Proposition 50K1768

Projet de loi portant assentiment à l'Accord entre l'Union économique belgo-luxembourgeoise et la République fédérale islamique des Comores concernant l'encouragement et la protection reciproques des investissements, fait à Bruxelles le 18 mai 2001.

General information ¶

Submitted by

The Senate

Submission date

March 12, 2002

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union Comoros international agreement international cooperation investment

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen Vooruit LE PS | SP Open Vld MR

Abstained from voting

N-VA FN

Party dissidents ¶

• Alfons Borginon (Open Vld) abstained from voting.
• Leen Laenens (Groen) abstained from voting.
• Jacques Lefevre (LE) abstained from voting.
• Dirk Van der Maelen (Vooruit) abstained from voting.

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Discussion ¶

May 23, 2002 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

This issue was discussed on 8 May. In fact, it was not so much about the concrete dossier, but about the general perspective. Mr Decroly has determined that this is the 38th text in this direction. There is always an acceleration of the current in such files. He noted that this has triggered a stream of protest. He connects this with the neoliberal globalization of which he is a fierce opponent. He says that this does not guarantee the public interest. I quote: “A shift from the situation where private enterprises are not subject to any restriction and the State, on the other hand, is faced with countless restrictions.”At the end of his speech, Mr Decroly asks for a policy note on all this matter and a debate on this issue. Their

Ms. Drion declares on behalf of Agalev-Ecolo that it is always about contracts with a weaker country. She also calls for reflection on this issue. It refers to the WTO, which is currently under discussion, and to a resolution on Doha adopted by Belgium.

I have asked myself to hold a discussion on this subject. It cannot be that one claims to be a globalist, while one simply approves these things. These are often contracts with leaders of a country, who do not directly represent the interests of their own country.

Mrs Leen Laenens joined these interventions. On behalf of the Minister, reference has been made to the UNCTAD, which promotes such situations. They also pointed out, on behalf of the government, that these are mixed agreements in which the regions must actually be involved. They also declare that it is about the protection of Belgian companies and not always about multinational companies, but also about SMEs.

Mr Chevalier, as chairman of the committee, requested that attention be paid to the fact that developing countries are often asking parties. He referred to the government statement. There was a vote that adopted the text with 7 votes against 1 and 1 abstinence.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to anticipate the next point, which has the same type of report.

Mr. Speaker, on the issue of investments abroad – my intervention also applies to the next draft law concerning Armenia – we are faced with a question that deserves a technical analysis and an in-depth political debate.

In fact, this debate should take place in the Senate since this assembly is in charge as a priority to conduct the reflection on international treaties. Unfortunately, in this case as in others, we had to find that our fellow senators studied the issue a little quickly.

As recently stated in the report, most of the least advanced countries, or more precisely their governments, are themselves seekers of foreign investment, at any cost, i.e. without social and environmental legislation to be enforced by investors.

It seems to me that, on the other hand, organized civil societies in these countries are not as demanding of this kind of unconditional investment.

These are bilateral, unbalanced treaties concluded between the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union and weaker countries that obviously do not threaten our achievements. But this must interpell us — there has also been a mobilization around multilateral investment agreements that ultimately did not take place — because this type of bilateral agreement draws down the social and environmental standards to which we are attached.

Yesterday, in the framework of public procurement, the government precisely demonstrated that at the European level it has been able to assert the importance of recognizing social and environmental criteria. Within the framework of these bilateral agreements, the government should also be at the forefront. by

The Minister of Foreign Affairs promised our Senate colleagues an assessment of the Belgian foreign investment policy. In the committee, my colleague Ms. Laenens and I have called for an in-depth political debate on this issue. We will abstain today.

We want, on the one hand, that parliamentarians receive technical information from relevant officials on this type of bilateral agreements and, on the other hand, an in-depth political debate with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and our Senate colleagues to define guidelines for Belgian investments abroad, in reference to the government declaration, which highlights compliance with the fundamental standards of the International Labour Organization and sustainable development to frame our economic relations.

Madame Drion, I suppose you will return to your speech for the second project that deals with the same subject.

