Proposition 51K0335

Projet de loi portant assentiment aux actes internationaux suivants: 1° Protocole au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord sur l'accession de la République de Bulgarie, 2° Protocole au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord sur l'accession de la République d 'Estonie, 3° Protocole au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord sur l'accession de la République de Lettonie, 4° Protocole au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord sur l'accession de la République de Lituanie, 5° Protocole au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord sur l'accession de la République de Roumanie, 6° Protocole au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord sur l'accession de la République slovaque, 7° Protocole au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord sur l'accession de la République de Slovénie, signés à Bruxelles, le 26 mars 2003.

General information ¶

Submitted by

The Senate

Submission date

Aug. 5, 2003

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

NATO international agreement

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

CD&V Vooruit Ecolo LE PS | SP Open Vld N-VA MR VB

Abstained from voting

FN

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Discussion ¶

Nov. 27, 2003 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

It would be a shame to let such an important issue go unnoticed. Today we vote on an international issue that we would have considered absolutely impossible 20 years ago.

Colleagues, today the final point is placed behind the Cold War, the military East-West confrontation, NATO versus the Warsaw Pact, or Western Europe versus Eastern Europe. This contradiction has kept generations of Belgians out of control, even nuclear cellars were built. Service officials had to be under arms to defend our external border on the Weser near East Germany. Nuclear scenarios were practiced as a total destruction war threatened constantly around the corner. The Cuban crisis was the frightening peak of this, or rather the bottom.

Following Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia now become full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This accession is the result of more than 10 years of actively negotiating, evaluating and above all persuading those countries that are at the periphery of the new bong company, in particular Russia. Indeed, the new NATO now extends to the borders of the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.

Colleagues, is this now the final seal of a flattering victory of NATO over the Warsaw Pact? One fact is certain. The Soviet system has ultimately exploded by itself, and our concern must now be mainly about good neighborhood with these new neighbors. NATO must be careful not to raise a new curtain of any kind on its new external borders. One of its primary objectives should be to actively involve these new neighboring countries in its policies, through the existing organizations such as the NATO-Russia Council and the installation of Russian delegations in the SHAPE headquarters in Mons and NATO headquarters in Evere. Regular mutual consultations remain the motto, with transparency and mutual trust high on the agenda.

The situation in the Caucasus should not be overlooked. This region remains an explosive fireplace of unrest on the external borders of the NATO alliance. As you know, there are vital Western interests compromised by internal conflicts, terrorism and disputes over their respective national borders. Together with Russia, NATO should also be able to play a role here, especially on the diplomatic level.

Let me go back to the extension itself. The importance of this enlargement is less evident for the candidate Member States on the military level, but has a much greater political and psychological effect. The expansion of NATO increases stability in Central and Eastern Europe, strengthens democracy and results in greater legal certainty and increased prosperity in the candidate countries. However, the current NATO member states also have an interest in expanding the alliance. At the military level, NATO will also be able to use the ports and airports of the new member states, the training facilities will be expanded and diversified, and the knowledge of other armed forces and the material aspect will be increased. The expansion of NATO will further strengthen the alliance’s role as a guardian of peace and security.

Furthermore, the expanded alliance still has the potential to create more stability in the future, ⁇ in the East and later ⁇ in the South and the Arab world. This alone makes it vital for Europe and especially for our country that NATO continues to exist. We must therefore advocate that, for example, Croatia, Albania and Macedonia should be given a fair opportunity in the next round of accession. The discussion in the coming years will have to focus primarily on the form and content of the alliance. In my opinion, its political importance is undeniable.

In order for NATO to preserve this political appearance of a stability mechanism, it is very important that it does not take a threatening or interventionist stance in the eyes of the rest of the world. Her great strength and success over the last fifty years was in her exclusively defensive character. In the last decade, the door has been opened to crisis management and peace support which, as long as they are under UN control and under UN mandate as required by the NATO treaty, will prove acceptable to the rest of the world.

Through the United Nations, the other major global players had a certain contribution to what NATO could and could do. However, it has begun to fail when NATO intervened militarily outside its territory without a UN mandate, when it was asked to support the war in Iraq, when the new strategic concept was approved that allows NATO to operate outside its territory, when preemptive strikes were warned, and so on. Meanwhile, the largest partner, the United States of America, announces that it is willing to use small, nuclear weapons in the fight against terrorism — in addition to a fair fight — if necessary. It is absolutely necessary for NATO to return to its origins in this area if it does not want to undermine internal divisions and if it does not want to lose its positive radiation to the rest of the world.

Colleagues, this is not a plea against transformation, but rather a plea for a transformation other than that which the current Secretary-General and especially the current rulers in Washington have in mind. Within the alliance itself, the European Union will and must play a more important role in the future. The Americans will sooner or later realize that the ambiguous behavior of their current administration towards Europe can only harm their own interests in the long run. If Europe wants to increase its weight in the future, it must build its own European defense, complete and integrated with all that is needed: a European command chain, headquarters, bars and military capabilities.

After the current U.S. government has gone through its worst attack of "superpower" - it has been a long time since we have heard the phrase "We are the only superpower" - and will realize that it cannot control the whole world on its own, it will also realize that this is necessary if it wants a strong and capable partner next to it.

Until now, the current U.S. administration — I distinguish it mostly from the people of America — has mostly tried to put European defense sticks in the wheels, by the way, with relative success. It will be important to remind them of this when they will complain about a lack of progress and cooperation. With the expansion of NATO, the relative importance of the new Europe, as Mr. Rumsfeld called it, must be put into perspective. That the cumulative financial contribution to the operation of the alliance — the civil budget and the investment budgets — of the new Europe, i.e. the new Member States, will be of the same order of size as that of Belgium alone, says something not only about the new Member States, but also about Belgium. In my opinion, the Secretary-General and his administration can safely show a little more respect for Belgium, as we ultimately contribute to their budget as much as the whole of the new Europe together.

