Proposition 50K1183

Projet de loi spéciale portant refinancement des Communautés et extension des compétences fiscales des Régions.

General information ¶

Submitted by

Groen Open Vld Vooruit PS | SP Ecolo MR Verhofstadt Ⅰ

Submission date

March 29, 2001

Official page

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Status

Adopted

Requirement

Simple

Subjects

transfer of competence regionalisation regional finances

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Discussion ¶

May 31, 2001 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

I refer to the written report.

Does anyone ask for the word?

May 30, 2001 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, you may understand that in my answer I cannot fully address all points of the numerous and detailed interventions and that I will therefore provide a more general answer, although I will respond to a number of comments that I find very important.

I will begin with a political note of a more general nature, in particular that this part of the State Reform has arisen in a ⁇ difficult situation with an equally difficult underlying pattern of thought. For many years before the elections, Dutch-speakers and French-speakers each tried to determine and capture a thought track for themselves. On both sides it was forgotten — and all political parties are to blame for this — that, in order to make a step forward, cooperation and agreements are necessary.

A Flemish requirement package was compiled that was declared as undisputed to change. Before the elections, the French speakers set up a kind of rejection front in the assumption that it could stand. However, such a policy has never worked in our country, and now neither. This led to the fact that the initiation of this state reform itself was more difficult than ever. After all, the two communities started out of a defensive attitude and the first steps took a lot of effort.

With the first agreements, however, the first steps were taken, and what now stands in both the Chamber and the Senate, is the implementation not only of this, but also of the solid agreement that we tried to ⁇ .

In the Chamber I heard declaring that it was necessary to weigh out how much money one community receives and what powers are given to the other community for this purpose. However, I cannot agree with this reasoning.

The essence of the funding provided is that the resources of the Communities and the Regions, on the one hand, and of the federal government, on the other, evolve uniformly, in particular in connection with the evolution of the GDP, both for the federal government and for the communities. In this way, the upcoming major challenges can be addressed at both levels.

It is not a question of unilateral giving. In the future, the resources will be distributed across the different levels so that all needs can be met. The fact that this should be discussed today is due to the fact that in the past it was not possible to put a well-structured mechanism on its feet. However, sooner or later agreements had to be made in that sense, without which problems would be faced either at the federal level or at the level of communities and regions, of course at the expense of those for whom the policy is carried out precisely.

The idea that we exchange powers for resources is not the right approach.

I have also heard here that with this draft we are returning again to the three-part state reform. This is a strange assessment. In 1993, I already understood that the whole discussion about duality and tripleity has finally taken a different form. As stated at the time in the committee — nota bene by Jean-Marie Dehousse — a definitive step was taken in realizing the cohesion of the North based on the community and the South on the regions, with the German Community as the outer bone. I learned this asymmetry in 1993. They did not choose one or the other, but they tried to make sure that the important accents that the North and the South wanted to place were both realized. That was the meaning of the St-Michiels Agreements and that phrase remains.

I also mentioned tax autonomy. I would like to clarify the following in this regard. If one wants to examine the extent of fiscal autonomy, one should not compare the resources with the resources of the Flemish Community. Tax autonomy belongs to the regions and therefore it must be compared with the regions. This law allows the Flemish Region to determine 58% of its resources itself, through fiscal autonomy. That is the result. We are talking about about 60%, which is more than in most federal states.

by Mr. Poncelet desired clarifications on the subject of progressivity, requesting in particular to insert in the law the definitions that appear for the moment in the Tax Code of 1992. The Government considers that it is not appropriate to legislate by reference to an existing legislation that is in any case likely to evolve. However, the Government confirms that, in order to assess the potential impacts on progressive taxation, reference should be made to the content and concept of the 1992 Income Tax Code, in particular the provisions of Title II, Chapter 3.

Similarly, the Government considers it inappropriate to include in a special law the list of definitions contained in the amendment submitted by Mr. and Poncelet. However, we have agreed to reintroduce this list in the report. The draft law transfers exclusive tax powers in a number of subjects. This transfer extends to all the taxes listed in Article 3 of the Special Financing Act as their respective taxable subjects are currently fixed by law.

As regards tax loyalty, the draft law aims to extend the tax powers of the regions. This extension fits into a cooperative and integral federalism that aims to further shape the government with the draft special law on the refinancing of the Communities. This general framework is specified, inter alia, by Articles 11 and 12. Article 11 stipulates that the Regions shall exercise their tax powers in the field of personal tax with the exclusion of unfair tax competition. This is an anchor point in the federal state structure whose legal development is entrusted to the Arbitration Court and not to the legislature. Article 12 provides that the Regions shall submit their decrees relating to their powers in the field of personal tax for advice to the Court of Auditors. This submission for advice takes place in the context of respect for tax loyalty. I repeat what I said in the committee, but what was not notted. This provision expresses the general objective of the draft law but does not intend to establish the authority that some confer on it. The opinion of the Court of Auditors should only concern compliance with the maximum percentages and the principle of progressiveness as set out in Article 9 of the draft law concerned.

A specific question was asked about the National Plant Garden. We do not want to leave the slightest doubt about the transfer of the National Plant Garden of Belgium to the Flemish Community. As set out in Article 15(3) of the draft delegating various powers to the Communities and the Regions, the plant garden shall be transferred after a cooperation agreement has been concluded between the Communities. A cooperation agreement was negotiated, the text of which was made available to the members. Article 1 is very clear. The National Plant Garden of Belgium, with the exception of the scientific and genetic collections, the herbarium and the library is transferred to the Flemish Community. The Government stresses that Article 9 of the Cooperation Agreement will be aligned with the transfer of funds to the Communities as provided for in Article 41 of the draft special law on refinancing of communities. If a problem arises in the future with regard to the dispatch of staff, it will be ensured that the financing is coordinated with the staff made available. The consultation committee will amend the cooperation agreement. I will go a little deeper into the issue of development cooperation. It is alleged that the agreement on development cooperation is not respected. I want to refresh the memory. The original agreement stipulated that the powers relating to the Communities and the Regions would be transferred. The agreement also stipulated that this removal would not be regulated by this law. The original agreement stipulated that only paragraphs 1 to 7 would be included in the law. The above-mentioned texts are an attempt to move forward without now aligning everything. According to Article 6 of the draft, from 2004 parts will be transferred insofar as they relate to community and district competences. We would like to give this provision an adequate fulfillment. Therefore, the establishment of a special working group is necessary. One does not work à l’improviste, ⁇ not in a legal text. In consultation with the sector concerned, a precise list of aspects of development cooperation to be defederalized will be drawn up. The law stipulates and the Government undertakes that the work of this working group must be completed by 31 December 2002. Other information provided, such as the report of the hearings in the Senate, may be useful and complementary.

At some point there were points. It has been said that this design is not the best possible or the most beautiful. I have no trouble admitting this. The whole history of our country teaches us that we have succeeded in evolving without violence, without loss of prosperity, and without international oppression, from a unitary state to a federal state. This happened because parties, parliamentarians and political leaders were willing to compromise and listen.

It is the compromise that has made our country evolve from the unitary state to the federal state. The government knows that the draft is not perfect and if amendments were the subject of broad consensus in this assembly, I don’t see why not accept them.

Mr Coveliers has the word.

Mr. Speaker, taking into account the Minister’s suggestion, I ask that you suspend the meeting for one hour in order to discuss and sign possible amendments.

Mr. Speaker, I find this very sympathetic, but one should not play too much with the feet of Parliament. If there is a suspension, I suggest that it be suspended until tomorrow morning.

No, a suspension is usually of limited duration. Mr. Coveliers, I think an hour is too long.

Considering my sympathy for you, I agree to a suspension until 22.15.

We suspend until 22:00.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the Minister if the Council of Ministers has just met.

Johan Vande Lanotte: No, that is not true.

Has the Nuclear Cabinet met?

Johan Vande Lanotte: Mr. Chairman, until further order, I do not have to say when, where and how the Nuclear Cabinet will meet.

At the request of the VLD group leader, the meeting is suspended until 22:00.

De vergadering wordt geschorst om 21.26 h. The session is suspended at 21.26 a.m. De vergadering wordt hervat om 22.45 h. The session will be resumed at 22.45.

Dear colleagues, the Government responded to the various speakers who spoke during the general discussion. by

The government had held a replica for several speakers, but as you know, Parliament has the last word. Does anyone want to replicate to the replica of Minister Vande Lanotte? (No to)

Then I must inform you that I have received a number of amendments, as well as their translation. The amendments were signed by Poncelet, Coveliers, Eerdekens, Bacquelaine, Van der Maelen, Tavernier and Gobert. These amendments have been submitted to Articles 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17 and 52bis (new).

I leave these documents round in the room. Are there any questions about the general discussion?

A briefing on your communication.

I mentioned what I mentioned and I read what I read.

As far as I know, there was no member of the People's Union.

You are big enough to know who you are. I read the names.

Thank you, Mr President.

and no. and no.

and no?

General discussion is closed. The general discussion is closed.

May 30, 2001 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, we talked a lot about St. Polycarpe and, which is not in my habits, I did bibliographic research. I found "A Life of Fathers, Martyrs and Major Saints" by Abbot Godescart, work published in 1834. I would like to communicate to the Chamber the result of my search.

In the sixth year of the reign of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, a violent persecution against the Christians of Asia began. The bishop of the church of Smyrna, Polycarp, then already 86 years old, was a victim all designated for the persecutors. Driven into the amphitheatre where his torment was to take place, he heard a voice coming from heaven, saying, “Courage, Polycarpe, hold fast.” In the absence of the lion that could have devoured him, they set fire to the straw that was to consume him. But by a surprising miracle, the flames curving into a bow and representing a ship veil swollen by the wind, spread around the saint. Despited, his bullies gave him a punch. The blood of the martyr came out in such abundance that he extinguished the fire. It was on April 25, at eight o’clock. It is celebrated on January 26. Here, Mr. Speaker, is the result of my research in this book of 1834.

Thus these were the circumstances which made, 18 centuries later, the martyr bishop of Smyrna the patron in Brussels of a much less glorious political agreement. For, contrary to the heavenly counsel given to Polycarp, the French-speaking majority, she, did not hold well. There was therefore no miracle: the negotiation gave rise to a bad agreement. The majority presents us with bad texts and they are not even, it seems, able to gather the necessary votes to strengthen them by a positive vote in the House.

Before examining the different articles of the special bill that is submitted to us, I would like to take the time and the retreat to replace it in the evolution of the structure of our State. The latter has passed in about thirty years from a decentralized unitary structure to a federal structure. Since December 1970, the constitution provides that Belgium consists of three regions and three communities.

Since July 1971, the French and Flemish Communities — called at the time "cultural" — have been created, organized and have been assigned legislative powers.

In August 1980, the third community was created and two of the three regions were set up. They have been granted significant competences and a certain tax liability.

In August 1988 and January 1989, the Third Region was created, the competences of the regions and communities were substantially increased, as well as their financial resources and their tax autonomy.

From that moment on, all the constitutionalists agreed to qualify this structure of our state as federal. by

In 1993, the federal structure of the state was "complete", as the title of the special law proposal of the time specifies. Therefore, the federal character of the state was proclaimed. In particular, the funding law was amended and the direct election of regional councils was instituted. The process of federalization was generally achieved.

The PSC participated in each of these stages of the federalization of Belgium, sometimes with the liberals, sometimes with the socialists, sometimes with the community parties, sometimes with the ecologists. The French-speaking social-Christian are essentially proud of this because they have always been supporters of the principle of subsidiarity and the maintenance of a strong interpersonal solidarity between all citizens.

Overall, we believed — unlike the PRL, for which we were already going far too far — that the result achieved after the 1993 reform constituted a point of balance beyond which we did not want to go. That is why it was agreed that the 1993 reform was aimed at "complete the federal structure of the state", as its title indicates. by

Despite the rapid questioning by the Flemish side of the definitive character of the established structure, the French-speaking parties held solidary to this thesis until the day after the last parliamentary elections. To reinforce their rejection of a new reform, the French-speaking parties of the government of the time — the PS and the PSC — ensured that the declaration of revision of the Constitution was minimalist, to the greatest damn of the Flemish. They thus prevented the transfer of certain new powers, such as the organic legislation of the provinces and municipalities, during the present legislature, unless a real institutional coup d’état took place.

This firm attitude of the French-speaking parties was justified by the increasingly serious doubts they experience in relation to the objectives pursued through state reforms by the Flemish partners. Rather than doubts, we should now speak of certainty: the goal of the Flemish parties is no longer a distribution of competences inspired by an interest in efficiency and subsidiarity, but rather its independence. by

The steps that should lead Flanders to independence are announced by the resolutions of the Flemish parliament: tax autonomy, regionalization of municipal and provincial laws, territoriality and non-interference, federalization of health care and family allowances, homogeneous blocks of competence, etc.

The unanimous refusal of the Franco-speaking parties to negotiate a new reform was therefore a strong signal to the Flemish parties: either you accept the institutional status quo, which testifies to your willingness to continue in a federal framework and we continue together, or you reject this status quo, which testifies to your willingness to leave the federal framework and you are taking the consequences. The signal was clear and strong.

By breaking the solidarity pact concluded beyond the majority/opposition split between the French-speaking parties and accepting to satisfy much of the demands of the Flemish parliament, the PRL-FDF, the PS and Ecolo have in fact accepted to make an important step towards Flanders independence. In fact, what will be the credibility of French speakers when they say tomorrow they want to refuse the federalization of social security or justice? By surrendering now, they condemned themselves to accept tomorrow the subsequent steps that will lead Flanders to independence.

In other words, as much as the content of the reform, which is equally serious and critical, it is the fact that this reform intervenes in violation of the solemn commitments taken together by all the French-speaking democratic parties. by

The signal given to the Flemish is that of the acceptance by the Francophone of the direction in which Flanders lead us, that is, its independence. Does this mean that the PSC would have preferred to camp on a refusal to negotiate a new state reform at the risk of seeing Flanders draw the consequences?

The answer to this question is definitely positive for two reasons. On the one hand, it is unlikely that Flanders' response to this refusal would have been its departure from the Belgian Federation. The minds are not mature or rather not yet mature for this in the Flemish public opinion. On the other hand, the cost of this independence would be exorbitant for Flanders, in the current state of our Belgian and European institutions: loss of international credibility, abandonment of Brussels and the French-speaking majority municipalities, taking over a substantial part of the debt and loss of this Belgian “label” that still exists.

The Francophone have every interest in preserving their interests and ⁇ the Federal Belgium to no longer accept any state reform until the debate on the purpose of the state reform has been definitively settled, either in the sense of ⁇ ining a strong federal state, that is, grosso modo the statu quo, or in the sense of Flanders independence.

Naturally, the PSC wants the outcome of this debate to be the maintenance of a Belgian federation, strong, efficient, organized on the basis of subsidiarity and solidarity and participating in an optimal way in the increasingly numerous decisions that will have to be taken at the European level. One of the essential reasons for our attitude is our attachment to what unites people rather than what divides them, tolerance and openness to other cultures and languages rather than intolerance and self-reliance. What happened in Czechoslovakia first, in Yugoslavia then, testifies cruelly to this. by

It is obviously not unnecessary to find that the party that most advocates the independence of Flanders is a party that advocates exclusion, discrimination, intolerance.

Because we are deeply attached to the multilingual and multicultural character of our country, which, in our view, constitutes an invaluable wealth, we oppose its dismantling. We cannot, however, cover our faces: there is in front of us a formidable separatist machine that works with a terrible efficiency. If we fail to prevent separation, we must ensure that it is not detrimental to the interests of the French speakers of our country.

Now, we are now convinced that the technique of small steps followed by Flanders so far is the most detrimental to the French-speaking interests, especially when it is accompanied by the division of the French-speaking. Each step, instead of satisfying the appetite of the independentists, excites them. Every step, however small it may be, is part of a comprehensive strategy, which is not hidden! - and contains in it the germs of other not much more significant new concessions stripped. Each step is seen on one side for what it represents intrinsically and on the other for all that it carries as not future.

If Flanders are determined to refuse the status quo because they aspire to independence, would it not be better for all to stop covering their faces and negotiate separation? At least the question deserves to be asked and the negotiation to be prepared. French speakers must understand that they cannot want to be Belgians alone, that a marriage cannot survive the determination of one of the two spouses to end it. by

The reform that we and proposed includes a significant “financing” component of the communities, both communities and, in the first place, the Flemish community. We have the right to rejoice. In itself, the conditions for a balanced agreement could already have been met: refinancing the two communities. Indeed, the government could have decided to devote to education and culture, through better community financing, in a fair distribution, part of the famous margins of growth. Why was it necessary to add an institutional component of such a scale, if not because it was the requirement of the small Flemish partner, whose majority had at once become prisoners? Having become its hostage for the reasons known – the exclusion at all costs of the social-Christian – the majority could no more than give in to every new claim of the Volksunie.

If it was to be with certainty the “dar des der”, this reform could be accepted in its financing component, by means of a number of corrections. But we already have the certainty that this will not be the case. Indeed, this time, like the previous ones, the Flemish took care to keep a door open, to keep the French speakers in a situation of applicants on one or the other point, in order to guarantee a later step. Following the insufficient financing of the communities in 1989 and 1993, there will probably be tomorrow a gradual strangling, financially, of the Brussels Region.

Let us not misunderstand ourselves, this criticism of the Lambermont or St. Polycarp agreements is far from incompatible with that formulated by the Flemish opposition. We denounce the outcome to which the majority-decided reform leads (Flanders independence under conditions unfavorable to French speakers), while our colleagues from the CVP, who consider this outcome as achieved on the basis of the weakness of French speakers in the government, denounce the too slow pace of progress towards this outcome.

It is therefore impossible to infer from the existence of Flemish and French-speaking criticisms, as virulent one as the other, the balanced character of the agreement concluded at Saint-Polycarpe, because these criticisms are not of the same order. One concerns the direction in which he trains us, the other concerns the speed in which we are trained. To take a picture: the CVP reproaches the train for having a few minutes late; the PSC reproaches it for having mistaken destination. This is the context in which the special draft law is subject to our examination. by

This project presents itself as a small step further, but a decisive step, towards the independence of Flanders and it constitutes a betrayal of French-speaking voters by the majority parties. To conduct a policy that leads to the independence of Flanders under conditions unfavorable to French speakers, the government obviously does not have a majority among French speakers. The ongoing reform, if it succeeds, would therefore only be the result of a deception towards French-speaking voters and the forbidden fruit of a usurped majority.

I would like to quickly summarize the fundamental criticisms my group has to formulate against the project that is submitted to us. As I said before in the committee, they are, in our opinion, in number of five. I will first quote them briefly and then develop them.

1 of 1. The breakdown of solidarity between communities, resulting from the fundamental change decided. In fact, we move from a key for the distribution of community funding per student to a key based on the income of the tax of individuals in communities. Thus, Flanders will receive, for each student, more funds from the federal than the French Community. by

2 of 2. The delay in financing as it is organized does not unfortunately lift the bankruptcy threats that plunge on the French Community and all the institutions that depend on it.

3 of 3. The insufficiency, not to say the inexistence, of safeguards intended to prevent the tax autonomy proclaimed by this provision from resulting in a dramatic tax competition.

4 of 4. The absence of refinancing of the Brussels Region risks bringing French speakers back into a position of applicants in a few years.

5 of 5. The confederate character of the reform is reflected by the undue use of cooperation agreements. by

First, the breakdown of solidarity between communities. The additional resources granted to communities will no longer be based on the number of students in each community, but on the wealth of each community. The wealthiest community will therefore receive more per student than the less wealthy community. This undoubtedly represents a break in the solidarity between communities, as it resulted from the previous funding law. by

We regret this even more because this is the second break of solidarity between communities. The French speakers of the rainbow majority admitted the same rupture for the conclusion of the so-called agreements of Saint-Eloi. Indeed, in the law of May 2000, these same French speakers agreed to renounce the rights conferred on them, according to the Council of State, Article 39 of the previous funding law, which provided for a distribution of resources between the communities according to the criterion of the number of students. However, in May 2000, the Francophone accepted that the students bisseurs or trisseurs - proportionally more in the French Community due to social and cultural situations that we know - are excluded from the distribution of resources. Hence a cost for the French Community of 1.8 billion francs, to which it must be added the 3.6 billion to which it renounced for 1999, since this year was excluded from the modification. by

At that time, I had expressed the hope that this renunciation of solidarity would not promise more serious ones. My hopes are cruelly disappointed. I no longer dare to express the wish that the present renunciation of French speakers is not the augur of further renunciations for what concerns social security tomorrow.

Secondly, the delay in the implementation of this funding mechanism. by

Given the irresponsible budgetary policy carried out by the current government of the French Community and the serious concessions made during the SaintEloi agreements, the refinancing provided by this bill will not be sufficient to avoid the spectre of the bankruptcy of the French Community. by

Indeed, for the years 1999 to 2004, the Lambermont agreements provide for a cumulative refinancing of 16.9 billion francs, while the cumulative net balance to be financed for the same period is 41.6 billion francs. The borrowing capacity was determined by the standards of the Supreme Council of Finance at 23.7 billion. The impasse for the year 2002 alone reaches 3.5 billion francs, beyond the Community’s borrowing capacity. by

Hence the question: why do not refinancing measures, which go hand in hand politically with tax autonomy, come into force simultaneously? by

Furthermore, if the Francophone had obtained their debt on the basis of the law of financing at Saint-Eloi, they would have benefited over the same period of 13.6 billion additional francs. If the community government had been responsible, it could have avoided raising the bill of more than 2 billion francs in additional cabinet fees, linked to the doubling of the number of ministers. by

This means that, for the period from 1999 to 2004, the refinancing obtained at Saint Polycarpe will have served essentially (15.6 out of 16.9 billion) to compensate for the concessions made to Saint-Eloi and the increases in cabinet expenses related to the plethora of ministers of the French Community. To ⁇ this, the price paid is not exorbitant, it is denial. by

In any case, the refinancing obtained will not avoid serious difficulties for the French Community for the years 2002 and 2003. If I succumbed to the same demagogy as the members of the majority, I would say that refinancing will not prevent the bankruptcy of the community. I do not want to give in to this demagogy, because I am confident that a rigorous management of the money of the community and those of the Walloon region must allow to find the necessary means to avoid this bankruptcy. It is not the sources of economics that are lacking, but the political will. The political will within the community and the region, and first the federal majority, to make the entry into force of refinancing measures coincide with those of tax autonomy. This is the political agreement presented. The political will to question a certain number of baronnies, whether it is cabinet costs, the cost of administration, intercommunal, provinces. The political will to bring the cost of the various networks closer, to rationalize. by

The difference between the subsidies granted to official education and the subsidised is 10 billion francs per year. In the irresponsible logic that is its own, the Government of the French Community will face serious financial difficulties with or without the refinancing provided by this project. This refinancing is insufficient.

Third, the serious risk of fiscal competition.

While a large number of EU Member States complain about the tax competition that other Member States or non-EU Member States deliver to them, and that they therefore seek to harmonize their taxation to eliminate this tax competition, the project that is submitted to us opens the door to a significant tax autonomy of each of the regions. In doing so, he takes the risk of creating within Belgium itself a tax competition in the image of the one that prevails on the European level and that everyone strives to fight. This is a serious risk, especially for French speakers and for people with low incomes. Tax autonomy allows regions to determine different levels of taxation for each of them. This can lead one region to increase its taxes, and the other to reduce them. If tax autonomy concerns taxes whose tax base is mobile, differences in tax level may incentivise the shift of the taxable bases from regions where taxes are high to those where they are lower, no one wishing to pay more taxes than is necessary. In such a perspective, the region that has lowered its taxes can hope to offset the loss of revenue associated with a lower level of taxation by increasing the number of taxpayers. Conversely, the region with the higher level of taxation risks losing the income advantage of this level of taxation by decreasing the number of its taxpayers. If this is the case, this region will have to lower its tax level to keep its taxpayers and thus lose revenue.

Two consequences therefore arise from tax competition: the reduction of the overall tax pressure through successive downward adjustments and the correlative decrease in tax revenues of different regions. In the case of tax competition, it is always the wealthiest entity that wins because it has more revenue and less expenditure and can therefore more easily deprive itself of some of these revenue or invest them appropriately.

In Belgium, there is a rich region – and that will be even more in the future thanks to the refinancing it will benefit through the community – and two poorer regions. I understand that the rich want to enjoy their wealth, but I do not understand that the less wealthy accept a change in the rules of the game that will impoverish them more and more.

I believe I can understand that French-speaking liberals see tax competition as a means of limiting taxation in Wallonia and reducing a number of abuses in Wallonia’s management of public money. If this really were the case, I would be happy. But then I find it difficult to understand the attitude of socialists and environmentalists, who risk seeing disappearing the means to conduct the policies they want.

This shows that the granting of increased tax autonomy to regions can not be decided if it is not accompanied by indispensable safeguards to prevent this autonomy from resulting in the crushing of the least rich by the richest.

However, the examination of the different chapters of the project shows that the guards set up are clearly insufficient to prevent tax competition, given in particular the extent of the granted autonomy. I would like to quickly review these shelters from the point of view of their content first and their punishment then.

The contents of the guards.

The prohibition made to regions to reduce the progressive tax on natural persons (IPP) has suffered several criticisms. The definition of the notion of progressiveness, which constitutes a crucial element of the arrangement established, does not appear in the text of the law and is relegated in the explanation of reasons. This is unacceptable because either this definition binds regions and must be included in the text, or it does not bind them and the way is open to the worst of tax competitions, the one on high incomes, more likely to relocate.

Furthermore, we believe that the mechanism of protection against progressive taxation has significant gaps. During the committee work, I had submitted, in the form of a question, an example of a tax arrangement which, in my opinion, is not covered by the arrangement established. Could the Flemish Parliament decide to grant for a fixed period a tax reduction to all persons who settled in Flanders after a certain date, or to all persons who built in Flanders after a certain date, or to all self-employed persons who settled in Flanders? I have not received a response from the Minister of Finance.

And for a simple reason: the project does not contain any provision that would prohibit this type of tax reduction that both targets high incomes, only likely to relocate and at the same time incites to relocate for a fiscal purpose. The question remains unanswered!

In the same order of ideas, the draft authorizes general tax reductions, whether or not differentiated by tax fraction, while on the other hand, it prohibits infringing on the progressiveness of the tax. There is there obviously a contradiction of threats that is so much heavier that the definition of progressivity of the tax is not found in the device of the project.

The project also has significant gaps in terms of the concepts it uses without defining them. This blur is intended to enable the region that will want to bypass the few sluts to the tax competition that the project contains. It will be ⁇ detrimental with regard to the definition of taxable bases and criteria for the location of taxes. As you can see, the rules set out in the project are far from avoiding a dangerous tax competition for French speakers in general and for the most modest people in particular. Now to the punishment of the guards. There is even more serious or even more surprising: the violation of rules that impose quantitative limits on the tax autonomy of regions in terms of IPP will not be punishable.

