Proposition 52K2246

Projet de loi portant assentiment à l'Accord entre l'Union européenne et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique sur le traitement et le transfert de données des dossiers passagers (données PNR) par les transporteurs aériens au Ministère américain de la sécurité intérieure (DHS) (Accord PNR 2007), fait à Bruxelles le 23 juillet 2007 et à Washington le 26 juillet 2007.

General information ¶

Submitted by

The Senate

Submission date

Oct. 1, 2009

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

United States disclosure of information protection of privacy data processing international agreement air traffic air transport public safety agreement (EU) personal data terrorism

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V LE PS | SP Open Vld MR VB

Voted to reject

Groen Vooruit Ecolo FN

Abstained from voting

N-VA LDD

Party dissidents ¶

• Patrick Dewael (Open Vld) abstained from voting.
• Jean-Jacques Flahaux (MR) abstained from voting.
• Peter Luykx (CD&V) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

Nov. 27, 2009 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

I would like to point out that I am a co-rapporteur. Since we do not have a written report in our possession, I would like to take the second part of the reporting on my behalf.

I know it is Friday night, but we will discuss this important treaty today.

As a co-rapporteur, I will discuss the work in the Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr Deseyn will report on the end of the discussion in the committee.

The Foreign Relations Committee discussed the bill on 17 November 2009, as well as last Monday and Tuesday. At the first meeting, then Foreign Minister Yves Leterme explained the agreement.

Following the dramatic events of September 11, 2001, the United States adopted a law requiring airlines to provide information about their passengers with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Colleagues, can I ask you to listen? You also take the plane from time to time. These data relate to you all.

Anyone who does not provide the information risks sanctions. European companies threatened to conflict with European privacy legislation and could also be victims of unfair competition. So the logical decision was made to negotiate an agreement between the Union as a whole and the United States. A first agreement of 17 May 2004 was annulled by the Court of Justice because it lacked the European legal basis, and therefore not because of its content.

Can I ask you again for silence? If you are not interested in the debate, please go out. Have a little respect for a parliamentary treatment of an important draft.

Couldn't you be able to do it? I’ve got all the understanding for that, but keep your discussion out.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker, I hope you realize the importance of this.

The interim agreement concluded in October 2006 expired on 31 July 2007. The negotiations for a new agreement focused primarily on the reconciliation of the legitimate fight against terrorism, legal certainty for airlines and breaches of privacy. As the guarantees of the United States in the latter two areas were deemed sufficient by the European Union, the present agreement was approved on 23 July 2007. Several commissioners have expressed concerns about the impact the agreement would have on the protection of privacy.

They had difficulties with the preventive nature of the collection of PNRs and with its fully automated processing. The combination of different passenger data could lead to problems for innocent passengers.

Furthermore, reference was made to the opinion of the State Council, which raised a number of fundamental objections.

Therefore, it was proposed to hear the Privacy Commission.

Some colleagues emphasized that the international community must, of course, be able to protect itself against those who dislike freedom. This agreement would show a good balance between that need, on the one hand, and, of course, the concern about the personal life sphere, on the other.

The Minister noted that the European Commission plans to review the agreement in March and April of next year. He also argued that the rights of passengers are improving compared to today’s practice. Belgium is among the last five EU member states to ratify the agreement.

At our meeting last week Monday, November 23, we held an exchange of views with representatives of the Privacy Committee. However, the Privacy Committee has not yet taken an official position. It was found that many of the principles contained in the agreement have not yet been fully developed and that the arrangements for monitoring those exchanges and for the protection of citizens and information are rather weak. A lot of data is being collected, thus challenging proportionality. Since the latest meeting, two years ago, of the Article 29 Working Group, which monitors data protection at European level, a number of U.S. promises have still not been fulfilled.

On the contrary, we must emphasize that the treaty has been in effect de facto for two years. It is unthinkable for the Privacy Commission to issue an opinion that is negative across the line.

The non-ratification could result in airlines being simply banned from the US airspace. Even for the citizen, a non-ratification is not positive.

However, the representatives of the Privacy Committee believed that we should activate the positive elements of the agreement, for example its evaluation, and put them into effect in practice.