Mr. Speaker, part of my speech concerns, indeed, the two projects and a second part concerns more specifically the agreement on the Comoros, one of the two treaties that are presented to us today. I thank Ms. Drion for clarifying, contrary to what, unfortunately, was said in a committee, that the government coalition agreement does not involve any form of commitment of anyone on this policy in terms of a transnational investment regime.

It includes, in particular, commitments on the future role of the Ducroire National Office or SBI in supporting risky exports and a series of commitments on compliance with the precautionary principle as well as social, human and environmental rights in the context of the evolution of international trade rules.

That being said, I would like to bring some background and general analysis on this type of agreement that I find extremely harmful and ⁇ dangerous.

Bilateral agreements on advanced advanced investment can be called the locomotive of the neoliberal globalization, which has been the subject of major controversy for several months. What is this transnational investment scheme? This is probably more important and even more dangerous than the recent evolution of the regime of international trade, since in order to sell a good, it is necessary first to define it as a commodity before launching it into the commercial circuit. This is all the issue of what is happening within the WTO.

Dear colleagues, if you do not want to listen to what Mr. Decroly has to say, I would be grateful for you going to talk out of this hall. In respect for the speakers, I ask you to remain quite silent.

To sell a good, therefore, it must be inserted into the commercial circuit, but before – we are now at the forefront of strictly commercial policy – it must have been produced, packaged, packaged, distributed, which requires an investment. In this regard, we are within the entire scope defined by the Transnational Investment Scheme. Then, it is important to have the possibility of repatriating the profits of operations thus carried out. This matter is also part of the scope of the agreements on which we are busy working. by

The problems posed by these agreements lie in three or four main points that I will summarize briefly.

1 of 1. This type of agreement gives transnational corporations a power never attained against states, a power that goes so far as to allow them to impose, to states that would hinder them in their will to maximize their profits, significant financial sanctions through "produced" judgments by arbitral bodies that are neither judicial nor state.

2 of 2. These bilateral investment agreements (BITs) legally prevent states from protecting public interests such as health, environment, labour rights and human rights, and even from protecting their public services. Investment abroad has now become the first locomotive of the purchase of profitable public services by private powers, and therefore of privatization.

These ABIs are also today the preferred instrument of relocation techniques. On this point, I do not share the opinion of Ms. Drion, who in her analysis indicates that this type of agreement does not involve any annoyance or risk for our own economies. This is generally true, but on certain aspects such as relocation, for example — this type of agreement promotes and amplifies real risks of boomerang effects. Consider, in particular, what Swissair has achieved through mechanisms governing direct overseas investment: Swissair had relocated its accounting to its subsidiary Airline Financial Support Services India in Bombay, and this has allowed a series of arrangements that we are talking about today in a certain commission of inquiry where I unfortunately do not have the right — Mr. Langendries — to question prominent financial figures who come to explain how this kind of affair has arisen and how it can be performing.

3 of 3. These bilateral investment agreements resurrect a multilateral investment agreement that had been rejected and condemned by that parliament during 1998. This is also important because when all these bilateral investment agreements have been terminated, by network effect, in fact, they will have reconstructed the multilateral investment agreement. Therefore, the problems ⁇ at the time about AMI will reappear in favor of these multiple ABI in network. The AMI and ABI have the same objectives, the same community of views on the supremacy of economic, financial and commercial interests over the general interest, the same striking disproportion between the obligations imposed on States and the very great freedoms guaranteed to private enterprises, the same broad understanding of the concept of investment.

I remember hearing Mr. Di Rupo said here in 1998: "Attention, we have some reluctance to AMI; we want only foreign direct investment to be defined as AMI scope." Dear friends, we are far farther with ABI since bilateral investment agreements allow to govern even investments that are not related to trade. Therefore, we find ourselves in a much broader framework even than what was feared at the time of the AMI by a number of representatives who, in the end, finally won a majority in this parliament. After the cancellation of the participation of France by Mr. Jospin in October 1998, the Belgian Senate also requested to stop the costs regarding the preparation of this AMI by Belgium.

