Proposition 54K1579

Projet de loi modifiant le Code pénal en ce qui concerne la répression du terrorisme.

General information ¶

Authors

MR Denis Ducarme
N-VA Sophie De Wit
Open Vld Patrick Dewael, Katja Gabriëls, Carina Van Cauter

Submission date

Jan. 13, 2016

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

offence criminal law penalty terrorism

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V LE ∉ Open Vld N-VA LDD MR PP VB

Voted to reject

Groen Ecolo PS | SP PVDA | PTB

Abstained from voting

Vooruit DéFI

Party dissidents ¶

• Olivier Maingain (MR) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

Dec. 1, 2016 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

The rapporteurs are Mr Hans Bonte and Mr Stéphane Crusnière.

I refer to the written report.

thank you . The floor is yielded to Mr Crusnière.

Mr. Speaker, dear colleagues, I do not want today, in the plenary session, to resume the debate that took place in the Committee on Terrorism, an intense and lively debate. But this is indeed an important text that deserves to be held a little.

The first thing to recall – my group has already said it – is that it is essential to have effective tools in the fight against terrorism. We are committed to contributing to this goal by supporting any proposal that is targeted, proportionate and effective. These are the three conditions. We have already done this several times.

But the objective of the text that is now on the table does not, in our opinion, meet these criteria. First, as regards the proportionality and targeting of the notion of "or having ought to have knowledge" which is specified in the text, it is clear that the majority and we ourselves do not share – it was said in committee – the opinion of the State Council. We do not have the same reading of this opinion. We believe, on our part, that there should be a clear criticism of this text that does not respect the principle of legality. I will cite to support my statements an excerpt from this State Council opinion which says: “To interpret literally the new version of the aforementioned provision implies that a person who merely participates in an activity of a terrorist group that is not related to terrorist activities of the terrorist group would also be punished.”

This element, combined with the "duty to know" that the group is a terrorist group, is also incorporated as an element of incrimination and this may have the effect of significantly expanding the scope of incrimination. A very broad formulation, an activity of a terrorist group can indeed be linked to a type of potential knowledge hardly determinable with certainty, not the effects of its own action but the nature of other people's activities which are not always unambiguous.

It is problematic, therefore, to assort these not always clear activities of other people from a standard of prudence for any third person. Thus, there is a risk of creating a too widespread incrimination that could undermine the element of guilt that constitutes an essential element of the offence.

Therefore, given the very different nature and degree of dangerousness of the acts which are likely to be covered by the definition of the offence, the question may also arise whether the proposed modification of the current formulation does not conflict with the principle of proportionality of penalties.

If certain amendments have, of course, improved the text – it must be acknowledged – in the sense of the opinion of the State Council, and if the author of the proposal has clarified others, in the light of the amendment of Article 141, these amendments are not sufficient, in our opinion, to mark the text as desired by the State Council.

This is a primary dimension of legal certainty: in order for an act to be punishable, the author must be able to know, at the moment of acting, that the act constitutes an offence. Here, the discretion that is left to the judge in the qualification of the fact itself is, in our opinion, too wide to guarantee the safety of all as well as to guarantee legal certainty.

Let me repeat the examples brilliantly cited by my colleague, Nawal Ben Hamou, in commission. Google Earth is an easy-to-track tool for terrorists. Should Google employees be condemned? Artificial explosives are prepared with common consumer products (oxygenated water, detergents). Should we, therefore, prosecute the drug addicts, the hairdressers, the grocery? Is a donation of a euro at a collection for a group close to the Salafists a preparatory act? Does the intention have to exist at the time of the disputed purchase or can it be established a posteriori? This is absolutely absurd, I admit. But this shows the uncertainty of this proposal.

Finally, my group is even more concerned about how this proposal interferes with the statements made by the federal prosecutor, the State Security and others, in the counter-terrorism investigation committee. High-level officials are concerned about overjudiciarisation, i.e. an increasingly rapid and increasingly massive judicialization of cases. According to their experience on the ground, such a logic greatly complicates their work, whether it is the obligation to prosecute any fact that could help or lead to the constitution of an offence or to simply prevent our intelligence services from functioning and carrying out their mission. This multiplication of criminal facts severely limits in any case their ability to carry out the necessary investigations, the dismantling of chains and networks.

It is therefore a measure that, instead of strengthening our capacity to act against terrorism, risks exposing us to future difficulties.