Several colleagues believed that an opinion of the Privacy Committee should have been part of the legislative dossier. They also emphasized the importance of the evaluation of the agreement in order to improve them.

Ladies and gentlemen, here is my report. We will see if we will speak on behalf of the group.

I would now like to give the floor to Mr Roel Deseyn, who will report on the conclusion of the discussion.

If you do not care, I give the word. Thank you, Mrs. the reporter.

Mr Deseyn will be speaking as second reporter.

On November 24, we held a third committee meeting dedicated to this topic. Mr. Moriau of the PS group had agreed that the PNR agreement is potentially dangerous, but the statement of the Privacy Committee convinced him that it is not an option not to approve it. He also spoke of the need for an urgent evaluation and stressed that the opinion of the Privacy Committee comes quite late.

Colleague de Donnea has joined it. He was surprised that the Privacy Committee failed to inform Parliament about its work.

There was also a debate about the cooperation between this House and the Privacy Commission. Probably a regulatory change is needed.

Geert Versnick, Chairman of the Committee, could agree with this. He also referred to the letter from the privacy committee, which must prove that this acted only late.

Mr Dallemagne drew two conclusions from the presentation of the Privacy Committee. First, there is much to be noted both in the text of the agreement and in the practical application of the arrangements contained therein. He also noted that Belgium is condemned to the ratification of the treaty. Like previous speakers, he also talked about the control mechanisms and the balance that should be guaranteed in the text.

I myself, following the colleagues, also said that it would not be a good thing if the present agreement was not ratified because there are, of course, legitimate concerns regarding the protection of the private sphere. Nevertheless, I believe that the whole is balanced and that it is still better to agree to this agreement than to have no legal framework at all and therefore be fully surrendered to the unilateral imperatives of the United States.

The State Secretary for Mobility, Etienne Schouppe, who then acted on behalf of the government, explained that the 2007 agreement for the passengers concerned represents a progression from the 2004 agreement. In other words, it is a more balanced agreement and it is also of great importance for the bilateral relations between the EU and the United States. Furthermore, as Mr Schouppe stressed, the commercial interests of the airlines, as well as those of the airports, must not be overlooked. He also pointed out that there have been mutual commitments, that it was not just the unilateral imposition of a text and that EU guarantees have been built for the citizen, which was precisely the great added value of the European Union contribution.

The Secretary of State, of course, had an ear for the aspirations of the Members of Parliament. He said there is room for further development of the evaluation moment and stressed that non-ratification would put the citizen in a worse position and that Belgium is committed to fully cooperate in the evaluation of the agreement. The comments made in the context of the discussion of the Consent Act will therefore be taken into account.

We then passed to the voting, since there were no further comments from the members. The only two articles of this bill have been unanimously adopted by the committee, Mr. Speaker.

I have Mr. Wouter De Vriendt, Mr. Tuybens, M. Moriau and Ms. Genot registered for the general discussion. Do other members ask the word in the general discussion?

If this is not the case, then Mr De Vriendt has the word.

First of all, I would like to thank both reporters for their reports.

Mr. Prime Minister, it must be done very quickly. You have just gained the confidence of the majority in this Parliament and this bill must already be approved. There is a hurry. I remember very well that you were quite bored with the delay some time ago when my group asked the opinion of the Privacy Committee.

What is there for? Our country must ratify the agreement governing the transfer of passenger data by European airlines to the United States. If we do not do so, we threaten to take the anger of the United States on our throat and we may indeed subject our airlines to certain sanctions.

After all, this agreement regulates an existing practice, which is quite important for the United States. The U.S. intelligence services want to see the personal data of all passengers on aircraft entering the U.S. airspace. On the basis of those data, an automatic calculation of the terrorist risk represented by that passenger is then made for each passenger.

It is an informed, statistical calculation of the terrorism risk of a passenger. Based on such a statistical calculation, an Air France aircraft on its way to Mexico on August 19 was forbidden to enter U.S. airspace. Apparently, a calculation was made that showed that one of the passengers still represented a risk of terrorism.

Colleagues, Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Ministers, the man in question turned out to be not a terrorist but a human rights activist; someone who is active in certain organizations and who is cataloged as such, but who was labeled as a potential terrorist by the automated informed statistical calculation.

