offer regarding investment and acquisition of savings products has too often misled savers who too naively trusted them. It is time that this changes and that the legitimate interests of bank customers and savers are no longer subject to the diligent search for increasingly high short-term profitability.

That said, the projects submitted to our vote today correctly frame the respective competences of the CBFA and the National Bank. In doing so, they provide us with the necessary framework for a renewed and efficient functioning of financial supervision in our country. The same applies to measures to avoid systemic disruptions in the financial system. For all these reasons, the MR group will vote these three bills with conviction.

In the limitation, the Master shows himself.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, I am a little less convinced than my colleagues of Mr. Minister. In any case, I will try to express our concerns and disgust very clearly.

The financial crisis exposed sufficient weaknesses in financial supervision.

First, there was a lack of proactivity. The CBFA, as a supervisory authority, has repeatedly held the facts behind, each time without a blatant speech against the activities that were out of control with the banks. Part of that problem was also in interpersonal relationships. During the talks we have held and during the closed-door hearings, one element has become very clear, in particular that our supervisors with the bankers had built up not only a professional but also a friendly relationship that led to the objective judgment, Mr. Reynders, not always being fulfilled in a concrete way.

Secondly, understanding both the macro and micro-side of finance is important. Corporate interests are outweighed by the public interest. Therefore, it is necessary that the government can intervene and not only in times of crisis.

The third weakness exposed during the crisis is the question of whether our supervisors effectively have the power to intervene, both in crisis and during “going concern”? We have seen that this was not the case. The CBFA has ridingly admitted that it was between hammer and hammer at regular times. They saw that there had to be an intervention but could not; that would be a shock for the banks. At that time, the instrumentarium was insufficient.

The main question is whether the current bills provide solace for these problems.

First of all, about proactivity. Will the new supervisor keep less behind the facts? To be honest, I can’t answer this, and I don’t think the minister either. The instrument is not known today. It will only be published later through a KB, both in terms of organization, as well as the responsibility and effective possibilities for intervention of the new structure under the National Bank. It will only be announced soon. Hopefully still on time.

Mr. Minister, I have clearly heard that several members of the majority — both of Open Vld and of CD&V — asked in the committee whether the KBs that will follow the current bill will be seriously discussed in the Chamber. I have not heard anyone ask questions about this at the moment. I ask you, therefore, whether you intend to have an open debate on those KBs in the Chamber? The special committee, by the way, is hunted here because of the very wide range of beautiful proposals and clear insights it has provided. Well, if we want to take that special committee seriously, it would not be unreasonable to discuss those KBs there too.

Is there a solution to the problem of interpersonal ties? No, that gets worse because we designate the National Bank as the main supervisory body. I can’t get rid of the impression that there is more than a seem of partiality around the National Bank. First, our national banks are shareholders. Secondly, the Regent Council consists of some political appointments, a number of trade union members and a number of industrialists. So I can imagine that a number of decisions will be taken in a very difficult and difficult way. Finally, the National Bank as a listed company will control shareholders. I wonder whose interests will be effectively represented.

Second, in terms of understanding of macro and microfinance, there is an important aspect that we have learned from the past. Although the Committee on Financial Stability already existed, Mr. Quaden of the National Bank has nevertheless come to the Chamber of the Committee on Finance at the end of September 2008 announcing that he was in no way aware of the extent of the problem at Fortis. We have discussed this matter sufficiently. However, it remains a question of why today, in the current bill, we no longer learn from that historical lesson. At first glance, the chair dance is only a solution to the mandates. It is a solution that brings an appearance of improvement to the outside world. Again, the instrumentarium is not discussed and will be created via KB.

Finally, is there more power to intervene granted to our supervisory authority? Only in crisis. In times of crisis, it can be very clearly intervened, with all my sympathy and support. Nevertheless, when there is no crisis – and hopefully there will be no more crisis – it is in the phase that precedes a crisis that it is important to improve control, become more proactive and come to conclusions faster. I remember that only a few weeks ago there was a judgment in a case at KBC that was filed one and a half years ago. It does not go. If we effectively want a better protection of both consumers and governments in our financial sector, we will need to be able to act stricter and faster. Again, I do not see the instrumentary for that.