We need to reaffirm in this sense what our security services need as a priority to respond to the threats that weigh on our society. This is not a wider legal framework. The legislative arsenal in this field is already very comprehensive, as is attested by Articles 137 to 141 of the Criminal Code.

What we need are financial, technological and human resources. For these reasons, we believe that this text is premature and that it would have deserved a deeper analysis, which we would have obtained, in particular by organising hearings.

It would now be appropriate at least to wait for the conclusions of the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee to judge on the basis of how this text would contribute to a response to the recommendations from the ground.

For this reason, my group will oppose this text, as it has already done in the committee.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, I think no one in this meeting doubts that the evolution of the terrorist threat requires increased control on the ground and that, where necessary, the material criminal law will be supplemented to enable all terrorist behaviors to be investigated and appropriately punished.

A careful examination of this material criminal law has forced us to perfect the criminal law, to clarify certain formulas and to further criminalize certain behaviors. I am talking, among other things, about criminalizing the financing of all terrorist crimes, which, unfortunately, is not the case today.

I would like to express my gratitude to Mr Crusnière for the constructive and careful debate we have held in the committee on the subject of the matter.

The final decision after this very extensive discussion and after repeated opinions of the State Council is that we need an additional notion in our Criminal Code, in particular the notion of preparatory acts. We must effectively and explicitly include this notion in our Criminal Code, so that preparation for a terrorist crime can also be criminalized.

It is not only important to provide for the punishment, it is also of the utmost importance that, as soon as we enter this notion in the Criminal Code, we allow the verbalizers, the investigators in the field to intervene very quickly and prevent much worse.

When preparing for a terrorist crime, it is important that investigators can use the most efficient methods, including special detection methods, to prevent worse events and to avoid victims and damage.

It is important to point out that we have not only introduced the notion of “preparative acts” in the Criminal Code, but that we have also made some refinements to our criminal law, which are important to address the entire chain of criminal conduct and terrorist offences. Nowadays, participating in an activity of a terrorist group is effectively criminalized, while it is known that it contributes to the crime. The supply of material resources for the purpose of committing a terrorist act is also a criminal offence, but, as already stated, these provisions are too limited. What we now want to do is criminalize when someone knew or ought to know that their participation could contribute to committing a terrorist crime.

In response to the comment made by Mr Crusnière, I would like to emphasize that the way in which the qualification is formulated is such that it is clear and understandable in advance to everyone, that everyone can know clearly that when he makes an act, that act will also become criminal under the law, and that this is thus consistent with the principle of legality.

This bill indeed provides the court with additional leverages and more arms to catch terrorists, and that is especially important, even before they can strike. I am convinced that the detectives will now literally have more weapons in their hands to intervene at that very early stage. At that stage, one can effectively prevent worse and one will be able to intervene when there are the so-called lone wolves who would plan an attack alone or with two.

Last but not least, the bill expands the criminalization of terrorist financing. From now on, financing any terrorist crime will be criminalised. Moreover, it is not only about facilitating a terrorist crime, but also the terrorist itself.

As for the technical aspects of this bill, I will not go further on today. This is clearly and thoroughly stated in the Commission. It is obvious that the intent to commit one or more terrorist offences is and remains essential to the punishment, including the preparatory acts. It stands like a pile above water. During the discussion in the committee, a clear distinction was made between, on the one hand, the preparation and, on the other, the attempt, in particular, the stage in which one is in the process, preparation or implementation.

Finally, during the discussion, it was clearly stated that there is indeed proportionality in the way in which we provided for the punishment of the preparatory acts.

The concerns of a number of colleagues – in reference to the discussion we have had in the committees on counter-terrorism and terrorist attacks – about early legalization do not actually have anything to do with the additional criminalization of certain deceptible acts that society cannot tolerate, in particular with the criminalization of preparatory acts. Rather, it deals with the interaction between, on the one hand, gathering information and, on the other hand, filing a case with the prosecutor’s office, in other words, initiating a judicial investigation. This will need to be addressed in the future and consulted by all stakeholders. That is clear to everyone. This is not an obstacle to further improving our criminal law.

I think that this proposal is well thought out and that there can only be one decision, in particular that we need these additional instruments.

By “we” I mean, of course, those who are daily on the ground with our security, who must fight terrorism on the ground. They implement the measures effectively in practice. The tools we approve are intended to strengthen them in their often dangerous job. I wish them much success.

I hope that, with your support, this tool can be useful in the field.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the bill that is submitted to us this afternoon is important in more than one title.