Colleagues, if we approve this agreement, if our country ratifies this agreement, we expose ourselves to such mechanisms. Such things will be avoided in the future. That is a first consideration.

Basically, I consider this agreement to be ⁇ problematic from the point of view of the protection of privacy. Not only we from Ecolo-Green! That said, the reporters have already alluded to it. The State Council and the Legal Service of the European Parliament also highlight its very problematic nature in terms of privacy.

The State Council sets as a condition for the transmission of such data that there must be a prevailing public interest. In the analysis, the State Council says that this serious public interest is not present or cannot be demonstrated. The State Council also points out the ⁇ long retention period of these data, namely an active retention of seven years and a passive retention of eight years. This allows for a total of fifteen periods of storage of these data. There is no view, and there is no control possible, of any third parties or third countries to whom the United States may transmit such personal data.

The Legal Service of the European Parliament formulated a number of objections in the same sense in a rather circumstantial analysis.

It was on my initiative that the Chamber Committee on Foreign Relations pulled the alarm bell and not without question went to the approval of this draft law but requested the opinion of the privacy commission. Faced with all the objections — objections which are also in the documents of the parliamentary dossier — I think that seeking the opinion of the Privacy Committee was a very justified step. Only last Monday we heard a number of people from the privacy commission. We have heard, among others, the gentlemen Willem De Beuckelaere and Bart De Schutter. Their comments were actually very critical in the light of the above. They set out a number of issues regarding the protection of privacy.

The agreement, they say, is poorly structured in terms of protection and supervision of privacy. They also note that many provisions are already implemented and that this is problematic.

There is, among other things, a control mechanism that should be installed. However, they note that during those two years the control mechanism is not yet operational.

Furthermore, the agreement has been reached in a rather obscure way: they complain of a lack of transparency in the negotiations on the first versions of the agreement circulating. They argue that neither representation of the people, Europe, the United States, any European Member State, nor any privacy committee had any view of the provisions contained in the initial draft agreement.

Both men also pointed out the problem of proportionality. For of course, colleagues, the fight against international terrorism must be fought, but not at the expense of everything, not at the expense of giving up our own fundamental rights and freedoms. They point out a number of short elements. Compared to previous versions or implementations of the provisions of this Agreement, nineteen fairly wide clusters of personal data are now requested. For example, it may also be possible to request the personal data of those who have booked the tickets, thus not only the passengers, but also the persons who in some way have a link with the passenger ticket in question.

Furthermore, the agreement not only reports terrorism as a possible basis for a transfer of personal data, but, and now you must listen carefully, also other serious crimes. Other serious crimes. Based on such a hollow, easily fillable concept, personal data may be requested by security bodies in the United States. What are those agencies? Wim Debeuckelaere has explicitly stated that any sheriff in any village in the United States may rely on this agreement to request personal data from passengers on flights heading to the United States. They have, of course, also pointed out the very long retention periods of personal data, which they consider excessive in comparison with a number of other arrangements.

I think it is important, colleagues reporters, to emphasize once again that they have, by the way, also said that the interaction between their Privacy Committee and Parliament should be much better. They are willing to make some suggestions in this regard. They also advocate for greater involvement of their Privacy Committee in parliamentary work. I know that in the Justice Committee, for example, the opinion of the Privacy Committee is regularly requested if appropriate. Had our group not pulled the alarm bell, colleagues, then the privacy committee would not have spoken about this agreement.

I believe that a stronger role of the Privacy Commission is needed. We need to think together about how to implement this. I have the intellectual honesty to say that the Privacy Commission has said that Belgium, in its opinion, cannot afford not to ratify this agreement. Why would it be problematic to not ratify? Simply because of the fact that our country then exposes itself to sanctions, to sanctions because of the United States, to a possible ban on airlines operating in our country to fly into the American airspace. This is a purely economic power argument. There were long debates on this issue in the committee. Here we are faced with a situation where we are asked to approve something we are not all so satisfied with. We all realize that there is something missing in terms of privacy and privacy protection. Nevertheless, I believe that most of us will approve this agreement in the plenary session.

Colleagues, what are we really doing? Alternatives are possible. An alternative would be the continuation of the current situation, as many of those provisions are already in effect, and an incentive from the Parliament to the government to immediately restart the renegotiations in order to reach a balanced and much better agreement.