Colleagues, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the future secretary-general of NATO, will urgently need to put things in order within the alliance. The authority of the nation-member States must be urgently restored. The Secretary-General and his administration have, in my opinion, attracted too much power over the past years, which has led to aberrations at the time when the administration was manipulated by one Member State or a limited group of them. It is enough to read some of Lord Robertson’s speeches from the past period to establish that, unfortunately, one has only heard an echo of the voice of Washington. If the alliance is in crisis today, it is ⁇ due to the soon-to-be former, therefore current secretary-general and his administration. The various nations have had to suffer Prague, since there was almost no initiative because of the alliance or because of the member states and we are still being pushed further in that direction.

Certainly not everyone who sits around the table is happy with that direction.

One case that can all be attributed to the current Secretary-General is the abuse of the feared silence procedure within the alliance. It is used properly and inappropriately to put pressure on nations or to press things through without debate. Colleagues, we know what the silence procedure is about, as it was also used in the Iraq crisis. In fact, this procedure serves to approve something about which there is no disagreement without having to formally meet about it. I think that today we have gone very far from that under the current administration of NATO. It is high time for the alliance to listen again to the views of its member states rather than to its silence.

Nevertheless, we welcome the fact that NATO’s enlargement is celebrated here today with this vote, and we wish the new member states much success with their membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Mr. Speaker, I will be very brief. by

If our group wishes to welcome this historical step that allows a second series of countries of the late Warsaw Pact to join the North Atlantic Organization and thus close the sad Soviet parenthesis, I would however like to make two remarks. We regret that NATO’s enlargement is carried out with fewer tags and without genuine objective criteria, unlike the EU’s enlargement marked both by the Copenhagen criteria, democratic and economic criteria to be met by the candidate countries, and by the pre-accession and accession strategies defined by the European Commission with an evaluation of the Community acquis. The NATO membership strategy exists well, but it would have deserved a broader programme, especially on the political level. Indeed, it should be remembered that the seven candidate countries for this enlargement took a position, before the beginning of the conflict in Iraq, for the US strategy and against that of the "old Europe" to which we belong in the same title as France and Germany.

The ten member countries of the Vilnius Group, including the seven countries, stated, while it was clear that Iraq was actually violating the Security Council resolutions including resolution 1441, that they were ready to participate in an international coalition to implement these recommendations and disarm Iraq; what they have done since. These countries were concerned, above all, to integrate NATO and thus give a pledge to the U.S. Congress so that ratification goes well. We would have preferred that they also remember that they are European and that five of them would join the club of "Old Europe" on May 1, 2004. We hope that they will be interested in strengthening the European Pillar of NATO and that their Europeanization will allow them to evolve in the right direction.

Mr. Van den Eynde, you have the word. You are "man enough" to be the spokesman of your group.

Thank you for giving the word. However, you will well understand that when it comes to such an important matter as the expansion of NATO to approximately all Eastern Europe, my group not only feels strongly involved, but also plans to address any subtlety that should be emphasized in this matter. I would like to do that in a 30-minute speech time, but I will not succeed in that. I will therefore not be the spokesman of my group here, but rather the parliamentary member Francis Van den Eynde, who takes the floor in that important Navodebat.

Let me first and foremost state that we are facing a historical extension of the Treaty. When NATO was founded, Europe was hopelessly divided. Through Europe, in the words of Churchill, went a iron curtain. Behind that iron curtain stood an iron-strong alliance—the word ‘alliance’ is ⁇ even an euphemism—a iron-strong empire, the Marxist empire of the former Soviet Union. From there, freedom in Western Europe was threatened, and freedom in Eastern Europe was snuffed, just as it will soon be snuffed here when certain laws will be passed to financially curb political parties or to restrict free thought.

In my opinion, it is therefore of great importance to emphasize that the transfer to the Western Alliance of all those former satellites — that was the word of the Soviet Union — shows that, first, the Cold War is over, second, the Marxism has been defeated, and third, we are facing a new situation on the geopolitical level.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to pay attention to the following. Some of you will undoubtedly remember that, when the war in Iraq began, when America made its first war deeds in front of the regime of Saddam Hussein, there were quite a few critical voices in Western Europe, such as in this country, in front of that war. Curiously, the former Soviet satellites that already belong to NATO were much less critical.

In addition, former Soviet satellites that were not part of NATO for a long time, and who were not on this line, even took part in that war. I think of a country that is at the top of the actuality at the moment. I’m talking about Georgia, a country with many problems, on the border of Europe and Asia, that with fifty soldiers — not more, but not less — is present in Iraq on the American side. Undoubtedly, this has irritated many people in Western Europe, who were much more critical of the American operation. I would like to ask them not to exaggerate this annoyance and to show a greater understanding of the political stance of Eastern Europe in general in these matters.

There is undoubtedly the fact that those Eastern European countries — let us call a cat a cat — can expect more support from the United States than from the current Western Europe, not because the current Western Europe would be less wealthy than the United States, not because the current Western Europe would have less interest, but simply because the current Western Europe is much less well organized. It is a house that is turned in itself and fights against itself. I would refer once, colleagues, to the words in the Gospel that say that a house that is turned against itself can never hold it. Consequently, in those countries the Western European states could not compete against the American prestige. That is a first thing.

There is a second case. These countries have only discovered a new freedom and that freedom has long been denied them by the Russian superpower. Let’s be honest, against this Russian superpower, Western Europe has never done much. From time to time there was criticism of the Soviet dictatorship and from time to time it was accused that the Marxist regimes in Eastern Europe were in fact totalitarian dictatorships, but in the end this happened much less, because it was no longer politically correct to have criticism of Marxist regimes. Consequently, the militant attitude of the Western European countries toward the brothers in Eastern Europe, which was so striking for the 1950s, was far-seeked. Meanwhile, Eastern Europe crumbled under the Soviet arms. I think it can be psychologically understood that these states, at the moment when they have fallen away from under that Soviet shell — the Soviet shell has, by the way, been completely wiped out, but that is another thing — yet still a little rushingly search for a umbrella that can protect them from a possible return of that threat.