First, it extends the offence of participation in a terrorist group to cases of potential knowledge of the terrorist offence. It then inserts an article 140septies into the Criminal Code in order to punish preparatory acts of terrorism. Finally, it extends the offence of terrorist financing to the offences referred to in Articles 140bis (incitement to terrorism) to 140septies of the Criminal Code – which therefore also includes the financing of departure and return. It also takes into account several FATF recommendations, as well as the adaptation of the European Directive on the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, which is being finalised – I will return to it.

By extending the offence of participation to a terrorist group, our bill will now allow to punish those and those who should have known that their participation would contribute to the commission of an act or crime by a terrorist group. Some colleagues mentioned in the committee the risk that this potential knowledge is difficult to determine with certainty. However, we have already had the opportunity to emphasize that a certain degree of participation would be necessary and that the main judge should therefore examine the determining circumstances and criteria on a case-by-case basis. In particular, it should check whether these are sufficient presumption beams to determine whether an accused has participated in the activities of a terrorist group.

It will be recalled here, dear colleagues, that jurisprudence has already used, for several years, these criteria to establish that an accused has indeed contributed to the activities of a terrorist group.

But the most iconic measure of the bill is ⁇ the creation of article 140septies in the Criminal Code to sanction preparatory acts. What do we mean by that? As early as 2001, the day after the attacks of September 11, the UN Security Council, through its resolution 1373, drew the attention of member states to the importance of acting ahead of the terrorist offence, thus even before the stage of the attempt, by dealing with the precursors of the act itself, which make it possible to commit it.

The bill lists in a non-exhaustive way – I will also return to it – a series of examples: the search, search or acquisition of premises that can be used as retreats, housing, gatherings; or possession, transportation or manufacture of fake papers, objects or explosives.

These provisions, which have been demanded by the UN since 2001, already exist today in several European countries. I think of Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The European Directive on Combating Terrorism, which I just mentioned and is currently being updated, also aims to address the offence. It is time to overcome the delay in the adoption of the proposal.

Furthermore, as I said in the introduction, the bill extends the offence of financing of terrorism to the offences referred to in Articles 140bis to 140septies of the Criminal Code. We also want to be proactive here by anticipating the update of the EU Directive on combating terrorist financing and by responding to the recommendations of the Financial Action Group (FATF).

That is why the extension of the offence will apply regardless of whether the means are or are not actually used to commit the terrorist offence and regardless of whether the accused person knows which specific offence his or her funding is intended for.

Finally, the third axis of the proposal is to punish the financing of a terrorist, i.e. the person who is going to commit a terrorist attack, regardless of any link between the financing and the terrorist offence. By this last point, we also wanted to meet the requirements of the FATF.

Two types of criticisms have been raised in a committee by some members of the opposition regarding the proposal. One type of criticism had to do with the opinion of the State Council, the other was rather an argument of opportunity.

We could first hear and read this and there that the State Council would have recalled the text. It is nothing. At most, the State Council has formulated a series of technical remarks, to which we have provided clear and precise answers in committee.

On the extension of the offence of participation in a terrorist group, the State Council recognizes that this extension is "admissible insofar as the criterion allowing to establish that the accused should have known that he participated in the activities of a terrorist group is deduced from concrete elements such as the personal situation of the person concerned."

Likewise, the State Council has not at any time questioned the incrimination of the preparatory acts. At the most, it expressed reservations on the non-exhaustive nature of the list referred to in the proposal.

You are not without knowing that terrorism is constantly evolving, that the Islamic State regularly demonstrates morbid creativity and adapts to the tools we put in place to strike it. In November 2015, the modus operandi was not what we observed in March 2016. In March 2016, the modus operandi was not used in Nice. And, in Nice, this is not the modus operandi that has been used with respect to a priest in France.

In this case, we refuse to allow ourselves to be locked in a too rigid framework. On the contrary, we wish to be able to cover any type of behavior that falls within the definition of a preparatory act. However, drawing up an exhaustive list would expose the services to the risk of not being able to incriminate an act that would be preparatory in facts but not in law.

For too long, we have been trapped by enemies who exploited the gaps of our legal system. If we refuse to sacrifice our freedoms, we also refuse to sin by naivety. On the contrary, we must anticipate the terrorist threat to protect our security, which is a fundamental right.

Finally, the penalties are also divided into several degrees in the proposal: lower than the penalties applicable, on the one hand, to the attempted terrorist offence, on the other hand, to complicity. Here too, the State Council considered that the determination of the severity of an offence and the severity of its sanction belongs to the judgment of opportunity of the legislator, while acknowledging in his wisdom that the difference in the degree of the punishment is not manifestly unreasonable.

