Proposition 51K1596

Projet de loi portant modification de la loi du 29 avril 1999 relative à l'organisation du marché de l'électricité.

General information ¶

Submitted by

PS | SP MR Open Vld Vooruit Purple Ⅰ

Submission date

Feb. 4, 2005

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

EC Directive electrical energy single market liberalisation of trade

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Vooruit LE PS | SP Open Vld MR

Voted to reject

Ecolo

Abstained from voting

CD&V N-VA FN VB

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Discussion ¶

April 28, 2005 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I will first report on the draft law amending the law of 12 April 1965 on the transport of gas-like products and other products through pipes and secondly on the draft law amending the law of 29 April 1999 on the organization of the electricity market.

Those who review the written reports will see that the draft relating to the electricity market is a bit thinner than the draft law relating to gas because the general and the substantive discussion of both drafts had a lot in common and the report of the discussion of the draft law relating to gas contains the majority of all the presentations.

I will begin with the report of the draft law on gas-like products and other through pipes. As regards the procedure, the proposal for hearings by colleagues Gerkens and Creyf was rejected by four votes in favour, three votes against and two abstentions.

The draft law aims at transposing a Directive of the European Parliament and of the European Council of June 2003 on common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing a Directive of June 1998.

As I said in my introduction, there are many similarities with the draft law on electricity. The differences mainly lie in the ability to store gas, which is not possible for electricity, and in the fact that Belgium can produce its own electricity, which is not possible for gas that must be imported.

The draft legislation transposing the directive includes four aspects: the designation of one or more network operators, the legal separation, the regulated access of third parties to the network and the acceleration of the timetable for the opening of the gas market. This means that the liberalization in this sector is to be continued.

In addition, the draft law implements a number of provisions contained in the Federal Government Agreement of July 2003. On these points, therefore, the draft law differs from the aforementioned directive. A multiannual tariff mechanism for transport shall be established in place of the current annual tariff methodology. It also meets the requirements of predictability and stability imposed by the European Directive.

Contracts awarded to the public authorities responsible for liberating the natural gas market will be redefined. A clear distinction is made between the policy preparation assignments by the Board of Directors, the General Directorate of Energy of the Federal Public Service Economy, SMEs, Middle-State and Energy and the supervision assignments of the functioning of the market for the regulator - the CREG, the Committee for the Regulation of Electricity and Gas.

As regards the general discussion, the draft law amending the law of 12 April 1965 on the transport of gas-like products and other products through pipelines, as well as the draft law amending the law of 29 April 1999 on the organisation of the electricity market are discussed together because the two draft laws are very similar.

On behalf of the PS group, Ms. Lalieux said that her group is positive, both in relation to the draft law on the transport of gas-like products and others, and in relation to the draft law amending the 1999 law on the organisation of the electricity market. The colleague noted that both bills introduce corporate governance rules for network operators and include a better regulation on control of the various actors of the energy market.

According to colleague Lalieux, there will be a clearer division of tasks between the competent administration and the regulator. For her, the political role of the regulator was previously too big. It is now restricted to the benefit of the administration. At the request of the distributors, a multiannual tariff system for the transport and distribution of gas and electricity will also be introduced. According to Ms. Lalieux, this should ensure the predictability of gas and electricity tariffs. This is, in her opinion, beneficial for all actors active in the energy market.

On behalf of the PS, however, colleague Lalieux regrets that liberalization has not yet led to a lower electricity price. This can be explained by the monopolies that still exist. Consumers deserve cheaper energy prices. She asked the Minister to provide more information on the study ordered by the federal government from the CREG, on the composition of the energy tariffs, more specifically whether this study gives an explanation for the increase in tariffs despite liberalization.

On behalf of the ECOLO group, Ms. Gerkens regrets that the committee did not agree to the hearings in which the CREG was initially heard. In both draft laws, she considers that it is a very important sector for our society, not only economically but also socially and environmentally. She considers that in the preparation, little attention was paid to the purchasing power of families and to the competitiveness of enterprises. Both bills do not require the government to consult the CREG on a preliminary bill. According to Ms. Gerkens, however, it seems obvious that the government consults the regulator on the occasion of a substantial change of both laws. The previous government did not, she said, but did not make any substantial changes.

She goes further in the committee and says that even the State Council has indicated in its opinion that although there is no legal obligation in this regard, it is still recommended that the advice in the gains of the CREG on those bills, given their importance and their highly technical nature. Therefore, Ms. Gerkens deeply regrets that no follow-up has been given to the advice of the State Council.

Collega Gerkens also regrets that, in her opinion, the opinion of the general council of the CREG is not taken into account. According to Ms. Gerkens, these two bills contradict the opinion of the general council of the CREG. It assumes that a very different direction should be taken than the one indicated by the regulator and the representatives of trade unions and companies. Their

According to Ms. Gerkens, therefore, it is likely that some persons, institutions, companies or associations thereof will challenge the draft laws before the Arbitration Court or the European Commission. According to her, there will be a lot of uncertainty and instability, which is detrimental to the proper functioning of a market, economic growth and good governance of the country. Their

Regarding the regulation of the electricity market and the gas market, Ms. Gerkens concluded that the electricity market and the gas market require strong regulation, otherwise it will not work. The previous government has, according to her, carried out that logic by appointing a strong regulator, namely the CREG, by issuing a whole series of royal decrees and by appointing a network administrator to whom specific rules of corporate government were imposed. However, all this has not happened, says Mrs. Gerkens. Their

With regard to the current situation in Belgium, colleague Gerkens also develops a number of visions on behalf of her group, in particular that the government of Elia, the manager of the transport network, is obliged to open its capital to third parties and has imposed strict rules on corporate governance. It was necessary, Ms. Gerkens believes. The establishment of a strong and independent regulator, the CREG, was therefore a good thing. Their

The public service obligations, the social rates, the social fund and the Kyoto Fund are for Ms. Gerkens as important as regulation. Therefore, it is pleased that this was not affected in both draft laws. Their

Ms. Gerkens notes that this government does not continue the policy of the previous cabinet and that it abstains from regulations. She illustrates this in her speech in the committee with four facts, which are extensively addressed in the written report. Their

According to colleague Gerkens, a core issue in both draft laws revolves around the choice of multiannual rates and how those rates are approved. The higher the transmission rates are, according to her, the more revenue the network operators have. Higher rates complicate the functioning of the market, as ultimately the families and ⁇ who pay the rates have to pay. Every shareholder, whether a private shareholder or a public shareholder, will of course try to increase the income by raising the transmission rates, according to colleague Gerkens. It is the task of the legislature to find a proper balance between, on the one hand, the public interest and, on the other hand, the interests of the shareholders of the networks.

Collega Gerkens also commented in the committee on some aspects of the issue of transmission tariffs, with each comparison with the policy of the previous government and the strengths of two bills currently under discussion. It also highlights the importance of good infrastructure. Therefore, colleague Gerkens also considers it appropriate that in the draft law relating to electricity the principle of a royal decision on the tariff structure on the proposal of the CREG is ⁇ ined. The gas bill, on the other hand, does not maintain that principle: it becomes a royal decision on the tariff structure after consultation, which she regrets.

Mrs Gerkens thus asks whether, with both bills, the CREG can still effectively exercise the power to control costs. If that is not the case, she says, then there is an end to the regulation. According to Ms. Gerkens, in order to control the costs, the CREG must have access to all intelligence. She also asks the Minister about the approval of the tariffs and the budget of the transmission network operators, as she considers that the draft legislation in this regard involves a profound change. Ms. Gerkens does not see the advantages of the introduction of multiannual rates, since the European directives do not impose this. It therefore raises the question whether the existing annual tariffs constitute a barrier. It considers that the scheme works well today, apart from the fact that some network operators consider their profitability insufficient and therefore submit an excessive budget and excessive rates, which in these cases it considers the importance of the role of the CREG. In this regard, it calls for the preservation of the existing regulation.

In addition, from colleague Gerkens some concerns about the draft law related to gas.