Next, how strict will the National Bank be able to act towards its shareholders? This is immediately the most important criticism. A number of colleagues complained that a listed company will control another listed company. That is correct. According to the statutes of the National Bank, there is no specific law that would prohibit this or prevent the government from implementing the draft law in question. What is there? Government must observe the general principles of good governance. These general principles of law constitute a source of law in our country. In this case, there may be a conflict with the general legal principle that no one can be a judge in his own case. Nemo iudex in causa sua. In other words, it is the principle of impartiality, which is required from a government or a control body. That principle also applies to the administrative court and may also apply to bodies of active management, insofar as it is compatible with the nature and structure of the body concerned.

That principle can be compromised if only a seem of partiality is aroused. “Justice should not only be done, but also be seen to be done.” In that regard, it is not unthinkable that in the first, least litigation, the counterparty has an argument to question the judgment of the National Bank.

Given the fact that the potential opponents of our National Bank in the future as a supervisory authority are also shareholders, we are not talking here about an apparent partiality, but about a serious violation of impartiality. This is specifically violated. The supervisor of a particular economic sector, ⁇ a sector, which is as essential to the Belgian economy as the financial sector, must be absolutely impartial and even counter any appearance of bias.

The violation must, of course, be further argued on the basis of factual elements, some of which I can demonstrate here. Not only does a listed company exercise supervision over other listed companies. The National Bank will have to oversee its minority shareholders and shareholders. For example, KBC ⁇ ly holds 2% to 3% of the National Bank shares in portfolios.

In addition, the National Bank has had a problematic relationship with these shareholders for many years. Witnesses are the many court cases that were challenged in the case of minority shareholders through Deminor and Modrikamen. I have heard several times the argument that other European countries apply the same twin peak model as Germany and the Netherlands, but that doesn’t matter here. Belgium, along with Greece, is the only country where the National Bank is a listed company. I do not want to extend the comparison with Greece here.

In addition, for example, the Bundesbank is known for its independence. With all respect, but the NBB, on the other hand, is heavily politized. There is clearly a preponderance of the government in the management of the bank. Each director, deputy governor and governor has a party card and 50 % of the regents are appointed through the Minister of Finance. The Council of Regents makes the main decisions at the General Assembly. So the partiality? and no. Appearance of partiality? Certainly not. Today, however, the door is opened to pure partiality.

Now I come to the essential question, which colleague Jambon also asked. Why is this split supervision necessary? Despite the fact that the Committee for Financial Stability existed, the National Bank has not seen the capital problems of the banks come. So I must conclude that these changes only mean an increase in political power and very clearly indicate a settlement with the CBFA.

The role and structure of the National Bank. As mentioned, as almost any European country, we also have a National Bank that is listed on the stock exchange. Our government is not at all disturbed by respect for minority shareholders. At various times, it has undermined the respect for shareholders and has made a number of adjustments. This proposal fundamentally changes the purpose of the company. A liability is introduced which, in any case, presents a risk to the reserves of the National Bank.

The organization is also thoroughly adjusted, without anyone knowing which direction it is going. Again, this also requires a KB that allows the National Bank to establish a number of entities. The number is not determined. We do not know what those entities will do and what their fulfillment will be. In that regard, I totally disagree with Mr. Mayeur in closing the interim step now.

In any case, I think the government is simply not ready. You have not prepared the work adequately. You have missed a few months of important time. This is evidence that the Systemic Risk Committee needs to be effectively installed. After all, you simply do not know in which direction you are evolving.

For the National Bank, you simply ask for a blanco cheque. You ask for a blank check to continue doing what you would actually want to do, not knowing what it is. After all, until now there is no clarity about the liability and about the organization, and so you ask for a blanco cheque.

I think it is no more than normal that, when one asks for a blanco cheque, one gives a guarantee for it. Therefore, together with Mr Jambon, I am submitting an amendment to this law, in which we request that the Belgian State give the shareholders of the National Bank of Belgium, who can provide proof of their shareholdership for the approval of this draft, the possibility to enter into a public offer for acquisition, and that at the price that is determined and which must not be less than the accounting value of the National Bank of Belgium on 24 March, that is today. The period for acceptance of that offer shall run until the publication of the decrees of the King referred to in Article 26.