Articles 6, §2 and 9, §1 of the Special Financing Act intend, in fact, to impose quantitative limits on the power of regions to collect additional cents, to grant reductions — qualified in the draft of remissions — as well as to implement reductions and increases of taxes — qualified in the draft of general tax increases. Indeed, on the one hand, the reductions may not exceed the amount of the product allocated to the region concerned and, on the other hand, a maximum percentage of IPP revenue is applied to the total of general tax reductions and increases, additional cents and discounts.

A control a priori by the Court of Auditors is instituted by Article 12 of the draft which inserts a new Article 9bis into the Special Financing Act. The control exercised a priori by the Court of Auditors suffers from two weaknesses: on the one hand, it is exercised from theoretical projections which may prove erroneous due to the insufficiency or inaccuracy of the data provided by the region concerned to the Court and, on the other hand, the opinion given by the Court does not bind the political authorities concerned.

For the PSC, the opinion given by the Court of Auditors in these circumstances must obviously be made binding, it must prevent the draft decree deemed incompatible with the financing law, if there is exceeding the permitted margins – and that was the meaning of an amendment that I had filed. It is about meeting the first weakness stated, but not meeting the second. by

In order to meet the second weakness, it is necessary — and that was the meaning of another amendment I had submitted — to amend the Special Law on the Arbitration Court to allow it to exercise its control in the matter a posteriori. Indeed, the six-month period provided for in Article 3 of the Special Act on the Arbitration Court does not allow a review of the violation of Articles 6 and 9 of the Special Law on Financing in so far as the extent or the extent of the additional income or the subtracted income resulting from the decree or the order taken on the basis of these provisions as well as the extent of the overall income of the IPP can be assessed with certainty only after the end of the tax recruitment.

However, it is precisely from the comparison of these elements that the compatibility of the standard in question with Articles 6 and 9 of the Finance Act depends.

Therefore, in order to avoid that the limits laid down in the draft by Articles 6 and 9 of the Special Financing Act may be violated impunely by one or another region, it is appropriate to provide in the Special Law on the Arbitration Court a specific time limit for appeal that allows a applicant to bring his appeal beyond the six-month period currently provided by that law. In order to provide the applicant with a reasonable time to prepare his appeal in knowledge of the facts, i.e. after the expiry of the period for recruitment of the tax on which the subtractable is collected, it is provided that the period within which the appeal must be brought expires only six months after the expiry of that period.

If the amendment we have submitted in this sense is not adopted, the limits set by this Act to the tax competition on the IPP will be left to the goodwill of each region, which means that they will remain dead letter.

I conclude from this brief, somewhat technical analysis that the project does not contain the minimum necessary safeguards to protect the Brussels and Walloon regions from a debrided fiscal competition. Competition that Flanders risk to deliver to them, thanks in particular to the refinancing of communities from which it will benefit more widely than its Brussels and Walloon counterparts. Thus, the latter risk losing through tax competition all the fruit of the refinancing obtained.

Fourth criticism, the definition — if I dare to use this neologism — structural of the Brussels Region. The Brussels Region needs to be refinanced for an amount ranging from 12 to 18 billion francs, according to the estimates of experts and the Brussels government. For years, this refinancing has been in vain. The Lambermont and Lombard agreements were an exceptional opportunity to finally obtain this refinancing.

We regret that this opportunity has not been seized. But what we regret even more is that the project that is submitted to us risks to further aggravate the delicate budgetary situation of the Brussels-Capital Region.

Indeed, the mechanism aimed at ensuring the budget neutrality of the regionalization of different taxes will have very likely catastrophic consequences on the resources available in the future to the Brussels Region. For Brussels, which depends more than other regions on regional taxes and is more exposed to the consequences of tax competition in the Flemish Region due to its geographical position, this could eventually mean a loss of revenue of about 7 to 10% of the current regional budget.

The security mechanism put in place to avoid this outcome is completely insufficient. It does not even guarantee that the Brussels Region will have, during the period in which this mechanism is applied — since it is only transitory — means equivalent in real terms to those, already insufficient, which it currently has. This means that the region’s purchasing power could decrease without this mechanism being applied.

Therefore, there is a risk of seeing the Brussels Region tomorrow in a situation comparable to the one that the French Community is experiencing today. Fearing to see its inhabitants leave for a taxally more favourable region, the Brussels Region will not be able to compensate for its deficit by an increase in taxation. In this case, the Brussels will inevitably demand a refinancing, in a few years, which will again be sold for a decrease in solidarity, through a de-federalization of social security or against the establishment of a full and complete tutelage of Flanders on Brussels.

As we can see, fiscal autonomy is loaded with threats to the future of the Brussels Region which, becoming ex-blooded, risks being put under the tutelage of Flanders against the will of its inhabitants. The fifth and final criticism, Mr. Speaker, is the confederate character of the reform, betrayed by the excessive use of cooperation agreements.

Before concluding my speech, I would like to emphasize the confederate character of the reform proposed to us, which will result from the aspect discussed in the Senate, but also from the denaturation of cooperation agreements.

In the 1988 reform, regional cooperation agreements played a marginal role. They aimed at solving specific technical problems falling within the competence of the regions but exceeding the territory of either of them. This was the case, in particular, in the field of public works where there was an objective need, due to the technical nature of the matter, to conclude a cooperation agreement.

During the 1993 reform, cooperation agreements played a more important role, ⁇ in the field of international relations, but it was within a well-defined constitutional framework. When such a framework was not defined, as was the case for associations of municipalities or provinces for a purpose of public utility, this led to enormous difficulties.

With the current reform, the role of cooperation agreements has been further expanded. For us, this enlargement very clearly reflects the confederate drift induced by the reform that is subject to us. Indeed, from now on, the special legislator delegates to cooperation agreements the care to settle the issues that he is not able to solve himself in a clear way. Read the agreement on the Botanical Garden of Meise. It is a delegation that is made by the special legislator to cooperation agreements, i.e. to each of the communities and regions to decide.

This, therefore, leads to a double drift: on the one hand, a series of questions are exempt from the obligation to gather a two-thirds majority and, on the other hand, the federal authority is excluded from the debate when it is concerned. Thus, there is a gradual transfer of the "competence of competence" from the federal to the regions that act together. The federal interest becomes the result of the sum of the interests of the regions, as the general interest is the sum of the particular interests in a liberal logic. This drift is precisely what characterizes confederalism and we regret it.

I come to my conclusions, Mr. Speaker.

The biggest paradox of this negotiation lies in the ambivalent role of the three French-speaking parties and in particular of the PRL-FDF.

It has always been known that the Wallonian socialists are acquired by the thesis of a minimum federal state. Any transfer of new skills is welcome as long as they fall into the wing of the PS State, that they increase its power. For some time, it has been known that French-speaking ecologists are ready for many concessions and denials because they have tasted power and hope to grab some symbolic advantage.

But remember the “masculine” and “masculine” and, for all to say, toning statements of liberal leaders during the spring 1999 election campaign: there is no question of negotiating with the Flemish. The VLD was described as a party far away from the “social liberalism” they advocated. There was no question, the Liberals said, of being at the institutional meeting scheduled for 2002. No to No! We even anticipated. There is no risk of institutional reform during the previous legislature. More strongly, they accused the PSC of being weak and of wanting to bear the interests of French speakers.

A few weeks later, they took the Volksunie, departing, as we know, extremely recommendable, in their luggage. Subject to constant blackmail for eighteen months, they had to devote most of their energy to demining community conflicts, any federal file becoming the object of a sad trade. As an illustration, should we recall the intrusion of regions and the private sector into the management bodies of the SNCB and the controversy around the 60-40 share of its investment plan? Only a dramatic accident managed to turn the majority around the position of the Flemish Liberals.

While the Flemish have, for a long time, had a common strategy, and despite the repeated proposals of the PSC, there has never been an initiative for prior intrafrancophone consultation, as was the case during the previous legislature. It’s not me who says it, it’s mr. Gosuin, PRL-FDF, who said this morning on the RTBF antennas. Should we be surprised, therefore, that the negotiation was carried out, from the strict point of view of the interests of the Wallons and the Brussels, in such bad conditions? The last six months have been experienced as a permanent calvary, each vote of the VU must be purchased, at the price of successive French-speaking concessions. A posteriori, it is obvious that the abandonment of the tactic "everything is in everything and reciprocally" will cost us very expensive.

Thro ⁇ this backward negotiation, the PSC has not ceased to be consistent in its expression and in its behavior. We have always been open, and we are still, to participate in a real negotiation prepared by the four French-speaking democratic parties. We have always been concerned about a refinancing consisting of the French Community.

For a long time, we have clearly defined the conditions under which we could — the conditions under which we could — be associated with the vote on this refinancing.

We have never been invited to prepare these negotiations, especially since on the French-speaking side it is rather about unpreparedness. We have never been asked by the Prime Minister to express our expectations, to explain our possible conditions. Verhofstadt and colleagues, VU has priority and even exclusivity. Never the "rainbow" majority — but given the announced defections, is it still a majority? He did not expect our contest.

But the PSC simply wants better for the federal state, better for all French speakers, better for Brussels.

Better for the federal state is, first of all, respect for the rule of law and the Constitution. It also protects the rights of all minorities. This is the maintenance of a consistent representation of Belgium at European and international levels. It is the democratic unity and the fiscal unity of our country.

Better for all French speakers, it is a quality teaching and respect for equality among students, regardless of the school they attend. This is the best financing of the French Community before 2004. It is the rejection of a regionalization of the municipal law that betrays the inhabitants of the Brussels periphery. It is the refusal of an impoverishment of Wallons and Brusselsans under the effect of insufficiently framed fiscal competition. Better for Brussels is the radical rejection of a flamandization and a impoverishment of our capital.

So far, the majority parties have not hesitated to start serious negotiations, according to a reasonable timetable, with the PSC to ensure its support for all or part of the legislative texts that should necessarily and substantially be corrected.

For the most part, the reforms we are proposing do not come into force before 2002. In the current state of things, they are and remain unacceptable.

If nothing changes in the substance as much as in the method, then you will probably not be surprised by the final vote of the PSC MPs.

The text presented to us is undoubtedly a bad text. It breaks equality between French-speaking and Dutch-speaking students. In the state, it opens the door to a fiscal competition whose effects will be disastrous in the long run for Wallons and Brussels. The badges are insufficient and their violation is not effectively punished. Of course, there is a refinancing and we welcome it in its principle. It is substantial, but it will intervene too late.

If you ask us if we would have done better, I answer clearly yes. Because we would have avoided presenting ourselves as applicants by continuing to conduct a responsible policy within the French Community itself. We would have negotiated, outside the framework of a state reform, an allocation of part of the margins related to growth returned to the community policies of Flanders and the French Community. We remain convinced that this was possible and that it was desirable. We believe that the rainbow was wrong to depart from the rejection strategy that was the one of all the presidents of the French-speaking parties before the elections. I repeat this, Mr. Gosuin, on behalf of the PRL-FDF-MCC, said nothing else this morning on the RTBF antennas.

If you ask us if we could do better as part of a renegotiation after a failure due to the random strategy defined by the prime minister, my answer is more nuanced. Because it is very difficult to return within the framework of a community negotiation on concessions already made. We cannot ignore the past and in this case the past negotiation will weigh heavily on any future negotiation.

It will ⁇ be difficult to overturn the steam, but it is not the difficulty of the task that must repel us: is it not said that by winning without danger, one triumphs without glory? by

Not sure whether we can get more or get better, we chose to propose to the majority to renegotiate the texts in order to improve them. We have submitted many amendments in the committee and we will submit many of them again in the plenary session. by

Our proposal always holds; it cannot last forever. If before the vote, no negotiations could be finalised and a fortiori started, we can only vote against the project that is submitted to us. by

By refusing to negotiate, by refusing to give a minimum of time to succeed in a negotiation, the French-speaking parties of the majority will take all responsibility for the possible failure of this project, a project which they have poorly negotiated, under the permanent blackmail of the extremists of the Volksunie and which they have until now refused to amend in the sense that we advocate with much moderation, circumspection but with great determination.

I return to the life of St. Polycarp to conclude, Mr. President: the voice does not come from heaven; it is not addressed to St. Polycarp but it says "Courage, hold firm."

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, after hearing some speakers this morning, I think that we would better not hold speeches, but that we would better pray: Lord, let the Flemish self-government fall by itself. It does not come. The Flemish self-government, the realization of the Flemish-national project can only be achieved by working on it step by step. That is working with the hands in the mud. Only by being ready again and again for the realization of his program will that program also be realized. Anyone who thinks it will fall from the air is mistaken.

I think it is useful to bring back a piece of history. In the previous round of state reform, some employees of Mr. Dehaene wrote an interesting book. It also includes a list of the answers of the various parties to the questions raised in the community-to-community dialogue. It included, among other things, the following question: "Should the Municipal Law and the Provincial Law be federalized in 1993?" Only the People's Union answers that question with "yes". All other parties have hesitation. For the CVP it is “discussable”. The liberals have “no opinion” at the time. The SP is against, and the PSC is against. This is the starting point of 1993.

In the St. Michel Agreement, under our pressure, there is a provision concerning that federalization of the municipal law and the provincial law. That provision was much less extensive than we had hoped. The Constitution was revised and a working group started an investigation. There is nothing else in the Saint-Michel Agreement.

During the legislative period 1995-1999, the then federal government carried out a policy in which nothing was carried out in the field of state reform. It was known that such files are difficult and explosive and could put governments at risk. Nothing was done and it was packed in a double strategy. In the Flemish Parliament, a machine was launched to create high expectations. However, there was no willingness to fulfill those expectations.

At the end of the previous legislature, a declaration on constitutional revision had to be issued. One would suspect that everything planned in the Flemish Parliament could also be arranged smoothly. That did not happen. They came back to an absolute minimum statement.

After the elections, the situation arose in which the People's Union could weigh on decision-making. It is thanks to the commitment of the People’s Union as a party that this issue has been put on the agenda. Thanks to our efforts, it has been included in the Flemish Government Declaration. For months, the People’s Union has pushed everyone forward in this matter.

When the Lambermont Agreement finally came into effect, the first reaction was both with us and in the rest of Flanders: finally that municipal and provincial law is de-federalized, finally the electoral legislation is also linked to it! They were happy about it!

Then there was a stream that wondered if it all goes far and fast enough. This is an honest discussion in itself. The problem, of course, is that this also made the communication of this file impossible. I give it to you on a note: if there are no hesitation in this dossier, then we are today in a completely different political context, then one is happy in Flanders and then one will demand that what is now ahead is also approved because it is an important step forward.

If we are talking about the contribution of the People’s Union then in the Brussels Agreement this contribution is clearly noted. During those negotiations one was perfectly able to clock off much earlier than what one has now achieved. The truth is that without the contribution of the People’s Union one would have achieved significantly less than 20% guaranteed representation, one would not have 19 representatives in the police councils and one would not have Flemish creatures. It would have had the anti-blocking system and the funding.

(Continuing protest on the banks of the Flemish Bloc.) I know that some are wondering what drives the People’s Union, a party that has not been easy in the last few months, in this file. The big difference is that we try to realize what we stand for. We stand for something. We realize that without the contribution of the People’s Union there would be no state reform. Only through our pressure can one come to state reform rounds. It is not only the automation of the French language money shortage that plays in this. We work step by step, which does not mean that matters such as the removal of health care and the family allowance would no longer be discussed. Even within this legislature there are still possibilities in this regard.

If we now fail to realize a political agreement, which we have asked for ourselves, then I think we only make it really difficult to talk about further steps in the state reform. I doubt if one would be so much better off with the very opposite, so-called "better" agreements that one would conclude on the part of the CVP or PSC. In this regard, I invite you to carefully read the remarks of the speakers of those two parties, asking whether there was room in them for a better agreement. For me, the balance of these agreements is fourfold in nature. The first balance I want to make is that of who wins: unitary or autonomous forces? There is one spot on the unitary aspect: the federalization of environmental taxes. This, however, was made at the request of the Wests who could not work with it themselves. All the rest is a great victory for the autonomous forces in this country.

We succeed – by linking the part of education of the community resources to growth – to prevent the federation from excessively benefiting from the tax revenues resulting from that growth. You also know that this distribution is beneficial for Flanders. As a result, the tax revenues according to the ‘just return’ principle go integral to Flanders.

We are also taking important steps forward in terms of powers. After all, it was not so obvious that the regionalization of the municipal law would take place and we are now doing more than what was ever in the pipeline. Electoral legislation and related legislation are also part of the package. There is a perspective on parts of Development Cooperation; we have Foreign Trade powers in a package that allows only a minimum agency to remain. It will operate according to the one-lock principle, allowing only the sub-area to come into direct contact with the companies.

When we discussed the law on the Belgian Foreign Trade Service during the previous legislature in this Parliament, there were a series of amendments — colleague Versnick can testify — in which we tried to key to the composition of the Board of Directors of the BDBH. Everything was impossible at the time; everything was rejected by the previous majority. Well, with this project, we will come to realize much more than that: we simply purchase the BDBH and we keep a limited agency over which has much less armslag than the BDBH has ever had.

Finally, we will also be able to federalize the entire Department of Agriculture. If you overlook the list of favores and opponents of 1993, this is not so obvious. In particular, the CVP had a principled objection to this. Therefore, one should not come to tell us that what is exaggerated is too little.

Through the regional taxes and the actual tax autonomy on the personal tax within the margin of 6.75%, one finally creates the possibility to realize in Flanders the famous principle on the link between democracy and taxation. The balance on this level is undoubtedly 100% positive.

There is a second balance that one can make, a balance of which autonomous institutions, regions or communities, get the money. This is a more difficult balance, in which we must keep in mind the partially theoretical character. In Flanders, Region and Community fall together and therefore it does not matter. On the French-speaking side, this, of course, means a difference, but for the Flamings, this means only a difference in Brussels. It makes a difference in Brussels whether one falls under the Flemish government or under a government based on a paritary composed college of Flemish and French speakers. With the new system, this college is based on a majority in both language groups.

Flanders will eventually receive 123 billion francs of new income by 2020, compared to a spending plate that currently amounts to 619 billion francs. This is a substantial step forward. The French Community receives much less: 68 billion francs against the 260 billion francs of current spending. As a result, Flanders will be given much more armslag than the French speakers.

Indeed, for Brussels one can formulate a number of criticisms on the Lambermont agreement. There are, of course, some paradoxes in this. On the one hand, it is said that the Brussels Region, by obtaining a portion of fiscal autonomy, still gets a full status. On the other hand, I hear from a French-speaking source that we are just working to close the throat of the Brussels Region through fiscal autonomy. Those who accuse us that we give Brussels such a huge amount of tax autonomy, accuse us that the tax autonomy we have provided for Flanders is so minimal. It is one or the other. The real challenge for Brussels is to find a formula that balances democracy and prevents French speakers in a Flemish Parliament. The current order formula is by no means the most perfect one can imagine. The project in which one also works in the Proeve for a Flemish Constitution and in which one says that Brussels should actually be governed on the one hand, with the Flemish Brussels supported by Flanders and on the other, with the French-speaking Brussels, sees through these agreements for the first time an opening created for that. Just by allowing the anti-blocking system to determine the majority in the VGC from the Flemish election results, it means that for the first time we are taking a fundamental step towards a new system to organize the Brussels Region. This is too easily forgotten. So I think that the balance for regions and communities is a fair balance with the current state of affairs.

I also want to make a balance between what Flamings and French speakers get. The Flamings shall have the following powers: Agriculture, Foreign Trade, municipal and provincial legislation, related legislation, Development Cooperation. We are making a breakthrough in achieving tax autonomy. We get the guardianship over the edge. We improve the position of the Brussels Flames in the Brussels Region and in the municipalities. The major distribution keys in the Finance Act are determined by the income from the taxes. In fact, with this agreement, we build up the financial transfers from the North to the South; only that is not understood in Flanders! (Protest due to the Flemish Bloc group)

The French speakers receive a piece of refinancing from the communities, but no refinancing that allows them to do anything in the future. The calculations that Mr. Poncelet has just made seem to me, in this regard, to be clarified. I think, in all honesty, that we as Flamings can present here a beautiful balance, a balance in which we cannot be blamed for not defending the Flemish interests sufficiently, a balance that realized what was today in the pipeline.

A fourth question I want to ask is whether we should do this now, or whether by not doing it now one would have the prospect of being able to realize something better in the future.

If you take a step now, you get everything inside. Health benefits and family allowances are not included. However, the next time you start negotiating, you start from things that are inside. The first topics that will then be raised will be health care and family allowances; that will be the starting point. You should not start all over again. The details of this dossier are known, with both its positive and negative sides. However, the details of future state reforms are unknown. At every election and at every federal government formation, a question from the French-speaking side can always be answered with questions to realize Flemish demands. It is not at all that the final phase of the state reform is linked to the refinancing provided for in this draft. Anyone who thinks so must look at the history of the previous state reforms; he or she will immediately notice that many state reforms were carried out without a demand for funding due to the French Community. Other moments can be created.

I consider these agreements as a victory of the federalists over the unitarists; it is balanced between flamingos and French speakers and one realizes certainty over dreams. I know that from time to time the loose Brussels comes to mind. Well, we actually realize a Flemish ship in the Brussels municipalities.

Those who declare that holding federal is the best guarantee for defending the Flemish interests at the local level in Brussels, should just look at how many legislative changes have ever taken place to realize something in that area. Never before in this federal Parliament was approved a bill that changed anything on this matter, except in the context of a large community round. That is exactly what we have done in this regard.

Mr. Borginon, Mr. Laeremans wants to intervene and I prefer that he interrupts you for a moment rather than that what has just happened happens.

Mr Borginon declares with surprising certainty that he is realizing the Flemish ships in Brussels.

Mr Borginon, I would like to point out the resolution unanimously adopted by the democratic parties in Brussels and the government agreement in the Flemish Parliament, which calls for political participation and guaranteed representation at all levels in Brussels.

Well, there is no guaranteed representation in the municipal council, nor in the OCMW, nor in the executive bodies of the OCMW, and there are no guaranteed ships in Brussels. In addition, you know very well that if no councillors are elected, no one is added in overtal, so that no Flemish ships are appointed. The evidence of this is the fact that there are barely two Brussels municipalities with one Flemish ship, while five Brussels municipalities remain without Flemish ships.

The following answer applies to all other interventions coming from that corner.

The difference between us is that we try to realize Flemish self-government and defend the Flemish interests, while you all can not care. The only thing you are interested in is that you can scream for a long time and make statements on the tribune that also sound good at the tough, while it may not matter to you whether or not something is achieved with this.

You can hide behind a small layer of Flemish national lacquer to bring your true message to the man. However, the only reason why you start screaming and thinning over and over again is that you want to throw out the coin there. You don’t care whether one steps forward or not. On the contrary, that works for you even counterproductively. Your only motive is to stay here as long as possible, with as many people as possible, and to impose your other program, that of which your voters are awake, on the community. I do not wish to participate in this.

I was working on the chapter-Brussels and the Flemish creatures.

It is sold as if in night negotiations, in exchange for two cows, one billion francs were given as a gift. Nothing is less true. Since 2006 we have installed a system that allows for the obligation to install a ship in as many Brussels municipalities as possible where a Flaming is in the majority. Furthermore, at the very extreme, at the time when this was again established, we wanted to use a piece of financing, which was also in the pipeline, as an additional root. In this way, the Flamings will be taken into account in the preparation of lists for municipal elections in Brussels. If we had come back here with an arrangement in which any Flaming can be picked up and dropped in the ship college, then exactly the same people who today criticize this arrangement – which in 2006 will ensure that there will be a Flemish ship in all Brussels municipalities – would have declared that these creatures would have nothing to say and that all decisions would be taken in a separate college. You also know, colleagues, what is happening in a municipality in Flanders where, by accidental circumstances, a majority of opposition ships arrive. There are two ship colleges. The formal ship college lasts ten minutes, while in the informal ship college, without the interested party, the actual problems are discussed for hours. We wanted ships with real power, real powers and real impact.

The Brussels Capital Council will have 17 Flemish electors. That’s just not 20% because they didn’t give us that symbol, but 19.1% which is more than we’ve ever achieved before. In all the police councils there will be enough people. We are talking about at least 19 people. Speaking of the merger operations in Brussels that one could ever carry out, one should be well aware that the current police zones are the forespeak of possible mergers. We realize the direct election of the Flemish parliamentarians in Brussels and we succeed in establishing the bond between Flanders and Brussels, through the mechanism of the five additional persons in the VGC. We will ensure that a majority in Brussels is not only based on the Brussels outcome, but that the Flemish voter will also have an impact on the governance of Brussels.

I think this is perfectly in line with the long-term project for Flanders. The Flamings have gone for guarantees regarding the presence of the Flamings in the Capital Council. We got this inside. The Flamings have requested measures in the transfer of the municipal law. We got this inside. The Flamings have requested the fulfillment of the promise regarding the Flemish presence in the police councils. We got this inside. Their

It is correct that we had to replace a bit of funding for this. However, the funding is much smaller than what, according to the studies carried out on behalf of Brussels, is necessary to prevent financial suffocation. It is correct that avoiding blocking the institutions is a bit of surrealism. This was a priority of the French speakers. We have used this mechanism to realize the connection between Flanders and Brussels. In this way, we have taken out of the Brussels Agreement what could be done.

Finally, I would like to consider some often heard arguments. It is often referred to Flemish resolutions. What is the content of the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament? The content is neither more nor less than those points on which a consensus could be reached on the Flemish side. These are those points that the various Flemish parties have accepted as the maximum common program. We fulfill a significant part of these requirements. We continue to strive to realize the rest as well. We will put the points that have not yet been achieved on the agenda again. Who thinks that the points on which the Flemish parties had reached a maximum consensus have just descended from the sky and should not be hard negotiated with the French speakers, dreams!

They are embarrassed by cooperation agreements. Cooperation agreements are the result of the logic of our model. Our model is confederate in its construction. Decrees and laws are placed on the same foot. In other federal states this principle does not exist. There is the rule “Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht”. All conflicts are resolved at the federal level. This country is not in this way. Those who criticize the existence of cooperation agreements should dare to acknowledge that these agreements are a consequence of the confederate construction of our state structure.

Colleagues, the present agreements, including those elements that are important and can still be realized but are not included in this draft, such as the government agreements on Delcredere and Finexco and the police arrangement – a problem that has not been sufficiently clarified – constitute the package approved by the People’s Union. That is the package that I defend on this tribune. That is the package that I am ready to approve tomorrow.

When one is key to this package, one must be well aware—without wanting to go into all kinds of cowboy stories—that the balance and balances as they are set up cannot be disturbed.

Whoever thinks that if one should address the questions that Mr. Poncelet has put very strongly on this tribune, the whole VU faction will without delay approve the agreement, is mistaken. My party has committed to a clear package. Amendments to this package should not disturb the balance, otherwise there will be no majority.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker In Poncelet, Saint Polycarpe was both bishop and martyr. But I dare believe that he will not be martyred again in the House of Representatives.

On the contrary, I would like to advocate for it to survive, which would be favorable to the whole of the Belgians, of the North, of the South and of the center of the country, because I remain convinced that these agreements are indeed balanced.

