Proposition 50K2083

Projet de loi modifiant la loi du 5 août 1991 relative à l'importation, à l'exportation et au transit d'armes, de munitions et de matériel devant servir spécialement à un usage militaire et de la technologie y afférente.

General information ¶

Authors

Ecolo Martine Dardenne
Groen Peter Vanhoutte
MR Robert Denis
Open Vld Stef Goris
PS | SP Claude Eerdekens
Vooruit Dirk Van der Maelen

Submission date

Oct. 16, 2002

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

arms trade

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen Ecolo PS | SP Open Vld MR

Voted to reject

CD&V VB

Abstained from voting

LE FN

Party dissidents ¶

• Vincent Decroly (Ecolo) voted to reject.
• Richard Fournaux (MR) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

Jan. 15, 2003 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, I ask for the floor for an appeal to the Rules of Procedure.

You have the word, Mr. Peterson. You have 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I try to educately, calmly and kindly know what Article 31 means. I don’t think it’s appropriate to say that I should be silent or accumulate. I assume that you made these statements in the fire of your speech. I think this does not fit.

Mr. Peters, I will read Article 31 for you. I quote: "At the time set for the meeting, the Chairman shall take note of the presence list drawn up by the offices of the office; he may either immediately open the meeting or call the names." I will continue with point 3 of Article 31. If it is established that the required number of members is not present, the President may postpone the meeting for a maximum of sixty minutes. If he does not exercise this right or if the required number of members is not yet present, he shall convene the next meeting on one of the next four working days.

I have to make the decision! Traditionally, this type of question is never voted at the beginning of a meeting. If we change the agenda, you are right and I must ask for a vote. You should not want me to do things that I am not just doing. We are not at the beginning of a discussion. If I am subsequently amending point 4 — which may be — then I must obtain the consent of the Chamber.

Mr. Pieters, excuse me for being shot a little out of my crumbs, but, forgive me! The incident is closed.

This is the report of our discussions within the Committee on Foreign Affairs concerning the bill amending the law of 5 August 1991 concerning the import, export and transit of weapons, ammunition and equipment intended for special military use and related technology.

The work on this report has been divided into two, and Ms. Laenens will make the summary of the hearings conducted in the committee and which have been decisive for the evolution of this proposal.

Our work can be divided into three parts. We initiated the presentation and discussion of a first text. In a second period, it was the organization of hearings of NGOs, representatives of the arms industry and trade unions. Finally, in a third phase, we made the last amendments to the text, which was subsequently submitted to the committee in the last week of December 2002.

The various groups were able to comment on a first version of the bill at the Foreign Affairs Committee on 6 November 2002. Our colleague Dirk Van der Maelen, chairman of the SP.A group, recalled that parliamentary reflection had begun in the previous legislature, stressing that the Belgian share in the European arms trade sector was only 5% and that, therefore, a coordinated approach at European level was needed.

Furthermore, Mr. Van der Maelen highlighted the amendments already made to the 1991 law, amendments aimed at subjecting to obtaining a license any involvement in the arms trade and to establish a regime of extraterritoriality of criminal sanctions.

by Mr. Van der Maelen subsequently highlighted the points in the proposal that he considered most significant, including the integration of the European Code of Conduct into Belgian legislation — a first that may have a training effect in other Member States —, the addition of new criteria to be taken into account in the decision to grant or refuse a license or the improvement of the control of compliance with the non-reexport clause. An additional improvement could be the introduction of a formula on the marking of weapons. The speaker ended his speech by refusing to introduce a priori control of Parliament.

For MR Group, Robert Denis highlighted the progress made in terms of transparency and efficiency. He also hopes that the integration of some of the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct will have a training effect on our EU partners. The MEP also denied Parliament’s co-decision power on licensing, such a formula not guaranteeing the required confidentiality. Robert Denis concluded his speech by considering that Belgium, through this proposal, reinforced the ethical character of its position on the international stage.

On behalf of the Ecolo-Agalev group, Martine Dardenne considered that the two important points of this proposal were the integration of the code of conduct into Belgian legislation and the strengthening of parliamentary control. As a member of the same group, Peter Vanhoutte distinguishes three types of states: those to whom we can sell weapons, those to whom we cannot sell weapons, and those who are in a grey zone and for whom it is important to well delimit a good framework of appreciation. In his view, defense capabilities should not be neglected as they aim to protect democracy and we should not close our arms companies for the benefit of other countries less ethically sensitive. The speaker considered that it would be a mistake to address this issue in Community terms, with Flemish exports experiencing a not negligible growth.

For the Socialist Party, Patrick Moriau stressed the importance of a reflection in order to avoid any perverse effect from the bill, thus referring to the reactions of the various actors concerned: companies, unions and NGOs. The MEP cites the age limit for children soldiers, the fight against terrorism, the link between military defence and social defence and the MEP calls for the hearing of the various actors concerned.

For the VLD, Stef Goris stressed the importance of giving the ministers responsible for the decision a power of discretion. The speaker also highlighted the concerns of the sector in Flanders.

On behalf of the opposition, Peter De Crem withdrew his proposal to introduce amendments to the bill under discussion and Els Van Weert stressed the importance of the precautionary principle and the issue of licensed production in a third country. She also advocated the drafting of a list of countries with which no arms trade would be allowed.

During this first discussion, the Minister of Foreign Affairs also intervened to clarify that the FN had developed a very sophisticated know-how: traceability, distant destruction of weapons and that it rejected the reducing slogans of the reconversion at any cost of the arms sector.

Following the hearing on 29 November, amendments were drafted to take into account some of the remarks made by the speakers. Personally, I was pleased on behalf of my group that the worries of employers and trade unions could be met. In this way, the Minister will be able to take into account socio-economic issues. Contractual information will remain confidential, even in the semi-annual report. A simplified procedure will be established for licenses concerning European countries.

Regarding the issues and the introduction of socio-economic issues in the assessment criteria, Mr. Speaker, I would like, at this point in my report, to comment on the need for a technical correction in the text. There is, in fact, in Article 3 a difference between the Dutch version and the French-speaking version. In the Dutch version, it is spoken of "ten factors van invloed mogen" ...

On what page are you, Mr. Speaker?

At page 5 at the end of article 3 of the text of the bill.

The French-speaking version says, “that these factors cannot have the slightest influence.” So the words "the least" were added compared to the Dutch version. I would propose that we remove these two words in technical correction to be true to the basic text, which was the Dutch-speaking text. If you want to, I continue. by Mr. Van der Maelen stressed the importance of introducing, through amendments, the entire code of conduct into our legislation, introduction which in his view is the essential point for all signatories of the bill.

This code of conduct will therefore be taken into account in the evaluation carried out under the “CFSP” when granting licenses. The list of military equipment will be supplemented by taking into account the European list drawn up under point 5 of the Code Implementation Provisions and the annual report will have to take into account the arguments put forward during the discussion on the implementation of the European Code.

As for the six-month report, Dirk Van der Maelen specifies that it will be examined before an ad hoc commission of the Foreign Relations Committee, a commission that will apply the regulations of the Military Procurement Commission. In this regard, our committee has decided to withdraw the amendment relating to the constitution of this ad hoc committee, considering that this was a prerogative of the committee of the Rules of Procedure and therefore of the whole Chamber which must decide on the creation of a new committee. A proposal to amend the Regulation has been submitted for this purpose.

On behalf of the Ecolo-Agalev Group, Ms. Drion approved the amendments, which have the merit of reassuring the sector and sending a positive signal to our European partners. She expressed her wish that our legislation will have a training effect towards our partners, as illustrated by our anti-personnel mines law. She concludes by saying that the formula adopted by Belgium is indeed excellent because it balances ethical imperatives and business aspects.

For the VLD, Stef Goris insisted on the dual objective pursued by the proposal authors: increasing transparency and incorporating the Code of Conduct. Parliamentary opposition representatives also commented on these various amendments.

For the CD&V, M. De Crem does not reveal in the bill a tightening of the legislation. He considers that the amendments are the result of merchandising related to other files. He regrets the lack of real parliamentary control and proposes that the opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee be made binding.

by Mr. Van den Eynde considers that the amendments made undoubtedly soften the law of 5 August 1991. The notion of confidentiality defended by companies cannot, in his view, be taken into account by the parties advocating greater transparency on this matter. According to him, the reports represent a small improvement because exports will be effective for a long time.

For the VU&ID group, Ms. Van Weert disputes the discretionary margins left to ministers, which prevents any improvement in the enforcement of legislation. In his eyes, the improvement of parliamentary control and transparency leaves much to be desired.

For the CDH, Mr. Jean-Pierre Grafé has submitted an amendment aiming to delay the entry into force of the law until the code of conduct becomes binding in a majority of Member States, including Britain and Germany. This amendment was subsequently withdrawn.

Articles of the bill and amendments of Mr. Van der Maelen and his colleagues will be adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee. Amendments by Ms. Brepoels, Ms. Van Weert and Mr. But they will be rejected.

The final text of the proposal was therefore approved by our committee with 7 votes for, 3 votes against and 2 abstentions. I thank you for your attention.

Dear colleagues, I take the opportunity to welcome to the tribune of the Chamber Mrs Amon Ago Marthe, First Vice-President of the National Assembly of Côte d'Ivoire, Head of Delegation, Mrs Dikebie Amenan Joséphine, Member of the Parliamentary Group PDCI and Mr. Dikebie Amenan Joséphine. Fanny Mory, member of the parliamentary group Solidarity Plus and first adviser to the Embassy. I welcomed you yesterday at the Presidency, I welcome you with great pleasure and I wish your country peace and prosperity. Thank you for being among us.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, colleagues, I will try to give a summary of hearings that took up a whole day, but that were very meaningful. I would like to briefly mention all the speakers.

During the morning there was a series of NGO presidents. Mrs Montserrat Carreras, who represents Amnesty International, has begun. It stresses that no government, in accordance with international law, should permit the export of weapons to a country where there is a manifest risk that those weapons would be used to flagrantly violate human rights. It would make sense for all governments to conclude an international and enforceable treaty concerning the control of arms exports.

However, Amnesty says that this legislative amendment is making significant progress. Amnesty’s remarks essentially conclude that there would be greater responsibility on the exporting country, not only in terms of legislation but ⁇ in terms of control and above all also of the use of the weapons. Amnesty is opposed to the demand from the weapons industry to the obligation to license taxes for a number of NATO and other associated countries. Finally, Amnesty states that there should be a number of enforceable rules for transfers to other countries and that this should also apply to private companies.

When asked what Amnesty thinks of the so-called black list, she replied that Amnesty was not in favour of it, as the preparation of such a list could result in export permits to other countries no longer being subject to human rights criteria.

Mr. Bernard Adam represents GRIP, an independent research center. He stresses that two important new criteria are being added, as colleague Bacquelaine has already mentioned. These include the prohibition of exporting weapons to countries where child soldiers are deployed and the extension of the permission to export weapons from the Act of 1991. There is also the introduction of the European Code of Conduct. Everyone knows that the European Code of Conduct has not yet constituted a legal obligation. Other speakers also confirm that Belgium is thus taking an important leading role. It is hoped that this signal will accelerate the establishment of a common policy on arms exports within Europe.

There is also a clear improvement in terms of stricter supervision of the final destination. He also urges to better verify the authenticity of the attestation of the final destination. He calls for more collective decision-making at the government level. GRIP does not believe that the implementation of this bill will have any socio-economic impact on the sector. According to GRIP, some say that 20,000 jobs would be put at risk by this bill, but it would be about 7,000 direct jobs in the sector. He emphasizes the need for better control.

For Pax Christi Flanders, Mr. Bart Horemans took the floor. He says his organization is moderately satisfied with this improvement. He also says that it will primarily be about compliance. He calls for, together with the International Action Network for Light Weapons, IANSA, to support the campaign that wants under the Italian Presidency to make the European Code a binding code one of the priorities on the European agenda.

There was also a brief discussion about the definition of child soldiers and what age should be taken into account.

Another aspect is transparency and control, in which they reaffirm that Parliament should be able to exercise its control function to the fullest extent, and that this legislative proposal will nevertheless improve this. For this purpose, the report should also indicate for each granted or refused license who is the manufacturer and the destination and specify what kind of weapons or equipment it was, especially for dual use.

A comparison is made with legislation in other countries and again stressed that marking and tracking would be an important tool in solid reporting that allows control. Both Mr. Horemans and later Mr. Crols emphasize the fact that until now the enforceability of the legislation has been a problem for those two and they advocate that right should also be granted so that they could legally challenge arms export licences.

The next representative of the Forum for Peace Action, Mr. Crols, says the key points are transparency and controllability. There are hardly any notable improvements. He compares to environmental permits to demonstrate that transparency is a good thing, because ten years ago, he argues, environmental permits were secret and the result was that environmental legislation was not applied by the government in its licensing policy. At the moment this has become transparent, there is a sensitive improvement to be seen in that legislation. Not so much the number of reports is important, but what is in it. He makes the comparison with the reporting in the United States, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. The controllability of the weapons law, as stated, he also finds no notable improvement.

After Mr. Crols, Mr. Albert of the Committee "Justice and Peace" spoke. He has situated the international context, ranging from the Cold War to September 11, as a key data that makes the spread of light weapons much greater and has a much greater impact than before. He made the link with Belgium, stating that Belgium is part of the thirteen countries that dominate the world trade in light weapons and, moreover, that FN accounts for 10% of all attack guns manufactured worldwide. He sees the current law as an important advance, also due to the European dynamics that it triggers.

In the comments of the members present on the introductions brought by the various representatives, the applicant, Mr Van der Maelen, stated that he disagrees with the criticism as if it was a easing of the weapons law and he has gone about it in detail. I expect that this will come out more clearly later in the discussion.

Regarding the issue of more collective decision-making, colleague Chevalier stressed that the minister does not decide alone, since he has reports from his administration, and concluded that it is a healthy principle that the politician is the one who takes responsibility.

Collega Vanhoutte cited the example of the Delcreder Service, for which several ministers are responsible for a decision which gives everything but more clarity in decision making.

Collega Denis believes that the representatives of NGOs have sometimes presented the weapons sector too unilaterally.

Regarding the discussion of the age of child soldiers, Ms. Montserrat Carreras of Amnesty International said that international law is not unambiguous about this. There was a discussion about the contradictory nature of the law. This was illustrated with the case of bringing a case before the Council of State. This gives a very restrictive interpretation of the concept of importance in the case. A case was initiated before the State Council to challenge the arms supply to Nepal.

Collega Goris has once again emphasized the leading role of Belgium in the European context. Finally, colleague Grafé stated that it is unacceptable that the applicants have split the European Code of Conduct into an enforceable part and a merely indicative part. This has also been reiterated later in the discussion and it has also been refuted because the European Code of Conduct is an integral part of this legislative change. Both colleague Drion and colleague Goris question whether the transparency in U.S. legislation would be greater.

In the afternoon we heard the representatives of the companies. Mr. Paul Soete has proposed the federation as delegate director of Agoria and said that the sector accounts for a turnover of 600 million euros and 18,000 employees. Within the Agoria sector, Mr. Jean-Claude Lacroix, as a representative of BDIG, this is the Belgian Defense and Security Industry Group, said that they all, without exception, observe the same deontology and ethics. They do this as a whole of the Agoria members. He also stated that they always act within a strict legal framework and seek the greatest transparency. We must not lose from the fact that industrials are active in a world where competition is considered a very important rule. Even in this context of competition, it is important for them and they are involved in making the code of conduct mandatory at European level. They are asking for a relaxation for the procedure for a number of permits. They request this in particular for the transfer of goods to countries of the European Union, NATO or associated countries. They emphasize that many of their supply agreements contain a confidentiality clause and that since it very often involves long-term investment programmes, a trust bond means a key fact.