And why ? That is nothing more than normal. You have taken a business in the tang right now, for many years. But today you do it again. Today you even put some new elements on the table that are completely unknown. I repeat them: the responsibility and the organization. You are asking Parliament to sign a blanco cheque. If nothing is organized in a serious way and if there is no risk, this proposal should not be a problem for you. At the same time, it obliges the government finally to make a serious calculation of what the bank is worth, the book value, and to organize a serious exit for the minority shareholders whom the bank would eventually have to withdraw in the future.

We see that clearly in the course of events within our financial sector, a national bank has other priorities than to serve the shareholders. Therefore, in that regard, it is no more than normal that we would take that step, instead of turning around this Parliament every time. The Flemish majority parties come here to say that the situation is not sustainable and that we actually need to move to a new system for the National Bank. Stop rotating circles and effectively grab the cow at the horns. Make sure that we can continue with the bank.

I would still be silent, Mr. Minister, on the ongoing investigation into the alleged course manipulation. We have not even talked about this yet. I will not discuss the matter too broadly today, but the arguments presented are not inappropriate. The sale, at the end of the stock exchange period, of packages that exceed the daily turnover and the large and very large out-of-the-share sales are not unfair. Sometimes it is about 17 000 purchases and 17 000 sales in a day. You know this is serious stock.

How did the warning system work? Who was informed and who was not? There was a complaint addressed to the CBFA. In this regard, I must take the CBFA in defense. Without that effective consciousness that it was about the National Bank, it was simply stated as a problem, with the data present at hand. The CBFA responded that such files did not need to come there. A number of frustrated shareholders trying to address a file. There was no sense in it. In the meantime, the data must be taken to the parket. This is being investigated at the parket. It has been there for a while, but in the meantime the file is running.

If I look at what has happened in the last 10 to 12 days since the file was attached, I find that the share has suddenly increased 10% in value. At the same time, we get disturbing answers about what has been done and what has not been done. I will return to the CBFA, Mr. Minister. It would not be unthinkable that there is effective speculation on a possible public acquisition offer. When we look at who the stakeholders are, who can effectively have an interest in doing so, we talk about the government and institutional investors, both at home and abroad.

As a government, you have already answered that you did not have that intention, that you did not try to influence the course in some way, and I still believe that. However, suppose you come to institutional investors who have had that intention, suppose it could, it is not excluded. I’m not saying it is, but it could be. It is possible that we will be very closely surrounded by the National Bank. And then ? Suppose that this survey shows that we are actually coming much closer than we thought and that there are parties involved that should be controlled by the National Bank in the future, or worse, that there might even be some form of participation. In that case, the entire structure completely falls on its poop. Knowing this background, for me, approving the design now is truly irresponsible.

We could have better looked at what is currently happening in Europe. To what extent is it aligned? Mr. Minister, I hope that you can give a clear answer as to the extent to which these three drafts are aligned with the European counterparts, especially with the largest markets. Of course, it seems obvious to me that our financial headquarters, Paris, the financial center of this country, is moving in the same direction.

For all these reasons, we will not. 2406 and no. 2407 approve but we are radical against no. by 2408 The No. 2408 witnesses of holderdebolder football. The Committee on Systemic Risk will not be, or again will not be, and now again will be introduced and will take over the relay during the interim period. Your instrumentarium is not ready. By the way, I see no reason why you should handle this structure today. You could perfectly identify the entire instrumentarium and the organization together in one design. The ongoing investigation into course manipulation has not been completed. It gives me a very strange impression of what is going on. Especially, you do not install an impartial supervisor. On the contrary, we install a party party.

The problem of the National Bank must now be fundamentally resolved before moving forward. I have also said that I fully support the idea of one supervisory authority. There is no reason to maintain this situation. On the contrary, if we left with a white leaf, one institution would be much more likely to succeed. This scenario is based solely on preserving the old structures, on preserving the old mandates, on preserving political power.

Next, I would like to ask you to discuss the royal decrees thoroughly first. I can hardly imagine that you would agree with us not to approve this bill today or tomorrow. This will go on, so we know you. In any case, I would like to ask you to thoroughly discuss those royal decrees that will complement the law in Parliament. Again, the special committee dealing with the financial crisis is suitable for this.