If it is true that certain concessions made can irritate the susceptibilities of one and another, that is the lot of any compromise. What are the reasons why these agreements are, in the eyes of the PS, good agreements?

First, the refinancing of the French Community can be ensured. This is for us the main reason for the adoption and our support of these texts. This is not a secret to anyone, the French Community of Belgium is not doing well. His financial situation is well known. This complex situation for the world of education, culture, at the social level too, forced French speakers to re-evaluate their point of view, very radical even a few years ago, regarding the Flemish claims made about the regionalization of certain taxes. by

The main thing, however, for the French Community, is to find a solution for the medium and long-term financial balance. The years 2002 and 2003 will still be financially and budgetarily difficult, but the balance will be reached in 2004. In the years to come, the French Community will benefit from a normal budget, which will finally allow it to conduct policies worthy of that name in the fields of education, culture, assistance to youth, people and health care. by

In the absence of adoption of these agreements, we should, in the French Community, face a real cataclysm for all French speakers and a fortiori for all Belgians. I will come back.

Certainly, if we still have to show patience for a few years, the advantage of this agreement is that it offers real prospects for the future and that the future financing of the French Community will be structural. This is, of course, an essential guarantee for the Socialist Party. And if 2004 can be considered as the pivotal year of debt discharge, the amounts that will be obtained in subsequent years will be exponential.

Thus, instead of playing the nurse who relieves the sick, the French Community will not only be healed, but in the long run and serious policies can be carried out in all Community matters.

The Flemish community does not lose. She also wins. On this point, I think, the exhibition that Mr. Borginon was quite demonstrative in this regard. The refinancing of both Flemish and French communities is all the more indispensable as the financing laws of 1989 quickly showed their insufficiency, despite the adaptations of the Saint-Quentin and Saint-Eloi.

As previously stated, Mr. Bacquelaine, each community has, indeed, an interest in that resources be released in the subjects that were delegated to it about twenty years ago. Similarly, several Dutch-speaking colleagues have stated that the establishment of a new funding mechanism is logical and indispensable. by

Thus, Mr. Tavernier said in a committee that it should not be lost from the eye that the Flemish Community, too, needs the means to continue to exercise its competences and, like Mr. Dirk Van der Maelen, I think the government has found a good balance between four major challenges: healthcare, education, public debt and aging population.

In short, if the French Community needs money and if these agreements allow it to quickly have an oxygen blow first, a second breath then, we must not forget that the Flemish Community is, too, refinanced and indeed oxygenized. Who would doubt this after the statement. Are you in this tribune?

The third reason for voting this text: the regionalization of part of the taxation. This money, which the French Community so needs, will not be paid without compensation for the North of the country; we know it. by Mr. Poncelet is right in this regard. For a very long time, we have been opposed to the Flemish requirement that demanded more tax autonomy. It is true that in the face of the needs of the French Community, French speakers were forced to accept more tax autonomy for the regions. In any case, it does not seem to us abnormal that taxes, already known as ‘regional taxes’, are established and collected by the competent region. However, this transfer of regional taxes will be carried out in compliance with three conditions. by

First, the federal authority will have to receive compensation for the loss of income it will suffer. by

Second, accompanying measures will be taken where necessary, to avoid the risk of tax competition, tax migration, relocation and unhealthy tax competition between the various authorities. by

Thirdly, in the field of personal tax, the current special funding law has proved too obscure and its limits will now be better defined. by

In conclusion, the Socialist Group will vote on these agreements. This concerns not only the future of the French Community, but also the Flemish Community, the project having provided balanced modalities. Finally, the regionalization of certain taxes, if it is accepted, is so under conditions and limits that avoid any risk of unrestricted tax competition. Therefore, the demands of both Dutch and French speakers are met. by

We have an extremely heavy responsibility to assume. If this project is not voted, the future of the entire population of our country is at stake. The moment is historic. That is why I allow myself to address our social-Christian colleagues, insisting on the future of those and those whose, alongside us, they have the burden. by

When the future of the French Community is at stake, when everyone in education – from early childhood to university – is at stake, when one knows what the importance of education may be in the development of society, when one knows the necessity of social and cultural policies, when one cannot lose sight of that the French Community concerns all French speakers in Brussels and Wallonia, then the duty of the politician and the politician is to transcend the classical political quarrels and the usual conflicts between majority and opposition.

At least you could have invited us to negotiate.

You know that negotiations and discussions are still ongoing. And in politics, you should not say “always” or “never”; you know it well.

I have heard this for something else, Mr. Eerdekens. In politics, it is like in love.

But some may be more experts in love than in politics.

Who are you talking about, Mr. Eerdekens?

I leave everyone to guess.

Of course, as in any compromise, everyone could see reasons for not being satisfied, including us. This agreement is in fact complex since it requires accession to the North, South and the center and requires a two-thirds majority.

Realism, however, commands not to miss this historical opportunity to properly secure the financing of our communities, and more ⁇ for us, French speakers of the French Community of Belgium. This is what the vast majority of the French-speaking population in Belgium wants.

As for the PS, it will not fail to do its duty and will vote on these agreements, as we will later vote on the text that the Senate is preparing to adopt.

It remains to us to hope that these texts will pass the ramp of two-thirds in the Senate but of course also in the House, where it is actually more difficult. I would like to remind my PSC colleagues, with whom we have previously worked loyally in the exercise of power and that I know that I am firmly committed to ⁇ ining the existence of Belgium in a federal structure, that they are like us and like other French speakers also called to assume a great responsibility. by

The "To the Future" of this 29 May 2001 reads the words of the Chairman of the CVP, Mr. De Clerck, asserting that the votes of the Lambermont agreements and in particular of their component "refinancing of communities" will fix the state structures for years. The message of the CVP is very clear. by

My dear colleagues, if what you are proposing is not accepted, Belgium will once again enter a spiral of new community surcharges that can let predict the worst for the future of the country and immediately trigger a disaster for the population that we are supposed to defend. I can’t imagine that the sense of responsibility that should guide us all will not overcome the mixed feelings that we can have each other, wrongly or rightly. by

For this reason, with conviction, all Socialist deputies will vote on this text.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ministers, Mr. Colleagues, I believe that one very important political fact has so far remained completely undisclosed in the debate, namely the absence of Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt in this Chamber. We stand 24 hours before what is normally a crucial vote, about what was called by that same Verhofstadt a definitive state reform, which would solve once and for all the community problems in this country. At that moment, we see that the Prime Minister, neither in the Senate nor in the Chamber, deserves to be present. Their

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, it must therefore be that the final result that lies here on the table and that so much suspicion, so much skepticism unleashes in so many groups, even among colleagues from the majority, is a mile from what Guy Verhofstadt had in mind when he talked about the definitive state reform `à la Verhofstadt', which would once and for all from a break with the past in a new way solve the community problems in this country.

Mr Coveliers asks and gets the word.

Mr. Speaker, can I ask Mr. Leterme if I can follow this logic? Does the reasoning that other persons, who are not present here and who perform important functions in certain political parties, also apply to the reasoning that they are miles away from what is said here by the people who represent them?

Mr. Speaker, I have never experienced that a prime minister was not present at such an important meeting.

Colleague Coveliers, this is a ridiculous argument. We assert from the opposition – and, by the way, the public can also assert this – that the Prime Minister has been present during the whole procedure in the Senate and in the House not a minute, not a second. This is the discussion in the plenary session, 24 hours before the final vote on one of the two or three major projects of this legislature, which he talked about in such crowded words.

Mr. Leterme this is manifestly incorrect. Indeed, in the previous government Mr. Dehaene had the portfolio of Institutional Reforms. In this government, the Prime Minister does not have that portfolio. In this government, that other ministers and those ministers are present here. So I find your comment completely wrong.

Mr. Coveliers, I can understand that this comment hurts, but there is one reality: he is like the captain of a ship, as the leader of a squad, and if for that squad one of the most important projects of the entire legislature is on the table, then there are no more excuses, then the prime minister comes and he is present. By the way, knowing him, if there were anything positive about this project, these special designs, he would have been the first to collect the dividend.

Now, to compensate for the absence of the Prime Minister, I will be so free to make the best of some quotes from him. First quote: "Belgium is about dying after death. This is the result of the dozens of community and institutional compromises and political bargains that have been concluded since 1970.” A second quote reads: “The reform of our institutions must be radically transitioned and addressed completely differently. Instead of always thinking about new communal compromises following the formation of some government, in which we continue to build on the weak institutions we have been with since 1970, there must be an entirely new state reform.” “A real, authentic, transparent federal state also means that each level of government intents its own income and bears its share of debt. There can no longer be donations, allocated income or taxes to be restored, as is now customary. In a true federal state, each of the levels of government itself manages its own tax matters." I read you a fourth quote from Guy Verhofstadt: "A genuine, authentic, transparent federal state, finally, makes each of the subregions competent for a well-defined and well-defined territory. In this context, the question is whether instead of the overlapping communities, regions and language regions, we would not better seek four clearly separated subregions, Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels Capital and the German-speaking subregion, in which the facilities would definitively disappear. For those who have forgotten, I have taken the quotations from the second Burger Manifesto.

A few years ago, the same author wrote in a book titled "The Belgian Disease" - a book that has long been divided in the category of non-fiction, but was better classified in the category of fiction, when we see what is now being realized - the following: "It is high time that extended powers on social security and, more importantly, fiscal autonomy are also granted to Flanders and the other subregions". The author of those writings, who is now Prime Minister and has announced that one of the crowns of his government program is the final state reform that will be achieved on his initiative with new methods and that will once and for all resolve our community problems, that man is hiding now, not in the walkways, but in houses here far away to march in the backs.

Through such statements, the VLD has tried for the past ten to fifteen years to measure an image of a radical Flemish party. The Flamings were not used to such a language by the liberals. Indeed, the PVV did not like federalism, but rather unitarism. Therefore, in Flanders, she had the nickname Pest For Flanders. With the transformation of PVV into VLD and with Verhofstadt at the wheel, it seemed that the liberals had swear off their love for unitarism and that they had become a real Flemish party. Since opinions and views can evolve, the Flemish public opinion a few years later, Verhofstadt gained the advantage of the doubt.

Even at the end of the previous legislature, we were able to witness that in the declaration on the revision of the Constitution, the VLD supported an extensive declaration on the revision of the Constitution to ensure the implementation of the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament on the state reform and adopted positions that were in line with the positions of the French-speaking liberals, including on the regionalization of the municipal and provincial law. At that time — which is now a little more than two years ago — the Fleming believed that with Verhofstadt and the VLD a new ally had arisen to effectively deepen the federal state further.

However, after the elections of June 13, 1999, this hope melted like snow for the sun. In the government agreement that was to serve as cement for the new ‘dioxin government’, the ‘anti-CVPregering’, it soon turned out that Mr. Verhofstadt was willing to make immense concessions to the French speakers, only and only to be able to finally become Prime Minister himself. The government agreement was the result of an unprecedented political agreement. Without that deal, the current purple-green coalition, this strange phenomenon of Prime Minister Verhofstadt, would never have come into being.

Colleagues, Mr. Verhofstadt did during the government negotiations of June and July 1999 what Dehaene, Van Rompuy and others, and together with them the CVP, previously refused to do, in particular the Flemish simply have to pay to temporarily solve the financial problems of the French-speaking education. Looking backwards, this attitude of Mr. Verhofstadt cannot surprise us. After all, it was the same Mr. Verhofstadt who had already made attempts ten years earlier, in 1991, to establish a purple government. Even then he was immediately prepared to meet the demands of the French speakers as a prize for the premiere. At that time, Verhofstadt even promised in the government talks advances on a comprehensive revision of the Finance Act. Thanks to the determination of some, this fortunately cannot continue.

In 1991, we could already know what Mr. Verhofstadt was willing to do. Nevertheless, some, including colleagues from this hemisphere, have made him do the same again in 1999, with the success we know so far. Already during the government negotiations in the summer of 1999, Mr. Verhofstadt promised an additional 2.4 billion francs for the financing of French-speaking education. Then came what is now called the "Verhofstadt method", namely to the one say A, and to the other B, and in the meantime win time. Verhofstadt initially denied his promises to the Dutch-speaking press. The French speakers involved in the formation of government, however, could not conceal their great satisfaction with the promises. They announced the commitments to French-speaking education, worth 2.4 billion francs in an initial phase, quite quickly. Minister Michel, State Secretary Deleuze and group leader Eerdekens all confirmed what Mr Verhofstadt denied at the same time. The credibility of the prime minister — who is, by the way, absent here today — had already received a first firm deck at that time. Nevertheless, the prime minister continued uninterrupted as if nothing was happening. In the House, the Prime Minister pointed out, both in the investment debate and in the debate on the policy statement in October 1999, that his government would not apply the old political culture so cursed for the definitive solution of the community problems: "no unclear compromises, no compensations, no waffle iron policy." I literally quote the words of the Prime Minister during the debate on his policy statement in October 1999: "Most often - for the community problems - a solution is found that costs the federal government more money. This has happened in the past. In this way, all EU agreements were concluded. Well, the fact that this government does not extract the waffle iron is a break in itself. We are no longer applying the waffle iron policy. We use objectivity. Completed with blockages. Ended with links. With unattainable deadlines.”

I think we must go very far back in the political history of this country to find a prime minister with whom the difference between word and deed is as great as with the prime minister of this government, Mr. Verhofstadt. That is proved by the word of the investment debate, the word of the political programs, the word of the statements in the media, his actions that are hardly still acts and his absence here in the Chamber. Of the plea for a new organization of the State, described in the civil manifests and other writings, nothing remains.

The same pages from which I have cited earlier also mention that then Guy Verhofstadt emphasized that what concerned him in a new state reform could no longer be a question of dotations for the financing of the Communities and the Regions, because "donations are contrary to the principles of a true federal state". It is therefore ⁇ painful that the first actual article of the draft that we are discussing now — the article on the allocation of powers not taken into account — provides precisely for a new allocation to compensate for the viewing and listening fee.

The Prime Minister, colleagues, who would put an end to consumer deralism emphasizes the consumer deralism in this draft. The principle of "no taxation without representation", which means that the citizen knows that he is paying for the policies that his government conducts and over which he decides, is further abandoned. The democratic deficit is increasing. The agreement upholds and reinforces the logic of funding the counties through grants. However, for the first time in a very long period, the socio-economic and institutional climate in Flanders was ripe for a plea, for actions and for a real progress of real fiscal autonomy.

However, the draft proposal does not contain any real tax liability of the Communities and the Regions for their policies. In addition, the very limited tax autonomy that has been registered has also been organized in an overwhelming manner. There is no jurisdiction for corporate tax and regional taxes. They are included in the Finance Act. Tax autonomy is encapsulated in numerous procedural and interpretation and political abuse restrictions. The distribution of the additional resources, which of course come to the majority of the Flemish taxpayers, is only very gradually spread over the years based on the localization of the revenues. Herman Van Rompuy, who is involved in so many successful Community negotiations for Flanders, pointed out that the agreement is also very expensive. The cost of the agreement is disproportionate to the new scarce powers. I will not usurp the image of the Mercedes and the autoped, but I must say that it is a ⁇ well-selected image. For a small overhaul of powers, a ⁇ high price is effectively paid. From 2002 to 2020, additional funds from the federal government will be transferred to the Communities at an increasing rate of 8 to 200 billion. Against this important additional funding — the only thing that interests French speakers — there are no new powers. Furthermore, the Communities should not assume any political responsibility for the acquisition of these resources. The federal government, on the other hand, owes the political responsibility to its voters, even though it has nothing to say about its spending. This is not consumption deralism. Nevertheless, this consumption deralism illo tempore was denied by Verhofstadt.

The Lambermont designs are politically highly unbalanced. It was already spoken yesterday by Mr Vandenberghe in the Senate, as well as by Mr Van Rompuy. It is and continues to be so. Repetition is a good law of pedagogy, insofar as pedagogy would still help this majority.

In any case, from the French-speaking side, more money was demanded. In addition, the French speakers in these negotiations set the conditions under which the money could be given. That is the situation in which the buyer, the one who has an interest in the negotiations, determines the price at which he wants to buy. A number of issues that were discussed in the Flemish Parliament and which were also included in the electoral program of the party of Prime Minister Verhofstadt, for example, on social security, health care, child allowance and financial solidarity, turned out to be a priori undiscussable. There was a very strange paradox. The French community was the requesting party and was held in this position thanks to the steadfastness of the last eight, nine years. Now, however, the French community was given the opportunity to set conditions under which its conditions could be met. What is transferred to powers, in fact, meets the Waal requirements. Flanders pay for what the other negotiating partner wanted and got.

Another criticism that has not yet been addressed is that the organization of our state instead of being more transparent and transparent — as desired by a younger Verhofstadt — becomes even more complicated. This point was only addressed in a different way during Mr Borginon’s presentation. Twenty cooperation agreements are needed to enable Lambermont to operate, with each time mutual blocking possibilities. Even today, within the majority — plus the outbound engine of the People’s Union that only works on half-power — there is still uncertainty about the precise interpretation and content of these cooperation agreements. Furthermore, the cooperation agreements regulate matters which would normally – if one would take the State Council and the Constitution au sérieux – be the subject of a special law. Thus, they ⁇ fall outside the scope of Article 92bis of the Special Act on the Reform of the Institutions. These cooperation agreements are therefore legally challenging. I would like to make this clear, even to my colleagues from the People’s Union.

Colleagues, the previous four state reforms followed some logic. The previous state reforms expressed a comparison between Belgium and the communities and regions. There is a certain political balance between these policy levels. This agreement will end this political balance. This agreement definitively departs from the Flemish aspiration to build a federal Belgium on the basis of communities. It thus fully supports the principle of French-speaking federalism based on three regions. This is reflected, among other things, in the rule that only the regions are granted an exclusive although very limited tax autonomy. The regionalization of the municipalities takes place through the regions, including in Brussels. As a result of this tripartiality, Flanders loses any participation in the administrative organization of its capital.

A first important finding is the absence of the Prime Minister, ⁇ out of honest shame, when discussing what was to become one of the crown pieces of his legislature. A second finding is that what is now in the foreground is in sharp contrast to what was once announced by Verhofstadt in, among other things, the civil manifests, to the program with which the VLD went to the elections and of course also to the resolution of the Flemish Parliament. To these two political findings, which have so far been insufficiently underlined, I would like to add a third. In the coming weeks and months, we will have sufficient opportunities in the competent committees, in the Chamber and in the public to highlight certain files.

At a time when the majority is trying to raise funds for French-speaking education, one should at least have the courage from that majority to let the French-speaking colleagues know that a small invoice is still open. This is about the backstations of the State Service for Social Security. I think that every reform of the institutions in this country, that every good dialogue between the communities in this country should be based on federal loyalty. Now, how could that loyalty be present in a negotiation in which Flanders negotiates with a French-speaking partner who verticates it to pay what is owed, who deliberately opens a debt of more than five billion and leaves the various legal steps to take place until April 1999? Moreover, a federal deputy prime minister sees a criminal charge out of itself for holding back and not paying out due RSZ contributions. From Flanders, from the majority, one does not even have the courage to ask to pay the open invoice before allocating additional funds.

In the absence of any trace in previous discussions, both in the Costa and at the level of the government, I would like to mention this dossier, because I suspect that we will have a discussion about this in the coming weeks and months.

The second reason is the lack of federal loyalty and a bit of patience on the Flemish side to put this dossier on the table, especially when we — according to the prime minister — have to deal with a definitive state reform.

I repeat: the first important political fact is the absence of the Prime Minister. When we see what is ahead, this is understandable. Secondly, what is ahead is at odds with what the young Verhofstadt and the VLD are pushing forward.

Third, one has not even had the courage to settle an open invoice now that 200 billion will be transferred by 2020 for French-speaking education.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, the different aspects of the reform projects that occupy us this afternoon are part of the same logic, that of confidence in the future of our country. The proposed reforms are actually based on a triple bet: first that of sustainable economic prosperity, which will guarantee in the medium term a significant refinancing of our communities, then that of loyalty, especially fiscal, between the three regions and finally the bet of openness, multiculturalism and tolerance in the representation of communities in Brussels.

Let me start with the refinancing of communities. Since its inception, on an institutional level, community competencies have been at the heart of human development. These are the personalizable subjects, i.e. related to the human person, which are managed by our communities: childhood, education, culture, lifelong education, audiovisual. So many sectors where women, men, children are born, grow up, learn, communicate, listen, talk, create. by

The financing law of 1989 no longer allows for proper financing of the French and Flemish communities. The merely linking of the means to inflation and birth rate no longer enables to meet the growing needs. by

After several episodes that, over the past decade, have brought airballs to communities and to which environmentalists have given their support, although in the opposition, the current reform finally proposes a structural adjustment of financing that will now be linked to the actual evolution of economic prosperity.

This is the first bet: to finance the needs of our fellow citizens in terms of education and culture from the fruits of development. It is a deeply humanistic bet in which the product of growth is reinvested in the service of the human person. Environmentalists see it as a concrete implementation of the principle of sustainable, citizen and solidarity development.

Tomorrow, in the French Community as well as in the Flemish Community, there will be more resources for schools. This is a democratic guarantee. It is the opportunity to better educate young people, to make them free citizens, critical, responsible, tolerant, capable of rejecting all totalitarian temptations. Tomorrow, in the French Community as in the Flemish Community, there will be more means for culture and creativity, this is another democratic guarantee. It is the opportunity for each artist to develop his worldview and for each of us to release our creativity, to share our ideals, our doubts and our differences.

Tomorrow, in the French Community as in the Flemish Community, there will be more means for audiovisual, for the press, for the media: it is a third democratic guarantee, and the possibility for everyone to be better informed and to develop their critical sense. Tomorrow, it is also early childhood, youth assistance, health education, sport, permanent education that will be refinanced in the French Community as well as in the Flemish Community. by

The second is the loyalty between the three regions. In a completed federal state, federated entities must have sufficient manoeuvrability both in terms of revenue and expenditure. Thus, even if the environmentalists were not demanding an extension of the tax responsibilities of the regions, the reform project that is proposed to us is reasonable and balanced. Clear labels have been put in order to avoid excessive risks of relocation of persons or activities to a region where the fiscal framework would be more favourable.

These tags indicate that any decrease in IPP can only occur within precise margins. The process is not new: at the communal level, there are differences in tax rates between communes without resulting in massive relocation of taxpayers. The project also provides that the progressiveness of the IPP cannot be diminished, it is also an important guarantee. In any case, regional tax initiatives should exclude any unfair competition, the draft says.

And that is the object of the third bet on the future: that of a new political culture and a new type of relationship between communities. A report based on what in game theory is called a positive sum game, i.e. a game in which there are no losers but only winners. To continue the playful metaphor, I would say that it is about choosing a cooperative game in which the partners help each other to win together, rather than a competitive game in which the goal is to destroy the opponent. by

I add that within our Ecolo-Agalev group, we practice this game daily for the greatest enrichment of everyone.

The third bet concerns Brussels, it is the bet on openness, multiculturalism and tolerance. I am not Brussels, and from the outside, the institutions of the Brussels Region have always appeared to me as a ⁇ complex political model, built in a real concern for democratic refinement. It seems to me that the Lombard Agreements further reinforce this democratic dimension.

Democracy has two major dimensions. The structural dimension and the cultural dimension.

The structure, in democracy, is the rules that mark the political game, it is the institutions, which by their statutes and their dynamics ensure a stable framework for political life and action.

Culture in democracy is the attitudes, behaviors, the quality of relations between women and politicians.

The Lombard Agreement strengthens democratic structures and is based on a culture of openness and tolerance. What is it actually about?

It is about protecting a minority, while finding parades to block institutions. If we want to protect a minority, we must give them guarantees in terms of political representation. To do this, the only possibility is to apply a positive discrimination that effectively gives it a over-representation. If this political will exists to install this positive discrimination, one cannot at the same time blame the rupture of equality. The slogan “one man, one voice” seems essentially incompatible with the idea of positive discrimination, or that of protection of minorities.

The striking example is obviously that of the German-speaking Community that has a community senator for less than 1% of the population and it is very well so. The Lombard Agreements are a step further in refining the Brussels democratic model. This is a step towards a better accounting for the deeply mixed character of Brussels. This is another step towards an open, evolving, multicultural model, which must remind us that in other places, yesterday and today, cities and regions that have not made this bet on multiculturalism, have paid it in blood and tears.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out that Mr. Gobert’s presentation was his maiden speech.

You are right, Madame Talhaoui. Mr. Gobert, it is good to be able to hold a maiden speech in a not insignificant debate.

The word is to Mr. Van der Maelen. His maiden speech is a past time.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Deputy Minister, Mr. Minister, in the presence of seven or eight members of the opposition, I will contribute to this debate. I repeat that - it has already been said several times on this tribune - the state reform in Belgium, if it takes place at least in a democratic way in consultation and consensus with all communities in this country, necessarily requires a step-by-step approach. There are colleagues in the Parliament who have other methods for doing so and who think that the problems relating to Brussels could be solved by surrounding Brussels, by starving the Brusselsers in order to come to solutions of total parity. In fact, they seek the total domination of what in reality is a minority. No, we believe that we must reform our State in a democratic, therefore consulted and step-by-step manner.

At every stage of our state reform, we have gladly contributed to this step-by-step process. In 1970, in 1980, in 1988, in 1993 the SP telkenmale gave its voice to the projects that were to shape the reform of our State. Today, in 2001, we will also make our contribution. The starting point in each of the five phases was for us the question of how to ⁇ a functional, better governance for the inhabitants of this country and also how to improve the democratic functioning of the different policy levels. I will keep it very short. The elements that should lead to a better, more functional, more democratic administration of our State, I will try to examine the current funding law. There was already extensive discussion about the other draft on the powers that are currently in the Senate. However, I will limit myself to the Finance Act and ask why we will approve this tomorrow. Why am I going to vote as a Social Democrat tomorrow? I have a few arguments for this. Their

The first argument is that we will adopt the financing law tomorrow for the very simple reason that we want to rectify a structural error that entered the financing mechanism of the communities and regions in 1989. In 1989, after complicated calculations, we came to a certain sum with which the regions and communities had to exercise their powers. The mistake was that we limited the growth of the resource package to merely inflation and that a denatality coefficient was also applied to it. So it was already written in the stars in 1989 that there would come a time when communities would struggle with a shortage of resources.

The Dutch-speaking press often refers to the difficult financial situation of the French Community. That is right. Unfortunately, it is not mentioned that the same problem occurred at the Flemish level. Flanders are therefore interested in changing the funding law tomorrow. Our first argument for voting is, therefore, the repair of a structural error that had been made in the 1989 reform.

A second argument is as follows. One can learn a lot about a financial law. It is actually just a mechanism or system to allocate the resources to each of the levels of authority in a federal state. With the current funding law, we move to a different allocation of resources to the regions and communities. This is right, because there is a need for additional resources at the Flemish level. This also follows from my first argument.