In doing so, it cuts some aspects of the Belgian gas market, in particular the development of the gas market, global warming and the Kyoto Protocol, the seizure of Suez, the public service obligations, the code of conduct and the transfer of powers from the CREG to the administration. She also talks about corporate governance at Fluxys. Ms. Gerkens overlooks a number of provisions on corporate governance contained in the present bills and compares those with the policy set out by the previous government, through the current royal decree applicable to Elijah.

Regarding the draft law on electricity, Ms. Gerkens talks about some aspects of the electricity market in our country, more specifically about the evolution of the electricity market, about which she asks the minister a lot of questions, with regard to the liquidity of the electricity market, the obligations of public service – which she considers also a very important aspect of this file – and the transfer of the powers of the CREG to the administration, in which she asks the minister whether or not the funds are made available to the administration.

Regarding regulation, Ms. Gerkens fears that this bill will lead to the end of regulation by the CREG which will no longer be able to do its work, that the costs will exhaust the pan, that the private sector will make excessive profits and that there may be some peanuts left for the municipalities. Everything is on the back of companies and families. This has nothing to do with promoting healthy and fair competition, according to Ms. Gerkens, and nothing to do with consumer protection. According to Ms. Gerkens, therefore, it is a highly unaccountable bill.

Collega Lano considers, on behalf of the VLD group, some of Mrs Gerkens’ comments correct and calls for a certain vigilance in the handling of the draft laws on gas and electricity. On the other hand, colleague Lano believes that Mrs. Gerkens has too much faith in the CREG. He replicates some of her statements and considers that the CREG is not a sacred institution. Certain tasks of the CREG may be taken over by other bodies, which will exit their tasks in the same way as the CREG. If a price benchmarking is made, it should cover the total energy price, including the costs arising from the nuclear departure. According to Mr. Lano, there should not be a stock exchange of Elia if there is no transport capacity. He says that the price of the Fluxys share is not determined by Elia’s pricing, but to a significant extent by external factors. The VLD group wants to further complete the liberalization of the energy market, Mr Lano stated in the committee, so that the competitiveness of the companies will increase and the energy tariffs for the users will fall even further.

Lano then discusses the key elements of the gas bill, which his political group considers to be important.

With regard to the management of the gas network, the gas bill opts for the appointment of three network operators. Such a system has several advantages including ⁇ ining the tariff equation throughout the country. The independence of the network operator should enable the proper functioning of the gas market. The State’s gold share in the network operator will continue to be ⁇ ined as an additional form of control. The multiannual tariff system increases legal certainty, but it is necessary to ensure that the balance between network operator and consumer is ⁇ ined. The network operator should have sufficient income to be able to invest in maintenance and development of the network. The consumer should be able to enjoy low rates, but this should not be at the expense of the quality of the service. New infrastructures are being developed and existing capacity is being increased as gas will play an even more important role in our society in the future. The indicative plan should ensure the future supply of natural gas. The exit from nuclear power means that a lot of power plants will need to be rebuilt. The bill also provides for an administrative simplification and a new division of tasks between the administration and the CREG.

Mr Lano then briefly discusses in the committee the two electricity directives underlying the draft law amending the 1999 Act. According to him, the main points are the supervision of supply security, technical regulations, an authorisation procedure for new capacity, tenders for the provision of new capacity, a legal separation of the network operators, a multiannual tariff mechanism and a redefinition of the CREG’s tasks.

Finally, the committee will discuss the main elements of the draft law on electricity. The draft is primarily aimed at supply insurance rather than market liberalization. New provisions are also introduced to promote the independence of the network operators. The introduction of the multiannual rate system will contribute to legal certainty. Consultations should also be conducted with the Regions in order to apply the multiannual rate system to the Regions. As with gas tariffs, electricity tariffs should ensure that the delicate balance between the network operator and the consumer is ⁇ ined.

Ms. Creyf, on behalf of the CD&V group, initially outlines the history of the two drafts in the committee. It emphasizes the fact that in September 2004 the Board of Directors of the CREG issued an opinion on its own initiative on the basis of the European Directive, the Federal Government Agreement and the policy note of the Minister. The CREG proposes an extension of its own powers, including the establishment of the indicative equipment program for the means of production in the electricity sector. The controlled parties, Elia and Fluxys, responded negatively to this opinion, says Mrs. Creyf.

Collega Creyf also notes that in November 2004 the General Council of the CREG, which comprises representatives of seats of consumers and regions, issued an opinion on the preliminary draft electricity law of June 2004. In that opinion, it states that the requirements of transposition of the European Directive, the independence of the operator and the independent controls are in no way met. Mrs Creyf also regrets that, in her opinion, the bills were further dealt with in inter-kabinet working groups, without having entered into consultation with the regions. The sp.a-spirit faction and the PS faction, according to her, are opposing the bills because they want the link to the C-powerdossier — she says — as decided at the Council of Ministers in Gembloux. Specifically, according to Mrs Creyf, the Socialists demand a contribution from the network operator Elia to the cost of the sea cable in the amount of 5 million euros per year for three years and the obligation for Elia to purchase green electricity certificates on the domain concession in the North Sea at a minimum price of 120 euros per unit.

Collega Creyf also says in her argument that the VLD is against this link because it will raise electricity prices. Since Minister Verwilghen cannot revoke that link, according to Ms. Creyf, the case of reducing the burden on energy for companies is also linked to it.

The degressive rate for the companies is approved by the Council of Ministers in January 2005. In January, Minister Verwilghen, says Ms. Creyf, also raises the idea of reducing the electricity VAT from 21% to 6%, but is reversed by the government partners. Ms. Creyf refers to newspaper articles.

Mrs. Creyf thus concludes that the VLD has had to get backseil since the bills are approved by the Council of Ministers under the conditions of the socialists.

Subsequently, colleague Creyf proceeds to her substantive concerns. She says the bills are too much written in the functions of Suez-Tractebel. Despite the fact that Elia and Fluxys, which are subsidiaries of the Suez holding, perform a special strategic task as network operators, the public interest and the interest of the consumer should not be overlooked. Collega Creyf regrets that civil society is completely ignored in this debate, according to her.

The powers of the CREG in the gas and electricity sectors are restricted in these drafts, including those of the general council of the CREG, which is still the only body where civil society can express its views on the federal energy policy, says colleague Creyf.

She also considers that Parliament is completely out of play in these draft laws. All decisions related to supply security, energy costs, diversification of energy carriers, long-term planning and investments and security aspects will now be taken by officials such as the General Directorate of Energy, the Federal Planning Bureau and the CBFA. Too little democratic participation and control, says colleague Creyf on behalf of her group.

She also points out the consultation with the West. According to her, the Flemish Region cannot agree to the provision that for the preparation of the prospective study on the electricity supply there is no obligation to consult with the Regions. Such consultation is, however, necessary for the promotion of the use of renewable energy sources, which is part of this prospective study, as well as for regional energy policy in general, she says.

With regard to the relations between the CREG, the Government, the General Directorate for Energy and the Competition Council, Mrs. Creyf agrees with the criticism of the General Council. As a result of the changes, the CREG can act merely as an advisory agent, while previously it could proactively formulate proposals. A few examples are cited by colleague Creyf. She says that the CD&Vfractie is of the opinion that the CREG should be able to fulfill its role as a regulator in all independence and therefore asks whether this is made possible by these bills. There is too much freedom given to the network operators-monopolists, which puts the control in the function of the public interest into oppression, according to the CD&V group.

Regarding corporate governance rules, Mrs Creyf considers that the corporate governance committee does not provide sufficient guarantees for the necessary independence, ⁇ in the electricity sector where 64% of the shares of the transmission network operator are still held by the dominant producer Electrabel. This scheme is not in accordance with the spirit of the Directive in question, according to Mrs Creyf, which imposes strict requirements on the independence of the network operator. Their

It is also remarkable for colleague Creyf that the provisions on corporate governance are not filled in the same way in the draft law electricity and the draft law gas. Mrs. Creyf gives some examples of these differences to illustrate her position. First, in the electricity bill, the board of directors should be composed of at least half independent drivers, but in the gas bill only for a third. In the electricity bill, the majority of the audit committee should consist of independent directors, but in the gas bill only a third. The tasks of the corporate governance committee are different in the gas bill and in the electricity bill. When assessing the independence of the drivers, the electricity bill consults the CREG as an advisory body. In the gas bill, this role is assigned to the CBFA. In the gas bill, the board of directors for the appointment of the independent directors may deviate from an opinion of the corporate governance committee. He asks the Minister thoroughly about this.

