Proposition 52K1793

Projet de loi modifiant les dispositions financières de la loi du 22 février 1998 fixant le statut organique de la Banque nationale de Belgique.

General information ¶

Submitted by

CD&V the Van Rompuy government

Submission date

Feb. 4, 2009

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

central bank profit

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen CD&V Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP Open Vld MR

Voted to reject

N-VA LDD FN VB

Party dissidents ¶

• Bruno Tuybens (Vooruit) voted to reject.
• Katia della Faille de Leverghem (Open Vld) abstained from voting.

Contact form ¶

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Discussion ¶

March 12, 2009 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Mjin, Secretary of State, given that the Minister of Finance has been detained in the nuclear cabinet, I would like to thank you for making the effort to come to Parliament.

Dear colleagues, if we can continue on the long title of the bill we discuss today, we tend to think that the organic status of the National Bank will be nothing special.

For completeness, I read the cryptic title again: “Draft law amending the financial provisions of the law of 22 February 1998 establishing the organic status of the National Bank of Belgium.”

Anyone who has read the bill and knows what it is about can immediately translate that title into normal human language. With this bill, colleagues, the government wants to expropriate the minority shareholders of the National Bank without compensation, nothing more but nothing less. This is the essence of the present bill.

Therefore, the Flemish Interested Parties in the Committee for Finance at the beginning of the discussions of this bill attempted to persuade the majority parties not to deal with this legislative amendment at a drop.

Our proposal, together with other colleagues, was to give the minority shareholders the opportunity to express their views on this legislative amendment concerning the modification of the organic status of the National Bank. Since these legislative changes have far-reaching consequences in our view, it seemed appropriate for us to hear those shareholders too.

It could not benefit. Our proposal was wiped out of the table by the majority parties and we have to regret it to this day. The majority parties intend with this law to change the profit distribution of the National Bank from the financial year 2009. With this law, the true nature of the Belgian State is once again revealed: it wants more and more money and it does not want to share it with the other shareholders.

Readers of the attached opinion of the State Council found it an euphemistic formulation. The State Council is of the opinion, and I quote, “that the State with this bill creates an extraordinary advantage.”

In recent years, the dividend has roughly followed the health index and, in addition, the dividend has risen much slower than the National Bank’s profit. Over the past decade, the National Bank has reserved about 60 percent of its profits and added a commission of 800 million euros to cover all kinds of risks. Normally, this commission would be expected to be co-owned by all shareholders, but apparently this is not the case for the shareholders of the National Bank.

If the new legislative changes were applied to the results of the National Bank for the period 2003-2007, the Belgian State would have received, according to Deminor’s calculations, an additional €389 million in the form of transfers, taxes and dividends, while the private shareholders, say and write, would receive only €48 million. With this legislative change, almost 90 percent of the additional benefits will be transferred to the State. Consequently, the minority shareholders, in my opinion, are rightly of the opinion that they are once again undermined. I say “again” because this is not the first time that private shareholders are out of play. In recent decades, minority shareholders have been treated almost permanently as a stepmother. For example, in the last ten years, the Belgian State received more than 12 billion euros from the National Bank, while the other shareholders, who together have an equally large participation and therefore also have an equal amount of risk, had to pay with 140 million euros. That is a ratio of approximately one to a hundred. This is, of course, entirely diverted.

In addition, there is and remains a discussion about the actual value of the share and the legal status of the gold and foreign exchange reserves. The minority shareholders consider that those reserves also belong to them in part and are therefore not merely owned by the State. Know, colleagues, that the National Bank was a real gold beaver until 1988. In 1988, the gold reserves amounted to 1,303 tons. When the Belgian State began unlocking the National Bank’s gold coffers, the gold reserves melt like snow for the sun. In 2005, the gold reserves amounted to 218 tons. Where did the majority of the sale of the gold stock go, colleagues? Indeed, it was sold under the nose of minority shareholders and transferred to the state treasury.

Consequently, no one should be surprised that our mailbox has been flooded in recent days with messages from outraged shareholders, who protest against the prevailing legislative changes.

In addition, the contacts with some Open Vld MPs show that some of them are not really in favor of the legislative amendment in question. I immediately advised them to inform their group leader of their restraint. I do not have to interfere with the political position of the Open Vld. I knew, however, well enough that their group leader, Bart Tommelein, had other heads of concerns over the past few days – and they still have to this day – with his chairmanship of the investigative committee regarding the separation of powers. So I can understand that he has had a little less time to listen to his ears to his party colleagues.

However, if we look at the list of shareholders who have contacted us in the last few days, I find, for example, that there is a certain G. Della Faille is on my list. He is the brother of a certain K. Della Faille, which is not unknown in our hemisphere.

I don’t know if you should count on your brother’s vote in the next election. It is not my responsibility to judge this.