A large part of the funds that will be added to Flanders will be spent on education. This is evident from the debates at the Flemish level and as a socialist I am very pleased with this. Education is the future of our country, we always say. Thanks to this funding law, Flanders will receive more resources that, fortunately, will be spent on education.

The care sector is the same social challenge at the Flemish level, which requires new money and which I hope will get the money.

In summary, I, as Flaming, can be pleased that this financing law, first, solves the structural problem of the financing emergency and, second, that the Flemish level is given the opportunity to spend more resources on crucial social challenges such as education and the healthcare sector.

As a Federal People’s Representative, I am also ⁇ pleased that the financial margin, with which the needs of communities and regions will be financed, has not been exhausted to the bottom. At the federal level, there are still some challenges that also require resources, such as debt reduction and population ageing. In the new mechanism of the Funding Act, it has been managed to ensure that sufficient funds remain available at the federal level, after providing the communities and regions with the resources to meet their own challenges.

A third argument why we will vote in favour of this funding law is the conclusion that an important step is being taken towards increased regional tax autonomy. In my view, it is a universal rule of good governance in a country that the level that is competent for carrying out the policy and making the expenses, also bears the responsibility for taxation to carry out the necessary policy. The financing law, which will be voted on tomorrow, will give the regions full jurisdiction over the eight existing regional taxes, to which four will be added.

In total, we are talking about the not insignificant sum of 110 billion Belgian francs that is moving to the Flemish level. In addition, this amount is compensated by the fact that the contributions from the personal tax, which go to the regions, will be increased. The Flemish Community, the French Community, the Waals Region and the Brussels Region shall bear the tax responsibility for whether or not to collect those 110 billion francs.

Secondly, still in the chapter of increased regional tax autonomy, we are pleased to note that the level of the regions will be competent for the own collection of its taxes by the abolition of the service of the Provincial Taxes.

Third, the SP welcomes the fact that we in Flanders, through the transfer of the view and listen money, will have the choice to come to an abolition of this view and listen money. We are in favor of this and rely on our Flemish colleagues for this.

Fourth, one of the reasons why we will approve this funding law is the fact that we reaffirm that there will be increased autonomy for the subregions. In particular, there is an implicit tariff power in respect of personal tax. Within certain margins, up and down rates may be granted. As a socialist, I am ⁇ pleased that the special law stipulates that the principle of progressiveness of taxes must not be undermined. This means that the granted tax advantage will always be relatively greater as the incomes are lower. I think this is a good thing.

If we pass this funding law tomorrow, the SP will be the only party in Flanders that gave its votes in 1970, 1980, 1988, 1993 and 2001 to take steps in reforming our state. We are proud of that.

As the second speaker of the Flemish Bloc group that speaks, I could actually easily finish it by saying that we are not federalists and in the Belgian context we are not even confederalists. We assume that Belgian federalism is not the appropriate way to enable Flanders to fully develop themselves according to their own insights and to let them take their rightful place in the European and international forum.

By the way, it will always remain a mystery for foreign political scholars why in a unitary state with two peoples, just the majority people chose federalism. This even constitutes a contradictio in terminis, since federalism constitutes a protection mechanism for the minority against a possible abuse of power by the majority.

With the marches in Brussels in the early 1960s and with "Leuven Vlaams!" the Belgian regime had made acquaintance with the Flemish power of the number. The regime knew very well that the Flemish autonomy struggle had to be channeled.

As an over-conservative reflex to preserve the Belgian State, the Belgian regime accepted federalism. It gave the Flammers the impression that their wishes were met. In reality, for 30 years, Belgian federalism has managed to channel and neutralize Flemish power. Already in the first state reform of 1970, the unforgivable mistake was committed in exchange for a speck of cultural autonomy to give our Flemish power of the number definitively out of hands by the introduction of parity at the Belgian government level. This is how we go from state reform to state reform. The Belgian federalism is very clearly a trap for the Flemish Bloc. The essence of the Belgian construction — the flow of billions and the excessive power position of the Wallish minority — was and is not touched. Their

The community problem has become very complicated. It is food for a handful of community technocrats and one can indeed not blame the ordinary man and woman in the street that the people are no longer awake to the modalities of the division of the Meise plant garden. This is why the Flemish Bloc wants to profile itself as an independent party more than ever. Then we do not need to lose ourselves in the details of Belgian fictional federalism, but we can focus more than ever on the ultimate goal: a modern, democratic and prosperous Flemish State. Their

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, when we discuss today in the plenary session the proposed adjustments to the Special Financing Act, we would ⁇ like to extend this discussion from the Flemish Bloc to the financial flows or transfers in this country. Professor Robert Senelle actually noted in a recent Free Tribune in the Financial and Economic Time that all involved in the Lambermont Agreement, and I quote: "... In all languages, we have silenced about one of the most negative aspects of the current state reform for Flanders, namely the financial transfers from Flanders to Wallonia and Brussels.

From my group, we have already agreed that we should include this topic in the discussion of the amendments to the Finance Act. In federal states, structural solidarity is always provided with elaborate and binding forms of solidarity, but even here, solidarity is always limited in scope and the cash flow generated by this is usually transparent and the result of free negotiations between the various states. Also the Flemish Bloc has been won for the solidarity of the Flemish people with other peoples, but if this is done on a voluntary basis, this solidarity is directly negotiated from people to people, it has a transparent character and it effectively benefits a people in need. Let there be no doubt about this: in Belgium this is largely not the case. The cash flows from Flanders to Wallonia have an automatic character, are not negotiated between the counties and are completely opaque. In addition, the troubled economic situation in Wallonia is mainly due to poor policy. The guaranteed flow of billions from Flanders to Wallonia does not even feel the structural need to carry out reforms. In fact, this transfer of wealth within the Belgian structure very clearly refers to a structural form of theft. Their

However, financial flows between subregions are of all times. However, the studies in Belgium are relatively recent and the Leuven professors have played a pioneering role. Figures from before 1975 are very difficult to find. However, a study by the professors Van Rompuy and Verheirstraeten, already dating from 1979, shows that Wallonia was already a deficit region at the time. According to the calculations of Van Rompuy and Bilsen, dating from a 1988 study, in 1975 2.5% of Flemish wealth flowed to Wallonia. Their

Ten years later, this transfer had risen to 4.3%. Currently, this figure amounts to approximately 3.6% of the Flemish primary income, but the studies in this regard do not naturally take into account the transfers related to public debt.

In the 1990s, the initiative was left by the Leuven professors to the economists De Boeck and Van Gompel of the KBC bank. They confirm the conclusions of other authors. Also, due to practical difficulties, they completely exclude public debt and interest charges.

The starting point in the transfer file is the principle of fair return, in the sense that a region that contributes more to the taxes must draw proportionally more profits from public spending. The KBC economists clearly examined wealth transfers at three levels: on the one hand through social security, on the other hand through the federal state budget transactions, and finally through the financing of the Communities and the Regions. In fact, during the 1990s, social security benefits in Flanders increased for all branches except for those relating to unemployment. This did not exclude the fact that the Flemish Region has no share in any branch that was higher than its share of the population, while this was exactly the case in terms of revenue. In other words, Flanders financed not only its own increasing social security needs, but also those of other regions. Also in relation to the transactions of the federal government there are financial flows to the other regions, especially as a result of the greater tax capacity.

To date, the main source of funding for the Communities and the Regions has been transferred federal personal taxes and VAT revenues. The distribution of personal taxes was linked to economic growth from 2000. The distribution is made according to the effective place of taxation. This distribution is based on just return and thus automatically leads to a reduction in transfers. It is important, however, that the national solidarity intervention of the financing law, which already dates from 1989, obviously provides for explicit transfers to the regions where the personal tax per inhabitant is lower than the country average. This means in practice that Flanders can repay.

Also from the year 2000 the VAT income used to finance education must be distributed according to the number of pupils. Thanks to the manipulated pupil numbers of the French Community, Wallonia once again managed to raise several billion more. This led to an income paradox arising in the 1980s with regard to the Wallish Region, in the sense that a region with a lower primary income per inhabitant – Wallonia in this particular case – enjoys a higher available income after receiving the transfers than the other, paying region, in particular Flanders.

Thus, over the past ten years, Flanders financed an average of 6.5% of the Wallish and 3.2% of the Brussels wealth, thereby reducing the Flemish wealth by approximately 3.7% annually. I would like to emphasize that these figures do not take into account the public debt or interest on it. In reality, the transfers are much higher.

In November 2000, the KBC published an update of its previous study, which shows an unchanged situation: Flanders continues to massively pump money to other regions.

Social security is an important component of financial transfers. In 1999, transfers to Wallonia and Brussels in this sector amounted to more than 110 billion, an increase of more than 25% in absolute figures compared to 1990.

Also expressed in absolute figures, transfers to the federal budget more than doubled between 1990 and 1999, from 22 billion to more than 50 billion. Remarkable is the fact that not only money flows from Flanders to Wallonia, but also from Brussels to Wallonia. The transfer is a reflection of the employment rate in the public sector, which in Wallonia is higher in percentage than in the other regions and is still increasing. In addition, the transfer is mainly related to the high tax capacity of Flanders. In 1999, federal income per person was 9% above the national average in Flanders, while in Wallonia and Brussels they were 15% and 3.2% below the national average, respectively.

The transfer through the financing of the communities and regions amounted to more than 38 billion francs in 1999 compared with more than 33 billion in 1990. As mentioned above, these long-term transfers slowly dry up. Since the income from these taxes in the Wallish and Brussels regions, respectively, amounted to only 88% and 97% of the national average, compared with more than 106% in Flanders in 1998, the national solidarity intervention provides for new wealth transfers to the poorer regions. In particular, the 2000 budget provided for a solidarity contribution of 24 billion francs.

As no agreement was reached in 1999 on an objective distribution key for the number of pupils, the old fixed rates for the distribution of VAT revenues — 57,55% for the Flemish Community and 42,45% for the French-speaking Community — were ultimately ⁇ ined. According to the same KBC calculations, this has resulted in a revenue transfer of another 23 billion francs to the other regions. As of 2000, VAT receipts will be distributed according to the number of students between 6 and 17 years of age. The use of the new key – 57,06% for the Flemish Community and 42,94% for the French speakers – will increase this transfer by approximately 1.8 billion francs.

There are practically no calculations on the transfers in the state debt. The only figure currently available is a calculation by professors Van Rompuy and Bilsen. They estimate that more than 142 billion francs flowed to Wallonia through interest on the state debt already in 1985. This is 28% of the total interest repayment of that year. Studies by Van Rompuy and De Grauwe show that the costs of debt reduction are borne only by Flanders and Brussels.

Transfers from Flanders to Wallonia are therefore nothing new. However, the real figures are silently silenced because it is not allowed to endanger the Belgian construction. Despite the facade of successive state reforms, fiscal autonomy remains very limited. Of course, the French speakers are satisfied with the Flemish concessions under the Lambermont Agreement. The French-speaking Community will receive additional funding, the financial solidarity mechanism will be ⁇ ined and the feared split of some parts of the social security will be stopped once again.

If we take our own estimate at hand, we can conclude that in 1999 more than 389 billion Flemish money was transferred to Wallonia. This means more than 65,000 francs per Flaming, including young and elderly. This comes down to the fact that an average Flemish family with two children sees more than 262,000 francs flowing to a Wallish family. In two years, this is a small 525,000 Belgian francs or the cost of an average family car. All this means that in 1999 Flanders transferred an estimated 6.88% of their Gross Domestic Product to the other regions. This is even more than Germany, where the cost of reunification was estimated at 150 billion German Mark per year or a small 5% of the West German GDP. Compared to normal federal European states such as Spain and Switzerland, the difference is even more striking. In these countries, transfers amount to less than half percent of GDP.

For the Flemish Bloc, this is no longer possible. Flanders can better use their financial resources to ensure their own prosperity. Because of the Wallish mentality, the theft will never stop. It can only be stopped by a complete Belgian settlement separation and real Flemish independence. We do not say that solidarity with other peoples is not possible. Solidarity with other peoples can be, of course, but on a voluntary basis, in a transparent manner and with peoples who really need it.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, the draft special law on refinancing the communities and expanding the tax powers of the regions contains two essential elements: the refinancing of the communities and the so-called expansion of the tax autonomy of the regions.

Regarding the refinancing of the communities, we can only conclude that the only constant in Belgian politics is the constant need for money of the French speakers.

Colleagues of the PS, normally you are not interested in a substantial debate. Today you are that because the French speakers are guaranteed to receive federal, say Flemish money, again. Cynically I can say that if you are not interested in the extra Flemish money, the free whisky distribution in the PS faction must have started very early this morning!

Despite the structural lack of money on the French-speaking side, there was and is no lack of political arrogance. To put it in a simple picture: one eats out of the hand of the Flammers, but this does not prevent the French-speaking political class from spitting in that same hand. Apparently the French-speaking politicians know very well that their Flemish colleagues are easy to lead the garden at the negotiating table. The French speakers will receive the additional resources requested by the French Community. Through this, the Flammers give out the last tactical weapon in order to move the French speakers ever to any step in the further state reform.

The financing law of 1989 provided for a provisional arrangement for 10 years in which the distribution for the Flemish Community was 57,55% and for the French Community 42,45%. Everybody still remembers the SintEloois Agreement. Thanks to the manipulation of the French Community’s pupil numbers, the French-speaking people were able to raise additional resources again. The Saint-Eloois Agreement of 1 December 1999 stipulated that the educational subsidy made available by the federal government to the two communities — more than 380 billion francs — is distributed on the basis of the number of compulsory pupils from 6 to 17 years of age.

Last year, this new arrangement turned into a real political vaudeville. The French Community changed the data submitted to the Court of Auditors twice after 15 May. The Court of Audit responsible for the statutory audit found the filings submitted suitable for audit. At the check via sample, the Rekenhof – where the court took the courage – removed 26 pupils of the French language and 2 pupils of the Flemish stock. As a result of the Sint-Eloois Agreement, the Flemish share in the education subsidy dropped to 57,08%, a loss of income of more than 1.7 billion francs. Recently, on 15 May 2001, the student data were submitted to the Court of Auditors. These figures still need to be checked. If the figures are not corrected, it is already clear that the Flemish share in the education donation will again fall to 56,97%, a loss for Flanders of more than 418 million francs.

This unfortunate Saint-Eloois Agreement serves as the basis for a new 10-year transitional arrangement for refinancing communities. In 2002 a redistribution of the additional resources is initiated, which is based for 65% on the adverse data of the pupil numbers for Flanders and only for 35% on the personal tax. Only in 2012 will we reach the scenario where the allocation of resources is 100% based on the personal tax. For the Flemish Bloc, it is clear that the implicit transfer of the Flemish to the French Community through the financing of education is smeared over a far too long period. In Flanders, the French Community continues to pay alimony, a lot of money. The cash flow is increasing. I don’t understand how Mr. Borginon dares to say from the tribune that transfers are decreasing. Let us not blow the wind. The cash flow increases.

Fundamentally, this Lambermont agreement does not give any incentive to the tax autonomy of communities. The viewing and listening money, theoretically a community tax, now even becomes a district tax.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, as regards the so-called expansion of the tax responsibilities of the Regions, I will not return to the purely scandalous way in which the Brussels Capital Region receives additional billions of federal — read Vlaams — money in exchange for two green excuse sheep. Collega Laeremans continued more than extensively this morning with the notorious Lombardy agreements.

Tax autonomy remains an empty box. The district taxes already defined as such in the Special Financing Act are transferred, but the amount is deducted from the dotations of the personal tax.

The fiscal leverage for effectively conducting one’s own policies are, by the way, the personal tax and the corporate tax. An abolition of the corporate tax, however a previous requirement of the VLD, is now no longer a question. An abolition of the personal tax — a proposal contained in one of the five resolutions adopted by the Flemish Parliament in 1999 — is also not in question.

The possibility of introducing up or down rates on the personal tax is far too limited. The margin is 3.25% in 2002 and 6.75% from 2004. This creates too limited policy space. Now the regions can theoretically allow unlimited reductions on the personal tax. However, the Lambermont Agreement limits this possibility.

The so-called fiscal autonomy is now placed in a strict sequence of a cooperation agreement with a reporting obligation to the Federal Minister of Finance. In addition, a new term makes its entry into the community jargon, in particular tax loyalty.

This means that there should be no excessive differences in the tax treatment of the regions. The already minimal fiscal autonomy is thus further undermined. We also note that the global scope of tax autonomy remains very limited in terms of quantity. Flanders had approximately 7% of the revenue from their own taxes, environmental taxes and viewing and listening fees not included. Now about 13% is added due to the regionalization of the district taxes and the viewing and listening fee. This brings the total to about 20%. If the maximum margin for up or down rates is included in the personal tax, from 2002 an additional 3% will be added, doubling from 2004. Taking into account the tax margin in the personal tax, Flanders thus achieved a tax autonomy rate of 23% in 2002 and of 26% in 2004.

Thus, Flemish tax autonomy does not reach more than a quarter of its revenues. In adult federal states this percentage is approximately 50%. The conclusion is that we are not even halfway and the colleagues — including from the Volksunion faction — already consider this as a great Flemish victory.

Furthermore, there remains uncertainty about the task description related to federal or regional deductions. The federal government may continue to apply unshorted tax reductions in the personal tax, even when it concerns regional jurisdictions.

We also continue to find it ⁇ negative that there will be no change in the inter-Western solidarity. The existing so-called solidarity mechanism remains intact. The reverse effects of it remain - ⁇ for the time being - valid. The rich region receives on average less resources per capita than the other regions. The poor regions benefit financially to remain below the national average in terms of tax capacity. Furthermore, environmental taxes will again become an exclusive federal jurisdiction.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, like in previous state reforms, the classic Belgian mechanism has worked again. According to this classic mechanism, Flanders and Wallonia were granted and are being granted a number of powers in exchange for strengthening the financial and political power of the French speakers in this country.

Colleagues, for an important part I can summarize my comment on this draft with the following quote: "Belgium is on dying after death. This is the result of the dozens of community and institutional compromises and political bargains that have been concluded since 1970. Since then, the citizen is lost in an institutionally untouchable cloth. The reform of our institutions must be changed radically and addressed completely differently. Instead of constantly thinking about new communal compromises following the formation of one or another government, in which we continue to build on the scarce institutions with which we have been shipped since 1970, a whole new state reform must come. Instead of increasingly dividing upward powers, institutions and administrative authorities, the two major communities in our country must sit down at the table and consider what they want to do with each other and in what way.

A genuine authentic, transparent federal state also means that each level of government int its own income and bears its share of debt. There can no longer be donations, allocated income or taxes to be restored, as is now common. We should not be afraid of tax competition between subregions, which is precisely the best guarantee that drivers will remain moderate in their tax and regulatory tendencies.”

Colleagues, this quote is not from the hand of one or another extreme flamingus, but is drawn "Guy Verhofstadt, June 1992". It may even remind some members of the VLD of a number of texts that they had to pass through as compulsory bed cleaning. I assume that the then opposition leader will not like to be reminded of quotes from his second civil manifesto. Each of us knows the story of the powerful who become unfaithful and the powerless who remain faithful.

Mr. Speaker, I will turn to you for a moment. From this tribune we will continue to say that we do not like this state reform. From this tribune, we will forever be the voice of the political dissidents in this Belgian false democracy. From this tribune, we will continue to oppose the purple-green dictatorship of politically correct thinking. From this tribune we will continue to say that we will continue to fight in honor and conscience until Flanders is a free state in a “Europe of Peoples”.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, in every state reform in this country, one inevitably talks about compromise. When assessing a compromise, the Agalev-Ecolo group is ⁇ well placed because it is the only group that cooperates with non-speakers across the language boundary. This, in my opinion, is a good thing, although it is not always easy. We must not hide that, despite the very large unanimity, there are also regularly discussions among us, and that in a different political landscape and media landscape, different emphasis is placed by the one and the other part of the group. It is normal that there are sometimes differences in vision. With regard to the Community aspects, however, we can formulate very extensive joint proposals. What is especially important is that through the daily contact we experience that the great clichemate approach to the community problem is in reality much more nuanced than it is often imagined.

The biggest cliché from the discussion about this state reform is that on the one hand, the Flemings demand more powers and on the other hand, the French-speaking more financial resources "pour le refinancement de la communauté ou de l'enseignement." When one sees what the Flemish government wants to ⁇ and what questions the Flemish teachers have, it is clear that there is also a demand on the Flemish side for additional financial resources.

For the sake of historical truth, I would like to emphasize that the questions from Flemish education do indeed exist, but that they are not solved by the current Flemish government. This is related to the wrong policy choices and to the wrong budget choices of the Flemish government, of which Mr. Tavernier’s party, by the way, is part.

Mr. Leterme, that may well be your opinion. However, I note that the majority of the additional expenditure covers the so-called white anger. I think the demands of the welfare sector were right. The welfare sector is an important sector in the Flemish society. You will have to acknowledge that the majority of the additional expenditure, rightly, went to the welfare sector. There have also been many more additional commitments made to the Flemish education than there have been completed concrete affairs regarding, for example, the offsets. I am speaking here about the decisions we have now in our hands and about the plans for 2002. One can indeed dream about what we are going to do in five years, but I like to talk about what has been decided so far and about which there are concrete commitments. I believe that the Flemish government has not made the wrong policy choices. On the contrary, a number of fundamental matters have been corrected after, ⁇ due to circumstances, they had shattered during the previous legislature. At that time, some sectors clearly did not come to their tracks. They were not properly reimbursed.

I assume that with the French speakers happens the same as with the Flamings. I listened carefully to colleagues. He said that the demand for more powers also lives with the French speakers. With regard to certain regional taxes, they not only require more resources; they also often want to adjust the regional tax to their own needs. They want to conduct their own policy, they want to choose the direction in which they want to direct their region. More powers are not just a Flemish requirement. Also on the French-language side, this question is very clear. Similarly, in the different regions and communities for a number of domains, there is a demand for more opportunities to conduct their own policies. There is a transfer of powers from the federal level to the regional and community level.

Let us return to the financial law that lies ahead of us. Here are some important steps taken, which are actually challenged by few. When they are challenged, it clearly happens from a completely different angle, depending on whether they come from one or the other side of the language boundary. The criticisms are in fact opposed to each other. Therefore, it is not true that an alternative agreement could be reached with a different majority that would be unanimously approved. It is the fate of a compromise agreement that no one meets all the requirements. But it is evenly balanced.

I note that no one is questioning the necessary refinancing of communities. No one denies the fact that the old system of funding of grants increasing according to VAT revenues is a bad system, resulting in a structural reduction of Community funds. We are proposing a new mechanism. You find it too limited, Mr. Leterme. Alleszins stands the criticism of the CVP alongside that of the PSC. Since the objections of the opponents of the complicated agreement that is now on the table — that cannot be otherwise, because it is a difficult problem — are so diverse, I can not help but conclude that there is little room for an alternative that carries away the approval in both major language communities.

Mr. Tavernier, you argue that there is no alternative to the texts on the table. I have all the indications that, at the moment you declare this from the speaker, through marchandage and renegotiations, there is an attempt to draw up an alternative text, which can ⁇ obtain a two-thirds majority. What are you here to tell?

Mr. Leterme, I ⁇ ⁇ would not count on an alternative text with a new mechanism. Forget that.

Mr. Tavernier, for all clarity, you assume that text changes will be made, quid that no entirely new text will be submitted? In other words, do you now announce amendments to the present texts by the majority?

I am not announcing anything here. What I said was that this is a balanced whole and that you should not hope or fear for an alternative that proposes entirely new texts or mechanisms.

I recall that the regions were also asking for greater tax liability so that they could have their own policy instruments. This too has never been disputed. There has even been little or no criticism of the fact that the federal level is re-competent for environmental taxes.

For us, it is very important that there are clear limits to regional autonomy, because the federal government must be compensated for its income loss. In addition, it was decided to counter the risk of fiscal migration. It is too easy to simply demand that even the smallest region be granted as much tax autonomy as possible. The risk of tax migration is unthinkable. Fiscal migration is always in the benefit of the inhabitants with the highest incomes, who most easily move to areas with the lowest tax pressure.

Sometimes I have the impression that one approaches fiscal autonomy from a too theoretical concept and that one takes too little into account what is happening in reality, namely fiscal migration and tax evasion. I think we should do everything we can to prevent this. Therefore, I find it very good that clear limits have been set to the regional taxes and to the reductions and increases of the personal tax. Today, there is also a difference between various municipalities in the additional municipal tax on the personal tax. Today in Flanders — and I suppose also in Wallonia — there are regular complaints about the fact that the wealthiest municipalities apply the lowest rates and thus attract the highest incomes. This is not socially correct.

Given these findings, it is more than correct to give the different regions the possibility of differentiation. If one does so, one must at the same time also clearly indicate the limitations within which that possibility is situated. That is why I think what is presented here is very good. Of course, it can be said that it was more before. Indeed, in theory it was a lake, but in practice, first, it was not applied and, secondly, it was connected to other, additional conditions, so that there was no such possible differentiation.

In the meantime, I would like to talk about corporate tax. The reasons why we consider that the regional taxes, the margins, the fluctuations and the differentiations in the personal tax should be limited are the same as the reasons why we consider that great attention should be paid to the possible regionalization of the corporate tax. The risk of tax migration to areas with the lowest tax burden is much greater for companies than for individuals. Therefore, regionalization here would, in my opinion, be a bad move and it is good that we keep the corporate tax at the federal level. After all, the headquarters of a company is too easy to move from one Region to another.

Let’s talk about the Brussels Agreement. Brussels has never been an easy case. A compromise is always a bit complicated. The advantage of this agreement is, in any case, that it came from the Brussels themselves. They have negotiated this and it is viewed by the two language groups in Brussels as a positive step forward. I hear it defended by Flemish and by French-speaking Brussels. A number of principles had already been set out in the Brussels Government Agreement and those principles have now been translated. For the Flamings there is for the first time a guaranteed representation. This will be clearly recorded. So I find it grotesque that one interprets that guaranteed representation as meaning that the Flemish representation in Brussels is suddenly in a slide. I think it’s almost a dream for many to ever reach those 19%. Before it comes to this point, I think it will have been several decades past. Given the Belgian construction, we would have talked to each other at that time!

Inventive constructions have been applied to prevent the Flemish Bloc from applying the blockade of Brussels. In addition to the element "possible blocking of the Brussels institutions", some have talked about other strategies. It is foreseeable from the Brussels to establish such a mechanism. Probably these mechanisms will not be needed. I hope this is primarily for the flames. If one looks at it from the Flemish side, the Flemish Block for the Flemish is actually a block on the leg. Their

I can understand the CVP when they say from their point of view that they have better proposals. I can also understand the PSC when they say they have better proposals from their point of view. I only assume that together they have no better proposal. Each individually, starting from the point of view of one community or region, one may have better suggestions from his own point of view. However, others then have exactly the opposite proposals. Therefore, I believe that what is ahead here is a good thing and a step forward. As we find this a step forward and a balanced agreement, we will fully support it.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, ladies and gentlemen, the declaration on the revision of the Constitution adopted in the last legislature left the current Parliament only a very limited space to take further steps in the state reform. We regretted this two years ago and still do. There will be significant progress in the current legislature. This was promised to us in the negotiations on the formation of a Flemish government. One important fact is that the parties promised to now hold no other discourse at the Flemish level than at the federal level. Two years ago we welcomed this break with an unfashioned practice from a recent past in which defederalizing muscle balls were rolled in the Flemish Parliament while this federal received little echo. by

Now I don’t know if I should be so excited about it. Certainly, honesty is a very great asset and unanimity at the federal and Flemish level is fair. That all this would result in a very low majority when it comes to further steps in the Flemish state formation within the Flemish Parliament, we could not yet foresee. Whatever they were, the Flemish government in which my party participated promised progress in a number of areas. I believe that the declaration of the Flemish government is therefore the right measure to assess the agreements and their legal transposition. I will return to that later. by

The further story is known. There was a Costa and a first agreement, the Hermes Agreement, then came a second agreement, the Lambermont Agreement and then there was a third agreement, the Lombard Agreement.