As regards tariffs, the CD&V group supports the introduction of a multiannual tariff mechanism for transmission and distribution, which will replace the current annual tariff methodology. This will reduce the tension between the CREG and the network operator as there will be more stability, predictability and transparency in the pricing. This multiannual rate mechanism only makes sense if an interim control is also possible, says Mrs Creyf.

She also doubts whether the draft legislation will promote the free market operation: the network operators are given a lot of space and can, in her opinion, charge all sorts of costs; the control is weakened and consumers will pay more.

Collega Magda De Meyer explains the views of the sp.aspirit group and says that for its group the most important thing is that the liberalization of the energy market leads to lower rates. In particular, the focus should be on optimally functioning markets to eliminate the risk of market dominance, a legal separation between the network operator, suppliers and consumers, and a comprehensive system of public service obligations.

Ms. De Meyer asked the Minister two important questions. The government agreement states that policy preparation should be passed on to the administration and regulation to the CREG. The opinion of the CREG General Council states that the government has not taken into account the government agreement in its bills. In the draft laws, the CREG can no longer proactively act, but can only advise, reconcile and mediate, thereby inhibiting the participation of the civil society. She therefore asked whether the minister with these bills is not in conflict with the government agreement.

According to colleague De Meyer, the poverty organisations are also calling the alarm bell, as the situation of protected customers is getting worse and worse. More and more often, she says, disadvantaged people have trouble paying their energy bills and now they will also have to pay a fixed fee. He asked the Minister what he would do about this.

Mr. Speaker, it will probably be up to us because we do not regularly have the opportunity to present the report. But is it the custom that a report is read simply literally or almost literally? We have no experience with this, but I thought it was usually a synthesis of the report.

Mr Mortelmans, I rarely interfere with the way a rapporteur reports. I would not discourage the rapporteur to do it in a more synoptic way. The report was sent to the members. I know that the Chamber must be thoroughly informed, but if Mrs. Douifi thinks she may leave sooner, I will not prevent her from doing so.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to express my great appreciation for the special sense of detail by which the rapporteur informs us about the discussion of this draft law. I can ⁇ say that for our group, the rapporteur may restrain himself to a number of essential discussion points. We have absolutely no problem with the fact that we are thoroughly informed about the report. Per ⁇ for efficiency reasons we can limit ourselves to the essential points of the discussion. But well, no problem at all. I especially appreciate the effort made by the rapporteur. I do not know what the other groups think about this.

I have the impression that the rapporteur felt the pulse of the Chamber.

I agree with Mr. Van Parys’s comment. I only expected that he would have made that comment last week. Mr Deseyn presented a report here for three hours. I would like to congratulate the lady, because so far only 20 minutes have passed.

There is no time limit for a report, you know, but as Mrs. Douifi...

Mr. Minister, colleagues, I will shorten my report but I thought it was intended, with such bills, to be able to balance the pros and cons of majority and opposition, so that one can later vote with knowledge of matters.

In any case, I do not want to remind you of the intervention of Mr. Tant, the chairman of the committee but also speaking on behalf of his group. Mr. Tant asked respect for the opinions and decisions of the courts in these, not least for the opinions of the State Council, and he stressed that our country cannot afford that parts of the energy legislation would be annulled by the Arbitration Court.

I now come to the extensive responses of the Minister. I will not read them. However, the Minister in the committee has responded to all the comments, questions and points of criticism of the various political groups that I have raised. I assume that the minister will later in his replica to the arguments of the various colleagues, which will largely repeat and deepen.

On the other hand, Mr. Speaker, I think I have been quite comprehensive — I hope in any case — with regard to the substantive general discussion. Their

Regarding the article-by-article discussion and, of course, also the discussion of the amendments and the voting on them, I refer to my written report.

Finally, as I said in my introduction, as regards the discussion and work on the draft law amending the organisation of the electricity market, I would like to refer to my written report, as it largely coincides with the discussions held following the draft law on gas. I would also like to refer to my written report for the article-by-article discussion on this subject and for the discussion of the amendments.

I thank you, Mrs. Douifi, for your effort. I did not want to make use of Article 44, § 6, which allows me to have the reporter round when I consider that the Chamber has been sufficiently informed.

Reporting is a very difficult task. I would like to remind you that reporters are not allowed to read the report. They must comment on the report submitted in writing, without their own contribution. Only with a verbal report, there is no text to be followed. However, there is no problem, and I thank the rapporteur.

Four members are currently registered in the general meeting, namely Mrs. Creyf, Mr. Wathelet, Mr. Lano and Mrs. Gerkens. Their

Ms Creyf, you are the first to speak in the general discussion. I give it to you with great pleasure.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, everyone will have understood that we are now discussing two bills that should form the legal framework for the appointment, operation, income, independence, of the operators of the transmission network for gas and electricity. Those bills should thus enable further liberalization of the market and a decrease in prices.

The committee has met for two and a half days to discuss these two ⁇ important bills. Half a day more to hold hearings with some key operators from the gas and electricity world, we were not granted by the minister and the majority.

There is high urgency. We are condemned by Europe, and the government is charged with fines. There is also the Elia stock exchange, which has already been postponed earlier, among other reasons due to the stock market climate, but also because Electrabel is waiting for the approval of multiannual rates to bring Elia to the stock exchange. The municipalities are also inexorable.

However, the government itself has taken almost a year to give its fiat to the draft laws on gas and electricity. On 20 July 2004, the Government approved the draft law amending the law of 29 April 1999 on the organisation of the electricity market and the draft law amending the law of 12 April 1965 on the transport of gas-like products and other products through pipelines.

The reason for the delay was the connection to the C-power file. Sp.a-spirit and PS opposed the bill. They wanted guarantees for financing by Elia of the cost of the sea cable to bring wind energy from sea to land in the amount of 5 million euros per year for three years. In addition, they also wanted to impose the obligation on Elia to purchase green power certificates on the domain concession in the North Sea at a minimum price of 120 euros per unit. The fact that sp.a and PS requested this will not be strange to the fact that the Limburg Interelectra and the Luik SOCOFE are shareholders of C-power.

The Socialists received their vote at the Council of Ministers of 21 January 2005. Only then could the draft laws on gas and electricity be submitted to Parliament, to be approved as soon as possible and preferably unchanged.

Colleagues, Mr. Minister, from the beginning the compromise weighs on these bills and on the discussion in the committee. Collega Lalieux, skilled and driven in consumer records, limited himself to a brief explanation with the message: "We are favorable." She complains that liberalization has not yet led to lower tariffs for consumers, but remains blind and deaf to the fact that precisely these bills will increase the transmission costs, resulting in price increases for consumers.

Ladies and gentlemen, that is surprising. It is surprising that socialist colleagues on the barricades will stand for free cash withdrawals and against the abolition of the maximum price of bread, but here very brave and very obedient. However, this is about something much more important and much more intrusive, namely the price that families and ⁇ will have to pay for their energy.

Families are already being pressured to the pump and for their fuel oil. In addition, the risk of rising transmission tariffs for gas and electricity is now included, and that is simply accepted.

It is remarkable that sp.a and Stevaert are constantly attacking established health care interests, but are ⁇ silent when it comes to the energy sector. The compromise weighs on both draft laws. Not only the compromise in the government weighs, but also the fact that many current energy files at federal and Flemish levels interfere with each other, thereby allowing everyone to give in order to get something in another file.

The Elia stock exchange is good for Electrabel and Suez. Electrabel will also try to maximize her participation in Elia. The municipalities are also involved party and are waiting for the stock exchange to recover as new shareholders of Elia part of the lost intangible dividend. The network operators themselves are the requesting party for a quick and unchanged vote on both draft laws. They can live with the draft laws, even more, they are cut off on their bodies.