They have stood under the American umbrella because – let’s be honest – Western Europe had no rain screen to offer. In the best case, we had an umbrella. Thus it is from that psychological approach that we must understand that rather pro-American attitude of Eastern Europe, which seemed to us so little critical.

I would like to introduce a second chapter on this subject. We will soon be welcomed in a military alliance of which we have been part since the very beginning and which, unfortunately, is no longer what it once was. We also have to dare to admit this. A number of peoples who share with us the European culture, who know our European sensitivities – Central Europeans thus – but who have been separated from us so long and so long sought to the West, not only for the goods of consumption, but simply for freedom and to discover the possibilities that they thought in the West and that they did not have.

I think especially of the German protest singer Reinhard Mey who expressed this very emotionally with his very well-known song: "Ich würde gern einmal in Dresden singen". He was West German and very popular with his protest songs. For the colleagues on the left, I signal that he was green-left. One should not suspect me of doing philoduits: it was a green-left singer. He had discovered that as a German he could sing in Kathmandu, in New York or in Paris, but not in Dresden, for Dresden was on the other side of the wall. These Eastern European peoples talked about those contacts, talked about that freedom.

Some colleagues of the Flemish Bloc will undoubtedly discuss other peoples, but I think in particular of what is commonly called the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Three small countries, but what is small? Flanders is not so big. Three small countries that have been stuck there somewhere on the Baltic Sea throughout their long history and still sit between on the one hand the Russian bear and on the other, less dangerous in recent centuries, but yet occasionally aggressive, a Scandinavian block.

My colleagues, I do not need to remember you. This is an assembly where the knowledge of history is undoubtedly very high. There has been a time when the Swedes under the Swedish King Charles XII were fighting deep into Russia. They were even in Ukraine and even in Silesia. The latter is now ⁇ ly Poland. However, it has been German for a long time. Their

Those three countries are between them. In one of these three, namely Estonia, one speaks a very separate language. This language group is called Finnish-Ugric. The language is related to Finnish and Hungarian. It is actually a language of Mongolian origin. The other two countries — Latvia and Lithuania — speak a language that is Baltic. There is no other name for it than Baltic. They are not Slavic languages. They are not Germanic languages. They are not romantic languages. It is the Baltic languages. Their

Three small states. Three small countries. Thro ⁇ the centuries, and despite this horrible geographical position — clashed between two great powers — they have retained their identity. You will not blame me for expressing my admiration here today as Flaming for this firm will to stick to that identity. Their

I’m not going to tell you the whole story. I would test your patience and I ⁇ don’t want to. If we look at the history of these peoples – I am talking only about the 20th century, about the century that is just over – we see that they were part of the Russian Tsarist Empire. Finland was part of the Russian Tsarist Empire until 1917. The Finns have taken advantage of the Bolshevik revolution that overwhelmed Russia in order to secure their identity, nationality and freedom as quickly as possible. Their

Thus these countries were first and foremost part of the Russian Empire. After the fall of that empire, they have known their own independence for a little 20 years. They have emphasized this independence by regularly discussing their own identity. This was done, for example, through very large singing festivals. These singing festivals have been the original source of inspiration for the Flamings to organize singing festivals with us from the 1930s. Their

They have been able to sustain for another 20 years. They were literally sold. This happened following the notorious agreement between Molotov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Marxist regime of the Soviet Union, and von Ribbentrop. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of that other socialist regime, namely the Third Reich.

As a result of an agreement between these two socialist regimes — very different in nature, yet both socialist and, moreover, equally totalitarian — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were simply handed over to Stalin. The Soviet armies wanted to win those countries, immediately organized an unnamed repression and the Germans watched, probably even approving, because it was the implementation of their agreement. I would like to remind you that at that time the Soviet Union, with the consent of that socialist regime of the Third Reich, also attacked Finland. The first Flemish Eastern Front troops have moved to Finland.

Those three countries at least went under foot and became Soviet republics. In 1941 the system reversed. The National Socialist Third Reich attacked the Socialist Soviet Union. This is the Great War in the East. The Germans claim that they are liberating these three countries. At least it happens because they are received as such. I have the greatest doubts about whether the liberation was real, but they were in any case received as such. It takes three years.

In 1944, the Russians returned and became the Soviet republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Anyone who in those years dared to allow himself the luxury to keep his own opinion and to stand up for his own traditions, his own culture and the peculiarity of his own people disappears to Siberia. There is a sort of repressive bulldozer rolling over those Baltic countries. Nevertheless, they remain faithful to their dream of freedom and to their own identity even though they are completely forgotten in this regard by the West. I would like to illustrate this with an example that was polite in this Parliament, in this Chamber. When, in the 1970s, the municipality of Gent, which was socialist and — I believe — Christian-democratic, concluded a friendship treaty — gemellarism is called that — with a sister town, namely Talinn, the capital of the then Soviet Republic of Estonia, only the Flemish Bloc knew — I am still proud of it today — that Belgium had never recognized the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union.

I know well that Karel Dillen then, in this hemisphere, solitary and solitary represented our faction, all behind, approximately in the place where Mr. Bourgeois now sits — thus Mr. Bourgeois sits in a beautiful holy place. It was Karel Dillen who then asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether Belgium suddenly accepted that occupation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs could only answer that Belgium has never recognized that occupation. This gave us the opportunity to protest in Gent against the city administration that, despite the non-recognition of the occupation, found it necessary to brother with the occupation regime that was at that time in power in Estonia.

