Proposition 51K2199

Projet de loi complétant la loi sur les armes, en ce qui concerne l'interdiction des systèmes d'armement à l'uranium appauvri.

General information ¶

Author

Vooruit Dirk Van der Maelen

Submission date

Jan. 11, 2006

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

uranium arms trade

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP Open Vld MR FN VB

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Discussion ¶

March 22, 2007 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, I will give a very brief report.

Following the bill, several hearings were held with various doctors, people from NATO, Foreign Affairs, NGOs and so on.

Following these hearings, several amendments and sub-amendments have been submitted to the bill.

This was mainly the following two main lines.

First, an amendment and sub-amendment that clearly defines weapons systems with impoverished uranium.

The second amendment stipulates that this law will enter into force only two years after its publication in the Official Gazette.

For the rest, I refer to the written report, because I think a number of colleagues will be speaking.

Thank you for your report, which was brief and concise.

The following members have registered for the general discussion: Mr. Goris, Mrs. Genot, Mrs. Wiaux, Mrs. Belhouari, Mr. Van der Maelen.

Thank you for giving me the floor in the first place.

According to international humanitarian law, States are obliged to ensure that no new weapons and no new means or method of warfare violate the rules in force of international law. These rules prohibit, inter alia, weapons and means or methods of war which are capable of causing unnecessary evils, which strike without discrimination or which cause extensive, durable and serious damage to the natural environment.

Weapons containing impoverished uranium belong to this category and should be banned. That is why, thanks to Mr. Josy Arens, the CDH, filed a bill on the subject in October 2005.

The density and flammable properties of uranium favoured its use in weapons to penetrate armor.

According to the WHO, although impoverished uranium is less radioactive than natural uranium, it still emits 60% of its radiation and exposure to impoverished uranium has potentially chemotoxic and radiotoxic effects, attacking mainly the kidneys and lungs. Thus, it is generally accepted that in the days and years following conflict, winds and rains disperse contamination into the environment and that people living or working in the affected areas may inhale particles or consume contaminated food or water.

According to the WHO, contamination of food and water, even after a few years, justifies conducting controls, de-pollution operations in the impact zones and even closing certain areas until they have been cleaned.

Is it necessary to recall that the use of weapons with impoverished uranium has been denounced since the Kosovo War in 1999?

Furthermore, in the face of the uncertainty surrounding the long-term effects of the use of such weapons on health and the environment, the European Parliament has twice affirmed the need for moratoriums pending a total ban. In this perspective, he called on Member States to play their full driving role by immediately imposing a moratorium on the use of depleted uranium ammunition and other uranium-containing warheads, pending the conclusions of a comprehensive study on the requirements of international humanitarian law.

Therefore, the adoption of a moratorium is required by the application of a precautionary principle under which it is considered that it is not necessary to wait for scientific certainty to prevent risks threatening the environment.

I conclude by reminding that for the CDH, it is necessary to keep in mind the importance of the development of international humanitarian law whose function consists, to the extent possible, in humanizing conflicts.

In this area, Belgium intends to play a pioneering role by prohibiting the financing, manufacture, storage and trade of weapons containing impoverished uranium. That is why we will vote this text of law, while regretting the provision postponing its entry into force by two years.

Mr. Speaker, it is my colleague, Martine Dardenne, a member of Parliament during the previous legislature, who initiated the struggle that occupies us today.

She had already managed to convince Belgium to be a pioneer in the fight against anti-personnel mines. But she was also the initiator of the first bill to ban weapons with impoverished uranium.

It is clear that these weapons cause a lot of damage. They were used massively. Hundreds of tons were used during the war in Iraq or the Yugoslav conflict. These ammunition, however – I repeat it – have damaging effects, both on the health of the military who are brought to manipulate them but also and especially for the civilian populations who see their land rendered uninhabitable for several tens if not hundreds of years. We know, in fact, that some of these small isotopes have the disgusting ability to remain harmful and alive for a very long time. In areas where these weapons have been used, many harmful health effects have been observed.

These small particles can disperse very easily. Thus, it is not because such a bomb was dropped 100 km away from a place that it is safe. These are weapons whose effects cannot be limited. It was therefore important to take specific action against their use.

In the most affected areas, the rate of cases of leukemia is 10 times higher than normal. At least this is what was found at the Basra Hospital. There is also a very high percentage of children born dead or suffering from malformations. Even after the war, the consequences associated with the use of such weapons remain.

The United Nations has already worked on this issue. Indeed, the UN Human Rights Commission had already explicitly condemned, since 1996, the use of such weapons because of the consequences of their use.