The intermediate phase is cooler for us. Bill No. 2408 is not a law. It is a declaration of intent. Further you will not come.

I suggest that we suspend for five minutes for the needs of the services. I also suggest that we finish this project. Only Mr Van der Maelen is still registered as speaker, but I assume that the minister wants to briefly replicate. The other points we would – I have consulted left and right for a while – postpone to tomorrow. We said we would not meet after 20 o’clock. I don’t know how long the minister wants to replicate. Will everyone agree with this?

We will then resume our work at 18.30 and we will finish after discussing this draft. No objection to suspend for ten minutes?

As far as I am concerned, there is no objection that we would further address a draft or a proposal. If we do this quickly, then tomorrow we have done it earlier. This, of course, depends on the approval of the colleagues and of you, President.

Yes of course. I am at the disposal of the House. There are many people who come to ask me the opposite. That they are out of this moment. We said we would not meet after 20 o’clock.

If there is a consensus there is, but I will, of course, be prepared by the door to go until 20:00. And Mr Gilkinet?

Mr. Speaker, I would like to make you another proposal, because the next text on hospital insurance is not anonymous. There should be a single discussion on this subject. It would also be more correct, both democratically and in terms of the quality of the debate, to conduct it tomorrow after the topical issues.

We could end the debate on the reform of the control of the financial system and return tomorrow to the debate on hospital insurance. This seems quite logical in terms of the organization of the work. Otherwise, we will have an important debate.

The President, Mr. Van der Maelen tells me that his speech will only take five to six minutes. Wouldn’t we finish this part before the interruption?

There is the Minister’s response.

by Mr. The Minister is always very short.

I am open to any suggestions. It seems to me, however, normal for the services to suspend our work around 18:00 for ten minutes! But if you prefer to continue the work now and suspend the session later, I see no objection!

Do you have a different opinion, Mr. Jambon?

Mr. Speaker, I have no other opinion, but of course you express yourself very diplomatically. You just said “not after 20 hours,” while I meant that it was agreed that we would work until 20 hours. That is a substitial difference. I suggest that we meet tonight until 20 o’clock.

Yes, but then there is the risk that we will cut a design as if in two and that we will have to continue the treatment of it tomorrow. If there is a majority to meet until 20 o’clock, as was announced in principle in the Conference of Presidents, me well.

If Mr Van der Maelen, who also has an agenda problem, intervenes first, then I propose to suspend, even if it is only for ten minutes, after the minister’s response, and then to resume our work until 20 hours. Are you agreeing with this? (Acceptance of all banks)

I will be short. In the committee, I have discussed the three draft laws extensively. I have not changed my opinion since the discussion in the committee. I listened carefully to the members of the majority. I assume that they have not changed their mind either.

My group voted in the committee against the first two bills, the numbers 2406 and 2407, and will also do so in the plenary session. There are three reasons for this.

First, these two designs provide a response to the previous crisis. We continue to sit on our hunger because there are no answers to the problems from the medium-sized and small banks. I was told in the committee that the legislation strives for continuity. Sorry, but that legislation has not been adapted to the financial sector. At this point, we remain on our hunger. We urge the Minister and the Government to take action in the small and medium-sized institutions as soon as possible.

Second, we are undermining the important role of the National Bank. The King should only seek advice from the Committee on Systemic Risk and the CBFA, but not from the National Bank.

Third, the draft laws do not work preventively in any way. They only fight the symptom. Certainly, a number of measures are being taken, but precisely because of the fact that crisis measures are being taken without doing anything to the moral hazard, the major system banks will know even more than before that problems are being intervened. In this Chamber is prepared a bill concerning the bank testament, from sp.a but also from the CD&V. We believe that it would be good that it be discussed as soon as possible and approved here, eventually amended.

I have submitted twenty amendments to Bill No. 2408 on banking supervision. In six points, I express the position of my group and the accountability for those amendments.

We also voted against this bill. As other colleagues said, it is nothing more than a framework law, an empty box, while we need legislation that already sets out concrete measures and instruments.

I refer to the statements made by the Governor of the National Bank and Peter Praet of the Bank for International Settlements in the Banking Commission. They both point out that, unfortunately, the banks have reverted to their old behavior and that very risky behavior, including with structured loans, is reappearing.

