Proposition 50K1679

Projet de loi portant assentiment au Traité de Nice modifiant le traité de l'Union européenne, les traités instituant les Communautés européennes et certains actes connexes, aux Protocoles 1, 2 et 3 et à l'Acte final, faits à Nice le 26 février 2001.

General information ¶

Submitted by

The Senate

Submission date

Dec. 13, 2001

Official page

Visit

Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

European Union European integration international agreement

Voting ¶

Voted to adopt

Groen CD&V Vooruit Ecolo PS | SP Open Vld MR

Voted to reject

FN VB

Party dissidents ¶

• Vincent Decroly (Ecolo) voted to reject.
• François Dufour (PS | SP) voted to reject.
• Richard Fournaux (MR) voted to reject.
• Dirk Pieters (Vooruit) abstained from voting.

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Discussion ¶

March 27, 2002 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, colleagues, the presence of the members at this plenary session is apparently inversely proportional to the importance of the draft that we are discussing, the Nice Treaty. It is not the largest European treaty in 50 years, but it is still an important treaty. After the treaties of the CECA, of Rome, of Maastricht and of Amsterdam, we now come to the Treaty of Nice. There are so few members present here, ⁇ because we have already discussed it thoroughly in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and because much has already been written and said over the past six months.

The Treaty of Nice was approved in the committee with ten votes against three, and will also be able to boast here, I suppose, with a very broad majority although it will not be an enthusiastic majority. From the very beginning, we have observed in various meetings that the Nice Treaty has remained below the standard in many points. However, we will approve it with more than just resignation, because in the meantime a few important things have happened, in particular the Laeken Declaration and the convention convention. In the light of a dynamic continuum of European integration, the Treaty of Nice should be regarded as a milestone.

At our committee meeting on 12 March 2002, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Michel, drew our attention to the important aspects of the Nice Treaty, the positive points. He has announced an interesting initiative, namely the foundation of what he has called a speaker’s office, a kind of speaker’s corner. In this context, interested European and national parliamentarians and – why not – also members of the regional parliaments could act as pioneers, as educators – not as demagogues – in all sorts of circles interested in the progress of European integration. Persons involved in the Forum, which was established in the framework of the Convention and has begun its work, may also be able to take part in it. I think this is a very good initiative. I hope that some members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and of the Advisory Committee on European Affairs will be found willing to cooperate.

The discussion in our committee was — as I said — extensive and thorough. Most colleagues have listed the pros and cons. One has put more emphasis on the positive aspects, the other more on the negative aspects.

For instance, Mr Simonet mainly listed the positive aspects, and many of them you find very well summarized in the report. Mr Simonet pointed out, among other things, the ceiling in the composition of the Commission, which is an advantage. The shadow side is that this ceiling can rise to 27. It will then be decided how to reduce the number of commissioners.

The appointment of the chairman of the committee can no longer be subject to a veto, so that the pericles surrounding Mr Dehaene’s candidacy may fortunately not be repeated. This is

The presence of members of the House today is inversely proportional to the interest of the subject we are discussing now. The Treaty of Nice constitutes an important stage in the history of European unification.

The Treaty of Nice was the subject of extensive discussions within the committee com pétente and the bill was adopted by 10 votes against 3. The vote took place without much enthusiasm as the Nice Treaty still contains a number of gaps. Since its conclusion, a number of progress has been made at European level. In this regard, I think in particular of Laeken and the convention.

At the committee meeting on March 12, Minister Michel mainly highlighted the positive aspects. He also announced the creation of a kind of speakers corner, within which parliamentarians will be able to act as educators and explain European integration. The debate in the committee was circumstantial. Both positive and negative aspects were addressed. by Mr. Simonet mainly mentioned the achievements. ll drew attention to the maximum number of members permitted for the composition of the committee, which is set at 27. A solution has been found for the revision of the vote weighting for the abuse of the veto right, for a closer collaboration at all levels, except for the defence. The qualified majority will now apply to 30 additional cases. There is still a long way to go in many aspects, especially in the fields of police and judicial cooperation, tax and social policy and immigration, as the majority is still required in KAMER -4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE uiteraard positive. In addition is one solution found for herweging van de stemmen en heeft men een versoepeling ingevoerd voor de formule van de nauwere samenwerking. It is also not clearly applicable to the foreign policy, if there is no vetorecht possible. Helaas is of nauwere samenwerking nog steeds niet van toepassing op het defensiebeleid. Ook in verband met de eerbiediging van de mensenrechten in de mogelijke schending ervan is voorzien in een niet onbelangrijke alarmprocedure.

The qualified majority has been extended to 30 additional cases. The co-decision of the European Parliament has also been extended, but we all know that unanimity still applies, in particular, to the harmonisation of fiscal and social legislation and to large parts of judicial and police cooperation, as well as to problems related to European migration.

The Treaty of Nice is therefore a gruyère cheese, but I have already stated during the committee discussion that enlargement is better with a Treaty of Nice than without a Treaty of Nice.

We are still on the brink of the failed referendum in Ireland. It is, of course, quite paradoxical that a country with a relatively limited population — the Treaty of Nice is in fact rejected in Ireland with a small majority of several tens of thousands of votes — can block such a mechanism within a Union of 350 and tomorrow ⁇ 450 or 500 million inhabitants. With regard to Belgium, this would be theoretically also possible, since a decision of one of our subparliaments, of the German-speaking Community or of the Brussels Capital Region, for example, could put the whole of Europe into an impasse.

I would like to add two or three considerations to this. First, the Nice Treaty is extremely complex. It is very difficult to explain to people. If you were to ask people on the street what the Nice Treaty is, you would get few meaningful answers. If you would go into the content, you may not get any meaningful answer. For example, there is the “decision making” chapter. The way decision-making takes place consists of three levels, which may be applied cumulatively. Their

First, there is the qualified majority, where the threshold of majority has been raised to slightly more than 73 percent. We still ignore this; this has also been applied in the past.

Secondly, every decision must be approved by a majority of Member States. I also leave this further out of consideration. That is still quite simple.

Third, however, — I thought the biggest shadow side of the Nice Treaty — is the so-called demographic clause. Every decision must be made and supported by a majority of the European people. That majority is set at 62 percent. That means now coincidentally that Britain, Germany and France, which together make up 41 percent of the population, actually have a de facto veto right in all problems, if they evoke the demographic clause.

When Mr. Verhofstadt returned from Nice, he said here that the interests of the small countries were addressed in Nice. On certain points he was not wrong. He said that a small country like Belgium has come out even better from the negotiations compared to other small countries such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, which are ces matières.

This treaty is basically a sort of Gruyère cheese but I personally believe that an EU enlargement with this treaty is better than without a treaty at all!

Ireland rejected the treaty in a referendum, even though it was by a very narrow majority. In Belgium, a rejection is still possible. It is sufficient for this that one of the regional assemblies refuses to ratify it. by

This treaty is very complex, the street man will probably not understand much of it. In essence, it concerns the European decision-making process, which will now take place at three levels: a qualified majority of 73%, the need to have each decision adopted by a simple majority of the Member States and, finally, the so-called "demographic" clause by which the majority of the total European population is fixed at 62%. Therefore, an alliance of Great Britain, Germany and Spain would reach 41%, which would allow these three countries to rule as a "directory". by

However, I would rather have a board of directors consisting of three members than a symposium with 25 members. A board of directors can direct things even if it acts primarily in the interests of the three largest countries of the Union and their populations. A symposium may lead to a lack of direction.

The limitation of competence (Kompetenzbegrenzung) cannot in any case lead to a one-way interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity. The competences of the Member States and of Europe must be defined. by Mr. Jacques Delors proposed to interpret the principle of subsidiarity in the way of the papal encyclicals of the nineteenth century: the higher powers only intervene in the absence of private initiative. Interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity in both directions KAMER -4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE candidat-lidstaten zijn. That formt trouwens a psychological problem, because they get fewer votes and a country as Belgium.

What Verhofstadt said is correct.

But it is equally indisputable — and this has been confirmed in recent months, following the terrorist attacks in the United States of America and the intervention in Afghanistan — that in fact in the European Union, whether you like to hear it or not, a directory de facto works. That de facto directory of the three great powers is partially institutionalized by the demographic clause. This must be dared to admit.

I immediately add that I would choose a directory with three over a symposium with 25. If, after the enlargement, we work not only on Nice, but on a subsequent treaty that truly deepens the Union’s functioning, it risks to become a symposium of 25 members, ⁇ in the fields of foreign policy and defence policy. I would rather have a directory than nothing at all. Then I would rather have a directory that directs, even if it takes mainly into account the interests of those three great states, than an unpolitical or, as Jacques Delors said, "Je préfère l'Europe à la dés -Europe"; a few Europe is to be preferred over a non-Europe. In my opinion, this should also be said clearly. This is of course a second best solution. The first best solution is to reach consensus through truly federal procedures, but in the absence of that, the directory will undoubtedly be continued.