In addition to direct effects on human health, the lasting and harmful effects of such weapons on the environment prevent populations, who had to flee during conflicts, from returning to their land to cultivate it. Therefore, these are weapons whose effects persist, even after the war is over, since they prevent any reconstruction.

Therefore, we are pleased to have been able to propose, along with others, legislation that prohibits the production, use and marketing of weapons of impoverished uranium. Belgium is a pioneer in this area. It was for anti-personnel mines. I hope it is with so much vigor that we will carry this text.

Madame Genot, I greet with you my fellow citizen of Viroinval, Mrs. Dardenne.

Poor uranium is a waste produced during the enrichment of natural uranium, a process at the base of the civil and military nuclear industry. Due to its particular properties, impoverished uranium is used in the manufacture of weapons and ammunition capable of penetrating armor.

According to official sources, ammunition containing impoverished uranium was used for the first time by U.S. and British forces during the First Gulf War in 1991. But it was the day after the wars in the former Yugoslavia, starting in 1999, that the debate on the negative effects of impoverished uranium on public health and the environment was carried out on the public square, raising a real polemic within the political and scientific worlds in the United States and in Europe.

Even today, we are delayed to put an end to this controversy, we are delayed to undertake the scientific work that some require, in order to officially confirm or inform the hypothesis that impoverished uranium is harmful to both public health and the environment. There is uncertainty, uncertainty. Even more unacceptable, it is consciously minimizing the likely harm of impoverished uranium on populations and their environment.

It is true that the political, economic and legal consequences of recognizing the negative health and environmental effects of impoverished uranium would be considerable.

While some argue that there is a lack of scientific evidence that impoverished uranium has negative health and environmental effects, many elements warn us that these negative effects still exist.

During this meeting, we had the opportunity to hear Mr. Van der Keur and Baverstock, two experts who have both made observations in this direction and which corroborate the conclusions of the many reports mentioned during the debates.

Although the effects of impoverished uranium on health depend on a number of parameters, such as the modalities and level of exposure, although these effects are primarily measured over the long term, this radioactive substance appears to be no less toxic chemically and radiologically.

This is why our group advocates a total ban on impoverished uranium. In the current context, the precautionary principle must apply until light is made on the actual impact of impoverished uranium on populations and their environment. In addition, its use against military personnel should also be prohibited.

During parliamentary debates, although many of my colleagues were convinced of the need to apply this precautionary principle, the ban on the use of impoverished uranium collided with two essential imperatives.

First, it is necessary to maintain "interoperability" of our armed forces, that is, their ability to cooperate with military forces of other countries. I remind you, in this regard, that the main mission of our defense is to participate in international coalition operations.

Second, given the lack of consensus on the effects of impoverished uranium, it is appropriate not to force Belgium on the international stage by premature political or diplomatic action. That is why we joined the signing and filing of two specific amendments.

The first replaces the words "weapons and ammunition containing impoverished uranium" by the words "inert ammunition and armor containing impoverished uranium or any other industrial uranium". Thus, it specifies the scope of the prohibition and complies with the obligations, alliances and international treaties to which Belgium has subscribed.

The second introduces a provision according to which the law will enter into force only two years after its publication in the Moniteur belge. It will not only allow to wait for political and diplomatic work to establish an indispensable foundation for the completion of the international ban, but also to preserve Belgium’s credibility and influence on the international stage. In this regard, we support Mr. Mr. Van der Maelen to make the point two months before the expiration of the period prior to the entry into force of the law, in order to ask the government - if the political and diplomatic context allows it - to advocate within international instances in favor of the ban on impoverished uranium.

This amended bill is a good project, pursuing noble objectives, but without neglecting the reality of the ground. It is therefore with conviction that I call on you to support it.

Mr Goris is speaking and then Mr Van der Maelen.

First and foremost, I would like to congratulate the rapporteur, Mrs. Meeus, on her report. Second, I would like to thank the applicant, Mr. Van der Maelen, for his perseverance with which he puts this proposal here today again, after we, also under his impulse, with our country already played a leading role in the prohibition of anti-personnel mines, which is now being followed worldwide, and subsequently with the prohibition of cluster ammunition or submunition. Today we are talking about weapons with impoverished uranium.

Colleagues, we held a number of hearings on this subject, which were intriguing because they brought up quite a few contradictions. There were scientists who said that these things are very dangerous, there were those who said that it may be dangerous for public health and some said that it is not proven at all that it is dangerous. Others said it could not hurt at all. In short, the science has not yet, in my opinion, agreed on whether or not impoverished uranium is dangerous to humans and the environment, but the VLD has supported the development of this bill in the committee from a precautionary principle and therefore, for the sake of security, from the precautionary principle, it is assumed that one can take better care of such things.