The second reason is that that bill is a law of authority, a law that leaves much power to the King.

The third reason is the very unclear division of powers between the National Bank and the CBFA. The criterion is whether or not it is prudential. I have asked a number of questions in the committee that I have not been answered. For example, there is no prudential aspect to the law supplementary pensions and to the law supplementary pensions of self-employed persons, but at the same time there are also no rules of conduct. We wonder how the powers will be distributed between the National Bank and the CBFA. We have not received a response to that.

The fourth reason why we will vote against is that the bill has not yet decided whether the National Bank will follow the model of the Banque de France or the model of the Dutch Bank. In the French model, banking supervision and macroprudential supervision are organized in separate entities within the Banque de France, each with its own board and joint chairman. In the Netherlands, both macro and micro-prudential supervision is housed in an entity with a management committee. This latter model is our preference, but we note that in our bill there is no choice in this regard.

The fifth plea grounds for the deletion of Article 45(2) without any explanation in the notice of observations. This is not innocent, as the rights of workers are referred to in the following articles. Thus, there is a possibility of offending the employees of the CBFA.

The sixth and last major defect in the law is the absence of arbitration. For example, which institution has priority in declaring members of decision-making bodies inadequate? That is not a fictional example, it is a problem that occurs in the Netherlands with the person of Gerrit Zalm, about which the Dutch AFM and the Dutch National Bank have different opinions. It has been determined that there is a need for arbitration, but this is not provided in the draft law.

Here are the reasons why we have submitted a number of amendments. However, I do not have the illusion that these amendments will be adopted. For the six reasons I have just listed, we will vote against the Banking Supervision Act.

Mr. Speaker, first and foremost, I would like to thank the Members of Parliament, not only the members of the Committee on Finance, but also the members of the Committee dealing with the banking crisis. The chairman of that committee has delivered a long story on the investigation of the causes of the crisis, and more than that, to a possible solution in the future.

I found it a very suitable opportunity for the government to properly cooperate with the MEPs, not only in Parliament, but also in the working group in preparing the various drafts.

I would like to thank the many political groups who support the first two drafts. I am also grateful to the majority for their support for the third draft that is now being submitted to Parliament.

We are one of the first countries in Europe and even in the world to come to Parliament with drafts on the subject.

We were the first or among the first not only to act but to act during the crisis. In the crisis situation, in the fall of 2008, it was necessary to react very quickly with the help of very innovative techniques and in an emergency. I think of the guarantees put in place in a very important way in the field of interbank credit. I also think of the guarantees concerning the National Bank which did not benefit from this state guarantee on its own interventions. I also think of techniques of borrowing or taking equity participation in a number of institutions.

Fifteen months after the crisis began, we are still managing it, but the commitment that was made on behalf of the government since September 2008 has been kept. Not a single saver in Belgium has suffered the dramatic consequences that could have entailed the abandonment of one or the other institution. We said we would not leave any savings on the road. Even in cases where there was no obligation to intervene, we intervened and I especially think of Kaupthing. A specific legislation was passed in Parliament to prevent any saver from getting into trouble. I think this is important to remember when we analyze projects such as those presented to you today.

Not only have we responded immediately to the crisis, but we have already taken a number of steps before presenting these different projects.

For example, we have made a very important decision in connection with the assessment of financial institutions. It was also a premiere in Europe. The tax was included in the 2010-2011 budget and is now poured into a law. For example, the tax on the banking sector and insurance companies, which has been introduced since last year, represents a total amount of more than 600 million euros for 2011. This is nothing in our budget. Indeed, it was normal for the State, after having interfered with the money of the taxpayers for the banks, to ask for support from the banking sector for the recovery of our economy and for a new path toward a balance in our public finances. This is really new. I have heard many announcements in many European countries, but in Belgium we now have a text and we can take action in that regard.

Today we see the same. We are going to vote on three draft laws with first and foremost emergency measures in case of crisis. Hopefully we can avoid new crises next year and even longer than that. It is always useful to learn from the crisis. We have now done that. I thank the many groups for their support.

From now on, we have more resources at our disposal to respond quickly to a possible crisis and to deal with it properly.