Mr Vandenbroucke, who represents Barco, considers that the bill appears to be excessive in relation to the aim pursued. He believes that we already have the strictest legislation in Europe or ⁇ even in the world. They would like to point out that if Europe wants its political dimension to be more closely aligned with its economic weight, it should not only look at the export legislation, but that Belgium will also have to invest in defence within a European framework.

In the first place, it would be desirable to take into account the nature of the product in order to determine what administrative treatment it should be subjected to, and for some this ⁇ implies a relief. Mr. Philippe Penson of the Herstal Group says that it is within the Herstal FN group that focuses on the military sector and that they are in a highly competitive sector of companies strongly driven by their government and companies whose existence corresponds to goals that are not only economic. They say that their market position is primarily determined by an ethical attitude and that they are, for example, precursors in the reference point in terms of the marking of weapons. In addition, quality and technological development are their main assets. In Telkenmale there is a change to the Belgian legislation they say was that there are many responses from concerned customers.

Mr. Raymond Pelicero represents SABCA. SABCA is an industry that with 1,200 employees mainly in the space sector and in addition to the defence aerospace is also increasingly active in the civil aviation. Export permits are a crucial issue for him because ⁇ a third of their jobs depend on exports. For Mr. Jean-Louis Fournereau, who represents Tex Space Aero, a centre of outstanding military maintenance of the SNECNA group, this legislation and the colleagues’ comments cited above are crucial. Finally, Mr Freddy Versluis of OIP Sensor Systems said that other European countries have an administrative system that is much more flexible and pledged to conform to the Belgian system. The sector decision was formulated by Mr. Soete who says that the industrial sector prefers to take all initiatives at European level and that the amendment should aim to do so in part. In addition, he says that the competent ministers should be given the opportunity to take into account the ethical criteria and the socio-economic and industrial criteria. Confidentiality should always be guaranteed and the administrative procedure should be simplified for a number of European countries. The report of the hearing.

For now, Mrs. Brepoels, Mrs. Van Weert, Mr. Bacquelaine, Mr. Valkeniers, Mrs. Daerden, Mr. Van den Eynde, Mr. De Crem, Mr. Decroly and Mrs. Laenens are registered. Mr. De Crem, I had provided from gallantry first Mrs. Brepoels, then Mr. Bacquelaine and then you.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, colleagues, I thank the rapporteurs for the comprehensive report, because I must admit that I was not able to follow all the discussions because the majority at some point wanted to implement this legislative amendment at night and night. The Committee on Foreign Relations was convened after plenary meetings, at impossible times and without agreements, all within the framework of a political agreement. I express myself very cautiously and should rather call it political cow trade. This happened at the time when the change of the tobacco law in favour of Francorchamps came here.

I think we have had enough opportunities to follow this whole political spectacle from last summer when the government decided to allow arms deliveries to that crumbling democracy in Nepal. This whole show not only led to the resignation of Agalev Minister Aelvoet, but several months later also led to a political agreement on an amendment to the weapons law. Officially, at least according to colleagues of Agalev and SP.A, this change had to come in order to exclude a Nepal-bis in the future. The amendment was also supposed to be a disgrace for those parties, and then I think first of all of Agalev and in a slightly lesser degree of the SP.A. Once being inattentive in the Core could still go through, but a second time would be absolutely unacceptable.

During that period, especially by representatives of those parties, strong statements were made. I would like to remind the colleagues of Agalev of their ⁇ important meeting of members held on 19 October. At that meeting, they unanimously approved an up-to-date motion containing four points. I can tell you in advance that none of those four points remains standing at the moment.

What were those points? First, the announcement by Deputy Prime Minister Michel on 15 October, at the time the first mission returned from Nepal, namely that the arms deliveries to Nepal could simply continue, was, according to Agalev, completely misplaced. The Deputy Prime Minister repeated exactly the same thing a few weeks later when the second mission submitted its report. Second, Agalev confirmed that if the conditions in Nepal remained unchanged, the conditions for delivery would not have been met. After an evaluation of the report of the observation mission and other relevant reports such as from Amnesty International, the Chamber Group of Agalev Minister Michel would therefore confront the application of Article 7 of the Arms Act.

You know that the statement of the Agalev member meeting was subsequently formulated by Minister Vogels and Minister Tavernier as if one would start a round of bullying against the Deputy Prime Minister. I have not noticed this, colleagues. I have, I think, almost always been present here at all committee meetings and plenary sessions. Chairman, colleague Lienens seems to want to comment on something.

I have only one ear, the government has two. You have the word, Madame Laenens, for an interruption.

I think we are going to talk about the reform of the gun law. Ms. Brepoels wants to refresh our political memory. I think this is really not necessary, that we are enough men and women for it. I would like to draw her attention to the fact that, before she interrogated the Minister in plenary session on the precise problem of respect for human rights in Nepal as a result of the Amnesty report, I already submitted a question to the Minister on this subject. Because of the foreign missions, we have not had the opportunity to ask questions in the committee since the submission of my question. However, this point is scheduled for the next committee meeting. For the rest, I suggest that at that time we go further into those points that you cite here.

Naturally, in the context of the discussion of that amended Arms Act, I would like to explain why I think that amendment has occurred and why I think that amendment is therefore absolutely unacceptable. This is a relief of the current weapons law. You say that due to circumstances you have still not been able to question the Deputy Prime Minister about a number of reports that Amnesty has indeed justified and yesterday Human Rights Watch has spread across Nepal. I was talking about the second aspect of your motion, about the fact that you would invoke the application of Article 7 of the current Arms Act, precisely to prevent arms being delivered to Nepal or to stop that arms delivery somewhere on the way. I have to be honest. When I learned a few weeks ago that there were problems using the airspace above India for shipping or flying over the weapons, I thought that Agalev was apparently still active on the ground between Christmas and New Year. Unfortunately, these weapons have been in Kazakhstan for several weeks and yet miraculously arrived in Nepal. Let us say, Mrs. Laenens, that I have not noticed anything about invoking Article 7. The first delivery has happened. In fact, the circumstances have only worsened. You say that there is a new investigation by Amnesty International. Yesterday, Human Rights Watch stated something that I do not want to remember to those who have not yet been able to view the report. It is a very recent report: 2003, the annual report. They say, “In Nepal, a large-scale civil war has broken out.” Per ⁇ the Foreign Affairs website also needs to be re-adjusted in that sense at the moment when one wants to inform the people about the situation there.

A civil war has broken out between an unpopular government and violent Maoist rebels. The rebels usually target a massacre of the police and the military. Government forces often respond with violence against civilians. The conclusion we can draw from that is that both the government and the rebels violate human rights in Nepal on a large scale.

Last week, the first shipment of Belgian weapons arrived in Kathmandu. No elections have yet been held. Ms. Laenens, you know that they were scheduled for the end of November. As far as I know, no date has yet been determined and it is now half January. Meanwhile, massive U.S. arms are also being supplied and the U.S. is even planning joint military exercises in central Nepal next week.

Mrs. Laenens, the third aspect that I would like to remind you for a moment is that Agalev said he was satisfied with the tightening of the gun law. She said that the criteria would be stricter and the parliamentary control would be improved, and she demanded that this law be voted by this year. That was last year. We are actually only a month later. But what does Deputy Prime Minister Michel say to everyone who wants to hear it? He responded to me here in Parliament on 12 December. "In the future, the next arms delivery to Nepal will be even easier, it will be more normal, it will be even more logical." I quote you from the Integral Report: "The law is a clarification of ..."

The [...]

In the plenary session of 12 December. I have the comprehensive report. I can read it all if you wish. I quote you: "At your last question, whether I would make the same decision on the basis of the new weapons law, which is yet to be voted, I answer yes, of course. It would be even easier, it would be more normal, it would be even more logical. Until then my answers, Mrs. Brepoels.”

It is clearer, but it is not easier.

But you said it. It would be even easier. Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, I will quote you. I find nothing here.

The assertion I want to defend is that the new law is written on the basis of the Nepal dossier. This law is therefore an unacceptable easing of the current law.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, the fourth point that Agalev had approved by all its members was that she continued to use her position in the government to monitor the arms delivery policy and to tighten the conditions for future supplies. You have already heard it, I have already quoted the Minister. I have not yet heard of your Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tavernier. Nevertheless, he proudly declared, shortly after his oath at the Palace, that the weapons would not be delivered simply.

I want to talk about the SP. I note that even the group chairman, Mr Van der Maelen, is not present here.

Mrs. Brepoels, he has apologized for a valid reason. I would like to note this here. I am convinced that he regrets not being able to be here.

He sent his cat.

I don’t see a cat sitting on the SP.A-banks.

He did not send anyone to replace him.

Not only has the group leader Van der Maelen bitten his teeth on that weapons delivery and a few weeks ago even had to bite his tongue, he also made the strong statement that if the situation in Nepal evolves favorably, there is no problem, but if it goes in the wrong direction, the debate in Belgium will rebound.

Mr. Van der Maelen, you are not physically present, but you are ⁇ spiritually present here. We can see the reports of the two missions that the Deputy Prime Minister has carried out. They are clear about the situation on the ground. I am not talking about its conclusions, but about its description. Amnesty International’s report and Human Rights Watch’s annual report are also clear. You also say, “My assessment is determined by the number of civilian casualties.” Have they not yet fallen enough, Mr. Van der Maelen? It is clear that in the rebellion that has arisen since 1996, about 8,000 people have already died in Nepal? Finally, even VLD chairman De Gucht dropped in early October, after the Nepalese king sent the government home and postponed the elections: “You will not hear me say that Nepal is an instant democracy.” However, colleagues was that exactly the argument of Prime Minister Verhofstadt to approve the delivery. Mrs. Laenens, your chairman — or your party secretary, I don’t know how to call him — Mr. Geysels, said: “If the situation does not improve by December, weapons simply cannot be delivered.” It is clear in any case that the export license, such as that which was delivered by the government to FN, was not in accordance with the Belgian weapons law at that time and that the law therefore had to be amended, read loosely, to make possible the subsequent deliveries that are still to take place in 2003, 2004 and 2005. I find this incomprehensible because SP.A and Agalev had demanded precisely the tightening of the law after the decision to deliver weapons to Nepal. I said it: it would only be seen through the fingers once.

Is the law stricter now? Does the introduction of the European Code into the law make it stricter? We are the first in Europe to do this. So you are totally wrong.

That is not true either. We are not the first.

It is intellectually unfair to claim such a thing.

It is absolutely not true. I was just demonstrating that, whatever one might argue about the effect of introducing that European Code of Conduct... From the Library of Parliament we have received two very delicate works in which exactly...

I do not believe that we can be allowed to say inaccurate things. Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The [...]

I will come back soon, legally and textually, Mr. Michel.

When you say, on the one hand, that the provisions of the European Code of Conduct are incorporated in the proposal submitted by the majority, it is only partially false or it is only partially true, inasmuch as not all the provisions of the European Code of Conduct are found in your text. And even when these provisions are found there, it is usually in a sweetened way or in a rabbit form — I will prove it soon, text in hand — that makes these provisions of the Code of Conduct vague pointing elements for your text, but not at all binding elements and not at all restrictive elements. I will prove it soon.

I just want to ask a question to Mr. President. Decroly, if he allows me to. Is there a legislation in a European country that already adopts the code of conduct in coercive form? No to! None of ! There is no legislation that goes as far as our current legislation. What you say is false.

The [...]

You are still demagogic.

Mr. Decroly, you don’t have to say everything before you’re at the tribune.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, the library provided us with two delicate works, in which a comparison is made with the manner in which criteria are used in the countries around us in the gun law or in a code related to that. This does not happen everywhere equally.

For example, I note in that review that in Germany the criteria relating to exports, which arise from a number of principles that form the legal basis for exports, are incorporated from the European Code of Conduct. Sometimes they are applied even more strictly.

The annual report of the Netherlands, which sets out the criteria for export permits, for the policies followed and the like, shows that it takes into account various international agreements and commitments. This is tested according to the eight criteria set out in the European Code of Conduct.

Both the Netherlands and Germany are already doing this. In Germany, this resulted in a significant percentage decline in the export of war weapons in the past year.

Just then I said that, whatever one may argue about the effect of the introduction of the European Code of Conduct, it stands for me as a pillar over water that there is a great turn to article 4 of the current law. It is precisely Article 4 that has been repeatedly referred to in the context of arms deliveries to Nepal.

Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, you know well that Article 4 of the current law stipulates that any application for an export or transit permit shall be rejected when the country of destination must cope with severe internal tensions which are of the nature of leading to an armed conflict, when the country is engaged in a civil war, when it is under a government that supports or lends itself to terrorist acts or drug trafficking, or has proven not to comply with the non-reexport clause.

The last two criteria are ⁇ ⁇ ined, but it is just the first two criteria that are eased. The current law applies a precautionary principle. In other words, if there is a civil war or heavy efforts, it is not carried out, given the high probability that such exports will lead to an exacerbation of the conflict. I think that the assessment in the past, i.e. in the current weapons law, is much simpler because on that basis one can examine the situation on the ground to decide whether or not to implement it.

That is normal!

That is normal, Mr. Minister, but you could have taken that over in the current weapons law. Instead of a principle non-export in civil war or internal tensions, that precautionary principle is now abandoned and there is an export, unless it can be demonstrated that the export itself leads to further problems.

In the present proposal, authorisation will only be refused if it can be demonstrated that the export itself aggravates the conflict or contributes to obvious human rights violations. You know very well — much better than me — that that bond is very difficult to demonstrate. In the current discussion on exports to Nepal, several government managers have already recognized that only after...

That is the responsibility of the Minister. Here is the band. You do not want to understand that. This is how the system works.

I want to understand it, but that is exactly the problem.

That is no problem. Political responsibility is the most important thing.

Yes, but there is no change in it. It is indeed the interpretation of one government member. This is not tormented.

What is the political responsibility of the Minister? Parliament still has the right to remove the Minister.

Yes, but I immediately come up with the publicity of the permits and the way in which it is reported to Parliament. You know very well, Mr. Minister, that it is impossible for a member of Parliament to carry out a check even after the facts. Therefore, I say that it is already acknowledged by various administrators that only after a few years will be clear what the outcome of exports is. The law can only be checked long after the export. Inscribing such a criterion in the law, in fact, is the total exhaustion of the law. The Code of Conduct of the European Union, colleagues, provides a minimum legislation...

Mrs. Brepoels, you can decide. I let you talk for a long time.

I am also explaining all my amendments. Then it should no longer be. I have submitted four amendments and I defend them now suddenly because this is important to be able to defend my position.

In fact, that code of conduct only reflects a minimum legislation that we hope all European Member States would comply with, but nothing prevents us from introducing stricter and more practicable criteria.

The [...]

Yes, but not at this point. Not the first two paragraphs of Article 4. It is clear that the maintenance of those two criteria in Article 4 therefore does not preclude the transposition of the code of conduct into Belgian legislation. With this amendment we do not want to tighten the current law, but we do not want to ease it.

Second, Mr. Speaker, the Minister had the question of how Parliament can respond to the permits or licenses issued by the government. I still remember that at the beginning of the discussion several colleagues developed various proposals to give Parliament a better insight into those permits. We now find that during the discussion of the bill — specifically after the hearings — the bill was misused in a political cow trade with all sorts of other files, such as the Tobacco Act, resulting in an additional weakening.