Nevertheless, in consultation, a number of amendments have also been made, giving specifications that we found very important. For example, there is the amendment in which we specify both in the title and in the articles that we are talking about inert ammunition and armor, with which we want to make it clear that we mean this type of ammunition and armor, but in this proposal we do not want to engage in the debate about the possible presence of nuclear weapons in our country. This is another debate, which also needs to be conducted, but it is not discussed in this discussion. In order to avoid any uncertainty about this, and since it was also the intention of the applicant and of the co-approved subsequently, it was specified that it is arbitrarily inert ammunition. In this way, there is also no possible contradiction with our existing commitments, such as our military commitments within NATO and the European Union. This also guarantees the participation of our troops in the operations and military exercises in which our partners or allies may wish to continue using such ammunition. We can continue to participate in this. Our country will not be isolated.

It seemed very important to us that there was clarity about this. It was already cited, the fact that the law would come into force two years after publication, has not just come there. We should not be too naive.

We know that our country as a member of the United Nations Security Council will already have to carry a heavy diplomatic burden and will have to assume many responsibilities. Our diplomats will have to solve a lot of problems in the Security Council. It may not be the right time to put that package of additional diplomatic burden on the shoulders of our diplomats, ⁇ in New York, where this topic could also be discussed. That is one of the elements.

It must be noted that we are still very active in keeping the debate on anti-personnel mines and cluster ammunition ongoing and persuading other countries to take the direction we have taken.

Furthermore, it gives us the opportunity to conduct an evaluation before the end of the two-year period to see to what extent other countries have already followed the Belgian example, to what extent our signal has been transmitted. Then we can also see what should be done if necessary.

In summary, the following should also be said. I just said that this is an important signal, because Belgium does not have such weapons equipped with impoverished uranium. We do not manufacture such weapons. We do not sell that either. We do not use it. We will not do that in the future either.

This law is therefore indeed an important international signal, where we would like to set an example again. We hope that in the world, in the world forums, the debate can now begin and that eventually, ⁇ and hopefully, a complete ban will come about.

Given all that I just said, there is obviously no problem. On the contrary, the VLD group will also vote for this bill with great conviction.

As promised, I will keep it very brief.

Belgium will later, this Chamber will later, if we vote on this bill, confirm its leading role in the fight against what we have called inhumane weapons. These weapons are inhumane for the simple reason that they cause more civilian casualties than military casualties.

As a young member of parliament, I had the privilege of having my first battle around a bill for a ban on anti-personnel mines. This was approved at the end of the 1980s. Then it took until the early 1990s before we got a ban on the storage of those weapons and also the order to the Belgian army to destroy the stock of landmines.

It lasted until 1997 before an international ban came into force with the Ottawa Convention. So we have eight years between the adoption of a Belgian law, the destruction of stocks and an international ban.

Last year around this time we were able to complete a second successful battle, namely, the cluster bombs. This has required a lot of time. Between landmines and obtaining a ban on cluster bombs lies a few years.

Once we had approved it, we also approved a ban on the presence and storage of such weapons for the Belgian army. In addition, it was necessary to proceed to the destruction of any stock, but that stock is not there according to my information. We did this in a movement. Only a few months later, namely the week before the crocodile holiday, we were pleased to see that a broad international movement had begun for an international ban on cluster bombs. This is likely to be the Oslo Treaty.

As several colleagues have said, we do not have such weapons and we do not produce them. Belgium, however, wants to retain its leading role in the fight against this type of weapons. Our colleagues at the CDH, our rapporteur and others have pointed out the very harmful effects of these types of weapons. I am convinced that the very harmful nature of this type of weapons will also allow us to find fellow supporters in the short term.

But we are realistic. We are still in the process of forming a coalition around a coalition on cluster bombs. We have asked our Minister of Foreign Affairs to play an important role in this. It is my personal conviction that within two years we will have an international ban on cluster bombs. It is my personal conviction that we will also establish a growing resistance movement against weapons with impoverished uranium. A few weeks before the two years expire, we will examine the international situation. This was agreed with colleagues in the Committee on National Defence. I am convinced that then we will have an international ban on cluster bombs. I expect that we will find widespread support from the rest of the international community. I think then we should come to something I would like to see now, namely the Brussels Treaty, which establishes an international ban on weapons with impoverished uranium.

Finally, I would like to thank all the colleagues who have worked in the Committee on Land Defense, as well as all those who have contributed outside this Chamber by providing information about this type of weapons. I would also like to thank the Chairman of the Commission, who unfortunately is not here, for his very cooperative cooperation. He was in fact, especially at the beginning, an opponent, but nevertheless he has fully cooperated. I thank the colleagues and I thank those outside the Parliament who helped to get this law passed here today. Belgium confirms its leading role in the fight against this type of weapons.