The same type of protection granted to investment and the same gaps, as Ms Drion recalled a moment ago, on issues such as the relationship between these bilateral agreements on investments and international conventions such as the ILO, the conventions governing human rights or the rights of the child, the major treaties to safeguard the planet. We are talking about it in the entire press today. When one sees that the Kyoto Agreement, essential in the field of environmental protection, is in no way taken back as a condition, as a framework, as a regulation in the field of transnational investment policy, when one sees other priorities stated earlier by Mr. Di Rupo, while he was in charge of this matter during the previous legislature, when it is seen that, like yesterday’s AMI, today’s ABI make no reference, even symbolic, even in a preliminary text or in an appendix, to the OECD Guiding Principles for Transnational Companies, it is realized that ABI are direct line cousins of the Multilateral Investment Agreement.

I come to the conclusions on this general aspect of my speech before coming to more precise considerations on the agreement with the Comores that will be submitted to you. Governments have been eagerly referring, for several years, to the goal of incorporating “social and environmental clauses” into the ABI. But what should rather be envisaged today are possibly economic and financial clauses to these ILO agreements, human rights, Kyoto, Agenda 21, Rio Convention and others, agreements that must be primary, which must remain the foundation and the basis of what is being done including in terms of trade or financial exchanges. If the business world wishes to be offered new opportunities to expand its business and optimize its opportunities to make profit, it may eventually propose that financial or economic clauses be incorporated into existing international conventions on economic and social rights, in particular. And do not try to bypass them by ABI.

It is necessary to reaffirm, dear colleagues, this Charter, adopted in 1974, whose terms are very clear, and to retake the notions that were advanced there.

Mr Decroly, Mr Willems would like to intervene.

Dear colleagues, I would like to remind you that we are in the general discussion. I don’t want to encourage anyone, but each member can talk for 30 minutes!

I would like to take the floor later.

I have come up with pistes to find an alternative to these bilateral investment agreements.

First, in my opinion, such bilateral investment agreements, wholly independent of the legal body of existing international law, in particular in the field of social and environmental rights, have no reason to exist.

Secondly, it is necessary that the United Nations Charter of 1974 on the economic rights and duties of States be the heart, the center of the reflection of today and tomorrow on this transnational investment regime and its possible evolution.

What does this charter say? I would like to remind you of two paragraphs. “Every nation has the inalienable right to regulate foreign investments and exercise its control over investments.” “No state can be compelled to reserve a preferential treatment to foreign investments.” However, this latter seems to me to have to deserve, in the hierarchy of norms, not a vaguely peripheral status, beautiful texts which are remembered once every 50 years at anniversary protocol ceremonies, but that of the backbone of reflection and possible changes in terms of trade regime or investment regime.

Thirdly, dear colleagues, it would still be necessary to take care to heal very quickly from his ratification rage the rainbow of the Lord. by Simonet. There is, indeed, a real ratification rage in the way the rainbow has been conducting bilateral investment agreements since the beginning of this legislature. I refer here to pure, simple, objective and undisputed figures, Mr. Speaker. Today, we have in Belgium a transnational investment scheme that is defined by 67 bilateral investment agreements.

Seventy-seven bilateral investment agreements have been ratified since 1964. Of these 67 agreements — believe me or not — 39 have been ratified since October 1999. This means that we are at a ratification rate, by our parliamentary assembly, greater than one per month. This also means that in two and a half years, with this majority, more has been done than in the last 35 years in terms of ratification of bilateral agreements. I think there is a real rage here and it is time to treat it with a parliamentary and governmental moratorium on any form of negotiation and ratification of such agreements.

I would now like to return more concretely, in the second and last part of my speech, to specific remarks on the agreement that is submitted to us, a bilateral agreement with the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comores. It was examined very quickly by our colleagues senators and adopted, unfortunately, unanimously. There is a lot to say about it! Basically, in the Comores, we do not know Belgium or maybe we know it through a fact that is not very resounding, that is, the role that one of our nationals, a mercenary named Bob Denard, could have played there and who, on several occasions in recent years, has illustrated himself in the Comores by his very active participation in coup d’état.

We definitely have something else to do in the Comores to reverse our blason than to conclude this type of bilateral investment agreements. No triumphalism at all. “The negotiations were initially based on the basic text of the Belgoluxembourgeois Economic Union (French version) which was accepted in its entirety (these seven words in majuscules!) by the head of the delegation of the Comores.” What does this triumphalism mean? For whom are they taking?