The second point concerns the limitation of competence. This has been defended, ⁇ by our Prime Minister. I remember that Prime Minister Verhofstadt, during our committee meetings before Nice and after Nice, actually considered it a positive approach that it was time to delineate the powers. In theory, I can make income. The Kompetenzabgrenzung, however, threatens to mean turning subsidiarity into a one-way movement, from top to bottom, with clear powers for the counties, ⁇ even greater powers for the counties if one would move to the form of hidden re-nationalization, subsidiarity. I experienced that meeting in Ireland in 1991 or 1990, when the concept was born, under Jacques Delors, to get the English over the bridge during that period. Jacques Delors then told us at that informal meeting of foreign ministers: “I once took a course ‘social doctrine of the Church’ as a good Christian militant in the French trade union.”

In that course was referred to the encyclical Rerum Novarum and its successor 40 years later Quadragesimo Anno of 1931. This includes the concept of subsidiarity. The Vatican at the time — sometimes well-inspired, sometimes less well-inspired — stated that subsidiarity means letting a private initiative take place whenever this private initiative is able to do so, and that the government only acts subsidiarily, a rather liberal approach to the relationship between the government and the private initiative. The government acts only if the private initiative is clearly failing. The Church was not talking about business and the market, but about education. It was a hidden plea for freedom of education.

Jacques Delors stelde voor de subsidiariteit uit de context van de encycliek te rukken in het begrip toe te passen op Europe. He was well forstander of application in two directions. This is also stated in the Treaty of Maastricht. Subsidiariteit means dat de deelstaten, meaning that member states can act alone but that all cross-border matters fall within the competence of Europe. The Council of Ministers must ensure that its decisions comply with the principle of subsidiarity. I also regret that fundamental rights were not included in the Treaty. I hope that this will be the case in a next deal.

The conference began painfully with endless speeches. Is it reasonable to start writing a European Constitution from the outset? Per ⁇ the Chairmen of the Convention are nourishing this ambition, but are we not thus putting the bar too high? There are approximately 20 problems to be solved. How can European taxation be settled? How can the EU enlargement be financed? I support a gradual integration of the new Member States: that they participate already in the preparatory phase of the decision-making process (decision shaping) while waiting for full participation in the decision-making process (decision making). by

I regret that in the committee, two parties voted against the Nice Treaty. One of the two opposes, by a blind nationalism, any project favouring European unification. The negative vote of the PSC surprised me and saddened me. I call on the French-speaking Christian Democrats to rejoice and contribute constructively to the realization of the European dream by showing impartiality, a notion better known overseas as bipartisanship. Camera 4 E Sitting Van De 50 E Sittingsperiode 2001 2002 Room 4 E Session Of The 50 E Legislature Should Do What They Can Do Zolang Ze daartoe In staat Be. Zodra een probleem grensoverschrijdend is must men het opstuwen naar een hoger level. This level is of European Union in its federalizing dynamiek. Noem dat het Europa van vandaag in morgen. There will be a convention in an intergovernmental conference coming, a confederative federation of a federative confederation in which subsidiarity is an absolute key.

In the past, we have also fought against the idea of having subsidiarity tested in every European Council of Ministers. There has once been a proposal to have each Council of Ministers on the agenda to examine the principle of subsidiarity and to check whether there were no items on the agenda that belonged to the national governments. If Kompetenz Abgrenzung means that subsidiarity will only be applied downwards but not upwards, the Community acquis is compromised. I think we should strongly oppose this.

We regret that fundamental rights are not integrated into the Nice Treaty. Hopefully this will happen in the next agreement. Their

A final note relates to the work of the Convention as it currently roads and sails. The first two meetings were open, with 82 speeches. Mr Giscard d'Estaing was more or less able to maintain order. Their

I wonder if it is a good approach to emphasize the need for a European Constitution immediately. I fear a dead-fighting debate about all sorts of concepts that belong to a constitution, not insignificant and in part also theoretical. The truth is that the European Union is currently indeed treaty law, but that those treaties also have a constitutional meaning. As Mr. Jean-Luc Dehaene proposed in the Committee of the Wise, let us distinguish between a basic treaty and the more implementing technical treaties. However, a real Constitution, worthy of that name, I do not see sitting at the moment. It may be the ambition of Giscard d’Estaing and his two vice-presidents to enter history as the constituents of Europe, such as Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin: “We, the people.” You know how much the U.S. Constitution as a relic is displayed in the archives of the republic, near the White House, where two large candlesticks are lit, guarded by two soldiers, and admired day and night as a sort of relic of the republic. Who, as a politician, cannot have the ambition to survive in the memory of the people?

My approach is that at least twenty delicate points must be resolved. I mean institutional issues that are of capital importance and some of the solutions of which should not be included in the Constitution, but which have a formidable political scope. The European Parliament will be encouraged to introduce its own European tax system. How will the enlargement be financed? The expansion is paradoxical. It is politically absolutely necessary, the faster, the better. Economically, however, the expansion is almost impossible. You should look at the economic analysis of the backwardness of most of these countries. Slovenia is still the most advanced. Most other countries are at a level of 25% compared to our wealth level. That disadvantage plays in both directions, because those countries are threatening to be plainly competitive by our industry. Economically, we are facing a very long transition period. For this reason, for at least two years I have proposed, ⁇ in the next CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION OF THE 50th SESSION PERIODE 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE Convention, to double the Articles 43 and 44 of the Amsterdam Convention and to introduce, in addition to the closer cooperation, coopération renforcée, a second concept, in particular the complementary cooperation, coopération complémentaire.

This will give the new Member States a suit on size. With the transition, they are engaged in a dynamic of gradual institutional participation. Let them sit around the table and make decisions. Give them the files and let them discuss with them. When it comes point to point, they cannot decide as far as it is not yet within their competence. However, they will get a sense of home, while now they will come in part with a sense of alienation in the Union.

These are very important tasks and we can only hope that in the future all this will be corrected. I regret that two parties in the committee voted against. One party has always rejected all European treaties for reasons of ideological blindness and extreme nationalism. This is incompatible with any form of international cooperation. I regret, however, that the PSC voted against. I find this very unfortunate because this party with us has always contributed to the European construction. It is known in politics that between dreams and deeds there are great contradictions, as Elsschot wrote. I advise you to hang the poem of Elsschot in Dutch and in French translation in the party office of the PSC. I deeply regret that you do not join the consensus that, in my opinion, is a tradition in Parliament, as European politics can usually boast of what is called bipartisanity in the American Congress, the cooperation of the majority and opposition to the same big a great enterprise of which our future and the future of those who come after us depends in the most extreme and applicable sense of this word.

Mr. rapporteur, I assume that you have already spoken on behalf of your group?

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, dear colleagues, thankfully we are a little over thirteen because otherwise, it could have brought bad luck to the Nice Treaty.

Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, I would like to thank you for your presence at this important moment for Belgium and for Europe.

My party is part of the tradition of the great defenders of the European idea: Monet, Schumann, De Gasperi, Adenauer, Harmel but also Spinelli, Spaak and Jean Ray. by

When we read the tormented and abscond text of the Treaty of Nice, nothing allows us to convince us that in the future, the legacy that these men have left us can actually be preserved.

Our most precious concern is to convince our fellow citizens of the need to build a democratic and respectful Europe of its diversity, an accessible and close Europe, in short, a Europe with a soul. However, it would be hard to find a high sense in the merchandise that presided over the adoption of the controversial provisions contained in the Treaty of Nice. by

In particular, four elements motivate the reluctance of French-speaking social-Christian elected members to ratify this document.

My party traditionally belongs to the great supporters of European unification. However, the confounded and inaccessible text of the Nice Treaty does not provide any guarantee regarding the future of Europe. We must convince our fellow citizens that it is important to build a democratic Europe that respects the individuality of everyone. The cow trade that preceded the adoption of the provisions of the Nice Convention does not seem to contribute to this. Their

Het streven om de bevoegdheden van het European Parlement uit te hollen — European Parliament waarvan de rol als volwaardige medewetgever naast de Raad niet wordt bevestigd in dat op het stuk van het landbouw- in binnenlands veiligheidsbeleid uit de KAMER -4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION OF THE 50 E LEGISLATURE 1° The proportion to which the European Parliament was reduced by choosing not to confirm it as a full-time co-legislator alongside the Council. Thus, in the crucial areas of agricultural policy and internal security, Parliament is kept away from the co-decision procedure. Is this the way we are supposed to remedy the democratic deficit of the European institutions? by

The way in which the weighting of votes in the Council has been reviewed is equally worrying as it complicates the decision-making process. For qualified majority voting, three different majorities are required.

By the way, the blocking minority will be reduced from 28.7% to 25.3%. Was it necessary? by

Critical areas have been kept outside the scope of qualified majority voting. Thus, unanimous agreement remains on a series of matters essential to the proper management of the enlargement such as immigration and asylum policy, police and judicial cooperation, foreign policy and competition distortions through taxation. by

4° As regards the reform of the Commission, it will lead to a decrease in the authority of its President. In current practice, the Commissioners have undertaken to resign at the request of their President. From now on, they will only have to do so if a majority of the College of Commissioners so decides. This is a worrying situation because the Commission will not be able to function properly with a weakened President at the exact moment when the increase in its size requires a stronger coordination.