For example, it was registered that the effect on the economic and commercial interests of Belgium can now also be taken into account, without these factors affecting the application of the criteria. However, there was also, and I am deeply concerned by this, a particular connection to reporting to Parliament. In fact, we note that there is an annual report to the Parliament and a summary of the permits twice a year. I think it is clear – we have also indicated this in our amendments – that we want a report every four months, as originally planned, with a separate report on the issue and the refusal of permits. We also want all these permits to be public. By the way, I think, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, that a more comprehensive provision of information to Parliament could avoid many discussions.

It is clear that at the present time the information is too summary — we have also observed this in the discussion of the export report — to be able to control the policy carried out. You also know that one can only do this if there is also insight into what exactly is delivered, in other words if the individual license is also made public. As a counterargument, it is often cited the risk that the disclosure of these permits would result in commercial harm to the applicant. You know that this was also said earlier, colleagues of Agalev, as regards environmental permits. They had to be kept secret, and so on. Meanwhile, they have been public for more than 10 years and the damage to the business has not existed, but the environmental policy has improved and all over become more transparent.

Control of the arms trade is therefore of public interest, because otherwise that trade would simply not be subject to a licensing obligation. It is precisely in order to improve that control and to make both arms trade and policy more transparent that those licenses should be public. The fact that this secrecy does not prevail so strongly, colleagues, is also evident from the fact that the companies themselves are too willing to pack out the contracts collected in all kinds of media, apparently in order to raise their stock market value. The competition argument therefore does not stand still, if we see that in several other countries a much greater publicity is provided than it is now in Belgium. For example, in the Netherlands, on the website of the Ministry of Economic Affairs you can find every refusal of an application, with all the details of the company and so on. We assert that the policy is best implemented through publicity and an open discussion and evaluation of the policy, and not through leaks and crises.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, we have also submitted an amendment relating to the way in which, after delivery and discussion, some things can also be made enforceable by legal means. This has to do with the fact that a number of associations and institutions of public utility, which have statutory objectives to defend human rights or to pursue the promotion of peace, must also be able to proceed in court in all legal disputes that may arise from the application of this law, when they find that there has been prejudice to what they statutory pursue.

A sound control of public policy, in my opinion, also includes a judicial and a public control. You know that due to the strict interpretation of the "interest" in a legal action only direct victims can bring this claim and that judicial control in practice remains inexistent. Our amendment gives the various judicial bodies the possibility of claiming without having to modify all of these laws.

Mr. Speaker, after the explanation of our amendments, I make a warm call to the colleagues to support these amendments to the law which, in our opinion, are necessary for now.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out to Mrs. Brepoels that it is not necessary to submit her last amendment again. Currently, the Senate Committee for Justice is on the agenda of a draft law aimed at providing VZW’s better access to law in this matter. It is an extension of AHRUS that was approved by Parliament for the environment. We want to extend this to other VZWs and other interests than environmental interests. The bill is currently being discussed by the Senate Justice Committee.

Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Laenens, if you agree with our principle, I do not see why that control, which is a very specific procedure for the State Council, is not registered in the Arms Act. If the majority agrees with the principle of expansion, I see no reason to wait. After all, if the Senate approves the draft, but the House fails to approve it before the end of this legislature, we have lost a lot of time and we are not a step further in this procedure. Their

I suggest that you re-examine this amendment and be prepared to fully support it in the vote.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, dear colleagues, since its inception, our country has naturally and necessarily turned to the outside. I believe that arms exports are a facet of a foreign policy and a foreign policy and that these exports must be analyzed and valued within the framework of a country’s policy that actually wants to be externally oriented.

Belgium produces weapons, first and foremost to ensure its own security against external aggression, even though today it is a very distant hypothesis — even though! - but also its internal security in order to maintain civil peace in our territory.

This is one of the main functions of the state, which is to ensure the safety of all its citizens. This mission remains relevant; the world we live in contains a set of risks that a responsible state must take into account. Armed forces and police forces capable of guaranteeing the safety of our fellow citizens through quality equipment remain a necessity and it is, in my opinion, the duty of politicians to guarantee these missions which are in the general interest.

All this to say that the manufacture of weapons is obviously a necessity and must be considered as legitimate.

I understand that in our dreams we can imagine a world without weapons — and much better if we can still do so — but in reality, we must obviously consider that the necessity of weapons comes in particular from a firm will to maintain democracy wherever possible.

In this context, it is in our interest to maintain on our territory an arms industry that is performing and internationally recognized.

Our arms industry is recognized both for the finished products it produces and for the elements that come into the manufacture of more complex components, and there is no difference in this matter, in my opinion, between the companies in the north or south of the country. While the terms are sometimes different, the well-understood interest must obviously prevail over any partial and reductive debate.

Our weapons production can also interest other countries and mainly our direct partners in NATO or the European Union, but also countries that want to meet their security needs. by

Such arms exports must therefore be based on a clear legal basis combining transparency, ethical criteria and stability for ⁇ .

Note Country has so far provided a legal framework based on the Act of 5 August 1991 and its decrees which contain a number of provisions that are quite useful. I think of the negative list of non-exportable military goods, the obligation for others to obtain an export license, a clearer definition of supervisory bodies and the tightening of criminal and administrative sanctions compared to the Law of 1962, the enunciation also of non-export criteria which are contained in Article 4 of the Law of 1991.

For the sake of transparency, the 1991 law requires the government to submit an annual report to Parliament on our arms exports, which — I want to emphasize it — has been significantly enriched on the initiative of our Minister of Foreign Affairs.

This legislation is supplemented by non-binding provisions of the Code of Conduct of the European Union dated June 1998.

This Code of Conduct sets out a series of eight criteria that we consider important: compliance with embargoes and human rights, the internal and external situation of the country concerned by the import, the importance of preserving regional security and that of the fifteen countries of the European Union, the behavior of the importing country and the risk of re-exportation as well as the economic health of the importing country.

Our country puts a point of honour to comply with all these conditions.

The whole of this legislative arsenal that encompasses our arms exports obviously leaves a margin of discretion to the minister responsible for granting licenses.

This seems to us a crucial, important point, because, in our opinion, there can be no mechanical effect in the decision to export weapons to one or another country. Exporting weapons should remain a political gesture and not an administrative decision. Exporting weapons contains a message and has a political meaning for which the minister prints his will. Therefore, as I recalled at the beginning of my speech, the export of weapons is indeed one of the instruments that make up the foreign policy of a country, and in our sense, the export, granting or refusing licenses have a political meaning and are in themselves a political action. Whether it is for granting or refusing a license, there is a political responsibility that must be taken and assumed. This is the point that we have insisted on during the discussions on the Nepal issue and we obviously continue to defend this viewpoint. by

Nevertheless, we are not anchored in a dogmatic position and the debate we took part in at the September return showed the shortcomings and inaccuracies in our legislation. It was therefore the duty of our assembly to study improvements that could be made. I would like to emphasize the word ‘improvements’ because, in our mind, it is obviously not admissible to legislate without listening to the main actors in this sector, whose points of view we have recalled in the context of the report made to you by Ms. Laenens and myself.

It was also not admissible to adopt a series of blatant provisions that were proposed to us, such as the organization of a systematic consultation on the granting of all Belgian licenses among the Fifteen of the European Union with a possibility of arbitration by the European Commission. Another proposal put forward at some point in the debate is the establishment of a prior consultation within Parliament and the establishment of a corporate co-responsibility in the control of the end user. These proposals probably start from a good feeling, but they refuse the slightest reality and the slightest pragmatism. by

If new provisions were to be introduced, they should, in our opinion, clarify, frame, make our exports more transparent, without however ending them almost unilaterally. The final outcome of this legislative work can, in our view, be considered as positive and must now be stabilized in order to provide our companies and our partners with essential legal certainty in the context of international business relations.

So I wanted to highlight the advances that we find most relevant. First, the integration of a large number of provisions of the European Union Code of Conduct. This is for us the most significant advance even though, I repeat, our Foreign Minister already respected its terms. The criteria underlying our exports are specified in order to take back the spirit of the Code of Conduct, ensuring the strong ties we have with our allies and taking into account the situation of the country with which we trade or to which we are going to export weapons. The prohibition of child soldiers in particular and the notion that a democratic government must be able to defend itself are two other important additions.

I am also quite sensitive to the issue of child soldiers. In this regard, from a legal point of view, I really do not see what adds to this law the mention of this criterion of non-alignment of children soldiers in the armed forces or in the security forces to all the criteria of application. Already before, this type of criterion must obviously and eminently be respected by our country, simply because the Convention of 20 November 1989 on the Rights of the Child signed in New York, in its article 38, paragraph 2, specifically requires all signatories to act only insofar as they have the guarantee that this problem of child soldiers does not arise. Chairman: Robert Denis Chairman: Robert Denis You can re-align, in a text like this, the whole of international public law to which Belgium is bound. This can be nice and, in terms of pre-election marketing, it is always good but on a strictly legal level, it is totally overabundant, superfluous and superfetatory! I think you repeat here things that were already applicable before 2003, especially since 1989 and, in any case, the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by our Parliament. I have the impression that one is pleased to indicate different mentions, though very sympathetic, in this text of law. But the latter has no need of it at all: all this must already be scrupulously respected long before you have the idea, of good political communication — there, I must acknowledge it — to insert in a legal text this kind of mention.

Therefore, I have two remarks. First of all, and I have already said it recently, all the criteria contained in the European Code of Good Conduct were actually already applicable in the framework of licensing by our country and by our Minister of Foreign Affairs, whether in terms of human rights or conditions respecting these human rights.

Should we no longer mention them? I take note of the remarks of Mr. Decroly who would rather not be registered that it is unacceptable to deliver weapons to countries where there are children soldiers. This is a way of seeing things, for my part, I find it interesting to mention it.

This provision is useless since it was already applied by international law. This is superfetarian, and I think it is for a pre-electoral purpose. Why add provisions that are already applicable in international law and that Belgium has never challenged?

So, I would like to be explained to me the consistency of wanting, on the one hand, that all indicators of the European Code of Good Conduct be formally inscribed and, on the other hand, when the problem of children soldiers is named, one suddenly wishes that it is no longer inscribed in the law. I wonder where the consistency is.

The European Code of Good Conduct is not legally imperative in the countries that have ratified this code, while the conventions that Belgium has ratified – which is international law – are already imperatively obligatory!

It is true that we were already applying the European Code in practice. It might seem useful to me to translate it into legislation as long as all European countries do the same. That is why I had proposed to wait until a majority of European countries have ratified this code or transcribed it into their national legislation, so as not, once again, to give the ridiculous example of standing out to give lessons to the world and to Europe.

I maintain that there is a total inconsistency in wanting to include certain elements in the law and not others while — and you know it — all the elements of the European code are already strictly applicable in the granting of licenses in our country. If I follow you and if I am the reasoning of mr. Decroly, in the end, did not need to change the law.

I think this type of mention is interesting on an electoral track. However, in a legal vocation text, it is superfluous. by

I would also like to deny another very precise point. The Minister and you yourself have repeated at the envi for months, especially at this tribune, that you are integrating the European Code of Conduct. For my part, I can give you examples where you do not include it. Furthermore, if this code of conduct was binding and was part of international public law to which Belgium must absolutely refer in its decisions, certain passages of that legislation would be clearly in breach. For example, paragraph 1 er , 4°, B, of Article 4 of the proposal we are discussing says “that it is necessary to verify the nature of tensions, conflict or civil war and responsibilities in this regard with all the strictness that is necessary, in order to be able to provide adequate assistance to democratic regimes whose existence is threatened”. I read your proposal. First, in the law of 1991, we were much clearer and more precise. by

But I come to the third criterion, gentlemen Bacquelaine and Michel. The European Code of Conduct is drawn up as follows: “Member States will not authorise exports that may cause or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate tensions or conflicts existing in the final destination country.” Now, in your text, you say, “There is a need to check.” There is no need to check. When such conditions are met, they are fulfilled without any possible form of derogatory verification for the rejection of the license. But you take back the European Code of Conduct and where the latter speaks of prohibition, you say “that there is a need to check.” I am sorry to tell you that this is not a translation of the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, it is neither binding nor in accordance with the prescribed of the latter.

If I refer to the current code, the passage that you have just read in order to oppose what appears in article 4 of the bill, it is absolutely not automatic not to give the license for export to Nepal. Nothing can prove that a delivery of weapons to the Nepalese authorities would sustain, prolong or create the conflict. No one can claim such a thing.

Not only do you violate the law of 1991, but you also pride yourself here that you have the power to change the European Code of Conduct.

We have not changed the European Code of Conduct. We introduce it into the law. Mr. Decroly, I would like to invite you to discuss the substance of the problem. If I understand you correctly, you consider that it is absolutely unacceptable that an export license is granted to a country or to authorities and that there is no question of taking into account the nature of the difficulties of that authority in relation to the democracy that it can embody or the promise of democracy that it embodies. So, according to your thesis, in no case [...]

( ... )

I would like to remind you that this code is absolutely not coercive and mandatory at European level. We make it mandatory for us. I do not understand what you are complaining about. What annoys me in your approach, Mr. Decroly, is that if I follow you, Belgium could not grant arms licenses to a political authority or institutional authority of a confronting country, as is the case in Nepal for example, to Maoists. So you prefer subversive terrorists rather than an authority that tries to experience a democracy! I do not understand!

Politically, morally and ethically, I would rather be in my own skin than in yours.

I read the two lines of the third criterion of the European Code of Conduct, which you say bindingly translates into the law, including the law you propose to adopt, and I read: "Member States - including Belgium - will not allow exports that may cause or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the countries of final destination." by

In relation to that criterion, you say, in your text, that “it will have to be checked.” There is nothing to be checked because there is nothing to be checked! In cases where these criteria are met, Belgium cannot deliver. Inserting this in your text does not mean applying, nor making binding the European Code of Conduct, it is deviating from it!

Mr. Speaker, if you allow me to continue my speech, I will thank you.

I would like to clarify that, in the case of Nepal in particular, in accordance with the European Code of Conduct, it was not about provoking or aggravating a conflict; on the contrary, it was about giving a state the means to suppress a conflict and return to a possible state of democracy.

Considering that the fact that there is a conflict, even if it comes from a faction of terrorist and bloody rebels, would not allow weapons to be exported, it means that one would agree to leave countries prey to hordes of barbarians who would make terror reign there.

I think there is a political responsibility. That is why, in our mind, what matters is not the mechanical application of criteria but rather the political appreciation of the situation. It is this assessment that must be assumed because it is the own of a responsibility; it is also this assessment that must first, of course, on the strictly mechanical application of criteria which can always be interpreted in one direction or the other.

In my view, what prevails is obviously to assume this responsibility, whether the license is granted or refused; for me, both options involve a responsibility. It’s a little too simple to consider that licensing alone is a responsibility that as long as you refuse them, you don’t take any responsibility. This is obviously a little short! On the contrary, when one refuses to grant a license, one can take the responsibility of letting conflict and terror develop in certain countries, without any reaction and without the application of the slightest right of interference which, however, is now often recognized as useful in the framework of a foreign policy. by

I was pointing out what I considered to be advances of this bill in relation to the pre-existing situation. I talked about the implementation of the European Code of Conduct. I would also like to highlight the transparency effort with a more comprehensive annual report and the submission of a half-year interim report that will strengthen the control of the Parliament without, of course, giving it a co-decision power that would have been impossible and dangerous to establish.