Why a deal with the Comores? I tried to decort the text of the exposition of the reasons to understand it.

What is interesting is that the exhibition of motifs explicitly acknowledges that in reality there is very little foreign investment and no Belgian investment in the Comores.

It is not tomorrow the day before that it will change, if you read the explanation of the reasons. Assessing the general environment of the Comorian private sector, the Government's Motive Exposure says, I quote: "This environment is totally ingrat: inadequate legal, administrative and regulatory framework, inappropriate tax system, lack of private sector support and management structure, high level of domestic costs, non-existent information system for operators, very restrictive financing and credit system, very narrow domestic market, etc." With an exhibition like that, any candidate investor will do anything except invest in the Comores!

So why are there such bilateral investment agreements? I think the reason is also found in the exposition of the reasons because, obviously for the government, I always quote it: "This is the first agreement of this kind that the country concludes with a third state. It is therefore, primarily for political reasons, a reason for great satisfaction.” “The conclusion of an investment agreement therefore has more political than economic importance.” This is the least that can be said, and I think that the fundamental goal is probably to incite the leaders of the Comores as well as those of other least advanced countries to abandon the protection of their internal market and to promote unlimited openness to privatization. This is the political goal that is pursued and this is what we should fight, as yesterday we fought the same goal pursued by the Multilateral Investment Agreement.

On the bilateral agreement itself and its current arrangement, I would like to draw your attention to a number of articles. First on the preamble which seems to me to show clearly how much this alleged bilateralism is merely a facade. Read again this passage: "... willing to strengthen their cooperation by creating favorable conditions for the realization of investments by nationals of one of the Contracting Parties on the territory of the other." Are you thinking about investments in Belgium? Is this what it is about? Are these bilateral agreements? Ms. Drion has just said that these are imbalanced agreements but there is not even balance or bilateralism. It is just a facade.

Unfortunately, the Minister of Internal Affairs cannot reassure me. I would like to point out that on March 27, last year, I asked the government for precise explanations on some concrete points, both political and technical, of its policy in this matter. This is the second time I will probably not have an explanation. I am not concerned with the person of Mr. by Duquesne. But this example also illustrates a malfunction of our parliament, on a series of problems, in its mission of control of the government, which allows itself to answer nothing to it.

The question I wanted to ask regarding Article 1(2)(d) is the question of the possible competence of the Communities with regard to the scope of this bilateral agreement on copyright investments, and in particular in the audiovisual sector. Why are communities not involved in this type of discussion? Why are they not co-signatory? Why should their parliament not ratify this type of agreement? I think there is something to ask about the federal organization of our country.

I now come to the heart of the problem and to the type of protection granted to these investments, in particular by Article 3. All direct and indirect investments, whether related to trade or not, are included in the scope of this Agreement. When we read carefully what is called “investments” in the text, we find that it is all types of assets, without any form of restriction or limit. This is an extremely broad scope of application.

It is prohibited "any unjustified or discriminatory measure that could hinder, in law or in fact, the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or liquidation of such investments". I draw your attention to the extremely broad nature of this type of definition. What does "any unjustified or discriminatory measure" mean? In the logic of the agreement, I can still understand that any discriminatory measure is punishable. But it is indicated “any unjustified or discriminatory measure.” Who will then judge what is unjustified? This is one of the substantive issues that I will come back to recently when I talk to you about conflict arbitration.

Article 10 of this bilateral investment agreement shows that the combination of the clause of national treatment and the clause of the most favoured nation allows foreign investors to have more favourable conditions than local investors to value their investments. by

This means, as Ms. Drion once said, that we are obviously in a leonine diet, in a unbalanced diet. In fact, the combination of these two clauses and their interaction, their simultaneity create the conditions for this type of derivative to be possible.