Finally, the State Council recognizes that the preparatory act cannot be punished as severely as the attempt or complicity.

The difference between the preparatory act of terrorism and the attempted act is that, in the first case, the act has not yet taken place or is known to have begun to be executed. As you can see, our approach here is also quite consistent.

The second set of comments raised by some groups in committees were rather related to the opportunity. Certain public hearings of the Parliamentary Investigative Commission set up to draw lessons from the attacks of 22 March have, in fact, highlighted the problem generated by the hyperjudicialization of certain terrorism files. In some specific cases, the intelligence services believe, in fact, that the federal prosecutor’s office takes back the hand too quickly. It is sufficient for this that they are faced with an infringement as part of their information collection work. However, it appears that the intelligence services would sometimes want to hold the hand longer and the judicialization reduces their margin of manoeuvre. In certain specific cases, it may be appropriate for the intelligence services to infiltrate a terrorist cell more deeply or to collect additional information in order to identify other terrorists, eventually return them or anticipate other information.

We are, of course, aware of this comment, of this issue. And the investigation committee will have to look at the possibility of better frameworking the judicialization of terrorist files, initially managed by the intelligence services, when the time comes to draft the recommendations for the security component. And we could, without going too far, at this occasion inspire ourselves from the British model. However, in certain situations it is more appropriate to act immediately ahead of the terrorist offence, to sanction preparatory acts. This remains quite relevant.

Ladies, gentlemen, colleagues, we would have wished that, like other reforms, initiated by this majority, the opposition could join us and support the text. Unfortunately, there was nothing, since the Socialist Party and Ecolo-Groen opposed it. We, dear colleagues, more than ever need unity, pragmatism, unity behind projects, whose sole objective is to strengthen our services and the tools that we put at their disposal in their daily and difficult fight against terrorism, fight conducted in strict respect of the necessary balance between security, on the one hand, freedom, on the other, between proportionality, on the one hand, and efficiency, on the other.

Hopefully everyone will vote for the proposal! As far as we are concerned, we will of course support the creation of a new tool, important in the fight against terrorism.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, our group had its own proposal, but we are pleased that this proposal, which we eventually submitted together, can still be approved. In tackling terrorism, it is very important that the legislative arsenal be further supplemented. There was indeed a gap in that area. We all know that criminal organizations and groups that set up preparatory acts in themselves were already criminal and could be addressed, but that was not the case for the so-called lone wolves, as we have known some of them last summer. For example, think of the truck driver in Nice.

With this legislation, anyone who has plans can also be addressed and punished. Think of someone who buys a liter of fluid in a pharmacy or a box of nails at Hubo. This allows us to continue and so we can gradually close the network more and more. This is also the case, colleagues. We must use any additional tool to prevent attacks. This is one such one, because it can be intervened even before an attack is committed. That is what it is about. Prevention is always better than cure.

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the last words of Mr. White. Without a doubt, we all agree that prevention is much better than healing. That in the fight against terrorism we must also work on a strong, efficient legislative arsenal, it seems to me a platitude. But I repeat why I myself am not convinced that the present bill is currently a powerful supplement to the legislative arsenal.

First and foremost, and as I said in the committee, the purpose of the bill, now a bill, we share with everyone, in particular that preparatory acts related to terrorism should also be criminalized.

It becomes more difficult, of course, when the debate is about intentions. It needs to be evaluated whether or not someone deliberately sells air tickets, for example, to someone who is going to Syria. What is the intention of the merchant who sells such tickets to young people who leave to Syria? This is a difficult question. In this context, judicial investigations are being conducted against sales offices. So there is now apparently already a legislative arsenal that allows action, but it remains difficult and delicate. In the committee, the example of Google Earth was also given, and I can take many other examples.

The (...)

Please allow me to conclude this reasoning, Mrs. Van Cauter, before intervening.

I agree with the colleagues of the PS that we must be careful not to fall into an atmosphere of arbitrariness and therefore also of legal uncertainty. After all, well-meaning legislation — and you know that better than me, Mrs. Van Cauter — can also have very perverse effects. Therefore, I reserve myself against my group to vote in favour.