Personally, I find it nice that the new Estonia, the liberated Estonia, does not show us our attitude badly. I just spoke about the faithfulness of those people to their principles, ideas, language, identity and peculiarity. In their faithfulness, however, they clearly should not have counted on our support, except that at that time still tiny Flemish Block. I know that the Estonians were aware of our support. I remember receiving a number of thanks letters from Estonia. Despite everything, Estonia remained faithful to the European idea and wanted the country to cooperate with Western Europe. Their

My story about Estonia applies with equally tragic chapters for Lithuania and for Latvia. My story about Tallinn also applies to Riga and Vilnius. Moreover, my story also applies to other countries such as Slovakia where the people were also threatened in their identity. After the First World War, Slovakia was intended to be part of a newly invented state by the Allies, with the almost inexpressible name Czechoslovakia. People remained faithful to their language and their religion, for which I would like to express my appreciation, for remaining faithful to your religion under the Soviet dictatorship was not easy. This also applies to Slovenia and other countries. Mr. Speaker, in fact, we welcome here brothers who have long been separated from us. I think this may be an enrichment for NATO and ⁇ for Europe. They have been under Soviet dictatorship for many years. Their culture, however, has never been under the foot of globalist companies such as the company that markets black limonade or the company that dominates the world with so-called sandwiches allegedly containing a kind of meat. I mean the company that carries a Scottish name, but is actually North American, McDonald's. They have not experienced all of this.

Their music remains their own music. I would recommend anyone who has the opportunity to visit these countries. Furthermore, it is strange that in those countries, in all segments of the population, classical music, true culture in the deepest sense of the word, and literature are still loved. It is strange how their churches are full. One cannot be proud of the success of the church in Flanders. Mr. Leterme, you are now looking at me with skepticism; I can only state that in those countries the culture is still alive, the identity is still alive, and the own religion is still alive. That has nothing to do with confession, I just suggest that. We have a lot to learn from these people and that is why the Flemish Bloc today enthusiastically welcomes their arrival in the alliance.

I do not know if the alliance has a long life. Not so long ago I heard the Prime Minister say that NATO would completely change, that it would be a loose alliance that has nothing to do with the Atlantic Ocean, a loose alliance of countries scattered around the world, led by the United States who will determine when one should fight with and with what weapons to do so. This was stated by Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt. I do not know how long and how the alliance will stand up, that I cannot predict. I only note today that countries that were so long oppressed in Eastern Europe and so long left by Western Europe to their sad fate are at this moment on our side. Today, I am hopefully voting for that.

Mr. Van den Eynde, you have one minute to speak.

I will keep my time. You know me.

Colleagues, I can assure you that there are many matters that do not vote me hopefully today, including in connection with free opinion in this country and the fact that in this country political parties are put to life. Sometimes I wonder if the Soviet regime has not moved from the East to the West.

But what comes here is hopeful to me. New countries discovering freedom. I welcome this with enthusiasm. As a Flemish nationalist and as a convinced European, I cry: Viva la liberté!

Mr. Speaker, I would like, together with you and the other colleagues, to pause a moment on the approval of the Enlargement Treaties and the important step we are taking in this regard. Today we are taking an important step closer to the new alliance of countries that choose military and political cooperation. It is possible that this decision was initially a purely political decision, but it does not matter that it reflects the desire of seven new countries to act together and to be solidary if the security of one of the Member States is jeopardised. This is the strict interpretation of mutual assistance as included in the interpretation of mutual assistance as included in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. It should delight us, as residents of one of the Member States that were at the cradle of the 1949 Brussels Convention – the NATO’s mother treaty.

It is also clear that Article 5 of the NATO Treaty for the seven new NATO member states is not subject to interpretation. This is not without importance for some colleagues on the sp.a. side who in the past have experienced some difficulties in the interpretation of Article 5 of the Convention. We still remember the distressing scenes in the village of the Sixteenth, just after September 11, when certain excellences of the Flemish socialists apparently did not know what the article 5, the solidarity article, exactly contained. Today we know that the interpretation of Article 5 is no longer a priority and that Article 5 is no longer in its own right. The Alliance has now established intense friendships with old enemies. The new threats, on the other hand, unfortunately did not wait for themselves.

Mr. Speaker, we had proposed to hold a large debate on this subject in the plenary session, but unfortunately this did not happen. The discussions were held in a committee, so we could not have a large debate to find an answer to the questions of where we come from, where we are now and where we should go.

NATO was established in 1949, on the ashes of a continent that had almost bombed itself in destruction, but which has risen like a phoenix from its ashes, inspired by the fundamental will to break old hostilities and by the common will to establish collective security on the basis of solidarity and the famous “burden-sharing” – sharing of burdens. It has been the great merit of NATO – despite all the world-improvers – that it has managed to save the old continent from a global fire between 1949 and today and that it has managed to uphold the ideal of NATO and its founders.

However, the unexpected end of the Cold War in 1989 with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the demolition of the wall, the fluffy revolutions and the unexpected developments in international security seem to show, sadly, that no security situation is definitive, nor that a security situation is definitive and predictable. The Belgian, Western European and transatlantic security policy must always keep this in mind.

In large segments of the population — which is a striking finding — the impression prevails that the risks and threats are no longer clearly demonstrable. The problem of domestic security is currently perceived as more priority. Once it was different. Fifteen years ago, heroic debates were held on this speech table between the then majorities and the opposition, the majorities within the opposition and the opposition within the majority over the placement of the so-called Euro missiles, the SS20 missiles and the cruise missiles. It is as if this is an eternity ago. It is, in any case, a discussion of the last century, but its essence is therefore not less current: what do we do together in our defense; what do we do together in our security to build a society in freedom, responsibility and security.