Article 4 is about sanctions. This is obviously one of the most spectacular articles of this type of agreement. I invite you to review the sanctions and how they are defined. Article 4 paragraph 2. It is specified that "these sanctions will be adequate and effective compensation" to be paid by the state that would have hindered the transnational company. This has already occurred. I have already illustrated this case in my speech on 27 March, with the case “ETHYL v Canada”. by

But what does an adequate and effective compensation mean? I note that point 3 gives an element of answer: "The amount of compensation will correspond to the actual value of the investments concerned on the eve of the day when the measures were taken or made public", namely the privative or restrictive measures of ownership that the transnational company would consider as sticks in its wheels. by

Therefore, I ask the question of how it is possible that a company complaining about measures that a State could take, is either in a position to claim damages in the amount of several tens of millions of U.S. dollars, for example, whereas if the same company established in our country relocates, we experience all the evil of the world, in our capacity as a State, to obtain from this company — I am not even talking about damages and interests — that it refunds us simply and only the public subsidies it would have received to develop its activities here. This is a matter of reflection, it strikes the sense of justice.

Furthermore, Article 7 provides for the way in which conflicts can be settled as regards the interpretation of the agreement or as regards differences of interest between the State party and the investor who would have invested in its territory. The bilateral agreement you may be adopting specifies: “Investors can take advantage of the arrangements that are most favourable to them.” This means that the provisions of the ILO, Kyoto and all those I have talked about so far are obviously considered subsidiary. They go to the second rank and, let’s say clearly, to the trap.

It is interesting to see — and it is an evolution of the rainbow that seems to me extremely negative — that in some agreements passed under previous legislatures, this type of disposition did not exist. On the contrary, it was said, even if it was somewhat hypocritical, that the national laws of the host country of the investment must in any case be respected. Here, not at all! It is said that the investor can choose: in any case, those that are more favourable to him can serve as a reference in the arbitration of the possible litigation between that investor and the State party with which he is in conflict.

I conclude, Mr. Speaker, by referring to the settlement of disputes which is obviously one of the nodal points of the problem that concerns me and which, I believe, concerns also a certain number of members of our assembly. In the settlement of disputes provided for in Article 9, paragraphs 2 and 3, again, it is the investor who chooses the judicial or arbitral instance, instance which otherwise excludes any internal administrative or judicial appeal. In addition, it can choose an instance that has nothing onusien or state-based. He may go before judges, in any case persons who are called judges but who form, in fact, panels constituted as arbitration bodies, on the basis of the exclusively commercial, financial or economic competence of their members. I do not consider them as judges and, in any case, as an arbitration mechanism, it is everything except jurisdictional, everything except fair. These are fake courts and fake judges, experts in fact, of which one cannot imagine a single moment, dear colleagues, that by inserting a social or environmental clause into all this, you will alter their general reference framework and their decisions. It is unthinkable for a moment that such experts will be overwhelmed by an environmental or social clause over a system generally focused on investment protection, which has only this purpose and which, obviously, given its content and given their competence as trade and financial experts, will likely remain their supreme criterion of judgment.

Furthermore, do you think that the costs of this type of arbitration proceedings are borne by investors? No to! A shared burden between investors and states? It is simply the responsibility of the state. You see that such investment agreements are absolutely leoninous and completely unfair.

To conclude, I think we should very quickly have a real debate, between us but also, if possible, with Mr. Michel of whom I hope he will soon return to us in full form, or with Mrs. Neyts whose attributes are even more prominent in this field.

I hope that this debate can take place because we cannot continue to accept that agreements completely unbalanced and in total contraction with the statements we hold during various demonstrations or public debates continue to be endorsed here as if nothing was.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, as colleague Drion pointed out, we would like to state with restraint that our demand for a well-founded political debate is not non-binding. After all, in order to ⁇ sustainable development, social, ecological and economic standards must be implemented equally, at a time when a policy is concretized, such as when drafting and concluding international agreements.

Yesterday, Director Töpfer presented in Brussels the important UNEP report Geo-3. We are lucky because we still have a choice, or rather, we have no choice, because the choice is limited between a pessimistic or an optimistic scenario. Ecologists are optimists; we are convinced that it can be better and therefore we choose the optimistic scenario. The optimistic scenario states that there is no way beyond the path of sustainable development. Only, he argues, the political courage to carry it out is lacking, because even in an optimistic scenario, the CO 2 concentration will not stabilize until 2050. For example, I can give countless examples to show that the treaties are too economically unilaterally drawn up to realize that optimistic scenario in the next 50 years.