The third element is the extension of the scope of the law to equipment intended for police forces. In my opinion, it is simply the inscription in the law of an existing practice.

The fourth element is the preservation and consideration of the economic, social, commercial and industrial interests that were, in fact, the subject of concerns of the sector concerned, both on the patronal bank and on the trade union bank.

The preservation and consideration of these economic, social, commercial and industrial interests when granting the licenses shall be part of the observance of a principle of confidentiality which will be established, in particular by the functioning of a commission which will work according to the shape of the closed door of the military procurement commission.

These different provisions must, in my opinion, be read as a balanced contribution linking the different facets of the problem, without disbalancing the legislation and therefore without compromising either our will for ethics and transparency, or our industrial and commercial base.

This legislation seems to me to make progress in both directions at the same time, ensuring the credibility and meaning of our foreign policy and the legitimate interests of an economic sector that performs in all regions of our country.

The coherence of the whole is ultimately guaranteed by the uniqueness of decision which is guaranteed by the competence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister designated, to decide alone, under his own political responsibility, whether or not to grant export licences.

For my part, I am convinced that this skill is used with intelligence and discernment. That is why my group will support and vote with confidence on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, the weapons law and the context in which it was created are a symbolic file of the green and red hypocrisy in the government-Verhofstadt. I pay tribute to the absent colleagues of the SP.A, who have ignored the historical rendezvous and its discussion in this parliamentary hemisphere. This cannot be done otherwise, because the stretchability of the green and the red conscience has indeed crossed many boundaries. Green and red voters, as well as delegates even in Parliament, have been deceived by their leaders on government banks and in closed conclaves.

Tomorrow will be put to an end to the sad and lying story that began on July 11, 2002 — o symbolism, on the nuclear cabinet of July 11, 2002! That nuclear cabinet was a kind of duvet valve in which ministers were present, ministers were no longer present, and ministers had to leave the meeting. It was in that pigeon hole that the Wallish fox has scaled the Flemish peace ducks. I would like to refresh the memory of the Greens and the socialist government partners and colleagues in Parliament for a moment. Tempus fugit, time flies and the deliveries continue. I would like to recall four conclusions of the Nepal scandal.

First, the Belgian Government has not consulted with Germany or with other EU Member States on the granting of the licence to the Fabrique Nationale van Herstal. That was the first big lie in this case. There was no consultation. Belgium has thus entered the European Code of Conduct with flat feet. Tempus fugit, the time goes fast. I wanted to remind you. But it is not only that. The ministers of the nuclear cabinet were not or not properly informed. If they were incorrectly informed, they were also incomplete informed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Not all information was their part.

Secondly, the export license for the Fabrique Nationale van Herstal, colleagues of the SP.A, could not withstand the examination with Belgian legislation and the European Code of Conduct. The decision was fundamentally illegal. The government has committed an unlawful act and has completely violated the current legislation. The whole Delcredere story — in French le service Ducroire, nomen est omen, what hides a name? — has repeatedly confirmed that the government lacks the law. The government, which so high-level ethics, went straight against the legislation that was intended to conduct a more ethical foreign policy. How was it in the government agreement? It is ⁇ interesting and, like the Burger Manifesto, has already been eaten a few times by members of the government. I quote: "The starting point of Belgian foreign policy is that human rights violations are unacceptable — inacceptable." Third, pro memorie, depending on it, this government decides on its own whether or not there is a civil war in a country, using the delete button on the website of Foreign Affairs as an especially easy aid tool. A slow democracy is not always a silent democracy, but a “slow democracy” means in the future that the military is allowed to violate human rights. I see the prime minister with tremolo, almost basins with vibrating voting bands, that Nepal was a rush democracy. Human rights could be violated. Therefore, newspapers can be censored and journalists can be imprisoned. In order to help democracy a little, to advance a foot, that same army may be extended with sophisticated machine guns.

Fourth, pro memory, tempus fugit, time flies, who pays the case? The Belgian taxpayer. This government with the Greens and the pacifist Flemish socialists — again thank you for your presence, colleagues of the SP.A, during the discussion of the historic rendez-vous — will in the future still approve orders for Nepal. In other words, the model state is a model of illegality.

Meanwhile, the Minimi arrived in Nepal, though with some delay. That had nothing to do with the Kazakh core, Kazakhstan was a bit of a game breaker here. The rapid democracy can fight the civil war with Belgian weapons, and that with respect for human rights. Chairman: Herman De Croo, Chairman President: Herman De Croo, President . On the offer table, after the fox had passed the boilers in the nuclear cabinet in Wetstraat 16, Ms. Aelvoet was the first victim and the Arms Act the second. Today we offer the last sacrifice, for after the discussion the easing of the easing of the weapons law will be approved by this majority. So it is incomprehensible... (Mrs. De Meyer stands talking between the banks). Thank you, colleague De Meyer, for your willingness to participate in this important discussion, especially for your party. The mutism that you have persisted since July 11, 2002 will be confirmed, but nevertheless your physical appearance delights us here. I do not assume that you will make a statement on this, because the principles have been overlooked.

It is incomprehensible that this has happened. Thus, the political agreement reached by the majority after the Nepal crisis provided for the partial transposition of the European Code of Conduct into Belgian legislation, which continued for a tightening of the gun law. The word, the principle "code of conduct", has thus become something new. In the Belgian political area, in the Belgian political linguistics, the code of conduct is the European code of conduct, but nothing is of course less true. I have also heard some tremolo between colleague Decroly and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The criterion of human rights, one turn or one crows it as one wants, was the main criterion in the law of 1991 and that is now subject to interpretation. The absolute criterion has now become a subjective criterion. That is, colleagues, Mr. Minister, a tightening of the Arms Act of 1991.

Now, with the amendments submitted and after the blackmail of the Socialist Party and the MR to safeguard the future of the Fabrique Nationale in Herstal, it shows the following. Those amendments have thus been accepted and will be approved by the other members of the majority. It appears that this European Code of Conduct is not fully incorporated in this text. Collega Van der Maelen — he is absent — can explain what he wants, but that European code of conduct is not included in the new text. The reference in the new Article 17 amended by Article 5 of this bill to the application of the European Code of Conduct does not refer to the application of the European Code of Conduct in itself, but to the government’s report to the federal legislative chambers, please.

This is the application of the European Code of Conduct. There is a report, a decision given to the federal legislative chambers. However, the report that the government now submits annually to Parliament already provides an extensive explanation of the European Code of Conduct. So that is nothing new. It is therefore even more surprising that this government, despite its extensive reference to the European Code of Conduct, does not apply it itself. It is really the reverse world. While a government in this constellation should blaspheme itself as the great defender of that European Code of Conduct and even look when it is not applied, it just does the opposite. Therefore, the tightening of the law is a relaxation.

In the future, however, the economic, social, commercial and industrial interests of Belgium may be taken into account. This allows such a broad interpretation that this criterion in practice — and that is actually what has always been anticipated — threatens to become the only criterion. The addition "without these factors affecting the application of the criteria laid down in Article 4" is, of course, a size shoulder clutter. This can only work on the laughing muscles, in some causing some cramps, but that is, of course, laughing with the people, as they say in the north of this country. It is the criterion that the PS and the MR eventually pulled over the line. It is the criterion that must secure the future of the Fabrique Nationale. Therefore there is a second easing of the law.

Tomorrow we will vote on the easing of the easing. However, in order not to follow our proposal and also to meet a bit with our proposal regarding NGOs and business, the government has turned in a number of curves. Our proposal had a number of concrete points. The first point was the absolute maintenance of the human rights criterion. Our motivation for this is very simple. She is glass clear. The new proposal does not include this criterion. The government text does not meet this criterion. There is, however, a small reference to the European Code of Conduct, but the space for interpretation associated with it is a weakening of Article 4 of the existing law. We wanted to maintain the criterion absolutely.

Second, there is the full transposition of the European Code of Conduct to become binding in its entirety. With a simple motivation, a glass-clear motivation, the European Code of Conduct becomes a full criterion for the Belgian government, also in the implementation modalities. This European Code of Conduct is nothing but a minimum minimum.

The fact that the adoption of a number of criteria must be meticulously reversed from a substantial point of view is evident, of course, from the analysis of the human rights criterion. Where the original article speaks very clearly of an apparent violation of human rights, the amended article is reduced to the following paragraph, I quote: "The work has been carried out very carefully" — says the quotation — "when, on a case-by-case basis and taking into account the nature of the material, permits are issued for countries where serious violations of human rights have been found by the relevant competent agencies of the United Nations, the Council of Europe or the European Union". This paragraph makes that the criterion of human rights violations does not provide absolute certainty for non-delivery of an export or transit license when establishing these violations because the number of organisations that can make such determinations is limited by the exhaustive listing. If we should apply this criterion to Nepal, remember the report of Mr Hollants van Loocke, former ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium, who spoke of a civil war in Nepal and “human rights abuses by the army”. Even that report was for the government of zero and no value. I will not even talk about the totally misguided interpretation...

The [...]

I have read it, Mr Minister.

You will, of course, only illuminate elements that serve your thesis. This is not balanced and not correct. Read that report and you will see that it is much more balanced than what you say.

Mr. Minister, it is very balanced on the other side, which says that there are manifest human rights violations in Nepal. You know that. I hope that in your replica you will repeat the ridiculous story of Pol Pot and the Golgotha and the Skull Place. No one believes that. The situation is not entirely similar. I will not even talk about the magistral rape committed during the lecture or citation by the Prime Minister of Mrs. Nelly Maes’ report in the European Parliament, which was supposed to be a discharge for the delivery of weapons by the Belgian government to Nepal and which Ms. Maes said it was shameful that a Prime Minister dared to abuse that report in such a way. Every week since August last year, yesterday in TerZake, documentaries are broadcast – neutral documentaries that are not colored in one or another sense – which accuse the violations of human rights and the civil war in Nepal and outline them with all clarity. You have a point, which we have never denied. There is a conflict in Nepal; there is a conflict of a seated government versus a guerrilla, but there is an equally large problem with respect to democracy. Do you know what the early democracy has disguised itself in Nepal? In a monarch who sent the government home. The fast-paced democracy in Nepal has disguised itself as a monarch who sent the government home and put two friends at the top of the government. That is it.

... ... And he left the Maoists master of the field. That is democracy!

Ethics is respecting the law. I believe in that. These are the foundations of our rule of law. Ethics is respecting human rights and not adjusting them for the pot-pourri or à gogo, if it fits into your womb. This is the subject of this discussion.

There are still countries that are eligible for Belgian arms deliveries where the internal political situation can be compared with the definition of a rapid democracy. I could give you a lecture from a purple-green Top of the National Arms Delivery Hit Parade. This is what is ultimately about in this discussion. I could give a hit parade of arms deliveries since the Nepal crisis. And forgeant, on becoming forgeron. One must forge the iron while it is hot: Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Brunei, India, the Philippines. The delete button does not always work.

( ... )

I never said they didn’t do it. I have said that they respect the law and you do not.

In the Philippines, we deliver to the police. Your website states that the situation in the Philippines is tense and that there is an armed conflict. You intervene in an armed conflict in Mindanao where human rights are violated. I can continue. The P-90s are being delivered to Mexico. Chiapas is unknown to you. There are also Panama, Chile, Argentina and Chavez in Venezuela.

Mr. Minister, if you want to speak, take your microphone otherwise your words will escape to many.

The [...]

Mr. De Crem, are you so scared of my questions? I have a very friendly question for you. I would not dare to be angry with you. Here are two examples where this Parliament has been given the opportunity to judge on its own.

As for the Philippines, you know that at the end of August the ASEP Parliamentary Assembly took place in Manila. You are talking about the Philippines. It’s about 3,000 islands, one of which you cite – Mindanao – where a Muslim fundamentalist, Mr. Abou Sayaf, houses in a terrible way. You know that the communist group in the Philippines is led by someone who emigrated to the Netherlands where he became a political refugee and now has obtained Dutch nationality. From there, he is now negotiating with the government in the Philippines. Should we not be able to deliver weapons to this country?

You also get to Mexico. I think this is quite strong. You should have listened when the President of Mexico, Mr. Fox, was here. Together with the Greens, he forms a government in Mexico. He spoke about Chiapas and Commander Marcos who came up with his mask to Mexico City to sign agreements there without a strobe being put in his way.

Then, therefore, one should not deliver to the police, which really needs weapons, that I can assure you. Politics also needs weapons. This is ridiculous. Choose other examples, but those two examples are foolish.

Mr. De Crem, be polite and let Mrs. Laenens speak and then Mr. Van den Eynde. Then you will have the word.

I would like to try, Mr. De Crem, to make a small step into the past. The Arms Act is from 1991. It was a serious attempt. There was then consensus to seek an economic and ethical balance. Before 1991 there were also arms deliveries. Before 1991, there were many governments — in my knowledge and as far as my history goes back, not purple-green — where there have been many arms deliveries. I think we are slowly, step by step, progressing, though too slowly, in respecting human rights as an international given. It goes too slowly, it goes too much with falling and rising, but I find it a little too cheap as here now the sanctuary of the saints is preached.

This debate of the right to and the right not to, however, raises my concerns. I will definitely not support this bill. Whoever owns weapons factories sells weapons, otherwise it makes no sense to have weapons factories. Those who sell weapons can only sell them to countries where there is war. I said in the committee that the Vatican’s Swiss Guard will not buy P90s. When you sell weapons to countries that are at war, you know that you sell weapons to countries where you are at least less concerned about human rights. Then, of course, it will be a matter of consideration. The reasoning followed here by the majority is not illogical, except on one point: if one does all that, Mr. Coveliers, then one does not go around the world, all screaming that one is the champion of human rights. That is hypocrisy.

Mr. De Crem, you get injury time, because you are already well over your time. Come, briefly and well. Or at least short.

We have always said that we do not take a hypocritical attitude. If there is a weapons industry, then it serves to wear weapons. Since the Middle Ages are over and the Liègeans may no longer attack the Antwerpers or the Genkenaars or the Gentenaars or the Bruggelings, these weapons must be destroyed abroad. For this there is a law: the law of 1991. The law of 1991 has entered into footsteps and that is our fundamental objection. The legislative change is now, rather than a tightening, an absolute easing. No one will be able to argue against it.

and yes.

When we talk about memory here, I have the impression that the majority has been ⁇ troubled by what has happened in the last six months. Therefore, I have refreshed the memory of which deliveries have occurred.

Mr Van der Maelen has apologized. I think he regrets not being there.

and his group. well well . The evaluation committee, which advises the minister on each dossier and explains its work to Parliament every six months, was one of our proposals. We ended up agreeing with the government to say that an ex ante control cannot be done. There are always political considerations that, given that in this small kingdom of the North Sea foreign policy is the prerogative of the executive power, are made by the government ex ante. Well, let’s not do this in Parliament. Ex post of course. There must be a subsequent control. First, are the regulations and legal provisions respected? Secondly, what opinions have been issued? These advice are not always accessible to us. I think it is important that we could know that. It would also allow us to no longer have to provide advice by phone, as was the case with delivery to Nepal.

That is why we want to set up a committee to monitor the arms trade ex post. The information provided to Parliament every six months should be kept confidential and trade secrets can remain protected.