I fully agree with you, Mrs. Van Cauter, that the fight against terrorism must first and foremost be carried out in practice. And not only are we convinced of this, given the statements of those who engage on a daily basis, at the local police level to the highest magistrates and the security services. The legislative framework must always be outlined, but a lot is lacking in practice, in the everyday approach to terrorism.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have given you a few examples that may make you ring a bell. A few days ago I read in the newspaper that people who return from Syria can still effectively get stamp money. I thought, however, that we had reached a consensus on the fact that people who were officially expelled for leaving the war zone in Syria would no longer receive any benefits. A few days ago, however, I read that this has not yet been resolved. I think a certain minister forgot something.

Ms. Van Cauter, you are right about financing terrorism. I was one of the first mayors, followed very quickly by my colleague from Antwerp, who officially placed deletions on the front of the agenda whenever we knew someone had been ⁇ as gone, with all the comments thereof. I did so merely to prevent the continuation of the effective financing of terrorist organizations in Syria. Well, I assume that this issue has not yet been settled.

With regard to the dynamic database, I invite every mayor to make use of his or her powers, in order to get thoroughly informed about that dynamic database. What their Corps Chief will indicate is that they are working on a new dynamic database because the first doesn’t work. Colleagues, the police officers in the field are no step further in terms of transparency and efficiency in the collection of information.

The LIVCs, the Local Integral Security Cells, are now a fashion word. Also in this context, the question must be asked who monitors whether the cells are assembled, how they work, with what frequency and with what schedule. I don’t want to say much about it, because I assume the principle that everyone should wipe before their own door. However, I see a lot of vulnerable places where hardly anything moves. It is left so. There is no opposition. It is about dealing with and monitoring people who have been radicalised and whether or not returned, who continue to be watched but not acted on.

Colleagues, I hear a lot outside the Parliament about the single police zone and a more efficient police organization. Once in Parliament, however, I notice all sorts of delaying manoeuvres.

Mr Metsu, President of our committee, I ask you again to convene your committee next week. I remind you of our appointment to meet every Friday. There is no meeting on the agenda next week. Nevertheless, as at every committee meeting, I again urge this plenary session to address the most pressing security issue in this country, in particular the search for a better police organisation in the capital.

Mr. Speaker, I ask you again. What prevents you from organising the bill that is being discussed, which has been explained and for which hearing is scheduled, next week Friday? I would like to get an answer to that.

We all have the duty, across the boundaries of opposition and majority, to intervene as quickly as possible and as efficiently as possible in the problems we see together in security policy.

Colleague Bonte, if there is an interruption in the security policy, or if we see gaps, the legislator is in a position to intervene and take the necessary initiatives. That speaks for itself.

I find that after the extensive debate in the committee, a large majority of the Parliament agrees that preparatory acts should also be criminalized. However, you say that you will not approve. Because, you say, participation in an activity of a terrorist group is already criminal. That is right. When you prepare for someone else, you can be punished.

But if someone prepares for themselves, if someone planned an attack and puts all the actions in place to commit that attack, to get out of his home with the bomb belt and create a danger of a terrorist attack, you say: no, one must wait until the person concerned is effectively on the way to the airport.

No, absolutely not.

If you say no, you must vote for later. And if you are in doubt, you should read it again. I tell you: preparing a terrorist attack that one can commit himself is not punishable today.

If we do not overcome this gap in material criminal law, it means that people on the ground must wait until someone with their bomb belt comes out before they can intervene, endangering themselves and society.

Ladies and gentlemen, read the text carefully. Think and vote for later.

You have made a number of other comments. You say, among other things, that the government and Parliament talk a lot about the dynamic database and the data exchange, but that nothing comes.

The relevant law was adopted in May 2016. Between voting and offering a framework and the moment when something operationally works perfectly, some time passes. Today, however, these databases are linked. Today, the information can be collected. Only that requires a number of operations, which would be better disabled, so that the system would work much better.

Of course, that will happen, but you need to be patient and show respect for the people who have to make the law.

The exchange of information between police, judicial assistants and prosecutors was not arranged and did not occur. It was arranged today and is happening today. Today there is contact between the judicial assistants or they should at least be there in theory. I have heard from certain contacts that have been there that something and something is happening effectively on the ground today. This will happen today, not in two years.

In the meantime, however, there are instructions and mail letters that are used in practice. One is not as proactive as the other, but today the instrument exists and it happens.

Sharing professional secrecy, empowering and empowering your local task forces, giving them the right to share information without being hindered by their professional secrecy are issues that are on the agenda of the Justice Committee for discussion in the morning afternoon. You are invited to participate in the conversations. I am curious whether I will be able to meet you there to determine that the problem has been effectively worked out and that it is not an easy exercise, but that we will do them so that on the ground the instruments will actually be available for those who are daily in the weather with our safety.