However, the actuality of the past months and years seems to leave little room for a security policy, colleagues, that would celebrate the tights. Of some recent conflicts, which vary in nature, we have undoubtedly never suspected that they could come into being. Nor did we suspect the size of it. We often refer to what happened on September 11th, which was actually a painful highlight in a prequel that had been ongoing for years and whose epilogue was undoubtedly and unfortunately not yet written.

Some of these conflicts—some of which, unfortunately, have flown away from us in a few hours—confirm that the ancient feedstock for armed conflicts remains intact. In fact, that food soil is no different from the food soil of 1914, that of 1870 or that of 1940. There is an intense sense of injustice among large parts of the world population, as was the case in 1914 and 1940, injustice due to the very unequal distribution of prosperity, prosperity and well-being and not the least of participation, knowledge and legitimate knowledge, injustice due to the power hunger of some or the radical ideologies of others, and frustration due to the efforts of the West to continue to guarantee world security. Per ⁇ there lies also one of the important tasks of the enlarged NATO: the unjust frustrations that prevail in many, turn into assets and leverages of a society in which peace and security, as well as responsibility, could prevail.

The underlying mechanisms of all these injustices are, of course, ⁇ complex and our efforts to overturn them appear to be far too weak or often contradictory. Therefore, we must absolutely bear in mind, colleagues, that there will continue to be the risk that illicit peoples or illicit leaders of illicit peoples will attempt to enforce their right by force.

This gives NATO a new role, a role that is not obvious and that will bring new uncertainties. When we look at the map of 2003 in Europe, it looks much more like the map of August 1914 than it looks like the map of 1944. The new role assigned to NATO is a role that will not always be easy. It will be a path filled with the necessary obstacles. There are a number of problems that can be accompanied by the expansion. The first is, of course, the weakening of decision-making. The unanimity in the decision-making rules that prevails can be a weak link for effective action. We are unfortunately with Belgium as a small country in the crashes of September 11, 2001, a little at the cause of the shortening of decision-making. It was a lesson for us but also for all other member states that decision-making within NATO is the absolute lever for decisive action, for ⁇ ining, restoring and above all guaranteeing public security order in the world and in the northern hemisphere. The re-established close bond with Russia — who ever thought that the antagonists of the worldview in the 1950s, 1960s, 1960s, 70s and 80s could find each other again about a consensus in geopolitics, not only in the northern hemisphere but also in the southern hemisphere — will not facilitate the operation of the alliance. One day, one day, there may be a response to the knock or request that the Western countries will address to Russia to join the hemisphere in such a way that from Honolulu to Vladivostok there will be a unit of security, cooperation and security guarantee, although this lever of security would not necessarily be able to counter the uncertainty, uncertainty and security threats in the southern hemisphere.

Finally, there is the finding that the American approach to the new role of NATO sometimes dares to differ from the European approach. I think that we should opt for unity in diversity. We have seen that on the basis of good agreements, dialogue and genuine solidarity, together with the American allies, a clear vision of security and cooperation can be developed in one Europe but also in Asia and actually in the entire northern hemisphere. It would therefore be best that, after the adoption of these treaties, we also work for a new and thus ⁇ better and more responsible attitude of Europe or some Member States towards the United States. Everyone feels that the transatlantic relations have not been the best in recent months. They are in full evolution. This has to do with a number of circumstances that we have already talked about in the past. It may have to do with other expectations, ambitions and priorities where we should actually go back to the essence, namely that NATO is gathering under its dome or umbrella genuine democracies with a legislative, executive and judicial power that has the same ideal of freedom and responsibility in mind.

These differences, although they appear to be greater in appearance than in reality, can and cannot work paralytically. They must be a challenge for Europeans and also for the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Belgium, who have always had a tradition of entering into dialogue and of seeking consensus, to deepen and broaden the ties with the United States. Unity in diversity, epluribus unum, does not apply only to the European Union. It should also be the guiding motive for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Otherwise, she will have no sense and her own success will also become her disadvantage.

The enlargement with seven Member States is fully approved by us and with a great heart. It is the challenge, the lever and ⁇ the break iron to move towards a new global order in the twenty-first century. We are convinced that it will contribute to a safer and better world order.

The North Atlantic Treaty was created in the context of the Cold War. It was intended to establish a common security organization, within which an attack on one of the members meant an attack on all the other members. Its purpose was both deterrent and security.

At the time, a state of the Soviet bloc that would have attacked a European country would have run the risk of seeing the US military fly to the rescue of the latter. This constituted for the Europeans a guarantee against the powerful USSR. The United States also saw security. Geographically close to the USSR on the North Pacific side and the Arctic side, they could not accept that the Atlantic coast of Europe was threatened by the Red Army. Being surrounded by enemy bases was out of question for the United States. NATO allowed them to maintain a military presence in Europe, which gave them the opportunity to monitor the enemy closer. The Soviets responded by implementing the Warsaw Pact.

The end of the Cold War changed the geopolitical context of the region. The break-up, the collapse of the Soviet bloc gave rise to a large number of independent states, republics and regions that had been diluted within the powerful USSR.

The admission of new countries opens the door to some reflections. First of all, it should be remembered that NATO is a military organization. It was designed in this direction and its working mechanisms are inspired by it. The new members will benefit from the provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for assistance from all members in the event of an attack suffered by one of them. This implies that the enemies of these new member states become our enemies. by

On the contrary, we have new allies in the event of an attack directed against us. We believe that we need to push the reflection further, in order to examine changes to NATO missions necessary for the new geopolitical profile of the world. The end of the Cold War, in fact, had the immediate consequence of ending the cause of the establishment and maintenance of transatlantic military relations.

However, we must not lose sight of the fact that the threat, far from disappearing, has diversified, divided. A clear global threat from defined, named, borders and clear intentions has left the place for a disturbing beam of phenomena that enable debate on the future of NATO and reinforce the idea of the need for strong defense in Europe and with the United States.