I do not need to draw a drawing. If the above is the case, several members of parliament from the majority parties are somewhat confused with the present bill. However, I do not make illusions. Their concerns will not change the final vote. The body discipline of the majority will undoubtedly again take the lead in the final vote. If necessary, the green button will be pressed with the eyes.

The Flemish Interest Group is of the opinion that the legislative amendments in question do not introduce fundamental changes in the manner in which the minority shareholders of the National Bank of Belgium are treated. On the contrary, the State once again seizes an increasing part of the future revenues of the National Bank of Belgium.

That is also why we re-presented our amendment to increase the distribution of profits to the minority shareholders in the plenary session.

Therefore, the draft law presented here cannot at all affect the Flemish Interest – you will have understood that in the meantime – even if it was only because a central bank with private shareholders, which is also listed on the stock market, is, in my opinion, an outdated structure. However, the draft may not be especially pleasant to us, since the legislative amendments in question actually expropriate the minority shareholders, without any compensation.

Therefore, we are not only angry at the lack of equal treatment of shareholders. Moreover, we oppose such a course of affairs, in which ordinary citizens must fight with very limited resources against the establishment, which is the Belgian State, which makes the rules itself, but does not observe them itself.

Consequently, the Flemish Interest will not approve the present bill.

Mr. Secretary of State, by approving this bill today, we write the next page in the never-ending plague story of the Belgian State against the minority shareholders of the National Bank.

The National Bank was initially founded with 100 percent private capital, precisely out of mistrust to a money-friendly state. In 1948, however, the State was admitted to shareholding, but a number of measures were provided to protect private shareholders. The main measure was the system of double majority in the general assembly. For example, the legislator wanted to deliberately avoid that the State could impose decisions without the support of the majority of shareholders.

But the Belgian State would not be the Belgian State if it kept the rules. The double majority system was abruptly abolished in 1993 without giving shareholders the opportunity to vote for it. Chapter 1 of the plague story was written.

Chapter 2 in the same plague story is the dividend policy of the National Bank. It was decided that private shareholders are only entitled to an annual fixed and indexed dividend. In addition, this indexation was not even followed. Net dividend increased between 1974 and 2004 only by a factor of 1.54 over a 30-year period. Every one of us will admit that inflation in that period many times exceeds that factor.

The next chapter of the plague book deals with the decomposition of reserves. When the National Bank no longer needs its reserves to meet its ESCB obligations, it shall decide to issue the reserves to the Belgian State. Nevertheless, in 1926, the legislature had stipulated that these reserves would be distributed to all shareholders equally, though with a 20% advance reduction by the Belgian State. This obligation also pushes the majority shareholder to the side.

In Chapter 4 of the Pest Book, we read how private shareholders are treated in the National Bank General Meeting. Questions from private shareholders are not answered. Some private shareholders are even refused to give the word. It is a monologue of the management rather than a dialogue with the private shareholders. If a response is given, one refuses to note those answers in the report.

Today, colleagues of the majority, with this bill, you are writing a next chapter in that great plague book of the National Bank.

The majority will now ensure that the monetary Belgian State receives an even greater portion of the cake. Insuring the part of the Belgian State is, after all, Wetstratees for the expropriation of a part of the private shareholders.

The new distribution will be determined by the Regent Council. It will not be surprising that private shareholders are not represented in the Regent Council. They are good enough to provide capital, but any involvement is not reserved for them.

From now on, the state will determine the subsidy itself. Again, the National Bank and its private shareholders are the cash cow of the Belgian State.

Colleagues, I understand the dissatisfaction of private shareholders, who do not even get the chance to make their story. When the N-VA in the committee proposed to hear the mourning private shareholders of the National Bank in a hearing, that was voted out by the majority cold way.

That cynical game has lasted long enough. For me and my group, the great plague book must now be closed. We will vote against the bill with great conviction.

Mr. Secretary of State, I would like to tell you in advance that this is not a bank in trouble, so we do not have to read tomorrow that the National Bank is on the verge of collapse. That would be regrettable.

This is the fourth attack in a row against the capital and the distribution of profits of the National Bank. After the statutory amendment in 1993, which put the minority shareholders aside, there was the enthusiasm of a government that on fiscal policy pretended to have the affairs under control, but which nevertheless had to go to the left and right looking for additional resources.

After that inheritance in the surpluses of the sale of gold, there was then the inheritance with the dividends, with a court case as a result, and now this. This is a new form of bank robbery, one where heavy weapons are not used, but one that is supported by law.

In addition, this is the second bank robbery we experience in a week, and this too is not under time pressure.

This is just one to solve a troubling fiscal policy, to solve on the cap of shareholders, on the cap of a company, a partially private enterprise. The Belgian National Bank is a European outpost. Due to its 50% shareholder structure, it is one of the only places where private capital participates in the national bank.