Mr. Bonte, I know that implementation must take place in practice and on the ground. Without tools, however, this cannot be done. No telephone can be listened if the preparatory act is not yet criminal. It is only by punishing them that the people concerned are given the opportunity to perform inspection operations, to listen to the phone and to prevent the bomb from being made and exploded in a way that and at a time when we absolutely do not want it.

This is what we want to prevent. Therefore, we have carefully done the exercise and found that there are gaps, which we will now fill.

Mrs Van Cauter, I just want to tell you with my list – and it was absolutely not completed – that the struggle against terrorism and radicalism will be won or lost, especially in the field of work. I mean by this that in the meantime we have seen a lot of legislation passing, but that the cry for attention and help on the ground, to address a number of issues that go wrong, is not heard.

You say I have to be patient. I have a lot of patience. About two-and-a-half years ago there was an overwhelming consensus here to stop giving stamp money to people who left to the war zone in Syria. I have patience! However, I see that they return and that they have money.

Yesterday I was visited by people who came directly to the town hall of Vilvoorde after visiting their son in the prison of Saint-Gillis, who was convicted of terrorism. They came to explain when their son is released. They told me what he did and didn’t do there. They then come to explain to the mayor and the police chief of Vilvoorde when he is released.

Do you really think this is the normal way of working? A year ago, it was agreed with the Minister of Justice that there would be a sound communication from the prisons and Justice to the police services. The moms and dads, however, must step to the mayor to ensure that after being released, he is not beaten down as someone who is on the run.

You say I have to be patient. I have patience, but sometimes it ends. The only thing I want to say, Mrs. Van Cauter, is that there is so much wrong in this policy area while in the meantime we are dealing with symbol laws which I cannot estimate today whether or not they contribute to greater security. This is also the reason why SP will abstain.

This has to do with a number of things. At the time of our discussion in the committee, I hear Mr. Raes, the great head of the State Security, say in the media that he has warned in the investigation committee for police services that sometimes act too quickly in investigations of terrorist organizations. This is one of the risks associated with this law. With this law, police services may be too quick to judge that someone is intentionally engaged. That is the sucking that I hear from the security services, formally in the investigation committee, but also informally.

I address the Speaker of the Chamber and the Speaker of the Commission. I am, unfortunately, today unable to make a correct judgment on who is right: the one who advocates absolute caution, even with new legislation, or the one who emphasizes that it is a powerful legislative instrument. Why can’t I do it? I cannot do so because we have not been given the opportunity to question ourselves in hearings or to involve the Committee on Justice, which has much more experience and strength in dealing with such technical legislative texts than the random Committee on Counterterrorism.

Last week, here in the Chamber, we also had a debate on the bill on passenger lists. We have all identified that Europe has very large objections. I went proudly to the committee meeting last week and proposed to take a closer look at that criticism and to hear the members of the European Commission about their views on the draft law and how the text should possibly be adjusted. But what did the majority say, Mr. Pivin? He does not want this debate.

This illustrates how to deal with the problem here. We are not looking for the strongest possible weapon against terrorism. However, there is a boxing match, a course underway, in which each majority faction tries to score with its dada. One is only concerned with how one can bring his bill to a good end in order to inform the public opinion that he or she is really concerned with safety.

Meanwhile, people work in the workplace day and night, with too few men, who are also often shifted from one day to another police zone. The essential tasks, including the merger into an efficient police zone in the capital, shift the majority away from themselves, because they do not dare to discuss it internally. That is the reality. Thus I said what I wanted to say.

Colleague Bonte, you warn of the danger of too rapid jurisprudence, as Mr. Raes has formulated in the committee. You might have done better to come and listen to him and question him or at least read the report on him and read not only the opinion of Mr. Raes, but also that of all the others who have spoken about the problem.

Not only Mr. Raes, but also the Federal Prosecutor’s Office has expressed its opinion on this. If they have expressed their concerns about too quick jurisdiction, it is not about too much punishment or whether or not certain acts are punishable. The only thing they are concerned about is that when information is collected, that information would not lead too quickly to the initiation of a judicial investigation or the filing of a file with the federal prosecutor’s office. They call for the investigation to go ahead, before acts are committed that disturb actors, potential perpetrators and cause them to flee. Let the investigation especially go on, so that one can detect the network and prevent much worse, so is the plea of Mr. Raes and a number of actors on the ground. Those who link the fight with terrorism are not concerned that we would have criminalized too many acts or labeled too many crimes as terrorist crimes.