I therefore hope that we will be able to conduct the debate, which we have repeatedly requested, including in the resolution that we all approved here and referred to by colleague Drion. In that resolution, we proposed that national and regional parliaments should be more involved in the negotiations through a broad democratic debate involving social partners and civil society, with a view to determining the positions that the government will defend where appropriate.

We need to conduct that debate in order to link trade to sustainable links, to get out of the impasse of current development, the impasse in which the earth sits right into chaos, and to enter not only more environment, but above all also more justice.

More than 1 billion people do not have access to drinking water. With 20% of the population, we consume 90% of what can be consumed. This should be used to protect investments. The Comores and Belgium, they will both be better off. That should determine the agenda of the twenty-first century much more.

Mr. Speaker, I will be very brief. We also believe that international agreements should not be blindly fulfilled. They need to be corrected socially. We are also for a debate. Much of what I have just heard from colleague Decroly is clear nonsense to me. I explain myself more closely. A few months ago I happened to be in Armenia through the Council of Europe. I have talked about this with the policymakers, but also with civil society. They are explicitly requesting parties to this Investment Protection Agreement. They also establish — I think rightly — that precisely those countries with which such agreements do not exist today are very poor and that there is no drinking water and electricity. Through these agreements, it is intended to raise the standard of living in those countries. They are clearly asking party and we are going to do so. It is intended that our Belgian investors contribute to raising local employment and living standards. We will definitely vote in favour of these agreements.

Since then I have been the rapporteur, now I have my own position. This late hour should not make us hide...

What do you mean by this late hour?

I will formulate it differently. The mood that prevails here and the feeling among the colleagues do not allow to deny that this is a very important matter for the Third World and for sustainable development, quid that one may not always have to get his great equality in an all-time discourse, since the essential thing has already been said in the committee and also in my report.

Contrary to what Mr. Goris says, Mr. Decroly has not said any nonsense here, he has a point. In summary, it comes down to this: one can impossible, without debate and without policy note, simply steamlessly, as one says in Antwerp, to sign and sign all these treaties, and at the same time to say that one is an antiglobalist. That cannot be, that is an inconsistency as large as a house.

For this reason, and for purely principled reasons, apart from the concrete of this file, I voted against in the committee with conviction.

Mr. Speaker, I will not, unless you insist and although it relates to the next project relating to Armenia ...

Would you like to discuss both projects at the same time? I agree with you, since the interventions of Mr. Decroly and Willems and other colleagues are dealing with both projects.

Mr. Speaker, I thank you for your permission, but if you want me to intervene for Armenia, I am at the disposal of the Parliament.

The House does not doubt for a moment your availability, Mr. Minister!

Bilateral agreements on the encouragement and mutual protection of investments are not liberalizing agreements. Their scope relates to the promotion and protection of investments as well as the elimination of any discriminatory regulations detrimental to investments. by

Thus, these agreements offer a double added value. First, they contribute to the creation of a stable framework for foreign investment, which makes the country in question more attractive to the IDF. Since the recent Monterrey Consensus (International Conference on Development Financing) gave the IDF an important role as an instrument of development financing, the relevance of these agreements for development is clear. This is why UNCTAD organizes conferences that allow a number of developing countries to conclude bilateral investment agreements. In the framework of these conferences, workshops and seminars are organized on the investment climate as well as on the substance and content of these agreements. by

Second, bilateral investment agreements provide legal certainty for companies, often SMEs who wish to invest abroad. Of course, this legal certainty is part of compliance with national legislation. For our country, these are mixed treaties and treaties of the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, which means that in addition to the federal authorities, the regions and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg are involved. by

The establishment of bilateral investments and the different stages to be undertaken (country choice, negotiations, signing of the agreement, parliamentary procedure and entry into force) are carried out in a transparent manner with all relevant partners (delegates from my department, regions and professional organisations).

A working group meets each year, publishes a detailed report on the objectives and sets the agenda for the following year.

The request to conclude bilateral investment agreements comes not only from the authorities of the Belgoluxembourg Economic Union but also from developing countries themselves. Negotiations on the conclusion of bilateral investment agreements have accelerated. Over the past eight months, negotiations have been started with Yugoslavia, Uganda, Ghana, Syria, Russia and Iran. This is part of a general trend of increasing economic interdependence.