All these provisions are extremely detrimental to the European institutional balance. Do we only have an idea of the treasures of pedagogy that will need to be deployed in vain to explain to our fellow citizens the functioning of the system of voting by the triple qualified majority within the Council? Are we only aware of what this alambic mounting means? We know enough how, in some cases, it will make impossible the extension of budgetary programming, how in other cases it will make impossible the modification of Community legislation? Have we well understood that by weakening the President of the Commission, thus the Commission itself, and by aggravating the decision-making process within the Council, it is the capacity of the European Union to act in crisis situations that is undermined?

But I already hear my pro-European roadmates tell me that every advance, even small, even negligible, even disappointing, remains an advance and that it is appropriate, as such, to engage it. How I wish they were right! It would be so comfortable! At least, I could not vote with the Vlaams Blok against the ratification; I could not pass in your eyes, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, for a euro-extremist. Above all, I could say that modestly, at my level, I would have contributed to the construction of the European building. by

Only, you see, to convenience, I prefer lucidity! by

Indeed, the enhanced cooperation that is presented to us as the great advance is not sufficient to neutralize the many other shortcomings contained in the Treaty. They are not sufficient in the first place because their implementation remains subject to excessive constraints medebeslissingprocedure wordt geweerd — is geen positive signal met het oog op het verhelpen van het democratisch deficit van de Europese instellingen.

The revision of the weighting of votes within the council is also disturbing, as it complicates decision-making as voting by qualified majority requires three different majorities. For some critical policy areas, voting by qualified majority does not apply. For essential matters, unanimity remains in force.

The Commission’s reform will reduce the authority of its President and thus weaken the Commission itself at a time when its enlargement requires a stronger coordination.

All these provisions undermine the European institutional balance and the citizens' understanding of the functioning of the European institutions and of the electoral system.

There is a risk that this structure will prevent the continuation of the budgetary programmes or the amendment of Community legislation.

The European Union’s ability to respond to crisis situations could be undermined as the role of the President of the Commission is weakened and the decision-making process within the Council becomes logger. Their

I verkies helderziendheid boven gemak, immers de versterkte samenwerking volstaat niet om de talrijke tekortkomingen van het verdrag op te vangen. De versterkte samenwerking blijft immers underworpen aan overdreven verplichtingen in de tweede pijler, where other partners nog altijd hun veto kunnen stellen. Bovendien is versterkte samenwerking niet KAMER -4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION OF THE 50 E LEGISLATURE in the framework of the second pillar, that of the common foreign and defence policy where the veto of the other partners remains placed. They are then insufficient because they do not cover issues related to defence or having military implications. They are not enough, last and most importantly, because since the events of last September 11th, everything reminds us that it is a necessity to develop the full capacity of the EU’s external action. The Treaty of Nice does not allow this kind of evolution. This is a vice-redhibitory, a vice that makes the treaty expire even before it has been ratified.

So, knowing that the Treaty of Nice is not a treaty like the others given that it could be the last before an unprecedented enlargement; knowing also that a respected professor like Mr. Franklin Dehousse came to the conclusion that “the Treaty of Nice represents a turning point in the European construction, inasmuch as, for the first time, the negative aspects for integration outweigh the positive aspects”; therefore, knowing that many agree that this treaty is bad, but also knowing that a majority of us, with remarkable audacity or, should I rather say, guilty disengagement, are still preparing to vote in favour of its ratification, I would like to recall some elements that will help to better understand the scope of the act we are brought to put forward.

To make my point clearer, I will briefly recall the decisive strategic principles that were at the basis of the postwar European integration process. First, there was the political and economic need to defend against the Soviet threat. There was then the will to integrate Germany into the political and economic ensemble formed by the European democracies, in order to turn it into a partner and not a rival. There was finally the search for the economic and social benefits generated by a common and open market. The first of these three principles, having lost any object, appears obsolete. The second and third points are widely met. They are no longer a problem either.

Does this mean that Europe will now find itself deprived of purpose? and no. There are many goals that need to be achieved. These are, on the one hand, the realization of the full capacity of the EU to act externally and, on the other hand, the construction of a social Europe.

Clearly, there is a lack of political will, not in your head, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, but in several of our partners. If not, in order to give itself a contention, one chooses to proceed with the enlargement, without giving itself the means.

The argument invoked to justify this approach is that our European institutions are the basis of the unprecedented prosperity and stability that Western Europe has experienced. Widening the Union would stabilize Eastern Europe by integrating it into the established institutional structures. Nothing is less true, nothing is more false. First, because, I just recalled, it is not the institutions alone that are the basis of stability and the will for European integration. Then because it is wrong to think that the structures that suited to the Europe of the Six, so poorly reformed in Nice, would be suitable for an enlarged Europe to twenty-seven.

And consequently, le risque existe que n'ayant pas adapté l'édifice institutionnel comme il l'aurait fallu dans la perspective de possible in defence matters or when there are military implications. Finally, the Union’s overall capacity for action with regard to the outside world should be expanded. The Treaty of Nice does not allow such a development and is outdated by this insurmountable deficiency even before its ratification.

Being aware that the Treaty of Nice may be the last before the enlargement, and being aware that many agree that it is a bad treaty, even if that is not an obstacle for a majority of us to ratify it anyway, I would like to briefly remind you of some strategic principles underlying the post-war European integration process: the defense against the threat of the Soviets, the willingness to integrate Germany as a European partner country, and the pursuit of the economic and social advantage of a common market. The first goal is now no longer based on anything, and both other intentions are now largely achieved.

Does Europe no longer have a reason to exist? Certainly not. The objective should be to build the European Union into a working unity with regard to the outside world, without disregarding the social Europe. Their

However, many of our partners lack the will to do so. And then one sustains his conscience and chooses an expansion while the necessary resources are lacking and one forgets that expansion consists in stabilizing Eastern Europe.

This is your most pure farm fraud! How can structures that were suitable for the Europe of the Six also be suitable for a Europe that extends to twenty-seven Member States? We want to make it so that we must move forward in a Union that is more and more away from a kind of CHAMBRE-4 E SITION OF THE 50th Session 2001 2002 CHAMBRE-4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE l'élargissement, nous nous retrouvions dans l'incapacité d'apporter aux pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale la stabilité et la prospérité qui sont les nôtres et auxquelles, comme nous, ils ont droit. Their

All we will have won is to have offered the new members access to a club of materialist states, with a large market and a single currency, and to condemn them to live in a Union that has become a kind of ungovernable Polish Diet, as it existed in the old regime. Let us admit that this is not a very exciting prospect.

In reality, we find ourselves in a situation where, by excellence, the principle of political precaution finds to apply. No imminent threat, no immediate danger compels us to tie our hands to a text containing paralyzing provisions.

So let us expand, but by grace, not on the basis of the Treaty of Nice, which offers neither the guarantee of stability, nor the institutional solidity, nor a vision of the future. Let us also not expand on the current institutional foundations. They are inappropriate. They do not allow more adequate reception of candidate countries. by

Okay, you will tell me. But then, what to do? What solutions to the imminent expiration of the enlargement? by

Dear colleagues, in order to try to answer this question and, at the same time, to conclude my speech, I would like to deliver to you a quote borrowed from Helmut Schmidt. The former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany said: “If the European Union had to experience the same fate as the New European Peace Order of Westphalia, three and a half centuries ago, and that the Congress of Vienna, 150 years later, its good beginnings would be little more than a subject of interest for future historians.”

But for us, European citizens, and for our descendants, such a fall would cause a tragedy: the definitive loss of our autonomy. Helmut Schmidt continued: “More than all treaties and articles of law, it is clairvoyance and loyalty to principles, state of mind, determination and example that matters.”

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, dear colleagues, let us have the clear vision not to ratify the Treaty of Nice! Let us have the spirit and determination necessary to succeed the Convention! This is what really matters today. Polish Landdag van Weleer.

There is no immediate threat that should force us to bind ourselves to a text that contains provisions that will work paralytically. Let us therefore expand the Union, but not on the basis of this Treaty, and not on the current, inadequate institutional foundations.

Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt believes that if the European Union had the same fate as the new European order established on the Westphalian Peace three centuries ago, or if the Congress of Vienna, the good start would be no more than feed for future historians. Such a fall would cause a tragedy for us, Europeans, and for our descendants, the definitive loss of our autonomy. More than any treaty and legislative article, it matters about sharpness and compliance with principles, on the attitude, the determination and the good example. These considerations are read in the book committed by the former German Chancellor under the title "Selbstbehauptung Europas".

Therefore, let us be as sharp as to not ratify the Treaty of Nice. Let us have the attitude and determination to make the Convention a success.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, colleagues, I would like to address first to Mr. Lefevre.

Mr. Lefevre, I do not understand that you will not approve of this. I can say that I know you pretty well. I know you as a honourable man, as a man of insight, as a man who is for the European thought and European integration. We can agree that this is not a huge, decisive step. However, we are taking a step. When I heard you speaking here, you reminded me of the People’s Union. The People's Union is a party that has managed to systematically interpret any progress made in their own program as a jaw blow for Flanders and a defeat. I can only say that the PSC

I do not understand that Mr. Lefevre considers that he cannot approve this treaty. In fact, he gave me the impression of being a convinced europhile. Now it reminds me of the VU, which interprets every Flemish victory as a defeat. The PSC is doing the same today: the small step forward represented by the Treaty of Nice is only the subject of criticism.