On the contrary, all those actors have very explicitly stated that there is a gap in material criminal law so far, in particular in terms of criminalizing preparatory acts. Now my question is up to you and this is immediately the question on which the vote is essential, whether you are for or against intervening quickly and preventing a terrorist crime.

Are you for or against? This is the only question to be voted on. If you oppose, you say that you disagree that a verbalisant intercepts someone who proposes preparatory actions but has not yet begun the execution of a terrorist offence.

If you vote later, you want the judges to be able to give permission to initiate investigations, so that they can intervene in a very rapid stage, from the moment of preparation, and prevent an attack. That is the choice you stand for.

That explanation, Mr Bonte, cannot be questioned intellectually correctly. What I say here is consistent with what is stated in the proposal. This is clearly stated in the opinions of the State Council. This is explicitly confirmed by the experts, who, I suppose, are employees of the Minister of Justice and who spoke on his behalf. This is confirmed by the case law, if you want to check it out.

The question I’ll ask you later is: are you for or against preventing a terrorist attack? Are you for or against intervening at the time the bomb is being made? That is the question, that is very simple. That is the challenge for you. Whether the proposal comes from the majority, Mr Bonte, or from the opposition, it doesn’t matter. What we want to do is perfect the material criminal law so that one can work on the ground. We want to do that.

Mrs. Van Cauter, I find it absolutely an imbecile question whether we are for or against terrorist attacks.

But that is the question.

Do we really need to be at that level in the debate in Parliament? Is there anyone now who believes that there is now someone here from any faction for the preparation of terrorist attacks or does not want to criminalize them? I will repeat what I said, Mrs. Van Cauter, try to listen.

I have said that we absolutely agree with the goal. I alone am not able to judge whether the bill we are now voting on is efficient in achieving that goal. You’re talking about justice and everything and everything. I have already expressed my opinion on the appeal of Mr. Raes. I also consulted people who are working in the field. Unfortunately, I meet them too often. They also have doubts. As a member of Parliament, I am unable to judge correctly about anything, because people are systematically refusing to invite people who can effectively speak with authority and from experience.

We are in a committee with only a few lawyers. However, I had asked the Justice Committee to give an opinion on the present proposal, but I could not. I would find it normal for the Committee on Justice to give an opinion on this subject because as a non-lawyer I cannot judge on the different and opposing opinions I receive on this subject.

What we share, Mrs Van Cauter, is the concern about what is happening in practice. If you now ask a little demagogically whether we do not want to let the people in the field do their work, then I answer that we must give the people in the field, who today work on the pleurisy, in difficult conditions and who have been screaming for additional support and resources for months, the opportunities to do their work.

Let me give you another example from this week. This week, in consultation with my zone in the zonal security consultation, I had to establish that a certain organization is in the vizier of detectives – I may say too much here in public – and that the zone is the requesting party to engage Belfi to conduct an investigation under the so-called channel plan. It’s been six months since we asked this question for the first time. This week we have been told again that Belfi does not have enough time and manpower, that it has its hands full of Molenbeek and that it will not investigate the organization considered to be especially linked. This happens in the field. There, the majority must also dare to look critically and look together for solutions, but you turn away from that.

I would like to address again the Chairman of the Committee. We really had the ambition to work beyond the boundaries of majority and opposition. I hear the colleagues of CD&V give long and broad press conferences about how necessary it is that we go to a single police zone in Brussels. I hear some people say that. I hear the N-VA say that. I hear people in the workplace ask how it is possible that a year later we still do not have an online connection between the police camera network of Molenbeek and that of the MIVB, namely in the underground metro stations. Still not yet. The competent minister is there. One year . I have patience, but one year is a little long. I’m still silent about the entire cinema over the 48 hours.

So do not blame us that we do not take our responsibility. You are watching the greatest misery our police and security services have ever experienced, and you are not giving an answer to what they need to do what they should do, in particular providing for a more efficient security policy.

Mr. Speaker, I ask the word with the necessary shame because I have not been in the Anti-Terrorism Committee in the last few weeks. I will get a place again from tomorrow. The necessary shame also, because I know with how much authority Mr. Bonte can speak in this matter. In the last months and years he has always managed to bring his authority together in an intellectually correct way and to make his point.