The enthusiasm for the first two agreements we participated in was rather moderate. Of course, much would depend on translating those agreements into legislation.

Well, this transformation proved quite disappointing, and on many points the texts differed from what was then agreed. Those who delve into or deepen into the technique of the accords can only establish that. So we pulled the alarm bell and tried to make a list of gaps. These were points where we believe a significant deviation from the original agreements in the submitted texts was found. We handed this list over to Karel De Gucht, chairman of the largest majority party on the Flemish side, who wanted to act as a mediator.

I will only list the most important points. First, it was clearly agreed that police surveillance would go to the regions, except for police powers related to the Octopus Package. For us, the texts also had to state that only the police powers on public order remained federal, the other supervisory measures related to the municipal police would pass to the regions. If I am not mistaken, a VLD faction leader in the Chamber thought that, for example, the traffic police would be under regional supervision. We do not find this statement anywhere in the texts.

A smaller point was that, according to the texts, governors, district commissioners, etc. could only be removed by the Northern Government after unanimous advice from the federal government. Withdrawal is a highly regulated and guaranteed procedure. It is therefore a little weird that at the end of such a procedure the federal government could block the deposition.

There was a question of guaranteed representation, for example in Flamingen, which would not be hampered by any other provision, in particular that of the principle of proportionality, such as the state registered in the electoral system.

Despite our comments, the text was not amended. We noted that a number of procedures, including an appeal to the Court of Arbitration, would necessarily require different deadlines. They were not listened.

The most important point was the German community. There was nothing on German-speaking municipalities in the Lambermont Agreement and we have debated it in this Chamber. On my question to the Deputy Prime Minister, the latter replied that there was no agreement. In the texts, we find that the oversight over the German-speaking municipalities is transferred to Namur, with all the problems for the German speakers.

The integration of OCMW with municipal social services, a very social and important point for us, was asked and more or less promised, but we could find nothing about it in the texts. Now it also turns out to be impossible.

The safety of the food chain was registered as a competence criterion where it should only serve as a statement for the packages that were or were not transferred to the regions.

With regard to agricultural prices, we pointed out that while the federal level may remain competent for price and income policy at the level of the consumer, but not at the level of agricultural prices. There was agreement with Mr De Gucht on this point, but we are still waiting for clarity on this point.

This is not insignificant, because it means that the region and not the federation can fill the margins that the EU policy leaves in this regard.

All municipalities should be treated equally. Our point was that a big city should not be subject to the same rules as a small town. That is not good governance. “No,” they told us, “that needs to be adjusted, making it clear that it is just about facilities. That’s why it was written: “Well, then do it. Say that explicitly, write it explicitly, otherwise you do not make bad legislation.

With regard to the Finance Act, we pointed out that the monitoring by the Court of Auditors and the possible ex-post audit by the Court of Arbitration can only take place on the basis of two quantitative criteria: the margins and progressiveness. “Yes,” they told us. “Yes,” Minister Vande Lanotte repeated in a reply not included in the report. “Yes, of course it is so. The unfaithful tax competition itself is not a test element.” We are still awaiting a clear and clear statement in the report that there can be no third assessment criterion, in particular unfair tax competition, in addition to the two quantitative criteria. Only the two criteria are possible.

We noted that we might have had to take care in the Finance Act so that the federal government would not be able to gather elements that had been transferred from tax to the West. Therefore, it should be stipulated that an object taxable already under the new jurisdiction would not be taxed again by the federal government, though under a different name. What has been done to avoid double taxation? A provision was written in only on avoiding double taxation between two regions, which is another matter.

With regard to ecotaxes and ecobonus, it was agreed that these, like the other regional taxes, would pass to the regions. Suddenly, a different course is taken when submitting the text. They are now made federal. The only weak explanation we get for this is that the regions are suddenly no longer interested and that it is not so important to Flanders.

Even if the latter is true, it still undermines the coherent power package theory, and it’s again a nice piece of federal useless recovery.

Comments were made regarding registration rights. I will save you the technical side.

I would like to highlight three short points that are ⁇ important to us.

First, the plant of Meise. The transfer of the Meise Plant Garden is repeatedly mentioned in this funding law. It is also better to know to whom it is delivered. Is it so difficult to report in the text of the law or in the explanation that it is transmitted to the Flemish community? This was the case in the earlier versions of the text. It seems that it can no longer. If that does not happen, it is not merely forgetting. That means there is more politics behind.

As regards the Meise Plant Garden, it was agreed that the funding of the French community that would respond to it would be limited to the French-speaking scientific staff working there. I understand that and that is good. In the current text we read that it is all about the staff of the French language role. Why should such changes be written down without serious consultation?

Second, as regards development cooperation, the Lambermont Agreement expressly agreed that all aspects of development cooperation related to the competences of the Regions and the Communities would be transferred as from 1 January 2004. In the present text we read that we are waiting. Until a next special law, for which a two-thirds majority will be required, the powers for development cooperation will be transferred. I’m sorry, but we’ve seen too many times that two or three-stage transfers don’t work as well. We do not want to be fooled again. It cannot. This is not a translation of what was agreed.

Third, I have a point about coherence. From the very beginning, we insisted that the agreements form a whole. The Special Financing Act and the Special Competence Act shall form a whole and be bound together as such. We find that one of the two is constantly plagued with suspicions of unconstitutionality or with placing major legal questions behind its validity. Transfer of money without taking any security measures. It cannot.

Until this House or the Senate, we have no guarantee that killing one law will result in killing another.

For us, these two laws are inseparably linked. Our attitude toward the law of jurisdiction will be no different than our attitude toward the law of finance. This is not the case.

I could add a long list. With the matters I have mentioned, I want to show that there is no agreement on all points between what has been agreed and the matters in which we could still find ourselves. Patrick Vankrunkelsven called the agreement the minimum minimum. Its conversion is below that minimum.

Some of the unrealized points were so essential to us that we called them breakpoints. We made very clear that we could not have the approval of the texts if those breaches were not realized.

Mediator De Gucht gave us absolutely right on most of these breaches. He said there were deviations on a number of points. One still wanted to try to come to agreements with an open mind to lead this part still in the right course. Much was promised to us in words, we still haven’t seen the texts.

In the meantime, our party had also made clear that there could not be a matter of accepting the authority of the Brussels Capital Region regarding the supervision of the Brussels municipalities without immediately and in accordance with the Brussels Government Agreement doing anything to improve the situation of the Flemish in Brussels. The mini-Costa was brought to life, talks were held and the Lombard Agreement was concluded. This Lombardy Agreement was not called by me, but by the Chairman of the VLD. But he defended it. This may be a sign of a new political culture.

New political culture may also be paying for mandates. I have heard in this Chamber that people who want to do politics at a certain level both north and south of the language boundary have a very hard time paying for mandates. This gives me a very bad picture of what a Flaming and a Waal is in the Brussels context.

We rejected the Lombard Agreements because they are completely understated in terms of strengthening the position of the Flemish in Brussels, a step backwards in terms of the double majorities that are abolished and because paying for mandates as a principle cannot be. A part of my party welcomed the agreements as a realization of the expected, better status of the Brussels Flemings. I will return to that.

How can we now determine our position regarding the transposition of the previous agreements into special laws? What should be our standard? We could do as the Flemish Movement would like to do and refer to the five resolutions of the Flemish Parliament: Brussels is not a state like the others, Flanders must be able to handle the personal tax itself, Flanders must be able to decide on health and family policy and the split of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. I will not do that.

We could refer to party programs. I could refer to my own party program, but I assume that I cannot convince people from other parties. Sometimes it is difficult enough for us here. We could also refer to the VLD program for example, yet an important and serious party. What do you say about tax autonomy? What they have said about the need for a federalization of social security is very interesting.

I hope the VLD will be able to convince me in the coming hours, days and weeks that the VLD is not a thin layer of paint. I hope that in the coming hours and days the VLD will still be able to prove that it takes that V in its letter seriously. Anyway, we will all one day have to realize that not everything and everyone is for sale, that not everything and everyone can simply ignore the public interest.

If, after keeping us on the line, agreements are made later in the government to pull some PSCs over the line, the responsibility of those who do so will be very large.

We know that they will try to take responsibility for this. We are used to that. I can only tell you that anyone who knows a little about this dossier, anyone with a little political sense, even with the VLD, SP and Agalev, and anyone who has a little self-esteem, will have to admit that this is not possible. You cannot dissociate the Competence Act and the Finance Act. by

What will we base our assessment on? Not on the Maximist or Maximist-named Flemish resolutions, but simply on what we agreed with the same parties as those who form the federal majority here, in the Flemish Parliament in the Flemish government formation. What does this evaluation lead to now? I would like to highlight three points in this regard. A core concept, not only in Flanders but also at the federal level, is good governance. For us, the state reform of Belgium is not in the sign of an unbearable urge for division, but is based on the aspiration to realize an efficient and good governance based on the principles as outlined in the Flemish government agreement: responsibility, subsidiarity and solidarity. However, Lambermont-bis, as it has become known, will not lead to a better, more transparent and coherent distribution of powers between the federal state and the Communities and Regions. The agreement is full of exceptions to delegations of powers and includes funding mechanisms that no one can yet see complete. This a la carte federalism serves neither the rule of law nor democracy. It is therefore not surprising that the opinions of the bilingual chamber of the Council of State are devastating, both for Lambermont and for the Brussels Agreement. Therefore, the possibility that the arbitration court will soon overthrow the neglect of these opinions here in the House and by the government is more than real.

Second review: the Lambermont Agreements reinforce the federalism of the state. The Brussels Capital Region is being substantially strengthened while nothing is being done to address the weak democratic functioning of the Brussels institutions. On the contrary, these poorly functioning institutions are often given even more powers, which go far beyond the city boundaries, literally and figuratively. Sometimes I fear that Flanders will say goodbye to its capital here. The guarantees for the Brussels Flamings are reduced rather than strengthened. Moreover, the principle of triunity is contrary to what our party has always declared.

Finally, there is the cost/benefit analysis. The Lambermont Agreement undeniably puts further steps in state reform, which is also true. One claims that the agreement surpasses all expectations, while the other claims that the agreement is insufficient. Despite the washlist of points of criticism that we could put out, I don’t want to end up in a welles-nietes game where nobody gets right. Let me refer to the Flemish government. There we can find an objective measure, even almost a quantitative measure, for evaluating the agreements and legislative texts submitted to us. The Flemish government agreement outlines ten areas of competence in which reforms need to be implemented "quickly" and six variable points. Even with a gentle assessment, it is inevitable that progress has been made effectively in just four areas of competence. Of the six variables, only two were met. In addition, the government agreement lists eleven difficulties and seven not insignificant variables for which, I quote, “in the first half of the legislature” – so now – “definitive solutions had to be found.” The same gentle jury teaches that four of the eleven problems were effectively solved.

The seven variable points, including important files such as the split of the judicial district Brussel-HalleVilvoorde and the split of the electoral district Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde, remained unanswered. 4 out of 10, 2 out of 6, 4 out of 11 and 0 out of 7: a total score of 10 out of 34, or 29%. Even a very gentle jury cannot decide.

In addition, there are the clear statements of a number of French-speaking politicians who, despite the highly contradictory statements of Flemish politicians, assure us that the approval of the present agreements definitively means the end of state reform. After addressing the French-speaking community’s financial needs, we will not make any progress in this area over the next ten years — and I am optimistic.

We can only conclude that the present special legislation cannot be approved. Other members of my party will approve the legislation, as it is, if no further concessions are made to disrupt some French-speaking votes. This disagreement within my group does not please me, but I cannot and do not want to deny it. Some members of my group chose a different path, based on their beliefs. Are they traitors? Are they bad fires? No to. They believe, on the basis of their convictions, that this is enough. But that is not our view. Are we nationalist extremists? Or are we, as some call us, right-wing conservatives or right-wing extremists? If the term extremist today means respecting your agreements and consistently pursuing your ideals and following your program, then they may be right. I’m not one of those who say link is link, but let’s not confuse right with straight.

We believe in a straight line policy, without any kind of folly. We also believe in a step-by-step policy. We also know that we are a very small group in this Parliament and that if we want to progress, we must seek consensus with the other Flemish and French speakers. We have always behaved that way. We perfectly realize the specific nature of our situation. We were and are still willing to continue to talk to anyone who wishes, Flemings and French speakers. We are and continue to be prepared to make a solid and honorable compromise; a compromise that should not be called perfidious, which leaves a fuzzy taste in the mouth of the French speakers or the Flemish, but in which the State is reformed in such a way that it becomes better, both for the Flemish, the French speakers and the German speakers. We believe that this is possible; we believe that a better agreement can be reached.

Let us build upon such a political consensus; let us remark the State into a better place with a proper distribution of powers. Let us take the time, in the sense that we use the period of the Belgian Presidency of the European Union to ⁇ a fair comparison and a step in the right direction, determined, faithful to the ideals, but also in all serenity and with a sense of compromise.

This is the request of Frieda Brepoels, Karel Van Hoorebeke, Geert Bourgeois and myself.

The Lambermont Agreement and the Brussels Lombardy Agreement are at least as bad for Flanders as the notorious Egmont Pact is happier, ⁇ even worse. If the bourgeois group had not resisted, Lambermont would have been closed by Parliament almost silently. This is mainly due to the complicity of the media, which in the vast majority are affectionate to the purple-green project and silence the opposition, but also by the conscious complexity of this agreement. They intentionally make things so complicated that people get rid of them. If they barely get correct information, most people do not even know what it is about. There is a lot at stake for Flanders. Our future depends on it, but the trees threaten to stop seeing the forest.

Since I had been trained in an earlier life to distinguish the essential from the additional, I did this exercise again here. That whole Lambermont issue can be summarized in one sentence. The enormous money transfers from Flanders to Wallonia and Brussels continue to exist forever and continue to increase drastically in exchange for some residual and apparent powers for the regions where Brussels 'en passant' is expanded more than ever into a full-fledged third region, which together with Wallonia can be used against Flanders. The minority of Brussels Flamings is losing its necessary veto right. They become second-class citizens, constantly subject to French-speaking blackmail with the global result of blocking the further state reform. This is the drama of Lambermont.

The French speakers get everything they need, especially the increasing federal — especially Flemish — resources for their money-sweeping education, while the Flemish lose their power in Brussels and must pay themselves eternally blue. This was frankly illustrated by Jean-Claude Van Cauwenberghe, the Welsh Prime Minister, who made the following statement on 7 November 2000. I quote, “The most important thing about the Lambermont agreement is what it is not capable of. I mean that neither social security nor solidarity is affected.” Colleagues, can it be more clear? Can it be more painful?

People wonder how this is possible. Why did the flames roll like this? Leuven professor of political science Wilfried Dewachter, a good colleague of Danny Pieters, also asks this question. In a reading-worthy interview in the Financial Economic Time on Saturday 26 May, he called it incomprehensible that the Flemings have undergone the pressure of the French speakers and have agreed that there was not even a talk about social security, health care, child allowance and financial solidarity. Then Dewachter is still silent about not addressing the division of the electoral district and judicial district Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde, not lifting the personal and corporate tax, not regionalizing the NMBS, telecommunications, statistics, and so on. Let us ⁇ not forget the imposition of a guaranteed representation for the Brussels Flamings at all levels of government. All these matters were listed in the five resolutions that the Flemish Parliament approved almost unanimously on 3 March 1999.

Again, how is this possible? Where does this Flemish loser mentality come from?

Professor Dewachter suggests that part of the Flemish long-suffering and lamentability at the negotiating table is due to the fact that the VLD delivers the prime minister. I quote an euphemistic Guardian: "The post of prime minister is not the best guarantee to push through your own policy." That is correct. However, there is more at stake. This Michel Verhofstadt government, in this order, was put together in the workshouses of the loge in Wallonia and follows fully the agenda of the francophonie in Belgium. Verhofstadt can play the premier of Michel, the kingmaker, but for the rest Michel and Di Rupo dictate what needs to be done. The backbenchers of the VLD must lay down to this.

The VLD, which enthusiastically approved the five resolutions of the Flemish Parliament and for whom all could not be radical enough — Mr. Danny Pieters has just recalled it; I remind you of the performances of Patrick Dewael and André Denys who crumbled on their Flemish battle rose, but also Karel De Gucht before he became president — has fully submitted to the French-speaking supremacy. The VLD no longer even defends the essential interests of the Flemish business community. I will strictly return to that.

The SP and AGALEV should not be counted at all on the defense of Flemish interests. They are already happy to be able to be there and be able to sit with the meat spots. The metamorphosis of the Greens in this regard is phenomenal.

But what does a part of the People’s Union inspire? I fear that the answer is very banal: career planning, job hunting, here and there some appointments can be made and subsidies can be entered. VU-ID21 has completely shattered it since the beginning of this legislature. Remember that Geert Bourgeois hesitated to enter the Flemish government and first wanted to wait to see if there would be anything in the house from a new state reform. That was counted outside of the values, in this case the power-hungry men Bert Anciaux and Patrik Vankrunkelsven who were so openly government geils that the whole Wetstraat knew that they could hardly wait to enter the government and thus have completely undermined the initial negotiating position of the VU, which is mathematically necessary in the Flemish government!

From then on, literally everything was swallowed and the future of Flanders was put at stake for the figurative hand full of silver coins. Meanwhile, however, every year Flanders are legally deprived of the fruits of its prosperity, thus heavily mortgaged the future of our region and of our people. My claims are based on figures, disturbing figures that demonstrate how Flanders is dismantled and empty milked every year. This year, in 2001, the Flemish budget amounts to about 650 billion francs. The transfers calculated in the KBC study, to which Mr Bultinck has already referred, will amount to more than 4,000 billion francs over the next 20 years, increased by the amounts of the Lambermont Agreement. In the next 20 years, we will have to pay approximately 6 times the Flemish budget of this year to Brussels and Wallonia.

I find myself in very good company when I assume that this is impossible to continue. Jef Roos, the Chairman of the VEV, stated on 8 January 2001, I quote: “Wallonia should be given the full opportunity to ensure its own growth. It would testify to great short-sightedness to count permanently on mass transfers from Flanders. The transfers from Flanders to Wallonia are currently not sufficiently focused on structurally increasing the dynamics of Wallonia and therefore on rendering these transfers superfluous in the long run.

Today, each Waal receives more than 50,000 francs per year from Flanders. This money vein cannot remain open forever. The current transfer mechanisms in this country can even be called perverse, because they reward being behind.” This is the quote by Jef Roos.

Instead of reducing the transfers, they are increased by this fateful Lambermont agreement, and not in a small way. Minister Vande Lanotte was so kind to give us a table, as an annex to the committee report. This shows the extent to which the resources for the French community — and therefore also the transfers — will continue to increase. In 2002, the French community already receives an additional 3.23 billion francs; in 2004, this amount has already increased to 8 billion francs; in 2005, already to 14 billion francs; to 20 billion francs in 2007 and to 89 billion francs in 2020, each at the current prices. It seems as if the French speakers have won a “win for life”, which keeps them assured for eternity of annual increasing resources and which makes Flanders see more money flowing away to the south every year.

In this regard, I quote Professor Robert Senelle today in Knack: "It is evident that here an important part of the Flemish prosperity is extracted in an unacceptable and cynical way to the hardworking, economical Flamingen. I wonder why Flemish politicians are silent about this as murdered." This is Professor Senelle.

Flemish colleagues, this can no longer be so. You can no longer answer this to our Flemish people. The annual transfer of 200 billion francs, further increased by the Lambermont funds, which are extracted from Flanders every year, represents an excessive deflation for our economy. This can no longer be, witnesses among others VEV chairman Roos. The VLD must realize that the Flemish entrepreneurs also no longer take this. The idea of an independent Flanders is growing in these circles.

There is an urgent need for funding for Flemish infrastructure, especially in and around Antwerp, at least 60 billion francs in the short term. However, this money does not exist. Our companies must be able to operate healthy and competitive. For this, however, in the future the lifting trees will be lacking. Colleagues of the VLD, if you want to work hand in hand with the separatism in the Flemish entrepreneurial world, then you must definitely approve the Lambermont Agreement.

To the Flemish workers — not to their representatives, for they are no longer workers — I say: Flanders are robbed, you are robbed, your family is robbed. If Flemish money remains in Flemish hands, you should not beg for a storage of 6% for the minimum wages. Then you should not beg for a higher pension. Then you should not beg for a higher child allowance. Then you should not beg for more jobs. Then our teachers should not beg for better framework and remuneration. No, then Flemish prosperity remains in Flemish hands and then we make Flanders the most modern region in Europe.

There is no good side to the Lambermont Agreement. This agreement deprives the Flemish for a long time of the financial leverage to force the French speakers again to the negotiating table for further steps in the state reform and thus for more Flemish autonomy and prosperity. I have good hope, after hearing colleague Pieters, that the four colleagues of the group-Bourgeois will not approve this agreement. If this is the case, I will take off my hat for them. The other four colleagues of the VU faction will have to respond to their attitude towards history. I also address the CVP, because this party also has a very large responsibility towards Flanders and Brussels. If this financial gap of Lambermont is approved tomorrow, for example thanks to the PSC, then there remains the CVP, if it means it with its commitment to the Flemish interests, but one thing: leaving the Brussels government to thus also drag the MichelVerhofstadt government into its trap and thus throw down this fateful Lambertmont agreement yet. However, I am afraid that the CVP will not dare to sharpen the head of its atomic bomb-Chabert, as Prime Minister Verhofstadt suggested here recently even challengingly spotting on this tribune. Even because Verhofstadt knows that the CVP in itself is still a regime party that continues to place Belgium in the final over Flanders. Mr. Van Rompuy, Mr. Leterme, I may be mistaken, but I do not think.

Colleagues, the best thing we can do in these circumstances is wait, wait and wait again. Time plays in our advantage. We must not rush now. It is better not to reach an agreement at the moment than a bad agreement. I conclude here again with the wise words of Professor Senelle, who said on 14 February in Knack: "Lambermont-bis weighs too light. The Flaming Party should not accept a new round of state reform without the division of health care and child allowances. That should be the first step towards reducing the shameful financial transfers that make Flanders 200 billion poor every year."

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I have heard about all the presentations in the draft and in the proposal. Then we are going to relativize a little. Some, of which I prefer to hear the one rather than the other, say in their own words that this is a bad agreement, an agreement that one should never have concluded.

On the contrary, those who, despite the fact that their vision of society is dressed on the same reading and inspired by the same source, come to make different statements. That crystallizes most in the presentations of the two speakers – I found their attitude very courageous – of the People’s Union. I do not comment on the accusations that have been raised here. Already in 1963 I have experienced how some Flemish people oppose the establishment of the language boundary, because Flanders FrenchFlanders had already lost to France and there would be other pieces lost. I don’t think anyone today dares to assert, except for a few exceptions, that a good decision was not made in 1963. Subsequently, the state reforms followed, with the SP always present. Depending on the vision, it will be said that it was responsible, as Mr Van der Maelen noted. (Protest by Mr Annemans)

Mr Annemans, I have just said that I will not respond to accusations, not even in front of coalition partners. I will also try not to blame you and your group, but that is ⁇ difficult.

If you succeed, I will remain silent until the end of your speech, Mr. Coveliers.

Mr. Annemans, I suggest that as soon as I address the first sentimental and passionate accusation to your group, you interrupt me and keep silent for so long.

There is a logic in the state reforms. After the establishment of the language limit in 1963, in 1970 we will come to what has become known as cultural autonomy, a first step in the framework of a Belgian whole. Until now, that was always the starting point for all state reforms — I do not see any changes in them for now. This, of course, implies constraints. It has been accepted to retain Belgium and to reform the state nonviolently — other regions in Europe not as far away here as they would probably have forced with arms — in federal later confederate sense. Cultural autonomy is the first step. Remember that in the Belgian government even two ministerial committees were created which were the forespeak of the subsequent part-governments. Only the next state reform in 1980 was also characterized by economic aspects. In 1993 there was then the important step toward a far-reaching form of self-government, always within the framework — I also admit that — of a Belgian state.

Those who reject the agreement and think they have arguments for it, actually want to break this state in two. To those people we say that we do not share that option. Because we try to take and give, because we try to live together with other people in this country, you sweep blame into our heads that are in a completely different frame. These arguments are not used to us because we do not agree with your basic option.

I have already told you that there is a dynamic in the state reform. In a confederate state, I think the reform of the Constitution has never ended. Just look at all other federal states — whether you are for or against it, for in this hemisphere one must be careful of foreign examples — look at the great example of the United States, where there is constantly a weighing of the federal dynamics, look at Spain, where every five years there is a reequalization of this federal dynamics. Therefore, it is no more than normal that this is happening in Belgium, that there are steps to change here too, that a number of matters need to be re-examined and that there is a refinancing. It is correct that this refinancing implies that the initial financing may not have been sufficiently forward-looking or that the powers of some components have been subsequently changed in such a way that refinancing was necessary. Their

We, federalists and confederalists, believe that one should always consider the problems of the federal partner. This is, of course, a much more difficult situation than that of the separatist. The separatist has it easy, because he has to take into account no one, often not even his own people. The separatist remains safe on his island and is not disturbed by the problems of others.

It is irrational to say that we would attract nothing from our own people.

I will try to explain it to you. I think that separatism is cutting off the possibilities for people with a more global, more European view, who want to keep this whole of one state. There you can find answers that we require you to remain in this whole and prevent you from experiencing separatism. The knife actually cuts on two sides. However, as long as the majority considers that separatism is not an option, I believe that we have democratic equality on our side.

We agree on this. The principle of the Belgian Union must indeed have a democratic support. This, however, has nothing to do with the state reform that we need to approve here or not with the majority or not. It is not because there is currently no immediate support for a dissolution of the Belgian Union that a state reform is mandatory.

No, of course not, the necessity of state reform lies in the fact that problems arise both in oneself and in partners as a result of previous state reforms, which must be cut off.

Mr. Speaker, I just want to point out the very simple fact that Belgium and the Parliament in which we sit are also based on separatism that occurred 170 years ago. This is equally comparable to the separatism we pursue today. Mr. Coveliers, the negative qualities you attribute to the separatists, you can thus also attribute to yourself.