I heard Mr. Mayeur wondered if we could really go towards shareholder compensation. I think so. I reminded him that, in the case of the Fortis case, for a very large number of small holders, it was a placement equivalent to government bonds, which they considered – this was often stressed at the time – as a placement of a good family father.

That being said, it is necessary that the State can intervene faster and without being confronted with the different debates of general assemblies that we saw in 2008 and 2009. It should then be allowed for the debate on compensation to take place before the court. I repeat, it will be held on the basis of the estimation of the value of the assets of the financial institution concerned at the time of state intervention, of course, not beyond.

But, I repeat, we mostly wanted to learn from the crisis and equip Belgium with a more efficient arsenal for the future. The majority of parliamentarians understand this approach.

As for the third project that you will vote on tomorrow, it is part of a European evolution. We learn a number of lessons from the crisis, but above all we want to follow the line of the reports of Larosière and Lamfalussy. By the way, Mr. George, we are going in the direction of what constituted the last discussion of your commission in charge of monitoring the financial crisis.

The question is what are the reasons for this choice. I have already answered that question in the committee, but I will repeat my answer.

First, it is an international trend in ⁇ all of Europe. Therefore, there is no real advantage of that choice compared to other options. This was also stated in the report of the Lamfalussy committee. However, we believe that it is better to go in the same direction as the other countries. This is now the evolution in Germany, but also in other countries of Europe. I am now trying to come to a definitive model as soon as possible, the twinpeaks model. It is a general evolution in several major countries in Europe.

Second, there is a small difference between the different financial tasks of the National Bank of Belgium. There will also be another role for the CBFA, which will be empowered, not only for banking and insurance companies or for the markets – because it is a market authority – but also for consumers.

Again, it was perfectly possible to install another model. However, I think it would be better for Belgium, a medium-sized country, to go in the same direction as the other countries, first and foremost those of Europe.

As I said in the committee, we will try to go as quickly as possible. I remind you that the text that is submitted to you is the one that had been submitted and adopted in first and second reading to the government for a long time.

I have heard a lot of things to explain why we should stay in this text. I will be very clear: the Financial Stability Committee proposed to amend the text by submitting an amendment to us; this is stated in the document, Mr. Speaker. There was no consensus on this amendment; therefore we will remain in the original text. This will not prevent us from doing everything we can to move as quickly as possible towards the Twin Peaks model, and thus removing, if possible, or shortening, in any case as much as possible, the period of establishment of the committee responsible for the control of system institutions.

Regarding the KBs, I repeat that after the second reading in the government, I will provide complete information to the Parliament. First and foremost, there should be a first reading, then the opinion of the State Council and then the second reading. I have always done the same for other laws. We must go to a confirmation of some KBs by law within two years, but I have already said in the committee that we will come to Parliament as soon as possible, i.e. within a few months; that is perfectly possible. I will inform the Parliament after the second reading before the Government. That is a normal balance between Parliament and government, even for the members of Parliament who will vote against such a law.

That is always surprising; you ask for more information about the implementation of such a law, but you vote against. That is your choice. On an intellectual level, it is very interesting to ask for more intelligence, but that does not apply to a bad law, as I have heard? However, this is not bad.

I repeat that we are going to complete information in this regard.

We are not yet in court.

and subsidiary.

Subsidiary in additional order. That is another story.

We will, of course, come with these texts.

I repeat that in some way we are strengthening the mechanisms of the 2002 law, which already marked a collaboration with the National Bank, the CBFA, the Financial Stability Committee; we will go further. We will try to go as quickly as possible in the implementation, but these are very technical modalities, let’s agree. The Financial Stability Committee itself says it will take some time to formulate the decisions. I hope to be able to move forward as quickly as possible.

In summary, we draw lessons from the crisis through an anti-crisis arsenal in case we should once again intervene.

To conclude this lesson from the crisis, I add that through these texts, we will strengthen regulation. But I quite share – and I spoke with him last week – the vision of Dominique Strauss-Kahn who considers that regulation is very important, but that it is still much more important to focus on supervision. One can have the best rules in the world, if they are not really applied and controlled by supervisors, it is then that the bast hurt. Therefore, it will be necessary to focus as much as possible on the functioning of supervision, here as in Europe.