With all respect, Mr. Bonte, you mentioned the question of Mrs. Van Cauter whether or not we are for the fight against terrorism a ridiculous question. That is as ridiculous as your comment that we would not strive, together with all members of the majority, to give as many resources on the ground as possible.

As a mayor, I have the same problem. You know that too. Of course, Vilvoorde is much worse. I also never had a problem with the fact that people from my police zone were delegated to secure the channel zone or the outskirts of Vilvoorde. Let us remain solidary.

I would like to talk about the bill itself, which our group will of course support. I will not return to the discussions that have been held on this subject in the committee. We are now in the plenary session.

Mr. Bonte, this should be from my heart. If the problem is that a further opinion should have been requested from the Justice Committee, I have two things to say on this.

You know that the anti-terrorism committee is largely made up of the same people. Return to the Justice Committee, please. I hope that the Socialist Party will be present there for the first time and will give its opinion on a bill being discussed there.

Mr President, I am a bit upset. I was going to start my speech by saying that if I go back to the twelve months of work – the duration of the Terrorism Commission until today – I find that the debate around this text has been made in the forms, even though I regret there was no hearing. We’ve really been to the bottom of the text, we’ve analyzed it. I asked for a second reading on behalf of my group. Ms. Van Cauter also asked for it, and we got it.

I thought we could have reached the end of the road. I wish we had done so for all the books. We also denounce when the work is done harshly, without asking for advice and sometimes with amateurism. This is not the case here. I wanted to start by saying that. However, on the other hand, when I hear Ms. Van Cauter simplify excessively, I find it a pity.

Mrs. Van Cauter, you bring the debates we had in the committee back to simply saying that those who vote for are for punishment and prosecution of people who are preparing terrorist attacks, and those who vote against don’t want to do it! This is totally regrettable! That is why I am upset. I was going to start my speech by pointing out that the exchanges had been rather constructive until your weapons deal with Mr. and good.

To get back to the substance of the text, we had a long debate in the committee and a number of questions were raised. I would like to return to the point that makes there still great questions and fears about this text. I will not go back to the fact that in matters of legislative inflation and legal means, what is called “judicialization,” the question of effectiveness can be raised. I would like to highlight the point concerning the non-exhaustive enumeration of cases and the preparation of terrorist acts. You list four circumstances and you say that by “preparing, we mean the following.” For us, the "particularly" creates disorder and makes us develop great fears about the proportionality, effectiveness and targeting that this measure could have in the future.

I also refer to the opinion of the State Council, which has been issued on this text. I will repeat a paragraph, to clarify our position: "We may also ask whether it is admissible to include in the article (of which it is a matter) of the Criminal Code a non-exhaustive list of acts that may constitute a preparatory act. The answer to this question is affirmative, provided that the definition of the offence specified in the list itself complies with the principle of legality in criminal matters and is therefore sufficiently precise, clear, predictable and does not disregard the principle that no punishment can be imposed without guilt. The foregoing does not preclude a limited list of acts which may be considered as preparatory acts, where appropriate, from providing greater legal certainty and, if such a list can be established, this should be preferred.”

It is not your choice, Mrs. Van Cauter, in this proposal. And it is really in relation to this strategic orientation that you give to the text of your proposal, leaving an open door to all the possible violations and preparatory acts, that we issue the greatest reservations and greatest fears. Therefore, we cannot, at present, support this text.

Mr. Speaker, I did not participate in the discussions in the committee, it was Georges Dallemagne who followed this case. Let me explain the position of our group. Some, I have heard during this debate, may consider that the proposal submitted to us too extends the scope of terrorist offences.

But I believe that this proposal should primarily lead us to ask two questions. First: Do we want to be able to incriminate acts preparing for terrorist crimes? The answer is yes. And the second: do we want to be able to take a criminal measure, including an arrest warrant, when such preparatory acts are found, for example, during a search? Our answer is yes, in the context we are living in.

These are situations that could actually occur, to which we must be able to respond at the legislative level. Indeed, it should be noted that there is currently a gap in the legislation concerning these preparatory acts for terrorist offences. And this is especially because the prosecutors are, it seems, demanding this possibility for the sake of effectiveness and to be able to prevent as many terrorist acts as possible.

So, dear colleagues, you will understand that we will support this text. However, I would like to repeat here what we have been saying for several months: laws will obviously never compensate for the human resources that are needed on the ground, whether in the field of police, justice or intelligence. We recognize that these services are at the end of the roll because of their workload. On the question of the means, but also on the question of the global piloting of terrorism, the shortcomings remain significant. We will support this text. I thank you.