You are talking about the separation of the Netherlands.

of course . It was also separatism.

Mr. Laeremans, then we can go back a little longer in time. In addition to 1302, one of the most strange dates in the history of this country is 1648. Then comes 1685 with the closure of the Schelde and the fall of Antwerp. The Munster Peace was signed in 1648. Then the Catholic — Mrs. Colen will be very interested in that — Southern Netherlands have separated themselves from the ugly Protestant northern parts of the Netherlands. We can go back so far, but I think this makes little sense. We can better hic et nunc in 2001 to establish that there are a number of problems and they are trying to solve. We do this in the context of the dynamics of the constitutional revision and taking into account the fact that we are not separatists but want to see it as a whole and a confederate bond. This is done in the knowledge that there may be a number of comments on it. In the committee, I listened attentively to Mr Van Rompuy’s remarks. I always listen attentively to him. In essence, he says that the CVP would never have negotiated such an agreement. I can only answer this with the words of the President: quod est demonstrandum. This is not true because if you look at the past, you can see that such agreements have been concluded. One has been obliged by agreement and consensus to put water in his wine but in any case to ensure that there was still enough wine to be drunk as wine. I share Mr. Borginon’s view that this is a clear step forward for a better structure of our community, especially in terms of better governance. This was apparently questioned by the other speaker of the People’s Union. I think this is incorrect.

I will not repeat the full texts. I try to summarize them and indicate why this is an important step. The argument that this is a whole is correct. There is, on the one hand, a refinancing and, on the other hand, a transfer of competence. We will be able to vote on the transfer of powers only when the Senate has also dealt with it. It is a consequence of our two-room system that the two texts are not treated simultaneously. However, it cannot be denied that the refinancing of communities will also bring a new dynamic of those resources. At the start of the communities, it has been determined that they have started to develop their own dynamics. Think of the dynamics that our colleagues from the Flemish Parliament and the Wallish Council received when they were directly elected. I am confident that this refinancing will also bring a new momentum, especially as a number of tax responsibilities will be expanded. This will create more possibilities, which have already been widely discussed.

Mr. Speaker, I had thought that Mr. Coveliers — who has just been called the group leader of the largest majority party — would explore the link between the draft we are discussing and the other, not insignificant, draft. Mr. Coveliers, I find your speculation interesting but the political point is now to know whether you agree or disagree with that link.

For us, this is not a big problem since we will vote for both texts. For us, they are connected. It is not up to me to decide how the other parties will react to it. I’m not a moral master, I’m just trying to convince people in the science that I may not succeed, but I’m making an attempt. It is up to others to decide how they will vote.

Mr. Speaker, colleagues, there is another matter that I would like to hear from the leader of the VLD group: if this funding draft here today or tomorrow – purely hypothetically, because I assume that you have also listened to the last one and a half speeches – would you ensure that this funding draft will not be put to the vote in the Senate before voting here on the draft power? Or are you not going to deal with it at all? If you answer “no” then that is an important political statement. This means that you are only concerned with how the VLD will vote. Then I know enough.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Annemans, you remind me of a well-known Flemish television commentator who also always answers before asking the question.

I did not answer. I ask the question.

Mr. Annemans, if you want to answer.

Mr Annemans, if you ask Mr Coveliers a question, you should also give him the opportunity to answer.

That may be a little contrary to his style.

Mr. Annemans, with all members of the majority we will ensure that both texts will be voted in both Chambers, as it belongs to our system. What you do is anticipate things. We will do our utmost to ensure that both texts are approved and thus become lawful.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask a short additional question. Suppose — purely hypothetical, because tomorrow it is voted here and the texts are transmitted to the Senate that in a few weeks the two texts are for the final vote. Will the VLD then ensure that the funding in the Senate is not approved unless the Chamber informs that the powers have been approved there?

and vice versa.

No, not the reverse.

Mr Annemans, let me speak. We will make sure that on both texts that conscious day, that Thursday that you are so dear, is voted.

First the powers and then the funding plan?

Mr Annemans, we will ensure that both texts are voted.

This is vague enough.

Mr. Annemans, both texts will be voted at the end of the day, when you drive back to Antwerp to meet some people there.

Mr Coveliers, for example, you could wait with the final vote on funding in the Senate until you hear here in the House that the powers there have received a majority.

If it is necessary to approve both texts, yes.

Let us not call each other Liesbet. Will Flanders give the money without the powers there? If not, then you should do it as I recommended.

Both texts are approved.

Mr. Coveliers, will you, if necessary, wait with the vote on the funding draft in the Senate until the mandate draft is approved in the House?

Mr. Leterme, that is indeed a possibility.

Mr. Coveliers, is it yes or no?

Don’t worry, we will vote on both.

I would like to be brief about the financial law. I think enough has been talked about. The broader policy capabilities are clearly demonstrated thanks to the greater financial capabilities. The amounts have been quoted in the committee and displayed in the report. I will not repeat them here again and I think the importance of fund allocation is underestimated. A more modern mechanism is used to make the allocation more aligned with the reality of the year in which the funds are allocated.

We believe that the special law has given a correct and clear answer to two important concerns. First, the improvement of the dynamics of the resources of the community and second, the expansion of the tax powers of the regions. Their

It is in that perspective, namely of an adaptation to the problems that now arise and because of the fact that we clearly choose to live in a confederate or federal country — confederate seems to me the best description — that we want to take into account the possible problems of the partners. However, we ask and desire from the partner that he takes into account our problems, which, by the way, happened in this problem. Their

This is further evidenced by the second proposal concerning the amendments of the Brussels Capital Council. I have heard a lot of criticism about it, especially from people who do not live in Brussels. Yesterday night there was a beautiful concert, organized among other things by the Brussels Capital Government, which gave the opportunity to talk about it with Brussels Flamings. I think they have a completely different view on this.

One can, of course, follow the Tastenhoye statement, which I will call the Balkan position, namely to cut off gas and electricity and see what happens. But that is not our style.

Mr. Coveliers, I think this from Mr. Coveliers below everything. It begins to become ridiculous. Mr. Coveliers, you know as well as I do that the real grain bevers of De Morgen have completely distorted my words and pulled them out of their context. I would like you to stop doing this.

Mr. Tastenhoye, I had a colleague in the Senate who said the same about you. I have not mentioned any names. The English principle of sub judice is not applicable in Belgium.

In my view, the Brussels Bill regulates an important aspect. It, by the way, only regulates matters relating to Brussels and nothing outside. The current proposal regulates the direct election of the six Brussels Flamings who will sit in the Flemish Parliament. No one can doubt that this will be a good arrangement. After all, there were many complaints about the fact that some were elected to the Brussels Parliament, to the Brussels Council, then to the Flemish Parliament and some even had the third mandate, the Senate. Unfortunately, some are no longer in the parliamentary bodies because of certain statements and certain words published in the press. I think it is of the utmost importance for the democratic representation of the Brussels Flamings that they are directly elected by these six elected.

In the opinions of the State Council, which reach the Parliament at varying rates, I read that there are comments about the concept of language group. It is said that a new definition of the concept is made. That is true, but that is the fourth definition that is being made. There are already three other definitions in our constitutional system, where every time a different definition for a language group is used when it comes to Brussels, which now adds this fourth definition.

In certain circles it is said that the extension of the community commission, to which in case of blockade a number of members are added, is only intended to block the case. I think that is incorrect. In the election of the members of the Brussels Capital Council, the list is expanded to include some non-directly elected members who are designated on the basis of the elections in Flanders. That arrangement should again satisfy the Flammers. This means once again that the task of the Flemish Community Commission – together with the French-speaking Community Commission – is seen as a task that is carried out by delegation for the Flemish Community and the Flemish Region. The band is also emphasized here. Contrary to what is claimed, there is no question of letting go or wanting to push up. One must be realistic. The Flaming Party currently holds 19.1% of the seats with their votes. Therefore, the presence is guaranteed in the Brussels Region.

Mr. Coveliers, please allow me to interrupt for a moment. You are talking about the unconstitutionality mentioned by the Council of State. You are trying to refute that. I am not going into that. However, you very well overlook the much more fundamental and, for me, much heavier criticism of the State Council. I just talked about it, but you were in the Conference of Presidents at that time. The State Council says you are undermining the foundations of the democratic order. On the one hand, you designate five persons based on a political relationship in another assembly that is not directly related to Brussels. On the other hand, let three ministers be designated by people who have not been democratically elected, but who have been designated. They are named alternately, either by the seventeen members of the Brussels language group, or by those seventeen members, expanded by those five persons, depending on the French speakers. The State Council made it clear that this way of working represents undermining the democratic principles of our country. The election results are actually being corrected. In other words, the election results are falsified. What is your opinion on this?

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Laeremans, the problem is that in the case of bills, a representative of the Minister at the Council of State can begin to explain what he actually means. This is not the case with legislative proposals. If we, the authors of the proposal, had had the opportunity to explain our proposal to the State Council, then I am convinced that the State Council had changed its view.

What is actually the intention? It is intended to obtain an arbitration system or unblocking system. In the Brussels Capital Region there are flamingos and French speakers. Your neighbor seems to have other theories about this, which I do not ignore. If a blocking occurs there because a group in an overwhelming majority cannot control with a part of the other group, then it must be unblocked. The de-blocking system is provided. That unblocking will not take place through a court, as that court would then have to intervene in the appointment of members of the local executive power. That de-blocking is done by the elected. These are people who have been on a list.

I can compare this with the following. The senators of the communities are also designated on the basis of the results obtained, but they are not elected in that place.

I could have expected you to accuse us of discrimination, but you did not. I am confident that the aforementioned aspect will not be broken by the Arbitration Court according to jurisprudence.

There is another argument. There are also copies in the Senate. Along the Flemish side there are six and along the French-speaking side there are four co-opters. They were not elected. I have never heard the word “unfounded.” On the contrary, the original constitution of Belgium incorporated the system of copied senators. By the way, a system of provincial senators was introduced that was much less democratic than the current system. I think that argument fails.

I express to the Council of State all the respect that this institution deserves, but I think that we, as the applicants of this bill, have not been given the opportunity to defend our views. I have already suggested to the Chairman to look for a possibility so that subjects of a bill, when asked for advice from the Council of State on their bill, have a chance to defend their point of view.

Mr Coveliers, you regret not having been given the opportunity to defend your opinion. I am very pleased that you are doing this now because in the committee you have not done this at any time. I have pointed to the State Council’s opinion and no one — not even the government — has answered. For me, your answer is absolutely not satisfying, but I am glad that you finally answer. You have the courage to finally say something about the State Council. In any case, the State Council has given us very strong arguments to go to the Arbitration Court and we will ⁇ do so.

Mr. Laeremans, I also have full confidence in the Arbitration Court. I think that with your step to the Arbitration Court you will receive a judgment in a proper way within a certain period of time. This court is one of the few judicial institutions in which one is certain of the deadline in which the judgment will be delivered.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, I do not remember all the points that Mr. Pieters cited, but one has struck me. I suspect he referred to me when he said that at some point it was even suggested that police could become a regional authority. I have indeed said this. Technically, it seems to me perfectly possible to bring the traffic police, which, by the way, is already partly a local authority, under the jurisdiction of the regions. To me, such a step would also seem logical because the regions must also ensure the safety of the construction of motorways.

In our conscious discussion, I said that this is a possibility. Since then, there has never been a thorough discussion of this subject, but I remain with that opinion. This can also be discussed with all partners. By the way, I think the police services are the party asking for this because they have previously structured themselves in this way. The provincial traffic units were units that mainly collaborated with the provincial governor. The Antwerp WODCAactions are an example of this. This is a possibility which, in my opinion, can easily be foreseen but which in fact does not appear in this text.

Mr. Coveliers, do the texts currently available offer the possibility that a regional police will soon act on traffic or was that possibility not created in the current texts?

I think it is perfectly possible that the motorway police, our traffic police, be entrusted to the West. I am willing to investigate with you whether it is possible in the current circumstances. I think yes. What matters is that there will be a solid motorway police so that the speed controls can be tightened.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Mr. Colleagues, I believe that we must especially take into account the fact that the current texts only deal with the form, the way we can do politics and the way we can make certain substantial decisions. I would like to admit that the form is important because it can hinder the proper management of the content.

We are convinced and hope that the future will also show that the form that has been developed now and that may need to be re-adjusted within five years, can now in a solid way provide a sound governance for the citizens of this country. That is why we not only approve these texts, but also ask everyone to think again whether it would not be better for this country and for the citizens of this country that these texts would be approved by a broad majority. Thus, after realizing the form, we would eventually be able to take into account the content. Per ⁇ then we will again differ on some aspects of opinion, but on others we will agree. Per ⁇ we could ⁇ something in this way.

May 30, 2001 | Plenary session (Chamber of representatives)

Full source

Mr. Speaker, I would like to say something and ask you something. On behalf of my group, I would like to note that in the majority, at the very moment, the number of members required to reach the quorum is not present. Their

Mr. Speaker, I assume that the PS is very numerous because the smell of extra money for the French community is already felt. First of all, I hope that the majority in the course of the day will be able to ensure that the required quorum is achieved at the times that this is necessary. In addition, I would like to draw your attention to a small nuance related to your announcement last week. The Conference of Presidents indeed discussed the arrangements for today and tomorrow. The speaking time allocated to the political groups shall be as stated in the report of the Conference of Presidents. I assume that these are indicative speech time limits that can be changed according to the actuality.

Mr. Leterme, let us be fair, not only in the Conference of Presidents. Last week I communicated to you the draft agenda proposed by the Conference of Presidents. I refer to page 38 of the comprehensive report of the meeting of 23 May 2001. I repeat what I said then: "Les votes auront bien entendu lieu le jeudi 31 mai 2001. Not for observation? (Non) The proposal is adopted.”

The vote will be held on Thursday, May 31.

Ladies and gentlemen, you know I’m not going to look for a few minutes, but otherwise we won’t get out of it. I think you do not dispute that. You agreed on Wednesday.

Mr. Speaker, as regards last week’s Wednesday, I repeat that the report clearly states that it is an announcement of alleged speech times by the political groups. I therefore wish in this regard not to be dependent on your existing or non-existent clemency. In recent days, new political facts, whether or not existing, have been announced. If there are evolutions in the coming hours then of course those announced indicative speech times will be subject to change.

Mr. Leterme, in this plenary session I have clearly repeated, and it is stated in the comprehensive report, that we have reached unanimous agreement on this. I also know what politics means. Tante, you know that too. One of the rules of parliamentary play is to respect the rules agreed unanimously.

If a particular context changes...

Mr. Tante, you have a lot of experience.

This is precisely why, Mr. President.

Mr. Speaker, I take note of your reluctance to spread the fair play exhibition in order to give space to the debate in the light of the evolution of the actuality. We take note of this and we will take it into account, including in the manner in which we will, for example, initiate the article-by-article discussion and the discussion of the amendments.

We will try to close the debate today and vote tomorrow afternoon. That was so agreed. In a beautiful English procedure in English law it is said: "Oyez et terminez", which means "to conduct the conversation and decide". The beginning of our discussions will begin with the discussion of the draft special law for refinancing communities and expanding the tax powers of the regions. There are two reporters. I think both Mr. Poncelet and Mr. Tavernier agreed on the report. Mr. Tavernier begins and Mr. Poncelet will speak afterwards.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Colleagues, I have agreed with Mr. Poncelet that I will first give a general introduction to the draft special law on the refinancing of communities and the expansion of the fiscal powers of the regions, after which Mr. Poncelet will report on the main points of discussion and arguments raised in the committee. I will subsequently report on the discussion of the bill amending the law of 12 January 1989 regulating the manner of election of the Brussels Capital Council and the ordinary law of 16 July 1993 completing the federal state structure.

As regards the draft special law, in the committee was first given an explanation by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Louis Michel. The proposal aimed, on the one hand, at refinancing the communities and expanding the tax liability of the regions and, on the other hand, at the leveling of the resources allocated to the subregions. With the draft, the Government aims to structurally adjust the financing of the Flemish and French Communities in order to improve the dynamics of the resources of the communities. After all, in the final system of the current Special Financing Act, the resources of the communities in the total amount of public financing are structurally reduced. The new law aims precisely to adjust the incomes of the communities to the actual evolution of economic prosperity, although gradually in order not to jeopardize the government’s objectives of further reduction of the government debt. This means that for a period of 10 years the additional Community resources will be distributed between the Flemish and the French Community according to a mixed scheme. Starting from the 2012 financial year, the new resources, which will then amount to approximately 100 billion francs, will be distributed fully on the basis of the income collected in each community from personal taxes.

In addition, the draft aims to give the regions wider powers in the area of regional taxes and in certain related taxes. That seems to be a logical choice, since those taxes are closely related to the jurisdictions of the regions in our federal state order. It is recommended to give the regions more policy options in the area of personal taxation. In fact, in the current financing system, the vast majority of the resources of the regions is already formed by the allocation of a part of the income from personal taxes. In order to expand the fiscal autonomy of the regions, the draft should provide for a rearrangement by some necessary and clearly formulated framework conditions, which is necessary and desirable in a federal state order.

The so-called regional taxes are regionalized in the present bill. The additional financial revenues are estimated at approximately 110 billion francs. In addition, the viewing and listening fee, which was previously a Community tax, is converted into a full-fledged district tax. In the reverse movement, the so-called environmental taxes are reformed and again entrusted to the federal government.

When transferring the regional taxes to the communities, this bill takes into account a number of important frame conditions. A first condition is that the federal government must receive compensation for its income loss. A second requirement is to try to avoid the risk of fiscal migration. A third condition is that the individual regions and communities do not lose resources from each other in relation to the current funding.

In the current Finance Act, the tax powers of the regions regarding the personal tax are conditional and rather vague. Now the regions can only impose or allow discounts after consultation between the federal government and the northern governments. Furthermore, in order to safeguard the European Monetary Union, the federal government may still set a maximum percentage for these opcents or discounts. With the present draft law, we seek to better define the tax powers in this context. It is assumed that the fiscal autonomy of the regions should not be made dependent on procedural problems or substantive discussions between the different governments. Therefore, we introduce a number of restrictions as regards the tax powers of the regions. These restrictions are unambiguous and they actually need no discussion.

As a first limit, a margin shall be established within which the regions, whether or not differentiated by tax scheme, may allow general percentage increases and flat-rate or percentage reductions, or introduce overall tax reductions bound by their competence. As a second limitation, the exercise of the tax competence of the regions for personal tax should take place without reducing the progressiveness of the personal tax, and with the exclusion of disloyal fiscal competition.

The third section of the present draft law concerns the leveling of the allocation of funds. In fact, we note that in the current funding law, the resources of the regions and communities can still be collapsed shockwise. This can naturally jeopardize the functioning of the regions and communities. Therefore, the present draft law introduces a new mechanism to transform the shock-like deposit, and thus to ⁇ a certain leveling of the asset allocation. This leveling takes place on the basis of more recent parameters than the currently used. Until the final determination of the average index rate of consumer prices and the real growth rate of gross domestic product, the amounts shall be adjusted to the estimated percentage change of the average index rate of consumer prices and to the estimated real growth rate of gross national income for the financial year concerned, as provided in the economic budget.

Colleagues, I have explained in broad lines and short terms the essence of the bill. Therefore, I leave the floor to Mr. Poncelet to identify the main difficulties and points of discussion, as demonstrated in the committee meeting.

Mr. Speaker, if you allow me, I would like to thank first the services that helped us in drafting this report. Those who have read it will have been able to realize that it is circumstantiated, that it resumes in a synthetic, objective and clear way the interventions of all those who participated in the discussion. It is also important to emphasize here the quality of service, work and availability of the Chamber staff.

Mr. Poncelet, the President of the Chamber joins your thanks.

(The Applause)

Mr. Speaker, I would also like to thank the co-rapporteur who summarized the project as such. It was, indeed, not appropriate at this stage of the discussion to enter into too many details. It was more appropriate to tell you, as he did, the main part of the content. You know that the discussion is mainly about the aspects of tax autonomy and community refinancing. It is of course on each of these two points that most groups have expressed themselves, some considering that we are not going far enough, others that we are going too far. by

The content of these discussions can be summarized quite briefly. by

The first problem is that of tax autonomy which, for some, is not sufficient, which, for others, allows, through openness, to create conditions of tax competition, or even of relocalizations. by

During a general discussion that lasted several days since we met several times, each had the opportunity to give their point of view. The Government also clarified its own by not minimizing the extension of tax powers but by reminding that there were limits and that the regions exercised their new tax powers in relation to natural person taxes in compliance with a number of principles. The first principle is the non-reduction of the progressivity of the tax on natural persons, the second is the exclusion of unfair tax competition. This obviously opens the door to questions concerning the definition of progressive tax, how to ensure that it is respected. Obviously, contradictory theories have been confronted on this subject. by

As fair tax competition is the basic principle for ⁇ ining a minimum of solidarity, we have determined when this competition becomes unfair and who will judge whether or not it is unfair. In this context, the draft provides the possibility for the Court of Auditors to intervene in certain cases and considers possible remedies to the Court of Arbitration. by

With regard to community refinancing, the adjustment of community revenue is now linked to the evolution of economic prosperity, but, as the government has recalled, within the limits set in order to maintain our country’s debt deflation. Therefore, not everything is possible. It was also recalled that there is budget neutrality of the new measures and therefore that the loss of resources of the federal authority will be compensated by the deduction of additional regional revenues from all resources allocated to the regions. Each of the groups discussed the subject.

It has also been taken into account the fundamental fact that in the past, communities were financed on the basis of the number of students while the new means will be more linked, as part of a progressive system, to the tax income of natural persons located in each community.

Finally, we discussed the mechanism of cooperation agreements, which constitutes one of the important components of this agreement such as, in particular, the coordination of fiscal policy in areas that depend on the competence of the regions.

The last topic addressed – it is not exhaustive – is that of the problem of the financing of the Brussels Region. Indeed, the principle of budgetary neutrality could ⁇ question the structural financing of the Brussels Region. The government explained why it believed that this was not the case. by

We also discussed, Mr. Speaker, the fifty articles that constitute the body of the device. by

A number of articles have been modified from a relatively technical point of view. This is in particular the case of Article 2, which has been the subject of a rewrite.

Other articles have been modified in a somewhat more fundamental way. This is why I would like to draw attention to Article 9. Members of this assembly who have looked through the report will have been able to find that this article was the subject of an amendment — forgive me to refer to it, it was your rapporteur who deposited it — aimed at supplementing the arrangement. A paragraph has been added to Article 9. The mechanism talked about tax cuts, leaving aside the tax increases. The text has been supplemented in such a way that not only tax reductions but also tax increases are mentioned. by

You will therefore see, in article 39, former article 38, a new rather technical paragraph deposited at the instigation of the government. by

Finally, long minutes of debate, including within the majority, were about the transfer to communities of the National Botanical Garden and how the distribution of personnel costs was calculated. The text contained, according to the government, a discord between the Dutch version and the French version. This is the reference made in the device, as part of the staff of the Institute of the Botanical Garden. In the original text, we talked about the effective organic framework and the government, following an amendment submitted by parliamentarians, itself amended the text in such a way that the linguistic role of personnel is taken into account. It will not escape anyone that it is not the same thing. The effective organic framework on the one hand and the linguistic role of personnel personnel on the other are two different concepts. The amendment proposed by the Government was approved.

For the rest, Mr. Speaker, the majority of the arrangement was adopted as planned, I repeat to a few nuances of close shape. Finally, the entire arrangement was approved by 10 votes for, 6 votes against and 1 abstention. Here is what concludes my brief report on this issue. by

Mr. Speaker, if you wish, I would like to give the floor to Mr. Speaker. Tavernier for the report on the second part, namely the supplementary bill.

It should be emphasized that the rapporteur always presents an objective report, regardless of the membership of his political group.

Following the discussion on the draft special law, a discussion was held on the bill amending the law of 12 January 1989 regulating the manner in which the Brussels Capital Council is elected and amending the ordinary law of 6 July 1993 completing the federal state structure. This bill is submitted by several parliamentarians with Mr Coveliers as the chief speaker.

In his presentation, Mr Coveliers pointed out that this bill is a result of the so-called Lombard Agreement on the composition of the governing bodies in Brussels. The proposal concerns the direct election of the six Brussels members of the Flemish Parliament and the appointment of five additional members to the Flemish Community Commission in the event of a blockage in the appointment of the members of the executive power in the Brussels Capital Region. This designation will be made on the basis of the election results of the Flemish Parliament. This bill was sent to the State Council for urgent advice. This opinion was repeatedly discussed during the discussion of this bill.

Mr. Poncelet pointed out, on behalf of the PSC, that this bill is in fact aimed at the implementation of a draft special law which, in his opinion, was approved in the Senate Committee the week before under disputed circumstances. He also refers to the opinion of the State Council to point out a number of constitutional shortcomings in this bill. He says that the State Council is talking about a clear violation of the Constitution. Furthermore, he hopes that the Court of Arbitration will soon decide on those violations and annul these agreements, the Lambermont and Lombardy agreements. Moreover, he does not think that the fight against undemocratic parties can justify the violation of the Constitution.

Although it is unusual to interrupt the rapporteur, I would like to protest for a moment. I hear the reporter use the term undemocratic parties. This is a very subjective term. Therefore, first of all, I would like to know who he meant exactly. Secondly, I ask him from now on to honor his objectivity as a reporter and to stop taking this word into his mouth, because I do not accept this!

I will repeat the most striking elements of Mr. Poncelet’s presentation. This is literally stated in the written report and it is the reflection of what he said in the committee. Later, I will also present the most important elements of your argument in the same committee. Probably they will partly go in the opposite direction.

Mr Tavernier, all members have received the report and have not made any comments. So they could read the terms used by our colleagues.

Subsequently, Mr Poncelet argued that the choice made by the proposers of the bill to appoint additional elected persons, not on the basis of the number of votes obtained but on the basis of the number of elected persons in another assembly, is a completely undemocratic legal practice. According to him, other systems were conceivable. Furthermore, he fears that since two votes can be awarded to voters who vote for a Flemish list, a number of voters who feel primarily Brussels will be encouraged to choose two votes instead of one. This would wrongly favor the Flemish lists.

Mr Van Rompuy pointed out that the political discussion on this bill had actually already taken place in the Senate. He also pointed out that the State Council’s opinion is destructive. He considers that the bill is an application of the principle of the primacy of politics in which the law must adapt to politics. According to him, the law must then adapt not only to politics but above all to the prevailing power ratio.

Mr Maingain pointed out in his presentation that in the context of the Costa Consultation, a political agreement on three specific points had already been reached in June 1999 with a majority in Brussels. First, it was about preventing a blocking of the Brussels institutions. Second, there was the strengthening of the Flemish parties in the Brussels Capital Council and third, it was a refinancing of the community commissions. According to him, the mechanism developed in this bill is based on a vague legal basis. It is therefore, in his opinion, unthinkable that the Court of Arbitration will annul the provisions in question. He acknowledges that the Flemish parliamentarians of the Brussels Capital Council have a rather heavy workload, but he believes that other constructions were possible. The construction that is drawn up in this bill does not satisfy him. He also said that the State Council has very serious concerns about this. It should be remembered that the refinancing of community commissions is not only beneficial to a single community, but it is beneficial to both.