Of course, as I have said, the fight against international terrorism must be carried out, but in a proportionate manner. If we simply approve this agreement, then we are actually falling into a cleanly placed trap. It is a trap because in the name of the fight against terrorism and in the name of the fight against the restriction of our freedoms, we are just throwing our freedoms and our fundamental rights overboard. So we are about to give up with a majority in Parliament. We are actually falling into the trap and we are taking out our own democracy. Can I ask you to stop here for a moment? Alternatives are possible. Let us give a signal. We do not have to approve anything here that we all know is very, very problematic in terms of privacy.

Mr. President, Mr. Minister, colleagues, as the previous speaker pointed out, this is a very interesting matter. One thing we have to keep in mind, unfortunately. What we need to approve here is actually an agreement that has been in force for two years and already has its effects today. In itself, that is already a reason to ask why we are still here to approve this. It is therefore true that this is no longer necessary.

Even though the treaty de facto entered into force two years ago, the reason for our criticism remains valid.

We are happy that there is a war against terrorism. That this automatically has to take out a whole set of human rights is, of course, something completely different. Let us make the comparison with Guantanamo, an attempt by the United States to hold terrorism in hand. A super-secure prison is being created where human rights are apparently no longer being discussed; even to the extent that the Bush government was shamelessly drawn on the fingers. They were, of course, bored with this, but it seems to me normal for the international community to point out that international law is not taken into account. It is therefore logical that the Obama administration has immediately indicated that it wants to quit this. They wanted to put themselves back within international humanitarian law and international law tout court.

This agreement also dates from the period of the Bush administration. To enable 19 clusters of data to be requested, people flying to the United States must indicate what their political beliefs are, what their sexual orientation is, as if these are important, essential elements to be able to assess whether or not someone is a state-threatening person. It is true that it is not clearly defined who may request that data. Is it only for the highest U.S. judicial bodies or is it also for the police of any city or county? These are all things that we, if we are intellectually honest, would say they go far too far. But because the United States asks, we have to fold.

I think Belgium has given exactly the example to give a response to this. At the time when in the Guantanamo case Belgium was asked to help with the reception of a number of people in Belgium, the opposition also said that it was a means to thus be able to quickly reverse a situation that is not legal and not in accordance with international law, to be able to recover more quickly.

Here too, Belgium can play a role in sending a signal to the United States that even though this agreement has been in place for two years, for substantive reasons we will not agree. Belgium is not the only country that has not yet ratified it. It will not depend on Belgium.

Mr Tuybens, one should not mistakenly give the impression that all these different categories of data are collected in the same way. Exactly at the request of the EU and during the negotiations, the number of categories was reduced from 34 to 19. The highly sensitive information relating to race and belief is subject to special guarantees and is not collected. This is filtered for storage.

I am, by the way, very curious about what your group will do later, because in the Senate sp.a has unanimously approved this. There were no special objections.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tuybens, I would be grateful if you were to step away from that typical left-wing, hypocritical human-friendliness. You say that Belgium has done something for Guantanamo. You can contradict me, but if I am not mistaken, a man of gender has been brought here. Less could not.

Second, you pretend that Bush is the worst guy in the world. Well, I am not going to defend it. In contrast, you place Mr. Obama as the new saint, also for the people of the liberal mind you are part of. However, Obama has not yet closed Guantanamo, far from. Stop that naive trouble.

Mr. Van den Eynde, on your last comment, it is obvious that it is difficult to evaluate a President-in-Office if he is ten months in office, ⁇ in a country like America where ⁇ many aspects have gone wrong. I’m ⁇ not the one who will say that everything Mr. Obama does is by definition right. There is still a lot to happen in America.

What I notice, that you must admit, is that he already talked about Guantanamo in his election campaign. There is also an end to numerous inhumane torture practices: Abu Ghraib, waterboarding and so on, of which we may have talked. There is at least a new, fresh wind blowing on that level, I feel, and I hope that this will continue.

The new Obama administration has effectively asked a number of countries to help end its predecessor’s illegal situation around Guantanamo. In any case, our country has reached the hand with respect to that one person.