I'admets que le traité de Nice reste CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION OF THE 50th SESSION 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE apparently has been affected by a disease of the People's Union. This is a very unhealthy disease for the spirit in a political party.

To say that the result of Nice remains far below our ambitions as European federalists is to enter an open door. Expectations and ambitions are one thing; showing realism in the possibility of progress is another thing. Europe is a story of half a century of progress where we have now arrived at a point that the “founding fathers” had never dared to foresee. Now that we are about to ratify the treaty, we should not ask ourselves how far the Union after Nice is still distant from our worst dreams of a truly federal Europe, but what small step we have taken towards the ideal in view of the historical enlargement of the Union.

The answer to that second question is a cautious “yes”. It should be noted that the European Council of Helsinki, as an explicit mandate for this intergovernmental conference, had committed to enable the Union to include the candidate Member States that were ready from the end of 2002. In other words, this treaty was to provide at least the minimum minimum amount of adjustments necessary to enable the enlargement to be carried out. There is no need to comment on these changes over and over again. Let us overcome them for a moment.

An agreement was reached on the weighting of votes in the Council. Its revision has been achieved in an acceptable way for small countries as it is ours. The treaty already provides for the progressive adaptation of the system to the entry of the candidate Member States. As of January 1, 2005, the major member states will lose their second commissioner. The Treaty also stipulates that the number of Commissioners shall be limited from the accession of the 27th Member State and that a rotational system shall be established on an equal footing between all Member States. Also not insignificant: the appointment of the chairman of the committee will be decided by a qualified majority. We do not hide that the expansion of the qualified majority does not reach as far as hoped. When it comes to, for example, asylum, migration or foreign trade policies, there remain significant constraints. However, let us not forget that this issue was not originally within the mandate of the IGC, and it has still been put on the agenda thanks to the efforts of our country and the Benelux.

We have long been asking for a relaxation of the conditions for establishing an enhanced cooperation, precisely because we realized that not all others were as euro-friendly as we were, and we still wanted to make progress in certain areas. Nice is an important step forward. The right of veto is abolished for the first and third pillars. The cooperation of eight Member States will be sufficient to start this. There is still work to be done for the second pillar. The veto right still exists, and in cases with military implications, closer cooperation can still not be possible.

The Nice Treaty contains a number of provisions which are far less noticeable, but which are therefore no less important. I think of the early warning system for identifying the risk of serious human rights violations in a Member State. The reaffirmation of the legal basis of the Union’s military identity through the Committee on Foreign and Security Policy is also worth mentioning here. The Committee will be able to incorporate the political control of crisis management operations and their strategic leadership. Finally, and not bien loin of the ambitions of the European Federalist Convaincus. It is not necessary, however, to ask what fosses we separate yet of the realization of the dreams, the most bold of a federal Europe, but rather it is nice to bring us closer or not to this ideal.

In my opinion, the Nice Treaty is indeed a step in the right direction. At the European Council in Helsinki, it was decided that this treaty should meet the minimum conditions necessary to enable an increase in the number of Member States. by

The Treaty of Nice includes an agreement on the weighting of votes in the European Council. This arrangement is acceptable in the eyes of small countries, such as Belgium. This system will be applied gradually upon the accession of new Member States.

As of January 1, 2005, the major countries will lose their second commissioner. The number of Commissioners will be limited from the 27th accession and a rotation system will be introduced to enable all Member States to be on an equal footing. A qualified majority vote will be held for the appointment of the President of the Commission.

The extension of the qualified majority is more limited than the persuaded federalists had hoped. Limits have been set for voting in asylum, immigration and foreign trade policy. For a long time, some have called for the easing of the conditions to be met in order to strengthen cooperation between Member States. Nice has largely fulfilled this wish. It removes the right of veto for the first and third pillars and provides that the collaboration of eight Member States is sufficient to establish a collaboration. For the second pillar, the right of veto remains. Chamber 4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 Chamber 4 E SESSION OF THE 50 E LEGISLATURE onbelangrijk, is er de verbetering van de gerechtelijke instellingen. Het gerecht van eerste aanleg in het Hof van Justitie zullen zich nu kunnen uitspreken zonder de verlenging van de termijnen die nu al erg lang zijn.

Of course, we are too much Europeans to not have hoped for more. We would, of course, have preferred to see a less complex procedure for voting in the Council and not a bush of majorities where no one can see through the trees. Naturally, we would have preferred to ratify a treaty that extends the qualified majority vote to more domains. So we can list things that we would have liked to see otherwise. However, the Treaty of Nice has been concluded after difficult negotiations, and by not ratifying it, not only are its positive achievements stopped in the refrigerator, but it also makes extension impossible without blocking everything. Fortunately, the heads of state and government in Nice have already recognized the debate on the future of the Union as a necessity. We will therefore approve this treaty because of the progress it means and because of the need to prepare the house Europe for enlargement. At the same time, we invest all our energy in a sustainable deepening of European integration. As Commissioner Barnier stated at a colloquium exactly a year ago: “This is a useful treaty, but a short-term treaty.” Let us hope that the Convention can prepare a treaty amendment that is both useful and long-term, and acceptable for the Council. In any case, we will cooperate on this. Nice to establish a system of priority for the constatation of risks of serious violations of human rights in a Member State. The Committee for Foreign Policy and Security can now re-establish, at its account, the political control of crisis management operations and their strategic direction. Furthermore, the European judicial institutions will be improved without, however, that this improvement is accompanied by an extension of the deadlines. All these elements deserve to be relevant. Their

We would have preferred to ratify a treaty that extends voting by qualified majority to much more areas, but if we do not ratify it, the positive achievements of the treaty would be challenged and any enlargement would be prevented. Therefore, we will adopt this treaty because of the progress it will make and because it is preparing for enlargement. By ratifying it, we also invest our energy in the sustainable deepening of European integration. This is a useful short-term treaty. The Convention is now called upon to prepare another amendment to the Treaties.

The Treaty of Amsterdam is undoubtedly the legal framework that determines, since its entry into force on 1 May 1999, the political process of evolution of the European Union. However, it must be acknowledged that regardless of the merits of the Treaty of Amsterdam, he was born with a notorious weakness, namely that he was unable to fulfill one of the main tasks that had been entrusted to him: to reform the Community institutions.

These were designed, 50 years ago, for a Six Europe and they continue to operate with a few "cosmetic" adaptations, with a number of Member States in constant increase, skills and powers expanded, in a political, economic and social environment, radically different from what was known at the time. by

The Treaty and the configuration of the institutions present clear limits both to a Europe of fifteen and to an enlarged Europe in the perspective of the 2004 deadline.

Since the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the preliminary principles of the Treaty of Nice, which we are called to ratify today, were already incorporated in the Community institutional debate, paving the way,

Although the Treaty of Amsterdam ⁇ provides the legal reference framework for the reform of the institutions, it failed to reform the Community institutions as set out in the original mandate. Their

The current institutions have their limitations in the Europe of Fifteen, but also in view of the enlargement in 2004. Their

Since the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, the principles of the Nice Treaty have been incorporated in the debate on the Community institutions. It was especially difficult to address the requirements that were made to the enlargement procedure and that Chamber -4 E SESSION OF THE 50 E SESSION 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE of one part, au texte que nous sommes appelés à voter et, d'autre part, aux travaux de la convention, que M. Versnick a rappelés.

The difficulty of negotiating the Treaty of Nice appears to have led to many, apparently, to embody the explicit objective, namely the adaptation to the requirements of the enlargement and twelve implicit objectives inherent in any review process and which are recurrent in view of the last two negotiations and the results that had been gathered in Amsterdam: the improvement of the structure and functioning of the Union and the pursuit of a better legitimation of the Union through greater transparency, a better readability of the decision-making process at European level that every citizen of the Union calls for his wishes. by

So it was up to the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference to articulate these different objectives, the previous negotiation of which had shown how conflicting this dimension was. by

Therefore, what I find important this afternoon is to read well the Treaty of Nice as being the continuation of the process initiated in Amsterdam, a treaty that can respond to the impasse of the 1997 CIG, but which also reflects a relative frilance of States in relation to the broadened Europe.

Our group will ratify this treaty without a state of mind because the Nice Agreement is the best possible agreement, given the positions adopted by the different European countries during the year 2000. It allows the Union to overcome a number of blockages, some of which were ten years old, and it paves the way for a controlled and successful enlargement. The prospect of enlargement is thus becoming more and more concrete. I think that through this treaty, which is not perfect in all aspects, we will deliver to Europe and the world a clear message about the irreversibility of the EU’s enlargement. by

Today we can say that the commitment to the member countries has been fulfilled. This is the first merit of the Treaty of Nice. by

Therefore, I do not understand the attitude taken by Mr. Leftover at this tribune. The right of parliamentary opposition is obviously to oppose, but I think there is both the way and the time to do so. In this regard, the opposition of Mr. The ratification of this treaty seems to me quite inopportune. by

Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, I would say that Nice had undoubtedly the vocation to respond to the relic of the Amsterdam Agreement. It also contains — and this has not been said by any of the speakers who preceded me — a whole series of complementary provisions that deserve our attention. I think in particular of the issue of the defence of human rights — which is fundamental to us — through the amendments that have been made to Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. There is also a well-needed adaptation of the European judicial order and finally the advances that were made in Nice in European defence. by

I would gladly admit to the opponents of the treaty that these are improvements that do not mask the breathing of the method of intergovernmental conferences. That is why I want to say to this tribune that we welcome the content of Annex 4, which provided for the establishment of the Convention and the convocation of the CIG Office for 2004. inherent are inherent to every hervormingprocedure evenals of doelstellingen op elkaar af te stemmen. Het Verdrag van Nice moest dus een antwoord bieden na de impasse van de Intergovernmentele Conference van 1997, maar de lidstaten stonden nogal koel tegenover de uitbreiding van Europa. It is also the last verdrag of a Union with fifteen member states.