The previous mention of Article 5 gives me the opportunity to return to the only and only invocation of this article in the history of this organization. It was after the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, that the United States sought support from its allies in the fight against a new threat of terrorism. Indeed, the threat no longer comes from States, it now comes from independent groups pursuing a cause, groups who are ready to do anything to get what they want and who will target the symbol of everything they reject, that is, mainly Western states. by

Although it is our duty as economically developed nations to promote the emancipation of peoples, to give nations the means to continue their economic development, to put the right above force, we cannot and must not give in to the threat.

Aid and development must be based on peaceful and frank relations between States. The use of violence and even more of terrorist violence that strikes civilian and innocent victims must not only be condemned but also strongly combated. This is one of NATO’s new challenges for the coming years. This new terrorist threat replaced that of a massive attack by one of the members of the Soviet bloc. It remains now to question the capacity of NATO to combat this more widespread, obscure, clandestine threat. Can the military power put an end to clandestine groups that do not bother with speeches or diplomatic manoeuvres? by

The other challenge of NATO finds a solution in its enlargement. Indeed, the states arising from the collapse of the Soviet bloc were numerous and often built on political and strategic bases, without popular or democratic legitimacy. The risks of dislocation of these states, of civil wars with their lot of atrocities and abuses, of interethnic unrest, which can spread across the continent and which can affect far more states than the original belligérants, are great. In order to avoid this, expanding the Alliance to newcomers will have several positive consequences. The first is to ensure the protection of these against the possible attack of a State wishing either to recover a territory it claims or to annex a country it considers to return to it. Another advantage is to stabilize the situation of new arrivals. Once integrated into the Alliance, internal stability will be imposed on them and they will be able to more easily request military intervention in the event of unrest. The third advantage of NATO’s enlargement lies in the territorial increase of the possibilities of projecting NATO forces. by

Thanks to NATO’s enlargement, stability will be ensured in a region where disturbances are likely to occur. Within the Alliance, democratic reforms can be encouraged, methods of conflict resolution through mediation and dialogue will be promoted, the consensus-based decision-making mode will be privileged, withdrawal to ethnocentrism will be avoided by a European approach in close collaboration with the American partner, which can avoid many ethnic conflicts.

NATO’s support should not conceal a reality often presented as an obstacle to a healthy and serene transatlantic relationship. I am talking about the European Security and Defence Policy. This policy must be ambitious, voluntary, and effective. A strong, influential foreign policy should be promoted in order to consolidate stability within the European Union. But we should not confuse the strengthening of Europe’s defence and competition with NATO. I am speaking here of a strengthening of the European pillar within NATO. Let us not forget the reasons that led to the creation of this organization. It was about protecting Europe and allowing the United States to have an ally beyond the Atlantic. There was, therefore, at the time of the creation of the Alliance an optique of collaboration between Europeans and Americans, some ensuring the security of others and these allowing them to prevent the expansionist desires of the Soviets from reaching Europe.

It should be noted that before the creation of NATO, the Europeans had created among themselves the Western Union which would become the Western European Union, a common security organization of the same type as NATO. It was the creation of the UEO that had persuaded the U.S. Senate to authorize negotiations for the creation of NATO, because they did not want to be the only depositary of European security.

The establishment of a European security organization was perceived as a willingness of Europeans to defend each other, which reassured American senators. It is in the same perspective that the transatlantic relationship should be considered at present. It is not a question for the European Union to act at the expense of the interests of its allies. It is not a question for the European Union to act outside of the United Nations. It is about reflecting on a way to use, in an optimal and coordinated way, the existing resources. by

A Europe with its own defence capabilities will not be a competitor but an ally of the United States. NATO is an alliance whose main military element is located on the other side of the Atlantic. A strong Europe is not the worm in the fruit of the transatlantic relationship but rather a strengthening of it. The Atlantic would be flanked by two strong military pillars, sharing the same values based on freedom, democracy and human rights, working together in close collaboration to make this region a stable, pacified region.

This reinforcement of the European security and defence policy is therefore in perfect accordance with the objectives of NATO. Two strong pillars collaborating frankly and safely within one whole, this is how NATO must evolve in order to be effective! It would be in the interest of the United States to have a strong partner. He would no longer be the depositary of international security and could share this role. It would also be in the interest of Europeans to demonstrate a willingness to be present on the international stage. by

Here, Mr. Speaker, are the few remarks I would like to make about this new geopolitical date, which must give rise to further changes in the way of considering the relations between States. It is no longer a question of building a military wall to protect itself from a massive attack, but of the progressive integration of new countries in order to participate in the stability of a Europe that has too often been the subject of unrest of which, as in all conflicts, the first victims are the populations.

Are there other groups that wish to designate speakers for the general discussion before I give the floor to Mr Tastenhoye? No to? Then I give the floor to Mr. Tastenhoye. Mr. Tastenhoye, you know that all speakers should stay on the subject. I have two ears to follow.

Mr. Speaker, I will ⁇ do that. Colleagues, as in the first round of NATO enlargement, the seven new member states were invited for membership negotiations for political rather than military considerations. The real significance of the new Navou enlargement is therefore primarily in the possibilities it offers to stimulate the political and economic development of the new Member States. Joining NATO will significantly increase the chances that Central and Eastern Europe will become a region of stable and pro-Western governments for the first time in their history. This is the analysis that was made in the International Spectator at the beginning of this year. I would like to discuss this with you a little more closely.

The NATO summit in Prague invited Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria to start negotiations on accession to the alliance. This summit would initially be mainly in the sign of the second round of enlargement. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 required a fundamental reconsideration of concepts, command structure and capabilities, making the meeting in Prague now known as a transformation summit. On these last aspects I will discuss later.