Mr. Deseyn, you say we have gone from 34 to 19 data clusters. Nevertheless, some important, sensitive personal data still needs to be made public. I cannot formulate it otherwise. The agreement does not specify to what extent the data will be stored. Where are they going? There is no guarantee that other police and judicial authorities can obtain this information.

It goes even further than what Mr. Tuybens says.

Mr Deseyn, one has indeed moved from an earlier version of 34 personal data to 19 personal data. You apparently did not listen properly to what the Chairman of the Privacy Commission said on this subject. He said very clearly that the 19 personal data are now clusters, very wide clusters, making the total personal data to be requested much wider than before. Your argument that this is a better situation is not correct. On the contrary, the situation has worsened.

I acknowledge that it is indeed not about 19 private personal data, but about a cluster of data.

Mr. Tuybens cites a number of examples, including race and religion. However, it must be acknowledged that these are not treated in the same way as the general data such as the name, the meal eaten on board, or the information surrounding the mail program with which that or that person works. This information is filtered in a special way and is not stacked with the other data. That was the nature of my intervention.

This proves that an American computer determines who is considered a state hazard and who is not. The question is whether we should go in that direction or not.

Whether someone is homosexual or not, will it be important to know if someone is a state hazard? All that, my colleagues, we should absolutely not accept! I think we really agree on this.

By the way, it is also true, Mr. Desseyn, that if a person is registered at a certain moment, that person would even have the right to access the data. In practice, this person, if he wants to request his own data in that famous computer, that he has to wait years before he gets a response. One does not even have the descensy to actually make this much more transparent.

It is also the case that the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in order to formulate it in this way, has drawn up a letter with privacy guarantees. Where possible, such data may be used for the protection of the vital interests of the data subjects or others, in criminal proceedings or in other cases prescribed by law. This is very vague; so one does not know what it is. The question can also be asked what is the relationship of that letter to the agreement. Does it mean that the content of that letter is automatically included in the agreement, or not? From a legal and technical point of view, a letter is, of course, a completely different given from the agreement itself.

In other words, this is a disproportionate story. It is the harvesting of human rights under the motto of the war on terrorism. There are also other colleagues who have noted this. This is also stated in the report. Mr. de Donnea says it relates to a very delicate matter. That is right. Ms. Vautmans says that the recording of such data is potentially dangerous. That is right. Nevertheless, apparently we are all going to walk in the line and very kindly dress up at the moment the US government confronts us with this.

Mr. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, you will soon meet Mrs. Hilary Clinton. You told us through the media. I find it very interesting to speak to her about this matter then. The United States now has the opportunity to use this data, not only for terrorist attacks, but also for other serious crimes. In other words, the Americans will decide what they see as another serious crime. Does that mean that this will logically be the same as what we see here in Europe as another serious crime? I think there will be at least some nuance differences about the perception of how Americans define a serious crime and how Europeans define a serious crime. We depend entirely on how the Americans will define what another serious crime is. I think this is disproportionate. I think it is wise to question the U.S. government on this.

Mr. Speaker, dear colleague Tuybens, I would like to make a small comment. What you say is right, but you step into an open door. What is a crime is determined in every country of the world by the legal system that exists there. With us is that the Penal Code and in Britain is that tradition, as you undoubtedly know. It is not up to us to determine what a serious crime can be in another country. That is simply unthinkable. Consequently, this reasoning is not incorrect, but not relevant.

Mr. Speaker, I think my reasoning is relevant. The question can be asked who is the party who prepares the personal data. Who is that? It is not the U.S. government that is doing an investigation. An airline is asked to request certain personal data of a passenger. This can be explained or interpreted in any way. It’s also a computer that does it, as I said. I refer to the example of colleague De Vriendt about the aircraft of Air France. There was an error in the computer. Instead of a terrorist, it was a human rights activist, which is 180 degrees different from each other. Probably a computer with –1 and +1 can make a mistake, so suddenly the entire aircraft has to return because it is not allowed to fly over U.S. airspace.