The Treaty of Nice should be seen as the continuation of the process initiated in Amsterdam.

The Nice Agreement was the best possible agreement, allowing patterns to be broken and paving the way for an extension that can be held in hand. It also contained the clear message that the Union is irreversible. Their

I do not understand Mr. Lefevre’s attitude: his speech comes at the right time, but he does not take the right tone.

Nice was intended to formulate a response to what was not arranged in the Amsterdam Agreement. Mr. Lefevre forgets the defence of human rights, the adjustments to the European legal system and the progress on the piece of European defence.

These improvements should not make us forget that the intergovernmental method is worth renewal. We therefore welcome the provisions of Annex IV which provide for the establishment of the Convention and the convocation of an intergovernmental conference in 2004. Their

Het verdrag van Nice, het laatste verdrag tot uitdieping van de EU met Vijftien, moet toelaten de samenhang binnen Unie te versterken en doet dat ook. De bereidheid tot hervorming moet echter aanwezig zijn, wil men het avontuur met 25 voortzetten en daarbij de integratie en de KAMER -4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION OF THE 50 E LEGISLATURE Nice can be considered as the last deepening treaty of fifteen aimed at ⁇ ining the unity and coherence of today's Europe. In this context, the Treaty fully fulfils its objective: to adapt the political structures, a number of common policies, the EU budget.

In the future, this will require a new volunteerism and a new generosity that will enable us — this is the wish of the group of the reformist movement, open to all supporters of democratic humanism — to continue the European adventure with the same degree of integration and above all the same European ambition.

We believe that ratification of this treaty is necessary and indispensable. We must not ask the Treaty of Nice for anything other than what it was born for: to make enlargement possible, to open the path of the future to an original constitutional construction. With this treaty, we can today honorably respond to the demands of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and engage with them resolutely on the path to a true European constitution. European ambition on peil keep.

The Treaty of Nice should enable the expansion and enable the adaptation and modernisation of the European institutions by safeguarding the legal status of the Convention. The treaty finally meets the aspirations of the Eastern European countries and brings us closer to the drafting of a European constitution. Their

All these reasons require our Parliament to ratify this treaty.

Today, in this House, the ratification of the so-called Nice Treaty is being discussed. As the interest of the people’s representatives shows, this may be a little bit of nothing, but unfortunately the opposite is true. While the European Union sometimes interferes in the daily lives of its inhabitants — think about the introduction of the euro as a means of payment — Europe is a mile away from the concerns of the man or woman on the street, and the euro will hardly change anything to that. I find it also useful that, if I drive from Antwerp to my stake on the Oosterschelde, now no Dutch goldens should be taken with me, but with that it stops for most, I fear.

Europe is not perceived as a government that responds to the immediate wishes and needs of citizens and society. We think in particular of supranational powers, such as the fight against international terrorism and crime, the fight against human trafficking, the stimulation of economic recovery and the promotion of a social Europe. Europe is perceived as an opaque moloch, in short a kind of super-democracy, where democratic participation is minimal, let alone there is co-victory and basic democracy. No, nothing of all that. On so-called summits, heads of state and government are seen, surrounded by bodyguards and guarded by thousands of police officers, in places that are closed to the outside world for that occasion — think of Guy Verhofstadt’s Gent. All this is expressed in words and images by an army of journalists.

This was also the case in Nice, in early December 2000. If possible, it would be a little worse. Instead of dealing with the real problems of the people, the political leaders there fought before the eyes of hundreds of cameras an ordinary game of power, for which one would be ashamed in the first the best municipal council. The purpose of this abominable spectacle was the re-examination, as it is called in the jargon, of the number of votes in the Council of Ministers, with a view to extending from fifteen to a total of twenty-seven Member States. This, indeed, required a re-alignment of the strength ratio, but whether that should be carried out in this low-by-the-ground way, the question remains.

The interest that members demonstrate in this bill suggests that we are talking about a minority. Nothing is less true. The European Union intervenes fundamentally in the daily life of the citizen, it is only to think about the introduction of the euro, but, for the majority of the population, the European political structures remain a mystery. Europe is too far from the socio-economic reality and the social needs of the population. In addition, European managers improvised the milestones of a rudimentary democracy. Just consider the fracas that surrounds European summits: concentration of police officers, more bodyguards than heads of government, blocked streets... Nice did not escape. by

Il fallait revoir la pondération des voix au Conseil de ministres pour pouvoir se prononcer sur l'élargissement mais cela s'est fait de manière totalement inappropriate. Our Prime Minister has unnecessarily caused the irritation of the Netherlands, with all the negative consequences that have resulted in other cases, such as those of the Rhin de Fer. The great countries of the EU have bridged the small. This has nothing more to do with democracy. ROOM 4 E SITION OF THE 50th SITION 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE The Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt, baptized Mr. Nice Guy, showed himself a hunt-of-the-front. He wasn’t even ashamed to go into the clinch with our best neighbors, the Dutch. The Netherlands received more votes in the Council of Ministers than Belgium. After a lot of hard work and hard work, the Netherlands got one vote more, but Guy Verhofstadt had unnecessarily aroused the wrath of our northern neighbors. This continues to work until today; think about the rough attitude of the Netherlands regarding the IJzeren Rijn and the Schelde Floor. A friendly Belgium could have achieved much more with the Dutch. We regret that the relationship with the Netherlands has been cooled in this way.

In essence, however, Nice was a game of power in which the great, with quite a success, have attempted to bind the small, to such an extent even that a coalition of France, Germany, Britain and Spain will now be able to impose its will on the rest of Europe.

With democracy all this has very little to do, especially since everything happens above the heads of the citizen. If, however, there is a state which organises a referendum among its people on this so-called Nice Treaty, in particular Ireland – which, by the way, is obliged to do so by its own constitution – and if this popular consultation happens to be negative, Europe simply refuses to take that into account. Europe is so democratic. Virtually, the Treaty of Nice no longer exists, but yet the European power channels act as if nothing has happened and they simply continue with the plans for the expansion and deepening of the European Union, completely ignoring the ruling of the Irish people, thus letting Europe its own legal rules in the eye. In such a Europe, which in no way wants to take into account the will of the people — not even its own rules — should we believe in that?

Louis Michel, our Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, however a liberal who should highlight the participation of the population, goes very far in ignoring the will of the European people. When Günther Verheugen, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, in a shock of democratic drive argued that the best public consultations on the enlargement would be organized, Minister Michel was one of the first to whisper him back. According to Minister Michel, “this could bring up the darkest of the people.” As a staple of faith in your own conviction power, this can count. Regarding the Irish rejection of the Treaty of Nice, Minister Michel even spoke in the Committee on Foreign Relations about "a lack of pedagogy", which in the committee report was gently repeated as "a failing educational work". Their

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, you have heard all this very well: the Irish are a bit of dumb, they have understood nothing and they need to be better educated. In the past, we heard about re-education speaking mainly behind the Iron Curtain. This is the vision of our great statesman Louis Michel who the world envy us.

I have repeatedly advocated in this House for holding referendums on the enlargement and deepening of Europe, including by submitting resolutions. Each time these proposals were wiped out of the table by almost everyone in this hemisphere. It is by no means the intention of the Flemish Bloc to put sticks in the European radar work. On the contrary, through the broad social debate on the institutions that necessarily follows the organisation of referendums, we want Europe closer to the L'Europe ne tient pas compte du citoyen et lorsque le référendum irlandais sur l'approfondissement et l'élargissement se solde par un résultat négatif, les cénacles du pouvoir européen n'en tiennent tout simplement pas compte. How do we believe in a Europe that ignores the will of the Europeans? It is nonsense to say that it is necessary to reeducate the Irish, as it is done by the Minister Michel. The term “re-education” was generally used on the other side of the Rideau de Fer. Their

I have regularly advocated in this homicide to submit the important decisions on the European level to a referendum, but these proposals have been swept away from the back of the hand. The Vlaams Blok does not seek to hinder the proper functioning of the European Union, but we want it to get closer to the European citizens. I see nothing wrong with it.

The European Convention, which is to meet soon, is responsible for putting Europe on new rails: this Convention is chaired by the former French president, now 75 years old, in particular assisted in his task by the mayor of Vilvorde. The House is represented by a member of the Flemish Parliament and the Senate by the Mayor of Mons. Within my party, we don’t think in terms of “Great Europe.” We have adopted this attitude since the birth of our party. We are not against the European Union, but we are realistic. The project to admit purely and simply the accession of 10 new countries in 2004 is based on purely geopolitical arguments. There are no socio-economic or financial arguments in favour of this project.