Since the late 1980s, negotiations and the conclusion of bilateral investment agreements have seen a great rise — currently, ⁇ 3,000 bilateral treaties, according to CNUCED sources — which has created a certain homogeneity of basic texts even in the least developed countries. Therefore, most of the internationally recognised basic principles in the field of investment promotion and protection — national treatment and the most favoured nation clause, free transfer of invested capital, internationally recognised clause concerning the settlement of disputes — are contained in virtually all texts, as well as in that of the Comoros.

To conclude, I will point out that with regard to the inclusion of a social and environmental clause in the text of the bilateral investment agreements of the Belgoluxembourg Economic Union, our country plays a precursor role within the European Union. It is in fact the first country to have developed, together with its partners, regions and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, a detailed and legally relevant text on this subject.

Mr. Speaker, we must not be mistaken: it is not the least developed countries that demand the most to have this type of investment protection, but rather the Western investors. However, there is no need for bilateral investment agreements so that these investors can already do a lot of things in different countries. They are assisted by various public bodies — SBI, Office du Ducroire, etc. These bilateral investment agreements are, compared to provisions already existing in the head of public authorities, at least superfluous. I even said before that they were harmful.

On the other hand, Mr. Goris, I would like to answer that it is also a little biased to think that in these countries, without bilateral investment agreements, nothing exists. About the Comores, I refer to an article published no later than last month in "Le Monde Diplomatique". It describes an extremely important activity, precisely in the financial field, developed by a certain M. Ali Amadi, who federates savings funds that bring together thousands of members and inject millions in the form of small loans accessible to all.

We also talk in this article of associations that develop family planning and engage school establishments and the state to address sexual education or, in the network of women, associations that work on literacy, health, economic initiation, law, etc.

This is the real investment in which Belgium should take part, it would in any case be more than what it does today since it has no form of concrete investment in this area, except a small pharmacy of "veterinarians without borders". There is a lot to be done, including financially. As I just said, there are projects and they need to be encouraged. I think the Comoros do not need investors like those encouraged by this agreement. Those can already work a lot and, if they wish, in the Comores as well as elsewhere, they can already have a very wide range of manoeuvre without further aggravating the inequality of the terms of the trade by legally codified measures, as rough as those you are preparing to adopt. This is what I would like to add as a reflection. I hope that the debate will take place because it is not enough to ask for it.

Regarding the social and environmental clauses promised by the Minister for months and years — as by his predecessor in the previous legislature — I find that he speaks of them in the present. I’m sorry, but we need to talk about it in the future. In addition, Mr. Mr. Michel, asked by Mr. Mahoux on May 2, 2001 in the Senate, already spoke of these developments while recognizing himself that they were somewhat illusory from the moment when one accepts the principle that no investor in general can be penalized.

The coordination of the social and environmental clauses that would appear in our model text is according to Mr. Michel needed, not only with those of European partners but also with those of other economic or financial entities such as the EU. They do not necessarily have a social and environmental clause. What needs to be changed is the principle of the supremacy of investment protection. It is the overthrow of a hierarchy of standards that puts investment and its protection above everything else. I think that social and environmental clauses are not needed in investment treaties, but possibly financial and economic clauses, treaties on workers’ rights, environmental rights, human rights, women’s rights and children’s rights.

Mr. Speaker, 09.15 just like Mr. Goris, I also had the opportunity two weeks ago, as part of an OSCE mission in Armenia and Georgia. I can confirm what Mr. Goris says. I have had contacts with the business world, politicians and civil society. They are the requesting party to such treaties. The monthly salary of a worker in Armenia is currently 1,000 francs or 25 dollars. People there earn $1 a day. They demand no better than that there would be investments.

They also seek a strong approach to Europe. In this regard, I am happy to be able to announce here as an Antwerp resident that another Antwerp entrepreneur, Freddy Van Gaever, will open an airline between the Armenian capital Erevan and Brussels within a few weeks. This line continues to the United States of America. An Antwerp man thus contributes to the unlocking of the so-called South Caucasus, namely the territory of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. I am very happy that Antwerp once again sends his sons across that part of the world.