Mr. Laeremans disagrees, among other things, with the fact that several ministers attended the discussion in the committee and received answers. He did not object to the direct election of the Brussels members of the Flemish Parliament. However, he pointed out that by appointing five additional members the link between Brussels and the Flemish Parliament is completely cut and that through this system one party is also aimed at keeping away from power.

This is a flagrant violation of democratic principles. This speaker also refers to the opinion of the State Council, which states, among other things, that these matters are unconstitutional.

Furthermore, he reiterates the various objections to constitutional principles. He also states that with regard to the additional members and the arrangement by which the distribution key of the Flemish Parliament would be used, it is clearly intended to change the power ratio within the Brussels Capital Council, something with which he can not agree at all. He also notes that this could not only be detrimental to his party, the Flemish Bloc, but also to the CVP, currently the two largest Flemish parties in Brussels.

He also asks for an explanation on Article 4.

In addition, he states that the proposal will result in the future there will be a maximum of 17 Flemish councillors in the Brussels Capital Council, compared with 72 French-speaking councillors. He concludes from this that the Flamings are thus definitively reduced to a minority, since they can never gain more seats than 17 of the 89, which means that the Brussels Flamings are, according to him, permanently placed in a marginalized position. Furthermore, according to him, the Flemish have more mandates, but they are powerless mandates, since by the abolition of the double majority the Flemish blocking force is abolished. Their

This is partly replicated by Mr. Coveliers. He refers to the apparentation system as it works at the provincial level. It is also possible to develop an apparent system for Brussels. The rapporteur himself replicates that the proposal that this bill would ultimately minimize the Flamings is still a grotesque approach to a proposal granting the Flamings a guaranteed representation in Brussels.

Mr. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have here described the most special aspects of the presentations in the committee. The arguments at the article-by-article discussion were very limited and referred to the points of discussion already cited in the general discussion.

Finally, I can only mention that this bill was adopted with 10 votes against 5, with 1 abstinence.

Mr. Poncelet, I understood that you are no longer speaking as a rapporteur on this proposal. by

As I usually do, I propose to establish the list of speakers according to each other’s requests and to provide, if possible, for a linguistic alternation.

The honour is to the main opposition party. Mr Van Rompuy has the word.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, Dear colleagues, thinking about what I would say here on behalf of our Flemish Christian Democrats, I thought I could initially limit myself to the classical role, of an opposition party that fulfils the democratic function, by highlighting the other side of the medal and bringing out the uncovered aspects of a policy. That is an honest position. There is another point of view that an opposition party can take equally, and that is the next question. Would the Flemish Christian Democrats have made or endorsed such an agreement and, if we have criticism, is it in the length of positions previously taken by my political movement? I choose this last approach. In the long run, it is the most credible.

For the dioxin elections of 1999, the CVP had chosen five priorities for the counties based on the well-known resolutions of the Flemish Parliament: first, homogeneous powers packages, second, extension of powers to include health care and child benefits, third, the abolition of the municipal and provincial law, fourth, fiscal autonomy and fifth, guarantee for the Brussels Flamings at all levels of administration.

I choose the method to test these five points on the draft law and the draft law to be discussed and in general on the so-called Lambermont agreements.

In terms of competence, points one and two of the five-point programme, the harvest is low, both in terms of homogeneity and size. In total, this is 7 billion francs of 700 billion francs contained in the five-point programme of the Flemish Parliament and is comparable to the 1,100 billion francs of the current powers. To those who now claim that the Flemish Parliament had drafted a long-term planning, I say that it is about a very long-term, I would almost say it is in the light of eternity. Furthermore, there is no increased clarity in the proposed new regional matters. Numerous important agricultural powers remain federal and scattered across various ministries and agencies - if the agency, by the way, exists. Some even said that a split-bomb was thrown on Agriculture. The highlight is the arrangement for decision-making within the European Council for Agriculture which allows a region of Belgium to force abstinence and thus to give up the defense of the interests of the farmers themselves.

With regard to foreign trade, the existing BDBH will be replaced by a new agency to be established with everything on and on, possibly new appointments, and the uncertainty remains. For the rest there is nothing, except the overthrow of organic legislation on public administrations. Although the citizens are only indirectly involved in this, we endorse this step. However, we had always subordinated our agreement on this to the introduction of a double majority in the Brussels Council and to guarantees for the Flamings in Brussels. Giving up this double majority is a real downturn, because today it is the federal government that is the best guarantee for the Brussels Flag and that is the safest way to improve their status. To leave the municipal law in Brussels to the French-speaking majority, I personally did not consider it possible.

Much has been said about the so-called guarantees at the regional and municipal level. At no one of the two levels there is any power shift. A few members of parliament more and one single ship in each municipality – which, by the way, already exists in 12 municipalities – means nothing in terms of power. This could only be achieved if the political agenda had been broadened and a redistribution of powers between the municipalities and the Region had been carried out for the benefit of the region. That would have both made the administration more efficient and given the Flamings more power through parity in the Executive. That agenda, however, was impossible from the moment when the negotiation on Brussels was left to the Brusselsers and the mayors alone. The federal level came almost only as a water carrier, for the sake of the federal money, intervention.

I do not agree about the perfide — the word is not mine — exchange between more money and a lonely ships. Until the next municipal council elections, 5 billion francs will be spent on the possibility of two green creatures. Perfide, but efficient, said the Chairman of the VLD. It is not even efficient.

The fifth point, more tax autonomy. Of course, we agree with full autonomy over regional taxes, mainly on real estate. Everyone has agreed on this for a long time. Any negotiation, whoever would have participated in the negotiation or the state reform, would have given that result. I would even say: it would still be missing. When it comes to personal taxation, all sorts of obstacles are raised and the space for movement is limited. Now that the monetary unit is no longer the Belgian franc but the euro, it is necessary to give the regions the opportunity to directly and unhinderedly align themselves with European fiscality. One should not wait for convergence in one’s own country first, ⁇ not if we can move faster. This is the new European logic in which we stand. We must dare to face this new reality lucid.

Why have the regions not also been given the possibility to allow discounts on corporate tax? One could spend this money better than on classical government subsidies, which is an outdated instrument of micro-economic policy. Reductions on corporate tax have the advantage of applying the market economy principle of "back the winner".

In addition, the fiscal autonomy of the current draft is undermined by the fact that the Regions are also given a lot of resources for the taxation of which they are not held accountable to their voters. It is already an unsustainable situation for the federal government to impose on citizens twice as many taxes as it can spend itself. There is a real democratic deficit. The cash flow amounts to 17 billion francs in 2002, to 100 billion francs in 2010 and 200 billion francs in 2020.

The Flemish government has wanted to create the impression that it was also the party asking for federal money. On the one hand, this was a tactic to open the federal money crane towards the South, but on the other hand, this was due to the lack of choices in the own Flemish policy, from which one can save only by fresh resources. The expenditure for the Flemish government increased in 2001 by 4.5% in real terms, twice the gross domestic product. Their

Therefore, the five-point programme is far from being implemented. If I compare it with the ten-point program of the Flemish government in 1992, then the Saint Michel Agreement is a very great success. The People’s Union will remember how we realized this program while they were not present even in the last negotiations, in September 1992, on their request. At that time, however, we held close contact with all sides in all parties, ⁇ the most Flemish-sensitive: the Flemish Christian Democrats and the People’s Union. Therefore, I can also answer the question whether the Flemish Christian Democrats would have done better. Are their positions today in the extension of those of before June 1999? The answer is yes twice. Have others broken their Flemish commitments? Unfortunately yes.

However, there was much more in those negotiations. They started with a farce: the Costa. I am still hearing the trumpet at the beginning about the definitive solution to our community problems. The inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary negotiations became literally, after a few seconds, an ordinary inter-party conference. There has never been a Flemish internal consultation or a Flemish front as in all previous state reforms. The Costa barely gathered and quickly settled in a majority council, preferably at night.

The method but even more the setting was wrong. Not a further deepening of federalism was on the agenda, but the stealing of a party to keep it in the boat of the Flemish government. The second goal was to ensure sufficient cash flows to the French Community. How can a minimum reform be achieved in order to ⁇ maximum political yield? That was, and that is the goal.

After years of immobilism, the majority would now have solved important, pressing problems; it is said. But what is the truth. In 1995, both the federal and Flemish governments agreed not to carry out state reform during the upcoming legislature.

In the period 1992-1995 a very important breakthrough was achieved. From 1995 to 1999, the future should be prepared. To present today as if one could do nothing or wanted to do nothing is simply historically incorrect and yet another lie. But the lie has become a political method! In 1999, the transitional arrangement for the financing of education was terminated and all Flemish parties had linked a new round in the state reform. The Saint-Elooisac Accords were already a negation of these Flemish tactical arrangements which included using this opportunity — the stop of the transitional arrangement — to continue with the Flemish autonomy. When after Sint-Elooi it turned out that more money was needed for the communities, there was a second chance to ⁇ a Flemish breakthrough. This was again neglected by granting financial resources to the states at the pace of a Mercedes and new powers at the pace of a trotinette, in order to apply an image of a few days ago to another matter. Their

Furthermore, the transfer of funds is so large that there will no longer be a need for further state reform on the French-speaking side for years, while the Flemish agenda includes a significant number of left overs. In Europe we know how difficult it was in Nice to fill the left overs of Amsterdam. Apparently, the new community climate has not been able to turn into the Flemish advantage. By the way, that climate is a myth. The internal community disputes between federal ministers are now greater — that everyone acknowledges — than in the recent past. That must be compensated by an external peace between the federal and state governments, but even that is a myth: after two years of community peace, there is not even a cultural treaty between the two communities. But one forgets that the biggest attack on community peace during the previous legislature was the attempt to block the Brussels institutions because of VLD and VU after the resignation of Father Anciaux. Only thanks to budgetary creativity could well-being and health institutions and well-being and health workers continue to be paid. It was only at the moment that the VLD could be persuaded to approve the Amsterdam Treaty in the Joint Community Commission. I know that it is not a postmodern habit to have a memory, but as you know I am not a postmodernist. Their

This leads me to emphasize another application of postmodernism: the primacy of politics. The carelessness with which the State Council’s opinion on Brussels was addressed is typical of this mentality. The conflict with the essential principles of democracy and with a number of fundamental rights is wiped out. The Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights must deviate from the political will to push Lambermont through. It takes the risk that and the revocation of the Municipal Law and the Brussels Agreement may be destroyed by the Arbitration Court. Cyclically, it is believed that this problem will arise before the next legislature. Pick the day. Every day brings its own suffering. Without Lambermont, the federal majority is threatened, that everyone knows, even though one pretends that is now suddenly no longer part of the government agreement. Note that if Lambermont comes there anyway, the Flemish and federal majority will hardly be able to hide its triumphalism and perform a new joy dance on the Martyrs Square, as it was two years ago once again. But if Lambermont fails, one will act as if nothing is going on. In addition to the arrogant lack of respect for the Constitution, the blackmail of individuals and parties reminds me once again of Egmont and the atmosphere surrounding it. The Egmont Pact was never approved by Parliament. Even the successor to the 1980 pact did not obtain a sufficient special majority.

I hope this will be the case again. However, one should be well aware that those who let themselves be threatened or squeezed with crumbs lose the most important thing one can possess, especially self-respect or the respect of others. Those who lose respect are dragged from one humiliation to another. Those parties, individuals or parties, make themselves aware that they are constructive, but in hard politics they no longer count in the future; they were once weighed, but found too light.

There is life after Lambermont and there is surely life after this government. The draft law and the draft law which are now put to the vote are not, in their entry into force, bound by the draft of powers discussed in the Senate. So it is even possible that there is a majority for money, but not for the powers. It may also be that if there is a majority for the money, the draft on the luttle powers and on Brussels will be framed by the throat of some. One is simply deception, the other is blackmail; skilled, professional blackmail, but nevertheless blackmail.

What a difference with the political culture of a few years ago, when an agreement between four federal majority parties was supported by three opposition parties. I could not see that openness this time; on the contrary, every opponent of Lambermont is an extremist. The accusations are characteristic of the slogan democracy in which we are embroiled and paralyze, by the way, extremism.

With conviction, my group will reject this draft. The number of arguments for this from a Flemish point of view and from the proper functioning of the institutions is impressive. We are ready to conduct a completely new negotiation in the spring of 2002 in order to truly give the federalism in this country a chance to deepen itself. However, the prerequisite for this is the end of Lambermont. This requires the famous five minutes of political courage. Five minutes of political courage! Hopefully they will be found.

I would like to point out to the members of this Assembly that I will be replaced by Mr. Jean-Pol Henry around 11:30, at least if he is present then, as I must attend the Conference of Presidents.

I would like to advise you that by 11:30 I will be replaced by Mr. Henry because I have to attend the Conference of Presidents.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, dear colleagues, for several months now our political activity has been mobilized by the question of institutional agreements and the refinancing of communities. It must be acknowledged that if these issues concern us today, it is probably not because the politician and – even less – the citizen are not passionate about community themes. This is simply because it is vital to ensure a recurring and worthy funding of that name of our federated entities.

In order to understand the subject of the debate, we must go back to the law of 16 January 1989 which instituted the financing of communities and regions. This law, result of the 1988 government agreement to which we were not associated and logical follow-up to the special law of 8 August 1988, carried in it the germs of the difficulties we face today and the need for a further refinancing of the federated entities.

Indeed, the mechanisms for the financing of federated entities envisaged in 1989 were completely insufficient, in particular given the competences that were transferred at that time and the needs that this resulted. These mechanisms were already described at the time as temporary and transitory.

Those who negotiated the funding law, who are the fathers of it even though certain paternities are sometimes not claimed, knew for sure that the problem would reappear and that it would be necessary to renegotiate again to obtain additional resources. That is why the bill that is presented to us today deals with refinancing. It tends to ⁇ the balance between the financial responsibility of the federated entities and the solidarity within the federal state. This is the very essence of federalism, and it should have been the conductive thread of the institutional reforms of the 1980s. by

I will briefly address the situation that prevails today and that results precisely from this 1989 funding law.

For the regions first, the allocation of resources is currently based on the amounts of the central state expenditure, so in fact on the 1989 budget appropriations, and this for the new materials transferred to the regions. As with the provincial and municipal fund, the allocation of funds is also based on the amounts of allocations granted by the law of 9 August 1980. These were the three financial masses that constituted the basic amounts of the financing of the regions.

Note that the basic amounts for current expenditure, i.e. for new competences or for the fund of provinces and municipalities, were not transferred in full in 1989. They were transferred at a rate of only 98% due to the participation of the regions in fiscal austerity. We already started on bad bases that did not allow us to cope with the expenses.

Not to mention the fact that the three major budget masses mentioned were simply indexed and only from 1990 and that they were, in any case, not linked to growth. by

In addition, the regions, as in 1980, have tax revenues from seven regional taxes, the revenues of which were allocated to them in whole or in part and over which they could exercise limited tax autonomy. Regions – which is an interesting element to highlight – have since 1994 been allowed to collect additional cents, regardless of the ongoing project, and to grant discounts on the part of the IPP product that was allocated to them.

According to the then Prime Minister, Mr. In Dehaene, more than 90 percent of the resources of the regions were financed by the returned income from the natural persons tax. Therefore, regions have broad financial autonomy in the sense that they can freely use the financial resources that are granted to them. This is a limited tax autonomy. For communities, the source of funding comes from taxes currently shared (the allocated portion of the outcome of the radio/television fee which will now be transferred to the regions, VAT and IPP), non-tax revenues, as well as loans.

The allocated part of the VAT corresponds to the credits for education. Since 1989, the government has taken the decision, I recall, to amputate the basic amounts of the part of VAT allocated to the detriment of communities and therefore of education. This means at the time already a loss of ⁇ 5 billion Belgian francs for the French Community. Certainly, it was an exceptional, non-recurrent reduction, aiming, among other things, to ⁇ an economy in terms of power of the School Building Fund. But this was also a bad start for the French Community.

Basic VAT amounts are in fact simply indexed from the fiscal year 1990 and adapted to the evolution of the number of inhabitants under the age of 18. Regarding this latter point, let me be permitted to regret even today the key for the distribution of inhabitants for the Brussels-Capital Region, held by the government partners at the time, i.e. 80 % of French-speaking and 20 % of Dutch-speaking. This financing of education was organized in this way until 1999, when it was to be reviewed on the basis of objective criteria to be established by law. In addition, it was the agreements of St. Eloi that allowed to correct the shot in this regard.

Radio/TV taxes are now another source of funding for communities. It is the part of the product of the fee located in the French or Flemish-speaking region that is taken into account. And we must again regret the identical key retained for the Brussels-Capital Region which does not correspond to the sociological realities of Brussels and which, since then, is regarded as an acquisition by Dutch speakers.

Therefore, the resources allocated to both regions and communities are insufficient. They were negotiated without real concertation with the executives of the federal entities. The basic mechanism for the transfer of the part assigned to the tax of natural persons to the communities is based on the same principle as for the regions, i.e. the transition over ten years from the distribution of resources according to the expenditure of 1989 to a distribution of resources according to the localized income of the tax.

Specifically for education, the failure of financing is undoubtedly the result of the absence of a link between VAT revenues and GDP growth. Already in 1989, the projections made from different work assumptions let no doubt predict that the negotiated financing led to serious difficulties for the French Community.

In order to take the education sector back again, a projection of the ratio between the education expenditure simply indexed and the resources allocated from VAT, allowed to predict a certain catastrophe, since, at the time, a gap of 27 billion francs was already planned in 2000, that is, at the end of those ten years of community financing arising from this law of 1989.

From a more comprehensive perspective, one could easily see that the funding mechanisms set up would result in a regular reduction of the resources allocated by the central state to communities, forcing communities to drastically reduce spending and to make significant sacrifices that would never do but limit the damage. by

I recall a study conducted by the CRISP in 1989, which highlighted difficulties for the Walloon Region between 1989 and 1996 and important problems for the French Community since 1989, intensified in the years that followed. This study concluded with these edifying terms, which I recall: “The context of budgetary restrictions underlying the mechanisms of financing provided for for teaching, i.e. non-link to national wealth and link with a demographic reduction, risks to favor financial aspects at the expense of the implementation of policies focused on the quality of teaching and the search for solutions to problems such as school failure or occupational inclusion.”

It is important, I think, to see where we come from, in order to better understand where we hope to go. Looking back to the past and making introspection, especially at the level of all French-speaking groups, are useful things. But what is fundamental, while assuming the mistakes of the past – for those who must assume them – is to take responsibility, to seize the opportunities to secure the future, this time in a sustainable way. by

I would like to address some essential elements of the Lambermont agreements and highlight the points that, in our view, justify that our assembly approves this bill. by

First, the financing of communities. I talked about the reasons that explain the catastrophic financial situation of the French Community and other communities in terms of education, and the absolute need for its refinancing. Lambermont’s institutional agreements ensure sustainable, i.e. recurring, refinancing of communities. I would like to remind you that from 2002 the additional financial resources will be granted to the federated entities: 8 billion in 2002, 6 billion in 2003 and 2004, 15 in 2005, 5 in 2006 and 2007 to 2011, an additional billion francs per year. These amounts are cumulative. They provide an insight into the particular effort made by the federal to ensure the viability of our federated entities, since they are added to the usual means and allocations. by

It is ⁇ important to emphasize that the agreements provide for the linking of all financial resources — thus new resources, but also of the conventional allocation — to growth from 2007. And if we look at the figures closer, we can say that the resources of the communities are linked to growth as early as 2002, since the additional resources that are granted correspond largely to the growth for the years 2002 to 2006. A parallelism is thus achieved between the evolution of the means of the federal state and that of the means of the communities. It is, as I have already explained, this total absence of connection until 1993, and then very partial from 1994 (since only 30% of the IPP allocation was at that time linked to growth), which caused the situation of fact that the French Community knows today.

Certainly, the new resources will be distributed among the communities on the basis of the principle of fair return. But the bill provides for a transitional period until 2012. And it will be noted that only the new means — i.e. 100 billion francs for that date — will be distributed according to this principle. President: Jean-Pol Henry, First Vice-President Voorzitter: Jean-Pol Henry, first undervoorzitter. The basic means, i.e. the VAT allocation, remain distributed according to the key derived from the Agreements of Saint-Eloi, i.e. the principle: "one student equals a student". For the French Community alone, the refinancing is estimated at more than 3 billion in 2002 and at 33 billion by 2010. This refinancing is, as the government emphasized during the commission work, an objective necessity for the two major communities of this country since the financing law of 1989 has constantly reduced the funds allocated, while a pressure to increase spending was constantly exercised. by

A supplementary allocation will be allocated to communities in place of the radio and television fee. Thus, the amount of this tax is definitively guaranteed to them, even if this tax would disappear under the effect of a decision of the regions. This represents 10 to 12 billion francs for the French Community. Even if communities don’t have their fiscal fate in their hands, linking income to growth should finally allow them to keep the way financially.

With regard to regions and the extension of their tax responsibilities, they already have the product of a series of taxes and sometimes limited tax autonomy relative to some of them. Institutional agreements provide for the financial transfer of a series of taxes to the region in compliance with the principle of budgetary neutrality. The regionalization thus carried out follows a logic: to give these entities more powers with regard to regional taxes and other related taxes. This is not a nonsense in an accomplished federal state. Regions are currently responsible for urban planning and mobility. The transfer to the regions of competence in the area of automobile taxation or real estate taxation is therefore the logical follow-up.

We also did not hesitate to be consistent in the opposite direction, since the bill entrusts the exclusive exercise of all competences related to ecotaxes to the federal authority. This assignment was indicated given the extremely mobile nature of these taxes. In the perspective of a complete and responsible federalism, the bill operates the transfer of full autonomy over these taxes to the regions. Regions will then be able to determine the tax base but also the exemptions and rates. by

In the same logic, the regions who wish to do so will be able to collect these taxes themselves from 2005 and, in this case, a specific allocation and a transfer of personnel will be provided. However, the agreements provide for guarantees that I would like to highlight because I think they are important.

- The system of information exchange that is established, the circulation of information very necessary, useful not only when the regions want the federal to continue to collect taxes on their behalf but also when they want to carry out this collection themselves. This exchange of information is actually provided for in a cooperation agreement.

The cadastral income remains federal, although regions can use it as a tax base. A property documentation agency is created which will be funded by the federal and will include staff made available to it. It will handle property rights aspects and tax aspects.

With regard to succession rights, a new guarantee has been introduced. This is an anti-regional competition provision because it provides that the entity that receives succession rights is no longer automatically the entity where the taxpayer was domiciled, but rather the entity where he had his domicile for the longest time during the last five years. by

A part of the institutional agreement provides for clarification and clarification of the conditions under which regions can exercise their competence in the field of natural persons tax. It is hard to hide from it, this element was an important claim of the Flemish region of the country. It can still be said that this element was ceded in exchange for the refinancing of the French Community demanded by the French speakers. That being said, listening to the CVP’s remarks in the commission on the revision of the Constitution, I think that French speakers can reassure themselves with regard to the guarantees provided and the limits imposed since indeed, Mr. Van Rompuy in commission was up to regret this aspect of the agreement, as it would be in retreat from the current situation, and restrictive for the regions. While it is true that regions are allowed, in the current situation, to grant subtractals or to collect additional fees to the IPP, it must be acknowledged that the planned procedure is poorly transparent and depends on the good will of the federal state. The option taken and defended in this project is to clarify the rules of the game, to fix them in the special law and to define the limits of what is acceptable in a federal state while recognizing the autonomy of the regions and their right to better define their needs without having to perpetually depend on what can be granted by the federal level.

I mentioned the guarantees, the limits provided by the bill. I am referring to those that we think are the most important. by

First guarantee: measures taken by a region cannot have the effect of decreasing the progressivity of the tax, otherwise the region would be at risk of tax migration and tax relocation. Clearly, this means that as taxable income increases, the ratio between the amount of the reduction and that of the tax due before the reduction cannot increase. A region could therefore not ensure that people who earn more pay less and less taxes proportionally.

Second guarantee: Regions must exercise their competence in this area without unfair tax competition.

Third guarantee: the fixing of margins, which did not exist previously, allowing the regions to provide for flat-rate or proportional general additional or subtracted general cents, whether or not differentiated by tax fraction, or to introduce general tax deductions related to their competence. These margins are always expressed in relation to the IPP product localized in each region and are set at 3.25 and 6.75. These margins apply to all measures taken by a region.

Fourth guarantee: the measures envisaged must be notified in advance to the Federal Minister of Finance, whose administration is responsible for the implementation of the measure. The Federal Minister of Finance is therefore required to give his opinion on the technical feasibility of the proposed measure. Information exchange, communication are also provided between regions for tax decrees, this element being regulated by cooperation agreements. The control of the margins and the principles of tax progressiveness, such as that of the principle of unfair tax competition, is provided a priori by the Court of Auditors and an appeal for cancellation or suspension is opened before the Court of Arbitration under the rules of allocation of powers. It is clear that the concept of unfair tax competition will need to be better defined and clarified by the case-law of the Arbitration Court.

The tax base will remain uniform regardless of the measures taken, as reductions can only be applied to the amount of tax due and not to the tax base, which is important. The regional measures on taxation at the IPP will therefore be neutral for municipalities — we talk a lot about municipal finances — and for the calculation of the mechanism of solidarity between regions, i.e. the intervention of national solidarities.

It is interesting to note that the measures envisaged will allow regions to obtain more than 50% of their resources through the collection of their own taxes. This is a change from the current situation as most of the funds granted are directly from the federal state through the IPP allocation. The latter shall be reduced in proportion to the amounts resulting from transfers carried out by the agreements. This is in accordance with the principle of budget neutrality.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, my dear colleagues, I would say that the modes of financing planned in 1989 did not allow – we must make it clear and know how to recognize, ladies and gentlemen, the weaknesses of the commitments made – to ensure the proper functioning of the federated entities and in particular the communities. Even dealing with indexed predictable spending, with unchanged policy, was impossible for communities.

This lack of resources has been severely felt at the level of education. Not only did the quality of teaching in the French Community suffer, but it was almost impossible to cope with the many problems and new needs of the school population. The teachers themselves have suffered and still suffer the consequences of this lack of resources.

At one time, our country embarked on the path of federalism, transferring to the federated entities the powers formerly managed by the central state. Even if the federalization of the Belgian state was not called the wishes of all because the opinions were varied, it must be acknowledged that over time, things have imposed themselves and that the institutional structures that we know today are a fact, a reality. Our role today is simply to make institutions and federalism work better.

This means, first of all, giving the federated entities the means that they did not have so far, to cope with the competencies that are theirs. by

Better functioning of federalism also means recognizing, as in any federal democratic state, the necessary financial autonomy of the federated entities, obtaining means other than by going to the federal state begging, allowing to feed these means or reduce them through its own taxation, while imposing limits dictated by the framework in which the entities live, that is, the federal space.