This project is impossible to implement. In fact, it risks to drive the current Europe into chaos. The establishment and free movement in the European Union of persons originating in the KAMER -4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE mensen brengen en ze de verzekering geven dat zij inspraak hebben en dat met their mening rekening wordt gehouden.

The so-called Convention, which was established as a result of the Laeken Declaration, will unfortunately not increase the democratic content and transparency. Maybe she will do the opposite. This Chamber is represented by a member of the Flemish Parliament. The Senate is represented by a municipal council member from Bergen. It is this Convention that must set Europe on a new track under the highly expert leadership of the 75-year-old former President Giscard d'Estaing, assisted by all of us JeanLuc Dehaene, Mayor of Vilvoorde. Openness and transparency are guaranteed.

The Flemish Bloc thinks very European, large-European even. It has always been so. As far as I know, this has been the case since the foundation of the party, about 25 years ago. At that time, the Iron Curtain was still completely intact, and all kinds of Western, “democratic” leaders were shaking hands of Eastern European, communist tyrants and mass murderers. Therefore, we should not be accused of anti-European attitudes. The opposite is true. Their

However, there is also such a thing as realism. In Dutch there is the beautiful word ‘reality sense’. The plans of the European oligarchy, about which — I repeat — no one was consulted, in 2004 in one blow, in one big bang to add 10 new member states to the European Union, borders to the impossible and even almost to the madness. It is a purely political project, driven by geopolitical considerations of power. In the near future, however, there will be no socio-economic foundations for it. The big bang in 2004 by expanding to 10 countries, many of which are socio-economically, budgetarily and even politically unprepared, could cause a total blockade and even a collapse of the European Union. Do you want to take this risk? Why this massive flight?

We advocate a gradual enlargement of the European Union. In a first phase, some countries that are more or less prepared for it would join, such as Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus with all internal problems of division, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In a second wave, a few years later, the Baltic states and Poland could join. In a third move, then the heck closers Bulgaria and Romania. This is a feasible and realistic scenario.

In anticipation of their accession, the candidate Member States should be offered increased socio-economic assistance programmes from Western Europe.

In the transitional phase after the accession of the Member States, for a maximum of seven years, it will be possible to restrict the free movement and the free establishment of persons, until those new Member States get close to the level of the least developed states of the current European Union, in order to prevent sudden migration movements to the West. This will, on the one hand, disrupt the labour market in the West and, on the other hand, create a brain drain in the East that is not assigned to either area.

Also serve men in the transition phase in maatregelen te voorzien om te voorkomen dat the new eastern member states are overspoeld by western landspeculanten, zoniet worden of Eastern European land in fact colonies van het Westen. The European Agricultural Subsidy Policies must therefore be fully rectified. New candidate countries are at risk of compromising our economic system. That is why we advocate a three-phase enlargement and the establishment of socio-economic assistance programmes for Eastern European countries. It is also necessary to provide for at least a transitional period to avoid significant migration flows to the current EU Member States, brain leakage from Eastern countries and real estate speculation. The EU’s agricultural subsidy policy is wrong. As long as Europe continues to massively subsidize agriculture and prohibit access to third-world agricultural products, immigration will continue in Europe, with the cornering of related asylum and illicitness issues.

The policy of agricultural subsidies should demonstrate greater creativity. You wisherais vous livrer une petite idée personnelle: in 2003 and in 2004, reduce the European subsidies to agriculture of 25 per cent each time and versus the amount obtained in a fund dedicated to agricultural development in Europe of the East and in the Third World. In two years, it would be thus possible to save half of the European subsidies to agriculture and to help the new Member States of Eastern Europe. ROOM -4 E SESSION OF THE 50 E SESSION PERIOD 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE Here I have drawn up a personal idea. The European agricultural subsidy policy is not sustainable, not only because it undermines all liberal, economic legalities, but also because it is a perverse mechanism that is, among other things, detrimental to the development of the third world countries. Those who keep the Third World, such as Western Europe, artificial street arm, should not come afterwards to complain about the fact that the people of the Third World want to come here. We must dare to make sacrifices here; we must be logical and consistent with ourselves. If Europe subsidizes its agricultural products artificially and keeps its borders closed to the agricultural products of the Third World, then one should not later complain that we are shipped here with illegals, with asylum seekers who come here because they can have a better life here. That is why I say that in relation to this agricultural subsidy policy we must dare to be creative. We must have the courage to take drastic measures.

Hence the following personal suggestion. This is a rough proposal, but think about it. Reduce from next year, from 2003, the agricultural subsidies sensitively in the West, for example from 100 to 75%, and deposit the saved 25% into an agricultural development fund for the East. Do the same in the year 2004: reduce the agricultural subsidies again by 25% and deposit the saved 25% again into that agricultural development fund for the East. Subsidies in Western Europe will then be reduced by half in two years. That money will then be available for agricultural development in Eastern Europe. This way it costs you nothing.

This does not alleviate the misery and poverty of our farmers. So simple is that. You can understand that.

From our farmers?

Yes of course! People should know that. Your proposal is too simplistic. You know very well that our agriculture and our farmers cannot survive without subsidies. You know that very well.

Our agriculture cannot function without European subsidies. by Mr. Tastenhoye knows this very well.

and yes.

Nevertheless, you are proposing to organize the poverty of our own farmers. Your system doesn’t work and you know it very well! I do not understand it well. You are very dangerous with such proposals.

The implementation of his proposal would contribute to the impoverishment of Western farmers!

I try to be consistent with myself. If I say that we must help the third world, can we not continue to subsidize our agricultural products and continue to refuse access to our market for third world products? What is your answer to that? How will you address this problem?

We will have to make choices. It must be radical choices. Agricultural subsidies are not sustainable. Eventually, all subsidies will have to be eliminated, both in Western Europe and in Eastern Europe, and this will benefit the development of the Third World.

The project of the Flemish Bloc for the enlargement of Europe is democratic, gradual and thorough. We are

How long will the West continue to subsidize the agricultural sector so generously by closing the door to all products from non-EU countries?

All subsidies are called to disappear in the long term.

With regard to Europe, our KAMER -4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE project is het tegenovergestelde van wat de Europese oligarchie van plan is met de zogenaamde big bang van 10 landen in 2004. The Vlaams Blok chooses for a European... The party has made a coherent, clear and transparent choice, unlike the Big Bang to which the European Union will face us by welcoming a significant number of new members.

For a moment, Mr. Tastenhoye, Mr. Leterme wishes to interrupt for a moment.

Mr. Speaker, my attention was drawn by an interruption of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He touches an important point.

Mr. Tastenhoye, it is important for the general public opinion, and in particular for the agricultural population, to know that for you, the whole common agricultural policy is preferably set up as soon as possible. Is this your position?

The Minister has just announced an important fact. The Vlaams Blok wants to end as soon as possible the European system of aid to agriculture.

and no. I launched an idea in my own name.

It was just a small personal idea.

Mr Tastenhoye, you are in the Parliament. I have no problem with you launching a personal idea in your back kitchen or in front of the mirror. Thus, even on the tribune, you have almost literally said that subsidies should disappear, both in Western and Eastern Europe. You said that the system of agricultural subsidies is unsustainable. It should be clear to the public opinion and to the agricultural population that for the Flemish Bloc one agricultural product is a product like another and food security does not matter to you. If your party goes around in Flanders to place stickers on farmland of farmers to get this population group behind its campaign, the public opinion should know that your party does not mean it all, but that it wants in the bottom of its heart and that of its party program that the common agricultural policy that deals with the viability of farm families be abolished as soon as possible!

Your statements are very tough for Belgian farmers; this does not stop you, however, from trying to rack up voices in these circles.

I did not say that these subsidies should be abolished immediately.

However, it seemed to be strong.

Mr. Tastenhoye, you said next year and the following year. That is immediate.

and no. I have said that the percentage subsidies should be gradually reduced and that the money generated by this should be deposited into a fund that can support the agricultural development policy in the East. I said that. You must not distort my words. I have not talked about the abolition of all subsidies in one blow. I did not say that.

I did not say that all subsidies should be eliminated immediately; I want to reduce them gradually and pay the money thus released into a fund aimed at promoting agriculture in Eastern Europe and the Third World.

Mr. Tastenhoye, you have been very clear.

Chamber 4 E SESSION OF THE 50th SESSION 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE I have been very clear.

Mr. Tastenhoye, you have pledged for the abolition of subsidies for our agriculture. You said that very precisely. You want to use the money you get to support the agriculture in those countries. This is a very limited idea. You know that. That idea does not work.

What should we do? Mr. Eyskens has just given a part of the answer. The real debate is about how we can govern Europe. That is the real question that needs to be asked. For that, of course, we still have to come to answers. This debate is a political responsibility that we must take together. You know that this debate already exists at the European level. However, we can hardly conduct that debate now because of the elections in Germany. As long as these elections are not behind, we cannot conduct that debate. However, the debate will come.