The only ones missing in the story are the consumer, the user of gas and electricity, the families, the SMEs and the ⁇ . It is remarkable that the bills well defend the interests of the operators, but completely ignore the midfield. At the moment, the only place where the civil society can speak in the energy debate is in the general council of the CREG. Representatives of small and large consumers participate. The reduction of the powers of the CREG therefore reduces the powers of the General Board. Where do small and large consumers have anything to say? It is therefore from the consumer’s point of view that there is a negative comment on the bills. We see that TestAkkup and the general council of the CREG express the reasonable fear that there will be an increase in the transport tariffs for gas and electricity.

Colleagues, the users of gas and electricity have not yet noticed much of the liberalization of the gas and electricity market and this due to various factors such as the lack of competition in the production and the wholesale market, the lack of regulation of the net rates, the many taxes on Elia, and so on. For companies, in addition to labour costs, energy costs have become a heavy post. Energy costs have risen and various measures by federal and regional governments make those costs, by the way, difficult to control and predict.

Both bills should be a step forward in market operation, resulting in a fall in prices. However, this is not obvious at all. With strong operators, who are given a lot of space by the law, and with a weakened regulator, it will be the consumer who will pay the layer. The network administrators fulfill a special strategic task. However, we must not forget that the network operators Fluxys and Elia are utility companies in private hands.

The transmission system operators are not ordinary non-market companies but undertakings which have received special rights from the government, in the present case the legal monopoly on network infrastructure of general and economic interest with the corresponding obligations. These major monopolies are in private hands and are also subsidiaries of the French Suez. The Belgian strategic interests should not be subordinated to the interests of a foreign company. Hence the emphasis on control.

Control over the network administrator must be carried out by a strong regulator. This, however, is weakened by the draft laws.

In the committee we have started the discussion. Also for CD&V it is discussable that the relations between the CREG, the network manager, the General Directorate of Energy, the Minister, the Council for Competition will be redefined. It is our vision that the CREG should be able to play its role as a regulator fully and in full independence. However, the powers of each must be defined in line with what their core business is. In that sense, CD&V can, in principle, accept that the General Directorate and the politicians also have and should be able to perform their tasks in this regard.

However, we set two conditions. First, the Directorate-General for Energy and the Competition Service must be able to perform this task. At the moment this is not the case. They do not have the know-how and the resources to do so. Second, the CREG should be able to fulfill its core business. Nothing more, but also nothing less. What is the core business of the CREG? Market regulation and customs jurisdiction. This latter is being demolished. This is the point where the consumers, the consumers of gas and electricity, are once again at the forefront.

New in the bills is the way the transmission network operators are financed. Unlike the current case, Elia and Fluxys will be financed using the total income method that includes a fair profit margin. The King sets the rules. This is new, colleagues! This is completely new. At present, the CREG controls the costs of the network operators and approves or rejects the costs. This is done through the cost-plus methodology. The costs can only be converted into the rates if the CREG has not rejected them. A study by the CREG of 23 September 2004, available on the Internet, shows that the CREG has already rejected unreasonable costs in the past for reasons other than benchmarking. In the end, the consumer pays. The consumer shall pay the costs of the transmission system operators and a reasonable margin. Unnecessary or exuberant costs drive the price up for the consumer. Moreover, the cost-plus methodology is an indirect way of evaluating and monitoring the efficiency of the network manager. The new methodology of total income for the network operators is much less transparent and poses far more risks for gas and electricity users.

The methodology of total income implies that a certain income is guaranteed to the network or system operator during the period in which the tariffs were applied. A certain income is guaranteed. This guaranteed income shall be determined in such a way as to enable the network or system operator to fulfill its statutory duties. Their

In this methodology, it is important that the network or system operator can not only generate additional profits by increasing its efficiency, and in that sense a revenue methodology is indeed a means of increasing the efficiency of the network operator, but also the additional profit can be generated by saving on service provision. The fewer services, the fewer costs result from them and the greater the difference between revenue and cost can become. Their

This methodology of total income is therefore potentially the most risky methodology, but also potentially the most profitable. The question is whether this methodology serves the general interest, which presupposes the right balance between the interests of the network and system operator, on the one hand, and the network operators, on the other. Their

We may ask ourselves what poses the least risk for gas and electricity users: a regulator that monitors the costs or a government that determines the total income and also sets the fair profit margin. After all, it is the government, not the CREG, that will fix the fair profit margin for the network operator. We can imagine that any pressure on the government is not excluded. Their

Mr. Minister, is it really the government’s mandate to determine the fair profit margin of the network operators? Their

The total income refers, among other things, to depreciation and all costs. Colleague De Meyer, rightly asked questions. The consumer risks paying twice when booking new infrastructure, once in depreciation and once in charge. Our amendments were rejected by the majority. Their

The provision on support services also involves potential risks of increased costs. The CREG report states that support services are sometimes subcontracted. If this happens at a market price, that is not a problem. If the price does not correspond to the market price, but is much higher, the costs will rise. Who will pay them? Indeed, the user of gas and electricity will pay for it. Because for us the methodology of total income involves too many risks for an increase in costs, we have submitted an amendment to return to the determination of costs and the fair profit margin. However, our amendment was rejected. Their

There was also a discussion in the committee regarding the bonus malus. This means that there is and usually will be a difference between, on the one hand, the budgeted costs of the network operator and, on the other hand, the actual costs of the network operator. What should we do if this creates a bonus or a positive balance? Mr Wathelet has submitted an amendment in this regard to the committee that a possible bonus must be distributed between three parties. Their

One: a reduction in tariffs for consumers. Two: a reserve for the investments. Three are the shareholders. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that a positive balance or a bonus does not go exclusively to the shareholders, but that a rate reduction for consumers is also possible, because logically the rates have proved too high, because: a bonus. This amendment was also rejected. Colleagues, I find this completely incomprehensible. It is a very reasonable argument, a very reasonable amendment that seeks exactly a balance between the interests of the user and the interests of the shareholder. But no, this is voted out. Their

Colleagues, rightly, the draft laws contain detailed provisions that minimize the risk of the network operators. The draft laws contain few provisions that defend those who ultimately pay the bill: the users of gas and electricity, the families, the SMEs and the ⁇ . Opposition amendments aimed at re-establishing the balance were also rejected. Both bills pose significant risks for increasing transmission tariffs for gas and electricity. Just this week — which is interesting — the McKinsey study was proposed in the Flemish Parliament. That was Tuesday in the Flemish Parliament and I attended it. One of McKinsey’s statements is that one can push the electricity price by 18%, precisely by pressing the costs of operating the high-voltage networks and the low-voltage networks. So where is it possible to save on the distribution and electricity tariffs? By pressing the costs of the network administrators. What are they doing here? Increase the costs of network administrators virtually! Their

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I would like to briefly address a number of other provisions. CD&V supports the multiannual rates, not only because this is a prerequisite for Elia’s stock exchange, but also because it provides more stability, predictability and transparency in the pricing. We regret that there is no longer a tariff structure. This would further increase transparency and is not in conflict with the multiannual rates. Corporate governance has been discussed extensively in the committee. Remarkable is a different embodiment of corporate governance in the Gas Act and in the Electricity Act. I am not talking about this, but the minister has failed to answer these differences. The Regions were kept as far as possible outside of this matter during the consultation and in the arrangement drawn up. One of the key points concerns the prospective study on the electricity supply. This prospective study concerning the indicative program of the means of production of electricity and gas may be submitted to the Regions for advice. This is unacceptable for Flanders. The prospective study should be consulted with the Regions, taking into account, inter alia, the promotion of the use of renewable energy sources and the adjustment of the environmental framework conditions determined by the Regions, expressly mentioned as part of the prospective study, but especially taking into account the importance of the prospective study for regional energy policy. Their

Within supply security, there is no regional supply security for the customer without a federal supply security of the country.

As for the prospective study on electricity supply, we find a prospective study too non-binding and wish to replace it with an indicative plan. Furthermore, we would like this plan to be submitted to the Regions, the General Council of the CREG and the Parliament. The amendment on this subject was rejected, but the Minister promised us a debate in Parliament. Mr. Minister, we hope that we can conduct this debate in the foreseeable time.