To make federalism work better is to recognize that the means of the federated entities must grow under the same conditions as the means of the federal state. In the period of growth, it is logical that the redistribution of fruit can be done at all levels of the institutional structure. When the federal state’s financial resources increase, when the budget margins unfold, it is not absurd to allow communities to invest in the future, i.e. especially in education. Not allowing it is, on the contrary, absurd and unworthy of a State which, in principle, bases its future on the formation of young people, which requires significant means.

Certainly, concessions have been made, on both sides, in these agreements, to ensure this refinancing objective, more urgent in the immediate for the French Community, that is true.

Institutional agreements are a compromise. There are things that are better for us than others, we must recognize this. Some aspects are sometimes even difficult to digest. But an agreement is assessed in its entirety and in view of the objective pursued and, in the present case, of the objective that we were to ⁇ , namely to obtain additional resources for the communities for teaching, in particular of the French Community.

This objective is imposed on all of us, all French speakers of this country. Whether or not we have participated in previous institutional reforms, whether or not we are in power today, achieving the goal is in this case an imperative necessity. Not taking advantage of this opportunity would be a serious mistake. This would be responsible for enormous difficulties for the French Community. It would also be putting itself in an even more difficult position if it was necessary to renegotiate.

Finally, real future prospects are opened for communities, the possibility of enrolling in the knowledge society, as well as the possibility of conducting concrete actions useful to the emancipation of persons and the well-being of people. This opportunity will no longer be present soon, it is a fact, and the conditions of negotiation and the climate will never be the same again. But beyond that, I dare to say that these agreements are balanced, in the sense that they meet the legitimate aspirations of each of the federated entities. If it is false to believe and say that only the French Community needs money, it is equally false to believe and say that, in the future, the tax competences of the regions in terms of IPP will never serve the French speakers of that country. I have the ambition to believe that, in the wake of the tax reform, all regions of this country will have the goal of one day being able to compete themselves in reducing the tax pressure in this country.

That is why I think that all the parts of this agreement concern all federated entities.

Mr. Speaker, the truth is complex and, in the face of the complexity, everyone can be rightly perplexed.

Mr. Bacquelaine, I am somewhat surprised to hear you talk about financial responsibilities when, in parallel with the problems experienced by all the regions and communities in Belgium, a policy reform that does not measure the financial impacts has been so developed.

Everything is in everything. We know very well that despite the repeated promises of ministers, no one can say today exactly what it will cost the communes. I still have the weakness to believe that it is the communes that, during these difficult years of financial crisis of this end of the twentieth century, have avoided many socio-economic and human dramas. by

In the context of education, for example, the municipalities have taken extraordinary responsibilities. On the social level, the CPAS have prevented many people from finding themselves along the road, abandoned, completely isolated. Examples could also be given of the aid granted in the framework of education, mostly all confused networks, as well as those granted in the framework of economic commitments. by

My speech is not controversial. I just mean that if there is a certain financial responsibility, the government too gave the impression, in 1999, that everything was possible and permitted. For many years, the state has experienced financial difficulties.

Mr. Smets, I would like to ask you to conclude, as you will still have the opportunity to express yourself soon.

Please allow me to add a few words.

The state experienced financial difficulties, I said, until 2000, when the municipalities were in boni. Crucially, the situation has just been reversed. This is one of the criticisms that can be addressed to the current government.

I suppose that when Mr. Smets will speak in the debate soon, he will speak about the policy reform and CPAS. Per ⁇ this is a technique used by the PSC to camouflage its responsibility in the problems that communities are currently facing as a result of the 1989 funding laws. Sometimes it is better to talk about something else.

(Interruption is unheard of) Absolutely. He also acknowledged his mistake. The only fact that he passed by us proves that he did. by

Mr Smets, it is true that the new means given to regions in terms of tax cuts, for example, could be turned against the municipalities. I have also recently welcomed the fact that the agreements on the financing of the regions and the possibilities to allocate tax reduction margins by the regions do not affect the tax returns to the municipalities and therefore do not have negative effects on the municipal finances. by

Beyond all the arguments or remarks I have been able to raise, I dare to say that these agreements are balanced. It is false to believe, as Professor Bercy wrote in an open letter published in The Evening last week, that it would have been different if some shared power today. “The present situation,” he said, “is the result of a much earlier policy. We must assume the past. If we vote against the agreements,” he concluded – the phrase seems interesting to me – “every month, every year counting, prolonging the time of recovery disproportionately, I will ⁇ continue” – is a professor of the UCL speaking – “a little longer or always to teach a group of university graduate students who were excluded from brilliant secondary students or the real potential whose main fault was to be born in a modest home and attend a college without means.” by

I am therefore calling for the sense of responsibility of each of us. We are all in the same boat. by

The vote on these agreements is essential for the survival of an efficient federal state, strong with viable regions and communities, able to exercise their powers and assume responsibilities.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Minister, colleagues, on 3 May, in this half-course, we were all able to establish how the Prime Minister deceived Parliament without shame about the consequences of the Lombard Agreement for Brussels, more specifically regarding the appointment of Flemish creatures in Brussels, which would be so-called mandatory, but which is now optional.

We have seen the particularly non-parliamentary behavior of the prime minister more often, such as during the administration of this government, more specifically regarding the financing of the French-speaking education; in the consequences of the police reform in Halle-Vilvoorde; in the hatred campaign that Verhofstadt instigated against our party and where the lies were unmasked by the Blok-watchers of De Morgen and, as already said, in this Brussels agreement. The lies are gradually becoming the trademark of this Prime Minister. The launch on May 3 was in any case extremely illustrative for the Lambermont agreement as a whole, as this agreement is surrounded by and packed in lies and deceit.

In fact, colleagues, one should congratulate the French-speaking negotiators, for they have managed to bend a situation that was extremely detrimental to them, in which they stood straight at the bankruptcy, in a total victory to bend. Everything they asked for, they inserted, both the financing of their education as well as the long-term maintenance of the Flemish money flow to Wallonia and the full trial. All these things are insured, while the Flammers remain hungry.

Let me start with the Finance Act.

For years it was clear that none of the French-speaking parties was willing to make any cuts in education, the most expensive and one of the worst in Europe. Consequently, they sat for once in the defensive and begged for a new cash flow, to pick up additional resources to continue feeding their luxury horse. For ten years, the Flammers have been able to prepare themselves for this situation, and yet they have been rolled in an unimaginable way. The French-speaking people, without any problem, enabled the additional financing of the French Community of many billions. In the long run, we are even talking about tens of billions extra per year, with years of preservation of the disadvantageous, manipulated pupil numbers for Flanders as the distribution key.

In exchange, Flanders receive things they had already paid for in the past. The removal of the municipal legislation was already planned in 1993 and Agriculture and Foreign Trade were already purchased last year. The only new thing in this story was some fiscal autonomy for the regions, but it was so limited and attached to Belgian conditions and loyalty obligations that there is no real autonomy. Flanders continue to eat for three-quarters of their income from the hands of Belgium and thus remain tied to hands and feet. At most, in the margin, something can be pricked, a coffee tax can be abolished, the gambling games can be taxed heavier or less heavier, and the simple Steve Stevaert — in 2007 or so — can play sinterklaas with the watch and listen money.

Those who dare to call such a thing tax autonomy are deceiving the Flamings. This result is, in any case, light years away from the almost unanimously adopted resolutions of the Flemish Parliament, in which the transfer of the entire personal tax and parts of the corporate tax was anticipated.

Furthermore, this agreement cannot be marked as a link in a step-by-step method. In the next negotiation, parts of social security will not be automatically discussed. The essence of Lambermont is that there is no next time. The French speakers have everything they need and are now in a position where they can and will block any conversation. From now on, they no longer have any interest in new negotiations, but in a status quo, in keeping united everything that today remains Belgian and in leaving unchanged the gigantic Flemish billions flow to the south.

Thus, in the next ten to fifteen years, there will no longer be a Flemish health and family policy, an integrated Flemish science and technology policy, a coherent mobility policy or an orderly social and efficient economic policy. However, these are all priorities that, according to the Flemish government, in this state reform, in the first half of this legislature, had to come to a solution. This is read in the Flemish Government Agreement under the Chapter Institutional Renewal. “In the first half of this legislature, within the framework of the new dialogue between the Community and the Community, a definitive solution to all these difficulties must be found.” Nothing can come home now. The Flemish state formation is blocked for an unlimited time. The leverage to truly bring some change in Flanders and to come to a streamlined policy remains all Belgian. As a result, the immeasurable flow of billions towards Wallonia remains steady and remains as opaque as it is today. Also for that reason, Lambermont is nothing but a fraud and a denial of expensive election promises.

Flanders had time and could wait, but with the Lambermont agreement it has completely wasted its strategic negotiating position in a staggering way. In the FET of the past weekend, Professor Dewachter says, I quote, “The Flamings have accepted the pressure of the French-speaking negotiators. The French-speaking people demanded money and also immediately told them what things were undisputed for them in the negotiations: social security, health care and child allowance and financial solidarity. The French Community was the requesting party but set the conditions. And the flames accepted it. Good negotiators are those, those French speakers.”

An additional element that works the blocking hand in hand is the very conscious consideration of the negotiators to put this Lambermont agreement and the cooperation agreements together so complicated, complex, opaque and hopelessly technically that hardly anyone, except a few maniacs and masochists, is still willing to study these texts. With this clutter, with these uninspired mechanisms, any further interest in the public in state reform is stifled.

In all this story, the responsibility of the People’s Union is crushing. We warned about this at the entrance of the government of Verhofstadt. From the beginning it was clear that this government is dominated by Michel and Di Rupo and is only in name led by Verhofstadt and, consequently, primarily serves French-speaking interests. This has become so clearly visible in the past two years that it surprised many that a party such as the Volksunion through the participation of the Flemish government kept the purple green card house of Verhofstadt standing. With the internal war in that party, the past months have made it clear to those who have not yet understood why. The People’s Union is more than ever in the hands of some fateful figures for whom the Flemish interest has long been out of the forefront and who, in addition to their personal ambition, put a very different political agenda at the center. Vankrunkelsven and Anciaux, the real head of the People’s Union, know too well that the Flemish state formation will now be silenced for a very long time. However, this has long been no longer their concern. Only 3% of the population is awake from Flemish autonomy.

Bert Anciaux evolved from a presidential candidate with a fairly Flemish image to a tragic and sadly labial minister who in recent years even began to emphasize the importance of solidarity with Wallonia in social security. A week before the municipal council elections he was given a stage at the celebration of 50 years Brussels Post where he summed up a washlist of good intentions for the Brussels Flamings. Hardly 14 days later, he had the chance to make this hard at the first Lambermont negotiations. It was a dramatic and total departure. He managed in one blow to link the fate of the Brussels Flamings to that of the French speakers in Halle-Vilvoorde, to deliver the Brussels Flamings without any guarantee to the French-speaking rulers in the Brussels municipalities and to make his own backbone know that with the preservation of the existing guarantees in Brussels a status quo was achieved. This was truly fraud. The so-called guarantees are nothing more than an empty box. For three months, Anciaux has fought and countered every one in his party that Lambermont wanted to renegotiate precisely for the sake of the Brussels section. Today he calls on the dissidents in his party to undermine the credibility of the People’s Union as a negotiator. The man apparently does not stand still with his own credibility with respect to the voters, which is ⁇ with the Brussels voters completely wiped out of the card. Breaking words against the voter is apparently the most deadly thing for that man. The evil faith of Bert Anciaux is in any case more than clear and more than proven. But there are other people in the People’s Union who can be suspected of some serious, and of whom I absolutely do not understand that they continue to support Lambermont. Annemie Van de Casteele, for example, who, like me, lives in HalleVilvoorde and better than anyone realizes that the maintenance of the electoral district and judicial district Brussels-HalleVilvoorde today inevitably means that our region will remain attached to Brussels for a very long time, resulting in further frenchization and imperialist francophone behavior. This was also a priority for the Flemish Government, which had to be resolved during the first half of this legislature. How can you, Mrs. Van de Casteele, in your pamphlets at the next elections still credibly claim that Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde must be split, now that you have finally wiped out all the opportunities to force this?

The third major French-speaking victory, in addition to the billions insured for the French-speaking education and the blocking of the Flemish state formation, is of course the definitive strengthening of the three-party of Belgium and the detailed elaboration thereof in the Saint-Hugo Agreement of 29 April 2001. Hugo Coveliers had in the committee the impression that I targeted him with that Saint-Hugo Agreement, but it was, of course, first and foremost about someone who is much more vanity than Hugo Coveliers, the inevitable Hugo Schiltz, who could soon celebrate the silver anniversary of his departure from Egmont and was so frustrated by his damaging defeat at that time, that he apparently swore to endeavor until the end of his days - and you can talk about it, Mr. Borginon - to make Brussels still promote to a full-fledged third region.

The strengthening of Brussels is, of course, first and foremost connected with the revision of the Finance Act, in which the final choice is made for the regional taxation and in which the only incentive for a taxation of the communities, the viewing and listening money, is permanently eliminated. This is also directly contrary to the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament, which emphasized the duality of this country, as well as a separate statute for Brussels. With Lambermont, the other path is resolutely chosen, in which the Brussels region is equalized in all possible areas with the two other regions and in which no competition between the Flemish and French Communities is tolerated on the territory of Brussels. Brussels was already a supergouvernement, as it also exercised provincial and agglomeration powers in addition to the regional powers. With the regional taxation and the overall guardianship over the municipalities, Brussels is more than ever equated with Flanders and Wallonia, with all the consequences thereof for the position of the Flanders in Belgium.

From the very beginning, colleagues, from the time the government of Verhofstadt took office, it was clear that it would go in this direction because everything that concerned Brussels was lightened from the Costa talks and was assigned to the Brussels Costa or mini-Costa. At the federal level, an agreement would be reached only after an agreement had already been drawn up in that mini-Costa. In itself, this was already a shameful concession to the French speakers, because it immediately meant that Brussels was removed from the Flemish control of this Parliament, that the fate of the Brussels Flamings would depend on the goodwill of the French-speaking parties in Brussels. The strong Flemish negotiating position at the federal level was rewarded for a Brussels negotiation framework very detrimental to the Flemish, where the French speakers have a crushing majority. And this is counted in the delicate case Brussels, where it is already so bad with the rights of the Dutch speakers.

From the germ, from the very beginning, it was wrong, and it was predictable that it would result in a very negative outcome. And in that mini-Costa, long before the Saint-Hugon Negotiations, a perfidious slide occurred in the debate of guaranteed representation.

The Flamingen were primarily the party asking for guarantees at the municipal level, ⁇ in the context of the overthrow of the supervision of the municipalities. The Brussels CVP was so brilliant and so strategic to conduct precisely the debate on the Brussels agenda, in the hope that Verhofstadt would arrange it. This was of course not the case. On our repeated interpellations — we are the only ones who questioned the government over the past two years, the government made it clear again and again that a guaranteed representation in the Brussels municipalities was not in question, unless there was an agreement in Brussels itself. The debate in the mini-Costa was therefore not about the guaranteed representation in the municipalities, but about those at the regional level, where it was much less necessary given the existing Flemish power in the Brussels government and the double majority in the western square.

Nevertheless, this had to be mordically encrypted, because not only some Flemish parties insisted on some additional posts, but ⁇ the French-speaking parties were interested in a debate about a guaranteed number of Flemish people at the regional level and for the following three reasons. First, in return, they could weaken the position of the Flemish Bloc, the only party in Brussels that does not want to compromise on compliance with the language legislation. Second, in exchange, they were able to abolish the double majority and realize a claim cherished for 12 years. Thirdly, they were able to maintain Brussels as a third region, which they want at all costs, because that institution serves them ⁇ well. For all these reasons, the French speakers wanted to avoid their region becoming unmanageable due to the demographic decline of the Brussels Flamings.

Thus it happened: after a swing of billions and intense action from Verhofstadt, the Saint-Hugo Agreement was born, with assured representation of the Flamingos in the region, an agreement that perfectly meets the French-speaking desiderata. The Brussels Agreement thus becomes the most nefaste and shameful part of the Lambermont dossier.

First, the Flemish Bloc is being fought in a way that undermines the very essence of democracy. What is one of the core elements of democracy? That is the equivalence of each party or candidate with respect to the voter. That principle is broken from now on. The parties can now, at their own discretion, agree on listing connections with whom they want and against the Flemish Bloc by analogy of the existing association between the arrondissements. The Flemish Bloc must thus attract the voter in a subordinate position as a paria with fewer rights than the other parties. A vote for the Flemish Bloc then automatically weighs less in Brussels than a vote for another Flemish party.

Second, for the election of the Flemish ministers in the Brussels Region are not only the directly elected Flemish candidates, but also the five unelected, the five built candidates. In fact, it is the first five unelected candidates who nevertheless get a parliamentary seat, with the sole intention of avoiding the formation of a politically incorrect majority. I have demonstrated in the committee by means of a forecast that this reform is primarily intended to keep the Flemish Bloc in Brussels from power, but that the system can easily have as a side effect that in addition to the Flemish Bloc a party such as the CVP can be pushed into the opposition and that the brown coalition of purple-green-yellow that currently in Flanders shares the sheets, with a minority of voters in Brussels, still comes to power, in particular by consciously harming the two largest Flemish parties in Brussels very heavily.

The system also ensures that the French speakers and no one else can play the arbitrator in the appointment of the Flemish ministers. This is left to their arbitrariness. They and only they decide which parliamentary assembly may appoint the Flemish ministers.

I had already pointed out the fundamental antidemocratic nature of this construction in referring this bill to the State Council. That respectable institution, which cannot be suspected of any sympathy for the Flemish Bloc, because it was designated by all parties except our own, has given our group absolutely right. In the most clear and at the same time most destructive terms, the State Council has weighed the floor with your anti-Flame Block construction. The State Council has said that the bill is not only contrary to the Constitution, but above all to the principles of democracy itself. It is not possible that ministers are not elected by the body for which they are responsible. It is also not possible that the composition of a parliamentary body depends on a foreign body, namely, on another parliamentary body, which is competent for another territory.

In its opinion, the State Council pushes into the core of the matter. Man and horse are called. “This system seems to have an implicit but certain intention to correct the outcome of the regional elections, as far as the Dutch language group is concerned.” Collega Borginon, every decent politician who gets this criticism on his board, should spontaneously throw his texts into the trash. The State Council accuses him of trying to falsify an election outcome, and of trying to falsify democracy. After all, what is the difference between "correcting" an election result and falsifying it? I therefore find it ⁇ cynical that the Lambermont parties dare to initiate this kind of institutional madness with the words: "To strengthen democracy in the Brussels Capital Region." The so-called democratic parties do not strengthen democracy here, they rape it openly and publicly.

Thirdly – it has not yet been done – the Lambermont parties are making another barrel on top of it. The only guarantee that the Flemish have in the Brussels Parliament, at least for community affairs, namely the required double majority, their only means of blocking, is removed by this agreement. From now on, Brussels can be ruled in all areas with the support of just one-third of the Flemish elected. Even in the current composition of the Brussels Parliament, this could lead to Brussels being further ruled by the purple-green-yellow coalition, with barely 4 out of 11, and later 6 out of 17 seats. Such a system reminds me of a club of Soviets of the old stamp that regulate among themselves how, if necessary with external help, they can always remain in power, whatever happens, and whatever the voter may decide.

All this comes down to a total capitulation for the years-old demands of the FDF, and a very great loss of power for the Brussels Flamings. In 1988, in this Parliament, the tripartite formation was "sold" to the population by Vic Anciaux with the adagium that Brussels could no longer be governed against the will of the Flamings. However, the only means of power the Brussels Flamings have since, the required double majority, is now completely overthrown. Where so far the Flamings in Brussels were still somewhat regarded as an equal partner, who stood at the same level as the French speakers, we are now reduced to a dogged minority. This is the essence of the Brussels Agreement on State Reform.

There are now six mandates for the Brussels Flamings in the Brussels Gewestraad. That should be the great Flemish victory. The number of flames is now finally guaranteed, they say. In fact, six of them are sent to the Flemish Parliament. Five elected candidates will now have a seat in parliament. They are throwing mandates. However, this does not affect the French speakers, because they also get a bunch of mandates. The Flammers get mainly powerless mandates. They can now actually play parliament together, to the great joy of Annemie Neyts, who did it wildly enthusiastically last Sunday in the television program The Seventh Day. It is nothing more than a false parliament. The Flemish power in Brussels is now broken. It is a purely illusory power. Therefore, it is a fraud, colleague Borginon.

In those circumstances, the Flemish Bloc cannot otherwise than by all possible legal means contest this Brussels Agreement. Should this indeed become law for the Flemish ⁇ nefaste Brussels Agreement, we promise that we will immediately go to the Arbitration Court to request its destruction. In any case, the State Council has played us very strong assets in hand.

The final part of the Brussels Agreement is truly the summum of lies and deceit. I am talking about the so-called guaranteed representation at municipal level. It was originally all to do. The necessity of this came to light, under the impetus of the Flemish Bloc and the Flemish Movement, during the debate on the European voting right, when more than ever became clear that the Flemish in Brussels threatened to be wiped out of the political map by the internationalization and the demographic situation.

For this reason, Brussels should never have been considered a full-fledged third region with full autonomy over its subordinate governments, equivalent to Flanders and Wallonia. The real power in Brussels lies, after all, still with the municipalities, the Fransdolle baronies. This is shown in abundance by the shameful appointment policy in the municipalities and in the OCMW governments, where today still, manifestly against the language law, hundreds of appointments are made of single-speaking French speakers, without the guardianship — which is the deputy governor and the Region — want or can do anything. Their

This anti-Flemish appointment policy should have been a lesson, colleagues of the People’s Union. It would have been a very legitimate reason to take the regional custody, which Brussels already owns, from Brussels and to move back to the federal level, where the Flemish have a majority and can provide the necessary legal protection. Today, however, they do exactly the opposite and they make everything much worse. The last control right of this Parliament disappears.

This Parliament, the Flemish majority in this country, now has nothing more to say about the policies and structures of its own capital, because what is being done today with the Lambermont Agreement is undoubtedly the surrender of the Brussels Flamings to the goodwill of the Fransdolle municipal governments and to the crushing French-speaking majority in the Brussels Region. It is the ultimate dolksteek in the back of the Brussels Flamings.

Who would think that ⁇ in such a situation, at the time of this irreversible extradition, would be fought for guarantees in those communities, is today an illusion richer. The Flemish Government Agreement speaks of guaranteed representation. Effective and balanced participation of both language groups at all policy levels. Unfortunately, despite all the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament and of the Brussels Flamings, despite the Flemish government agreement, nothing comes into the house from all this. There is no guaranteed representation at the municipal level in Brussels. In those municipalities where there is no Flemish elected, no one is also referred to in general, despite the little democratic municipal electoral system that harms the small and therefore Flemish parties. There will also be no guaranteed representation in the OCMW boards and boards. There will also be no Flemish representation in the ship colleges. Only increases the likelihood that in some municipalities one – and no more – Flemish ships will be added. They must either have been on a bilingual list or have been found good enough to support the majority parties. Therefore, it must be a person who is very favorable to the French-speaking majority in his municipality. All the gates of abuse are open here. Without any problem, those ships can be a fake Flaming, a Flamand de service, a so-called FDF-Flaming, who has no bond with a Flemish party, but who frequently proclaims himself to be Flaming.

There is no guarantee, Mr. Borginon, that there will be a Flemish ship. Furthermore, if there is one, there is not even the certainty that it is a real Flaming, who will exercise real powers and who will be allowed to engage in more than ceremonial courses and church courts.

For this formidable outcome, this historic breakthrough that you have been able to ⁇ in Brussels, is paid with heavy currency. The Brussels municipalities receive as much as one billion francs per year from the mainly Flemish taxpayer, without even one additional condition, which will automatically lead to an additional reinforcement of the French-speaking rulers. This has made it clear that Lambermont does not imply a full recognition of the Flamings as an equivalent community in Brussels. On the contrary, the Flammers are in a disheartening manner reduced to ordinary merchandise. It is entirely a lie that this would be a first step towards better long-term recognition. What is happening now is definitive; more definitive cannot be. It does not seem to realize this. Once the powers have been transferred to the Brussels region, any hope of improving the Flemish position in the Brussels municipalities has been definitively lost. The paradox of the entire Brussels Agreement is therefore that the Flemish receive guaranteed mandates and additional mandates in those places where this does not provide additional power and where the Flemish power is, on the contrary, broken. In those places where the real power lies in Brussels, namely the municipalities, the ship colleges and the OCMW governments, the Flamings get almost nothing. It is clear who sits here at the negotiating table: Vanhengel, Gatz, Delathouwer and Bijttebier have taken care of themselves alone and no one else, they have pulled a lifetime mandate out of fire for themselves and their friends and have generously abandoned the small Flamings on the ground, in the municipalities where it is so much more difficult to work.

I would like to conclude with three concerns about all this nefarious trouble. Mr. Verherstraeten, you enjoy the sad honour to be present here as the only member of the CVP. I would have wanted to address Mr Van Rompuy because he was in the past involved in the previous stages of state reform. I have saved the CVP so far, but I hope that party realizes that it carries a very large historical responsibility in this file. She lies at the foundation of this country’s triple freedom and must now, to her damage and shame, establish that the cordon in Brussels can also be closed around her. If Lambermont is approved, only your party will be able to reverse the tide. With Chabert, you have the treasure in your hands to bring down the entire card house of Louis Michel and Verhofstadt. You will either have to get him out of the vitrine and make it clear that it is done with the life of the ruined Lamme Goedzak and eternal pants. Not only being, but also your credibility as a CVP — in so far as there would be — is at stake.

Mr. Borginon, your party will go into history as the party that called itself already a guardian of democratic nationalism, but which shattered the democracy in this country aside and handed out the Brussels Flamings forever to the French speakers and blocked the way to Flemish deprivation. I have read in several places that you are playing with the thought of providing the Flemish lion in your party flag with a red tongue and red claws. For my part, you can paint them green, pink or purple, but one thing must be clear: do not think that your party or what remains of it after the approval of these disastrous texts will ever be able to count on the clemency of the Flemish national voter.

The Lambermont Agreement is another proof that the choice for federalism in this country has been a trap, a fake in which Flanders remains tied to Belgium and in which the Flemish majority is reduced to a minority. Dewael’s recent demarche at Guy Verhofstadt, his plea to give the regions a little more participation in Europe, illustrates very convincingly that Flanders in Europe has the status of a beggar. At the same time, it was never so clear that Belgium is a ⁇ artificial state that can only survive through undemocratic, opaque compromises and unreadable, fraudulent agreements.

More than ever, this nefaste agreement persuades us to put an end as soon as possible to this sad display, to this land of lies, to this kingdom of the kitsch, to this state of pure appearance, to this Belgian deception, to this Belgian peasant deception.

More than ever, we will strive for an independent Flemish state, with Brussels as its capital, of course, not to do small-scale construction or to draw a wall around Flanders, but to finally give Flanders a real voice in Europe and to give the Flemish people what they have so long been entitled to: their own fatherland.