This debate has nothing to do with your proposal. Your proposal is a — apologize for the word — simplistic proposal. This is not sustainable or impossible. Through your system you organize the complete bankruptcy of the European agriculture and of the Flemish and Wallish agriculture. Such ideas should not be spread. This means giving bad ideas to others. What you are proposing is really very dangerous. You know this very well, too.

You talked about dismantling the EU agricultural aid policy in order to finance agriculture elsewhere. However, the European debate on agriculture financing can only be activated after the German elections. What you are proposing is impossible. This is a simplistic and dangerous idea.

Mr. Tastenhoye, please formulate your decision.

Mr. Minister, you try to give an interpretation to my statements.

Mr. Tastenhoye, I’ve listened to you, right?

Mr. Minister, of course, but you are trying to give my words an interpretation that is not mine.

Mr. Tastenhoye, no, that is not true.

Mr. Minister, also in terms of products, we will have to move toward a reorientation of agriculture.

We must move towards a reorientation of agricultural production. This is what I wanted to say.

Mr. Leterme, indeed a reorientation regarding the products.

I now formulate my decision. The Flemish Bloc chooses a European confederation, for an intergovernmental Europe in which the various states and peoples can fully preserve their own identity and of which independent Flanders will later become a full part.

The Vlaams Blok is ⁇ not anti-European. We advocate for a realistic, democratic and social Europe of the peoples in which an independent Flanders would also have its inalienable place.

Mr President, Mr Le

From KAMER -4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION OF THE 50 E LEGISLATURE Minister, dear colleagues, I will try to conclude this debate with a more optimistic note. I listened attentively to the report. and Eyskens. Even though, like other parties, the Socialist Party has expressed its disappointment with regard to the results achieved in Nice, which it considers to be inadequate to properly prepare the European Union for its enlargement, my group will nevertheless vote unanimously in favour tomorrow. For although it is not one of the most important ones we have been forced to adopt, some improvements have nevertheless been recorded and participate in the construction of the European building.

The Intergovernmental Conference, which ended in Nice in December 2000, was intended to limit the number of cases of unanimous decisions, adopt more democratic voting procedures and facilitate cooperation for a few. In addition to this last point, it must be noted that the objectives set have not been achieved. The failure to put collective ambition ahead of its own goals has somewhat distorted debates about the future of Europe. The prospect of enlargement and the problem of the functioning of the European institutions are short-term, the major challenges we are and will soon face.

While the enlargement process represents a fundamental and meaningful political act, it is also important for us that the deepening, stability and cohesion of Europe must be reaffirmed. This means, in particular, the integration of new strong institutional structures adapted to a European Union comprising 27 Member States.

Furthermore, bringing the European Union closer to its citizens must encourage us to redouble our efforts in policy, in pedagogy – as Mr. Leviathan in his speech. We must therefore aim to simplify the European body chart to make it more accessible, transparent and understandable for all Europeans.

The European Union desired by my group is one that will be more committed to the quality of work, the struggle for equal opportunities, against exclusion and against poverty.

This struggle goes through sustainable economic development, a necessary condition for the creation of jobs and wealth to share. It is also about ensuring the improvement of the quality of life of present and future generations in an area of freedom, security and justice.

In addition, Europe should be presented as a credible international actor to guarantee peace, security and work for greater social justice and solidarity. It is also essential to reaffirm our willingness to live in a united political Europe, based on democratic values. Finally, for the Socialist group, there is no question that the European Union is gradually diluting to become a mere free-trade zone. The Socialists therefore recall their willingness to continue the political integration of the European Union with a view to the construction of a federal Europe. Obviously, the Treaty of Nice must be perceived for what it is: an additional, ⁇ not fundamental, step in the European construction.

We will vote without hesitation and in favour of this project, without dénigrement, tout et le considérant à la place qui est la sienne. PS was at the time disappointed by the results of Nice, but will unanimously vote for the treaty because certain improvements were made. Their

The Intergovernmental Conference has failed to ⁇ objectives such as introducing more democratic voting procedures. But soon we will face even greater challenges: the expansion and integration of new institutional structures adapted to a Union of 27 Member States.

We must also strive to simplify the European organisational structure in order to make it more accessible to citizens. Their

We want Europe to be more committed to quality work and equal opportunities, as well as to fighting exclusion and poverty. It is also important that Europe acts as a credible partner in ⁇ ining peace and that Europeans express their will to live in a united and democratic Europe. The PS wants further work from the federal Europe. The Treaty of Nice must therefore be considered as a next step in that unification and we will therefore vote in favour.

Chamber -4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 Chamber -4 E SESSION OF THE 50 E LEGISLATURE

First and foremost, I would like to thank the speaker very sincerely and very warmly. Eyskens, for the quality of his report first, but especially for his personal analysis of the issue of the ratification of the Treaty of Nice. The very free remarks he has made, which, as usual, go very far and are very imaginative and very creative, also meet very widely with my conviction. Particularly in your assessment, your analysis of what concerns the Constitution, Mr. Eyskens, I clearly perceive that certain developments in relation to this subject, far from having to be interpreted as positive signs of some countries orienting towards this idea, must rather be interpreted with caution. I also believe, like you, that the price that true Europeans should pay in relation to the terminological concept of the Constitution would probably be much higher. I realized the risks that you mentioned on this subject and I can only share this point of view.

I know of course the criticisms aroused by the negotiations of this treaty. However, I think it is useful to distinguish between the method of negotiation, on the one hand, and the content of the treaty, on the other. The method first. Nice has undoubtedly shown the limits of negotiation within the traditional intergovernmental conference. In terms of content, the Treaty of Nice contains advances that are ⁇ not sufficient but which can nevertheless be called important. The implementation of these advances is conditioned by the ratification of the treaty which – I would like to recall – is intended for our excellent colleague, Mr. Lefevre — has already been ratified in a dozen Member States.

Mr. Lefevre, the position expressed by you is not in the tradition of your party. As I said before, I have too much appreciation for you to use hurtful words. I will do so with great modesty and moderation. I do not fully understand what you are looking for, which may motivate you to virtually isolate yourself in this Chamber and, what is most annoying to me, to break with the very great tradition, the more than honorable tradition and even with the historical contribution that your party has made to the European construction.

When you say that we do not respect, to some extent, the legacy of the Founding Fathers, we know well that this is not true. You know that is not fair. If the Founding Fathers, by a miracle in which I unfortunately have not yet been able to believe, were to come back today, they would, I think, be happy to find that today’s Europe is far more complete than they hoped when they launched the idea. And you also know, when you evaluate the way Europe was built, that it is a succession of small steps, of “stop and go”. There have been periods of stagnation, there have been crises, which, much more often than one imagines, gave rise to substantial advances, to leaps forward. You know that European construction, like any idea, like any great project, is never the reflection of a quiet history. There are always negotiations, there are always discussions. Let us not forget that we are fifteen today, that tomorrow we will be more and that therefore we must try to advance the idea, sometimes in a modest way, sometimes in a more ambitious way.

In fact, I was wrong. In the committee, I told you that you were a “euro-extremist”. I don’t think you’re a “euro-extremist”. In the end, you are a pessimist. I have heard you

I would like to thank the rapporteur for his sharp analysis of what is at stake in the ratification of the Nice Convention. I also believe that developments related to the constitution of some countries should be interpreted with the necessary caution. We have properly assessed the potential hazards you state, in particular with regard to the consequences for the citizens of the Union. It is necessary to distinguish between the method of negotiation and the conclusion that the IGC has its limitations and the content of the Convention, which in fact is a major step forward. It has already been ratified by a dozen Member States, and therefore I cannot understand the arguments of the PSC, in particular given the contribution that that party has made throughout history to European unification.

The European construction has experienced moments of crisis and periods of stagnation and has often been achieved only gradually. The idea of a Union has only gained ground through discussions and negotiations. Mr. Lefevre spoke pessimistic and fatalist language. You demonstrate rebelliousness, while now especially some thoughtwork is required. It is not too late: you can still ratify the Convention with us!

Nice has opened the perspective of Laken. All representatives of our country have supported the Presidency with heart and soul. For the first time, the future of the Union will be openly discussed. The Belgian government will do everything in its power to correct the shortcomings of Nice. If everyone refuses to ratify, it means the deadlock for the enlargement. This enlargement is the reunification of Europe, but also, and that is very important, the first authentic political act of the Union. We have the means, we also have the will. We Chamber -4 E SESSION OF THE 50E SESSION 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE ici avec un fatalisme qui faisait peine à voir — j'étais triste parce que vous êtes un bon ami —, une véritable résignation, une véritable démission. This does not resemble you. You engage you, once again, at reflection. It is still time to rejoin those who carry Europe, who want Europe and who want to make progress.

The declaration adopted in Nice opened a perspective which, I believe, we all, both the opposition and us, fully exploited at the Laeken European Council to launch the debate on the future of Europe. I have not yet had the opportunity to express my gratitude to the democratic parties of the opposition, whether CD&V, Volksunie or PSC. I find that, during this presidency, the whole democratic corpus of our country supported the presidency, at no time made an act that damaged the presidency. Ultimately, the success of the presidency is due to a truly remarkable Diplomatic Corps as well as a common front, a historically strong adherence of the democratic political corpus to the European idea. And I mean the recognition of the government representatives for this behavior, for this attitude.