The authors of this proposal say that, in addition to the inclusion of the European Code of Conduct, it is also necessary that a number of arrangements should be made that should allow Parliament — and I will quote again — “to be able to fully fulfill its role in this dossier”. I think this is a cynical comment. However, the problem with this statement is that although it is in principle a ⁇ honorable and honest statement, there is no clear role for Parliament in the texts presented. After all, it is about the ex post evaluation and therefore there can be no opportunity control that could influence the government’s decision in any way. Our absent colleague Van der Maelen has followed our example and has also submitted a proposal to amend the Chamber Rules. However, I think it was essential for the majority to address this as soon as possible. Without this element, the political agreement is not fully implemented. It does not depend on it, it is not in the preamble and not in the appendix. It would be interesting if we could discuss these proposals in the committee.

Mr. De Crem, I said last week at the meeting of the working group coordinating and supplementing the new Rules of Procedure that we may, in the last week of January, submit to the Rules of Procedure Committee – wherever your group is represented – the aspect you are talking about now and of course the other aspects. If we reach an agreement there — which I hope and expect — we will normally approve the Rules of Procedure probably around mid-February. That means, looking at everything together and considering the course of this bill, a similarity.

Mr. Speaker, I can see from your body language that you think it’s time for me to finish my argument. I will do that too.

I wonder why we have been debating the application of the law for months. Why have we debated this for so long? Everyone has established that there was a strict law, which is assumed to be respected by every Belgian, thus also by every Belgian who is part of the government. All Belgians are equal before and by the law. Everyone, and in particular the green colleagues, has been able to determine that this was not the case, even with them in the government. Conclusion: Tomorrow we vote on a new law, and the controversial arms deliveries just continue. Life just goes on, it’s business as usual, things go on as usual. In other words, the ethical foreign policy of the purple-green coalition is on its hole. It is even to the extent that the father of the Greens, chairman Geysels, proclaims that the Greens are not the Peace Movement. This is where it has come with our parliamentary democracy and with the cohesion between certain political parties and civil society.

In conclusion, I would like to say, Mr. Minister, colleagues, and in particular colleagues of the majority: the Nepal saga has actually had the opposite effect. In the government statement it was stated that we wanted to give our country a place on the globe again, but I can tell you that we have been severely distracted by the Nepal crisis and its consequences. The arms deliveries, and the way they now take place, are a stigma for Belgium. So don’t think that the image has improved since the deliveries to Nepal. We are now identified abroad with a cracking legislation and with arms deliveries in a dishonorable way. The deliveries are completely contrary to the law of 1991. That it has come so far is the crushing responsibility of purple greens.

Mrs. Laenens, you seem to be nervous today.

I am not nervous at all. I just want to say to colleague De Crem that I am proud not to be a member of a standing party. We always listen with open ears to the Peace Movement and we go with them to the extent we can, while still taking on our political responsibility.

I am not a member of the VLD, which is the new standing party of the 21st century. I am a member of the Christian Democratic Party, you know that for a long time, Mr. President.

I wish the next one to share with you. I contacted the Prime Minister and the Government to know when the interpellations we talked about recently could take place. According to the regulations, they must take place in the course of the week.

According to the Rules, the interpellations should be held during this week.

It’s not easy to get everyone’s agendas matched.

In order to approve the new agenda, I will formally propose tomorrow that a plenary session of the House should be held on Friday 17 January 2003 at 6 p.m. and that then all interpellations, both urgent and other, would be developed.

No other time can be determined and the Rules of Procedure are observed, in the sense that the interpellations are held in plenary session, during this week and that I have the right to formulate such a proposal.

I contacted the Prime Minister and the Government to know when the interpellations we talked about recently could take place. According to the Rules, the interpellations should be developed in the course of this week. It is difficult to reconcile everyone’s agenda. Tomorrow, I will formally propose the holding of a plenary session of the House on Friday 17 January 2003 at 18:00.

It is not possible to decide on another time and thus the Rules are respected. I have the right to make such a proposal.

Mr. Speaker, all these arguments do not prevent me from formally protesting hic et nunc against this method.

Friday evening may interpell about a war situation in which our country may be involved, which is because the government is mocking the Parliament. It would have been even better if the interpellations were held on Sunday morning or Saturday night! The fact that these interpellations were held on Friday night shows contempt for Parliament and I would like to strongly protest against them.

I thought it was advisable to share this now and not in the morning afternoon. This allows everyone to prepare themselves a little better. Mr. Leterme, this is only a communication and should not lead to debate.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to say quietly and explicitly that this is an attempt to effectively insert the constitutional right of interpellation into a ⁇ important file. This is truly a low point in the parliamentary history of our country.

I repeat that this afternoon, at the beginning of the plenary session, it has once again been shown that Prime Minister Verhofstadt had no problem to be present for this assembly tomorrow.

Yes, but only until 15:00.

However, we were informed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Prime Minister was only willing to dedicate a minidebate to this maxidossier.

The difference between the proposed mini-debate and the constitutional interpellation right assigned to us is that, when interpelled, each faction must confess color and the prime minister must be able to answer on behalf of the entire government. The problem is apparently that the prime minister today is unable to answer in this important file that concerns the whole population, on behalf of the whole government, and the majority is unable to speak with one voice. That is the only reason, and all the rest are escapes. That is the only reason why this Parliament is insulted and why these interpellations cannot be developed tomorrow at a normal time, which is at 14.15.

I inform you that this proposal will be made tomorrow in order to facilitate things.

Mr. Speaker, the proposal to meet on Friday at the end of the day for this debate does not seem to me really serious. It aims exclusively to try to stifle a parliamentary debate to camouflage once again the divisions of the current government team.

Mr. Speaker, you know that I have the habit of keeping my speech time. I will briefly and briefly explain what is still essential in this document. This requires a plenary debate. Therefore, I do not wish to return to the circumstances in which this law was created and in which the amendment to the proposal originally laid on the table was also made. I think this has already been done abundantly by the other colleagues from the opposition.

I have mixed feelings about this law. There are indeed some positive elements. I refer to the inclusion of the Code of Conduct and the addition of new criteria, in particular the prohibition of the deployment of child soldiers, the ratio between military and social expenditure and the extension of the scope of the law to non-military equipment. However, we would have liked to see an even broader scope of application, which would also include training in the law. I also think of better control over what is produced abroad under a Belgian license. These are a number of positive elements, which have ⁇ led to a narrowing and clarification of the law.

I am disappointed by the limited improvement or adjustment of parliamentary control. In this regard, we would have liked to set up a more extensive system. In this context, a Peace Institute would also be established to assist the Parliament, including in the preparation of a blacklist. In the meantime, I have heard the arguments — which were subsequently cited by Ms. Laenens — not to draw up such a blacklist, but I am not entirely convinced.

However, there are also some negative elements to this legislation. I will express it differently. There are a lot of missed opportunities. Then I am speaking more specifically about the famous article 4, fourth, which, in our opinion — and even if the text is applied to it — offers a broader possibility to the minister to make arms deliveries to countries in crisis and countries in civil war, still possible. I disagree with the philosophy behind it. We strongly doubt that arms deliveries are good tools to come to an end to a conflict. As pacifists, we are absolutely not convinced of this. Therefore, we regret that Article 4 has been amended in that sense, giving the Minister wider arguments in the law.

We are also disappointed by the simplified procedure for the so-called white countries. I have heard different interpretations on this in the committee. We talk about our neighbors, the EU countries to NATO member states. I think the last one is a bridge too far.

In short, the correct application of this law is crucial. I would like to go back to the entire Nepal dossier. There, however, we have to conclude that the law of 1991, which was applicable at that time — and, by the way, still applies — was stepped down. We only fear that with this tightening of the law on a number of points, but at the same time with the broader possibility for the minister — on the basis of Article 4 — to deliver to countries where human rights are violated or to countries in civil war, we have absolutely not done a good thing.

Therefore, it remains crucial — we will therefore continue to monitor this in the future, also following the various reports — that this law is applied properly and thoroughly and that the interpretation power available to the Minister is not exaggerated. We are convinced that if this law is understood and followed in this way, it may – as some peace organisations say with great hesitation – still be able to contribute to a better and more peaceful world. I will therefore abstain tomorrow in the hope that the application of this law will proceed in a good way.

Mr. President, I would like to apologize to Mr. Dirk Van der Maelen, not for his absence as such. Mr Van der Maelen worked very hard on this draft, but was suspended due to illness and was therefore unable to participate in this debate. Therefore, I refer explicitly to all that he said in the committee on this subject. I think it was appropriate to emphasize this here again from the faction.

I have already mentioned it later, Mr. Erdman. I think our colleagues understand that Mr. Van de Maelen would have done everything he could to be here. That is clear.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, dear colleagues, we arrive at the end of a discussion which, in my opinion, has resulted in a balanced outcome and of which it is, of course, unnecessary to recall that the starting point was the issue of a delivery of weapons to Nepal, a country that must face severe internal tensions that are likely to lead to an armed conflict. I refer here to the terms of Article 4 of the Act of 1991.

It is known how many in this kind of countries, situations are never completely white or completely black and how much the margin of appreciation and evaluation of the responsible minister is important in the decisions made. This justifies that the person who exercises jurisdiction must be able to take into account a whole series of data and can, as will be said by the new article 4 of the law, amended by the text we will adopt, verify the nature of tensions, conflict or civil war and the responsibilities in this regard with all the rigour that is required, so as to be able to provide adequate assistance to democratic regimes whose existence is threatened.

I would like, intentionally, to emphasize this aspect, because it seems to me to emphasize a new element brought into the law which, in my opinion, opens the field of appreciation more than it narrows it, but which also highlights the responsibility of the person who exercises the powers, which should lead it to put as many guarantees as possible on its part while respecting the terms of the law.

Mr. Speaker, I can remind Ms. Dardenne that the party to which she belongs and the program on the basis of which we have been elected, textually mentions, in its proposal 15 of chapter on international politics: "It is necessary to limit the export of weapons or technologies for military use to areas either in conflict or already overarmed."

In addition, you say “defending democracies.” I am already making the impasse of the debate of what is a democracy, young or other. But to defend a democracy, for a party that has always been a supporter of UN multilateralism or the European minimum, shouldn’t it be done in a concerted manner and not through unilateral or bilateral actions of arms deliveries to strengthen the so-called democracy attacked?

Therefore, you are in flagrant, manifest and obvious contradiction with the program on which we have been elected, both on this point and on many others.

I would like to express my appreciation for our differences in opinions. You are sending them. I think, for my part, to be correct in relation to what I committed when we decided to participate in this government coalition. It is inevitable to have divergent assessments on certain events based on its past, its ideology, what is represented and differently, but it must, of course, be decided and this is the role of the competent minister. It is also the responsibility of each to take responsibility.

I would also like to emphasize the addition of two important criteria in my view: the prohibition of delivering weapons to a country whose regular army aligns children soldiers, the taking into account in the assessment of the legitimate needs of States in security and weapons equipment but by ensuring that these needs do not override other needs in terms of economic and social development.

In the early 1990s, when we worked in the Senate on what would become the law of 5 August 1991 – I think I have worked a lot and submitted a lot of amendments – we had already tried, but in vain, to highlight this criterion as it is true that some countries sometimes spend much more resources on their arms than on their socio-economic development.

And the producing and selling countries are co-responsible for this situation of imbalance which, often, is itself the source of many riots, rebellions, guerrillas, etc. So everything happens to those who know how to wait, but in the meantime, collateral damage may have been many.

It is also interesting that, with this legislative amendment, Belgium explicitly introduces the European Code of Conduct in the field of arms trade in its legal texts and thus makes it binding. This, I think, is part of the answer I would like to give you, Mr. Decroly, on the position of a party that wants to be European.

It should be added that this does not change in any way the Belgian policy since Belgium regularly claims to apply seriously and scrupulously, I believe, this code. However, it should still be noted that this European code, like many European texts of the same order, is a common and minimum basis and that most countries already apply it in their national laws, and often in a more strict manner, as we already did in Belgium.

This introduction therefore has rather a symbolic scope, which shows Belgium’s willingness to see accelerated the process of establishing a genuine European common policy of arms export, which is well, I believe, in the right thread of the common policies that Belgians, convinced Europeans, are trying to promote.

Parliamentary control on the matter is further strengthened by the submission of a report every six months in an ad hoc committee. This formula meets well-understood commercial and/or industrial confidentiality requirements but it will also allow, by its functioning, a better parliamentary follow-up of policies in this area. I can only congratulate myself on this because it joins one of the ideas we had put forward at the beginning of the discussion, suggesting an ad hoc commission such as that of military procurement.

I would like to conclude, Mr. Minister, by emphasizing once again how necessary it appears to be to control arms exports. It is undeniable that the excessive proliferation of light weapons has serious consequences. The United Nations estimates their annual casualties at around 500,000 people. Furthermore, the fight against terrorism also involves better public control of arms flows, not to mention a necessary policy aimed at stopping arms trafficking. Tracking of weapons and strict control of final destination certificates are among the necessary means for this purpose. I dare hope that we can make further progress in this area.

Finally, I believe that we must make every effort to avoid conflicts, including by developing conflict prevention and first by exhausting all available diplomatic or dialogue means in order to resolve these conflicts. I dare to believe that in this 21st century we have not reached such a degree in intelligence and understanding of the world and its mechanisms to have no other instruments of settlement than the good old war, the one of which we were told too often when we were young that it would have made us good to know it. I maintain that no, and I would like to tell you, Mr. Minister — and I also say it to my ex-collega Decroly — since I have only a few weeks of parliamentary life left, that I can hardly tolerate being treated, whether it be half-word or by veiled allusion, — I heard you this morning — of “blatant or irresponsible pacifist”. I think, on the contrary, I am a credible pacifist and I maintain that my action and the action I have been able to carry out in parliament since 1990 on this law has always been in this direction. I recall in particular the action I carried out on anti-personal mines with the outcome you know. I think it has contributed to that Belgium plays a role on the international stage.

I would just like to say to Mrs. Dardenne that I treated her as a naive and irresponsible pacifist, but not blatant!

I may be able to say to the colleagues of the majority that if they find it necessary to make some further quarrel among themselves, we are readily prepared to go out for five minutes. That is not a single problem.

Even if you go out, it is still booked.

Mr. Speaker, I want to hear all this, but when I hear a minister from the majority members of the same majority irresponsibly call ‘irresponsible’, I wonder where that majority is still.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, today we are speaking about a bill that already has a moving history behind. When this proposal was made, ice was not gone overnight. This proposal was also initiated to avoid the pericles, resulting from the arms supplies of FN-Minimi guns to Nepal during the last summer months, in the future.

The applicants, all majority parties, wanted to signal a common EU approach to arms exports. Finding a consensus did not seem so obvious at first glance. However, the majority parties sought and found, after mature deliberation, a good solution for the refinement and precision of the existing Arms Act of 1991. The joint proposal meant a breakthrough in this dossier. Many did not think this was possible until recently.

Contrary to what is often proclaimed by the opposition and spread in the press, this is a proof that the majority in these cooperates with the necessary coherence, and at the same time also dares to engage in the debate.

Since the entry of this government, discussions on arms deliveries have been conducted more thoroughly within the cabinet and the competent parliamentary committee. Members of CD&V, let us be honest, in the past, weapons were also supplied by the governments of which your party belonged. At that time, questions were also raised about the opportunity of such a delivery and the respect for human rights. Not only our country, but other countries also supply weapons! Think about South Africa. I remember very well that the ANC accused previous governments of sending arms supplies to undemocratic countries. Right now, the ANC in South Africa is in power and weapons are being delivered! The statement is that if weapons are not supplied, employment is endangered. I think every country that produces weapons is facing this kind of debate. It is not easy.

The general principle of the recently submitted proposal is the transposition of the European Code of Conduct into Belgian legislation. Belgium takes on a leading role by being the first country within the European Union to incorporate the non-binding European Code of Conduct into national legislation.