After the first expansion of the alliance at the Navotop in Madrid in 1997 was accompanied by the necessary discussions, it has gone without difficulties in Prague. When the U.S. Congress in September 2002 agreed to the invitation to seven new member states, there was a running race for those countries. As the dominant leader of NATO, the voice of the United States is decisive. For Americans, the contributions of the new member states to the fight against terrorism and their potential role in an attack on Iraq have played an important role in their decision.

For countries that have received an invitation, the period of accession negotiations is now finally behind. Parliaments, both in NATO countries and in new member states, will also have to ratify the accession. This is what we are working on now. We all sincerely hope that this ratification can take place today. That is our intense desire.

It is expected that around the same period the new Member States of the European Union – which will happen in a few months – will also join the Union. Unlike the first round of NATO expansion, there were hardly verbal threats from the Russian side against this new expansion. President Putin had already stated in October 2001 that if NATO continued to become more political than military, he would rethink his position on enlargement. The critics of expansion in the mid-1990s were therefore not right. Relations with Russia have not deteriorated, but have been significantly improved by the joint fight against terrorism and the start of the new NATO-Russia Council in May 2002. Their

In the decision on the accession of the seven new Member States, political considerations played a clearly more important role than military criteria. The new expansion further emphasizes the evolution of the alliance into a collective security organization. Indeed, in the 1990s NATO had already expanded its tasks to include conflict prevention and conflict management across Europe, including beyond the borders of the NATO treaty area. This, by the way, was contained in the new strategic concept adopted at the Washington Summit in April 1999. Now that the NATO Summit in Prague has accepted the fight against terrorism as a new official task, NATO has also become a global player. NATO is no longer a coalition by necessity, but a coalition by force.

Before looking at the new Member States, it is good to briefly review the experiences gained with the Member States of the first round of enlargement, namely Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. These experiences are not undividedly beneficial. This is especially true for Hungary, which so far has only fulfilled one-third of its promises, which has led to sharp criticism from NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson and NATO Chief Commander in Europe, General Joseph Ralston.

The new Hungarian Minister of Defense Juhász was even informally told at NATO headquarters that, if this had been possible, Hungary would have even been excluded from NATO. After an in-depth inventory of the Hungarian military force, Juhász then even came to the dark conclusion that the armed forces were less deployable than in 1990 after the fall of the Wall. In addition, Hungary was, in addition to Iceland that has no own army, the only NATO country that did not contribute to the joint fight against terrorism. The country spends 1.6% of its GDP on defense, which is well below NATO average. The Czech Republic has reduced its defence budget by ⁇ 3%, further delaying adjustments in the areas of interoperability, maintenance and logistics support. Only Poland has clearly demonstrated its determination to contribute as much as possible to NATO but also faces difficulties in implementing reforms.

It is also remarkable that due to the lack of sufficient knowledge of the English language, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic do not all fulfill their future functions in NATO. For now, these countries remain more consumers than producers of safety. The integration into the alliance of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary shows that there is a long and difficult process. So far, the prospects in the military field in these countries are not rosy. The political and economic benefits of membership seem to weigh for these countries more than bringing their armed forces in order. Since Poland and the Czech Republic became NATO members, foreign investment in these countries has already increased by 50%. Their

The Member States of the second round of enlargement also face difficulties, but thanks to the Membership Action Plan, MAP, they are in a better starting position than Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic at their accession. The expectations and requirements of the MAP can be grouped globally into two categories. Their

First, it is politically strategic. This includes criteria such as a functioning democratic political system and a market economy, treatment of minorities, border disputes or other disputes with neighboring countries and some other matters such as acceptance of the strategic concept of NATO.

Secondly, the military. This includes, for example, the military contribution to NATO, including the possibilities for interoperability and the establishment of democratic civil-military relations.

The military aspects can be roughly divided into, on the one hand, considerations relating to military capabilities and, on the other hand, considerations relating to the defence organization.

Within the framework of the Partnership for Peace and the associated Planning and Review Process, the new Member States have already gained experience in improving interoperability with Navotropops and in preparing their armed forces for membership. Like the Partnership for Peace, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) is based on the principle of self-differentiation. The new Member States have indeed been free to choose which elements of the MAP are best suited to their specific circumstances and priorities. However, as they do not yet fully meet the MAP criteria, the activities under that plan will continue during the accession negotiations.

However, there is also progress. For example, Estonia and Latvia have established good arrangements in the area of minorities on their territory. Lithuania and Slovakia have returned property to the Jewish community. Slovenia has significantly reduced the role of the State in the economy. Bulgaria has adopted key laws to strengthen export controls and the security of classified information. Romania has raised money for an anti-corruption agency.

By the way, corruption — which will not surprise you, colleagues — is one of the major problems for the new Member States. In the Transparency International Index, which indicates a rising ranking for corruption in a country, Estonia is in the twenty-eighth place. Slovenia ranked thirty-fourth, Lithuania thirty-eighth, Bulgaria forty-seventh. Slovakia and Latvia are both in fifty-nine place. Romania is in the 69th place after Zimbabwe. However, Hungary – thirty-one – Poland – forty-four – and the Czech Republic – forty-seven – are still struggling with corruption.

Corruption undermines public confidence and, therefore, democracy, which, of course, is a requirement for NATO membership. Corruption also opens the door to the influence of organized crime and creates an environment in which NATO members cannot trust that classified information will be protected.

I will subsequently give a brief overview of the individual situations in the new Member States.

Let me start with Estonia. Estonia largely meets the admission criteria. Estonia is considered to be able to sustain itself economically in the free market. Given its location, about 150 kilometers from St. Petersburg, it does not offer military advantages to NATO, but can cause strategic complications. The reform and restructuring of the military force is entirely in the sign of the accession to NATO. Additional expenditure has been made for the improvement of communication systems. In addition, a start has been made with the establishment of three light infantry reserve brigades and with the development plan of the Est Bat. Priority is also given to the continued modernization of training programmes and the formation of a rapid response capability. In addition, attention will be paid to improving NATO interoperability, combat power of units and infrastructure. About 60% of the Estonian population supports NATO membership.