It should be recalled that, for the first time, the future of European construction will be debated in an open, largely representative forum, in close relationship with civil society, in cooperation with the Parliament. The Belgian government will, of course, do everything in its power so that the imperfections of Nice can be corrected. I must say that the first sessions of the Convention have largely kept their promises. They confirmed the convergence of views between Member States and Candidate Countries on the horizon of Europe’s future. It is a horizon that is ambitious, that is generous and that is concrete. The work of the Convention only makes even more necessary, of course, the ratification of the Treaty of Nice.

Because there’s an argument that you don’t seem to consider enough, I think. If everyone had to do what you are preparing to do, i.e. not to ratify, I think I can say that would mean a terrible halt to enlargement. But the enlargement, with all its imperfections, with ⁇ its unpreparedness to some extent, with its unknown, with its uncertainties at the limit, is the European reconciliation, it is the reunification of Europe but it is also something else. I know you are sensitive to this. This is more than the economic and financial characteristics of Europe. The enlargement is the first genuine political act of the European Union.

Sometimes I wonder if I have the means. I usually answer with a formula. We have the means. You need to have the heart to do it. This is what is important. This is a political act. But, by definition, every political act involves a dimension of risks, uncertainties, ⁇ measured. Nothing is written in advance when a political act is made. It was important to remind him.

Failing to ratify the Treaty of Nice would be like sending the wrong signal to the candidate countries when they are participating for the first time in the debate on the future of the Union within the Convention. by

The absence of ratification would make the successful implementation of the Convention a new condition for enabling enlargement, which would obviously be contradictory and unacceptable.

The Treaty of Nice has, even though it contains some, just have to do it.

A political act always involves some risk and uncertainty, even if these are limited, but that is precisely what makes its charm.

We would give the candidate countries a wrong signal if we did not ratify this treaty. Their

The Treaty of Nice has delivered concrete results. It is above all the rearrangement of the weighting of the votes that has given the thread to retort and which has been the subject of long and virulent discussions. But we have no reason to be ashamed of it. Belgium has managed to limit the damage to small countries. The weighting was simplified from the outset, in view of the future enlargement to 27 Member States. This is a positive result. by

The reorganization of the composition of the European Commission has also been the subject of harsh negotiations. The current composition, with two Commissioners for the large Member States and one Commissioner for the small Member States, is not operational in the long term. I admit that we could have shown a little more courage in the negotiations, and recognize that a more narrow, and therefore more effective, Commission would have been the best option. The extension of the qualified majority was one of Belgium’s priorities. This extension is in approximately 30 areas. The co-decision power of the European Parliament is required for many matters.

In the framework of the Intergovernmental Conference, the Benelux had demanded a relaxation of conditions in matters of cooperation. The right of veto was abolished for the Prime Minister and the Third Pillar. In addition, the cooperation was limited to eight Member States. Cela vaut également pour la coopération dans CAMER -4 E SESSION OF THE 50th SESSION 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE imperfections, undoubtedly great progress made which cannot be put on the slope. I would like to remind you here of the achieved results. The prospect of enlargement requires a change in the voting arrangements in the Council, which has led to harsh negotiations. I think that is also logical. It is always said that negotiating is something that is not honorable, but that is the political life, I would even dare to say. You may not know what that means. Hard negotiations are actually the core of democracy. It is forgotten that too often there is therefore nothing that would not be honorable to harsh negotiations. During those negotiations, Belgium managed to keep the revision of the voting system within reasonable limits. Furthermore, the Treaty of Nice did not limit itself to developing a new voting system for the European Union of 15 Member States; it also established a progressive system that takes into account the extension of the Union to 27 Member States.

The perspective of an enlarged Union also raised the problem of the size and functioning of the Commission. The rule that gives two Commissioners to the big Member States and one Commissioner to the other threatened to hinder the proper functioning of the Commission in an enlarged European Union. Mr. Eyskens, I would like to intellectually and politically admit that we might have had to follow your advice when you tried to convince me. This was not the case at the time, but I changed my mind. You said in a yet convincing way that it might be good to determine and address the size of the Commission in a different way. We have been somewhat chauvinist intergovernmentally. We were afraid to admit that a smaller Commission might work better. In a sense, a smaller and more efficient Commission would ensure a much more community approach. The best way to defend and protect small countries depends, of course, on the community method. One cannot always be right and I think we would have been better inspired if we had that courage. For that gesture, we might have got other things in exchange.

This is the extension of the qualified majority. The increase in the number of cases in which the Council decides by qualified majority was one of Belgium’s priorities. The Treaty of Nice extends the qualified majority to 30 articles. We know that this is not enough. We were asking for much more. In addition, it provides that a certain number of provisions, which will be adopted by qualified majority, will require the co-decision of the European Parliament. We should welcome this progress, even though there are some constraints associated with the decision-making by qualified majority. This decision-making is sometimes accompanied by certain modalities or conditions that make it difficult and delay its application, for example in areas such as as asylum and immigration, foreign trade policy and structural funds. the domain of foreign policy and security policy, but that a veto may be opposed to the mise et oeuvre of the mechanism of cooperation. The respect for human rights and fundamental rights is being monitored even more closely thanks to a measure in the Convention submitted by Belgium. Given what happens in a particular neighboring country, this is not an unnecessary luxury. Their

On the part of defence, the Union’s military identity was strengthened.

The results may not be called miraculous, but they are also not insignificant, especially since on several points it was hard negotiated. I therefore advocate the ratification of the Treaty, otherwise the Union will reverse the clock indicators. Moreover, we did not submit this text to Parliament for ratification before the Laken Summit in order to develop a concept, a structure on the basis of which the Nice Treaty could be improved.

The ratification by fourteen Member States will be a clear argument for Ireland to reflect on its decision and will enable adjustments. I can hardly understand why one would be against the ratification of this Treaty. In conclusion, I regret that the ratification will not be supported by the heirs of the new founders of Europe, Harmel, Eyskens, Tindemans, Nothomb and Herman. Mr. Lefevre, you are a civilized man. Do nothing you might later regret. In the framework of the IGC, the Benelux called for the easing of the conditions for the implementation of the enhanced cooperation. We also obtained them. The right of veto, which allows each Member State to oppose the initiation of enhanced cooperation in the first and third pillars, was abolished. The number of countries needed to initiate mechanisms of enhanced cooperation was limited to 8. In the future, it will be possible to develop closer cooperation in the fields of foreign policy and security policy. CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION DE LA 50 E LEGISLATURE This result is important even if it is accompanied by limitations. In this area, a Member State will always be able to veto the launch of the mechanism.

With regard to the safeguarding of human rights and fundamental freedoms, a new procedure has been inserted into the Treaty in order to strengthen existing mechanisms to ensure that the fundamental rights are respected by Member States. This improvement follows, as you know, a Belgian proposal for the establishment of a preventive system of democratic control. Recent results recorded in neighboring countries show that such procedures are not unnecessary. by

Now to the European Security and Defence Policy.

The Treaty of Nice has, on the basis of a proposal from the Benelux and Italy, strengthened the Union’s military identity. by

After September 11, it is urgent to ratify those decisions that will give concrete content to the Union’s operational character in crisis management.

The results recorded in Nice are not miraculous, nobody has ever claimed it. But they are also not insignificant. Some have been – it is true – obtained from high struggle and I’m not at all sure that a negotiation like that of Nice will lead to better results today. In reality, and given the position of some partner countries on the future of European construction, I am convinced of the opposite.

All these reasons lead me, Mr. Speaker, dear colleagues, to advocate for the ratification of the Treaty of Nice. In the current context, a negative vote on this draft would be equivalent to bringing the Union backwards. You also know that in order to justify the arguments that we know and have already been widely expressed, we did not want to present the draft ratification before the Laeken Summit. We wanted to be sure that at the Laeken Summit, we would get a mechanism, a structure, a concept to improve the Treaty of Nice. That is why we can present this project to you today. by

Ratification by fourteen Member States is also – and it is not negligible – the most effective way to persuade the Irish people to reconsider their position. Can one imagine for a moment the consequences this could have if, today, a member state, which has always been very European, sent this sign to the Irish. by

To ratify the Treaty of Nice is also to give the Convention, I have just said, a chance to correct in serenity the imperfections of the Treaty. That is why I would like to make a last call. I find it difficult to understand what could be the most-value even political refusal to ratify this treaty. There has always been in our country a very broad consensus beyond the opposition-majority split. There has never been a line of fracture between Democrats in support of European advances and treaties. That is why I allow myself to insist one last time. It is clear that this treaty will be ratified, but what would be a shame, Mr. Lefevre, is that it will be without the heirs of the most prestigious men who gave to the European construction many of its letters of nobility. I do not dare to imagine the suffering that KAMER -4 E ZITTING VAN DE 50 E ZITTINGSPERIODE 2001 2002 CHAMBRE -4 E SESSION OF THE 50 E LEGISLATURE you could inflict by your vote on men as prestigious as mr. Harmel, Eyskens, Tindemans, Nothomb, Herman and many more. But you still have time to think. You are an honest man, I know. You will definitely think. If you do not, you will regret it.