Mr. Minister, colleagues, this bill gives a significant signal. Within the European Union, Belgium is the first step towards a unified legislation on arms trade. The new law provides for more uniform, better defined and stricter provisions on the import, export and transit of weapons and ammunition.

What is changing concrete? An important point is Article 2. This article clearly stipulates that Belgium may not export weapons to countries that are in a state of civil war or that violate human rights. At the same time, however, reference is made to the nature of the tensions and the responsibilities associated with them. If democracies are in danger, Belgium can export weapons and ammunition. Mr Goris has already emphasized the importance of this article extensively during the discussions in the committee.

The subject of the present bill is extended to material for military use or for order-keeping. This was welcomed positively by peace movements such as Pax Christi. A royal decree consulted in the Council of Ministers will clarify what material will be able to be carried out. Currently, a license is already required for materials used for dual use.

Controls on the import, transit and export of weapons and ammunition shall be clearly defined. The Parliament will receive a government report on the application of the law once a year. The report will cover, among other things, the development of exports, the analysis of world trade, the data on Belgian imports, exports and transits and the monitoring of compliance with the law. In addition, the government will report every six months on the licenses granted and refused by category and destination.

In the Chamber Committee on Foreign Affairs, sufficient time was allocated to exchange views with representatives of the weapons industry and trade unions. During the hearing in the Foreign Affairs Committee, representatives of the weapons industry expressed concerns that the obligation to provide information could endanger commercial interests. The amendments submitted and approved in this regard remove these fears. Confidentiality will be guaranteed in an ad hoc committee of the House which is competent for foreign affairs and operates in accordance with the rules of the Committee for Army Purchases. Competitiveness and employment guarantees were topics that made consultations with the numerous representatives of employers and trade unions very vivid. Article 4 was therefore amended. Where appropriate, the impact on the economic, social, commercial and industrial interests of Belgium shall be expressly taken into account.

Mr. Bernard Adam, the director of the Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, explicitly stated that the weapons industry should not fear that the new weapons law would undermine its activities. An increase in exports is among the possibilities with this new weapons legislation, according to Mr. Adam.

Clearness, transparency, reliability and straightline can further strengthen the image of Belgium. The export of weapons and/or ammunition to countries where children serve in the regular army is expressly prohibited. The consultation with the peace movement shows that this was also welcomed positively.

The thought track on the establishment of a follow-up committee, as proposed in the term, was adopted by the government and held back in the present bill. After delivery, the final destinations are closely followed. Diplomatic missions on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will check whether the weapons are effectively used for the intended purposes. For this purpose, diplomats and military personnel can be engaged. Regular exchanges of ideas and data can benefit the thus acquired expertise in this field. This could lead to even greater cooperation with European partners.

With the new law, Belgium aims to clearly signal that it not only verbally agrees with a European harmonisation of arms exports, but that it also actively supports and strives for this step to be followed on the European level.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Colleagues, what pushes me to the chest in this debate and in this bill, in particular, is the hypocrisy, the hypocrisy, with which it comes. I would like to explain the reasoning that I have subsequently put forward. I do this not because it would be my philosophy or because this finding would match my political views, but simply because I have to make this finding. I cannot do otherwise, because it is in accordance with reality.

This conclusion is as follows. Those who have weapons factories produce weapons. Those who produce weapons can only sell those weapons. Weapons are sold to customers who buy these weapons because they need them. Who needs weapons? Countries where war is being waged, whether it is a civil war or another. I come to a final determination. When there is war, and even less when there is a civil war, one should not count too much on respect for human rights. This has never been the case, Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs, in no country, in no political camp, and at no moment in world history. Let us simply establish this.

Consequently, the policy of a state where weapons are produced has only two options.

Either one wants to absolutely avoid delivering weapons to warring countries and thus to countries where human rights are not or less respected.

Either one looks around and says, "Look, if we don't deliver those weapons, someone else will sell them"; or one says, "We need that weapons sale for our employment"; or whatever other reason may exist. And they provide. But if one would do that – and it is done here – then one has the elementary courtesy and the elementary honesty not to walk around the world as being – and I have also said that later – the white knight of pacifism and morality. That this government does not comply with that basic honesty is very easy to demonstrate. On the one hand – I will never forget it because I thought it was so rough – we must have heard that the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs needed to call on our compatriots to boycott Austria because, in his opinion, the Austrians voted wrong, but on the other – I now look especially at the pacifist parties who participate in the debate here so numerously and passionately – we do not only supply weapons to Nepal or the Philippines, but is one of our biggest clients Saudi Arabia. You can tell me a lot about Saudi Arabia, but the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not a democracy and about human rights I think they will say "connais pas", but then in Arabic. Apparently, no one in the government parties has ever objected to these arms deliveries. It is not up to me to speak on behalf of their conscience, but I can only state that this is quite bizarre.

Therefore, I would like to accuse this hypocrisy here. This hypocrisy is even more expressed in the present bill whose history may be sketched for a very short time. What about this bill? We have since 1991 a weapons law, quite strange, which is almost regionalized. Remember the time of the famous...

The [...]

Yes, indeed, with the weapons committees, the institutional atomic bomb and so on. That weapons law was so-called strict, but when our pacifist countrymen occasionally received an acute attack of moralism, they found that there could still be something to hide from it.

Last summer, they saw their chance clear, or rather, they were obliged to do something about it. You will remember that. Mr De Crem subsequently again highlighted the symbolic date. On July 11, the nuclear cabinet put the proposal for arms deliveries to Nepal on the agenda.

It is strange. The representatives of the peace movement in politics, I would almost say the political emanation of the peace movement, namely the green parties and the parties that appeal to socialism — because it also exists — do not respond. They might suddenly beaten with blindness or they were all scattered at the same time, I don’t know. They do not respond until at some point the matter comes to light. Mrs. Aelvoet can only resign after a few clashes. Suddenly her conscience was awakened.

Nevertheless, the government remained in its position. These weapons would be sold. These weapons would be delivered. I had no problem with that at all, to the extent that it seemed to me logical from the conclusion with which I began this presentation. It is not that I accepted or approved this, but it happened on the basis of that finding. What was troubling was that they thought there was a price to be paid to Agalev and the SP.A. The SP.A. which has a great interest in this debate. (The SP.A banks are empty) This price would consist of a new weapons law that would be stricter. She would be stricter. I remember that in the Nepal debates here more than once I have heard say that we can’t otherwise, that we must deliver this time, but that we should be confident that with the new weapons law it would not be true, that it was the last time that something like this happened, that the new weapons law is there and that it is coming and that it was then done with deliveries like this to Nepal. These are beautiful dreams. It looks like the story of the cigarette and of Francorchamps. Francorchamps, over which the majority was divided. Eventually, the lobby of tobacco publicity was defeated here in this meeting. This would also be punished. How was this punished? By once again introducing a relaxation of the bill that one hoped could use once and for all to cancel arms deliveries such as those to Nepal.

In other words, it was a return. It was done with that strict law. There are, of course, still a few rules that are somewhat stricter than in 1991. However, there has been a serious easing ahead of the original bill. This was done in the form of a number of amendments that were put together very quickly in order to be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. That was on that notorious evening when the committee had to meet immediately after a plenary session of the House.

Again, the conscience of our pacifists did not resist. They were swept in sleep. Mr. Van der Maelen is not here. He also did not allow himself to be replaced. Mr. Speaker, I know in the meantime that he has apologized. This has already been said six times. Mr Van der Maelen also had the courage to protest in the Foreign Affairs Committee when we said that the amendments submitted and approved meant a new easing of the original bill. In other words, the whole debate about Nepal and the tightening of the gun law has been useless. It has been totally useless. We have sold weapons to Nepal and will continue to do so. Again, it is not up to me to prove that this is immoral or not.

What, however, lies on my liver, is that here in this house, for months now, on that level, a horrible hypocritical spectacle is being performed. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, and ⁇ for other reasons, but especially for this reason, my group will vote against.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to briefly recall the situation in Nepal – a country through which the evil came – even though, before the Nepal problem, other arms exports were agreed by Mr. Speaker. Michel, especially those to Mexico, suffered at least a questionable character. To do this, I will refer to relatively recent reports issued by “Amnesty International” and “Reporters Without Borders” What’s happening in Nepal? What about this young Nepalese democracy whose government, Mr. Do you think you have to protect the future?

Mr. Michel, ladies and gentlemen, according to the two reports that I would like to quote quickly, it becomes increasingly obvious that Nepal looks less and less like a democracy. This is not unrelated to one of the critical points on which I will subsequently emphasize my intervention, namely the question of the power of appreciation, now quasi-discretionary, which will be entrusted to the minister on a number of criteria, in particular on what constitutes or does not constitute a democracy.

What does Amnesty International say? In a document entitled "Nepal: a deepening human rights crisis", the organization lists events since the breakdown of peace talks between the Maoist guerrilla and the government. It also highlights the unprecedented level of human rights violations. The rebels have their share in the picture drawn up by Amnesty: murder of about 800 civilians considered “enemies of the revolution”, hostage-taking for ransom, torture, murder of captured soldiers, children recruited in the guerrilla.

However, Mr. Minister, it is the Nepalese army that comes at the forefront for the abuses listed by Amnesty. According to Kathmandu authorities, at the time of the publication of these reports, 4,366 people were killed in one year, compared to 2,700 people "only" for all the previous five years.

For Kathmandu, of these 4,366 people, 4,050 were Maoists. Amnesty claims that the vast majority of the victims were civilians – I cite the Amnesty report – “targeted for their real or supposed support to the guerrilla,” the others being actually rebels that the army shot down rather than capturing them. Additionally, according to Amnesty, "torture is practiced on a large scale by the Nepalese security forces and at least 66 people 'disappeared' after being arrested."

The executions are carried out today in a climate of total impunity reinforced even more since the adoption of an anti-terrorism law that prevents any prosecution.

As for the report of Reporters Without Borders, I would like to cite some similar findings. "The Maoists attack civilians and practice torture, mutilation and summary executions to establish terror." "Army and police are guilty of summary executions, severe torture, arbitrary detention and intimidation." by

In the sectors covered more specifically by Reporters Without Borders, the press sector and the freedom of journalists, it is ⁇ that a journalist was killed by rebels who had first cut off his members and stripped his eyes and two other journalists kidnapped by the rebels. The authorities, for their part, have arrested, without complying with judicial procedures, more than 150 journalists, 21 of whom are still imprisoned for having — I always cite Reporters Without Borders’ report — “worked for ‘pro-Maoist’ or far-left publications or covered rebels’ activities.” by

This makes me know that not only were we far from the situation of a so-called young democracy at the time when you granted this license, but that in addition, the remedy you considered good to bring to this problem by delivering weapons to that country or promising it the delivery of the weapons that are coming to it, is a counter remedy, totally counterproductive in view of the objectives you display.

To get out of the specific issue of Nepal, a government in Belgium, in 1991, fell on a similar issue. But for what happened during this legislature, several components of the government and the majority of the so-called "rainbow" have expressed themselves quite clearly, and in any case very publicly, about their opposition to certain deliveries or about their discomfort in the face of certain deliveries. One of these components was even so far as to disconnect his deputy prime minister and replace him with another; a secretary of state was indignant that the procedures relating to the coverage of these licenses by the National Office of Ducroire were not respected, which makes the decision of coverage not valid in his opinion, I quote Mr. Ducroire. by Boutmans. But under the government and the so-called rainbow majority that would restore a form of ethics in the Belgian conception of international relations, the deliveries continue with the support, in several votes since the July decision, of deputies of these parties who, on the outside, say themselves so uncomfortable.

We can also cite in the feedback, the interesting work, begun but aborted, of a working group gathered in the Chamber under the guidance of Mr. Van der Maelen, who, from 1995 to 1999, sought to move things in the right direction. Many of the questions I ask or the suggestions I introduce here by amendments are nothing but inspired by the work, in my positive opinion, elaborated at the time by the working group of Mr. by Van der Maelen.

What were we told at the time of the Nepal affair? “We are probably losing Nepal’s arms deliveries at this point, but, in substance and structurally, we will ⁇ a real improvement in legislation, procedures and their application in practice.” It was already a bizarre thing in itself. For if it really was intended to improve the law or to make it something more restrictive, why maintain at all costs the procedures and decisions that, with regard to the Nepali case, could have been repeatedly suspended since, when, fundamentally, the decision had been taken in flagrant violation of Article 4 of the Act of 1991, as in violation of the European Code of Conduct?

So, this law that was going to be improved, here we are.

We are there today, but I, I cannot separate myself from the impression, and it is more than an impression, since I base it on facts and texts as usual, Mr. Minister, from the impression that if the proposal currently debated had been in force at the time of the delivery of the Nepali weapons, this delivery of weapons, like others, would have been no more difficult, but much easier than it was in reality.

First of all, Mr. Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to ask about the legal and legal quality, about the legal certainty of the text of which you are the authors, dear friends of the so-called rainbow majority.

First I would like to talk to you about article 4, §1er, 4°, lettera a) of your project.

It states that the application is rejected when, I quote, "there are sufficient indications with respect to a given destination country (...) that there is a clear risk that the goods whose export is considered serve internal repression."

I do not know how it was possible to elaborate a text that is so subtle, but I ask especially the head of the reporting service to expressly cite this formula and without correcting it.

Another quite blunt formula is found in Article 4, §1er, point 4°, letter a) which indicates that the application is rejected when, I quote, "there are sufficient indications with respect to a given recipient country (...) when it is established that children-soldiers are aligned in the regular army".

Then, a third element that will show the quality of your majority work, but above all, let us be clear, your indiscriminate will to blur as much as possible the pistes of the one who would seek to find himself there and thus to give the executive, in this case to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, an even greater latitude than under the law of 1991 to proceed as it seems to him, and this by following his appreciation, to the deliveries he intends to authorize, to the licenses he intends to grant.

The next point on which I wonder about the legal certainty that it offers is that of the last paragraph of Article 4bis in draft which says — and again I ask the service not to correct, I textually cite a text of which we will make the Belgian law —: "If necessary, the effects of this licence on the economic, social, commercial and industrial interests of Belgium can be taken into account, without however that these factors may have the slightest influence on how the criteria referred to in Article 4 are applied."

So here, really, I challenge every lawyer and every magistrate to tell me exactly when this type of criteria can be taken into account and with what concrete effectiveness from the point of view of the decisions of granting or not granting export licenses by our country.

After these observations of a legal character, which are yet to blur the background of the criticism that I would like to develop, I would like to come to some substantive observations that touch on the content of the text. Dear friends of the so-called rainbow majority, Mr. Minister, I understand very well that you need to consult, I suppose that it is probably not to answer my suggestions or questions, that Mr. The minister does not have the habit of taking into account, but I would like to be heard because I pretend here to do a correct parliamentary job, not to polemize unnecessarily and rely only on your text. In any case, this is what I have done so far, on your text which is unqualifiable, dear friends of the majority, from a legal point of view.

I want to be listened to a minimum, if not by courtesy, at least by parliamentary correction.

Article 4, §1, 4° of your project provides for three reasons for rejection.

The request is rejected when there are sufficient indications and I quote: "in respect of a given country that export or transit will contribute to a flagrant violation" ... Mr. Chastel, you will prevent Mr. Michel from well understanding what I say, .... “Human Rights.”

What would this piece of article replace in the 1991 law? Because this is obviously the essence of the parliamentary work of control which I believe can be delivered here, to which one must deliver. This is a comparison between where we come from and where we would go if this was voted tomorrow.