Mr. Minister, we choose an indicative plan with a clear policy choice for the production capacity to be installed. There must be a clear framework that provides sufficient assurance for investors in the short and long term, as new capacity is needed. In the past four years, little or no investment has been made in new capacity. Investors need security. In that perspective, I also dare to suggest reopening the debate on energy supply in Parliament, as well as the debate on green electricity production and the debate on nuclear energy.

Ladies and gentlemen, I come to my conclusion. We have serious doubts as to whether the bills will promote the functioning of the market and will lead to a reduction in the tariffs for gas and electricity, which is the purpose of the liberalization of the energy market. Because the draft laws are necessary, but because we do not expect tariff reductions as a result of those laws, even the opposite, we will abstain at the vote.

Finally, I would like to make a comment. I would like to point out the questionable legal quality of the texts submitted to us. This led to more than 100 comments from the Chamber’s legal service. At the last meeting, at the moment we were voting, that debate still burdened. In fact, we still had discussions about the scope of some provisions and about the differences between the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking texts. It is a pity that we have to confirm this. Worse, this can also have consequences in the long run, for example if the Arbitration Court will ever have to destroy paragraphs or articles of such a law due to legal uncertainty. It is regrettable that we have experienced this again following the present bills. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I thank you for your attention.

It is true that the legitimacy leaves something to be desired from time to time, to say no more.

Mr. Speaker, this intervention is in line with what Mrs. Creyf just said. I am not referring to the “auditions” in this committee. Mrs. Creyf did so in a fair and well-founded manner. Indeed, we had to go quickly. This was ⁇ not due to parliamentarians and we can ⁇ not be blamed for not working in the best way possible. We tried to work as constructively as possible. We did not have the opportunity to have these hearings, though this is a case in which we are continually confronted with a mixture of politics but also of technique. In fact, it is not always easy to understand all the concepts that are made available to us.

The Government Agreement of July 2003 had established this desire to strengthen the CREG’s tasks as an independent regulator, as well as its objective to clarify the roles between the different market players. The European Directive that we need to transpose has different objectives: - Improving the functioning of the market at the level of competition. The separation on the legal and accounting level of the activities of the network operator from those of the producer and supplier of gas and electricity. Protection of the consumer. - The establishment of a tender procedure for the construction of new production capacity. Minimum level of public service obligations.

We were forced to find that the legislative provisions that were present in Belgian law already in large part met these requirements of the European Directive. Furthermore, the bills we are discussing today contain many measures that do not concern, sensu stricto, the transposition of this European directive. It is clear that in some matters the bill goes far beyond what the directive required it to do. Indeed, the project itself has two other objectives: establishing multiannual tariffs and transferring tasks from the Regulatory Commission to the Energy Administration, i.e. moving from the CREG to the administration.

The first goal, namely the introduction of multiannual tariffs, is not a problem for us. We even think that is a good thing. On the other hand, we are much more concerned with regard to the second part, which aims to transfer tasks from the CREG to the administration. We have, indeed, intervened in a committee, concerned to avoid that the transfer of tasks from the Regulation Commission to the administration does not take place at the expense of the quality of regulation and the effectiveness of its prospective mission.

Bearing in mind that the electricity and gas transmission market operates in the form of a monopoly, we want regulators to maintain a clear and independent mission that benefits all market participants, including the consumer. In this regard, Mr. Minister, we were not satisfied with the answers provided. In this regard, it should be kept constantly in mind that the electricity and gas market does not concern only the transmission system operator and its shareholders, but also the consumer of the network, namely both companies and individuals.

We also know how high energy prices can weigh on the competitiveness of our ⁇ and can weigh heavily on all our households. It is therefore essential that this market is effective in the best possible conditions of competition but always in the interest of being able to provide citizens and ⁇ with the best service at the best price, the best price being the fair price.

We have spoken several times in the committee and have submitted many amendments always insisting on the constructive part of the work that should be done in this matter.

I would like to highlight here three points that we think are essential in the work we have provided in commission.

1 of 1. The aim is to constantly improve texts. Indeed, we regretted that financial incentives, as provided in the tender procedure for the installation of new power generation units, are not dependent on the type of production. This — it seems to us — would have been a good way to make the type of production dependent on the incentive that was intended to be given to it, or in any case to make the type of production enter into the criteria to be taken into consideration in order to offer that incentive. We think it would have been in the right direction. by

We would also have wanted the text to take more into account the evolution of productivity in the sector, which should have an impact on the tariffs practiced. It is also in this sense that we have submitted an amendment to promote the inclusion of new services during the regulatory period. In fact, we believe that it is necessary to ensure that the network operator has clear incentives to improve its efficiency and control its costs. Of course, if the service is better, there is no problem with price change.

2 of 2. Redefine the tasks of the regulator. Indeed, a redefinition of these tasks must take place, in particular with regard to the establishment of a forward-looking study. by

It must be ensured that the organization that takes on this task, this willingness to make it pass from the CREG to the administration, enjoys both the necessary independence and sufficient skills to exercise it as effectively as before. On this point, we also could not consider the Minister’s answers sufficient, especially since we deprive ourselves of a work that is already being done, that one knows how to evaluate, that one knows how it is done. And I think I can say that everyone can consider it satisfactory. We will therefore transpose this well done work to an administration whose cadres and job opportunities will have to be increased. In other words, we know what we have and I think that everyone can be satisfied with it and we will impose an additional burden on the administration, which may be a petitioner, but of which we do not see the added value it will bring.

On the other hand, we were pleased to see that the members of the committee and the Minister joined us on the need to restore the CREG’s proposal competence regarding the approval of tariffs in the gas market rather than the opinion competence as it had been included in the original project.

I would also like to emphasize that the government has submitted an amendment to replace the term “opinion” with the word “proposition”. At this point, the government followed the position we had adopted.

3 of 3. The provisions within this project must truly benefit all the players present on the market. We believe that this objective should be the common denominator of this bill. by

The actors are multiple. There are, of course, shareholders who have an important place to occupy in this market, operators who need to be rewarded for their good management. There are also investments to be made in this area. Finally, there is the primary beneficiary, the customer. It is this customer, whether it is an individual consumer or a business, who must be able to participate and benefit from the best management possible.

This is why we defended the provisions contained in the Royal Decree of 15 December 2003 that allowed investors to develop the important project of the Zeebrugge terminal. In this sense, I agree with Mrs. Creyf, we did not invent a system by submitting this amendment. We wanted to be constructive and we referred to something that already existed, that was in a royal decree and that has already proved, to a measure that has already demonstrated that it was effective and proportionate.

These provisions specify that when a positive balance is drawn from the total income, at the end of the regulatory period, that surplus — this bonus, as indicated in the project — must be able to benefit from the three components: shareholders, investments, consumer tariffs. Indeed, if a bonus is issued, there is nothing to do, there is always a customer who has paid too much, who has advanced money and who is not sure of being able to recover that money. He will then be punished twice, as Ms. Creyf said. First, he paid too much and then he has no opportunity to recover that amount paid too much.

Mrs Creyf, I did not attend the energy debate in the Flemish Parliament. Instead, I read the press, including the Dutch-speaking press. And I read the following:

"De stroomprijs kan 18% lager", I say to myself that the consumer probably already pays too much for all these energy-related costs. However, we know how much the “energy” component reaches increasingly large proportions in the business and consumer budgets. In the absence of such accuracy, we fear that users of the network...

Mr. Wathelet, you you référez probablement au rapport McKinsey. I think your tone is more constructive and also more moderate than your predecessor’s tone, but I actually wanted to say the following. The energy policy in this country is a tanker with 700,000 tons of gross. It does not change the course from today to tomorrow. If the prices are too high, which I endorse, one must dare to situate it in a historical perspective. The same applies to Mrs. Creyf.

No, maybe that’s also a little — you see I’m a correct person — but mostly because the energy market was dominated by mixed intercommunals that kept prices artificially high. There, with all respect in the past, your mandators have been given a big finger in the pot. I would like to add this.

Mr. Lano, I hear you well. That is why our amendment was quite constructive, because it took these three speakers into consideration. Of course, these investments had to take place. Intercommunals and the manager must also be able to be rewarded in case of good management. Who would still invest today without being able to benefit from the fruits of its investment, especially if its management is correct? At the same time, we must not forget the third stakeholder, namely the consumer. This is exactly what we wanted to do in the field. It was that and only that! It is not an injunction, a distribution key, or an obligation. It is this willingness to mark the ground and, when we are going to have to distribute this bonus, to have continuously these three key points in mind: shareholders, investments and customers.