Dear gentlemen, if your strategy is to come to a nationalization, do not do so by trying in a sluggish way to undermine the capital structure of this enterprise and ensure that the share, listed on the stock market, goes down. In the long term, this will be the result of this bill. If you want to do it, do it honestly. Launch an offer and be a reliable partner. For a government that advocates PPS structures this is a very sad sight, PPS structures in which the government wants to participate together with private shareholders in all sorts of projects: with this kind of unreliable partner, never. And cours de route changes the rules of the game, which is cheating. At least that’s what I tell my children. As ⁇ yesterday, we will, under all conditions, evoke this bill in the Senate so that this lax and unreliable majority will have time to recover common sense and fundamentally adjust or reject this draft.

Ladies and gentlemen of Open Vld, don’t play a game, don’t play a hiding game. Now, once and for all, dare to put aside your treasury obligation to power and do a good thing. Do as we do and vote against.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Secretary of State, colleagues, we are dealing here with a legislation concerning the revision of the organic status of the National Bank of Belgium. During the discussion in the committee, we addressed this draft with urgency. We discussed and approved it in one session. The reason for this swift adoption was the fact that we wanted to see this law realized before the general assembly of 30 March 2009.

The main reasons for the extreme urgency were the desire to postpone the General Assembly of the National Bank from March to the end of May because during the discussion in the month of March data from the European Central Bank are made available, but the European Central Bank has not yet gathered. In other words, we caused a problem by making third-party data available without meeting of shareholders and the European Central Bank.

Due to the slowness of the parliamentary system, the ordinary meeting of shareholders of the National Bank will be held on 30 March. In other words, it will not be able to take into account that legislation, so too – let’s be honest, there has been a lot of talk here about the rights of the small shareholders, and we know very well what the rights of the small shareholders are – if the law were published, the dividend paid at the end of this month would not be 75 euros but 79 euros.

In other words, it would mean an advantage for shareholders. The truth, however, has its rights in this Parliament.

There are people asking for the word.

Mr. Speaker, at the beginning, the debate is polite, but when important discussions are underway, the intensity increases. I am now completely calm, Mr. Speaker. You should not worry.

Mr Van Biesen, you say that the share goes from 75 to 79 euros. You must dare to say it. That will say correctly, but the theft, which is already ⁇ large at 75 euros, is thus reduced by four euros. Congratulations on this important measure.

The organic status of the National Bank is not regulated. You know that a number of other changes are imminent and that we will have a fundamental debate on the shareholder structure of the National Bank in the autumn anyway.

Be honest with yourself. Do you think it is logical that the National Bank has 50 percent private shareholders? Do you think it makes sense that the National Bank is listed on the stock exchange?

We must dare to ask this question again in the Chamber and dare to ask it again among ourselves. Is it logical that 50% of the National Bank is in private hands? Is it logical that we do not discuss this? I invite all political groups to bring this debate back with us in the autumn.

Mr. Van Biesen, I hear you say two things.

First, you approved the bill. You have even defended this in the committee. Now, by way of speech, under the pressure of a number of shareholders, you come to the conclusion that you have been stupid and that you want to reverse that now. That is the first thing I want to tell you.

Second, I also hear you say that you want to continue with that afterwards, but in the meantime you want to get the pressure from the boiler.

Where are you going in the future? You are going to try to evoke that now in the Senate, temporarily stop, and afterwards you just go on.

I have already said that I have no problem with nationalization. It is not unreasonable to anticipate. We are a European outsider. I understand that they want to do this in a defective way. However, the way you announce this now is pure shame. If you do, then do it with a blatant bid and then do it in a way that happens in private. For a liberal, I think this is a pure bullying.

Mr. Speaker, I listen to the argument of Mr. Van Biesen with increasing surprise.

The argument existing structure with shareholders and listed on the stock market is, of course, not the basis for the amendment of the organic status. You should have done this twenty, thirty, forty years ago. And besides, you have been in power long enough, colleague, to privatize it at the time of Verhofstadt, but of course on a condition, in particular that you would pay out the shareholders in a correct way.

I have the impression that you do not want to do that thinking exercise, let alone that you want to implement them in practice.

Mr. Van Biesen, I think the debate is not about whether or not the private shareholders from the National Bank. This is not the core of the debate, but what value you give to the share of those people.

What we have seen so far about the government’s valuation of that share indicates a continuation of the theft rather than a proper compensation. If you now announce that the future debate will be about the rejection of the private shareholder from the National Bank, I will hold my heart in place of those people to hear your offer per share.

I would like to thank my colleagues for their interruption. I have invited them to a broad debate about the shareholder structure of the National Bank and I see that everyone already has an opinion on it and would like to discuss it with us in autumn.

This bill is no longer urgent, as stated in the committee. In the Senate, we will look at whether the evocation is a solution so that we can conduct a broad debate together in autumn, adding to the other changes that should be made to the organic statute of the National Bank.

Mr. Speaker, I have another concrete question.

Mr. Van Biesen, does that mean that you will later vote for this bill and that in the meantime you will manoeuvre in the Senate to let it evoke?