This piece of article that speaks and I insist on "flagrant violation" replaces a 1991 provision that said: "The application is rejected if, in relation to the situation of the destination country, it appears that the export or transit would contribute to a manifest violation of human rights."

I have three comments on the text, first on the evolution of the notion of manifest violation to the notion of flagrant violation. This can be sold to the street man without any problem, as synonyms. Nevertheless, on the legal level — and I will make the economy of a series of references that prove it — the notion of flagrant violation and the notion of manifest violation do not at all have the same meaning. In law, the degree of evidence corresponding to the notion of flagrant violation is far greater than that required in order to be able to speak simply of a manifest violation. What are the concrete implications of this difference on the law that you want to be adopted tomorrow by our assembly? This implies that even in the event of a manifest violation, weapons can be delivered as long as the violations are not flagrant. This is obviously a significant downturn compared to the formulation of the 1991 legislation.

I say yes, ladies and gentlemen, to compromises that would bring our legislation closer to the agenda on which we were elected, but not to those who move it away from it. For information, I will cite the bill submitted in 1996 under the number Chamber-614/95-96 by Ecolo-Agalev, by Mr. Agalev. Vanoost and his servant. This bill removed the adjective ‘manifest’. Here, not only is it not removed, but it is replaced by the adjective `'flagrant' which will allow you to sell weapons more easily and more often than yesterday. It is not a compromise that brings us closer to our goals, the goals for which we have been elected; it distances us from them.

The second note relates to Article 4, § 1 er, 4th letter A (in project) ...

Mr. Decroly, do not let yourself be distracted!

I will not let myself be distracted, I have a text and I will continue to read it but I really find that for a majority that wrote on its fronton, a few years ago, the revaluation of the Parliament, not only does it not take part in this quite important debate and which caused one of the crises of this majority a few months ago, but in addition, it does not respect the simple principle of listening to the arguments, even legal and very textual that I try to make heard. by

I therefore said that there is a very serious decline in this article 4 compared to the law of 1991 since in the legislation that you would like this Chamber to adopt, the delivery to countries where serious violations of human rights have been found by the competent bodies — which I will spare you the enumeration, as in your text — such delivery will be permitted ‘subject to the proof, in such cases, of special caution and vigilance.’ But here, frankly, Madame Dardenne, Madame Drion, Mr. Michel, what a truffle! What a pure and simple lie to present this so-called compromise as an advance over the 1991 law! It is very good to decide on the basis of the reports of international bodies, although if we limit them to official bodies, we do not necessarily go very far in human rights matters. But it should be enough to have a condemnation, by official reports of international bodies, of a country that does not respect human rights, it should be enough to say that in this case, it is not delivered.

We do not deliver and we do not help Maoists, as you do! Reporters Without Borders.

To the far left, Maoists, we cannot surrender!

Don’t pretend you don’t understand me. We are not delivered to Maoists or to a government that torture, that violates fundamental human rights, as Amnesty International and Reporters Without Borders denounce, which I cited in extenso at the beginning of my speech. This is what is not done. Neither the Maoists nor the government! Absolutely undisputed reports indicate that both sides and, in some points especially the government, violate fundamental rights. We do not water, either part or the other, of any small weapon in a context like this! I repeat, it is really a truffle and even a characterized lie to present this part of the bill as an advance compared to the 1991 legislation.

Mr. Decroly, allow me to ask you a question. There is a conflict in the area. The government has decided to send weapons to the current government and another group, of which you claim to be the defender...No? 2 2 3 ...: Yes

Amnesty International and Reporters Without Borders — which I first cited in extenso — talk about characterized violations of which Maoist movements and rebels are blamed. There is no problem, no ambiguity! I also condemn the rebels.

I take note of this but tell me then what is your solution so that this group, which you also condemn, does not have weapons.

Through the diplomatic and multilateral routes, such as the one behind which your government is used to shrink, for example when it comes to supporting war preparations against Iraq. You might also be able to use it in this kind of situation. In any case, the program on which I was elected with others indicates that, in similar situations, it is not the beginning of a shadow of solution by watering a country or region affected by Belgian weapons, but that it may be possible to start a solution by intervening on a much more multilateral level to prevent weapons from reaching this, whether through embargoes, political pressure or all sorts of other means on which I will not extend here.

But anyway, delivering weapons has never been and is not the evolution I described to begin with. The situation has not been better since weapons were promised to Nepal. It is even worse. This is not and will never be a solution neither in Nepal nor elsewhere!

I come to a third comment on Article 4, first paragraph, fourth subparagraph, (a), in the draft — that is, of course, the heart of your project — and on the notion of “contribution” of exports to a flagrant violation. In my opinion, this notion of contribution to a flagrant violation of human rights introduces a blur, and therefore a form of subjectivity in the way that law will be applied. It therefore introduces the opposite of what would be necessary to legislate properly. I sincerely believe that it would have been better to prohibit purely and simply deliveries to countries that carry out acts of violation of human rights, whether or not Belgian weapons are likely to contribute to this. The notion of contributing to human rights violations and the notion of "being likely to contribute" to human rights violations are concepts that reinforce the blur of law. They give, therefore, even more power tomorrow to the executive and his minister, with as corollaries, even less parliamentary control and even less precise legal marks.

I would like to come to my fourth and last comment on this passage of your project. It seems to me quite superfluous to insert notions such as the non-alignment of children soldiers, etc. I have discussed this issue recently by asking Mr. Backline on this. I maintain that the mention of international commitments would largely suffice and that its inclusion in the statement of reasons would already largely suffice. I feel that there is more policy aimed at sending signals to the public opinion than a real legislative or legal work.

I am referring to article 4, paragraph 1, b). This is the most obvious downturn compared to the 1991 law. What does this law say? It refuses to grant the export license, I quote, “if the recipient faces serious internal tensions of a nature to lead to an armed conflict.” This is very clear. In the context of the 1991 law, this was enough to refuse the delivery of a contingent of weapons. But if this text is adopted tomorrow, the export discussed should cause or prolong conflicts or tensions. This is a way to clearly and objectively soften the criterion of 1991.What does this mean? This means that tomorrow, in the event of severe internal tensions of nature to lead to an armed conflict, it will be delivered, provided that it is not established that exports cause, prolong or aggravate these tensions or conflicts. That is why I submitted an amendment aimed at restoring the 1991 legislation on this point that I thought was serious on the legal level and politically important.

This article 4, in its paragraph 1 er , 4°, letter b, includes a second regression from the law of 1991. It would contain a breach of the European Code of Conduct, if one projected itself in a scenario where this code would be binding.

What does the European Code of Conduct say? If the delivery can cause, prolong or aggravate tensions – this is the third criterion of the European Code of Conduct – there is no delivery. “Member States shall not authorise exports which may cause or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate tensions or conflicts existing in the final destination country.” What does your project say? It indicates that there is no delivery, except for “threatened democracies.” Nevertheless, in its formulation, the European Code of Conduct did not provide for a derogation, this kind of pseudo-democratic pseudo-exception that you claim to establish. It provided for only one type of derogation, recalled in point 2 of the dispositif of the same Code of Conduct: "This code shall not affect the rights of Member States to conduct a more restrictive national policy." This means that the only possible derogations are those that Member States can afford under their right to conduct a more restrictive national policy. But the idea of defending a so-called democracy – one must know that there is also to drink and to eat in the way the notion of democracy is defined – does not suffer any possibility of derogation in the European code of conduct.

I heard Mr. Baquelaine talks about the right of interference. There are many discussions about what the right of interference is or should be, but I have never heard of one-sided type of right of interference. The right of intervention, in the best of cases, or the duty of intervention, in the least disputed scenario of the notion of right of intervention, is a right of intervention carried out in consultation with several countries. A country cannot, from its own head or on the basis of its own assessment of the situation, in the name of even the broadest right of interference, Mr. Bacquelaine, afford to consider delivering weapons. This is a last resort, after the use of all other possible ways to reduce problems, and in good understanding and multilateral consultation with a number of instances and other States.

I come to paragraph 2 of the new Article 4 which introduces a so-called element of the European Code of Conduct. In fact, the 8th criterion of the European Code of Conduct – and I stick scrupulously to the text – establishes “a criterion” – in this case the word “criterion” meaning something according to which one decides by yes or by no on the issue of a delivery of weapons – “compatibility of arms exports, with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, given the fact that it is desirable that States meet their legitimate needs of security and defense by devoting a minimum of human and economic resources to arms”. This is the 8th criterion of the European Code of Conduct. Therefore, there is a criterion that indicates that depending on this compatibility, it is yes or it is no! And the text of the Code of Conduct takes into account one element: legitimate security and defence needs. by

(The Minister of Foreign Affairs leaves the chamber and is replaced by the Minister of Economy and Scientific Research ) In Proposal 2083, ... by

It is curious! When I speak of the non-compliance of the text of the majority with the European Code of Conduct,

We should not interpret the “evaporation” of a minister as a reaction to a statement that has just been held!

I hope he will answer in a few minutes when he comes back!

In Proposition 2083, this criterion does not become a criterion allowing for a positive or negative decision but – and I quote your text – “an element to be taken into account.” No, it is not the same thing! A criterion is a criterion. One element that will be taken into account is not a criterion! It is something that is integrated into a constellation of elements of reflection and appreciation, with all sorts of weights that can intervene, but it is not called a criterion in the strong sense of the 8th criterion of the European Code of Conduct! It is much less net. This is not an offence, nor a contradiction, let’s admit it! But it is much less clear, it is much more blurred in the statement of Proposition 2083 than in the text of this European Code of Conduct that you claim to have transcribed.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen, in your text, there are a number of additional criteria but I suspect that for the most part, they are taken here only for purely political marketing purposes. In fact, legally speaking, they are superfluous given the international obligations already contracted by Belgium. These different criteria could have been included in the developments, but they are completely useless and superfluous, on the legal level.

Moreover, the criteria added in the most truly and genuinely innovative way are clearly deprived of any practical scope. This is the criterion of the risk of internal repression and the criterion of the impact on the social and economic development of the State of destination. In my opinion, the manner in which this criterion is stated is far too blurred to actually have any effect on the decision to refuse or grant export licences.

On the other hand, the proposal marks a very sharp decline on two criteria, obviously among the most important and which were included in the 1991 law. There is, on the one hand, the violation of human rights — I recently mentioned in particular a shift from “manifest” to “flagrant”, and, on the other hand, the problem of internal conflicts. For the assessment of these two criteria, the proposal significantly expands the discretion of the competent minister. by

Compared to the European Code of Conduct, the proposal is in breach on one point, namely the democratic exception that creates a derogation not provided by the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, it is blurred in how to transcribe into Belgian legislation the notion of compatibility with the notion of sustainable development by which I finished, a moment ago.

Finally, I find that the new proposal does not take on any of the advances of the proposals of law 614 of Ecolo-Agalev and 1520 of SP.A, deposited during the previous legislature.

I find it embarrassing that the evaporation of Mr. Michael continues on. This is a question concerning parliamentary work, to which I would have liked to have an answer from him or ⁇ from a member of the majority. I will put it on, Mr. President.

Go to!

I would like to ask you to read it in the event that I do not receive a response.

I will do it, Mr. Decroly. I would like to point out that you have already somewhat exceeded your 30-minute speech time.

Mr. Speaker, I arrive at 02.99 at the end of my speech but I will make an important comment on the extension of the scope of the law enforcement equipment. This is obviously positive and therefore I support this kind of evolution, even though the modification confirms an existing practice.

But there is still a doubt and I would like one or the other, Mr. Mr Erdman, Mr. by Bacquelaine, Mr. Coveliers, Mrs. Drion, Mrs. Laenens or Mr. The minister — when he comes back — raises the doubt. This doubt lies with the formulation selected: Article 4 provides for the replacement of the words "for military use" by the words "for military use or order maintenance", in the law of 1991. This is very good, but in the text 2083 itself, it is not said whether, whenever it is a question of military use, one should actually understand "military use or order maintenance". I think, in the minds of the authors of the proposal, this is obvious. The inaccuracy is probably related to the extremely expeditive writing conditions of this text. Nevertheless, in several places, especially at the end of your device, the notion of military use appears without the notion of ⁇ ining order coupled with it. In the context of parliamentary work, it might be useful to have an interpretative precision on this aspect.

As for parliamentary control, the last point of the proposed arrangement, the discretionary power of the Minister, I have already let him hear, will be quite expanded under Article 5. Proposal 2083 recalls and strengthens the system of a posteriori parliamentary control and introduces the concept of confidentiality in relation to the companies or companies concerned. Unfortunately, no type of license application can lead to a prior consultation with the Foreign Affairs Committee or an ad hoc committee. Therefore, we are far from the green or socialist proposals submitted before.

The proposal retains the principle of the individual ministerial decision, while one could have imagined a more collective process, for example deliberation in the Council of Ministers. This might have helped mitigate the absence of parliamentary intervention ahead of the process. Symmetrically, the power of judgment resulting from the provisions A and B of the new article 4, §1, 4° reinforces the system of a posteriori control.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I observe and regret a double downturn of which there is no doubt about the actual scope. First, the notion of contribution to a flagrant violation of human rights. Then, the assessment left to the Minister alone regarding the finding of violation established by the competent international bodies, and this even in contradiction with the criteria recommended by the European Code of Conduct. Finally, I regret the possibility of exporting material covered by the law while the country of destination is in a civil war or in a conflict situation; this is this pseudo-democratic pseudo-exception. This does not seem good either, as well as a number of easing criteria that make the proposed legal arrangement move away from the objective of limiting the export of weapons and technologies for military use to areas either in conflict or already overarmed, a principle that is part of the mandate on which I was elected.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I am concerned that today we do not incorporate — not unpleasant to all those who defend this proposal in the name of the European Code of Conduct — all the criteria of this European Code of Conduct. When they are integrated, it is only in an allusive or evocative form and – I have insisted on this several times – in a non-binding and sometimes eroded form in relation to the very text of the European Code of Conduct. More fundamentally, I fear that you are emptying the law of its meaning.

The minister has not yet returned. I sincerely regret this type of practice. The minister hides behind a principle of political responsibility before the parliament, which I obviously do not challenge, but he is obviously not there to exercise it, while his first responsibility before the parliament and the nation is to respect the legislation.

I would like to speak to you in your absence. Your government and you in particular — you have never hidden from it — you have been a little embarrassed by the 1991 law at the time of licensing decisions against Nepal, Mexico and other countries. But that doesn’t matter, you have achieved your goals. You amend the law that bothered you and tomorrow, unfortunately, we will have more arms deliveries to infringing countries or to undemocratic regimes. That is why, once again, I will vote against this proposal — and I wonder whether I will not be the only French-speaking MP to do so.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, it has already been said and it is almost a boutade, but whoever produces weapons wants and must also sell them. Due to the nature of production, namely weapons, unstable regimes and countries are engaged in an internal power struggle, dictatorships, a known market, very often through illegal trade. It is therefore absolutely necessary that this production takes place within a clear legal framework. That legal framework is part of a foreign policy that must always find a balance — and hopefully most often also find — between the application and ⁇ also the improvement of international law and respect for human rights, both in diplomacy and in another important objective of foreign policy, the promotion of commercial interests. The 1991 law sought a consensus between those commercial interests and respect for human rights. Consensus does not mean balance. Year after year, they have called for a revision of the gun law. We will continue to do so. We are convinced that today the transposition of the European Code of Conduct into Belgian law meets both ethical and economic criteria. The ethical I would like to situate above all in the fact that there is an escalation of violence, of the use of light weapons and that this is one of the very negative aspects of globalization, that it is therefore absolutely necessary that our legislation more and more also internationally legal a binding legal framework, the European code. Economically, we cannot avoid the fact that production is increasingly happening in a European competitive context.