In the absence of such accuracy, network users who had to suffer from too high rates might not find compensation in the application, subsequently lower rates. This would give sufficient importance to the investments to be made in the network, both for its maintenance and for the development of new infrastructures. In view of such materials and given the dangers that may arise in the field of gas transportation in particular – we have unfortunately learned this at our own expense – infrastructure investments must continuously remain in the minds of all investors.

Furthermore, we have denounced this legislative drift, which seems to give increasing importance to financial flows, to the profitability of the network rather than to its optimal functioning: the security, efficiency and reliability of the network. So we believe that these three concepts, which are the primary objectives, can only be met if, in the redistribution of the bonus, we keep continuously in mind these three essential lines: the customer, shareholders and investments in the network.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, since no one has done it for me, I will still be able to thank the rapporteur for her summary of the long work.

Of course, it is not intended to polemize with the previous speakers, but I would like to begin by saying how relative the works we have done are. The ink is not yet dry, or a McKinsey study, which Mr. Wathelet alluded to, shows that the benefits of liberalization are still not fully playing out. It has nothing to do with the legislator.

Not playing at all! The [...]

McKinsey says “not fully,” Mr. Tant, “not fully.” It is a process in working, or a work in process, as you prefer.

Contrary to what is often thought — not I say that, but McKinsey; you can spot it, but I think they are competent people who work internationally — there can still be much efficiency gains in transmission and distribution, more than in production.

The [...]

Mrs. Creyf, I’m just an entrepreneur, I’m just a fool of an entrepreneur. You are a perfect legislator. But the legislator speaks, and the companies must do it. That was what I wanted to say to you.

Allow me to go deeper into it.

I have also criticized the interests of the companies.

Well, but I also speak in the interests of consumers. Because, as Mr. Wathelet says, it is a triangle.

Mrs. Creyf, if you want history to keep your words, then you should use your microphone.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, interested in this regard is the role and organization of the regulator, as the previous speakers have said. According to McKinsey, the regulator is still far too dependent on the different parties, making it not play its role as an independent regulator sufficiently.

McKinsey also referred to the cost-plus mechanism, on the basis of which, of course, the rates of transmission and distribution are fixed and which offers little room for efficiency improvements and cost savings.

Per ⁇ we should look at this all over time. But we had to take a step forward.

In any case, with those bills today we are making another step forward in the liberalization of both the gas sector and the electricity market. That is an important step, I said; not less, but neither more.

In the gas sector, the government opts for the appointment of three network operators. Such a system has several advantages, including ⁇ ining the tariff equation throughout the country.

It shall, of course, provide for the necessary principles to guarantee the independence of the network administrators.

Without independence, the proper functioning of the gas market is impossible. It must be determined that the State ⁇ ins its gold share in the administrator. That may allow for an additional form of control, but in our opinion this is not actually strictly necessary.

The new tariff methodology enables multiannual tariffs for transport. This increases legal certainty and means simplification for the administrator and the government. That is a good thing. Establishing the rates is a delicate balance exercise. On the one hand, network operators should have the guarantee of a reasonable income — which has been sufficiently emphasized by the previous speakers — so that they have the necessary resources to make investments that involve maintenance and development of the network. On the other hand, which has also been emphasized by the previous speakers, the interests of the consumer must not be overlooked. The tariffs must therefore be sufficiently low, but at the same time the service must also be high quality and safe. Consider, for example, what happened in Ghislenghien. We strive to ⁇ perfection in terms of security and maintenance of the system.

Here I have a personal note, in addition to what the previous speakers have said here, in relation to the interests of the consumer. I am still convinced that benchmarking and international comparison will push prices down. The legislator has played his role, but that will be the decisive element that will benefit the consumer, both the entrepreneur and the ordinary user.

The development of new infrastructures and the capacity enhancement of existing structures are necessary and will be promoted. We live on the limit. It goes without saying that this is necessary. We have already taken a step in the right direction at the end of the previous legislature and today we are taking another step. Gas will undoubtedly play an important role in our energy supply in the future. This is the price of a barrel of crude oil. It will therefore also depend on what we will ⁇ in the future in terms of energy saving and alternative energy sources, of course. As Mr. Wathelet said, McKinsey has predicted that gas will possibly make up to 80 percent of the market. I like it a lot, but good. Oil cannot be replaced in the short term.

That’s what McKinsey said.

I still have a tendency to trust skilled people and consultants a little bit.

The gas supply must be secured. The indicative plan for the natural gas supply is also in line with this framework.

In no way should we lose sight of the ultimate goal, in particular a competitive gas market, so that prices can fall, while naturally at the same time ensuring the supply, the safety of the network, the installations and the public functions. The VLD believes that the draft law in this regard may be a step in the right direction.

The design of the electricity sector is less in the sign of market liberalization, but rather has the insurance of supply in mind.

Surveillance of supply security, the preparation of the study, the technical regulations, the authorisation procedures and the procurement of new activities are, of course, directly or indirectly related to this.

Regarding the independence of the network operators, new provisions are introduced that need to be enhanced. In the past, however, there were also principles to guarantee this independence. The question is whether they have failed, and if so, in what sense. Shouldn’t the actual separation between producer and network manager at the level of shareholders actually be extended? The question can be asked. Well, you cannot do everything at the same time. Backwards, this bill represents a step in the right direction.

The establishment of a multiannual tariff is also a good thing here. It increases legal certainty and eases the workload for both network administrators and regulators. It is of course beneficial to the liberalization of the market because the tariffs must at the same time provide an incentive for the network operators to continue investing in the maintenance and development of the network but at the same time, simultaneously with what I have said about the gas design, are low enough in an international perspective not to prevent competition on the market and, again, to benefit the consumer. Again, here one can ask whether the cost-plus mechanism is sufficient and will prove sufficient. The future will show it because the last chapter has not been written here yet. However, I think we did our work, all together. Therefore, my group will approve these two bills.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, these two bills that we are examining today demonstrate, in my opinion and in Ecolo’s opinion, that the federal government is in fact renouncing to regulate the gas and electricity markets and that consumers, households and ⁇ will have only to extract from their portfolios.

by Mr. Lano says we are moving forward. In fact, I rather think that we are returning to the period before 1999, a time when gas and electricity operators set the tariffs themselves, with the complicity of policies through their participation in intercommunal. The independent regulator that allowed a reduction in tariffs for consumers, while allowing the increase in equity and surplus values for Electrabel, Distrigaz, therefore Suez, is rancid.

These two bills are obviously very technical and their understanding is difficult. However, they have social and economic consequences that are likely to be very serious, at the expense of the purchasing power of households and the competitive position of companies.

It is, of course, the transposition of directives, but not only. It is also the realisation of political orientations or rather the abandonment of politics in the face of the dominant player in the Belgian energy market, Electrabel, therefore Suez.

I would like to return to the “good household” that should form the liberalization of the electricity and gas markets and a regulated organisation of the markets.

In this project, the government actually sacrifices regulation, not for the benefit of greater liberalization, as one would like us to believe, but for the benefit of the dominant players in the market. After many hours of discussion in the committee, after many questions asked, few answers were given, except that the government chose a different orientation and that "all the remarks and questions of Mrs Gerkens show that Ecolo has a different orientation, makes other choices than those of the government".

In fact, when the European Union decides to liberalize the electricity markets in 1996 and the gas markets in 1998, it does not adopt directives on the liberalization of gas and electricity, but it adopts directives establishing common rules for the internal market. It was about introducing regulatory mechanisms in these markets so that competition rules and supply obligations are respected.