We must also ask ourselves the question of how we will react, here and everywhere in Europe, to the speculation that has developed in recent times against the states themselves. This will be one of the concerns not only in the coming days and weeks of the European Council and ECOFIN, but it will also be the concern in the coming months of the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

Indeed, it is unacceptable that, barely out of difficulties thanks to the support of the states, some financial actors attempt to put the states themselves in trouble. I recalled this for the case of Greece and I hope that the European Council will go in this direction: it is important that we can work in the euro area in collaboration with the IMF. I do not understand why some states refused, at first, the intervention of the Monetary Fund. We are the first in Europe to finance this Monetary Fund. It is therefore normal to ask him to intervene, even though, in my view, the euro area must retain the leadership in this approach.

I have two conclusions.

First, in connection with the National Bank of Belgium, I have made a lot of comments and therefore I refer to the report for the various questions related to the composition of the various general meetings of the National Bank of Belgium. There were various discussions on this. I have given a clear and clear answer in the committee.

In connection with the evolution of the stock exchange and the so-called manipulations, I must tell you that this evening there has also been a communication from the CBFA, to be very concrete. You have to read a lot of articles in the newspapers, but you have to read the various comments from the government. For the CBFA it is clear and there is now a communication from the CBFA Executive Committee.

The chairman of the committee knows this: it is not my role to perform the functions of the CBFA. The Commission has also recently put the points on the "i" in relation to the transmission of information, the data that has been communicated to the prosecutor's office and the content of these data. Obviously, they were very misinterpreted by one speaker and repeated in a press article. CBFA also reserves the right to conduct the necessary judicial procedures to counter the breach of secrecy on confidential data that had been transmitted as well as to act against the identified person who allowed himself a number of erroneous comments on the basis of this information.

I come to a final point of conclusion. As many have said, we must go further and we will go further, first in Belgium, through the texts that will be submitted to you, in particular with regard to consumer protection. In view of the evolution of the financial world, several elements must be kept in mind. I will cite two.

The first is to strengthen the training on financial products and the functioning of the elements affecting the financial world. We are working on it. In the Flemish Community, there is a willingness to go in this direction in teaching. It is obvious that young people who enter the professional life are increasingly in need of having a minimum of information about the functioning of the financial system. It is important! We expect to work there with the CBFA and in collaboration with educational leaders in our country and beyond. The MiFID directive at the European level already goes in this direction, namely giving an obligation of information but above all of verifying knowledge in the matter.

Then comes the protection component. As I have already said a few times outside of this speaker, we will have to focus much more on consumer protection to prevent too complex products from being presented to them. We need to be able to work with products that match customers. Between professionals or between professionals and individuals, the products are not the same. All the work on this subject is now completed.

On the same method of collaboration, Parliament and the federal government will present a text on this subject that will address a very large number of concerns in the logic of consumer protection. At the European level, we will do the same during the Belgian Presidency. I will soon meet with Commissioner Barnier to discuss with him the programme of this Presidency.

It may also be necessary to intervene on the rating agencies if the Spanish presidency has not finished the work.

It was at the request of the British Government that the Spanish Presidency withdrew the file from the draft directive concerning investment funds including hedge funds. Not being a member of the Socialist International, I cannot understand why the British and Spanish governments agreed on this. But I will be clear: Belgium, like Germany or like France, with the finance ministers of these countries, wants to adopt this draft directive as soon as possible. There is a majority to do so. If this does not happen under the Spanish presidency, we will come under the Belgian presidency.

The other aspect is the draft Directive on derivatives, including the CDS that is so much talked about. This will be one of the important points of Commissioner Barnier’s first work and we will do everything to accompany his approach. Beyond what we do to control, monitor, supervise financial market players, we also need to be much more attentive to the products and the use that is made of financial products by the various actors. Derivatives are indeed a major concern in this regard.

This is what I wanted to answer in your speech. Of course, the work is not finished, of course we will still need to adopt texts within the government, to present them to you, especially in the field of consumer protection, to make progress at the European level. I hope that those who intervene vehemently in these places will also ensure that their European colleagues, in their respective political formations, support this approach so that quick decisions can be made.