Latvia meets the political criteria and is considered to be able to compete in the free market in the medium term. From a military point of view, however, that country has little to offer NATO. It is, like Estonia, difficult to defend because of its geographical location. While initially, due to socio-economic priorities, a very small percentage of GDP was spent on defence, in 1999 the Latvian Parliament decided to gradually increase the defence budget, thus now providing more funds to expand military resources and carry out restructuring in the military force. There is great corruption among government and security forces. A large majority of the population is in favor of the Navolid community. Special attention deserves the establishment of the Let Bat, which became operational this year. That regular combat battalion consists of four companies, two professional and two duty officers. Let Bat has NATO standard individual equipment and will form the core of the future military structure. The armed forces are also specialized in mines, cleaning teams, military police, medical units and diving units.

Lithuania also meets the political criteria and is able to sustain itself economically in the medium term. With its accession, the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad will be enclosed entirely by NATO member states. Given the neighboring Poland, the country can quickly be provided with reinforcements in the event of tension. Lithuanian expats who returned after the 1996 elections have a major influence on the reforms in the military force. Some of them have held high positions in the U.S. military. They introduced a new culture and American concepts into the Lithuanian armed forces.

The military has, among other things, ordered Stinger anti-aircraft missiles that are part of a $31 million contract. Unlike Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania initially did not have a majority of the population for membership. Meanwhile, the percentage of supporters has increased sharply. Their

Slovakia has a functioning market economy and can cope with competition in the medium term. The country missed the boat at the first expansion due to the rule of populist Vladimir Meciar, which did not meet NATO’s democratic criteria. Mikolas Dzurinda, however, won the elections in 1998 and was elected for a second term in September 2002. This opened the way for NATO membership. There is still concern about widespread corruption and poor law enforcement. For example, in Dzurinda’s first cabinet, five ministers had to resign due to corruption. Their

From a strategic point of view, Slovakia narrows the borders of NATO. It forms a bridge between NATO member states Poland and the Czech Republic on the one hand and with Hungary on the other. The importance of the country’s strategic position was evident during the crisis around Kosovo, when Austria closed its airspace to NATO and the alliance was dependent on Slovakia. In the field of civil control over the military force, Slovakia has made less progress than desired. Slovakia has a fully equipped army with relatively modern equipment. The reform plan, known as Model 2010, aims to make the armed forces even more flexible and interoperable with NATO units. Priority is given to rapidly deployable units, the professionalization of the army and the aim to spend 2% of GDP on defense. Their

Slovenia has made good progress in political and social reforms. The United States vetoed the country’s membership in the first round of enlargement. Although strategically Slovenia moves the borders of the alliance, it is a bridge over land between Italy and Hungary. The country can also serve as an operation area if problems arise in the former Yugoslavia. Slovenia still has several military weaknesses. The restructuring of the military force comes hard from the ground. Defence spending remains low and the quality of the military force leaves much to be desired. Slovenia is facing a huge challenge. Further professionalization, improvement of interoperability, logistical support, training, equipment and employability of units and restructuring of the command structures of the armed forces are necessary. For this year, 2003, a 12.4% increase in the defence budget is on the agenda.

Slovenia made a big mistake. After all, it has taken over the structure of the American military force for its small military force. This has resulted in a heavy organization. This must be re-adjusted. Even here, the social support for NATO membership is not so great. In the meantime, however, this support has increased strangely. Their

This is how I came to Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, the process of liberalization is approaching its completion. The 2001 elections went well. However, the country is struggling with poverty, corruption, patronage and little encouraging outlook for young people. It took until 1997 before the necessary reform of the military force was seriously started.

In the land force there is a slow but certain increase in the number of units that can operate alongside the armed forces of other countries. The Bulgarian air force is still in a deplorable state. However, the few MIG-29s will soon receive a structural, life extension and modernization program that will ensure that these Soviet-era aircraft will have another 15 years of life. Their

The Plan for the Organizational Development of the Armed Forces by the year 2004 — shortly Plan 2004 — provides for comprehensive troop reductions and rationalization and restructuring of the armed forces. A total of $700 million has been allocated for investments until 2007. By 2010, the military force must be composed entirely of volunteers. Bulgaria now has two deployable battalions. It hopes in 2004 to have a brigade operational for non-Article-5 operations.

I am coming to Romania. Romania, despite the support of a number of European member states, failed membership in the first round of enlargement due to a U.S. veto. It is now the most pro-American country of the new member states. It ⁇ ins close ties with the United States. This is mainly due to September 11th. Romania declared itself de facto a NATO ally. The Romanian government also responded to the U.S. wish to exclude U.S. military personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Their

Romania is the largest new Member State in terms of area and size of the armed forces. Strategically, the country forms a connection between North, Central and South-East Europe. In addition, Romania provides access to the Black Sea and to more than 1,000 navigable kilometers of the Danube. The membership of Romania – as well as that of Bulgaria – also ends the isolated geographical position of Greece and Turkey in the region. Of the 12 candidate countries to join the European Union, Romania has the lowest GDP, the highest inflation, the least foreign investment and the most corruption. Their

The country does not have a real market economy. Reforms have been partially reversed. Corruption is blooming. This is especially the case with the privatization of state-owned companies. In July 1999, the Romanian Armed Forces Restructuring and Modernisation Program was adopted, which forms the basis for fundamental reforms and modernizations of the armed forces.

Mr Tastenhoye, you exceeded the 30-minute speaking time.

I was working on the last country to join NATO.

If you need the same speaking time for each country, it will take another 3 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I have almost finished my presentation on Romania.

I have taken the line of the future new Member States. I have drawn up an overview of what they have to offer to NATO. Based on what can be found in the International Spectator, I made an analysis. With this, I have made my contribution to this debate and thank you for your generous attention.