The objectives aimed were these. by

When Belgium transposed these directives in 2003, it also transposed directives that were not only liberalization directives but laws on the organisation of the electricity and gas market. This market organisation was characterized by the establishment of a regulatory system to ensure the principle of non-discrimination, effective competition and effective functioning of the market, in accordance with the terms of both directives. It is therefore important to emphasize that what will characterize the proper functioning of a liberalized market is the ability to regulate it, especially since we are in particular markets, and I will not return to the characteristics of electricity and gas in terms of storage, in terms of networks, in terms of less price flexibility. These two markets present greater risks of abuse of dominant positions with pernicious effects on the functioning of the market, the purchasing power of households and the competitive position of companies. I think that in Belgium these problems are all the more important as we actually have a historic operator that dominates the entire chain in the electricity sector: production, transport, distribution, supply, trade. The same is the case in the gas sector and it is, in addition, the same actor, which is the proof that strong regulation is needed.

I cannot help not to point out that the previous government had followed this regulatory logic by designating this strong regulator that is the CREG, by also designating a network manager who has been imposed rules of corporate governance very specific and much stronger than the rules of "corporate governance" that exist in other sectors, and this, because it was a dominant actor in the ⁇ important activity sector that is the energy. It was therefore in the interest of the Belgian economy and not for the pleasure of regulating for free. Indeed, opening a market with a dominant operator, without providing regulatory mechanisms, is obviously worse than a monopoly. The two laws of April 1999 on the organisation of the gas and electricity markets were therefore inspired by a voluntary approach to good regulation.

Among the assumptions that defenders of liberalism, and especially wild liberalism, often do to environmentalists, is that of killing the economy and ⁇ because ecologists are obscured by the regulation and regulation they impose on these companies.

However, I think it is interesting to look at the evolution of the turnover of the companies concerned. The management and regulation, imposed and defended by the Greens, have been beneficial to these companies. The revenue and results of Electrabel, Distrigaz and Fluxys in recent years show that the organization of both markets has not had a negative effect on them. I can only rejoice because they are important operators.

Furthermore, the value of Fluxys’ stock has more than doubled since tariffs were approved by the CREG and the 2004 results, recently published, have again been very good. Fluxys’ dividends have been increasing by 5% annually for ten years and, for the year 2003, they have increased by 12%. There is therefore no problem caused by a too strong regulation by the CREG that would disadvantage this operator.

Elia also received from "Standard & Poor's" a rating A, the best of all ratings. This made it possible to borrow 1 billion euros for a period of 10 to 15 years at a very low rate. It can therefore be concluded that the CREG has demonstrated a pragmatic and economically correct approach by fulfilling its role of regulator, with a beneficial effect for all. Consequently, reducing the role of the CREG, removing its competence, changing its way of setting tariffs, determining profit margins are part of a desire to reduce regulation and increase the profits of regulators and are in no case based on an objective analysis that would have highlighted the failures of the CREG.

The consequences of these two projects are as follows.

Control of costs, rates and profits will be the subject of conflicts of interest to the benefit of Suez and local authorities and to the detriment of consumers. For five years, the profit margin was determined by the CREG for transport networks. It can be concluded that it has granted appropriate profit margins to network operators through its independence. However, the bill stipulates that the King will adopt rules relating to the "methodology for determining the total income that includes the fair margin, including the rate of return on that regulated asset, etc." The Government therefore limits the competence of the CREG. The royal decree could also be written in such a way that the powers of the CREG would be reduced to zero. I consider this way of acting to be politically unacceptable and contrary to European directives. The European Commission can only object to this provision.

Who is the shareholder in the network managers? Local operators and intercommunals.

It is the government that will be brought to define the profitability of intercommunal companies. For me, this is impossible because the pressure of the political world on the government will be huge. The CREG is already subject to many pressures, but it is controlled by the general council of the CREG which itself brings together all economic, consumer and political actors. Here, however, the government will be subjected, as a political organ, to the pressures of men and women politicians from another level of power. Furthermore, the capacity of control and intervention of the Parliament is, in my opinion, illusory, given the large number of parliamentarians who also sit in intercommunal councils, who are schevins or mayors. Thus we find ourselves in a situation of conflict of interest, facing a derivative, to profitability problems that risk being paid cash by ⁇ and citizens.

Similarly, for cost control, which is the current work of the CREG, the latter normally has control of the nature and extent of the costs of the network managers which it can approve or reject. This will no longer be the case. However, studies commissioned by Elia showed that services that depended on Suez offered exorbitant prices. Nowadays, the bills no longer guarantee this competence.

It is said that this is nothing because we will resort to an organ that exists and is planned for this, the Competition Council. This is the summit of hypocrisy! Indeed, in order for the Competition Council to finally intervene a posteriori, it must first accept that estimated excessive costs are applied. Again, some will find themselves Grosjean as ahead: consumers, households or ⁇ .

I would like to return on two points. First, the choice of multiannual tariffs. In absolute terms, multiannual rates can meet the objectives of cost and tariff stability, both for those investing and for entry into the stock market. Nevertheless, with the difficulties I have just highlighted regarding the lack of control, the impossibility of independently fixing profit margins considered to be fair, estimating reasonable costs or refusing excessive costs, if in addition tariffs are fixed for several consecutive years, the only thing that can happen is a sustainable increase in tariffs. There is nothing to do, the interest of shareholders is to increase their profits.

If the objectives were to strengthen the revenues of Suez and its various components or the revenues of local authorities, this would indeed succeed. I would prefer that the local authorities be overwhelmed by other means, and that it be done in a direct way rather than in a distorted way.

Another important element I would like to emphasize is access to information for the CREG. In order to be able to control costs, the CREG must have access to all information. The legislature provided for this case in a specific article in 1999. However, it happens that, in the bill, the CREG will not be able to access information regarding the network manager, distribution, production, distributors, etc. only if he justifies his request. In this regard, I have proposed to remove these last words. This was refused. This means, therefore, that the CREG may see its request for supplementary information rejected because it is insufficiently motivated. In this way we risk to find ourselves in front of the State Council and again, the regulatory mechanisms will be undermined.

We have put a lot of energy into the writing of these two projects. Indeed, we have been delayed and it will take all this time to ⁇ this. However, for two years now, nothing has been done at the government level to allow consumers to benefit from the result of liberalization. I would like to cite as an example that the auctioning of virtual capacity for electricity production was planned as early as September 2003. This has not been done except for 1,200 megawatts, while specialists advise 4,000 to 5,000 megawatts.

Furthermore, in April 2003, the government composed of the Greens but also socialists and liberals had decided that Elia could no longer take historical contracts into account when renting electricity import capacity in Belgium. Again, things have been denied. Nothing was undertaken. When I asked the Minister about the import of capacity reserved for Electrabel, there was no way to get a response, while we are in a sector where transparency is a necessary condition for the proper functioning of the market. Consumers are violated in their rights. According to the law of 20 March 2003, there should be a Ombudsman to handle complaints. The royal decree was ready in early 2003. Nothing at the moment! The federal government and federal entities are unable to implement this project.

The same law gives the government the power to fix electricity and gas prices for captive customers in Wallonia and Brussels. The latter may therefore, after the advice of the CREG, fix the tariffs. Only the Minister of Energy does not do so while transport and distribution tariffs have decreased by several tens of percent. This means that Electrabel must pay less to Elia and distribution network operators to transport its electricity but that consumers do not benefit from this reduction.

The only case in which the government has put energy in the past two years is that of the refund of the treasures of the Flemish municipalities. There, the special financing law was completely amended to allow a tax to be collected that will allow municipalities to compensate for their lack of earnings following the loss of dividends. The Walloon Region and the Brussels Region, on the other hand, have made arrangements to be able to impose a contribution in their respective competences.

In fact, we are facing a liberal government and a minister who refuse to apply a reduction in tariffs for captive customers in Wallonia and Brussels — in other words citizens — as well as for SMEs because they do not want to accept that Wallonia and Brussels have not completely liberalized their market. We are therefore confronted with an abuse of political position in relation to a right of citizens that is not respected.

I cannot finish my speech without recalling a few extracts of the opinion that the CREG general council has just given about the study of “London Economics” which had indicated that our market did not allow to develop the positive aspects of liberalization.

This council, which consists of representatives of employers, large and small companies, trade unions, consumers, environmental NGOs, gas and electricity market operators, draws its independence from the diversity of interests of the protagonists. This is in accordance with the recommendations and analyses made by Mr. Lippens and the people who worked with him to elaborate the famous code that bears his name.