I would like to emphasize once again why we are convinced that the new weapons law is not a relaxation of the law of 1991. For us, the main advancement of the 1991 law is that the code becomes binding. We have long been a demanding party for this. During the Belgian Presidency of the EU, a number of initiatives were taken under the leadership of Louis Michel. Apparently, however, there is still no majority. We therefore hope that the campaign that Pax Christi will launch this month together with Jantza, the international network, Lichte Wapens, will help to find enough co-supporters at the latest before the Italian Presidency to make this code binding at European level as well.

The six-month reporting to Parliament will allow Parliament to play on the ball much shorter than it does now with the annual reporting. Not only will the report be published twice a year, but the information in the report will also be better. Just think of the inclusion of refused licenses in the report.

The law will and must be interpreted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. By the possibility of doubling parliamentary control, we can better monitor compliance with the law: not delivering to countries that deploy child soldiers and more order-keeping material.

Critics say this law makes it possible to deliver to Nepal because it can be delivered to democratic countries anyway. That is not true. The new law states that it should not be delivered if it is proven that the export triggers or prolongs armed conflicts, exacerbates existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination or in the case of civil war in the country concerned. This requires careful examination of the nature of the tensions, conflict or civil war and who is responsible for it so that sufficient support can be provided to democratic regimes threatened in their existence. According to the new law, it can also not be delivered to countries in civil war.

I have repeatedly said that weapons supplies to Nepal cannot be carried out because they are contrary to the law. The new law will also make it easier to demonstrate this through increased transparency. As far as the human rights issue in Nepal is concerned, I do not think this is the forum to discuss it now. Finally, we are talking about improving the weapons law. I will do this next week in the committee.

The point is and remains the control of the application of the law. I think it is important that this legislative change is also politically framed. For us, there was no need for September 11 to realize that terrorist attacks are inseparably linked to a lack of human rights, a lack of international law, undemocratic regimes and injustice. Weapons are not the ultimate answer and this has already been cited by several colleagues. Strengthening human rights, stabilizing weak, democratic societies, and negotiating peace is all this. It is therefore an illusion to think that we can solve all this within the framework of our Belgian weapons legislation. Their

The United Nations Conference on Light Weapons in July 2000 emphasized that there is a very clear link between terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and illicit commodity trafficking. The call was repeated for effective control over the production and trade of weapons. It is in that international framework that we sign up with our Belgian legislation.

I would therefore like to reiterate the request for an extension of control over production abroad under a licence of Belgian origin and for a better and stricter control of end-users. Control of arms traffic is also a strong form of conflict prevention. I beam the words of colleague Dardenne: what could for the landmines must also be able for light weapons. After all, sustainable development also means turning production processes in a sustainable sense. We must be able to eradicate not only landmines but also cluster bombs because they almost always cause victims among the civilian population and then especially children.

This should also be for us the unwavering commitment to continue to improve the gun law. I agree with colleague Decroly — I think we have never had the pretension to say this — that with this improvement of the weapons law we can therefore suddenly forget all the other proposed improvements. I am and will remain a pacifist. I am not a naive pacifist. I know and I experience every day what it means if you as a pacifist also want to take on a political responsibility, a political responsibility that we all have as colleagues and as members of parliament. It is and continues to be a continuous search for how to maximise our political agenda. We will do this in consultation and discussion — I don’t think we’re going to avoid discussion — with all democratic forces. These democratic forces are situated inside and outside the Parliament. They are situated both within the Parliament, here at the debate or the final discussion that we are conducting here of this improvement of the weapons law, and outside the Parliament, where we are conducting the same discussion with the peace movement, not only within Belgium, but within Europe and worldwide. I therefore hope to be able to count on all democratic colleagues to make known the campaign that Pax Christi announced during the hearings — everyone here has European colleagues from the same political family — and to ensure that what we do here today follows within Europe.

Mr. President, Mrs. Laenens, frankly, talk about pacifism etc. to defend such a position. What I find striking is that you did not answer a question that is asked from the beginning and to which no one has yet answered in this homicide, neither one of the promoters of the proposal, nor the minister who has not yet returned, and that in addition, you alluded to your alleged management responsibilities to justify the unjustifiable. by

The question I would like you to answer is the following. The European Code of Conduct in its third criterion says: “Member States will not allow exports that may cause or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate tensions, etc.” Why, while the code of conduct that you claim to transcribe says: “They will not allow,” you say in your text “they will permit on condition that one checks and shows a special vigilance and caution.” You create a derogation from the European Code of Conduct that you claim to translate in a binding way. It is not approaching a compromise towards the pacifist options you still claim to defend, it is moving away from them. by

As for the management responsibilities, the political responsibilities you claim to have, I might ⁇ agree with you if there was, anywhere in the coalition agreement that commits you to support this government for the entire duration of this legislature, the commitment to reform in a sense like this the law on arms deliveries. There is not in the coalition agreement the slightest virgule, the slightest point, the slightest element that would make you things binding and that would therefore make your position, on the level of political ethics, begin to become justifiable. by

In reality, you have and you had free hands on that proposal to say: "We, on these points, those points and those points that constitute either infringements in relation to the European Code of Conduct, or objective regressions, legally constatable and verifiable in relation to the law of 91, we cannot agree ... simply because it is not in the coalition agreement and because we have been elected on a program that is opposed to the goal of making arms deliveries easier and the legislation supposed to control them more flexible."

Colleague Decroly, I remember the discussion during the discussion in the committee and I know that there the text of the code was read next to the text of the law, to have the guarantee that it was a transposition of the European code into the Belgian law and not an interpretation of the European code. I remain with it and I trust that this is also the case. I do not have the text here for me. You have read it to me, but I know it pertinently and I hope to find it in the report too. I really do not need to have the text. I continue to assume that the European Code will be transposed into Belgian legislation.

As for “les mains libres”, of course, we have the hands free. This is precisely what I have quoted with the political responsibility that we have incorporated in the debate with others. We are convinced that if we want to see our political agenda fully translated into law, we know that we will not get a majority. The law will be applied even less. Then the question is what we have achieved with this at the moment. I would like to conclude by saying that this is a step.

You refer to the European Code of Conduct and its criteria to claim to have it integrated into a law that is said to be better than that of 1991, you must have actually read it. You say that you do not have it in your eyes, I put it in your eyes; please read it and you will then tell me in what way your bill is compatible with those criteria.

Mr. Decroly, I will not read it. I just read what the new law says. I don’t need to repeat what I read literally. “Do not deliver if it turns out that...” and then clearly stated what you are quoting from the European code.

I want to challenge you, and especially colleague De Crem who, unfortunately, still had important and other obligations, to conduct this kind of discussion, free from what is so bluntly called the political game of opposition versus majority. I think this also applies to colleague Decroly. I hope that, when we talk about consensus, that means over majority and opposition.

Mr. Speaker, I will be the last to speak, but it seems that the last will be the first! Patrick Moriau was supposed to intervene but was prevented at the last minute. My intervention will, of course, be inspired by his text.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the debate that we are dealing with today is an old debate, only the actors have changed according to the political majorities. Over the years, many initiatives to amend the law regarding this matter, as well as those concerning illegal arms trafficking, have been developed. We must not deny the obvious: in the field of import, export and transit of ammunition weapons and equipment specifically for military use, we have the most binding law at European level, which is yet a very important form of guarantee.

The issues of this law question us about our register of securities. This includes, in particular, human rights. Some states will be recognized, others will be denounced in this regard. The political, economic and social repercussions are obviously very important.

Following the hearings requested by the Socialist Group during the meetings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, new amendments were drafted. Indeed, if the text had remained in its original state, we were aware of the serious and damaging consequences that could affect the activities of the Belgian industry and all the direct and indirect jobs existing in the arms sector. The application of the text in question would have resulted in high risks of relocalization of industrial activity in this area.

We have constantly expressed clearly our priorities of continuity and specificity of the Belgian industrial activity in this sector, as the issues are important, even in terms of jobs. The evolution of this matter required a development adapted to our economic reality and our social context. In addition, the amendments could not cause commercial damage to companies specializing in the arms sector.

I would like to clarify that the text finally accepted allows to take into account ethical criteria and socio-economic issues. It respects the necessary balances: on the one hand, the constraints imposed on industry by legislation and, on the other hand, the effective implementation of the democratic intentions manifested by the legislator. Finally, the amended text also follows the principle of transparency enunciated by the government.

A real danger to foreign policy is to see domestic problems supporters take the step and influence according to particular interests.

Following the auditions I participated in, I make myself one or the other reflection.

First, point 10 of the disposal of the European Code of Conduct is now taken into account. It is about taking into account economic, commercial and industrial interests at the same time as ethical aspects, that is, the reference to our values. Thus, by referring more specifically to this point 10, we are in a positive line of conduct in relation to the implementation of our values.

I highlighted a second element following the hearing of many bosses in the north and south of the country concerned with the arms sector. Most of the opinions were convergent and established evidence, ⁇ on two points. The first concerns the relief of constraints when exports are intended for a so-called “safe” country, partner or ally in the field of defence. The second point relates to the need for confidentiality given the creation of a system inspired by the operation of the military procurement commission.

Also about the hearings, we also talked about the issue here because the bosses we heard also talked about ethical issues and referred to aberrant situations.

It has just been said that it should not be repeated with regard to child soldiers because this element already appears quite explicitly in international law. But if there is a problem that can overwhelm us on the emotional and ethical levels, it is the question of children-soldiers, and I do not see why reiteration should necessarily be excluded.

In the same context, one obvious thing is recognized by all: the need to open the eyes about the economic and social health and the needs of the population, met or not, in these countries that import weapons. Obviously, we are in the register of intentions and speeches. These notions appear in different texts, but the day when we really have to weigh the economic and social health of different countries and look to see whether the real needs of the populations are met, I have the impression that one can reduce the world map to a map of a few countries that one can count on the fingers of one hand.

The world is what it is and it is a pity. This is even a European consensus since already stated in the Code of Conduct of which I spoke earlier. There are really very few countries with good economic and social health. In addition, it facilitates the speech and it makes the debates more explicit. We speak of Maoists on one side and regular governments on the other. Of course, Maoists or extremist movements, whether they are left or right, are not very good... But governments recognized in the hands of the big owners who keep the most humble in misery are not very good either.

I have the impression that if we really have to check what our democratic values are, we will not export a lot of weapons to the world! On the other hand, everything we are doing now, in my opinion, leads us to reflect on what our development models are, but this is another debate. When you think, for example, that in economic statistics and in particular in terms of GDP calculation, the more you manufacture tanks and weapons of destruction, the more your GDP rises, and the more you are supposed to be a country in good economic health. But it is not obvious that by doing so, we really meet the needs of the population.

The Socialist Group supports the parliamentary initiative as developed and finalised in a committee. The various amendments made to the text have restored a certain balance between the primary ethical considerations and the economic, political and social aspects. Furthermore, let us hope that one day we will live in a world without weapons and that development strategies will allow us to move toward what is now called sustainable development, which is a quite galvanized term, or toward a development that meets the needs of the most humble.

So I finished the list of speakers who wanted to sign up for the general discussion of this proposal.

I give the word to the Government.

Mr. Speaker, I entered during Mr. Decroly’s intervention and listened attentively to Mrs. Laenens and Mr. Depreter. Mr Michel has confirmed to me that he will refer to the report.

Mrs. Brepoels, do you want to replicate this replica of the government? Shortly please.

I find this very strange. I can understand that the Deputy Prime Minister makes certain arrangements to answer questions asked by the members, but that he simply disappears and in fact leaves that task to his colleague Piqué, who indeed only heard the last two people, is strange. So we must ask it at this moment without a single answer. The government is even pushing it so far that it has not yet answered the questions asked by Parliament at any time. If I understand Minister Piqué correctly, he says that Minister Michel has said that he refers to the report. Does he mean the report of the committee in which he answered a number of questions? Then I have to tell you that in the meantime a lot of things have changed, for example in connection with the first phase of arms deliveries to Nepal, the human rights situation in Nepal, and so on. The Minister of Foreign Affairs thus considers it absolutely not necessary to address a response to Parliament.

Mr. Speaker, we have been able to compile the whole afternoon from the body language and the responses of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that he found it a mere waste of time to be present in Parliament, to follow the discussion, and to listen to the questions of the opposition. This is another step in the relationship between the government and Parliament, which I deeply regret.

I think what we have been witnessing since the beginning of the afternoon, in particular the multiple distractions of Mr. Michel, his almost constant refusal to intervene on the subject and his repeated absences, all this is never but the anticipated illustration of how this dossier will be handled from tomorrow if this bill should be adopted.

The law is largely sweetened, made more blurred wherever it could have represented a possible stone in the shoe of the executive, concerned with proceeding with the arms deliveries according to its own judgments, and the Parliament is put out of play. That’s what we’ve witnessed this afternoon, and it’s just prefiguring what’s going to happen on this case, as on many others unfortunately, with an increasingly arrogant executive. Outside, he clams more and more loudly his concern for the revaluation of parliamentary procedures and work, as he negates them and denies them in the very premises where we are supposed to work.

On a more technical level, I would like to again ask a question that has not yet been answered. I am not talking about more political or logical issues. I was asking you about the scope of Article 1, § 1, 4°, point a), which says, I quote, “[...] provided that you demonstrate special caution and vigilance with regard to the issue of licenses for countries where serious violations of human rights have been found (...).” Thus, in the event that there is special caution and vigilance, you can, contrary to what prevailed under the 1991 regime, issue export licenses. Madam Laenens and Drion? I have not yet received an answer to this question and I regret it.

On the other hand, I modestly asked a much more technical and simply legal question just recently, which has also not been answered. This refers to the scope of the text deposited by the majority, the so-called "rainbow" and the extension of this scope to the material relating to the maintenance of order. We move from the only military equipment, to the use of the armed forces, to the equipment for the use of the police forces or the maintenance of order. I find this interesting, positive in itself, but it requires clarification. In fact, in the middle of Article 5, I read: "In the report referred to, a separate chapter (...) will be devoted to ammunition and equipment specifically intended for military use." Should it also be understood, according to the spirit that apparently animates the promoters of the proposal, that it is a military use or order-keeping?

And, in the end of the preceding paragraph of that same article 5, it is again made reference to a material "specially intended for military use". Should we understand that this is actually a material specifically intended for military use or order maintenance? This is a question without controversy, entirely objective, textual and legal. It would have been a good tone if one of the ministers present or, better yet, one of the promoters of the proposal — but, to hear the way they defend it, I fear that they do not all know it — brought this precision, so that, at least at the level of parliamentary work if not in the device itself, we have all the desired clarity on this small aspect of the scope of this law.

It’s a pity that we can’t get an answer after 4 hours of debate and more than an hour after the question was asked. It is still a little regrettable.

I can share some of the views that Mrs. Brepoels or Mr. Decroly has just announced.

Nevertheless, it must be said that after such a lengthy and interesting debate as this — I have yet to go through the report — it would still have been more satisfying if the government could give complementary answers to the new questions that were raised.

The government is there, I do not criticize anyone, but I also have the duty to raise the matter on behalf of the parliamentary institution.

Mr. De Crem, the government has responded, in so far as this was a response.

Mr President, did you say?