Therefore, it is clear that here something else is meant and something else is being discussed.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, it is absolutely of the utmost importance that we are very well aware that international human rights have a higher value than anything else. That is my political and personal belief. Well, if a war is being waged against terrorism, I can only bear that it is happening, but if it is undermining the fundamental human rights, I have ⁇ many problems with it. This agreement does not need to be signed. We do not have to ratify it, not even in this Parliament. There are five other countries that have not done so yet. The Netherlands, Spain, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Malta have not yet signed and ratified it. Therefore, we do not have to do that either.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I hope that the Permanent President of the European Council and the new Commissioner for Foreign Trade, who know our country — I know that they attach great importance to human rights — will also have the courage to say that during bilateral discussions with American fellow officials.

Thus, it will end the abuse of human rights under the guise of the war on terrorism.

That is why, in any case, our group will vote against the agreement.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out that one must also respect the period or the procedure in which one has been affected. If this still falls within the pre-Lisbon era, the ratification procedure would have to be resumed, which would lead to a vote in the European Parliament. We stated in the declaration that we would proceed to ratification in the national parliament before declaring our agreement with the entry into force of this agreement. The example of Hungary that you cite, I can say that they have indeed ratified.

Your interpretation of the procedure as if we should not ratify is controversial. There is indeed the European directive, there are KBs and therefore there is already legal work within a framework. Failure to ratify would not be in accordance with the agreements made by Belgium.

Mr. Speaker, very briefly I have taken the data of Hungary from your own report, Mr. Deseyn. Your report is not correct. Hungary has not yet ratified it.

Mr. Moriau, by the way, is in charge of citing him. He also rightly said in the committee that he heard that the US Secretary of State for Homeland Security would be willing to negotiate a new PMR agreement. In other words, the Lisbon Treaty makes no difference in that. It can effectively transition to a new negotiation or a newly negotiated agreement.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen, during the examination of this text in a committee, I have repeatedly pointed out – I have just been quoted – the potential danger that this agreement constituted. You should not cover your face. He is in the right line of the Patriot Act, which arose from the events of September 11, 2001, and which, today in the United States, suffers an assault of critics from Democrats from all horizons because of the deviations it has generated. Indeed, in my opinion, this Treaty does not offer sufficient guarantees and contains inaccurate provisions. The threat of terrorism should not be underestimated. But it cannot spill into deviations that consist of wanting to absolutely control everything, at the risk of putting at risk the very foundations of democracy.

The recording of personal data must be able to go hand in hand with an efficient and transparent processing of personal data, but it must be ⁇ ined a balance and, above all, it must not turn into a universal big brother. In fact, the data concerned are: information about the travel agency that made the booking; the itinerary of the trip (eventual steps, connections); the flights concerned; the groups of persons recovered under the same reservation; the passenger’s contacts (telephone number, etc.); sexual orientation; the rates granted, payment details (banking card); hotel or car reservations; services requested on board (seat number, casher meal, hallal, vegetarian, medical assistance); frequent flyer status.

These data are stored for seven years active and eight years sleepy, which is a total of fifteen years.

Dear colleagues, this is great! We must be happy because we have rejuvenated by twenty-five years. In other words, we are in 1984, but it is the year of George Orwell!

Dear friends, is this a paranoid fantasy or a reality? This is why we have asked for the opinion of specialists. You were not the only one, Mr. De Vriendt; there was also Mr. from Donnea, myself and other colleagues.

It was also requested by the State Council. This notice has been enlightening in many ways and highlighted three issues that we should follow closely in the evaluation process, on which I will return later: the lack of transparency in the process of negotiating the agreement; the lack of control possibilities; gaps in the right of citizens to have access to their data and the possibilities to correct errors in case of abuse.

What would we have heard if it was China or Iran or any other country that asked us for such a treaty?

But above all, the Privacy Protection Commission has also recognized that non-ratification would have serious negative consequences. I have two main reasons in my view.

Airlines located in the European Union territory could be hit with a ban on flights to the United States, or even overflight as it has already happened. And above all, in current practice, the provisions of the agreement are indeed implemented without the protection, ⁇ minimal, but without the protection well specified in this agreement. So the danger is even more immense.

That is why, in the light of all these elements, we will vote with all our fingers for the adoption of this agreement by pure pragmatism and realism. Indeed, it is better to adopt this agreement than to let the vague allow everything and anything. The main point must therefore be the legal guarantees in terms of the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens. To this end, we would like to pay particular attention to the evaluation of the agreement. During our discussions in the committee, the Minister of Foreign Affairs specified that the European Commission plans to evaluate the agreement in March or April of next year.