This council finds that prices are too high for consumers despite the economic performance of the production plant and this is because the reductions in transport and distribution tariffs, achieved in recent years, are not reflected. This is your job, Mr. Minister.

It recommends that any market player for whom the production, supply and/or trading of electricity constitutes a substantial activity reduces its shareholding share to a level below the blocking minority and that the credibility of corporate governance rules be strengthened.

But the project leads to a completely different outcome. The council advocates what is contained in the 1999 law, namely that it is important, in this sector, to have even stricter rules of "corporate governance" and to avoid any conflict of interest.

This opinion also recommends auctioning virtual production capacity, opening up to new actors, increasing import capacity, creating an electricity exchange, as well as implementing a regulated “balancing” system with tariffs based on actual costs and not on market prices and, finally, the obligation for market actors to make available certain information on production, transport and distribution data, as is practiced in States where liberalization has long existed.

These are the critical points I have pointed out. The projects we are going to vote on today are going in the opposite direction of these new recommendations. In conclusion, employers are released by the liberals, trade unions by the socialists, consumers and NGOs count for butter. Therefore, Ecolo cannot vote on these two bills.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I can and will not boast of Mr. Lano’s technical baggage as an entrepreneur, but in the short period of being a member of the House, I have learned from my group chairman that it is the task of the opposition to lead opposition. Therefore, you will not blame me if I discuss the draft proposals from a different perspective, from a political perspective, and evaluate them.

The current bills, which are largely a transposition of European directives, do not come too early. At the end of May, the European Court of Justice may impose a fine on that country if the directives have not been transposed into national law. Today I accidentally saw a Belga report stating that Belgium was once again condemned for not transposing a European directive in time. According to figures from the European Court of Justice, Belgium was convicted 13 times last year. With that, I just want to say that it will not be up to us if these designs are pushed on the long run.

Both designs do not come too early. In addition, Electrabel and SPE, the two main shareholders of Elia, request a quick conversion because Elia wants to go to the stock exchange before the summer vacation. The Government has opted to add two elements to the draft, namely a multiannual rate system and a new division of tasks between the administration responsible for policy preparation, the administration of the FOD Economie, on the one hand, and the regulator, on the other.

Mr. Lano and Mrs. Creyf, we can all agree on the multiannual rate system. This is indeed an improvement. It provides more certainty, both for the producer and for the consumer. The main problem, Ms. Creyf and Mr. Wathelet have mentioned, lies with the new task distribution. Mr. Minister, you have explicitly stated in the committee that you have not requested advice from the CREG on the preliminary design. In your opinion it was not mandatory and in addition you do not have good experiences with the advice of the CREG. It is therefore not surprising that you declare that the new division of tasks between the regulator and the administration is a political choice resulting from agreements within the majority parties.

Due to this choice of the government, the CREG can only act as an advisory body, while previously it was able to formulate proactive proposals. In fact, in this way, too much freedom is given to network operators, thus suppressing control in the function of the public interest. Furthermore, the administration and the Competition Board are not ready for the newly assigned tasks. You have said that with so many words, Mr. Minister, also said in the committee. Therefore, in the committee you also opted for a new structure, a new organization of this administration.

I can only conclude that the fear of the opposition, in particular that the network operators will implicitly gain more power, is not unjustified. The drafts, Mr. Minister, presented today are the result of a political cow trade. You called it a political agreement. Whatever they want or may call it; they are politically inspired designs in which the socialist parties increase their grip on the energy sector. They can now switch to political appointments at the level of the administration and the network operator. In addition, the sp.a demanded the link to the bill regarding the financing of the sea cable for the wind farm at the Torntonbank, the so-called C-Powerdossier. Mrs Creyf has rightly referred to the fact that it cannot be called a coincidence that both Interelectra of Limburg, the province of Robert Stevaert, and SOCOFE of Liège, the home of PS, are shareholders of C-Power. All this can not be a coincidence.

Our conclusion cannot therefore be other than that these drafts do not serve the public interest, that the independent control of the network operators Elia and Fluxys is reduced and that a wide-ranging political interference in the energy market is created. For these three reasons, the Flemish Interest will not approve these designs and will abstain.

Mr. Minister, you have the word for a brief response in this general discussion.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues and I

may be shortly after the full and detailed report published by the rapporteur.

I would like to remind for a moment that the two bills, which have much in common with each other, are the transposition into our federal legislation of European directives. They are, therefore, both an end and a starting point for the gas and electricity market.

They are an endpoint, since the first wave of liberalization began in 1999. At that time, we aimed primarily at the transposition into Belgian law in order to ⁇ a number of objectives. The first objective was the establishment of a single market for gas and electricity. The second goal was to guarantee supply security. The third goal was to respect European and international environmental obligations. The fourth and final goal was to try to improve the competitiveness of European companies.

Belgium has fully drawn the map of liberalization and must continue to do so. We are now at the gate of the second phase. With the two new directives, we are trying to continue on the set path. We have built up a number of experiences, we have identified a number of shortcomings and we have also been able to recognize the opportunities that the market offers.

For this reason, Europe has asked us to set a number of new targets, namely to ensure equal competition at the level of production, to reduce the risk of potential market dominance, to guarantee non-discriminatory tariffs and to ensure the protection of the vulnerable final customer.

That is the ultimate goal that we must ⁇ . It is good that we are reminded today that there is a certain high urgency, not only to make the goals hard, but also for two other reasons.

First, Belgium was condemned — which is one of our weaknesses; we must dare to admit that — because we do the conversion too late. I hope that we will be able to complete the conversion before 16 May 2005, otherwise the likelihood of a fine is real.

A second reason is that we have explicitly chosen to liberate the market, including by allowing Elijah to go to the stock exchange. This requires a legislative framework.

I also remind you that we do not only do the conversion, but that at the same time we also try to shape the objectives that we set forth in the Federal Policy Declaration, in particular the Policy Declaration of July 2003. Then it was about additional measures to increase market liquidity, to a number of measures to enable cross-border capacity of the transmission network, to encourage investments in the transport network and in the transmission network, to introduce the system of the multiannual plan, to the efficient management of the networks and also to the regulatory task. In this regard, we have made a series of agreements. I would like to admit that I would have preferred that the CREG would have been in a similar situation than the BIPT. The BIPT has had the great luck to be able to use mobile telephony as a kind of lightning leader in order to effectively liberalize the market much faster. Unfortunately, there is no such thing as a GSM in terms of energy. It would ⁇ have helped us.

We have translated this in a balanced way. This means that a permanent role has been played through the advice to the regulator. The provinces are also involved in the process. The role of the network manager, both in gas and electricity, is ⁇ highly appreciated by us, which is why we have taken additional measures regarding corporate governance and the independence requirements in the composition of the boards and committees.

I come to the multiannual rates. These rates are associated with a triple advantage. First, the suppliers have been able to obtain the assurance of longer-term long-term contracts. Secondly, customers also have a long-term assurance regarding the energy price. Third, and important for both, the multiannual rates will undoubtedly lead to more investments.

There is a lot to be done about the role of the regulator. A regulator needs to regulate, nothing more than that. Important is the opinion of the Council of State, which states that the granting of regulatory powers to public institutions or their bodies is difficult to bring into conformity with the general principles of Belgian law. In this regard, we have chosen a clear ex ante control that will have to be followed by an equally clear ex post control. At this point, I have heard the comments made by various members that the competition authorities, in particular the Competition Council, should also be at least at the level of the regulators. En ce qui concerne le projet de loi modifiant la loi du 10 avril 1965 sur les transports de produits gazeux et autres par canalisations, il vise à transposer la directive du 26 juin 2003 and abrogant en même temps celle du 22 juin 1998.

The transposition provisions concern the designation of one or more network operators, the legal separation — a very important point —, the provisions necessary to ensure corporate governance that guarantees the independence of decisions within the network operators, the regulated access of third parties to the networks, the approval by the CREG of tariffs and, above all, the acceleration of the opening schedule of the gas market. by

The two markets, electricity and gas, are not completely comparable, but I will not mention all of their differences.

However, I invite this Parliament to vote as soon as possible on the transposition of the two texts so that Belgium can join in the continuation of the liberalization of the energy market.