I therefore actively advocate that, as soon as the new European Commission is set up, our government and our Parliament can effectively ensure that this evaluation results. I insist on the term “concrete”, as the agreement provides for a periodic review by the European Union and the Department of Homeland Security of the United States, but it does not specify the practical arrangements. Which Commissioner, for example, will be responsible for this assessment? How will we proceed?

Knowing that this agreement was signed in 2007 and that, in practice, it already produces its effects, whether we want it or not, it is therefore urgently necessary to put this dossier on the European table, in order to be able to draw the conclusions in light of all the concerns we experience.

Not only would this approach respond to the complaints expressed by the Privacy Protection Commission deploring the lack of control but it would also allow us to position ourselves in the perspective of a renegotiation of the agreement, as the US Secretary of State for Homeland Security said during a meeting with the European MEPs, realizing that we may be going too far. In this regard, too, Obama’s spirit allows us to hope.

Last, and not least, we also highlighted the role of the Privacy Protection Commission, whose opinions and observations are useful and relevant but sometimes come too late. I am referring to the letter sent at the end of October by the Chairman of the Commission to the Prime Minister in order to draw his attention to the dossier, while the draft had already been voted in a committee in the Senate. It would therefore be useful that in the future, quick and prior information can be circulated as a preventive measure between the Privacy Protection Commission and our Parliament on topics as sensitive as this.

Indeed, in view of the late opinion of the Commission on the Protection of Privacy and in view of the risks of non-ratification a few days after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, my group has no choice but to vote on this agreement but I request the Government and Parliament to pay all the necessary attention to the evaluation of the follow-up of this matter. In the meantime, my dear colleagues, a good advice! If you take the plane, eat vegetarian! It is not suspicious and it seems to be healthier! And most of all, smile, you are filmed!

Before giving the speech to Ms. Genot, Mr. De Croo, Van den Eynde and Deseyn would like to intervene.

I would like to point out Mr. Moriau very friendlyly that the few thousand votes I have made here, I have always made them from the tip of the finger, never from the elbow or palm of the hand!

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the examination of this case has clearly highlighted the fact that there is a communication problem between the Privacy Protection Commission and the Parliament. I think that this Commission, which also depends on us, should systematically report to us the cases it deals with and inform us of the international negotiations in which it participates.

The P Committee, namely the Police Service Control Committee, systematically informs us of the investigations and work it begins. We should review the law governing the functioning of this Life Protection Commission, so that we are proactively aware of the negotiations in which it participates and the work it begins.

We must make sure that the Privacy Protection Commission does not come here to parliament like the carabiniers of Offenbach, when the piece is played.

Mijnheer de voorzitter, aan de heer Moriau zeg ik in zijn taal het volgende: voting with the fingertips or voting with a straight and firm fist on the button is the same at the level of the tables.

There is little change in this area.

I am in fact grateful to him for his ruling that the citizens who end up on the chips do not have a chance to improve the information. That is undoubtedly correct. I will therefore look forward to the attitude of the Socialist Party when it is proposed here that we may review and improve the information maps that the State Security ⁇ ins about citizens in our country, including about parliamentarians. Only then will we experience a real democracy, even according to the standards that were defended. However, I fear that we will never get that chance.

Mr. Speaker, I would have liked to have told Mr. Moriau that the adoption of the text is not the end point, as a joint review will take place in the spring of 2010.

To Mr. Tuybens, I would like to point out that it is a pity that he discredits reporters. It is not because someone puts something in a commission that the information per definition remains valid forever. I explain myself more closely. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 17 November in the Committee on Foreign Relations said that Hungary is one of the countries that have not yet ratified the treaty, that does not mean that it has not been able to do so in the meantime, between 17 and 27 November. Mr. Tuybens, he did that too. Hungary ratified the treaty last week. In this sense, you should not question the reporting.

Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to answer: I think we have not heard well. Indeed, for now, with this agreement, the citizens will be fired, but they are already. The little guarantees that the treaty contains are all the more important: at the moment, we have no guarantee, no protection. This seems to me essential.

There should be pragmatism and realism, but I will not repeat what I said.

Mr. Moriau, if I understand correctly, the PS senators did not show pragmatism? They either abstained or voted against.

So I am surprised. Therefore, pragmatic analysis is not the same everywhere: there are differences.

For me, the problem is that we got a privacy law that constituted a delicate arbitration between the possibility of obtaining data, processing it in some cases, and, at the same time, getting tags to protect them.

On this point, the Privacy Protection Commission, competent only for this, after being consulted very late at the request of the commission and not of the executive – this is problematic in my view – says to us: ‘Here, we no longer fall within the framework we set ourselves democratically.’

This is a problem: we fix our beacons and we foot them ourselves. Consequences must be taken.

I will not return to all the arguments that my fellow environmentalists Benoît Hellings, in the Senate, and Wouter De Vriendt, have listed here. However, there remains for me a problem to which it has not been answered.

The system works; a fellow citizen was confronted with it since one of our fellow citizens on his way to Latin America, passing over American airspace, saw his plane forced to be deviated. This proved to be very problematic for all passengers due to time loss and missed correspondence. The event has resulted in economic losses, an argument that comes into account in these discussions.

Did this man have anything to blame? Did he have weapons? Did he prepare an attack plan? and no. He was able to get out completely free from the plane and return in the other direction via another plane. For the United States, however, this gentleman, given the algorithm of the data in their possession, from various databases, was suspicious. It is doubtful though that they cannot read each sheet one by one and that they therefore use mathematical systems. Obviously, a mathematical system can have failures.

What have we done, we Belgium, to stop the failure of these mathematical systems against one of our fellow citizens, to allow him to take back that plane and discuss this issue?

What do we do in fact to protect our citizens from this American system? I would like to hear our executive on this subject. What can a citizen do in the face of a refusal? How can he challenge it and what exactly did you do in this case? It is not every day that an airplane is turned away from its route. It is important to look at the question when such serious acts are committed. Was this person dangerous? It would rather seem that he is a right-wing activist who is very critical of American politics in Latin America, which I do not think is worthy of being on the no-fly list. Concretely, what have we done in this case and what will we do in the future? If the algorithm decrees that casher diet and sexual orientation are not suitable, what can a citizen do to avoid being on this no fly list?

Does the Government ask for the word, Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs?

Mr. Speaker, I will not do this for long. I just want to say on behalf of the government that we listened well.

We heard warnings and calls from those who announced that they would vote for the project and those who announced that they would not approve it.

It is true that a number of these warnings can still be taken into account through the exercise that Mr. Deseyn spoke, the joint review, which will take place in the spring of 2010.

We will therefore take this into account. That being said, I find at this stage that the current design as it stands now is the best way to balance between a number of considerations that one should keep in mind at the same time. Here, rightly and with great emphasis, and in my opinion also with a number of considerations that must absolutely be taken to heart, was spoken about the absolute importance of respecting a piece of privacy in relation to personal data. We must put that in the political balance alongside a number of other considerations such as, of course, the fight against terrorism, the commercial interests of the operators concerned, the legal certainty that is essential for both the concerned and the same airlines, and of course also the solidarity of Belgium in the context of the fight against terrorism. That being said, I feel that this design in the best way that respects balance.

Mr. Speaker, I asked a very precise question, that of what the Executive did to defend the rights of one of our fellow citizens who was put on the no-fly list for unknown reasons.

I did not want to go back to the debate, which has already taken place. Like the mr. Moriau correctly pointed out that, in any case, all those affected will be better protected, as there is currently no access to the protection rules that exist at the U.S. level.

I will not go into details because this has been widely discussed in the committee. The protection for the persons concerned will be increased through the approval of this Treaty.

Mr. Minister, I have asked a specific question. One of our fellow citizens was placed on the no fly list. What have we done so that he can either defend himself against what is accused of – something he is currently unaware of – or be informed that he is a dangerous terrorist? It is essential to have a clear answer.

So I act that the answer is to say that when someone is put on the no-fly list, they will have nothing to expect from our government.

Mr. Speaker, I think that Mr. Genot is a little blind to the asymmetric situation that arose after September 11, where the suicide terrorist must shoot only once and the security services must always ensure that nothing happens. It is precisely from this concern that this design is indeed legitimate.